Diasporic interventions: State-building in Iraq following the 2003 Iraq war

by

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses how the UK and the Swedish Iraqi diaspora mobilised towards state-building in Iraq following the 2003 US led intervention. It explores why some diaspora mobilised towards state-building processes through institution-building and governance while others through civil society.

While the literature has explored diasporic development and peace-building, it has not systematically addressed diaspora mobilisation for state-building. Neither has it paid sufficient attention to the factors that shape diasporic political choices in intervention and conflict settings.

My thesis contributes to this body of literature and argues that an overlooked dimension of state-building, is that of civil society. State-building involves top-down approaches of institution-building but also bottom-up approaches of participatory politics that encourage democratic practices. I thus develop a new two-category operationalization of state-building to capture the interventions and transnational fields of different diaspora groups and individuals.

My findings show that during different time periods, three factors have shaped the mobilisation of the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora towards state-building; diaspora profiles, hostland foreign policies towards the homeland and links to homeland political parties in Iraq. Theoretically these findings demonstrate that diaspora's socio-economic profiles and networks are key to understanding the type of politics that diaspora can engage in. Meanwhile, hostland foreign policies can shape diasporic interventions by creating different relationships with homelands and thus different opportunities for engagement. Furthermore, in divided societies, diaspora connected to homeland political parties, or represented by them, are more likely to be involved in the apparatus of the state, where as those excluded are more likely to engage outside the structures of power through civil society. Finally, my study demonstrates that temporal
dimensions are crucial for understanding, which factors mattered, when and why.

Empirically, this thesis also contributes original knowledge about the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora. It sheds new light into the myriad ways that diaspora in these two countries have been attempting to rebuild the country after the 2003 intervention by illustrating their efforts and experiences, and how it has informed their current relationship to Iraq.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADM – Assyrian Democratic Movement
CARDRI - Committee Against repression and for Democratic rights in Iraq
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
CIS – Swedish Centre Party International Foundation
CMC – Iraqi Communications and Media Commission
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
DFID – Department for International Development
DOD – Department of Defence
EU – European Union
FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FIA – Federation of Iraqi Associations
HDF – Humanitarian Dialogue Foundation
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Authority
ICP – Iraqi Communist Party
IDM – Iraqi Democratic Movement
IGC – Iraqi Governing Council
ILA – Iraq Liberation Act
INA – Iraqi National Accord
INC – Iraqi National Congress
IRDC - Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council
ISCI – Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IWL – Iraqi Women’s League
KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party
KRG – Kurdish Regional Government
LC – Leadership Council
MFA – Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NDA – National Democratic Alliance
NED - The National Endowment for Democracy
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation
OFCOM – The Office of Communications
OPIC – Olaf Palme International Center
ORHA - Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
SCIRI – Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SFI - Swedish for Immigrants
SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency
UN – United Nations
UNAMI – United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMOVIC - United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
USIP - The United States Institute for Peace
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Since the 2003 intervention of Iraq scholarly literature has focussed its attention on assessing the US led intervention and occupation with countless books dedicated to the task of unpicking ‘what went wrong?’ (See for instance Lake, 2010; Chesterman, 2004; Chandler and Sisk, 2013; Diamond, 2006; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Ismael and Ismael, 2015; Allawi, 2007; Packer, 2003; Dodge, 2006, 2003; War and Occupation in Iraq, 2007; Luckham, 2004). Meanwhile in the media, Iraqis have been depicted as either victims or perpetrators of sectarianism, terrorism or corruption. Images of dusty black clad women wailing at the scene of a bomb explosion have dominated our screens, as have Iraqi men in suits, in marble surroundings shaking hands with international leaders, smiling for the camera next to an Iraqi flag. These polarised images have not only dehumanised Iraqis under a cloak of victimhood or corruption but have denied Iraqis everywhere the telling of their own stories and efforts to rebuild their country following intervention.

For the first time in decades, the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and his Baathist regime, signified a possible return for millions of Iraqis around the world who migrated or were forced to migrate due to political conditions or persecution. From the 1950s to our present day, millions of Iraqis of all backgrounds including Monarchists, Jews, Assyrians linked to the British Royal Air Force, Communists, Kurds, Islamists, those accused of having Persian descent, and various ethnic minorities have found new homes in neighbouring countries and Western hostlands (Sassoon, 2009). From this landscape of Iraq’s social history a diaspora emerged, creating social and cultural associations, charitable organisations, and political party branches with transnational links to their former country of origin. Far from being victims of circumstance, Iraqis in the diaspora have been contributing in myriad ways to rebuilding their country of origin in spite of intervention, occupation and continued violence.
So far this picture has remained hidden behind the headlines obscuring the reality on the ground of how transnational links and networks between the diaspora, the hostland and the homeland have contributed to building state and society in the modern state of Iraq. Whereas the contributions of elites to positions of power in the homeland have featured in critical analyses of the post-intervention period (Allawi, 2007; Bremer and McConnell, 2006; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Barakat, 2008), very little is known about the contributions of Iraqis in the diaspora who have also attempted to rebuild the country, albeit in different ways.

While the diaspora literature has looked at the ways that diaspora have mobilised towards their countries of origin and provides us with rich empirical case studies of national struggles (Shain, 2002a; Sheffer, 2003, 1986, Shain, 2007, 2002a, 1994, Tölölyan, 2000, 1991; Safran, 1991; Bruinessen, 1998; Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005; Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014; Baser, 2012; Koinova, 2011) and in times of conflict (Abdile, 2014; Turner, 2008a; Fair, 2007; Dahre, 2007; Khoser, 2007; Smith and Stares, 2007), very little empirical work deals exclusively with diasporic state-building following foreign intervention and in times of occupation. Though there are references to the intervention in Afghanistan and the diaspora’s involvement in rebuilding the country following intervention (Brinkerhoff, 2008; Turner, 2008a; Kouser, 2014; Siegel and Kuschminder, 2012; Oeppen and Schlenkhoff, 2010), a comprehensive investigation into the role of diaspora mobilisation for state-building following foreign intervention and their approach to that political process has not been studied. Furthermore, there is very little academic empirical work on the Iraqi diaspora and their political transnationalism following the 2003 war, with a few exceptions related to Iraqi Kurds (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014; Natali, 2007) and Iraqi women in the diaspora (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2009, 2010; N. Al-Ali, 2007).

Just as the diaspora literature has not addressed the state-building literature directly, the state-building literature has been fixated with the foreign
interventions of powerful states and intergovernmental organisations, usually in developing countries; it pays scant attention to diasporic interventions and their contributions to state-building processes.

This thesis views diasporic state-building as comprised of two important and necessary categories. The first relates to building the institutional capacity of the state, its institutions, and instruments of governance, which allow the state to perform state functions such as laying down the rule of law, providing public services, enacting policies, providing security and generally providing for the infrastructure and development of the state. This approach may be classified as a top-down approach where the state apparatus sets out laws, policies, rules and privileges to its citizens. The second category is in fact a reverse, where the citizenry, through civil society groups, grass-roots associations, and movements, support or challenge the state. In doing so, civil society becomes another important arena for state-building as the interaction with the state informs state policies, holds the state to account, challenges its policies and thus evolves its practices, meanings and values (Migdal, 2001). As such this is classified as a bottom-up approach where civil society actors (peaceful or non-peaceful) inform or influence state practices. Both top-down and bottom-up approaches have been witnessed in Iraqi diasporic mobilisation for state-building following the 2003 intervention, where diaspora from both the UK and Sweden have responded in varying ways in their attempt to help rebuild the country.

This new two-category understanding of state-building is particularly important for recognising that in states transitioning to democracy, or have undergone regime change, there is an exchange between state and society for the kind of state that is being built. While traditionally states have been viewed through Max Weber’s static “monopoly of the legitimate use of force”, states are in actual fact built through a negotiation between state institutions and rules and the civil society actors that these rules and institutions inspire.
While this understanding of state-building underlines the dual process of building states, it is important to underline that diasporic interventions into state-building do not always reveal a unified approach or goal for the country. In the context of Iraq, where there has been conflict, ethno-sectarian divisions and consequently fragmentation (Herring and Rangwala, 2006), state-building has not meant a unified project towards re-building the country but rather has reflected the deep divisions, imaginations and idealised conceptions of what the Iraqi state should look like. Where the Shia political parties have wanted dominance for the long oppressed Shia population, the Kurds have wanted independence from Baghdad or complete secession. Meanwhile, others have wanted representation and rights for their ethnic minorities, while others have fought for a democratic conception of the state founded on secular and humanitarian values.

As such, diasporic state-building, whilst undeniably occurring among disparate groups, who have been supporting communities translocally by providing services otherwise the domain of the state, or transnationally by championing and defending minority rights when the government has been seen to contravene human rights, has simultaneously reflected the polarised and broken vision of the Iraqi nation. This has meant that the diaspora have largely mobilised through their ethnic, political or sectarian groups, which has further entrenched divisions both at home and abroad. Diasporic state-building in Iraq has thus not contributed to a united project for the country, but rather has led to a fragmented state-building that serves sectarian, ethnic, political and ideological interests, reflecting the splintered Iraqi state.

The Puzzle
With the rise of civil wars and unrest across the globe (Kaldor, 1999) scholars have become interested in analysing the role of diaspora as non-state political actors in conflict states (Shain, 2002b; Adamson, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Adamson, 2005; Lyons, 2006; Smith and Stares, 2007; Esman, 2009; Lyons and Mandaville, 2012; Baser, 2009). Some scholars have underlined the ways
they prolong and exacerbate conflicts, while others have promoted their peace-making and development potential in post-conflict contexts (Mohamoud, 2006; Galipo, 2011; Pirkkalainen, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Lyons, 2007; Feyissa, 2014; Van Houte et al., 2013; Koser, 2007; Kleist, 2008; Cochrane, 2007; Baser, 2009; Smith and Stares, 2007; Lubkemann, 2008; Fair, 2007; Baser, 2009; Cochrane, 2007; Wayland, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Diasporas are also contributing to state-building processes in conflict and post-conflict states. Case studies largely from the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa have highlighted the ways diaspora mobilise to support, challenge or re-shape the state through institution-building and governance or through civil society. For instance, we know that diaspora have mobilised towards institution-building through diaspora returnees taking up political or ministerial positions and helping to build state capacities, or informing state policies (Antwi-Boateng, 2012, 2011; Mohamoud, 2006; Galipo, 2011; Pirkkalainen, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Lyons, 2007; Feyissa, 2014; Van Houte et al., 2013; Koser, 2007; Kleist, 2008; Lampert, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2016; Turner, 2008b; Natali, 2007). Similarly, we know that diaspora have also mobilised through civil society to support the state by promoting democratic governance and liberal norms, providing services that states normally provide their citizens, contesting the state or informing the state (Mohamoud, 2006; Galipo, 2011; Pirkkalainen, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Feyissa, 2014; Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014; Van Houte et al., 2013; Koser, 2007; Kleist, 2008; Koinova, 2010; Turner, 2008b; Dahre, 2007).

Yet why do some diaspora mobilise towards state-building processes through institution-building and governance while others through civil society? What factors influence the choices of diaspora mobilisation when contributing to state-building processes?

Research with the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden has revealed that while the UK diaspora had more opportunities to mobilise towards institution-
building directly as returnee politicians, ministers, policy advisors and capacity-builders (Allawi, 2007; Bremer and McConnell, 2006; Bonin, 2011; Roston, 2008), individuals and groups from within the Swedish Iraqi diaspora were mobilised in a very different way. Instead of mobilising towards institution-building and governance they worked through civil society organisations to support Iraq’s state-building process. What accounts for this variation in mobilisation? Why did one diaspora contribute towards building the state through state institutions whereas the other through civil society? The primary research questions this study seeks to answers are:

1. How have Iraqi diaspora in Sweden and the UK mobilised towards state-building following the 2003 intervention?

And

2. Why was the UK diaspora able to contribute more to institution-building and governance while the Swedish Iraqi diaspora contributed more to supporting Iraq’s new state through civil society?

This thesis thus brings the story of the Iraqi diaspora into focus. It looks comparatively at the mobilisation efforts of the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden. It asks how individuals and groups within the two hostlands have been contributing towards this political process. It also questions why there were differences in the way individuals and groups within the two diasporic communities reacted to and engaged towards Iraq’s state-building project in the lead up to and following intervention in 2003.

**Argument**

The act of state-building is not only limited to states, but is a process that involves multiple actors including, as will be demonstrated by this thesis, diasporic actors. The case studies of the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora show that following intervention in 2003, there have been many attempts to shape the state by various diasporic individuals and groups in myriad ways. There have been two approaches to state-building, which I argue incorporate aspects
of institution-building and governance on the one hand and supporting/challenging the state through civil society on the other. The former relates to building state institutions, governance, and involvement in the political apparatus of the state. As much of the state-building literature has emphasised, this requires building the institutional capacity of the state so that the rule of law can be enacted, authority can be imposed and governance can take place (Fukuyama, 2004, 2005; Chesterman et al., 2005; Sisk, 2013). The latter refers to a much-neglected aspect of this process in the state-building literature, which is the role of civil society in state-building. While gaining legitimacy is emphasised through local ownership and security provision (Diamond, 2005; Chesterman, 2004; Lake, 2010), little attention has been paid to the bottom-up approaches related to the political participation of citizens in contributing to state policy through democratic governance (Andersen, 2012; Paris and Sisk, 2009). I therefore propose a second category of state-building, which addresses supporting/challenging the state through civil society. Civil society as argued is necessary for holding governments accountable, giving a political voice to citizens and providing quasi-state services, which are often lacking in weak or post conflict states.

By comparing the two case studies and their mobilisation, I show how and why different variables affected differences in the way that the UK and Swedish diaspora groups and individuals were able to engage in Iraq’s state-building political process both before intervention, during intervention and occupation and following Iraq’s first democratic elections. I argue what has shaped the capabilities of the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden to mobilise for state-building during different time periods has been three major factors relating to diaspora profiles, hostland foreign policies towards the homeland and links to homeland political parties in Iraq.

Leading up to the Iraq war I argue that the Iraqi diaspora in the UK were more able to contribute towards Iraq’s state-building plans due to their specific profile. The UK Iraqi diaspora was older, from prominent wealthy families in
Iraq, educated and skilled and their political connections both in the homeland and hostland were connected to allies in power both in the homeland and hostland. They therefore had the material resources to create an opposition in the UK, lobby foreign governments and eventually form part of Iraq’s state-building process by presenting themselves as potential political leaders for the country to US and UK governments.

Meanwhile in Sweden, the profile of the diaspora differs markedly. The majority of Iraqis in Sweden were refugees, impoverished individuals with low education and skills. They were also a new diaspora having arrived en masse only in the 1990s and following the 2003 Iraq war. In this respect they did not have the material resources or networks, or understanding of their hostland to launch an effective opposition and to be involved in pre-war planning.

Later when intervention took place in 2003, the UK’s foreign policy to militarily intervene in Iraq with the US created opportunities for the diaspora to be involved as they already had links to British and US officials during the opposition years and in preparation for the war. Military intervention thus created an opening for specific Iraqi diaspora individuals to be involved in Iraq’s state-building future. This was especially the case as intervention turned to occupation and the Anglo-American coalition needed Iraqi leaders to govern, lead ministries and generally re-build the country.

In contrast, during this time in Sweden, formal opposition to the Iraq war did not give individuals in the Iraqi diaspora an opportunity to be involved in Iraq’s first state-building phase during occupation. Since their government was not part of the occupying coalition and largely did not want to be associated with it, the diaspora had no access to positions of power inside the country during this time. As a consequence of this reality, the diaspora involved itself in mobilising towards state-building through bottom-up approaches, mainly through grass-roots organisation, through their own efforts and with the
Swedish Foreign Ministry, whose foreign policy towards Iraq was oriented towards development and helping to re-build the country.

Following Iraq's first elections in 2005, however and once an ethno-sectarian system was effectively institutionalised in Iraq, Iraq's internal state-building phase was affected by a different dynamic. The profiles of individuals mattered little unless they were connected and supported the state-building plans of ethno-sectarian ruling parties in Iraq. Those in the diaspora connected to the largely Shi’a Islamic or Kurdish ruling parties were able to join in state-building processes related to both institution-building and governance, and through civil society directly and from afar. Meanwhile those not linked to Iraq’s ruling elites were excluded from positions of power and from participating in institution-building and governance but directed towards challenging the state through civil society, acting as a transnational civil society. By holding the government to account, protesting in solidarity with organisations in Iraq, defending and championing minority, women, and human rights in Iraq, they have also been attempting to shift Iraq’s state-building project towards more democratic means as will be shown.

**Setting the Scene - Background to the 2003 Intervention of Iraq**

The prelude to the military intervention against Iraq can be traced as far back as the early 1990s following the first Gulf War, when the International community decided it could no longer ignore the brutality of Saddam's Baathist regime. Records of his human rights abuses began to emerge publicly both in Whitehall and Washington and foreign policy towards the country began to shift. Yet it was the inability of the UN sanctions regime, placed on the country in 1991, to curb Saddam Hussein’s ability to build weapons of mass destruction, which eventually tipped things over the edge. For the United States the only solution to the ‘problem of Iraq’ was to overthrow the regime and re-instate a more friendly, pro-US government into the world order (Tripp, 2007).
The culmination of this was the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, whose explicit purpose was the overthrow of the Baathist regime. The act stated, “It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.” (cited in Allawi, 2007, p.62) This document effectively provided justification for regime change in Iraq and set forth a programme towards military intervention and the ousting of Saddam Hussein from power.

In 2001, under the new presidency and administration of George W Bush, many neo-conservatives in Washington saw an opportunity to push for a more aggressive foreign policy towards Iraq in reaction to failed attempts by the UN to tighten the sanctions regime and get weapons inspectors back in the country (Tripp, 2007). This line of policy was precipitated following the Al-Qaeda September 11 attacks, which shook US policy makers, dealing a hand to neo-conservatives, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith, who had been championing a strategy to intervene in Iraq since the late 1990s (Bonin, 2011). Under a climate of fear and insecurity, states perceived to be a threat to US interests were targeted as part of the ‘War on Terror’. For Iraq, this meant a refocus on its weapons of mass destruction programme. The neo-conservatives in Capitol Hill attempted to link Iraq to Al-Qaeda claiming that Iraq had sponsored Islamic terrorism (Ismael and Ismael, 2015).

The obsession with Iraq only intensified following the 9/11 attacks and as early as December 2001 plans were being drawn up in the Pentagon for regime change (Tripp, 2007; Ismael and Ismael, 2015). Plans slowly turned into reality as Saddam was proving to be deliberately uncooperative with United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). Meanwhile, the UK government grossly overstated Iraq’s WMD capabilities (The Iraq Inquiry, 2016), while Dr Hans Blix, the Head of the UN Inspection team ahead of the invasion stated that Tony Blair had ‘misrepresented’ what they found to
push the case for war (Oborne, 2015). In a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment in the UK, the draft stated:

Iraq has probably dispersed its special weapons, including its CBW [chemical and biological warfare] weapons. Intelligence also indicates that from forward-deployed storage sites, chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 45 minutes. (‘Timeline: the 45 minute claim’, 2004)

Saddam, however, did not possess weapons of mass destruction nor had plans for their re-production.

The UK and US had, however, made their minds up and were joined by other coalition partners including Australia, Italy, Spain, and Poland. By early 2003, troops were stationed in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere. It was clear that the US led coalition was no longer interested in diplomacy with Saddam Hussein despite the final reports from UNMOVIC and International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) stating that Iraqis had cooperated and that there were no signs or evidence of prohibited weapons (Tripp, 2007).

On March 19th 2003, the US-led coalition invaded Iraq after giving Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to leave on the 17th of March, which he refused. Therein commenced “Operation Iraqi Freedom” with aerial bombardments, followed by troops on the ground who fought with the Iraqi army and Saddam’s notorious Fedayeen paramilitary forces (Allawi, 2007). Within three weeks however, the US and its allies had captured Baghdad, Basra, Kirkuk and Mosul and became the occupiers of Iraq.

Since 2003 there have been a plethora of academic, media and official texts denouncing the intervention of Iraq as a failure citing a multitude of reasons including a lack of post-war planning, insufficient resources and troops on the
ground, imperial ambitions and lack of true will, a lack understanding of the society and politics of Iraq as well as a tragic post-intervention policies (Lake, 2010; Chesterman, 2004; Chandler and Sisk, 2013; Diamond, 2006; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Ismael and Ismael, 2015; Allawi, 2007; Packer, 2003; Dodge, 2006, 2003; War and Occupation in Iraq, 2007; Luckham, 2004)

There have also been critical voices from global civil society with protest marches against the war held all over the world on 15 February 2003, and whose impact has been captured by Amir Amirani’s captivating documentary film ‘We are many’. Kofi Annan, the UN General Secretary, who stated that it was “not in conformity with the UN charter, also denounced the war as illegal. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.” (‘Iraq war illegal, says Annan’, 2004). More recently the long-awaited Iraq Inquiry in the UK, led by Sir John Chilcot provided damning evidence against the Iraq war. The Inquiry’s ultimate conclusion was that “the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.” (The Iraq Inquiry, 2016).

Unpacking the failures of intervention in Iraq however is not the focus or within the scope of this research. However, what is important at this point is to understand the context from which Iraq’s state-building future commenced so that we can better place diaspora’s political engagement towards this process.

The Contribution of my Study

The goal of this study is to provide new empirical knowledge of how Iraqis in the UK and Swedish diaspora have informed part of Iraq’s state-building process and how this has been approached through different arenas of the state. Through the case studies of the UK and Swedish diasporas and their comparative analysis it also provides theoretical explanations for variation in

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1 There is a vast literature on the failures of state-building in Iraq. The references quoted here
2 ‘We are Many’ was released in 2014 http://wearemany.com
the ways that diasporas from the same country of origin have contributed towards state-building processes over time.

While the state-building literature is dominated by the actions and rationales of state interventions, this thesis shows that the actions of diaspora in state-building processes have been much neglected in academic analyses. Non-state actors, like diaspora, are also shaping state-building practices and processes in intervention and post-conflict settings.

Furthermore, a new two-category operationalization of state-building is developed in this study, which advances the state-building literature by drawing attention to a much overlooked dimension of state-building, that of civil society. This underlines how state-building is formed not solely through top-down approaches of institution-building, but also that of bottom-up approaches of participatory politics that encourage more democratic practices. This two-category operationalization of the definition is beneficial for capturing the state-building contributions and transnational links of different groups and individuals who are connected to varying social fields in sending and receiving states. Ordinary citizens through their transnational links and networks are also driving the politics of state formation.

With regards to the diaspora literature, this thesis advances our understanding of diasporic actors and how their political actions are shaped by both structural and agent based factors. Indeed, beyond understanding who mobilises, how and for what reasons, this thesis emphasises how diasporic political choices are shaped. While the diaspora studies literature has emphasised hostland factors such as citizenship and integration regimes (Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Odmalm, 2009; Wayland, 2004; Van Houte et al., 2013) or foreign policy alignments between diaspora and hostland policy makers (Rubenzer, 2008; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008) it has overlooked how the profile of diaspora is a factor in and of itself that can shape how
diaspora mobilise and the transnational links that they have with their countries of origin.

Similarly, more neglected still is the homeland-diaspora relationship where diaspora groups and individuals are positioned unevenly in homelands that are ethnically, religiously or tribally divided. While some are privileged, others may be excluded from political representation. These realities may lead to disengagement or diversion into other forms of politics that may be peaceful or extremist as in the case of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Diaspora’s transnational links to the homeland is thus explored in depth in this study, and raises important theoretical implications for the type of politics they become involved in, and why there may be differences even within the same diasporic community. Diaspora may be inhibited from mobilising in the homeland if they are a marginalised community, or if they are a political, ethnic or sexual minority that is not considered or accepted as forming part of the nation. As such, understanding diaspora politics requires us to look closer at who is mobilising but also who is not and why.

For the broader discipline of political science this thesis also provides an interesting case study of the ways that power is constituted among diaspora groups and how this has affected politics in Iraq. Simultaneously it shows how even those who are limited in their power or constrained by their positionality can still find alternative avenues that are shaping domestic and transnational politics. Political power, as this thesis demonstrates, is hierarchical, but not limited to the purview of states, and is also derived from people and their collective actions. Simultaneously it also shows how long-distance nationalists, who can simultaneously entrench ethnic and sectarian divisions or challenge them, are also shaping weak states.

**Structure of the Research**

The study is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, I define the concept of diaspora, the subject matter of this thesis. After exploring its historical use in the literature and more modern understandings of diaspora, I stress why it is important to consider the imaginations of diaspora for understanding their political actions and stances towards their homelands. I then discuss the optic of transnationalism, the process that connects diaspora in hostlands to their countries of origin, with a particular focus on political transnationalism and how it is being shaped and is shaping state policies. In the section that followed I discuss diaspora mobilisation past and present drawing attention to how this topic has thus far been approached in the diaspora politics literature. This is then followed by a definition of diaspora mobilisation for state-building where I draw on the state-building and civil society literature to emphasise the two necessary components of building states in our modern times; institution-building and governance as well as state support and contestation through civil society.

In Chapter 3, I survey the diaspora politics literature, for how it has thus far approached the study of diaspora mobilisation for state-building. I show that analyses of state-building have predominantly approached through the concepts of peace-building and development. Through this body of work I draw attention to the ways that diaspora have also contributed to state-building processes, though there is a clear lack of a comprehensive definition or study of diaspora mobilisation for state-building in the literature, a gap this study addresses. I later draw on the limited diaspora literature, but also extrapolate from the case of Iraq; to both inductively and deductively draw out explanatory factors that may elucidate this study’s research puzzle for why the two diaspora case studies might have contributed to state-building in different ways. Using the two-tier state-building category proposed I put forward my hypotheses for why there were divergences in the way the two diaspora case studies engaged in state-building in Iraq. These include, the profile of the diaspora, the foreign policy of the hostland towards the homeland and the links to ethno-sectarian homeland political parties. Finally I define my independent variables for this study.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the methodology used to carry out my investigation. I discuss the comparative method and why it is fitting for my research and the particular comparative model I use to investigate variation in outcomes between the two cases. I outline why the cases were selected for this study, the qualitative method used for gathering the data, as well as the coding and process tracing method used for analysing and uncovering the variables that mattered over time. In this chapter I also discuss ethics of carrying out this investigation. I also reflect on my positionality as a researcher of Iraqi origin conducting research with Iraqis in the diaspora and how this affected my research and findings.

In Chapters 5 and 6, I analyse the empirical findings of the UK and Swedish diaspora case studies respectively during the period 2003 to 2013. As part of telling the story of the two case studies I relate the migrations of the two communities and their reasons for leaving Iraq. Whereas the Iraqis in the UK were an older diaspora whose migrations commenced in the 1950s, the Swedish Iraqi diaspora had a much later genesis in the 1980s and 1990s. While the UK migrations included wealthy, middle class individuals from prominent families in Iraq who were able to leave voluntarily, the latter were largely refugees who escaped persecution or escaped to find a better life for their families. The in-depth case studies show that the profiles of Iraqis in both contexts affected both their relationships to their countries of origin, their connections and consequently what they were able to contribute back to their countries of origin. The transnational social fields they encompassed varied significantly, which affected the politics they could contribute to after intervention.

The case studies also reveal the importance of the foreign policy of the hostland towards the homeland during the intervention and occupation phase. In the case of intervention in Iraq it proves to be an important variable that affected the type of state-building in which they could involve themselves. Given that the UK was involved militarily and formed part of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) alongside the Americans, the UK diaspora had more opportunities both prior and during intervention to involve themselves in the future state-building process. This opened up further opportunities for the diaspora as friends, party members and transnational networks created more opportunities to recruit from the diaspora as the political process proceeded. Meanwhile in Sweden, the government opposed the war and did not want to be involved with the CPA, which meant that the diaspora was limited during this period and could only involve itself in the state-building process once formal sovereignty was handed back to the Iraqis. Later, Sweden’s foreign policy towards Iraq was oriented towards development and democracy building, which directed diaspora’s state-building towards grass-roots organisations.

In the period following Iraq’s first democratic elections, however, the type of state-building that diaspora could engage in was very much dependent on their links to ethno-sectarian parties in Iraq. In the aftermath of formal occupation once Iraqis took hold of power, and an ethno-sectarian system was put in place, only those connected to the ethno-sectarian political parties in Iraq were able to contribute to institution-building and governance, while those excluded from power or representation were driven towards challenging the state through civil society.

In Chapter 7, which is the concluding chapter, I summarise the findings of my research by exploring how the hypotheses proposed affected the state-building contributions of the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora. In discussing the findings, I outline their theoretical contributions to the development of the study of diaspora and political transnationalism, state-building, and political science more generally. Finally, further avenues of research are also proposed.
CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTS

In this chapter, I define how I use the concept of diaspora, the subject matter of this thesis, as well as draw attention to the optic of transnationalism for understanding their cross-border connections. This is then followed by a discussion of diaspora mobilisation, before a definition of the dependent variable of diaspora mobilisation for state-building is drawn from the state-building and civil society literature that operationally captures the two categories associated with building a state.

Diaspora, Diaspora wherefore art thou diaspora?
What is the difference between a diaspora and a refugee? Are diaspora created by dispersal from a territorial homeland or are they socially constructed entities? The concept of diaspora remains a heavily debated subject in the diaspora literature. Definitions of what constitutes a diaspora are so contested and conflated with other migrant groups that Rainer Bauböck has declared the concept “notoriously vague and overstretched.” (Bauböck, 2010: 313). Defining the concept of diaspora is therefore crucial for clarifying and limiting the scope of this research.

It is not hard to see why Bauböck has been frustrated by the definitional dilution that the concept of diaspora has been subjected to. Since its popular emergence over two decades ago, the concept has been defined and used in countless ways to describe virtually any “population which is considered ‘deterritorialized’ or ‘transnational’” (Vertovec 1999: 277). Nearly two decades ago scholars attempted to delineate who constitutes a diaspora by identifying and listing common attributes of classical diasporas, stressing their ethnic collectivities and myth of return to the homeland. Meanwhile, others created diaspora typologies such as victim, labour, trade, imperial and cultural diaspora, depicting the initial reason for their migrations (Cohen 1997). Others still have focused on ethno-national diasporas and how they differ to other transnational groupings (Sheffer, 2003).
While these broad typologies have been useful for our understanding of diaspora histories, they have failed to capture the complexity and reality of contemporary diaspora. Firstly, speaking of diaspora in this way essentialises migrant groups' ethnic identities depicting them as unified groups with a common and shared identity (Brubaker, 2005). Secondly, not all diaspora migrations have necessarily been rooted in dispersal. Diaspora can emerge as much from labour migrants such as the Kashmiri community in the UK or refugees from Eritrea or Bosnia (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002). Thirdly, not all diaspora are marked by a real desire to return to the homeland. For some diaspora this is neither possible nor sought (Clifford, 1994), while for others a cultural identification with the homeland is enough (Brah, 1996).

This older and now much critiqued essentialist literature on diaspora often depicted diaspora identities as fixed, homogenous and continuous rather than susceptible to change and multiplicity. Indeed, objectively and discursively we may talk of a “diaspora”, yet to what extent do fractions of any community see themselves as belonging to one, and under which conditions?

In response to this archaic essentialist view of diaspora, Rogers Brubaker’s memorable piece on the “Diaspora” challenges the diaspora literature’s emphasis on diaspora qualities, namely dispersal, homeland-orientation and boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005). Through appraisal of these three categorises Brubaker problematizes issues related to distinctions between dispersal and division, the pertinence of a teleology of return and the conflicting literature that emphasises boundary maintenance while simultaneously extolling hybridity and heterogeneity. In this way Brubaker exposes the analytical traps of classifying diaspora in fixed terms that often do not capture their reality. While the literature often talks about a diasporic community, it is argued here that there is no such thing. There are heterogeneous voices, identifications and senses of belonging that lead to what Brubaker convincingly argues we should term as diasporic “stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices, and so on.” (2005: 13).
Understood in this way constructivists have supported Brubaker’s proposal that diaspora are created when mobilisation towards a specific political stance or goal occurs, and not from a presupposed bounded group. Fiona Adamson (Adamson, 2008) and Rainer Bauböck (Bauböck, 2010) argue that far from being “natural”, diasporas are discursively constructed and mobilised for strategic outcomes. Lyons and Mandeville join Adamson’s assertion and add that diaspora are the outcome of transnational political mobilisation by the “activities of transnational political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction in order to influence politics in the homeland.” (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010:15). What these scholars have rightfully stressed is the act of imagination and mobilisation for diaspora to come into existence (Bauböck 2010: 315). As such, identity is not seen in primordialist ethnic terms but rather it functions as a master frame in the same way that social movements are created and from which mobilisation is shaped (Ibid., 2006).

By concentrating on their political mobilisation the constructivist shift has allowed us to go beyond essentialist ideas about identity, that are rooted in a territorially fixed place, to understanding how identity frames are constructed by diaspora to propel action. By creating imaginations of community, senses of belonging are strengthened to what Martin Sökefeld terms ‘an imagined transnational community’, which then spurs action (Sökefeld, 2006: 267). The important thing to stress here is that diaspora continue to see themselves as forming part of the imagined community, even though each member may have a very different imagination of what that community symbolises or means. In mobilising towards their imagined community however, they can influence or shape their homelands much like other societal domestic non-state actors. Consequently, diaspora not only view themselves as citizens who have a stake in their homeland’s politics, but tangibly exercise their citizenship, whether they are dual citizens or not, by influencing their homeland states and societies through various means.
This understanding of diaspora allows us to see the remaining gaps in the literature, such as those tackled in this thesis, including comparative analyses of diasporic stances under specific political circumstances such as foreign intervention. How do diasporas contribute to state-building processes? what are the factors and contexts that shape their mobilisation practices and choices, as well as the obstacles that diaspora face in achieving their goals?

**Conflict generated diaspora**

Another defining feature of this thesis's conception of diaspora is that related to conflict-generated diaspora, a particular sub-group of diaspora whose migration was instigated by conflict. In recent years there has been an emphasis on the underlying forces that motivate the mobilisation of conflict-generated diasporas (Lyons, 2006). Terrence Lyons has drawn attention to the ways conflict shapes the identities of conflict-generated diaspora, which in turn motivate political action (Lyons, 2007:532). Other scholars have supported this thesis and found a strong relationship between conflict-generated diasporas and political transnational activities as opposed to economic migrants (Portes, 1999; Lyons, 2007; Bloch, 2008). Though the overwhelming majority of research suggests there is a link between conflict as the instigator of migration and diasporic political action, Nadje Al Ali’s work has drawn attention to the gendered dynamics of this claim by offering a more nuanced examination of how conflict can motivate or discourage political action in diaspora (N. Al-Ali, 2007).

These findings are pertinent for my study as many Iraqis in the diaspora faced forced migration due to political reasons. These findings will be tested empirically in this study but suggest that amongst the majority of politically active Iraqi diaspora members one would expect to find many who left for political or conflict reasons. Yet what this literature does not address is a distinction between leaving on the one hand due to political conflict and leaving due to political persecution on the other. Being personally persecuted for political reasons in the homeland may generate emotional attachments of a
very different scale and nature. This difference needs to be taken into account if we are truly to understand the link between motivations for migration and political behaviour in the hostland. Furthermore, the concept of conflict-generated diaspora also needs to be problematized further when one considers that even those individuals whose initial migrations were voluntary and not forced may have later become a conflict-generated diaspora due to an inability to return due to conflict in their homelands or in depth conflict socialisation (Koinova, 2013). This study thus hopes to elaborate on the dynamics between conflict-generated diaspora amongst the Iraqi communities of the UK and Sweden and their mobilisation towards Iraq.

**Defining diaspora in this study**

This study can now define diaspora as conflict-generated individuals and groups who continue to see themselves as belonging to an ‘imagined transnational community’ and who are mobilised politically through various “stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices,” (Brubaker, 2005, p.13) to defend, change or challenge domestic politics in the ‘homeland’.

What does this understanding of diaspora offer the study of the Iraqi diaspora and its mobilisation? In understanding the constructed nature of diaspora and how this is tied to heterogeneous imaginations of community and senses of belonging to the homeland, the process of diaspora’s political construction can then be examined empirically for a better understanding of the “stances, projects, claims, idioms, practices,” of particular individuals and groups (Brubaker, 2005). It also allows us to observe how diaspora are shaping homeland states; whether they are trying to challenge the state (Koinova, 2013; Alinia et al., 2014; Natali, 2007; Wayland, 2004); put pressure on the homeland state (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Rytz, 2013; Vanderbush, 2009; Shain, 1999, 1994; Shain and Barth, 2003; Shain, 2007; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008); or perhaps support or defend minorities from discrimination in the homeland state (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007; Alinia et al., 2014; Baser, 2012; Doraî,
In other words, diaspora’s material stances and actions influence state formation and development because they are also non-state transnational actors that have the power to contest, challenge, support or inform homeland states and societies.

**Transnationalism**

This thesis uses the concept of transnationalism for understanding the cross-border political linkages that diaspora maintain with their countries of origin. Transnationalism offers an optic or a lens for viewing diaspora mobilisation (Faist, 2004) and for appreciating how nation state contexts shape mobilisation practices.

In the last few decades the concept of transnationalism entered the lexicon of various disciplines to describe broadly the activities and links of individuals and organisations across state borders (cf. Nye and Keohane 1971). As Vertovec rightly points out, the notion of transnationalism has been applied to various phenomena including, transnational communities, citizenship, social movements, families, identities and politics to name but a few (1999: 2). Vertovec identifies six clear varieties of transnationalism that have been conceptually conflated in the literature, 1) Social formations across borders, which include diasporas and networks 2) Type of consciousness marked by duality or multiple identifications 3) Mode of cultural production, through fashion, music and film for example 4) Avenue of capital, such as transnational corporations and global remittances 5) Political engagement of transnational communities, and 6) Reconstruction of place and locality (1999: 2-13).

While the study of diaspora partially draws on all of the above varieties, I am only interested in the first and fifth type that relates to diaspora political formations across borders. Transnationalism, as I use it in this study, refers to links, activities and networks by diasporic actors that cross borders.
Migrant transnationalism is not a new phenomenon. Historical connections across states by individuals and groups have long existed in opposition movements, nation building projects and remittances (Shain 1999, Portes, Guarnizo and Haller 2002). However, what marks the difference between todays’ transnationalism is the speed, extensiveness, and sustained and intense exchanges across borders (Portes 2002, Vertovec 2004, Lyons and Mandaville 2010). Globalisation therefore has facilitated migrant mobility due to advances in telecommunications and transport. Yet transnationalism should be distinguished from a flow of information and goods or globalising processes that transcend state territories (Faist 2004). Transnationalism is instead located in specific places between nation states. Fundamentally this has altered the boundaries of social, economic and political life, calling us to examine the “actual topography of social life” (Levitt and Khagram 2007: 12).

So what exactly does contemporary transnationalism allow us to observe? And in what ways has it altered our social and political formations? In the first place, transnationalism allows us to observe the nature of contemporary migration, where migrant life is not so much uprooted as transnationally constituted between homelands and hostlands (Glick-Schiller et. al, 1992). This triadic relationship between diaspora/homeland and hostland has lead to vastly different migration experiences forming transnational social fields of familial, economic, social and political relations that connect countries of settlement and origin (Basch et al., 1994).

The process of transnationalism therefore allows us to see how the geography of diaspora mobilisation is composed through a triadic connection between hostland-diaspora-homeland. In this way transnationalism has moved the study of migration beyond fixations with assimilation and immigrant incorporation in host states, or the ubiquitous “myth of return” to what Faist refers to as “circular exchange and transnational mobility” (2010:33).

A transnational perspective allows us to look at the changing nature of political life in the international system, as life worlds are no longer limited by time or
space (Faist, 2004). Social worlds can now be found online or over the phone (Brinkerhoff, 2006, 2009; Graziano, 2012; Everett, 2009). Money can be transferred through online money transfer accounts and politics can be exercised from abroad. Consequently, this has contributed to transformations in the social, economic and political organisation of groups and individuals (Vertovec, 2004).

As globalisation processes have developed and facilitated human mobility between far-flung places, new political actors have been able to connect transnationally and change the nature of conflict and wars (Kaldor, 1999; Smith and Stares, 2007). Today’s globalised transnationalism has therefore opened up opportunities for political actors like diaspora to mobilise and take on transnational roles. Local struggles are taken up globally (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010) creating a “globalisation of domestic politics” (Koslowski, 2005).

**Diaspora mobilisation past and present**

The flourishing diaspora politics literature has been successful in highlighting the significant impact and contributions of diaspora to the domestic politics of their countries of origin. Indeed amidst global technological advances in travel and communication, and mass migrations due to old and new civil conflicts, contemporary diasporas have emerged as new political actors on the world stage (Esman, 2009).

A review of the diaspora politics literature reveals a wealth of knowledge about diaspora mobilisation and its impact on homeland states. The early diaspora politics literature, which largely spawned in the United States, highlighted the powerful draw of ethno-nationalism amongst diaspora communities (Sheffer, 1986; Cohen and Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991; Sheffer, 2003) and their influence on the foreign policies of the Unites States. Pioneering amongst these was the work of Yossi Shain and his analyses of the role of the Jewish lobby in America
and their impact on US foreign policy towards Israel (Shain, 2007; Shain and Barth, 2003; Shain, 1994, 1999). This influential literature illustrated the power of diaspora in permeable political systems, where the political decision-making process can be swayed by the interests of powerful lobby groups (Shain, 2007; Koinova, 2013; Ambrosio, 2002; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Shain and Barth, 2003). The most successful groups were said to be those who had the organization and level of political activity needed to influence political events (Rubenzer, 2008). Or in the case of the Cuban American lobby, those who enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with policy makers, which fomented the grounds for policy change (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999).

While the above literature often looked at the role of diasporic elites or highly organised groups, another strand in the diaspora mobilisation literature drew attention to a transnationalism from below (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002). This literature captured the everyday transnational links that transmigrants continued to have with their former homelands (Portes, 2001; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Portes et al., 1999; Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). A focus on their transnational political practices soon ensued and their contributions to external voting, home-town associations, remittances, and advocacy work for women’s rights, and human rights (Schiller et al., 1995; Basch et al., 1994; Fouron and Glick Schiller, 1998; Levitt, 2001; Charles, 1995; Orozco and Lapointe, 2004). Though this literature had its roots in American scholarship, European scholars soon followed with their own empirical case studies of migrant organisations (MOs) and the development and advocacy work of their migrant communities (Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010; Van Houte et al., 2013; Morales and Jorba, 2010; Mügge, 2012b; Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005; Halm and Sezgin, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Salih, 2001).

Diaspora were now hailed as development agents (Faist, 2008a), as actors that could mobilise to redress global developmental inequalities through brain gain (Patterson, 2006), remittances (Kapur, 2009; De Haas, 2007; Lukemmann, 2008).
and investments (Kapur, 2010; Sidel, 2007) to name a few. More recent scholarship has addressed diaspora mobilisation from the perspective of homeland governments and their diaspora policies and institutions to encourage development and economic growth (Gamlen et al., 2013; Ragazzi, 2014; Mügge, 2012a).

With the rise of civil wars and unrest across the globe (Kaldor, 1999) scholars’ attention soon shifted to analysing their roles in conflict states. Were diaspora a force for good or bad? Some reported the deleterious effects that diasporas incurred on their countries of origin by exacerbating conflicts or prolonging them (Wayland, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Adamson, 2005; Lyons, 2006; Smith and Stares, 2007; Fair, 2007). Diasporas, as Terence Lyons argued, are more emotive and less inclined to compromise due to their close connections to homeland struggles (Lyons and Mandaville, 2008). Others meanwhile promulgated their peace-building initiatives in conflict and post-conflict settings. This was particularly stressed in reference to supporting peace and reconciliation initiatives, helping with negotiations and peace treatise, lobbying for peace settlements and supporting livelihoods during state collapse (Mohamoud, 2006; Galipo, 2011; Pirkkalainen, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Lyons, 2007; Feyissa, 2014; Van Houte et al., 2013; Koser, 2007; Kleist, 2008; Cochrane, 2007; Baser, 2009; Smith and Stares, 2007; Lubkemann, 2008). Ultimately the literature reconciled that the real question was not so much whether diaspora were peace-wreckers or peace-makers, as they could be both dependent on timing, conflict conditions (Smith and Stares, 2007) and positionality (Koinova, 2012).

The diaspora literatures’ now empirically rich database has allowed us to go beyond looking at the issues that diaspora engage in but to ask why there is variation in the ways that diaspora mobilise. Comparative case studies have therefore began to emerge within the field to account for variations of mobilisation behaviours based on a plethora of hostland and homeland factors. Focussing on the hostland, Koinova’s research for example reveals that the
Albanian diaspora had more opportunities to engage in Kosovo’s independence struggle in the US than in the UK due to the permeable political system in the US, highlighting the importance of hostland political contexts for successful lobbying (Koinova, 2013). Her more recent work has elucidated some of the dynamics of why diasporas choose different mobilisation channels to pursue sovereignty-based claims (Koinova, 2014). Liza Mügge, meanwhile has looked at why Surinamese and Turkish governments have differed in their approach to their diasporas abroad due to different ideas of nationhood (Mügge, 2012a).

Others have addressed hostland institutional factors such as citizenship and incorporation regimes that encourage or discourage mobilisation depending on the political and discursive opportunity structures that they evoke (Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Odmalm, 2009; Marco Giugni, 2004). Meanwhile Bahar Baser has looked at the discursive and political opportunity structures between Germany and Sweden, which have yielded variation in mobilisation strategies amidst second generation Kurds and Turks (Baser, 2012, 2009).

To summarise, it is clear to see from the above review that the concept of diaspora mobilisation has developed to include various diasporic stances, actors, projects and actions to quote Brubaker (Brubaker, 2005). As presented above, these have included homeland struggles, secessionist claims, development, and peace-building amongst others. Diasporic mobilisation has been mobilised through elites, others through grass-roots initiatives and there have been many channels adopted including national, transnational and supranational (Koinova, 2014). These studies have greatly informed our understanding of diaspora and the factors that influence their behaviours, capabilities, successes, strategies and levels of engagement.

My study adds to this body of literature by looking comparatively at another aspect less explored in the diaspora literature related to diaspora mobilisation for state-building, the dependent variable. Before exploring the
diaspora and state-building literature, it is first necessary to delineate this study’s definition of diaspora mobilisation for state-building by firstly looking at what is meant by the state and thus state-building.

**The State**

Although a full account of the historical developments and conceptualisation of the state is outside the scope of this research, I refer to important developments within the study of the state in order to distinguish between the state and nation and to advance my argument in this study.

The concept of the modern European state was born from the institutional changes that occurred during the medieval period that saw the sovereign state trump other political organisations, including the Hanseatic League and the Italian city-states once the feudal system gave way (Spruyt, 1996). By the 19th century the idea of the territorial state expanded and today we live wholly in an international system of states.

Yet not all states are the same in our international system. They have developed in different social, cultural, economic and political contexts, leading to variations in their compositions, regimes, politics, and practices. Not all states for example are democracies, have parliamentary systems, or have liberal economic policies. The variation among states must therefore be placed within their socio-historical context.

We know from the body of work by Charles Tilly, for example, that the modern state form was conceived in Western Europe due to war making by states in their struggle for dominance over territory. This led to the need for coercive exploitation for capital accumulation in order to compete for dominance with other leaders or rulers over a given territory, created differing bureaucracies and political institutions to support the capitalist state (Tilly, 1990). Meanwhile, for post-colonial states emerging after the Second World War, colonial borders and legacies have disrupted their social structures and hampered their political
So how do we understand the concept of the state in our modern times? The definition proposed by Max Weber is still widely used in the social sciences for distinguishing the defining features of the state. Weber's preoccupation with the relationship between domination and obedience led to a definition of the state that captures the relationship between the dominator and dominated. For Weber, the state is an organization of political domination, which has been able to expropriate all the material means of organization and thus be placed at the top of the power pecking order. Obedience to the power holder thus grants the state authority, which in turn legitimates their monopoly of the use of force (Gerth et al., 1997). Weber thus defined the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Ibid., 1997, p.78).

In our modern world, however, we know that Weber's ideal-type is not always lived up to by states, some of which do not have the monopoly of force over their territory or legitimacy from their people. Iraq being a prime example, where militias also exercise force and terrorist groups such as ISIS also act as a morality-imposing force and have occupied and waged horrific acts of violence on the population.

Does Weber's definition suggest that Iraq is not a state? Considering the interconnectedness of states on matters of security and defence, NATO being a prime example, it is clear to see that the very concept of sovereignty has shifted in certain domains previously only occupied by the state. While territorial sovereignty might not be monopolised by the state other aspects related to the flow of goods and services, or formal recognition and juridical independence may exist, rendering a state like Iraq weak in domestic and Westphalian sovereignty but stronger in other aspects related to interdependence and International legal sovereignty (Krasner, 1999).
At the same time, Weber’s definition only allows us to see variation between states in terms of how it measures against this ideal-type. This static definition thus can only lead us to comparative enquiries of state’s strengths or weakness, or capacities that deviate from this model (Migdal, 2001). Furthermore, this definition sees the relationship between the dominated and the dominator as that of passive acquiescence, as though the societies of which states rule over have no say in the rules, policies, and practices of states. In effect, it positions the state as the only autonomous actor and agent of change.

Yet the state does not govern in a world of docility, but rather within its territory is a locus of social actors with competing interests. It is the very inter-relationship between society and the state’s apparatus of governmentality, to use a Foucauldian term (Foucault et al., 1991) that has shaped the evolution and trajectory of states and their politics (Tilly and Wood, 2003; Tilly, 2010). The apparatus of government may be the police, the army, the judicial courts, state policies, the rule of law etc. Meanwhile societal interactions may include meetings with individuals, non-governmental organisations, interest groups, militias, associations, social movements and other actors found in civil society.

As such, the state must not be seen in isolation of the society in whose name it purportedly acts. Rather, using Migdal’s state in society approach, it must be seen as a dynamic process, where the interaction of the two, the struggle of that interaction, leads to changes both to the actors involved and also to the state’s organization, rules, meanings and partners (Migdal, 2001).

Migdal defines the state as “a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts (Ibid., 2001,p.16). Migdal points to two important elements, the image of the state, and the practices of the state. The image of the state is important for holding the idea of the state as dominant, organized, autonomous, controlling within its territory all rule
making (Ibid., 2001, p.16).

The image also maintains the bounded lines between the state and other states in the international system, as well as the boundary between the state and society. Meanwhile the practices of the state can either validate or nullify these distinctions. For example, the state’s ability to quash other non-state groups by force and maintain authority over its territory can strengthen its image as a sovereign and dominant state (Krasner, 2004). Similarly, the interaction of multiple state institutions and resistance from social movements may lead to different outcomes for the movement and the state’s future policies (Kitschelt, 1986). These fragmented interactions between the state and its multiple parts in society may change its rules, create new meanings and thus shape its values and identity.

Seen in this way, states are the product of the instruments of government and their interactions with society. The inter-relationship between the two therefore accounts for variation amongst states, their politics, challenges, and capacity. Without reducing the state to a normative or static ideal, we can now inspect the practices, institutions, tools of government and their interactions with society for an understanding of the actors, meanings and challenges shaping state-building processes.

If states can now be characterized as evolving political organizations in a given territory, what then are nations? For Smith, nations are a ‘named human population which share myths and memories, a mass public culture, a designated homeland, economic unity and equal rights and duties for all members’(Smith, 2013, pp.56–57). Whereas states dominate and operate within a given territory, nations can span many states and are held together by their cultural commonality. The source of their commonality is often ethnic, being passed down from former ethnies i.e. ethnic groups or communities (Smith, 2013). Enduring cultural traditions, rituals, values, myths and memories that may have been passed down over generations, supports the continuing lineage
of the ethnic group. Nations according to Smith then are formed from the meeting of ethnicity and symbolic commonality, which he refers to as ethno-symbolic myths (Smith, 2009).

For others, the nation is a modern phenomenon that has been constructed from cultural artefacts including print, education and other media forms (Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1998). For Benedict Anderson, nations are bound by their collective consciousness, where they imagine their belonging to a community even though, as he reminds us “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p.6). Their belonging is thus predicated on the fact that members of the same nation recognize rights and duties to each other by virtue of their shared membership to it (Gellner, 1998, p.7).

Stressing cultural commonality as well as an ethno-symbolic approach used by Smith, Guibernau offers a helpful definition of the nation that excludes Smith’s political functions, which are more in line with the state. She draws on the cultural commonality of members stressed by Anderson and Gellner but also highlights their claims for self-rule. She sees nations as a “human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself (Guibernau 1996:47–48).

Guibernau’s definition underlines the difference thus between nations as cultural communities, and states as political institutions (Guibernau, 2004). Nations may exist without states, just as states have not needed nations for their emergence (Gellner, 1998). At the same time, Guibernau’s definition is helpful for highlighting the political claims and legitimacy that nations hold and why states may be interested in utilizing its cultural capital for nation-building purposes.
Diaspora also see themselves as forming part of the homeland nation (Shain and Barth, 2003; Sökefeld, 2006) and many are members of their homeland states through their dual citizenships. They can therefore also affect the evolution of homeland states through their mobilisation practices that target homeland states and societies.

However, the state-building literature has paid little attention to the independent role of non-state actors towards state-building processes, especially that of diaspora. Academic studies have been dominated by research into the foreign interventions and agendas of powerful state actors or intergovernmental agencies in weak or developing states. This has predominantly meant a focus on the foreign interventions of the United States or the United Nations (Fukuyama, 2004; Chesterman, 2004; Chesterman et al., 2005; Chandler and Sisk, 2013; Sisk, 2013).

Furthermore, while the state is a product of the interactions of state institutions and society, the literature has focused largely on institution-building, neglecting the other side of the state in society approach related to civil society’s role in state formation. In the next section, I draw attention to these dual aspects of state-building drawn from the state-building and civil society literature before defining the dependent variable of this study.

**State-building**

Using Migdal’s state in society approach, the state is conceptualised as both a controlling organisation as well as its meeting with its multiple parts. It follows then that if we adapt this definition to state-building, there are two arenas that this relates to: building state institutions and interactions with civil society. State-building thus is the confluence of the building of the instruments of government and their meeting with societal actors. How does this inform our understanding of diaspora mobilisation for state-building?

As stated above, state-building is largely seen to be the purview of states or
International Governmental Organisations, where foreign states intervene to re-build or re-model failing or failed states. According to David Lake there have been three state-building models in recent history, version 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0, each guided by its particular political theory, policy focus, weaknesses and strengths (Lake, 2010). State-building 1.0 occurred from 1890 to the end of the Cold War, where great power rivalry was pursued through realpolitik. From the Caribbean to Europe and South Asia, US influence and interventions took place with the purpose of pursuing America’s interests abroad, maintaining its hierarchy and hegemony in the international system and for creating the economic and political conditions that worked in its favour. Democracy was not a priority and only pursued when it helped US interests (Ibid., 2010).

In contrast state-building 2.0 moved from building loyal states to legitimate ones. Underlining this legitimacy was a liberal agenda marked by democratization and economic reform (Lake, 2010). This phase in state-building history commenced in the 1990s when civil conflicts and the fragile societies they created in the wake of the post-Cold war era led to a multitude of international interventions (Fukuyama, 2004). Humanitarian emergencies, fatal diseases and genocide were no longer seen as problems affecting only the states involved but also as posing a threat to the international communities’ peace and, indirectly, to its security (Sisk, 2013). As such the international community prioritized post-civil war state-building at the top of both the international peace, security and global development agenda (Ibid., 2013).

Meanwhile version 3.0, focussed on legitimacy but this time in the form of bringing security and services to the host population. The focus of this state-building phase was to create legitimate states that could function and independently govern their people (Lake, 2010:273). Whereas version 2.0 focussed on legitimacy through liberal democracy that would provide services for its citizens, legitimacy in version 3.0 was reversed so that services would be provided first legitimating the state (Ibid., 274).
Lake’s historical account of state-building is impressive and useful for understanding state-building attempts by powerful states and their methods throughout history. However, yet his analysis neglects the post-colonial states built under the mandate system. For post-colonial states such as Iraq the concept of the state itself was a colonial export (Mayall, 2005:37). State-building therefore also raises issues of imperial domination (Diamond, 2005) especially in cases of foreign intervention, which are defined by their transgression of state sovereignty (Reus-Smit, 2013).

In any case, since versions 2 and 3 the state-building literature has focussed on two major areas relating to institution-building and governance. Indeed, state-building theory heralded a triumph for institutionalism. Institutions were seen as the crux of professionalizing public administration so that various aspects of governability related to elections, parliamentary politics, and development could take place (Sisk, 2013; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Chesterman, 2004). In the 1990s it entailed two features related to democratisation and economic liberalisation (Berger, 2006; Lake, 2010). Democratisation was pursued through the creation of a democratic political system and institutions, writing a constitution and usually and within the space of two years holding national elections. Secondly, economic liberalisation meant implementing Washington Consensus policies, privatisation, reducing barriers to international trade and investment (Lake, 2010:266).

The ideas behind these policies were rooted in the democratic peace thesis, which stated that democratic states tend to be more peaceful towards others and domestically. The post-Cold War era thus saw a number of liberalising missions taken on by international agencies, often with the leadership of the US, to areas experiencing civil conflict, ranging from short term to long-term missions performed with a range of functions with the aim of fomenting the conditions for a lasting peace.
However, there has been much critique of these endeavours in the literature as the international communities’ efforts to transform developing countries facing conflict took on an imposition of Western values and ideologies (Lake, 2010; Fukuyama, 2004; Diamond, 2005). Unfortunately the one-size fits all approach lacked sensitivity to the historical, social and economic conditions of local contexts and were exacerbated by the speed in which these policies took place. For many war-torn post-colonial states, introducing liberalisation amidst a lack of efficient state institutions and institutional know-how, led to worsening social and political conditions (Paris, 2004).

In response, Paris advocated “Institutionalization Before Liberalization” (Paris, 2004: 7), while Fukuyama stressed the need to create “stateness” before economic development and democracy could take hold successfully (Fukuyama, 2005). As such state-building theory did not reject democratisation and economic liberalisation as such but rather stressed the a priori need for effective institutions for their implementation (Fukuyama, 2004).

Still the institutional approach of version 2.0 faced several obstacles. Despite knowing that institutions mattered, there was still the task of determining which institutions, and in which order. Fukuyama and others have drawn attention to a sequencing problem by highlighting the need for effective state institutions before democratisation can occur (Fukuyama, 2004; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). Others meanwhile have been critical of democratic sequencing (Berman, 2007) preferring a gradual approach that incorporates all dimensions slowly but holistically (Carothers, 2007).

It is clear that the recent literature has approached state-building from a Weberian understanding of the state as the focus has been the provision of security (Weber’s monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory), but also respect for the rule of law (authority) through political, social and economic institutions of governance, (Sisk, 2013). Yet legitimacy cannot be imposed on a population, it must be earned. Furthermore
where can legitimacy reside when law and order are built through violence and force? This is the Catch-22 of state-building; imposing law and order through military occupation, while simultaneously bringing freedom and democracy, which is the purported overall goal of the state-building venture\(^3\) (Chesterman, 2004).

State-building is an enterprise that requires the political participation of both governments and citizens. Using Migdal’s state in society approach we know that the state is not a static force that works in isolation (Migdal, 2001). It is built from its interactions with its multiple parts. The state-building literature has not paid sufficient attention to this very important dimension of state-building linked to civil society’s role in supporting the state, which is key to propagating legitimacy for the state through civic participation, which strengthen state-society relations (Manning, 2005) and legitimacy.

Legitimacy therefore is not gained solely by being the only licensed arbiter of force, but also about empirical legitimacy as seen and experienced by local partners and citizens (Andersen, 2012). This refers to political participation of citizens, where civil society can inform, contest and challenge the state, allowing for legitimacy through peaceful contention.

The concept of civil society resurfaced in more recent history following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democratic states in Eastern Europe (Keane, 1988). The instability of transitioning into democracy thus created an opportunity for the international community to intervene and to mediate for newly emerging states.

Strengthening civil society and its relations with the state were seen as fundamental for preventing, reducing or even resolving such conflicts by international agencies, NGOS, and academics alike (Cochrane, 2007).

\(^3\) The purported goal may in deed be to bring about a “liberal peace’ to a country, though security interests of states may also motivate military interventions (Paris and Sisk, 2009).
Consequently the concept of developing and strengthening civil society was to form part of the broader framework of peace-building that was prevalent during the 1990s. Peace-building, understood as the prevention of the recurrence of violence, or creating the conditions, which encourage sustainable peace in war-torn societies was the buzzword of the day (Paris, 2004). Peace-building was not only about supporting a ceasefire between warring factions but also identifying and supporting local structures that would strengthen and consolidate peace and avert a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). As such international actors took more interest in the civil society of conflict states who they saw as a bridge for connecting grass roots movements and political elites to consolidate political negotiations and peace settlements (Cochrane, 2007).

Scholars have debated at length the concept of civil society pointing to at least three strands related to a) A normative ideal type. A transparent, tolerant and democratic ‘good society’ to aspire to with positive norms and values. b) voluntary associational life that acts as a counterweight to states and corporate power and c) a public sphere where “societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated” (Edwards, 2004, p.55).

Philosophers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci and Jürgen Habermas, to name a few scholars in history, have differed in their interpretations and ideas about civil society, as do more contemporary scholars. Yet one of the important features that all scholars cannot escape is the relationship between the state and civil society. Whether civil society is best seen as separate from the state (Gellner, 1994), as supporting the state to foster social capital and democratic governance (Putnam et al., 1994), or challenging and contesting the state through non-violent means (Keane, 1988, 2003), the concept has been fundamental to the making of states and their politics.
Undergirding this argument is the important work by Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, which shows the importance of civic community for building effective governments (Putnam et al., 1994). Civic associations and civic engagement contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governance, because they create internal effects for members of associations and external effects for society at large. Internally, civic associations help foster norms of cooperation, trust, and tolerance, while externally they help support collaboration to address civil matters collectively. Putnam stressed that in civic associations relationships were horizontal that help to engender co-operation and reciprocity in contrast to vertical relations of authority and dependency (Putnam et al., 1994, p.88). Instead of encouraging relationships of patronage, civic communities are more likely to work together to resolve community problems or address policy issues. They are also more likely to hold their politicians to account and create what Paul Hirst has referred to as “democratic public governance” (Hirst, 2012, p.16).

A vibrant civil society creates the space for representation and participation in various interest groups. It therefore promotes cross-cutting cleavages, which expand memberships and identifications beyond primordial kin or ethnic groups (Manning, 2005). Simultaneously, the horizontal structure of civil society minimizes political polarization and thus builds norms of tolerance through peaceful disagreement. This point is particularly relevant to the case of Iraq, where ethno-sectarianism has dominated Iraqi politics in the aftermath of the Iraq war. This reality has undermined the growth of civil society and thus the possibility of forming membership in different groups, a necessary precursor to the creation of crosscutting cleavages (Truman, 1951 quoted in Manning, 2005). Building civil society in divided societies is therefore paramount for countering ethnic cleavages, providing citizens an alternative source of power through interest group collective action, as shall be demonstrated in the empirical chapters.

In the case of the Middle East, understanding the state means also considering
civil society (Norton, 2005). In the face of weak states and authoritarian rule, civil society can often be the only place for participatory politics for the disenfranchised, a place for advocacy, contestation and representation. Civil society thus informs state practices and policies by holding governments to account, challenging clientelism and corruption, calling for human rights and democratisation, as has been witnessed through a politics of resistance across the Middle East that goes beyond the Arab uprisings (Tripp, 2013). This is an important element of state-building related to the relationship between state institutions and civil society, where actors’ perception of the state, its image in Migdal’s language, legitimates rules and institutions (Hurd, 1999).

Furthermore, civil society provides services that weak states cannot perform. This fact has been corroborated by international institutions such as the World Bank and the OSCE, who have expounded the importance of a strong civil society for good governance, development and democratisation (Cochrane, 2007). Indeed, in the Middle East there is often an interdependent relationship where the state needs civil society to provide state services and civil society needs the state to carry out particular state functions. For example in Jordan, professional associations are performing quasi-state functions providing a necessary service for the Jordanian government in the forms of licensing, salaries and pensions (Clark, 2013). In Lebanon, the Amel association provides various state services in the form of healthcare, education and assistance to refugees⁴. This can take on further salience in conflict and post-conflict settings where transnational civil society initiatives can take on important functions such as protecting those who are vulnerable from poverty or repairing infrastructure (Lubkemann, 2008; Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014).

For weak states, such as Iraq, the role of civil society is not only important but also necessary for political reform and re-building a new state. This is because it is civil society that ultimately tests the limits of political contestation, which

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provoke or revive collective identifications and collective actions (O’Donnell et al., 2013, p.49). As such political reform demands the political participation of civil society organisations for holding governments to account and maintaining pressure to deliver on its word. There is therefore a co-dependent relationship between civil society and the state in the development of the state. Rules and laws can only be followed once society feels them to be just and when they trust that the law will protect them. Likewise a state can only protect its citizens if rules are followed.

The concept of civil society thus encapsulates within it an a priori link to the state as several scholars have argued throughout history. Marx proposed that it was a means of promoting the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, whereas Antonio Gramsci saw it as a form of domination and control through cultural and ideological hegemony (Schwedler, 2006, p.81; Edwards, 2004, p.8). It was Jürgen Habermas, who would change our ideas of the “public sphere’ by taking the arguments made by Marx but applying the idea of contestation to the liberal tradition, where members of society could critique and debate issues of shared public concern (Ibid.2006; Ibid., 2004). This idea of civil society saw the role of civil society as constraining the power of the state whilst simultaneously being protected by it (Schwedler, 2006).

In today’s understanding, civil society and its relationship with the state remains heavily debated. However what is certainly hard to ignore is the fact that whether it is a form of state control, a quasi state tool, a public sphere for contestation, or a means for citizens to address issues in the public sphere, it is an arena where the disenfranchised and the underrepresented can mobilise to advocate for their rights, and draw attention to their needs. It is in the words of Michael Edwards ‘people power’ (Edwards, 2004).

Therefore in agreement with Paris and Sisk, state-building is not “limited to “top down” approaches of institution strengthening (i.e., those focusing on national elites), nor does it preclude “ bottom-up” approaches (i.e., working
through civil-society groups, or promoting measures to facilitate the accountability of state structures to their societies)" (Paris and Sisk, 2009:14). State-building is therefore defined by its ability to address both dimension of the state and society through institution-building and governance (top-down), but also legitimacy of the state through civic-participation and practices (bottom-up).

**Defining State-Building**

As such adapting Migdal’s state in society approach and building on the state-building and civil society literature above, I thus propose a definition of state-building that operationally incorporates two categories to be used for analysing the diaspora literature in the next chapter. Diaspora mobilisation for state-building thus refers to 1) political institution-building and governance and 2) supporting/challenging the state through civil society.

**Institution-building and state governance** refers to diaspora mobilisation to build or strengthen state capacity or create new institutions of governance. This may refer to constitution building, forming ministries, forming policies or political institutions of the state that help governments to effectively administer their states.

**Supporting/Challenging the state through civil society** refers to diaspora mobilisation that supports civil society groups in the homeland that support the state such as strengthening participatory governance, developing human rights initiatives, the promotion of labour rights, minority rights, and women’s rights, as well as providing quasi-state services. Simultaneously these also include aspects related to challenging the state, which also strengthen the state through engendering accountability, transparency and building legitimacy. Development projects may also be included here if they play a role in shaping state practices or policies. These are not limited to Western ideals but also include initiatives that resonate with local audiences and practices.
It is important to mention here that the two categories in no way connote that these two approaches to state-building are separate processes. As shown above, there is a relational quality between building state institutions and civil society. Thus it is important to stress that these dimensions of state-building do not occur in isolation but should be mutually reinforcing processes, working in tandem to reinforce one another. The two categories however draw attention to two distinct categories of state-building that diasporas engage in and serves as a heuristic tool for understanding the two approaches to state-building that work to strengthen both.

To summarise, in this chapter I have delineated the subject matter of this thesis; diaspora. Following a detailed discussion on who constitutes a diaspora I have underlined the importance of having an imagination of community and mobilisation towards specific goals, actions and stances for diaspora to come into existence. Simultaneously, I have showcased the many ways that diaspora can and have mobilised towards their countries of origin, while drawing attention to the specific focus of this study, diaspora mobilisation for state-building.

Finally I demonstrated that state-building is operationally comprised of two categories, to include building state-institutions and supporting/challenging the state through civil society, that have neither been seriously addressed in the state-building or diaspora literature. In establishing how the two approaches are interlinked and work in tandem to evolve the state, I drew attention to the two categories that define state-building in this thesis and that will be used to investigate the diaspora literature in the next chapter but also the empirical evidence in chapters 5 and 6.

In the next section diaspora mobilisation for state-building is reviewed where attention is drawn to the gap in the literature. Following this I put forward explanatory factors that may account for why there were divergences between
the state-building contributions of the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora and set forth my hypotheses for this study.
CHAPTER 3 - DIASPORA MOBILISATION FOR STATE-BUILDING

In the last chapter, the concepts of diaspora, transnationalism and diaspora mobilisation for state-building were defined so as to outline the subject matter of this study as well as the research question under investigation. I have operationalized diaspora mobilisation for state-building in this study under two categories 1) Institution-building and governance and 2) supporting/challenging the state through civil society.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I review the diaspora literature for an understanding of how diaspora mobilisation for state-building has been approached and what we know so far. I then identify the gaps in this field that this thesis seeks to address and develop through the case study of Iraq. In the second section, I address the second research question of this thesis by probing the literature for factors that may account for variation in the ways that the UK and the Swedish diaspora approached state-building in Iraq. The diaspora literature can only partially help my investigation, therefore, I use both an inductive approach by drawing on the diaspora literature for guidance, but also adopt a deductive approach extrapolating from the case of Iraq to draw out explanatory factors. In the final section, I explore alternative factors, lay out my hypotheses and define my independent variables.

Diaspora mobilisation for state-building – the status quo
There has been very little systematic research of diaspora mobilisation for state-building processes in the diaspora literature (Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014). At first glance it would appear that the diaspora literature has been reluctant to address diaspora mobilisation for state-building, since very few mentions of the word in diaspora case studies exist and even fewer explicitly analyse state-building processes in diaspora-homeland analyses.
Part of the reason for this apparent absence can be attributed to the fact that the concept of state-building has been conflated with concepts of peace-building and development. Often these are used interchangeably to depict a plethora of activities without delineating definitions of what is meant by each. At times anything supporting local communities is deemed a development or peace-building initiative so that the concepts of state-building, peace-building and development have lost their analytical rigour. Peace-building as stated in the previous chapter refers to the prevention of the recurrence of violence, or creating the conditions, which encourage sustainable peace in war-torn societies (Paris, 2004). Meanwhile development broadly speaking refers to the improvement of socio-economic conditions in the homeland.

Yet deeper explorations into the peace-building and development fields within the diaspora literature reveal that multiple diasporas are not only informing peace-building and development processes in the homeland, but also state-building processes as defined in this study related to institution-building and governance on the one hand, and supporting/challenging the state through civil society on the other. The majority of what we have learned in this respect derives from African case studies under the paradigms of peace-building and development initiatives in post-conflict societies.

Diasporas have been involved in institution-building and governance in countries of origin by returning to their countries of origin to take up political positions in ministries, as new presidents or they may inform governance procedures through training and capacity-building, as well as strengthening state policies and institutions though their expertise and knowledge (Antwi-Boateng, 2012, 2011; Mohamoud, 2006; Galipo, 2011; Pirkkalainen, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Lyons, 2007; Feyissa, 2014; Van Houte et al., 2013; Koser, 2007; Kleist, 2008; Lampert, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2016; Turner, 2008b; Natali, 2007). Two prominent examples of diaspora figures who returned to their countries of origin to take up leadership positions are Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a former member of the US Liberian diaspora who eventually went on to become President of Liberia in 2006 (Antwi-Boateng, 2011) and Ahmed Chalabi the Iraqi
pro-intervention lobbyist who would go on to become Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister in 2005 (Bonin, 2011).

Returnees may initiate their own return or be called upon by homeland governments to contribute to the country’s state-building process. This phenomenon has been witnessed in war-ravaged societies where failing states or weak governments are lacking in educated, professional and skilled diaspora (Mohamoud, 2005). For instance, in Somaliland, one third of ministers are from the diaspora, as well as two out of three political parties in Somaliland are led by diaspora (Galipo, 2011).

Returnees can bring much needed brain gain and skills to weak and contested states through the expertise and skills gained in Western hostlands and transporting them to their countries of origin. A good example is Djimé Adoum, a diaspora from Chad living in America who was able to directly inform good governance in his country of origin (Brinkerhoff, 2016). At the invite of President Déby in 2010, Adoum’s technical expertise⁵ would lead to his appointment firstly as a Technical Advisor on Rural Development, and then as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation to address issues of food security. In his post as Minister Adoum tackled issues of governance by working with multiple local stakeholders as well as US, EU and international donors, emphasising and encouraging the local ownership dimension stressed by the state-building literature (Chesterman, 2004). Governance reforms initiated by Adoum included, “the modernization of administrative, financial, accounting and human resource management tools, as well as financial and accounting audits, amongst many others (Ibid, 2016).

Diaspora with skills and expertise can contribute their knowledge to homeland governments by addressing the shortage of state personnel and kick-start democratic and governance programmes (Turner, 2008: 181). Diasporic interventions into state-building can include providing advice on various policy areas, rehabilitating political institutions, or writing treatise and constitutions.

⁵ Applying his PhD training as an agricultural economist.
For example, the Eritrean diaspora helped draft the country’s first constitution after its separation from Ethiopia in 1993 (Mohamoud, 2006; Koser, 2007; Mohamoud, 2005). Similarly the Kurdish diaspora have been extremely active in supporting the Kurdish Quasi-State through democratic norms. After the Iraq war in 2003 for instance, a group of Kurdish lawyers prepared a constitution and institutional guidelines to support a modern parliamentary political system, which included ‘a speaker of the house, president of the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA), and expanded the ministerial cabinet to include four newly created ministries: reconstruction and development, humanitarian aid and cooperation, peshmerga’ affairs, and culture (Natali, 2010, p.33).

Diasporas are also constituent actors in homeland civil societies (Cochrane, 2007) and just as they have been contributing to state-building processes through institution-building and state governance, they have also been supporting the state through civil society. It is argued in this thesis that diaspora as another civil society actor in homeland states can also act to challenge or support state policies and institutions that transform or alter the state. This is especially relevant in war-torn countries or in weak or fragile states where the role of civil society can be crucial in supporting the political stability of the state (Mohamoud, 2005; Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014; Dahre, 2007; Galipo, 2011; Cochrane, 2007; Smith and Stares, 2007; Al-Ali and Koser, 2002; Basch and Glick-Schiller, 1995; Mohamoud, 2006; Baser, 2009).

Diasporas can support the state through civil society in two fundamental ways. Firstly they can help through the transfer of social remittances, which can help develop liberal norms, values, ideas and social capital (Levitt, 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011; Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014). Levitt coined the term social remittances to refer to the norms, practices, identities and social capital that migrants send back to their countries of origin, a distinction from financial remittances related to money (2001). Levitt’s study of the Dominican diaspora showed that the ideas and behaviours that Dominicans brought with them such
as community organization and social responsibility were transformed in the US as they met with a legal framework that demanded accountability and contractual agreements. In turn legal norms, accountability and transparency were some of the social remittances that diaspora leaders remitted back to the country of origin when dealing with community projects back home (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). As the Dominican community leaders’ organizational capacity and ideas about public services fomented in the host country, they were able to further institutionalize these in their hometowns.

Similarly the Liberian diaspora in the US have attempted to spread norms of pluralism, rule of law, human rights, anti-corruption and democracy in their home country to support peace-building processes in Liberia, which are also relevant for state-building processes (Antwi-Boateng, 2012). Consequently diaspora have been labelled norm entrepreneurs and have been hailed as agents of the liberal peace (Turner, 2008b), though others are more sceptical about their liberalising language that can often be used to advance nationalistic goals (Koinova, 2010).

Beyond norms, diaspora can also support civil society materially. Diaspora can often perform quasi-state services in weak states where governments may not have the capabilities or resources to do so. For example in Morocco, a group of diasporic labour workers in France helped set up an electricity grid to provide electricity for rural villagers in Souss, using their transnational networks and labour organisation experience (Iskander, 2008). Health-care workers from the Somali-Finnish diaspora meanwhile have helped strengthen and reconstruct the healthcare sector in Somalia and Puntland through collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (Weiss, 2009). Others meanwhile, have contributed to developing the education sector by funding the creation of universities and other education projects (Hoehne and Ibrahim, 2014; Orozco and Lapointe, 2004).

The above case studies demonstrate how diaspora’s experiences in Western
hostlands and the skills they gain can be transferred to their homelands to strengthen or transform state institutions. Indeed, some initiatives can inform state practices and help develop new state policies and initiatives. One of the most prominent examples of this occurred in Mexico. Seeing the development potential of links between diasporic hometown association and their counterparts in Mexico the government created Mexico’s 3x1 programme where home town associations investments are matched by the government and scaled up to local, state and national levels (Orozco and Lapointe, 2004).

On the other hand diasporic intervention can also raise suspicions in deeply divided or conflicting societies, and can be undermined by government institutional weakness (Hoehne and Ibrahim, 2014). Nonetheless whether these supportive initiatives conflict with states or not they are shaping the state through their interactions with local populations, changing mind-sets for better or worse, and providing new opportunities and horizons that are ultimately shaping the evolution of states.

Diaspora can also challenge the type of state being built by Contesting state policies, advocating for human rights, minority rights and women’s rights amongst others. Using the political spaces open to them in the hostland, that are often prohibited to them in the homeland, diaspora can mount pressure on homeland governments acting much in the same way as transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). In doing so they are shaping state-society not only on universal issues but also those particular to the homeland in question (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010).

Diaspora activism in this regard may lead to a state altering its stances and policies. For example, diaspora Kurds across Europe have been able to socially construct a collective Kurdish identity against Turkish nationalism through cultural, social and political practices in the liberal space of their western hostlands. Kurdish transnational practices and actions eventually led to a change in policy in Turkey when previously prohibited Kurdish language
broadcasts were legalized in Turkey in 2001 (Adamson and Demetriou, 2007).

Similarly religious rights have also been championed by diaspora where there has been discrimination in homelands against a religious minority. The Muslim Ethiopian diaspora, for example, have been very active in advocating for legislative and public policies for the protection of the civil and humanitarian rights of Ethiopian Muslims (Feyissa, 2014). Using a rights-based and pluralistic approach learnt in the diaspora the Ethiopian migrant organisations based in the US and Sweden have been able to effectively target the Ethiopian government. Meeting with the Prime Minister and Christian leaders they have attempted to alter the conception of the Ethiopian state by challenging its Christian heritage and advocating for a more secular state (Ibid., 2014).

There is nothing to suggest that diaspora may act in a peaceful way to alter or fight their homeland states. Diasporas working through civil society can also challenge the state by supporting more violent groups in the homeland battling for independence or secession (Skrbiš, 1999; Orjuela, 2008; Baser, 2009; Smith and Stares, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Koinova, 2011; Casier, 2010; Eliassi, 2016; Natali, 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Wayland, 2004; Fair, 2007). Diaspora can support militant groups fighting the government through remittances, funding for weapons and training (Orjuela, 2008). They may alternatively work to topple governments by supporting opposition governments abroad in exile (Shain, 1994; Lyons and Mandaville, 2010; Antwi-Boateng, 2011). Diaspora support for violent groups is thus contributing to the evolution and process of state-building in homeland states through their funds, support and clashes with homeland governments. This is reminiscent of the evolution of the concept of the state where war and competition for power developed the sovereign state (Tilly, 1990). The difference today however is the struggle and competition for power exists to determine the kind of state that diaspora and homeland groups are struggling for.

The literature review above has revealed the myriad ways that diaspora are
mobilising towards state-building processes through institution-building and governance, on the one hand, as well as supporting or challenging the state on the other in countries of origin. However it has also exposed a number of gaps within the literature that this study would like to address. Firstly, the case studies informing this political process have been predominantly drawn from the peace-building and development case studies within the diaspora literature. There is yet to emerge a distinct and clear sub-category within the diaspora literature that addresses directly diaspora mobilisation for state-building. Case studies of diaspora’s mobilisation towards political institution-building and governance remain patchy and sparse, and though case studies within the civil society literature are numerous, very few address directly how diasporas are working through civil society to contribute to state-building processes (Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014). Addressing this gap is important as diaspora mobilisation for state-building, as defined in the previous chapter, is distinct from both peace-building and development as shown. Yet diaspora’s contribution towards this distinct political process remains an area under-investigated in the diaspora literature.

Secondly, the case studies presented above reference largely case studies from the African continent and depict the experiences of post-conflict societies and states. Though there are certainly similarities between the post-colonial states in Africa and the Middle East, each region and country has its particular post-colonial legacies, socio-cultural dynamics, obstacles, and levels of development that inform their state-building evolution. With some exceptions from largely Turkish and Kurdish diaspora case studies, very little work has dealt with diaspora mobilization for state-building in the Middle East, a generally neglected region in the diaspora literature. My study would build on the case studies from the African continent and offer new insights from a lesser-explored diaspora and part of the world.

Thirdly, with a few minor exceptions from Kurdish and Afghani case studies (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014; Natali, 2007; Kouser, 2014; Brinkerhoff and
few studies have comprehensively researched diaspora mobilisation for state-building following military intervention and occupation. Those that have, have looked at lobbying efforts of diaspora groups to influence foreign governments to intervene in countries of origin (Moss, 2016; Koinova, 2013). Yet, these studies do not discuss diaspora mobilisation for state-building following intervention and the ways diaspora incorporate themselves in this process.

In contexts where military-intervention and occupation have occurred, diaspora are not only dealing with homeland governments/leaders but also foreign states. These lend a different dynamic to diaspora mobilisation for state-building, especially where an incumbent regime has been ousted, as in the case of Iraq, and a new state is being re-built by foreign interveners. How do diaspora mobilise for state-building under these circumstances? What kind of state are they trying to build? And for the purposes of this study why are there variations in the ways that diaspora contribute to this political process? These are the gaps in the literature I would like to address in this study using the case study of the Iraqi diaspora.

**Explanatory Factors and Hypotheses**

Now that we have looked at how diasporas can mobilise for state-building and we have laid the grounds for investigating how the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden mobilised towards state-building in Iraq in the post 2003 period, let us turn our attention to exploring the second research question of this study: Why did the UK based diaspora have more opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance, while the Swedish diaspora had more opportunities to mobilise towards supporting the state through civil society? In other words, what factors determine the types of diaspora mobilisation for state-building that diasporas engage in?

The diaspora literature offers only partial indications in this less–investigated area. Therefore using both inductive and deductive research methods, I explore
this subject matter using the limited diaspora literature as a guide, but also extrapolate from the case of Iraq for addressing the main research question of this study. I put forward three possible factors that may account for this puzzle: the profile of the diaspora in each host state, the foreign policy of the hostland towards Iraq in 2003, and a new hypothesis drawn from the Iraqi case study; links to ethno-sectarian parties.

**Diaspora Profiles**

The profile of diaspora is an important factor that may account for differences in the behaviour of groups and why they may mobilise politically in different ways. The literature has approached the study of diaspora profiles and their impact on diaspora mobilisation in two distinct ways. The first relates to attributes of the collective community including size, unity, and ethnicity, while the second references individual backgrounds related to education levels, prior social and political experiences and socio-economic status. I argue that the former is unhelpful in informing this study’s research question, while the latter is partial and neglects the historical dimensions of diaspora waves and profiles and their impact on diaspora mobilisation.

**Collective diaspora profiles**

There are several collective attribute-based factors that can shape the political transnationalism of diaspora. One of the important features in this regard is the size of the diaspora. As Shain asserts, ‘the nature and range of diasporic involvement in the home country’s affairs depend largely upon the size and diversity of the overseas community …” (Shain 1994: 815). Size matters because with a larger constituency there are more human, knowledge-based and monetary resources to be pooled, utilized and mobilized on homeland issues. Size is also important for mobilization purposes because a considerably sized and organized diaspora can pose an electoral threat to presidential candidates as the case of the Cuban diaspora and the Reagan administration demonstrates in the United States (Shain, 1994). Governments with large ethnic
constituencies cannot ignore their power, nor the transnational potential they may wield both diplomatically and in terms of trade (Rao, 2011). Furthermore, the larger the diaspora, the more it is likely to create ethnic, cultural and social organisations that help continue its homeland attachments (Safran, 1991) and thus continue its powerbase. However, while size is important for understanding the scale, variety and impact of collective action, it cannot account for why there may be variation in the types of state-building that the Iraqi diaspora in each host state engaged in, especially as both the UK and Sweden have large Iraqi communities (Sassoon, 2009).

While the literature recognises that diasporas are a heterogeneous mix of people with varying socio-economic backgrounds, religions, ethnicities beliefs, aspirations and interests, an important factor for political mobilisation is the level of unity among diaspora members. Gabriel Sheffer argues that diasporas must overcome generational, social and ideological differences if they are to survive, and strongly asserts, “without a significant degree of solidarity, any domestic and trans-state activities will be almost impossible (2006: 88). Meanwhile Haney and Vanderbush claim, “a group will be more influential to the extent that it enjoys a large and unified base of politically active members who vote in a concentrated bloc” (1999: 344).

In this respect, ethnicity and religion can act as a unifying force in response to homeland claims, struggles and threats. As the bountiful literature on ethnic interest groups and ethno-nationalism attests, ethnic identifications are powerful modalities for diaspora mobilisation (Shain, 1994, 2007; Shain and Barth, 2003; Sheffer, 2003, 1986). This can be seen in various empirical case studies where the diaspora has had very clear political aims such as the Kosovans pursuing sovereign independence (Koinova, 2012), Kurds campaigning for Kurdish rights in Turkey (Adamson and Demetriou 2007), or the Jewish diaspora lobbying against existential threats facing Israel (Shain, 2002). What this literature proves is that the more fragmented a diaspora, the less salience it will have politically as collective action is forestalled, as the case
of the Arab-American diaspora in the United States demonstrates (Shain, 1996). However, in the case of the Iraqi diaspora, the diaspora is fragmented along multiple lines related to ethnicity, sect, class, and waves of migration, to name a few. While there is unity amongst different groups, these divisions and unities are found in both the UK and Sweden, which therefore rules out this variable as a factor in our analysis. Furthermore, while an understanding of unity/disunity of diaspora may shed light into the motives, issues and obstacles of diaspora mobilisation it does not inform our puzzle or shed light into why there might be differences in the type of mobilisation that diaspora engage in.

The literature focusing on collective attribute-based qualities has also stressed the role of partial assimilation in the hostland for mobilising towards homeland affairs (Rubenzer, 2008). The argument here relates to the group in question being seen and accepted as a political player in domestic affairs (Ibid., 2008). Other scholars have supported this finding by stressing that as immigrants become more integrated their transnational political activities increase as they become more familiar with the political institutions of the sending country (Guarnizo et al., 2003; de Haas, 2006; Baser, 2012). Once again however, partial-assimilation may account for different levels of political transnationalism between diaspora who may be more or less assimilated, but the question here is to what extent assimilation affects the types of diaspora mobilisation that diaspora engage in? In this regard, assimilation may account for differences in what diaspora can do in the country of settlement, however this has no bearing on what diaspora can do in the country of origin. In this respect this variable also holds no explanatory power for this study’s research question.

As has been documented in the literature review above, collective diaspora attributes can have a significant bearing on diaspora mobilisation in countries of settlement. However, as demonstrated these studies have largely focussed on how diasporic attribute-based qualities affect the scale of transnationalism or which groups are more successful at mobilising towards transnational issues.
These studies, therefore, fall short of informing how diaspora profiles affect types of diaspora mobilisation, the subject matter of this thesis.

*Individual diaspora profiles*

More informative for this study are diaspora’s individual attributes, which may shed light into why some diaspora were able to become involved in institution-building and governance and why others may have been directed to supporting the state through civil society.

One important factor relates to education. Contradicting much of the assimilation literature that suggests that the more immigrants are assimilated the less they will maintain homeland links (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) Guarnizo and colleagues’ findings instead suggest that transnational political activities are not restricted to marginalised or poorly educated migrants, but in fact those who were better educated and have been in the host country the longest (2003: 1238-1239). This finding is supported in the diaspora case studies with those most likely to return, help in capacity building or initiate projects have been largely educated diaspora, who have gained skills in their hostlands and thus have been able to give back more to their countries of origin (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 2016). Education is an important factor for diaspora’s involvement in political transnationalism, however, it does not hold explanatory power for this study as we know from the literature review above that educated diaspora may act in different ways to support state-building in countries of origin. Some may work towards institution-building and governance, while others may wish to support their homeland states through civil society. As such education levels while important for understanding who is more likely to mobilise towards the homeland, cannot explain the puzzle of how diaspora profiles influence the types of state-building that diaspora engage in.

Another set of literature has stressed the importance of prior social and political experiences. According to Levitt and Lamba-Nieves,
“People’s experiences prior to migration strongly influence what they do in the countries where they settle; this, in turn, affects what they remit back to their homelands, which becomes clear when we analyse migration through a transnational lens. The ideas and practices migrants bring with them actively shape who and what they encounter in the countries where they move, which then shapes what they send back.” (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011, p.2)

Levitt’s study of the Dominican diaspora showed that the ideas and behaviours that Dominicans brought with them such as community organization and social responsibility were those that were practices and further developed in the US as they met with a legal framework that demanded accountability and contractual agreements. In turn legal norms, accountability and transparency were some of the social remittances that diaspora leaders then remitted back to their country of origin when dealing with community projects back home (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011).

Similar to Levitt and Lamba-Nieves’ social remittances’ argument, other scholars have underlined the relationship between migrants’ prior political experiences and their political transnationalism. Guarnizo et.al found that individuals who were already politically active in their homelands continued these interests after emigrating (2003: 1216). Furthermore a comparative study of the political participation of Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in the Netherlands revealed that Turks who were more politically involved, often had prior political participation in their country of origin where “civic virtue and social capital seem to have migrated together with the ethnic groups” (Fenemma and Tillie 2001: 37).

If the literature is correct than we would expect that diaspora who may have been involved in civic associations to continue their political trajectory in this way following migration, just as we would expect those who were involved in formal politics to continue their engagement directly through state structures. There is certainly some truth to this statement as within the Iraqi diaspora
many homeland political and social organisations have been replicated in the diaspora such as the Iraqi Women’s League or the Iraqi Communist Party. However, opportunities to be involved in formal politics were limited for Iraqis unless they were members of the Baathist party who constitute a minority within the UK and Iraqi diaspora and who are not included in this study.

More relevant for this study’s research question is the socio-economic profile of diaspora for understanding the types of diaspora mobilisation they can and cannot engage in. The literature has documented some of the differences between diaspora elites, those who occupy a higher socio-economic status in society and those that Dorai refers to as the rank and file of political transnational activities found amongst the majority diaspora population (Dorai, 2002a). There are two important factors that may account for why these two socio-economic groups might engage in different ways. Firstly, elites have at their disposal monetary resources, which grant them the power to lobby, execute political campaigns and build political networks in both the homeland and hostland. For example, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which is often cited as the exemplar diasporic political organisation in America, has the monetary resources, networks and support, which have built its organisational strength and led it to become the most successful ethnic interest group lobby in America (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Rubenzer, 2008).

Non-elites do not have at their disposal financial resources to set up organisationally strong political organizations, a prerequisite found to be important for effective lobbying and political influence (Rubenzer, 2008). Therefore their engagement will more likely be in the form of independent initiatives or grass-roots activity more in line with supporting the state through civil society where financial resources can be fundraised collectively or acquired through grants. Monetary resources may therefore partially explain who was able to return to Iraq and become involved in institution-building, and why others without financial capital were directed to civil society.
Yet monetary resources on their own cannot fully explain why some diasporic elites were able to become involved in institution-building and governance in Iraq. Clearly along with monetary resources to effectively carry out political campaigns, diaspora also need to be connected to the right political networks. Another big difference between elites and ordinary diaspora actors are their networks. While elites are connected to powerful socio-political networks in the homeland and hostland, ordinary diaspora citizens are connected to “kin and friendship ties” (Guarnizo et al., 2003, p.1232). As such the transnational networks they are linked to are often familial and local (Basch and Glick-Schiller, 1995; Schiller et al., 1995; Al-Ali and Koser, 2002; Halm and Sezgin, 2013; Karabegovic, 2016).

Transnational activities therefore cut across class lines, and tap into different transnational networks and encourage alternative political activities. This is especially the case for diaspora form the same country who have migrated at different times and in different periods as in the case of the Iraqi diaspora. These “vintages and patterns of migration” may contribute to what Pasura has termed a “fractured transnational formation”(Pasura, 2012, p.153), which effectively leads to different political transnationalisms based on the historical contexts, status, socio-economic profiles and reasons for migrating from the original homeland.

Just as the literature on social remittances has argued that migrants’ prior experiences influence their transnational practices (Levitt, 2001; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011), I argue that prior social and political networks are also important for influencing the types of mobilisation that diaspora engage in. Yet with few exceptions (Mcgregor, 2009; McGregor and Pasura, 2014), historical networks have not been adequately explored in the diaspora literature. The social and political networks that diaspora had upon exiting their country of origin links them to specific socio-economic groups and political networks in the homeland. So diaspora from prominent or wealthy families are often linked to more elite socio-political networks, while those who are connected to a
lower social status are more likely linked to grass-roots socio-political networks.

Similarly in the hostland diaspora’s socio-economic profile will likely connect them to different socio-political networks. These networks also provide diaspora with further capital to engage in political transnational activities (Weiss, 2009). For elites, financial resources can also provide them with access to powerful networks (Shain and Barth, 2003; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008), where as ordinary diaspora may be limited in their reach or ability to effectively lobby hostland politicians and government.

This argument is supported by the profiles of Iraq’s diasporic returnees in 2003 and those who would become Iraq’s first state-builders. The majority were those who formed part of Iraqi’s diasporic elite socio-political network, whether religious, political or professional, many of whom had relationships with political elites in Washington and Whitehall (Allawi, 2007). I therefore hypothesize that diaspora with monetary resources and those connected to elite socio-political networks had more opportunities for becoming involved in state institution-building and governance once intervention took place than for Iraqis who were limited financially and not connected to powerful groups in the country of origin or hostland. This study’s first hypothesis states: 

**Hi:** Diaspora who were connected to elite socio-political networks in 2003 and had monetary resources had more opportunities to engage in state-building through institution-building and governance, while those who were not connected to elite political networks and had insufficient resources were directed to supporting the state through civil society.

**Hostland foreign policy**

For this study’s purposes hostland foreign policy positions towards Iraq are fundamental for understanding the political relationship that each host state had with the diaspora homeland and how this affected the type of state-building that diasporas were able to engage in following the 2003 intervention
Hostland foreign policies and their alignment with diaspora’s goals have been suggested to increase the opportunities for diaspora to intervene in the politics of the hostland. This wide literature has been advanced within the US context where the openness of the American political system has allowed ethnic diasporas to have a voice in US foreign policy (Shain, 2007, 1999, 1994; Shain and Barth, 2003; Rytz, 2013; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Koinova, 2013; Vanderbush, 2009; King and Melvin, 2006). Examples from the Israel lobby and the Cuban lobby abound, demonstrating the power of diasporic interest groups, especially when their goals and hostland foreign policies align (Shain, 2002a, 2007, 1994; Shain and Barth, 2003; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; Haney and Vanderbush, 1999; Vanderbush, 2009; Rytz, 2013; Ogelman et al., 2002).

Yet while there are abundant case studies of the affect of diaspora lobbies on US foreign policy in the literature, there is little work on the effect of hostland foreign policy positions and their impact on the type of diaspora mobilisation that diaspora engage in (for exceptions (Baser, 2012, 2014, Koinova, 2013, 2014). More specifically, empirical evidence relating to a foreign policy of military intervention and occupation by a host state against a diaspora homeland, and the effects of this on diaspora mobilisation in the hostland are few and far between (Koinova, 2013; Moss, 2016). Yet the effects in the homeland have not been systematically or comparatively explored as I do in this study.

The Iraq war was an exogenous intervention, marked by a desire for regime change and transformation (Reus-Smit, 2013). In choosing to intervene, the UK hostland was committed alongside the US senior partner to depose the ancien regime and in its place plant a new democratic and liberal political system (Synnott, 2008; Stewart, 2006). This long-term mission would require the help of Iraqis on the ground and political leaders to replace Saddam’s government. Indeed we know that the coalition worked with UK diaspora leaders in the run up to intervention, and the US had been financing the opposition overtly ever
since their foreign policy position changed towards the country with the introduction of the Iraqi Liberation Act in 1997 (Allawi, 2007; Tripp, 2007; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). This relationship paved the way for the Iraqi opposition leaders to take advantage of this once intervention had occurred and secure a political position inside the country (Bonin, 2011; Allawi, 2007; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Tripp, 2007; Dodge, 2005).

In Iraq we also know that during occupation, the US government used US Iraqi diaspora to support governance programmes in the country. In one of the limited academic studies of Iraqi diaspora involvement during occupation, Iraqi diaspora members in the US were hired by the US Agency for International Development to help restore public and local administration services that supported democratic governance mechanisms (Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, 2008). The Local Governance Program, as it was named, served to train municipal councils, develop democratic councils and capacity-building for civil-society organisations. A similar case scenario played out in Afghanistan following foreign intervention when diasporic actors were used to fill government and development positions (Brinkerhoff, 2006; Shultz and Merril, 2006). What these two case studies indicate is that military involvement and subsequent occupation increased opportunities for diaspora in the US to contribute to their homelands directly due to the foreign policy position of their hostland government.

Yet, how did the war impact the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden whose government opposed the war? In what ways did their anti-intervention foreign policy stance towards Iraq shape the state-building endeavours that diaspora could involve themselves in the aftermath?

Diasporic interventions to support homeland states through civil society have also materialized as an extension of the foreign policies of Western governments, often working through United Nations frameworks of ‘good
governance’ or the Migration-Development nexus. Development cooperation or what are termed, co-development diaspora partnerships have thus received funding from Foreign Ministries, Inter-governmental Organisations (IGO), development organisations as well as other civil society platforms with the explicit aim of working with diaspora organisations and individuals to strengthen weak states.

Indeed diaspora are increasingly seen as bridges between their hostlands and homelands due to their linguistic, cultural, social and political understanding of their homelands and hostlands. As such there is growing awareness amidst policy, IGO, and NGO circles of the link between migration and development (Faist, 2008b). As migrants leave their homelands, many maintain various social and political links, which can serve as a platform for development cooperation. As a result, host states are now more aware of their diverse populations and are taking full advantage of their continued ties to their country of origins (Laakso and Hautaniemi, 2014).

A good example is the collaboration between the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Somali diaspora in Finland. A pilot project was launched called the ‘MIDA Health - Strengthening the Health Sector in Somaliland and Puntland through the Engagement of Somali Diaspora Health Professionals from Finland’ under the framework of the IOM’s Migration and Development for Africa (MIDA) programme. The aim of the project was to connect professional and skilled diaspora from Finland to assist in contributing to the country’s health sector. The project lasted 18 months from 2008 to 2009 and was considered a success in delivering 22 female and male doctors and nurses to help with capacity building in Somaliland and Puntland (Weiss, 2009). Other hostland

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6 See for instance the Migration and Development Programme of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

7 “Migration for Development in Africa” (MIDA) is a capacity-building programme, which helps to mobilize competencies acquired by African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. (‘Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA)’, 2015)
governments including the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the UK government, as well as the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have all engaged with diasporas with varying degrees of interaction and success for supporting homeland states through policy advice, capacity-building and long term partnerships (Ezzati and Horst, 2014; Sinatti, 2014; Moore, 2013). Meanwhile other countries which do not have the institutional capacity for diaspora collaborations have designated responsibility to development NGOs as in Spain, Italy or France (Mezzetti et al., 2014; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010).

Clearly the empirical case studies reveal that foreign ministries are increasing their development toolkit by including diaspora in their repertoire, providing an opportunity for diaspora individuals and groups to become involved in supporting their countries of origin. However the opportunity is dependent on a number of factors related to the foreign policy position of hostland governments vis à vis the diaspora’s country of origin and whether development forms part of their remit. If for instance relations between the country of origin and settlement are fraught with problems then co-development projects will simply not be possible leading to diaspora independent initiatives, or no initiatives at all if the diaspora is not welcomed by the homeland government. On the other hand if relations exist, and foreign policy stances also include developmental work then opportunities may exist for some diaspora individuals or groups with the requisite skills to contribute in various ways.

Co-development diaspora partnerships by foreign ministries are particularly relevant for my case study in Sweden as the majority of literature on hostland state and diaspora engagement initiatives in the literature reference case studies from Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands where civil society and social capital often rank at the top of the global charts (Sivesind and Selle, 2010). In countries such as these the gap between society and the state is smaller, and civic associations tend to have far more influence on the state’s decision making processes (Ibid., 2010). As such foreign policy stances and their
implementation will likely include far more stakeholders than countries whose politics is not defined by its associational life.

Since Sweden did not involve itself in military intervention in Iraq, it is most likely that it contributed to its development through the United Nations. Yet considering Sweden's large Iraqi population, the diaspora may have been incorporated into their development strategy directing their engagement to supporting the state through civil society.

Clearly the type of state-building that diaspora engage in is strongly affected by the hostlands’ foreign policy position towards the homeland. This leads to my second hypothesis: H2: If a diaspora hostland's foreign policy supported militarily intervention and occupation then there will be more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to institution-building and governance where as if the hostland’s foreign policy is limited to development interventions than it will create more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to state-building through civil society.

**Links to Ethno-Sectarian political parties**

Much of the literature related to political transnationalism focuses on countries of settlement (McGregor and Pasura, 2014) with far less work addressing diaspora’s relationship to homeland states and how this can impact who contributes and the type of contributions made. The final hypothesis is therefore deduced from the case of Iraq and addresses this matter by investigating the impact of ethno-sectarian politics in Iraq and its affect on types of diaspora mobilisation.

Since the diaspora literature does not address this variable of links to homeland ethnic parties I draw on the limited diaspora case studies and borrow from the ethnic party system’s literature to make the argument that ethnic cleavages can

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lead to a divisive politics, that privileges diaspora dominant groups at the expense of diasporic minorities.

The ethnic party systems literature has highlighted the dynamics of ethnic diversity and the maintenance of democracy. Many studies, for example, underline that democracy is difficult to maintain in ethnically diverse societies (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972; Lijphart, 1977; Reilly, 2001; Horowitz, 2001; Guelke, 2004; Elischer, 2013). They argue that the dependency on communal support entrenches division and conflict, as communal boundaries are dominated by ethnic or religious cleavages rather than a multiplicity of political or ideological cleavages (Elischer, 2013). In their bid to maintain their grip on power, ethnic groups thus adopt more radical stances to allay any competition from inside groups (Horowitz, 2001), eventually leading to more autocratic forms of governance (Elischer, 2013). Even politics theorists such as Lijpharat and Horowitz, who propose institutional engineering in pluralist societies, are circumspect about the success of sustaining democracy in multi-ethnic societies (Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 2001).

One of the most cited studies relating to ethnic dynamics is David Horowitz's *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Horowitz, 2001), which demonstrates how ethnic parties can exacerbate and entrench ethnic divisions as they appeal to their ethnically divided electorate. Case studies from the African continent have showcased these political dynamics at play, where elites have taken advantage of ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages for political gain (Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2014). An in-depth analysis of party politics in Kenya by Sebastian Elischer for instance, reveals that ethnicity has dominated politics where ethnic alliances have led to relationships of patronage and marginalisation and underrepresentation for ethnic minorities (Elischer, 2013). Similarly, in Zambia, ethno-regional factors are still significant and where the politics of inclusion and exclusion determine votes (Paget, 2014).

There are, however, several cases in Africa that demonstrate that ethnic
cleavages do not always lead to undermining the democratic system or lead to ethnic conflict, as in the case of Ghana or Benin (Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2014; Gisselquist, 2008), in others cases they have led to polarizing effects. Meanwhile, Chandra argues that democracy can be sustained in ethnically divided societies and that what matters more is the institutional context (Chandra, 2005). Using the case study of India, and the state of Uttar Pradesh, Chandra demonstrates how state-recognised institutional social categories of caste and language helped overcome divisive ethnic divisions by moderating cleavages and moving party politics towards a centrist ground, in contrast to the more opposing affect of religious cleavages.

Indeed, in divided societies where religious cleavages exist, minorities or those excluded from political representation in the homeland will not have the same opportunities to engage in the political process. For example Ethiopian Muslims have struggled to contribute to state-building inside the country due to their exclusion from the Ethiopian political system which is dominated by Christians elites. Consequently the Ethiopian Muslim diaspora’s state-building efforts have focused on lobbying for inclusion and political rights for Ethiopian Muslims through diasporic civil society organizations, which have been effective at reaching Ethiopian government officials and even the Prime Minister (Feyissa, 2014). Meanwhile in Nigeria, ethnic cleavages have been reflected in the diaspora as transnational practices have reinforced ethnic competition for power and resources in Nigeria (Lampert, 2009). In what way has ethno-sectarian politics in Iraq shaped or informed the type of state-building processes that diaspora have been able to engage in?

These insights are pertinent for the case study of Iraq and for understanding state-building in Iraqi politics today. When sovereignty was formally handed over to Iraqis in 2004 and democratic elections later took place in 2005, Iraq’s political system was consolidated on ethno-sectarian grounds (Dodge, 2005, 2012; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). The politics of ethno-sectarianism has been advantageous for those in the majority at the expense of the minority who have
been excluded due to their social, political, ethnic or religious minority status.

Since 2005, this has meant power for the dominant Shi’a and Kurdish parties and their members at the expense of Iraq’s other national minorities. As the literature above rightly asserts the reinforcement of ethnic and sectarian cleavages in Iraq has led to authoritarian rule resembling the politics of Saddam’s dictatorship defined by violence and relationships of patronage (Dodge, 2012; Tripp, 2007). As the ethnic party system literature has shown this has led to ethno-sectarian conflict as the exclusionary political environment has fuelled electoral violence, autocratic rule, which further drives polarization and conflict (Horowitz, 2001; Basedau and Stroh, 2012; Elischer, 2013).

Using Chandra’s focus on the institutional context, it is also clear to see that the ethno-sectarian system discourages cross-cutting cleavages that undermine majoritarian groups since each Ministry in Iraq is essentially run by specific sectarian parties, who control various sectors of the state (Tripp, 2007). As such, despite having the formal constitutional and democratic governance apparatus of the state, the reality on the ground has thus far been more akin to what Tripp refers to as absolute control by ‘fiefdoms’.

Drawing on this literature, I therefore posit that following the period of formal occupation when Shi’a Islamists and the Kurds took hold of power following Iraq’s first democratic elections, this impacted diaspora mobilisation and diasporic contributions to state-building as power positions were echoed in the diaspora. Thus it is likely that those in the diaspora who are connected to the ethno-sectarian ruling parties in Iraq will most likely have opportunities in the diaspora to engage in institution-building and governance processes where as those unconnected will be directed to supporting/challenging the state through civil society. The type of state-building that diaspora can engage in is therefore heavily influenced by the governing political parties at home and the politics they practice, which has repercussions for diaspora. My last hypothesis therefore is: H3: Diaspora connected to ruling ethno-sectarian political parties
will have more opportunities to support the state through institution-building and governance where as those unconnected to the ruling ethno-sectarian parties will more likely have opportunities to support/challenge the state through civil society.

Before proceeding to the empirical chapters, it is important to now address competing explanations for why the UK and Swedish diaspora had different opportunities for engagement. To this I now turn.

**Alternative explanations**

In this section I look at competing explanations for why there may have been differences in the state-building contributions of the two diaspora case studies. In the first instance, hostland factors such as citizenship and integration regimes can encourage diaspora mobilisation for different reasons. While some have argued that exclusive, assimilationist citizenship regimes encourage transnational mobilisation because they can exclude ethnic minorities from integrating into hostlands due to discriminatory practices (Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Koopmans et al., 2005; Odmalm, 2009), others have made opposite claims that more open and multicultural citizenship regimes encourage transnational activities because they allow ethnic minorities to participate politically in public life (Wayland, 2004; Baser, 2012; Van Houte et al., 2013). Those who side on the exclusive political systems argue that an inability to access the political system orients claims-making towards the homeland due to high barriers to naturalisation and accessing the hostland’s political institutions (Koopmans and Statham, 2001). Furthermore, as Odmalm rights states, citizenship also confers the type of relationship it has with newcomers through their labelling. In Germany, immigrants are called *foreigners*, an inherently exclusive label that restricts their entry into the hostlands political community and directs their mobilisation towards the country of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000). In other words, exclusive
Citizenship models prohibit political integration through discriminatory laws and denial of rights.

On the other side of the debate on integration and diaspora mobilisation, it is argued that more inclusive political systems encourage diaspora mobilisation. Therefore by providing the political space for minority representation, they give diaspora communities the opportunity and access to formal political institutions and the ability to mobilise towards homeland issues (Van Houte et al., 2013). Inclusive citizenship models in the words of Shain are “weak” and “permeable to societal influences on its decision-making process” (Shain, 2007:143). This allows diasporas to act as ethnic interest groups in their host societies (Shain, 1999). Furthermore, open access to citizenship allows a two pronged approach whereby diasporas can travel to their homelands and mobilise whilst simultaneously lobbying their host state governments (Wayland, 2004). Additionally more inclusive political systems can encourage developmental projects between diasporas and host state governments (De Haas, 2006). Inclusive citizenship regimes therefore facilitate diaspora mobilisation through an open access political system, thereby encouraging transnationalism through a mechanism of accessibility.

Citizenship regimes are clearly important for understanding the structural constraints that can limit political behaviour both in their policy and discursive manifestations. Yet this variable is unhelpful in the case of the Iraqi diaspora as both the UK and Sweden are considered to be multicultural regimes (Howard, 2009; Koopmans et al., 2005). There are of course differences in their multicultural approaches, with the UK’s best described as laissez-faire (Joppke, 1999), where the onus of integration is on ethnic minorities via the Big Society and local authorities. Meanwhile in Sweden there is a more structured incorporation regime that funds Swedish language classes, native–tongue language schools, and more funding opportunities for ethnic social and cultural events (Khayati, 2008; Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014). However these minor differences may account for why there may be more social and cultural
diaspora events in Sweden owing to more opportunities for funding, but it cannot explain differences in the way the two diaspora communities contributed to mobilising towards state-building in Iraq.

Another factor could be related to the openness and accessibility of the political systems in each hostland, where more permeable political systems such as in the United States are said to facilitate accessibility to policy makers (Shain and Barth, 2003). For example, in a comparative study between Albanians in America and the UK, Maria Koinova looked at the ways hostland political systems can affect the political strategies of homeland elites, who may choose the diaspora hostlands that can further their causes the most (Koinova, 2013). Her research showed that Albanians in the US had far more success in lobbying for Kosovo independence due to the openness and accessibility of congress in comparison to the UK’s parliamentary system, which proved more difficult to influence. Though there will inevitably be variation in levels between the UK and Swedish political systems, in the case of the Iraqi diaspora the openness of both the UK and Sweden becomes a controlled variable as both systems are considered open and accessible (Howard, 2009; Koopmans et al., 2005). Furthermore, while openness may encourage activity, it tells us nothing about why activity is directed towards one type of state-building or another. Therefore this variable is inadequate for explaining why there was divergence between the two diaspora hostlands.

**Defining the Independent Variables**

To reiterate, the hypotheses to be explored in this study are:

**H1:** Diaspora who were connected to elite socio-political networks in 2003 and had monetary resources had more opportunities to engage in state-building through institution-building and governance, while those who were not connected to elite political networks and had insufficient resources were directed to supporting the state through civil society.
**H2:** If a diaspora hostland’s foreign policy supported militarily intervention and occupation then there will be more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to institution-building and governance where as if the hostland's foreign policy was limited to development than it will create more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to state-building through civil society.

**H3:** Diaspora connected to ruling ethno-sectarian political parties will have more opportunities to support the state through institution-building and governance where as those unconnected to the ruling ethno-sectarian parties will have more opportunities to support/challenge the state through civil society.

Below is a table summarising the hypotheses under review with the concepts that they relate to and their operationalization.

**The Independent Variables:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1 Elite Socio-political networks and monetary resources</td>
<td>Having resources and links to elite socio-political networks or not</td>
<td>Having monetary resources to mobilise and linked to socio-political networks in Iraq and in the hostland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Military involvement or not</td>
<td>Military employment and occupation in Iraq (UK) or not (Sweden).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3 Ethno-sectarian party</td>
<td>Connection or lack of connection</td>
<td>Membership or link to ethno-sectarian party or not.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Before this study’s investigation can proceed it is necessary to define and operationalize the independent variables.

1. Having monetary resources and links to elite socio-political networks

Though the word elite has in history been used to depict a minority ruling class which governed and was distinct from the masses, in today’s modern usage, elites can be a number of social groups within society who have a powerful influence on the political process. In Europe this can include a plethora of actors who are a reflection of the capitalist and industrial political systems in which they operate, including businessmen, bureaucrats and managers, political leaders and intellectuals. Yet in developing countries, such as Iraq, elites are the creation of not only industrialisation but also of colonial rule, as such both internal and external factors have shaped their creation (Bottomore, 2006).

Elite groups in the Middle East have thus been the product of dynasties, nationalist movements, wealthy individuals and the intelligentsia (Ibid., 2006). Indeed in the case of Iraq, there have been the British installed monarchists, nationalist movements such as pan-Arabism, Communism and Islamist movements, as well as intellectuals and prominent and wealthy elite families who have shaped and influenced politics in Iraq (Batatu, 2004; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001; Marr, 2012; Tripp, 2007). In Iraq, there is also the religious authority of the Marja’, the highest clerical authority in the country. Even though the Marja’iyya does not engage directly in politics it has the power to influence political decisions as witnessed in Iraq in 2004, when Ali Al Sistani, the Iraqi Marja’ demanded that the constitutional convention be elected (Bremer and McConnell, 2006). In any case it is this mix of Iraq’s elite socio-political network that I refer to in my study. Those who are connected to political, religious and powerful leaders in the hostland and homeland.

In order to observe their presence it is necessary to trace back the migration waves of the diaspora to understand who left and when, what their socio-
economic position was in the country of origin upon exiting, their political pasts and their reasons for migrating to the UK. In doing so we can compare the profile of the two diaspora in Sweden and the UK for an understanding of their links to Iraq and their capabilities. For example, were they from prominent political, wealthy or religious families? What is their educational level or professional status? Were they linked to opposition politics and how? All these questions will be determined from interview questions shedding light into the profile of interviewees. This information will also be triangulated via other diaspora individuals and groups and where possible via Arabic and English media outlets.

Similarly, their access to monetary resources will also be determined from interviews where respondents are questioned about their professions as well as how they financed their political activities.

2. Foreign policy
The concept of foreign policy loosely relates to a country’s diplomatic relations with other states. The type of relations that states have is determined by its set of shared interests in relation to other states in the world (Nye, 1999), which is often referred to as its national interest. Foreign policy thus is often debated in the literature in relation to the concept of national interest. Foreign policies are said to be decided by what a state considers to be its national interest. Yet the concept of national interest is elusive, and has been defined in both narrow and broad terms by scholars who view it as relating to state survival, material economic or political interests, moral values or anything that the government deems the ‘interest’ to be (Krasner and Affairs, 1978; Nye, 1999; Rice, 2000; Waltz, 1979; Burchill, 2014).

In this study foreign policy is defined practically as the policy adopted and behaviour towards Iraq in 2003. It therefore eschews rationales and assumptions about the foreign policies adopted by the UK and Sweden, but
rather focuses on the strategy and implementation of policy and how this created or limited opportunities for the diaspora under study.

The UK’s foreign policy towards Iraq in 2003 was involvement in military intervention to change the regime of Saddam Hussein. This required working collaboratively with the US and deploying military and civilian personnel to Iraq as part of the Multi-National Force, code-named Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Meanwhile Sweden was opposed to the Iraq War and did not involve itself in military intervention or occupation of the country in 2003 but supported the work of the United Nations in Iraq. The divergent foreign policies may account for the different diasporic state-building contributions of the UK and Swedish diaspora.

Operationally, this variable will be determined by looking at the practical involvement of each host state in the Iraq War and how these positions of involvement or lack of affected diasporic state-building. This will be assessed with data from interviews with diaspora, diplomatic and government officials, policy papers and media reports where UK and Swedish foreign policy and actions are stated.

3. Links to ethno-sectarian political parties
A political party is identified by its organisation and separation from other organisations, it is also defined by its participation or attempts at participation in the decision-making process of a state (Neumann, 1969). A political party thus is a group, “however loosely organised seeking to elect governmental office-holders under a given label” (Epstein, 1980, p.9). The label is the distinguishing factor that differentiates one party from another in a competitive and participatory political system, distinguishing between participatory political systems and authoritarian ones.
The type of parties in the political system will thus dictate the foundation of politics since it is their political programmes and candidates who will be structuring this process (Manning, 2005). In Western democracies labels or party identities are predominantly based on cross-cutting social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) such as class and political ideology. Yet in non-Western countries, cleavages are less diverse and ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages, are often more dominant than ideology (Doorenspleet and Nijzink, 2014). Often these are centred around political elites or clientelist networks that take advantage of ethnic or religious cleavages, to build constituencies (Manning, 2005). Eligibility for membership to these groups is thus determined by descent-based attributes or at least those believed to be associated with descent (Chandra, 2006). These include and are not restricted to language, religion, tribe, or physical traits. Thus ethnic labels for political parties are often politically rewarding for dominant ethnicities (Kaufmann, 2004).

A defining feature of ethnic parties is therefore their narrow interests, which is to advance their particular ethnic group or coalition of groups by using existing state structures to channel benefits towards their particular group (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.183; Chandra, 2005). According to Herbert Kitschelt their defining feature is their appeal to a particular constituency where inclusive and exclusive boundaries are drawn between co-ethnics and others (quoted from (Diamond and Gunther, 2001, p.184).

Understanding links to ruling ethno-sectarian parties is pertinent to the case of Iraq where in the post-2003 period an ethno-sectarian party system was consolidated under the Coalition Provisional Authority, which gave way to ethno-sectarian politics and thus the rise of dominant ethno-religious groups in the country (Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Allawi, 2007; Barakat, 2005; Dawisha, 2005). The dominant ethno-religious groups in Iraq are the long time repressed Shi’a and the Kurds who have capitalised on their majoritarian status in their respective regions. Consequently both have dominated Iraqi elections in 2005, 2010 and 2014 where politicians have relied on their co-ethnic or co-
sectarian constituencies to keep them in power. Iraq's Shi'a and Kurds have thus largely controlled building the state of Iraq in the post-intervention phase at the expense of other ethnic and sectarian minorities.

Links to ethno-sectarian parties in the diaspora will therefore likely create more opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance than for those disconnected from this new ethno-sectarian political class. These include but are not limited to the Shi'a Islamic parties, Da'wa and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and the Kurdish parties, Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Meanwhile Iraq’s others minorities, whether ethnic, sectarian, or political will most likely mobilise towards supporting or challenging the state through civil society by holding the government accountable and fighting for democratic and political representation and rights.

Operationally this variable will be evidenced through interviews where diaspora are questioned about their political work and memberships and historical links to political parties and activism. This information is also determined through triangulation with other diaspora individuals and also media reports where necessary.

To summarise, this chapter has narrowed in on diaspora mobilisation for state-building by showing the ways diaspora have contributed to this political process but also by highlighting the gaps in the literature related to our understanding of diaspora mobilisation for state-building in cases of military intervention and regime change. Furthermore, understanding how and why diaspora approach the task of state-building in different ways remains a puzzle that the state-building and diaspora literature have not been able to adequately answer. I have thus presented explanatory factors that may account for why there were divergences in the mobilisation of the two diaspora case studies and presented three hypotheses relating to the profile of diaspora in each host state, the hostland foreign policy of each host state towards the homeland and links
to ethno-sectarian parties in the homeland. I have similarly presented alternative explanations, which can only partially account for differences and defined the independent variables to be investigated in chapters 5 and 6. In the next chapter, I explain how I carry out my investigation and analyse my data. To this I now turn.
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY

The previous two chapters addressed the concept of diaspora, transnationalism and defined the dependent variable of diaspora mobilisation for state-building and its two categories to be analysed in this study and compared in each host state context. Secondly, three hypotheses were proposed relating to the diaspora’s profile, hostland foreign policy stance, and links to ethno-sectarian parties in the homeland. In this chapter the research design is outlined that will be used to help address the two research questions of this study:

1. How have Iraqis in Sweden and the UK contributed to state-building following the 2003 intervention?
2. Why was the UK diaspora able to contribute more to institution-building and governance while the Swedish Iraqi diaspora contributed more to supporting Iraq’s new state through civil society?

Since this is a comparative study that is interested in understanding why state-building contributions differed across cases an imperfect Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) is most fitting for this comparative study. Following a discussion on the small N comparative method and the MSSD design, the methods used for data gathering, coding and process tracing will follow. My position as a researcher is also addressed in the final section where I reflect on my presumed ‘insider’ position and how it influenced the research process.

Small- N Comparative method

Since this study is interested in understanding why diasporic contributions to state-building vary, individual accounts are needed to determine how choices were made. Therefore the unit of analysis in this study is the individual so a case-oriented approach (Ragin, 1989) as opposed to a statistical–oriented approach is fitting for my research design. As George and Bennett rightly assert “case studies remain much stronger at assessing whether and how a variable
mattered to the outcome than at assessing how much it mattered (George and Bennett, 2005:25). This is precisely what my research attempts to uncover by assessing how the variables under study affected the type of state-building efforts that individual actors engaged in.

Secondly, a small number of case-studies will allow for the “rich details of diverse societies and cultures and to show how the different spheres of each society and culture interrelate” to produce a given outcome (Skocpol and Somers, 1980: 192). Indeed, one of the strengths of comparing a small number of cases is the ability to investigate specific contexts in more depth, due to the lower level of abstraction that makes them less extensive in scope yet more intensive in detail (Lijphart, 1971, 1975; Landman, 2008). This is particularly relevant for my research as detailed information on the Iraqi diaspora and its political transnationalism from a European context is severely lacking.

Every research design has its weaknesses and the small-N comparative method is no exception. While focusing on a small number of cases provides “detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance” (Gerring, 2004: 348), which may contribute to meso-level theory development, it will not uncover trends related to diaspora contributions to state-building more generally. Therefore in comparing diaspora state-building in the UK and Sweden, this research design will provide description, and test hypotheses, which may contribute to middle range theory (Meckstroth, 1975), but will not serve as a predictor of outcomes due to the small number of cases under study. The study will therefore hold internal validity and strong inferences within selected cases but weak externally since representativeness can only be achieved once empirical testing is carried out in other host lands (Slater and Ziblatt, 2013) where Iraqi diasporic state-building is occurring or with other diaspora in different hostlands.

However for the purposes of this study, whose main concern is to understand variances in mobilisation types, case studies will provide original empirical data
on Iraqi diasporic state-building in Europe. The comparative method of two cases therefore makes a valuable starting point for our understanding of this political phenomenon among the Iraqi diaspora in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war.

The Comparative Method

While all political inquiry may be classified as comparative in nature owing to the fact that we define who we are by comparing ourselves to others, the comparative method is not a technique of analysis but a strategic scientific method comparable to the experimental, statistical and case study method (Lijphart, 1971). It therefore follows a positivist approach whose epistemological assumptions suggest that political behaviour is observable and explanations of that behaviour can be empirically tested for its verification or falsification (Ritchie et al., 2013). The science of politics thus draws on the rigour of natural science in its methodological assumptions so that a scientific ordering is obtained via a cyclical relationship between discovery and justification (Faure, 1994). This approach to political science acknowledges that empirical evidence may be less than perfect (Lijphart, 1971; Landman, 2008), yet it attempts to gain the best empirical data available in an ordered and systematic way, so that inference is made possible (King et al., 1994:119).

The comparative method will thus be helpful for this study as it generates “logically rigorous causal explanations of regularities and variations in empirical phenomena” (Smelser, 1976: 174). It does this by providing much needed description and classification of phenomenon, as well as hypothesis-testing and prediction. In this study it will be used to eliminate rival explanations, test theory derived hypotheses for similarities and differences cross-nationally, uncover important variables, explicate causal relationships (Landman, 2008: 6-9) and help contribute to middle range theory.

Consequently the comparative method is apt for this study as it is not only
useful for comparing political phenomena and “testing hypothesised empirical relationships among variables” (Lijphart, 1971, 1975), which will address the why question of this thesis, but following Rose (1991), also one that will provide a substantive focus with-in cases addressing the how question of this study.

Traditionally there have been two classical comparison models whose methodological roots stem from John Stuart Mills’ “method of difference” and method of concomitant variations” (Lijphart, 1971: 687-688). The first model, developed by Lijphart (1971) is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD), which compares different outcomes across similar countries. Similarities across systems act as the control variables, allowing the researcher to uncover the key dependent variable that is common among cases. Meanwhile, another model offered by Przeworski and Teune is the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD), which works by uncovering the common key independent variable that accounts for similar outcomes in different countries (1970).

The MSSD model is the most commonly used comparative research design and is considered by various scholars (Lijphart 1971, Faure 1994) as the optimal design owing to the similarities between countries that make them apt for comparative inquiry (Przeworski and Teune, 1970:32). With regards to this study’s interests regional clustering also helps with controlling and reducing extraneous variation. This is valid for my research project whose cases are both European and share many political features (this will be further expanded in the case selection segment of this chapter). This is helpful as one can be more confident that the phenomena investigated will be more closely comparable because of the similarity in social and political context (Smelser, 1976:169).

Under this framework, common systemic factors provide the “control”, whereas inter-systemic differences are considered explanatory variables. The more similarities exist between cases, and the less differences that exist between them the better. This will make it more likely that an explanatory variable can be determined for explaining differences in the dependent variable.
For the purposes of this study an MSSD model is the most fitting design for addressing the research question since explaining variations in the type of state-building engaged in across country contexts is at the heart of the research problem. The MSSD model will allow a comparative and detailed investigation of contributions to state-building within the two country cases addressing the first research question related to how the diaspora in each context contributed to state-building while an explanation for understanding differences and patterns across cases will address the second research question related to why this was the case.

**Case Selection**

As many comparative scholars have rightfully warned, in order to carry out a systematic scientific comparative inquiry, appropriate case selection is vital (Lieberson, 1991; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013). Case selection is critical for avoiding selection bias where the choice of countries has been deliberately chosen on the outcome of the dependent variable (Geddes, 1990; Landman, 2008) or particular sources used that support a particular theoretical position (Lustick, 1996).

The country cases were chosen for this study by the ERC funded research project ‘Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty’ based on differences in integration regimes. The UK and Sweden, however, share similar citizenship regimes as indicated using the citizenship models of Howard (2009) but also Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). Howard and Koopmans have documented the divergences in citizenship policies and classified them as either ‘restrictive’, ‘medium’ and ‘liberal’ in the former and ‘exclusive’ or ‘ethnic’, ‘assimilationist’ or ‘republican’ and ‘multicultural’ or ‘plural’ regimes in the latter. Howards model is formulated by looking at the policies surrounding whether jus soli is granted, naturalisation rates and ability to gain dual-citizenship, whereas Koopmans and colleagues focuses on the levels of access
to the political community and naturalisation. Both the cases of the UK and Sweden are considered liberal and multicultural under these two models.

Nonetheless, the two cases differ in their modes of incorporation with the UK having a much more laissez-faire approach to its multiculturalism (Joppke, 1999), where as Sweden has a more interventionist approach that provides for language classes, funding for native language classes for children and ethnic cultural and social events (Borevi, 2013). However, what is more important about this controlled variable is that it gives the same opportunities for diaspora to mobilise politically as it encourages political participation and allows diaspora to freely engage with regards to homeland affairs in both the UK and Sweden.

Secondly, both cases bypass selection bias problems because the cases have been selected on the certainty of finding diaspora political transnationalism in each host state prior and following the 2003 intervention without selecting on a particular outcome.

Thirdly, the cases of UK and Sweden are suitable for a controlled comparison since they both share political and social similarities. Both are liberal, western democracies, with a cultural heritage that pertains to a Judeo-Christian lineage. All have a ranking of 10 signifying full democracy status on the Polity VI data set (Polity VI Project, 2013) and all are considered Free by Freedom House’s democracy indicators (Freedom House, 2013). Furthermore, both are members of the European Union, the United Nations and are considered advanced economies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)⁹, as well as having a very high human development index score. The cases are thus fitting for holding constant certain variables to reduce explanatory variables within cases (Lijphart, 1971).

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Fourthly, the host countries also have the largest Iraqi communities in Europe according to various governmental and non-governmental organisations (Sassoon, 2009). Although there are no accurate official figures for Iraqi populations in Europe due to the rise of newly arrived refugees and European born Iraqis, according to Sweden’s National Statistic Office there were 131,888 Iraqis in 2015¹⁰. Estimates for the UK range between 350,000 to 450,000 according to the Iraqi Embassy in London, where as a mapping exercise by the International Organisation for Migration estimated that the figure could be around 200,000 (IOM, 2007). Size matters for this project since it is important that the Iraqi communities studied reflect the diversity of Iraq’s ethnic and religious make-up, though this is not to say that there may not be majority groups or differences in configuration.

**Data Gathering**

Semi-structured interviews with politically engaged diaspora individuals who worked independently, or were members of civil society groups, political and religious parties was the main method used for gathering data. One to one interviews were needed to understand the intentions and motivations of why and how people mobilised and the meanings they gave to their actions. Interviews are therefore necessary for entering into the person’s perspective and gathering their stories (Patton, 2002: 341).

Semi-structured interview provided a middle ground for capturing “detail, depth and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time allowing hypothesis testing and the quantitative analysis of interview responses” (Leech, 2002: 665). They also allowed for more focused exploration and advancement of knowledge concerning Iraqi political diasporic engagement, while the open-ended element ensured that time could be given to probing for additional details that might otherwise be lost in a structured questionnaire (Louise Barriball and While, 1994).

¹⁰ Statistics Sweden database found at http://www.scb.se/en_/
The questions formulated drew out information regarding social backgrounds, migration motivations, political activities prior to and after the 2003 intervention, political motivations, organisation, experiences in the hostland and attitudes to the 2003 intervention. The questions were designed to aid the process-tracing method (George and Bennett, 2005), and contribute to the analysis and understanding of why and how diaspora mobilise differently in different contexts and over time. For the questions see Appendix 1.

In the last three years I have also conducted a large number of informal interviews with a plethora of Iraqis including Iraqi writers, poets, musicians, academics that provided invaluable background information about the diasporic experience and the political situation in Iraq. I also attended academic, cultural and social events in London and Stockholm pertaining to Iraq, which provided more opportunities to meet with individuals and discuss my work. I also carried out open-ended interviews with government, diplomatic and public officials who worked or collaborated with the diaspora both prior to and after intervention in both the UK and Sweden.

**Participant Selection and Ethics**
Selection of participants for this study commenced in 2013 in London, UK. Participants were selected based on their political activities towards the homeland whether through political party branches or civil society organisations or individual work. As best I could I tried to capture voices of individuals from various ethnic, social backgrounds and gender who were willing to be interviewed.

It is important to note that this thesis does not claim to represent the views of the entire Iraqi diaspora in each host state, nor could it ever. The diaspora in each host state is not a monolithic community. Not only are there diverse ethnic, social, political and religious groups, but there are also divisions and differences within them. For example, some Iraqi Christians identify as
Assyrians, others Syriac or Chaldean depending on how they view their history. Neither does this thesis claim to depict the entire spectrum of activities, actors and organisations that represent the Iraqi diaspora in each host state. Rather this thesis aims to gain an indicative overview of the variety of political activities since 2003 to 2013 in each host state for an understanding of how actors contributed to state-building and the factors that led to these choices.

London
Being a Londoner with an Iraqi background I was aware of the various diaspora communities based in London and was able to locate participants easily. My search commenced with informal gatekeepers associated with the Iraqi Association in London, who provided a good background to the active political groups and organisations operating, as well as identifying key individuals associated with the organization both past and present who remained politically active.

In seeking to meet with members from different backgrounds I also attended diasporic events, and conducted Internet and social media searches to identify participants. A very useful diaspora event was the Iraqi government’s Migrants and Displaced Persons Conference, which convened in London in October 2013. The conference proved to be a rich source for identifying key gatekeepers from Iraq’s multiple ethnic and religious communities, civil society organisations, businessmen, as well as political parties who were invited. This led to a snowball effect as once participants understood the nature of the study they were able to identify other individuals within their network that were politically active towards Iraq.

In London I conducted 37 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with Iraqi diaspora participants that lasted from 1-2 hours. I met with individuals at a place of their choosing and explained to participants how the data was to be used in my study and reassured them of their anonymity. Once I’d gained their permission to use the data for this research I presented them with a letter of
consent from Warwick University to sign, which some chose to sign while others refused. I always sought permission to record interviews, which some were happy for me to do.

I also conducted 6 open-ended interviews with senior diplomatic figures, Foreign and Common Wealth officials and NGO organisations that either worked on Iraq prior to intervention, served in Iraq during the occupation years, or beyond. The open-ended method used for these interviews helped to elaborate on the nature of collaborations with diaspora individuals and groups in the UK prior and after intervention from the perspective of the UK government and its foreign policy at the time. It also helped to triangulate information received from diaspora individuals.

**Sweden**

Identifying participants in Sweden commenced through friendship networks in Stockholm that were able to provide the names and contact details of key gatekeepers who were politically active and who had contacts with political representatives from various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Upon arrival in Sweden I discovered that there was also a coordinating committee between Iraq’s political party branches in the diaspora representing the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Da’wa, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Turkmen Front, various Iraqi Christian parties, Yezidi organisations, and the Iraqi Democratic Movement amongst others. This was a great source from which I was able to meet political Iraqis from all ethnic backgrounds but also gain information about other Iraqi organisations and associations and also individuals active in this area. This was important for capturing as wide a range of activities and actors from all backgrounds within each diasporic community.

I conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with Iraqi diaspora in Stockholm that lasted from 1-2 hours. As with London I reassured participants about the nature of the study and how the data was to be used before asking their
permission to use it. Unlike London many participants did not wish to sign the consent forms and some refused to have the interview recorded. However all gave their consent orally and were happy for me to use their interviews anonymously for the PhD.

I also carried out 10 open-ended interviews with government, diplomatic and public officials who worked or collaborated with the diaspora both prior to and after intervention. The interviews helped to triangulate information received from the diaspora but also served to give an accurate understanding of the Swedish government’s foreign policy position towards Iraq during different phases, and the nature of collaborations with Iraqi diaspora individuals and groups.

Secondary sources from academic texts, NGOs, government policy papers and international organisations were also used both for the UK and Swedish case studies for supporting evidence and further triangulation (Elliott and Timulak, 2005).

Data Analysis
Data analysis for this study adopts wisdoms and practices of both grounded theory and positivism, two approaches that are considered theoretically paradoxical. Grounded theory starts with the data and uses a bottom–up approach inductively to draw out theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Glaser and Strauss, 2009), where as positivism works in the opposite way by deductively identifying hypotheses from theory to be tested on the data gathered (Ritchie et al., 2013). However, owing to the fact that the research puzzle of this thesis is an area under studied in the diaspora literature, it is an area that requires exploration, as well as investigation calling on the use of what Johnny Saldaña refers to as ‘eclectic pragmatism’ in the approach of how data should be coded (Saldaña, 2009). While hypotheses have been drawn out from the literature, a more open approach is also required for other interesting factors to emerge (Seidman, 2006). As such it is argued here that the two approaches need not be
contradictory, but can actually be complimentary if undertaken in stages, that allow for the data to speak to the theory, while also allowing the theory then to speak to the data.

Before uncovering this research puzzle and the focus of the study, a preliminary research trip to Sweden was taken to meet with few diasporic actors to gain a sense of Iraqi political transnationalism. Once a number of interviews were conducted I was able to listen to the interviews without having any theoretical guidance, which helped identify an emerging pattern regarding the diasporic contributions of participants, which differed to those witnessed in London. As such interviews were firstly heard without assumptions borrowing from the wisdom of a grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss, 2009). I wanted, in effect, to observe the data in the first place from a more neutral position, without any theory framing my analysis. This helped direct my study to a focus on state-building, and to explore theoretically how and why diasporas built their countries of origin in different ways.

Coding

Once all interviews were complete, extensive notes and part transcriptions were made of each interview. After reading and rereading the interviews I gave myself time to process the information before I began to code (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). This was effective in helping me see the broader causal links, and to differentiate between intervening and independent variables when I finally came to coding the data using the theoretical framework adopted.

I then commenced initial coding of the interviews using the theoretical framework outlined in the study as well as allowing for other noteworthy topics to emerge (Seidman, 2006). Initial coding included past political activities, persecution in the homeland, belonging, elite networks, grass-roots activism, political parties, democracy building, human rights, minority rights, collaboration with hostland state, work with Iraqi government amongst others.
After gaining a comprehensive understanding of the range of diasporic integration experiences, motivations, range of political activities, and actors, codes were recoded under the categories of the dependent variable in order to distinguish between the causal paths that lead to each type. This followed a second cycle of process coding for understanding the causal mechanisms that lead to each type (Saldaña, 2009). Eventually thematic categories emerged from the data relating to the hypotheses put forward. Gradually connective threads were made between the type of activities engaged in and the factors that lead to specific types.

**Analysing the data with Process Tracing**

Controlled comparisons in qualitative research methods are difficult to achieve under the strict criteria outlined by Mill’s method of agreement and difference (cf. George and Bennett 2005 Ch. 10). Indeed, Mill himself was sceptical about their use in the social sciences (Lijphart, 1971). As George and Bennett explain, both methods may lead to ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’, where causal inferences made by comparing two cases may turn out to be spurious or invalid when tested against another case (2005: 153-160). In an attempt to address the shortfalls within the controlled comparison, the 1990s saw a wave of literature sparked by King, Keohane and Verba’s influential *Designing Social Inquiry* (1994) who sought to make qualitative comparative methods more robust. The dawn of this new era of methodology focused on new tools and strategies for improving causal inference (Mahoney, 2010: 123), and one of the key methods outlined was the use of “process tracing” for refining causal inference. So what is process tracing?

George and Bennett define process tracing as a method, which “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” (George and Bennett, 2005:206). It is therefore a research method for analysing evidence in light of research questions and hypotheses put forward by the researcher (Collier, 2011: 823). ‘By tracing the process of
events, causal variables may or may not be ruled out as having causal significance’ (George and Bennett, 2005:214-215). In this way causal paths that lead to a specific outcome are uncovered or differences in causal paths in different cases identified.

Due to its close inspection of individual cases, process tracing is therefore useful for a variety of research tasks including, “(a) identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them; (b) evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and assessing these new causal claims; (c) gaining insight into causal mechanisms; and (d) providing an alternative means—compared with conventional regression analysis and inference based on statistical models—of addressing challenging problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias.” (Collier, 2011: 824).

Furthermore as George and Bennett have pointed out process tracing can contribute to testing theory and theory development as it not only generates many observations within a case but that these observations must be linked in meaningful ways to form an explanation of the case (George and Bennett, 2005: 207). It is therefore a method that can develop middle-range theories and typological theories (2005: 225).

One of the crucial differences between process tracing and historical explanation is that the process tracing method is couched by theory identified by the researcher which will serve to offer an analytical explanation of the outcome under study. It is not solely historical account that offers a chronology of events, but rather one that offers a causal sequence, analysis and explanation (Collier, 2011: 823). The two crucial elements of process tracing are thus description and sequencing. In describing events carefully and knowing cases well we can start to make sense of how they link together and analyse the causal change from one event to another over a period of time.

Since this thesis is concerned with explaining contextual and causal factors that lead to variances in state-building during a time period spanning the pre and
post intervention, process tracing within cases provides the best means of uncovering the linking minutiae of these temporal processes. It is therefore a complimentary method to the small-n comparative method that will chart the intervening causal process and explanation for state-building in each context. In doing so differences in state-building paths will be discovered, allowing a comparative composition across cases (Mahoney 2010; Slater and Ziblatt, 2013).

Process- tracing will be used throughout my empirical chapters to analyse the migrations and creations of each diaspora in the UK and Sweden. Tracing the diaspora back in time to its creation and migration waves allows us to inspect the profiles of diaspora in each hostland, while allowing us to see how the profiles within each context created a very different social and political diasporic scene. This is important for recounting how oppositional activity grew in each hostland in the lead up to intervention in 2003 and why there were differences in the capabilities of each diaspora.

As the 2003 intervention and occupation took place, the empirical chapters piece together how the foreign policy stances of each hostland impacted or shaped the type of state-building that each diaspora was able to engage in. The UK’s foreign policy stance of military intervention and later occupation created openings for the Iraqi diaspora as political leaders, governors and advisors. Meanwhile Sweden’s foreign policy stance of non-intervention and working through the UN framework during the occupation years meant that Iraqis in Sweden had no access into Iraq until Iraqis gained their sovereignty and Sweden created its own relationship with the Iraqi government.

In the post-2005 period and after Iraq’s first democratic elections a different story begins to unfold as repercussions of ethno-sectarian dynamics in Iraq have a bearing on the capabilities of those in the diaspora to mobilise towards state-building processes. The empirical chapters trace the effects of ethno-sectarianism to reveal that those linked to ethno-sectarian parties have far more opportunities to mobilise towards institution-building and governance
while those not linked to these ruling parties are steered towards supporting/challenging the state through civil society.

The empirical chapters thus will proceed by recounting the story of each diaspora over time revealing how diasporic profiles, hostland foreign policy stances and later links to ethno-sectarian political parties affected the type of state-building that diaspora were able to engage in 2003 and beyond.

**Positionality and Reflexivity**
The production of knowledge is a two way relationship between researcher and participant (Geertz, 1993). A multitude of categories including the researcher’s class, religion, gender, sexual orientation, as well as the subject matter of the research and the locations in which the research is conducted (Al-Ali and Pratt, 2006) can all influence the production of knowledge in subtle and unsubtle ways. Having a reflexive approach, i.e. an understanding of how one’s subject position can alter the research process is therefore important for understanding how knowledge is produced. Crucially however it can also crucially enhance the research by lending greater understanding to the nuances of the research topic (Finlay and Gough, 2003).

Indeed, as a British citizen with an Iraqi-Arab background I was aware from the few readings on reflexivity how my positionality carried with it obvious privileges owing to my cultural, social and political understanding of Iraqi issues, speaking Iraqi Arabic, and crucially, access and legitimacy within the community (Chavez, 2007). Born to Arab Iraqi parents associated with the Iraqi Communist Party, I knew first hand the political persecution my parents faced in Iraq, the personal sacrifices made for me and my brothers and sister, as well as the loneliness, missed opportunities, and the yearning for home that life in the diaspora often evoked. My parents’ left-wing associations affected the diasporic life they led and consequently my diasporic milieu. Growing up this largely incorporated Iraqi poets, musicians, artists and political stalwarts of the Iraqi Communist Party. Growing up in the diaspora, I was oblivious to ethnic,
religious or sectarian tensions because I led a secular familial life.

In my younger years I attended cultural events with my parents at the now defunct and sorely missed Kufa gallery in Bayswater, as well as social parties organised by the Iraqi Association or the Iraqi Communist Party in Acton Town Hall or Holborn’s Conway Hall. Up until this point in my late teens, I had a diasporic life, which was also shaped by an increasingly distant hope and waiting game of returning when Saddam Hussein’s reign would come to an end. With each year both the hopelessness and the distance from the diaspora increased until I stopped going to diasporic Iraqi events and parties. My relationship to Iraq was only revived in my late twenties through my identification with feminism as I decided to explore the position of Iraqi women following the 2003 Iraqi occupation for my MA dissertation. This study subsequently re-connected me to Iraq, to activism and thus to the diaspora.

On entering this research project I did not consider myself as belonging to the Iraqi diaspora but I understood it from my own diasporic references. My links to Iraq were largely familial, understood through the food, the stories of family back in Iraq, the music, the news, talking the language, but also through sporadic activism. As such I am considered by the literature as a classic ‘insider’ whether understood as belonging to a group in terms of culture or biology or knowledge of the community under study (Merton, 1972). In reality I felt more of a cultural ‘insider’ because it is the culture I am intimate with (Ganga and Scott, 2006). In any case I could never have anticipated or appreciated how my own experiences of diasporic life differed and how much of an outsider I could be until I was faced with other ethnic or sectarian Iraqi individuals and groups.

Markers of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ affected the research process in different ways. These included generation, different migration waves, language/accent, religion, ethnicity, gender and family political background. By the end of my fieldwork I had a greater appreciation for the complexities of the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ dynamic and how ethno-national boundaries do not automatically
Inspire ‘insider’ status (Carling et al., 2013). Rather there are multiple layers of intersectional categories (Crenshaw, 1991) creating shifting ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positionalities that can be both felt from the researcher’s own position or attributed by respondents.

Contrary to the dominant literature on migration research that perceives those who are ethnically from the migrant community as ‘insiders’ and those who are not part of it as ‘outsiders’ (Ganga and Scott, 2006) in most cases during my fieldwork I felt both an insider and outsider. During the same interview, my feelings changed sometimes within minutes due to my or my respondent’s behaviour. Thus my positioning shifted and altered, underlining the false dichotomy of the insider/outsider taxonomy (Breen, 2007; Chavez, 2007; Greene, 2014). Instead my position changed when categories of difference/similarity between myself and the respondent were highlighted. For example, religion proved to be a category of difference, which affected my interactions and relationships with participants. A good example was the first interview I had with a religious Iraqi man. Not being religious or growing up around religiosity in my Iraqi family life, I was unaware of the religious customs associated with a woman greeting a religious man. Upon meeting the respondent I went to shake his hand, to which he politely declined. In that instant I was acutely reminded of my secular position and lack of knowledge of religious custom, which made me feel like an outsider. It also served to underline the distance between my diasporic life in the UK and that of the participant. In that gesture I had effectively communicated my lack of religious knowledge, which immediately set us apart, making both of us aware of our different social and religious positions (Ganga and Scott, 2006).

Another example related to my visit to a religious mufti in London. Thinking I understood the social norms I dressed professionally and conservatively and tied my hair back. When I greeted him, the first question he asked me was why I was not wearing a hijab. My internal reaction to his question, a mixture of indignation and irritation, also made me realise how removed I was from
certain segments of Iraqi diasporic society due to my secular beliefs. I also felt naïve in thinking that I could visit a senior religious cleric as a woman without expecting and being prepared for such a question. I felt like an outsider and was seen as one, and the conversation between us hence was shaped by my response to his question and his need to educate me on religious practice.

In those instances I could understand why a positivist position of using ‘outsiders’ to conduct social inquiry (Chavez, 2007) might be deemed more appropriate. I wondered whether an ‘outsider’ might have been better suited to meeting with religious clerics or religious figures as the relationship between them would have been more neutral and less affected. However, knowledge is always inter-subjective, irrespective of outsider or insider categories. Both carry ideas, values and presumptions that shift and can affect the research process in individual ways (Naples, 1996). A stark reminder that during migration research ethno-national categories do not always an ‘insider’ make (Carling et al., 2013).

There were also generational issues that came to the fore during my research. Being the same age as many respondents’ sons or daughters, I was treated as such by first generation Iraqis. I was welcomed into people’s homes where they insisted I eat and drink and many expressed a pride that I was doing a PhD on Iraq, which facilitated my access to knowledge and placed me as an insider.

Often however, with respect to conservative first generation individuals, this positioning of older/younger meant that I had to be especially respectful of elders so that challenging them on specific political issues had to be done with much diplomacy and caution, especially as sensitive political issues were discussed. Several respondents for example had lost family members or friends to the Baath regime, which made talking to them about their prior political activities difficult at times. Self-reflection and awareness of my own position of researcher helped me overcome these difficult instances and proceed in a more professional manner.
At other times first generation respondents assumed I knew about political legacies, religious customs or historical events, which I had to admit I did not, again positioning me as an outsider. These episodes impacted the research in that I learnt a great deal during interviews but it also meant that lack of knowledge about certain historical events affected the questions I raised or didn’t raise during the research process.

While my Iraqi Arabic allowed me to conduct research in the respondents native language making me feel like one of ‘them’, I was surprised when particularly in Sweden, my Iraqi accent was teased for being southern and also more interestingly, for using archaic words that respondents hadn’t heard in a long time. This was a revelation to me, as I had never reflected on my Iraqi language in this way. It suddenly occurred to me how my Iraqi language hadn’t evolved and was in effect stuck in time. Since my family’s exile in the UK, in 1990, my Iraqi language learning occurred in the diaspora and mainly through my parents’ and their generation’s vocabulary and expressions.

This realisation made me once again feel like an outsider and at times self conscious as I could not know whether my expressions were archaic or not. It brought into sharp relief the distance between the older ‘diaspora’ and those who had fled Iraq more recently. I felt closer to those who left Iraq at the same time as my family, mostly those in the UK, than the Iraqis in Sweden who had arrived more recently. On the meta-level were any of us really insiders? This relationship thus proved to be far more complex due to the concept of diaspora being the subject under study as well as the self-ascribed or attributed identity of the researcher and the researched. Reflexivity when studying diaspora thus brought its own particularities and challenges (Collet, 2008; Baser, 2012)

My southern Iraqi accent and vocabulary also proved to be a source of suspicion, which at times meant I had to work hard to prove that I was Iraqi and not from the Gulf as some respondents accused me of being. A rather tragic incident occurred when I called one gentleman on the telephone to
arrange an interview who then proceeded to shout at me and accuse me of being an Islamist spy. This was in spite of the fact that I had approached the man through a trusted gatekeeper, to reassure him of my authenticity as a PhD student conducting doctoral research.

Though this was an extreme case, and most participants were reassured once they’d met me, these experiences, though ten years after intervention, expressed the continued fear/distrust of Iraqi governments and spies. Unknown individuals were still treated with suspicion. During these times I had to give more of myself by presenting a personal curriculum vitae, usually in relation to three specific areas, my family name, where in Iraq my parents were from and when we migrated to the UK. Often I was asked about my father, his name, occupation and politics. In many respects participants interviewed me before I could start interviewing them.

What is apparent as I look back to my experience in the field is that insider/outside positionalities are in many respects irrelevant as each individual and their meeting with an (other) create both insider and outsider dynamics irrespective of traditional understandings of this phenomenon. What is perhaps more important is the self-reflection needed prior to commencing research about how interactions with the groups/individuals under study may affect us or be affected by us, which then calls for methodological solutions for countering these in specific situations.

One caveat to this remains the privilege of accessibility that those connected to the migrant community they research have at their disposal. Being seen as an insider and speaking the language allowed me to penetrate various elite and non-elite circles, build trust, gain access to events and information relatively easily because I was seen as a legitimate member of the ‘community’, a feat that might otherwise be difficult for those perceived as outsiders (Agar, 1980).

To summarise, this chapter established the research design and methodological
tools used for carrying out my investigation and the data. It drew attention to the small n comparative method, which frames my research, and the case studies that are under investigation. Due to the need to uncover new information, as well as understand causal mechanisms, I explained why the semi-structured interview proved the best method for gathering the data. Furthermore, I emphasised that analysing the data with process tracing allows for contextual and temporal variations to be exposed, so that causal pathways can be explained. Finally, I reflected on my own positionality as an Iraqi researcher, and how my own ethnic, cultural and political background informed the research process. In the next chapter, I explore the case study of the diaspora in the UK in the pre and post intervention period.

CHAPTER 5- THE UK IRAQI DIASPORA
As outlined in the theory section of this thesis, the three hypotheses presented for investigating throughout this chapter are related to the profile of the diaspora, the hostland’s foreign policy towards Iraq in 2003, and lastly links to homeland political parties. In this chapter, I make the argument that all three variables affected the type of diaspora mobilisation for state-building during different time periods. The first relates to the period leading up to military intervention, followed by the period of occupation and lastly following Iraq’s first democratic elections.

This chapter thus traces the history of the Iraqi diaspora and their mobilisation for state-building over time. The chapter commences by tracing how the profiles of those who came to the UK and their social formations in London had a bearing on what they were able to do in opposition and who they were able to reach. As shall be explained in this chapter, that strategy created an opportunity for the Iraqi opposition figures in the diaspora to be involved both in the pre and post intervention years for several reasons. In the pre-intervention phase the coalition sorely needed intelligence on Iraq as very little was known about the inner workings of state and society. Secondly, the coalition needed Iraqi opposition figures it could work with to carry out propaganda projects and preparations for the post-intervention phase. Thirdly the coalition needed to collaborate with Iraqi political figures to gain, at least publicly, legitimation for the military campaign taking shape. This ultimately affected their ability to influence UK and US policy makers and position themselves as future leaders of the new Iraq once the war became imminent.

In the post-intervention and occupation period the coalition needed political figures to govern the country as there was a dearth of political leaders in the country under Saddam’s oppressive dictatorship. The diaspora thus assumed a privileged position because they were political leaders the coalition could work with to govern Iraq and who in their minds were representative and legitimate political leaders. This opened a transnational channel whereby further diaspora figures were recruited from abroad with each political development, creating a
chain of diaspora returnees. Secondly, following the controversial policies of de-baathification and disbanding of the army, the coalition was desperate for skilled Iraqis to fill the thousands of government and ministry positions that were now left empty. This further created opportunities for educated and skilled UK diaspora to become involved and gain positions during the occupation years.

The first two hypotheses account for how and why certain UK Iraqi diaspora were able to contribute to institution-building and governance due to the profile of diaspora and hostland military intervention up until Iraqi’s first elections. However, following the 2005 national elections the playing field was altered. After Iraq’s first elections the third hypothesis holds explanatory power for this phase in Iraq’s state-building when ethno-sectarianism became institutionalised in Iraqi politics. This transformed the politics of belonging so that those connected to the ruling ethno-sectarian political parties and elites were more able to contribute to institution-building and governance and those excluded from power were driven towards supporting/challenging the state through civil society, outside the structures of power.

The UK Iraqi Diaspora

Before understanding the ways that military intervention created opportunities for the diaspora to be involved in institution-building and governance, it is important to understand how London come to be an opposition centre for the Iraqi diaspora and how those involved were able to access and influence US and UK policy makers. Understanding this relationship requires taking a look at the historical context from which the Iraqi diaspora in the UK emerged, the migration waves that took them to British shores and their socio-economic profiles upon exiting the country of origin. It is precisely these factors that provided the Iraqi diaspora in London the symbolic, educational, cultural and financial resources to create a vibrant Iraqi cultural and political milieu. This link between the profile of diaspora and the connection to the kind of transnational political work they engaged in therefore needs to be
contextualised within the relationship that these migrants had with Iraq when they left, and their networks and resources, which I argue affected their ability and proclivity towards political work. To this I now turn.

As a former British mandate, Iraq and Iraqis’ links with the United Kingdom have a long and historic precedent. The first waves of Iraqi migrants to the UK were the Iraqi Jews, Assyrians and Monarchists who came to the UK in the 1940s and 50s largely because they no longer felt welcome or safe in Iraq and were opposed by the incoming regime. Iraqi Jews up until 1939 formed part of the fabric of Iraqi society as politicians, educators, merchants, journalists and government officials (Morad et al., 2008). Yet turbulent times loomed ahead when anti-Zionist sentiment and Arab nationalism combined and unleashed a pogrom against them named the ‘Farhoud’ in Baghdad in 1941. One hundred and thirty Jews were killed and 2,500 injured (Ibid., 2008). The situation was further exacerbated following the creation of Israel in 1948. Iraqi Jewish lives were threatened and despite the patriotism that many felt as Iraqis, conditions progressively worsened and many felt compelled to leave to Israel, Europe and beyond.

The Assyrians were considered allies of the British during the First World War and later formed the majority of the Iraqi levies. The Iraqi levies were a military force that became dominated by Assyrian Iraqis, recruited by the British to protect Assyrian refugees, who were displaced from their homes during the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the defence of Mosul’s northern borders (Al-Rasheed, 1998:48). Their close association to the British and the role they played in crushing a revolt against the British by Iraqi forces in 1941 created further hostility towards them from the Iraqi government. While employment in the levies helped formulate nationalism amongst Iraqi Assyrians, it simultaneously helped cement their association with the British from whom Iraqis had been so strenuously trying to eject from their territory (Al-Rasheed, 1998, p.50). Thus by the time the British mandate was coming to an end, many
Assyrians no longer felt safe in a country that increasingly saw them as an obstacle to independence and many sought settlement elsewhere.

Iraqi monarchists, those closely allied to the Iraqi royal family created another flow of political, diplomatic and administrative elites leaving the country following the 1958 Revolution (Batatu, 2004; Al-Rasheed, 1992; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001). Many had maintained links with Britain since the creation of the monarchy, and were familiar with the country and its peoples (Al-Rasheed, 1992, p.539). Several diaspora elites interviewed for this thesis belonged to this wave of Iraqi migrants to the UK.

The second migration wave to the UK was as a result of the 1963 Baathist coup, which overthrew the government of Abd al-Kareem Qasim. The Baathists, determined to quash the Communist threat and expel politicians from the Iraqi Communist party, instigated a Communist witch hunt, which killed hundreds of Iraqis and exiled many more (Batatu, 2004). This time the profile of migrants was somewhat different with mostly middle class professional doctors, lawyers, artists and intellectuals (Al-Rasheed, 1992). Many came under the guise of continuing their education, while those who had a profession continued their practice in the diaspora. This profile of migrants continued to arrive after the Baathist leadership coup in 1968, wherein a young Saddam Hussein emerged as the new Baathist leader. Amongst this wave were also middle class Kurds and Christian Assyrians, who felt increasingly pushed out by the regime’s intolerance of Iraq's other ethnic identities, political opposition movements and general climate of repression (Al-Rasheed, 1992).

As can be seen, the profile of the Iraqi diaspora in London, from the 1950s and all the way through the 1970s, consisted of largely wealthy landed gentry closely associated to the British monarchy or middle class professionals, artists, intellectuals and political leading figures from the Communist and the Kurdish parties. Iraqis who arrived during this period were thus largely affluent upper and middle class Iraqis who were able to establish investments and live a
comfortable existence in the UK (Al-Rasheed, 1992). They were able to leave voluntarily due to their material capabilities, as well as their colonial social or political links. Consequently, their migration and integration was facilitated by their financial resources, but also their social ties with the British system (Al-Rasheed, 1992). Many, for instance, came to pursue their undergraduate degrees in the UK. As one interviewee recounted,

"We knew the system, we knew the language, we have friends here. Yes. We have connections in this country and especially people in the Gulf and Iraq, they used to look up to the English as great men and very respectable men, altogether admirable, they used to look up to them."

All were conflict-generated migrants because conflict in the homeland was the reason they migrated. However, though the literature has emphasised conflict as the reason for diasporas emotive responses, I argue that what matters more is the relationship that conflict-generated migrants had to their country of origin prior to exiting.

UK Iraqis who left during the 50s to 70s had a very different relationship with their country of origin than those who came later. They were wealthy and professional individuals who were forced out either because of an unwelcoming and unsafe political climate, or those who feared for their lives or were persecuted due to their political opposition and political activities. Many families within this group had prospered before the 1958 revolution due to British inspired land reforms and oil booms (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001). For others, the social and political changes that took place after the revolution offered fresh promise. For example, women were encouraged to play their parts in the workforce and in public life (N. S. Al-Ali, 2007; Efrati, 2012) and the oil boom in the early seventies led to more prosperity and better economic and social policies (Tripp, 2007; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001; Marr, 2012), which meant better education, health and hope. Thus for the diaspora who fled during this period, their associations and memories of Iraq

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a Author interview with Respondent 29, 22 April 2015, London
were tainted by nostalgia for an Iraq they loved and that was prospering socially and economically. This acted as a spur for their political involvement in the diaspora, as many hoped to return to what was perceived to be the Iraq of the Golden Age.

Following the flow of political Leftist and Kurdish leaders as well as more affluent Iraqis into London, the eighties saw a new wave of Iraqis make their way to the UK. The Iraq-Iran war, which commenced in 1979 and ended in 1988, brought in largely Shi’a families who were Da’wa party activists, sympathisers, or those accused of taba’iya Irania (Iranian ancestry) and deported by the regime in droves (Tripp, 2007). This wave of Iraqis was mixed, from merchants who had lost their wealth, to professionals left without an occupation, to semi-skilled and unskilled workers with poor education and qualifications (Al-Rasheed, 1992, p.539).

This wave effectively continued throughout the eighties until the next big wave hit in 1990 and 1991 during the First Gulf War and the Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings (Tripp, 2007). This surge of migrants and refugees was also mixed. Those who had the material wealth to escape and claim asylum in the UK did so. One interviewee from a wealthy Kurdish family recounted arriving in the UK with USD 52,000 in his hand luggage. Others meanwhile recount arriving in 1990 illegally with few resources and were dependent on the UK’s social welfare system to support their families. Either way, those who arrived during this time were either persecuted by the regime following the failed uprisings or those who had left Iraq previously due to political persecution but had firstly migrated either to neighbouring Middle Eastern countries or to one of the Soviet Union’s satellite states. Many were former Communists party members or Shi’a families.

As such the Iraqi community in the UK is comprised of Iraqis who came from the 1950s all the way to the present. The socio-economic backgrounds of those who came earlier differed to those who left in the 1990s and beyond. The earlier migration waves bought with them Iraqi elites, businessmen, intellectuals,
teachers, doctors, writers and artists, but also prominent political and religious families. These elite families continued to be linked to Iraq in a nostalgic way as their positions and experiences of privilege throughout the monarchy or during Iraqi’s golden years (up to the mid 70s) coloured their memories so that the majority faced the myth of return dilemma. Though many were able to integrate economically due to their business or professional skills, many remained strongly attached to the idea of returning to Iraq. Those who were politically active or linked to opposition politics continued their work in the diaspora and were able to do so because of their particular social and political networks inside and outside Iraq and also the resources they had at their disposal.

**Iraqi diaspora political activity in the 1980s and 1990s**

Consequently with prominent political, business and educated Iraqi elites settling in London since the 1950s it is no surprise that London came to be the Arab capital in Europe. Wealthy, intellectual and educated Arabs helped establish London as a hive of social and cultural activity. Cultural venues like the Kufa Gallery, established by the Iraqi Architect, Mohamed Makiya, were regularly frequented by Iraqi poets, artists, writers and intellectuals, as was the Baathist financed Iraqi Culture Centre, based in Holborn. Similarly for the Kurds and the Assyrians, cultural centres and clubs, churches and religious events were active in their respective communities, in Croydon for the former and Ealing for the latter. Shi’a religious Iraqis have also founded a multitude of religious and faith based centres along the Shi’a triangle between the boroughs of Westminster, Brent and Harrow (Bowen, 2014) including the prominent Al Khoei Foundation and the Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre amongst many others.

Political activity soon followed. London quickly became alongside Syria and Iran another Iraqi opposition centre with emerging opposition leaders and groups actively working to oppose and raise awareness of Saddam’s dictatorial

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12 Author interview with Respondent 29, 22 April 2015, London
regime. Reflecting this, Arab publishing houses and newspapers were established in London catering for the now large Arab diaspora. Iraqi intellectuals in exile wrote for popular Arabic newspapers published in London such as *Al Hayat, Al Sharq Al Awsat, Azzamman* and *Al Arab*. Furthermore, politically mobilised groups within this social class had the means to publish their own opposition newspapers, most famously *Al Tayyar Al Jadid* (The New Current) (N. S. Al-Ali, 2007; Allawi, 2007) and created other opposition newspapers and magazines including the National Democratic Alliance’s *Democrat* Magazine, all of which helped denounce Saddam’s regime. Meanwhile other opposition papers were published abroad in either Syria or Iran but distributed in London. This included the Da’wa party’s, *Lua’ Al Sadr* and *Sawt Al Iraq*, and the Iraqi Communist party’s *Tareeq Al Shaab*. One respondent recalled distributing an opposition paper published in Syria called *Al Badeel from his house in London*. Having material resources therefore helped organise activities and raise awareness about the regime through magazines, newspapers and meetings.

Newspapers and opposition papers also provided a political platform whereby the diaspora was able to assert opposition to Saddam’s Baath regime, and start sowing the seeds of resistance. Arabic media in London created a connecting transnational space for Arab diaspora and their former homelands and vice versa. The global city of London thus provided a multitude of outlets for disseminating information transnationally (Adamson and Koinova, 2013). Iraqis in London could now not only receive information about the homeland but writers and journalists could also denounce homeland governments and thus target both hostland and homeland Iraqi audiences. In an age before the Internet this mode of communication was the only means of spreading ideas and showing solidarity with Iraqis inside the country.

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13 Author interview with Respondent 29, 22 April 2015, London
14 Author interview with Respondents 16, 22 and 29, 12 November 2013, 21 November 2013 and 22 April 2015, London
15 Author interview with Respondent 31, 1 May 2015, London
16 Author interview with Respondent 25, 6 January 2014, London
Iraqi opposition in London – pushing for regime change in the 1990s

In time a more organised political opposition was formed. Loosely speaking, the groups that made up the formal opposition were the Kurds, the Islamist groups, anti-Saddam Arab nationalists, Baathists allied to Syria, liberals, communists and socialists (Allawi, 2007: 35). Iraq’s main political parties were represented in the diaspora to include the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and later in the 1980’s Shi’a Islamist parties including the Da’wa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). There were also other notable religious figures from respected Islamic centres such as Ahlul Beyt and the Al Khoei Foundation and democratic individuals and groups.

As repressive stories from within Iraq started spreading in the diaspora following the flow of political refugees arriving in London due to the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, (Allawi, 2007) a campaign was launched by key political and academic Iraqis to raise awareness about the brutality of the regime. CARDRI (Committee Against repression and for Democratic rights in Iraq) was established. The organisation reported “the crimes of the regime of Saddam Hussein and protested against the tacit support he received throughout the eighties from western governments” (Rt Hon Ann Clwyd MP, 2010). CARDRI was eventually sponsored by a group of British parliamentarians from all political persuasions. In 1984 Rt, Hon Ann Clywd, who would later become Tony Blair’s Special Envoy to Iraq in 2003, became the organisation’s chair and helped publish several books on Iraq written by British and Iraqi academics and political figures (Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, 1986; Hazelton and Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq, 1994). Meanwhile the Iraqi Association17 and the Iraqi Welfare Association18 were established to help integrate Iraqi political refugees now flowing through the UK’s asylum system.

17 The Iraqi Association, [www.iraqiassociation.org](http://www.iraqiassociation.org) [Last accessed 30 September 2015]
18 The Iraqi Welfare Association, [www.iraqiwelfare.com](http://www.iraqiwelfare.com) [Last accessed 30 September 2015]
As political momentum was increasing amongst the political network of Iraqis in the UK, their organisational capabilities increased further once the UK’s, and to a large extent, the international community’s stance towards Iraq shifted. The first perceptible shift was following the Bazoft Affair, which led The UK’s prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, to recall the UK’s ambassador to Iraq (‘Butchery in Baghdad’, 1990). In 1989 Farzad Bazoft, a young journalist for the Observer newspaper in the UK, was accused of espionage by the Baath regime and executed in Iraq in 1990 (Harding, 2011). This event would act as a catalyst for the growing isolation of the regime, which would reach its apex only a few months later when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United Nations punished the Iraqi regime for its transgression against Kuwait and retributive sanctions were placed on the country for thirteen years.

Iraqi opposition figures that were desperate to rid the country of Saddam Hussein and insert themselves in power saw a golden opportunity to take advantage of this shift in policy and political climate. A respondent, who was part of the opposition during this time and would later serve in the new Iraqi government for 8 years, explained how a distinguishable change in UK foreign policy in 1989 opened up the political space in which the diaspora opposition were able to act; “After 1989, things changed. The government here was closer to the opposition and after the invasion of Kuwait things changed completely.” Another diaspora opposition figure that is now a Minister in Iraqi Kurdistan explained that the UK context was optimal for working against the Baathist regime due to the support received from the Foreign Office (FCO):

“When I arrived to the UK [1990] I found the environment a great environment to work politically against Saddam Hussein from there. I was among the people and the INC, we established INA in London then we had the first conference in London then Vienna and Kurdistan. I started to be more politically active on Iraqi level than Kurdish level.”

**Author**: So when you say the environment in the UK was great for working against Saddam, what aspect made it great?”

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19 Author interview with Respondent 27
Respondent 1: “I think the Foreign Office was great they were helping us to form ourselves, to organise ourselves as opposition groups, to come out with a plan or at least to educate the international community about what we have been through, what was happening in Iraq at that time by the regime against Iraqi people and how it’s a threat to regional and international stability as well.”

A variety of opposition groups emerged in London privately financed who were able to target UK/US and international government officials, ambassadors and the general public. Prominent amongst them was Ahmed Chalabi, a wealthy, intelligent and secular Shi’a Iraqi. Chalabi, an Iraqi from a historical and eminent family in Iraq had powerful political and business networks both in the Middle East and across the Atlantic. His determination and tireless lobbying in Washington since the early 1990s would eventually see his newly created Iraqi National Congress (INC) funded by the CIA for several years (Bonin, 2011). The covert operation allowed the INC to have an office in northern Kurdistan (Ibid., 2011).

It was under the INC now acting as an umbrella organisation for the fractious opposition groups, namely Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), that two conferences were held as a means of fomenting cooperation between the various opposition factions (Tripp, 2007). The first in Vienna in 1992, and later that year, another conference in Salahuddin, in the Kurdish region, where Ahmed Chalabi was confirmed as leader. Both were funded by the CIA (Bonin, 2011)

Another group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), under the leadership of Ayad Allawi, was also formed in early 1990 to include Baathist defectors, and Sunni Arabs. Allawi was from a prominent Shi’a family from Baghdad, a former Baathist with close connections to Arab and Western governments (Allawi, 2007) and for many years also on the CIA pay roll (Chandrasekaran, 2006). There were also other groups including Saad Salih Jabr’s Free Iraq Council (Allawi, 2007; Suri, 2004).
The 1990s saw a new dawn of organisation largely due to the tangible new political climate and the confluence of Iraqi diaspora opposition figures with the material wealth and networks to access the corridors of power. Ahmed Chalabi was by now well connected in Washington amongst the neo-conservatives in the Pentagon (Chandrasekaran, 2006), and had been advocating for regime change for some time. Meanwhile Ayad Allawi, who was a Baathist defector had strong links to the State Department, and the CIA for many years (Barakat, 2008). Both also had contacts with the FCO and the British intelligence services. Though the two diaspora leaders had different approaches\(^{20}\) they both organised around the ultimate goal of regime change by attempting to influence and convince American and British governments to help depose the regime. One diaspora member, who reflected on this period, emphasised the social and political networks of those involved as well as the material capabilities of the diaspora that helped mount a strategic offensive:

“We began to identify the global centres of power and make contacts with them, strengthening the internal opposition with the Salehuddin conference. The first thing is to strengthen the internal opposition and to have a formal leadership. We voted for three leaders, Massoud Barzani representing the Kurds, Hassan Al Niqab representing the Sunnis and Bahr Al Uloum representing the Shi’a. It was important to have one unified leadership so this gives support and this gives a united front to deal with the Americans. And of course the patrons, Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad Allawi were on the ground the relationships with the Americans and the British and all the western countries. There was a structure. On the head was the leadership and individuals working on the ground and this was what was needed and this was invested in an effective way before regime fall.\(^{21}\)

By framing Saddam Hussein as a war criminal the groups lay the grounds for a foreign policy shift towards regime change. These activities required time and money, which only certain diaspora individuals with the material power and networks could achieve:

\(^{20}\) The INC approach was to gain support from Iraq’s disenfranchised minorities, namely the Shi’a and Kurds to mount a rebellion, while the INA preferred a tactic of infiltrating Saddam’s military and state structure.

\(^{21}\) Author interview with Respondent 25, 6 January 2014, London
“I got involved. I went to the Vienna conference, the first conference with Tamara Daghestani, Ahmed Chalabi and others. I did a lobbying campaign for the UN human rights conference in Switzerland, we used to go because I was a member of the Coalition for Justice in Iraq, [...] So the purpose of that group was to get political support in the west to try Saddam Hussein for war crimes, crimes against humanity. [...] This was in the 90s."22

Several groups financed international conferences and conducted international lobbying trips to influence policies on Iraq.23 One diaspora individual recounted the formation of a new liberal political opposition group called the Democratic Alliance. Members were largely wealthy, professional and political figures able to personally finance trips to lobby Arab and Western Governments and organise conferences.24

Chalabi reached the upper echelons of Capitol Hill where he impressed the new class of neoconservatives, including Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith (Bonin, 2011). He published several pieces in leading papers including Foreign Policy (Chalabi, 1991), and provided the neo cons in Washington intelligence about Iraqi’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) capabilities (Dodge, 2005). Finally, Chalabi’s intellect and impressive resolve would in the mid to late 1990s finally pay off. The Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) was passed in US Congress in 1998 marking an historic and important milestone in the organisation and collaboration between the US and later UK governments with the Iraqi opposition. Without Ahmed Chalabi’s personal wealth, time and connections dedicated to Iraqi politics from afar (Packer, 2003), the opposition’s collaboration with US and later UK governments for regime change would not have occurred.

The ILA effectively sanctioned the provisions of weapons, military training and other forms of support to designated opposition groups (Herring and

22 Author interview with Respondent 23, 21 November 2013, London
23 Author interview with Respondents 16, 23 and 15, 12 November 2013, 21 November 2013 and 6 November 2013, London
24 One party had agreed to a personally financed budget of USD 5 million dollars to establish a political party in Iraq for the post intervention period, Author interview with respondent 16, 12 November 2013, London.
Rangwala, 2006). The ILA stated “it should be the policy of the US to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace the regime.” (Cited in Herring and Rangwala, 2006: 10). Later however they focussed more on building their organisational capacity and supporting democracy building with a USD 97 million pay cheque (Allawi, 2007).

Funding for the opposition from the ILA was also being channelled in the UK through INDICT, the international campaign to indict Iraqi war criminals (Allawi, 2007). INDICT was launched by Ann Clwyd, the President of CARDRI in the House of Commons in 1997 and the campaign was supported in the UK parliament in 1997 by several leading political figures including the Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the previous Prime Minister John Major, as well as other international organizations, governments and groups including the INC (Kani, 1997). At the launch Ahmed Chalabi stated, “We are using the sixth Anniversary of the start of the Gulf War to draw the world’s attention to the fact that Saddam and his criminal regime are still there. They must be brought to justice” (Kani, 1997). Indeed the INDICT campaign was a collaborative effort that would seal the fate of Saddam as a war criminal, snow balling the need to indict him and preparing the grounds for regime change.

The lead up to Military Intervention
Suffice it to say that that the diaspora opposition groups and leaders had made their influence in US and UK foreign policy circles through their privately financed lobbying trips in the UK, US and the Middle East. The ILA effectively institutionalised the relationship between the diaspora opposition groups and the Anglo-American coalition. This relationship meant that the diaspora opposition parties, who were happy to collaborate with US/UK plans, were involved in pre-war state-building. Those whose vision diverged from the coalition did not attend the opposition conferences. This included the Da’wa, the Communists and the Democratic Alliance. These parties insisted on Iraqis liberating themselves and wanted the coalition to play a supporting role. As
such these groups were not included in the formal opposition and did not receive funding through the ILA or join in state-building plans. At the same time, it meant that the UK and US were setting the agenda now. As such those who sought a position in any future Iraqi government needed to gain favour and collaborate with the coalition.

In the US, the parties were designated Zalmay Khalilzad as ‘Ambassador to the opposition’ (Allawi, 2007) and in the UK it led to increased contact with the FCO. Yet why was this the case? Why did military intervention create a need for collaboration with the Iraqi opposition?

While the coalition were capable of executing a military strategy for ousting Saddam Hussein out of Iraq, the problem the coalition faced was a serious lack of intelligence about the political, social, economic infrastructure of the country. Intervention would require planning and strategizing for a new democratic political and economic order, as we have witnessed in the previous chapters, yet very little was known about the inner workings of state and society in Iraq at this point. Since the 1990 Gulf War, most Western governments had withdrawn their embassies from Baghdad as a punitive measure against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The severing of diplomatic relations between the US and UK governments with Iraq meant that for the last 13 years very little was known about what was happening inside the country. When I asked UK diplomat 1 where their sources came from at the time, he stated it was largely from intelligence sources at the Jordanian embassy, which had close links with Iraq, and French and Italian governments who were one of the few who still maintained diplomatic relations with the old regime25.

Faced with a lack of up to date sources, on the ground knowledge and contacts, the Iraqi diaspora assumed a privileged position as brokers between Iraqi society and the coalition. As FCO official 1 remarked uncomfortably, “If the UK

25 Author interview with former UK diplomat, Cambridge, 9 April 2015
government has no one else to talk to then...”

Indeed, it is under this climate that the Iraqi opposition came into prominence. The UK and US now needed partners they could work with, partners who could provide sorely needed intelligence so that planning could take shape. A Senior FCO official confirmed that in the lead up to the Iraq war, orders from above had encouraged reaching out to the Iraqi diaspora where informal and regular meetings were held. When the author asked about the nature of these meetings between the Iraqi opposition and the UK government, it appears that the Iraqi opposition diaspora provided much needed information on Iraq and supported the UK and US in whatever form to oust Saddam Hussein out of Iraq.

With intervention now firmly on the horizon, the US and UK coalition would need further help from the diaspora in two strategic areas, which would necessitate collaboration. Firstly, if the UK and US were preparing to govern the country, they needed propaganda tools to prepare Iraqi society of what was about to occur but also to win over the hearts and minds of Iraqis and public opinion in the Arab world. One diaspora interviewed who was tasked with this job described what he was hired to do:

“...Yes to do a basically TV channel aimed at the Iraqis, but predominantly as they always do when they go to war they want to psychologically win the war. So what they do is they have a broadcast. They know for example, all of Saddam’s generals. They say we are going to attack, defect be careful you don’t want to be killed, your kids etc. But they have this Hercules, which has all this radio signals in it. So what they do is that whatever bulletin they do they go and jam Saddam’s antennae and go and broadcast the bulletin. So they said can you lead this”

He also recalled an incident, confirmed by Richard Bonin in his book on Ahmed Chalabi, *Arrows of the Night*, (Bonin, 2011, p.109) whereby the CIA froze their assets in order to verify whether any broadcasts had been aired and decided they would pay the INC head office in Knightsbridge a surprise visit. In

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26 Author interview with former FCO official 1, 8 April 2015, London.
27 Author interview with FCO UK official 2, April 2015, London
28 Author interview with Respondent 23, 21 November 2015, London,
a last-minute effort the respondent claimed he was called by Ahmed Chalabi to set up an INC TV and radio station called Al Hurriya, which was broadcast out of Camden in London so that they could convince the CIA they were using their money effectively. Respondent 23 described how the INC often sent him communiqués to publish in the Times Newspaper or the Guardian. Indeed this strategy was adopted during the INC’s first operation phase with the CIA, when the majority of its USD 4 million budget was being spent on television and radio stations as well as the INC’s newspaper (Bonin, 2011). This time round it was more of the same. Indeed both the INA and the INC were now publishing their own papers, Al Wifaq and Al Mu’tamar respectively.

The second strategy lay in preparing and planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. US and UK policy makers needed the opposition’s help with planning for the effective running of the state for the post-intervention period. Frank Riccardione, the senior State Department official designated by the Clinton administration as its man responsible for the Iraqi Liberation Act, reportedly stated that the other role of the diaspora was to “perhaps draft a blueprint for maintaining government services for the morning after Saddam fell- how to keep the hospitals and schools running, the courts functioning, and the electricity flowing” (Bonin, 2011, p.164).

The new Iraq would require technocrats, professionals and various experts to purge Iraq of its old socialist and centralised state system. Therefore those with expertise and skills and who were of course willing to go along with neo-liberal state building plans had opportunities to be involved in pre-intervention institution-building and governance. In fact, just before the war in 2003 Ahmed Chalabi reportedly reached out to Iraqi academics and technocrats and informed them of the impending war in Iraq. He reportedly urged them to get involved in the reconstruction of the country as the Americans were looking for

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29 Author interview with Respondent 23, 23 November 2013, London
Iraqi experts to administer the Iraqi governorates\textsuperscript{30}. Indeed as shall be detailed later, Emad Dhia, an American Iraqi, was recruited by the Pentagon Office to recruit Iraqis from abroad who were willing and who had the relevant expertise to help the coalition with the administration of Iraq’s ministries (Allawi, 2007). An interview with one of the principal recruiters revealed that the majority of experts taken on were from the coalition countries of the US and the UK through networks of highly educated and professional individuals\textsuperscript{31}. Two UK respondents stated they were personally recruited through their contacts at the IRDC and due to their expertise\textsuperscript{32}. Eventually 150 people were recruited to help with governance and helping re-build political institutions and ministries related to electricity, trade, health, education and much more\textsuperscript{33}.

Others meanwhile worked through the FCO, who were also busy preparing for state-building for the post-intervention period. A good example was the media expertise of Respondent 23 who was linked to the opposition and later helped the INC with their political work through the FCO in the UK and Iraq. Respondent 23 was commissioned to help write the constitution for the establishment of the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC), essentially the media infrastructure for the country that was to be modelled on the UK’s communications regulator, Ofcom. In preparation for this, Inter News Network, a not for profit media reform institution in the US who predominantly worked for USAID, was to create a think tank consultancy in order to strategize the media development plan in Iraq for the post-intervention period\textsuperscript{34}. As a result two conferences funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were held in early 2003 before the war. The first was in Cairo, Egypt, with Iraqi, Arab, British and American media experts, lawyers and journalists. Following this conference a document

\textsuperscript{30} Author interview with R30, Skype phone call 1 May 2015, London. This group was to form what was to be the American Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC)

\textsuperscript{31} Author interview with Respondent 35, 25 August 2015, Skype telephone call with Montreal

\textsuperscript{32} Author interview with Respondents 34 and 36, 13 August 2015, London and 28 August 2015, Birmingham

\textsuperscript{33} Author interview with Respondent 35

\textsuperscript{34} Author interview with Director of media strategy in Iraq, 7 April 2015, London
was prepared for the proposed strategy for media reform in Iraq. This document was to be interrogated at another, much bigger conference in Athens, funded by USAID and the European Union, which was also organised by Inter News and attended by various Iraqi and Arab journalists and other media and journalism experts. The Athens conference, as it was referred to, was where a suggested draft of the media strategy was presented and cross-examined at various workshops. The revised document from this conference was later accepted and referred to as the Athens Framework, which was to be the founding document for Iraqi’s media strategy\(^\text{35}\). Respondent 23 helped prepare the draft of the constitution of the CMC so that it could be presented in time for the USAID funded conference in Athens in 2002. According to Respondent 23 he helped tweak and edit the draft to make it more localised for Iraq, but that it was essentially based on the Ofcom constitution.

Legitimation for the war effort was also necessary for winning the hearts and minds of the British and US public. Especially as senior politicians in the Labour government, including Robin Cook and Claire Short, were vehemently against the war and the general public had expressed their opposition during the global 15 February 2003 demonstration, where a reported 1-2 million people expressed their anti-war stance (Moreton, 2015). The coalition was therefore in need of Iraqis, or what Dabashi might term ‘native informers’ to legitimate the west’s neo-liberal plans (Dabashi, 2011). The UK government was therefore working to support the fractious Iraqi opposition groups to be united,

“With the INC we had periodic roundtables to exchange briefings to emphasise the need for the Iraqi opposition to act cohesively. One of the big problems that a foreign government faces when it is dealing with a diaspora, is if you’re dealing with, well you simply can’t deal with large numbers of disparate organisations with different lobbying lines because in the end you don’t know who’s right and who’s got support inside the country and who’s actually offering any form of credible leadership or an ability to deliver, or whether it’s a social programme or a political programme. Umm it’s actually a point that the (mentions another UK diaspora group) have not got to grips with

\(^{35}\) Author interview with Director of media strategy in Iraq, 7 April 2015, London
yet, that even if they have differences amongst themselves if they’re engaging with the international community, even if they have differences amongst themselves and differing objectives that if they’re actually going to carry any weight at all they really have to agree on some basics if they’re going to deal with the international community.”

The UK’s collaboration with the diaspora in the lead up to intervention was strategic and necessary both for legitimation, intelligence and planning for the post-intervention period. Consequently, this need on behalf of the British and US coalition created opportunities for the diaspora to be involved in the lead up to the war and to be involved in the post-intervention period. FCO official 2 states, “Basically our job was to have as good an understanding of what was going on inside Iraq and what the opposition’s lines of communications and in the future what their ability to deliver would be”.

The UK’s involvement in military intervention thus opened the door of collaboration with certain groups and figures from the Iraqi diaspora because they needed a) intelligence, b) propaganda tools, c) help with post-intervention state-building plans and d) legitimation. Yet collaboration was facilitated for a certain type of diaspora, those who supported the coalitions neo-liberal plans and were willing participants. One top British official, who worked alongside Bremer during the occupation years stated,

“You had people like Allawi who had their own political parties and certainly I know that the FCO was talking to him and others, there were others you know people like Ayad Allawi and Chalabi, although he was far more in Washington than he was in London, who were fluent English speakers, highly educated who had strong political organisation behind them, and therefore, were natural interlocutors for either the British or the American governments in the run up to the invasion and in the case of Allawi and Chalabi post the invasion. And then there were other people whom I got to know in Baghdad like Ibrahim Jaafari, the first Prime Minister, who’d lived in London. I don’t

36 Author interview with FCO Official 2
know how many years in exile, 20 years before the invasion as far as I’m aware.. barely spoke English. I can't believe he was much of a viable interlocutor for the British government in the run up to the invasion even though he was a very senior person in the Da’wa and became a member of the governing council and was Iraq’s, and ended up as Iraq’s first Prime Minister. So I suspect that who the British government talked to depended certainly partly on whether they represented political organisations which gave them a degree of legitimacy and a good reason therefore for the British government to talk to them, but also whether they were, to use a crude term, user-friendly and for the British government people who spoke English were always going to be more user friendly than those like Jaafari who didn’t”.

Despite Da’wa’s strong political following as represented by their results in Iraq’s first democratic elections, their political leaders’ anti-intervention stance meant that collaboration with the FCO was minimal. The main political parties and groups who would later become official partners with the US and UK were thus those who were capable of organising through their financial, social, religious or political networks, such as ISCI, the INC and INA, but also importantly those who had bargaining chips to offer the US for when regime change would occur. This was either in the form of powerful political allies as in the case of ISCI and its connection to Iran, or those who shared in their ideology, or in the very least those they could work with once regime change took place (Al-Ali, 2014).

It is important, however, to recognise that the formal Iraqi opposition in London was by no means representative of the Iraqi community in London, the UK or for that matter any diaspora located outside of Iraq. Most were disconnected from the opposition since it was by no means a democratically elected unit, but rather an amalgam of opposition groups who had established historical following through political or religious family ties, or those who had the resources to create new groups in the diaspora. A vast majority were against
the war and even those who were for regime change were against the US/UK occupation that was to follow.

**The Iraqi diaspora and state-building following military intervention**

The UK’s military involvement in Iraq meant that various British civilian and military officers would be based on the ground in Iraq. This created opportunities for the UK Iraqi diaspora to be involved in institution-building and governance because the diaspora leaders had made themselves known to the FCO and the Pentagon during the opposition years, which facilitated their transition to positions in government in the aftermath of intervention. Secondly anyone who was interested in helping out and offering expertise or skills would have been encouraged and supported by the FCO. As one diplomat interviewed stated “Any Iraqi who said look I’d like to come out and help would have been encouraged and helped to do that... they would have approached London not Iraq”37. Thirdly, the coalition, who was eager to leave Iraq as soon as possible, could not find alternatives to govern the country at the time of occupation. In an increasingly hostile environment towards the CPA and its occupation of Iraq, the diaspora leaders thus became natural interlocutors between the CPA and the groups they allegedly represented in Iraq. They spoke English, which facilitated communication, and they were known by US and UK officials. It is under this climate of occupation and a shortage of political leaders and skilled technocrats that certain diaspora groups and individuals were able to intervene to claim a stake in Iraq’s new political system.

When intervention took place on the 19 March 2003, the diaspora leaders had by now cemented their relationships with the coalition, placing them firmly in a position to govern Iraq and be a part of Iraq’s state-building enterprise. The Pentagon, and more specifically the Office of Special Plans, who had been placed to handle the post-intervention period had by now earmarked the Iraqi leaders, notably Ahmed Chalabi, to take over as a Provisional Government

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37 Author interview with Diplomat 2
(Herring and Rangwala, 2006). Their influence in Washington had become so
great in fact that tragically one coalition civilian officer remarked that the
political strategy in 2003 “relied upon two things: exiles and optimism” (quoted
in Herring and Rangwala, 2006: 12).

As the US and UK coalition forces toppled the old regime and successfully
battled the Iraqi army they were now faced with trying to govern a country that
had not welcomed them with “sweets and flowers” (Packer, 2003) or as
“liberators” (Herring and Rangwala, 2006) as some of the diaspora opposition
had convincingly argued at the time. Upon finding a devastated infrastructure,
decrepit industries and a broken society, the US military realised that their
presence in the country would last longer than previously expected and that
the original plan of handing over to an interim Iraqi government by May 2003
was not feasible (Bremer and McConnell, 2006).

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) leading the
military strategy in Iraq at the time and headed by Lieutenant Jay Garner, was
keen to get Iraqis to govern themselves and wanted elections held as quickly as
possible. The diaspora Iraqi political leaders wanted to form a transitional
government that would take control of the country headed by a small council
to include the most prominent diaspora politicians that were already known to
the US and the UK governments. This included, Ahmed Chalabi and Ayad
Allawi, Shiite leaders Ibrahim Al-Jafari (Da’wa) and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
(ISCI), and Kurdish chieftains Jalal Talabani (PUK) and Massoud Barzani (KDP)
(Chandrasekaran, 2006). This plan was endorsed by the Pentagon who wanted
a quick handover to Ahmed Chalabi and the other exiles but was opposed by
the State Department, which wanted an occupation with the US in charge
before identifying representative internal Iraqi leaders (Chandrasekaran, 2006).
It is under this context that the ORHA was replaced by the Coalition
Provisional Authority under the management of Paul Bremer who became the
Viceroy of occupied Iraq with his junior UK partner, Sir John Sawers, the UK’s
Special Representative.
Under the CPA the diaspora leaders felt short changed as effectively the US and UK governments had turned from liberators to occupiers and were the rulers of Iraq. This meant that they had to adhere to the coalition’s policies and state-building plans for the country if they wanted to maintain their positions of power. Yet the CPA who was determined to start the reconstruction of the country needed Iraqi involvement both for legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis and the wider international community (Herring and Rangwala, 2006). Finding native Iraqi leaders representative of all of Iraq’s diverse ethnic and sectarian mix to take over government ministries however was proving more difficult than previously envisaged. Firstly, the majority of Iraqis who were not Baathists had been forbidden from forming political groups and mobilising, thus many inside the country did not have experience of open politics due to the stringent conditions they experienced in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

At the same time, many native Iraqis were distrustful of the coalition and did not want to be seen to collaborate with it. The need for local ownership to legitimate state-building in Iraq, as much of the state-building literature has emphasised, drove the Anglo-American coalition to the Iraqi diaspora opposition leaders who were more than willing to collaborate under occupation to maintain their grip on power (Dodge, 2003; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). A symbiotic relationship was therefore fostered between the coalition who needed Iraqi leaders to support their ideological plans for Iraq and diaspora leaders who were willing to acquiesce to coalition plans to gain access to the corridors of power.

Military intervention and the commitment to reform Iraq’s political system therefore opened opportunities for the diaspora elite leaders to become involved in institution-building and governance. The CPA knew the Iraqi opposition leaders; especially those they’d groomed and who spoke their language and in the words of one British official who worked alongside Paul Bremer, “people who had good English and understood the way the west
worked, therefore were able to make themselves useful and approachable by western politicians and diplomats and so on". This gave the opposition groups and leading figures a head start in subsequently governing the country (Allawi, 2007; Al-Ali, 2014). A Leadership Council (LC) informally called the G-7 was thus set up, comprising six leaders including, Jalal Talabani, Masoud Barzani, Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi. Naseer al-Chadirchi and the Da’wa Party, spokesman, Ibrahim al-Jaafari 39(Allawi, 2007:108-109) many of whom were from the UK diaspora. As one Senior FCO official who served in Iraq stated, “Most of the people I worked with in London ended up in Baghdad or other governorates” 40. The LC was to work alongside the CPA and effectively act as the political bridge between the CPA and Iraq’s political elites as a makeshift provisional government. Indeed, in July 2003, the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) was one of the first steps taken by the CPA and the LC towards Iraq gaining sovereignty and running its own affairs.

The chosen 25 ministers, most of whom were from the diaspora, were carefully sifted by Paul Bremer on ethnic quotas, without anti-US Shi’a leaders (such as Moqtada Al Sadr) or former Baath members (except some former exiles such as Ayad Allawi) (Barakat, 2008), not to mention the fact that there were only three women none of whom were on the rotating presidency of the Governing Council. This political exclusion of Baathist officials or anyone with an alternative view to state-building in Iraq did not lead to a collaborative state-building exercise, but rather an exclusive one, where only those aligned to the coalition and their particular neo-liberal state-building agendas were consulted at the expense of ordinary Iraqis. The chosen diaspora leaders had thus helped institute a divisive ethno-sectarian political system, which did not adhere to an Iraq of 2003-2004 (Dodge, 2005). Furthermore they endorsed the harsh neo-liberal policies forcefully pushed through by Bremer and his colleagues (For more on this see Medani, 2004; Barakat, 2008, 2005; Ismael and Ismael, 2008,

38 Author interview with Diplomat 2
39 Half of the Leadership Council were British nationals including, Jalal Talibani, Ahmed Chalabi, Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Jaafari.
40 Author interview with Senior FCO official 2
The significance of the chosen diaspora leaders is hard to underestimate since it laid the foundations for the fabric of the political system in Iraq. As each member was tasked to choose a cabinet minister, the now firmly rooted Iraqi diaspora leaders reached out to their members in the diaspora and recruited from their previous social and political networks abroad. Several Iraqi politicians interviewed for this thesis confirmed this finding. When asked how they became involved in the domestic politics of their homeland two contributing factors were mentioned: firstly that they had been involved in the opposition elite network in London prior to regime change and secondly that they were approached by opposition leading figures who were now established in Iraq. Ali Allawi, for instance, states that he was called by Mowaffak Al Rubaie, who offered him a position in the cabinet as a Trade Minister in September 2003 (Allawi, 2007). Meanwhile Respondent 22 was invited by one of the IGC leaders to Iraq where she campaigned for women’s rights, and has served in Iraq since 2004 in several positions including Deputy Minister of Culture and the Council of Representatives.

One minister interviewed by the author was called to help rebuild relationships between the Islamists and the now appointed Interim Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi. He states:

“When the regime fell, our goal was achieved. At that time, my work was going well, I had work. At the same time it’s not in my nature to take a position after regime change. Ayad Allawi became Prime Minister and he insisted that I come to Iraq to take up a position in a ministry. I did not accept. I didn’t want to. What we had wanted we achieved. This was in 2004. In 2004 he left the ministry, after I saw that things were going backwards. At that time Ayad called me up again in 2005 and wanted me to come. I had prior connections with the Islamic opposition movement so I could play a role. Though I wanted to play a

41 The Iraqi Independent Women’s Group is an organization dedicated to giving women in Iraq a voice to address women’s issues. It was established in May 2003, www.iigw.org/index.html [Last accessed 20 September 2015]
42 Author interview with respondent 23, 21 November 2013, London
national role not a Shi’a or Sunni, this was why I stood by Ayad Allawi and so I played a role in bringing Ayad Allawi and the Islamic parties to work together.”

The ease in which figures such as Ayad Allawi and other UK diaspora were able to recruit from abroad friends and associates depicts not only the ubiquitous cronyism but the importance of specific transnational political and social networks stemming from the UK diaspora where many elite and prominent Iraqi families had chosen to reside in exile. While the CPA had the final say over matters, the diaspora leaders were responsible for how they distributed roles and the institutions they led.

Further opportunities for involvement in state-building emerged through the CPA when it became evident that the country was missing leaders to administer governorates and ministries in Iraq. This was felt more acutely and took on more urgency after de-baathification, which saw the four top tiers of Baath government removed and after disbanding the Iraqi army. The controversial policies were meant to act as a reassurance to native Iraqis that the era of Saddam had ended, similar to de-nazification (Sky, 2015). De-baathification, however, left the country with effectively no senior administrative staff to run Iraqi ministries, senior management positions in hospitals, universities and other public institutions. Meanwhile disbanding of the army left the vulnerable Iraqi state with no security apparatus and a widening security vacuum with roughly 400,000 armed and now unemployed army personnel (Herring and Rangwala, 2006). The decision was taken by Paul Bremer and was backed by the IGC, especially Ahmed Chalabi who was keen to dismiss and isolate any ties to the former regime (Markaz al-Imārāt lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Istirāṭījīyah, 2004; Chandrasekaran, 2006; Sky, 2015). Chalabi would later become the head of the de-baathification commission, which removed the four top tiers of Baath personnel, leaving millions of Iraqis disenfranchised and unemployed.

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43 Author interview with Respondent 25, 2014, London
44 This was roughly 40,000 Baath employees (Stewart, 2006: 7)
Consequently, this move encouraged by Ahmed Chalabi, and enacted by the CPA, created more spaces for Iraqi diaspora individuals to involve themselves, as the coalition now sorely needed people to fill those positions. As a senior diplomat working alongside Paul Bremer confirmed, de-baathification had created more opportunities for the diaspora to become involved; “It created an enormous need for Iraqi expatriates to get involved and the Americans did try, no doubt about this, they did try quite hard to get expatriate Iraqis to come out and fill some of these positions.”

Indeed, the CPA’s response was to encourage Iraqi expertise and skill through the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC), set up by the US Department of Defence (DOD) to manage the structures of civil government after Saddam was deposed from power (Herring and Rangwala, 2006). Though the IRDC’s role was eventually reduced to supporting CPA administration, the creation of such councils gave British Iraqi diaspora an opportunity to engage in institution-building and governance albeit in more inferior and subordinate roles than had been promised or envisaged (Herring and Rangwala, 2006).

As previously mentioned, the IRDC was made up of predominantly US and UK diaspora experts, exemplifying how military intervention created more opportunities for the Iraqi diaspora in these two hostlands to become involved in state-building. However, on paper at least, these individuals had to have the appropriate educational or professional credentials to be considered. Speaking to one British Iraqi woman who was recruited by the IRDC to work for the Ministry of Culture, the opportunity came as a result of her expertise. Recalling the first IRDC meeting in Washington in preparation for their deployment in Baghdad in 2003, Respondent 34 stated that IRDC recruits were all PhDs or Doctors.46

45 Author interview with Diplomat official 2
46 Author interview with Respondent 34, 13 August 2015, London
Respondent 23 also offers a good example of a skilled Iraqi who was able to contribute to institution-building due to his expertise and skills by working through the FCO in Iraq. R23 was contracted to work on Iraq's media infrastructure, i.e. a legal and regulatory framework for telecommunications and broadcasting. According to the man responsible for media reform strategy in Iraq, the project was funded through the CPA and later the British Embassy to establish a free, independent and professional media in Iraq. This also involved formulating and drafting Iraqi media and telecommunications legislation and regulations, developing the Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (CMC) and its subsequent broadcasting regulation, licensing, law and policy, as well as many other media related tasks such as election media monitoring.

Once intervention had taken place R23, who was part of the opposition and a skilled Iraqi, contacted the FCO and flew into Baghdad in 2003. He met with the FCO, who were stationed in the Green Zone, to offer help as he had previously worked with the opposition and the FCO prior to regime change. From 2003 to 2010 he worked alongside the coalition governments and developed a string of initiatives including the CMC, election campaigns, anti-terrorism, human rights and Basra trash campaigns, police recruitment campaigns, big media campaigns on television, and radio broadcasts, posters and helping to reform the country’s media legislation and media law in the Iraqi constitution. Once the British forces officially left in 2009, R23 continued to work with the Iraqi government helping to implement their state media strategy. Media was seen as a vital component of state-building as explained by the man leading the strategy as it was seen to be a marker of a true democracy for states emerging from dictatorship, but also necessary for state-building purposes as the population needed to be informed of what was happening.

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47 Author interview with Director of media strategy in Iraq, 7 April 2015, London
48 Author interview with Director of media strategy in Iraq, 7 April 2015, London, See also http://www.albanyassociates.com/about-us/projects/iraq
49 Author interview with FCO contracted senior official who worked in Iraq from 2003 to 2006, 8 April 2015, London
Similarly those working from the diaspora could also contribute to state-building from afar through their associations with diaspora opposition leaders from their social circles back in London. Two of the diaspora members interviewed who had been active in the opposition years and knew leaders in the transitional government set up a new democratic group in the UK to support Iraq’s transition to democracy. Since 2004, they organised a series of conferences bringing together the most prominent Iraqi intellectuals, scientists, lawyers and academics from the diaspora to address the pressing issues that Iraq was facing including the contents of the constitution, human rights, democratic rule, and the controversial Kirkuk issue. The Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, funded the conference at the time, giving USD 100,000 for its organisation. The conferences were held in London and brought together diaspora experts in the fields of law, justice, science, engineering and various others to discuss and write policy reports, which were consequently written up and sent to the Iraqi government. The Iraqi diaspora in London were thus able to inform state policy and governance of Iraq via these state funded conferences from afar.

Furthermore, as a result of the ensuing chaos during this period the British government, which was responsible for the southern region of Iraq, reached out to certain well respected members of the diaspora in the UK for help with how to deal with religious and governance issues. This gave diaspora political elites the opportunity to act as advisors to the British, but also work alongside them in some cases as consultants. According to one diaspora interviewed British officials from the Defence Ministry and the FCO would regularly call in to a prominent religious Iraqi organisation to ask for advice on certain issues.

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50 Author interview with R11, 6 November 2013, London and R16, 12 November 2013, London
51 Author interview with R1, 6 November 2013, London and R16, 12 November 2013, London
52 Author interview with R11, 6 November 2013, London
including cultural and religious rituals and suggestions for who should lead the country. 

**Supporting the state through civil society**

The coalition’s commitment towards building a free Iraq also meant that they had a responsibility towards democracy building, women’s rights and human rights. Military intervention and occupation brought with them a bandwagon of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to help towards creating Iraqi civil society. A ‘packaged’ civil society that would be transported by funding democracy building, human rights and women’s rights initiatives. The senior British diplomat working alongside Paul Bremer in 2003 stated that several foundations were brought in to advise on how to create civil society in Iraq. Indeed, this was corroborated by an Iraqi diaspora from the UK who was part of a UK based organisation called the Iraqi Prospect Organisation, which returned to help with democracy building and was funded by the coalition and their chosen partners including, The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). He described how this opportunity came about,

“It became very obvious that some Iraqis didn’t understand or have a real experience of democracy, and so the organization moved from focusing on the political elite to democracy promotion in the grass roots. They picked universities and started university societies aimed at promoting democracy through debates and newsletters, all of which were run by an elected student body. The project was a huge success in Baghdad University, and funding came in from a number of groups like the USIP and National Endowment for Democracy and the like. The experience was moved to a couple of other universities were it was also relatively successful.”

Organisations such as the USIP and NED were brought in by the United States government to help the growth of civil society, to encourage democracy and political participation in Iraq. These organisations were funded by the US

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53 Author interview with R1, 6 November 2013, London. The author was also provided with photographic evidence of top Iraqi and British elites at the aforementioned organization.
54 Author interview with Diplomat 2
55 United States Institute of Peace is a federally funded organization in the United States www.usip.org
56 Author interview with R31 via email exchange, 3 May 2015
government, which had earmarked USD 750 million dollars from the American and Iraqi budget for funding civil society institutions, which Paul Bremer referred to as Iraq’s “social shock absorbers” (Bremer and McConnell, 2006, p.385). Opportunities for funding revolved mainly around areas of democracy building, education and importantly the inclusion of women in the state-building process. As the case of the Iraqi Prospect Organisation shows, UK or US diaspora organisations present in Iraq had access to these colossal funds.

The issue of women’s rights was particularly poignant considering that it was rhetoric that was repeatedly stressed by the coalition leading up to the war (Allawi, 2007). Therefore the objective of empowering women was part of the neo-liberal political agenda and this meant ensuring their participation in the newly forming Iraqi state. Indeed the UK had a Civil Society Fund and a Political Participation Fund whose aim was also to back gender equality and the inclusion of women in the political process (Development Assistance in Iraq, 2005). Thus in 2003, Tony Blair appointed Ann Clwyd, Special Envoy to Iraq on Human Rights, to “embed human rights best practices as the institutions of a new Iraqi government and society were being formed” (Clwyd, 2010). Ann Clwyd held a meeting with Iraqi diaspora women and women’s organisations in the UK to ask how the UK can support women’s rights in Iraq. This gave Iraqi diaspora women the opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns and inform the MPs present about issues affecting women’s rights at the time.

One of the major issues facing Iraqi women’s rights put forward in the meeting by Iraqi women in the diaspora was Resolution 137, introduced by the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003 as a means to overrule Iraq’s progressive 1959 personal status law. The 1959 personal status law provided security and protection for women and girls in the areas of family and personal matters (Efrati, 2012). The acceptance of Resolution 137 would allow Muslim courts to rule disputes relating to marriage divorce and family matters. This resolution provoked a huge outcry from Iraqi women both inside and outside the country. In the UK, Iraqi women activists lobbied MPs, gave public talks at the European
parliament, wrote against the resolution in London based Arabic newspapers and worked to raise awareness.

"Here Ann Clwyd, was in charge of human rights under Blair's government. They had a meeting with Iraqi women at the end of 2003. Ann Clwyd was the chair in parliament. Ann spoke and then I put my hand up. I said to Ann, Ann we really respect you, you have campaigned with us against Saddam Hussein, but seeing that you’re responsible for human rights under Blair’s government what have you done about rule 137 for human rights? She said this meeting is not about this, and I said, No! This is the pressing issue of the day [...] Two of the women sat at the front, two MPs one was conservative and the other labour, were listening, Ann said we don’t have time for this and they said, what do you mean we don’t have the time, we’ll write this up now against law 137."57

Iraqi women in the diaspora have had opportunities to influence state-building measures inside Iraq through the UK’s Special Envoy to Iraq on Human Rights who was acting as a liaison between the coalition government in Iraq and Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister at the time. In this respect the transnational linkage between the homeland, diaspora and hostland has been subverted in the Iraqi case so that the hostland government has appealed to Iraqi women in the diaspora for help with implementing women’s rights in the homeland due to their occupation in Iraq.

Interestingly, interviews with diaspora and government, FCO and diplomatic UK officials serving in Iraq did not reveal any development projects between the diaspora and the Department for International Development (DFID). In fact, according to Hilary Synnott, the coalition’s senior civilian officer in Southern Iraq, “DFID undertook little or no planning for possible post-conflict” (Synnott, 2008). This was partly due to the fact that Clare Short, who was in charge of DFID at the time, was opposed to the occupation and thus was not enthusiastic about working alongside the FCO during this time58 (Synnott, 2008)

57 Author interview with Respondent 6, 1 November 2013, London
58 Author interview with Diplomat 2
Assessing Diasporic Interventions in Iraq 2003-2005

Though there is no doubt that diaspora leaders influenced and contributed to state-building in Iraq during this period, one can critically question the kind and quality of state-building diaspora leaders conceded to and the kind of state they were helping to build. The IGC leaders were after all cherry-picked by Paul Bremer on ethnic quotas and were allegedly representative of Iraqis (Barakat, 2008). Political appointments by the Anglo-American coalition and the acquiescence of IGC members to go along with coalition plans did nothing for gaining the nation’s support in re-building the country. Indeed, as mentioned previously, from an Iraqi perspective they promised liberation yet collaborated in occupation, with the full might of US and UK military power. In agreeing to an ethno-sectarian political system they undermined state-building efforts institutionalising a politics of sectarianism rather than creating a national vision for re-building the country. Consequently, the diaspora leaders did not endear themselves to the native population. Several polls and anecdotal evidence indicated their lack of popularity (Dodge, 2005; Ismael and Ismael, 2008; Al-Ali, 2014) revealing their inability to gain legitimacy as Iraq’s new leaders and impeding any sound state-building plans.

Furthermore, the naiveté of diaspora leaders who had been out of the country for decades meant that often the intelligence they provided was out dated, or tainted by nostalgia for an Iraq they left. Put simply, they were misinformed about current conditions in Iraq. One former Iraqi minister interviewed who returned spoke honestly about his culture shock at finding a corrupt society whose moral values had degenerated, “I thought that the shock of wars and dispossession, sanction, and invasion which must be the most degrading thing that people can go through would make people question the kind of societies they have created.”

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59 Author interview with Respondent 26, January 2014, London
This lack of awareness was reflected in the monumental errors the IGC leaders endorsed, including de-baathification and the disbanding of the army, which effectively dismantled existing state institutions and human resources instead of strengthening or building on the legitimate institutions it had. Not only did these two policies remove any law and order that could have prevented the wide scale looting and violence, but they unleashed public resentment and the exclusion of thousands from state and society who would later enact their vengeance. It also contributed to a complete loss of legitimacy in terms of containing the worsening security situation. Instead of promoting peace and reconciliation by co-opting the old functionaries of the old regime, the diaspora leaders, along with the coalition who were ruling Iraq, endorsed political exclusion, which has plagued the country’s state-building efforts ever since.

As a result the new political system authorised and consolidated by the majority of diaspora ministers would have serious repercussions on Iraq’s state-building future. In the first place, the governing structure of the IGC was consequently not decided on technocratic abilities needed for state-building but rather through cronyism and submission to CPA state-building plans. Instead of moving away from a corrupt and centralised system, as in the former Baath regime, the diaspora ministers actually reverted back to the same methods that they had fought to overturn in opposition. UK diplomatic and coalition officials interviewed also underlined that the diaspora leaders they worked with lacked any understanding of politics, with the noted exception of Ahmed Chalabi, who was described as “a politician to his finger tips” although he was “only interested in advancing his own career ultimately”60. Even though one can be critical of FCO officials, who may be wanting to divert blame on the diaspora for failures in Iraq, there is no doubt that cronyism was institutionalised during Iraq’s first phase of state-building laying the grounds of division and authoritarianism that would later blight the country indefinitely.

60 Author interview with Diplomat 2
One can therefore question the opportunities for diaspora individuals whose vision of state-building did not agree with or conform to the CPA’s vision for Iraq. As the case of Ahmed Chalabi shows, once his views diverged from the CPA, he was no longer the neo-conservative favourite he had been prior to intervention. It also leads us to question how much the coalition was interested in real qualifications since they appear to have been more interested in figures they could co-opt and work with.

From this perspective there has been a great irony to state-building in Iraq. The project of state-building a democratic and free Iraq commenced undemocratically through cronyism rather than a meritocratic political process. By the time Iraq’s first democratic elections took place in December 2005, political leaders put in place through the IGC had already gained a significant advantage, so it was unsurprising that one of the top political positions in the country went to a British Iraqi diaspora exile, Ibrahim Jaafari who took the position of Iraqi’s first democratically elected Prime Minister and Jalal Talabani who was elected the President of Iraq. Many more from the diaspora would later assume ministerial and parliamentary positions.

Similarly, the coalition’s insistence on having Iraqi leaders to legitimate the occupation backfired because, in having left Iraq decades ago, they carried little credibility with the native population who more often than not resented them returning to occupy top positions. This was especially the case as from the population’s perspective they had not lived under Saddam’s rule. Furthermore, the fact that there were no Sunnis amongst the opposition diaspora leaders undermined state-building efforts from the start, as the original G7 were not representative of all Iraq’s ethnicities. Consequently despite well intentioned efforts by some at state-building, Iraqis did not see the leaders of this period as credible governors of the country leading to a fragmented and incoherent state with no legitimate central authority (Herring and Rangwala, 2006).
Likewise, as shown above, experts and skilled diaspora also had opportunities to contribute because they provided much needed professionalism and skills that have been previously missing in Iraq’s formerly defunct state. This was felt more acutely in the aftermath of de-baathification where administrative staff from the Baath regime were removed leaving an administrative vacuum that many skilled and highly educated diaspora were able to fill through the IRDC or through their own initiatives. In many respects the IRDC opportunity and working through other CPA or FCO platforms, proved to be a more productive use of diaspora talent and skills for rebuilding the country. Especially as the UK diaspora has many skilled and professional lawyers, doctors, engineers, architects to offer as shown above. However it appears that the majority of those who had successful careers in the UK and beyond did not return in 2003 (Al-Ali, 2014) due to their opposition to the occupation or security concerns, while the large part of those who did were more concerned about gaining political positions than rebuilding the country.

Military intervention and occupation also created opportunities for supporting the state through civil society through funding initiatives for democracy building, human rights and women’s rights. The neo-liberal agenda in Iraq thus created further spaces to be involved through funding bottom-up approaches as we have seen. It is questionable, however, how much these initiatives by the coalition were genuine in trying to help Iraqis considering how little time was dedicated to this task before occupation officially ended in June 2004. As one UK diplomat confirmed, the handicap was the lack of time and the lack of indigenous support to take initiatives forward but also a lack of military and civilian resources, which ultimately led to the British failing in Iraq. 

Summary
The first section of this chapter has argued that the profile of the UK diaspora, namely the links that diaspora have with their country of origin, and their

61 Author interview with Diplomat 2
socio-economic resources and their networks are important for understanding the type of political activity in which they can engage. Their resources and networks created the means by which they could influence policy makers, organise an opposition and eventually have a say in Iraq’s state-building future. When the UK’s foreign policy towards Iraq shifted in the early 1990s, their resources and networks helped them to become organised and eventually influence US and UK policy makers so that once their foreign policies shifted the diaspora were able to take advantage and insert themselves in the state-building process, presenting themselves as a government in waiting ready to govern the country.

During the 2003 to 2005 period and leading up to the writing of the constitution and Iraq’s first democratic elections the coalition and the Iraqi diaspora leaders faced turbulent times. They grappled with a society whose social fabric had been vastly destroyed and whose attitude towards the occupying powers and the diaspora leaders was suspicious at best and seen as an American construct at worst (Synnott, 2008). Nonetheless as we have seen, military intervention and the subsequent occupation of Iraq heralded a new political system and the need for new leaders to administer the running of the country created opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance. The UK’s involvement in military intervention thus created the political space for Iraqi diaspora leaders to become involved. While the coalition were the true governors of Iraq they needed Iraqi diaspora leaders who could lead ministries, and with whom they could collaborate with, to inform Iraq’s political process and enact their state-building plans.

As shown, opposition leaders had cultivated an institutional relationship with the coalition government so that once intervention took place opposition leaders positioned themselves alongside British and American officials on the ground and became part of the first cohort of politicians to govern the new Iraqi state along with the CPA. The coalition’s need for political leaders and skilled Iraqis, both in terms of filling important political positions and
legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and the wider international community, created the opportunity for the opposition to take leading roles in the governance of the new Iraqi state. The roots they planted during the opposition years also meant that an institutionally backed channel was created whereby other figures from the former UK opposition network could be recruited from the diaspora. They joined in the governance of the new Iraq through direct involvement in the IGC, and subsequent political developments including the drafting of the constitution and in the lead up to the handing over of sovereignty with a new Interim government.

We have also seen, however, that those who were involved were more than often those who were selected by the coalition. These were political leaders who were seen to have political organisations and legitimacy behind them, or to use one diplomat’s term ‘user-friendly’ diaspora individuals whose objectives did not appear to diverge from that of the coalition. Others who had opportunities to be involved had the expertise, skills, or political backing and influence to be of use.

Furthermore, British involvement in Iraq also meant that they were stationed on the ground and this opened up further opportunities to work with British officials as shown above. Those who were willing and able and who turned up at the gates of the occupation compounds or those who contacted the FCO in London were welcomed62 especially Arabic speakers and skilled personnel who could provide expertise and so-called local knowledge and act as brokers between the coalition and Iraqi society.

Military intervention and the subsequent occupation of Iraq as we have seen also created opportunities for the diaspora to be involved in supporting the state through civil society, through coalition funding of democracy building, human rights and women’s rights initiatives.

62 Author Interview with Diplomat 2
Iraq's 2005 elections and beyond

On the 8 June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority was effectively dismantled and sovereign powers were handed over to the Interim Iraqi government who had succeeded in writing an interim constitution under the Transitional Administrative Law. During this period, most of the IGC diaspora leaders retained their positions of power and continued their governance of the new Iraqi state. The next stop on the CPA political roadmap were Iraq’s first democratic elections scheduled for the end of 2005.

Iraqi diaspora leaders were now competing with political figures and parties that had previously been denied under the Baath regime that had by 2004 mushroomed into 7,785 political candidates and 111 political parties (Dodge, 2005). Yet despite the surge in political participation, diaspora leaders had consolidated their political positions within their respective parties, and their relationships with the coalition governments, as well as Ali Al Sistani, Iraq’s most senior religious authority, which put them at a political advantage. One senior FCO official stated that Ayad Allawi was backed by the coalition albeit not publicly\(^\text{63}\), meanwhile the Shi’a parties, ISCI and Da’wa were the front runners receiving support from Al Sistani, and the two Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK had their strong regional support-base. This reality put the diaspora leaders at a huge advantage that did not promote the growth of indigenous political parties (Dodge, 2005). Furthermore with their wealth and vast political networks diaspora leaders were able to make the biggest impact in the run up to the country’s first elections in 2005\(^\text{64}\). It was no surprise then that the election results reflected those who were previously in power. The Shi’a topped the results with their United Iraqi Alliance, followed by the Kurdish Alliance and Allawi’s Iraqi List, with Ibrahim Jaafari as Prime Minister and Jalal Talabani as president. The ethno-sectarian political structure put in place by

\(^\text{63}\) Author interview with Diplomat 2
\(^\text{64}\) Ayad Allawi alone spent £2.14 million on his electoral campaign (Dodge, 2005)
the coalition and supported by the diaspora leaders was now institutionalised as Iraq’s new political system.

As a consequence, opportunities for diaspora to involve themselves in state-building in Iraq also reflected this ethnic division. Those in power continued to involve their relatives and associates abroad in the political process, or those with connections to Iraq’s new political leaders were equally able to reach out and gain access to political positions through these social and political networks. Yet this time round with government positions and administrative staff to fill, Iraq’s state-building plans were dashed when ethno-sectarianism became the rule of the day. Instead of hiring technocrats to rebuild state institutions, ruling elites were recruiting from the diaspora ethnic or sectarian kin irrespective of qualifications. As one professional diaspora interviewed, who regularly returns to Iraq to help the government with various communications work stated,

“I saw the symptoms before they went to Iraq. So when they went to Iraq I wasn’t surprised at what was happening because when they went to Iraq everyone was bringing their family and friends and cousins and brother in law around him even if he is an idiot or a primary school graduate...” 65

The majority of diaspora leaders in Iraq clearly had no political qualifications that would allow them to administer a country (Al-Ali, 2014). A former IGC member interviewed described the majority of UK diaspora who returned to take up political positions as “second stringers at best or losers and dead enders”66. When I questioned what happened to those who were part of the opposition movement in London, the former minister stated that they succumbed to “animal farm”67. This scathing review of UK diaspora returnees was also echoed by another former minister, who stated that many saw an opportunity for corruption and took it, perverting both the Iraqi and the UK system68. In this way, the new political classes were not those who had the

65 Author interview with R23, 21 November 2013, London
66 Author interview with Respondent 26, 2014, London
67 Animal Farm is an allegorical and dystopian fictional book by George Orwell, written in 1945.
68 Author interview with Respondent 25, 2014, London
country’s best interest at heart but rather those who fitted a certain criteria, namely a particular ethno-sectarian identity and connections to a ruling party or what in Iraq is referred to as muhasasa “the distribution of the spoils of power along communal, ethnic and tribal lines” (Gerges, 2014). As such it is no wonder that Iraq’s first state-building venture outside of occupation led to ruin as those running the state were more interested in recruiting people who would offer them their allegiance, than their skills. The legacy of occupation and the fragmentation of political authority were now beginning to reverberate.

Power dynamics inside the country were thus reflected in the diaspora as long-time opposition parties and those connected to them were now firmly in power, elevating their status in the diaspora but also vis à vis the hostland government. Access to hostland governments has been facilitated for those linked to ruling parties in Iraq. When I asked one representative from a ruling party how this development had impacted his political work in the diaspora since 2003, he responded:

“Yes, now we feel free in our work. We have people in government in Iraq, they have connection with British so now it’s easy for us to be in touch with Foreign ministers and MPs, politicians, with the community. They look at us as government people not just as refugees. This is a good impression”.

The consolidation of power that stemmed from the diaspora into Iraq has now boomeranged back into the diaspora. From the humble origins of the opposition movement in London, diaspora leaders were able to impose their authority in Iraq, consolidate their power and re-use it to their advantage amongst the diaspora networks they were a part of prior. As a result, a transnational political bubble exists between the social and political networks of religious, social and political elites in Iraq and their respective kin in the diaspora. As one former Minister interviewed reflected, “politics has been seized by a coterie, by a group of people so the diaspora people in Iraq have to be connected to this coterie, and if you’re not connected to it there’s very little

69 Author interview with Respondent 2, 24 October, 2013, London
you can do except on an individual basis.”

It is this coterie of individuals, which created in Iraq in the early years of occupation a dual society that stemmed from two distinct sets of political elites; diaspora political figures and local political figures. Yet in the later years this dichotomy has increasingly morphed into those who are connected to powerful ruling parties and those who are not.

Thus, opportunities for diaspora individuals to contribute to institution-building and governance in Iraq has thus been limited to those associated to specific ethnic or sectarian political circles in Iraq. This has largely meant the Shi’a and the Kurds in Iraq whose diaspora communities in the UK have been able to take advantage of their connections to leading parties, which have opened up for them opportunities in the hostland. Respondents described relations with members of parliament, the House of Lords and the FCO with whom they clarified political party positions on various issues, corrected ‘misinformation’ about events inside the country or lobbied about critical homeland events. In this regard political party branches in the diaspora have acted as lobbyists for political parties in the Iraqi government, pushing for international support, foreign investment or recognition for various domestic issues.

At other times they have tried to support their political parties through governance initiatives more generally by bringing their cadres to meet with Labour or Conservative politicians in the UK. The Kurdish Special Representative to the UK, a diaspora Kurd appointed by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) described the ways she has been able to influence the UK

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70 Author interview with Respondent 26, 13 January 2014, London
71 Author interview with Respondent 26, 13 January 2014, London
73 Author interview with Respondent 8, 6 November 2013, London
and Kurdish government in her ambassadorial role between the diaspora, the hostland and the homeland:

“In my role I can influence things by helping to take back some of the expertise that there is. For example we have a good relationship with parliamentarians here; we arrange visits for them to go back and meet with people and keep them up to date. One of them happens to be chair woman of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) and it trains parliaments abroad in democracy and through her we got them to engage with the Kurdish parliament, so now both parliaments are going through workshops with WFD. I was there for introducing the idea and nurturing it.”

It is important to recognise that due to the no-fly zone UN agreement in 1991, Iraqi Kurds had a safe haven from Iraqi security forces (Tripp, 2007), the Kurds enjoyed a certain level of autonomy and protection from Baghdad, but also the chance for stability, reconstruction and the maturation of their regional politics and governance. Where politics in Baghdad was still in the process of consolidating new parties and leaders that could unite the country, Kurds in the diaspora were answering to two well-established parties and elite leaders with a vision for the region. This put the diaspora Kurds at a relative advantage both in terms of their political organisation and engagement during the opposition years but also in terms of their links with the British government in the aftermath of regime change. Several diplomats interviewed who worked in Iraq during the occupation years and beyond confirmed that the Kurdish leaders were far more skilled than their Arab counterparts.

The Kurdish diaspora has greatly benefitted from a close and active relationship with the British government, a partnership that has been supported and facilitated by the Kurdish All Parliamentary Group, which was set up in 2007 “to encourage the development of democratic institutions in the Kurdistan

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74 Author interview with Respondent 19, 14 November 2013, London
75 Author interview with Respondent 19, 14 November 2013, London
76 Author interview with Diplomat 1 and Diplomat 2
Region as part of the democratic and federal process in the rest of Iraq.”

One Kurdish Minister I interviewed related how the diaspora has been fundamental to Kurdish state-building,

“They did a great job seriously. I think Kurdistan is going to be a good example of a successful diasporic community. When they come back how they affected the society. Before these people came back we were a conservative society. We had big villages instead of cities. I think one of the main achievements the diaspora managed to divert the culture from a village culture to a city culture. In the methods of government, planning, and the vision of the government. Look at Erbil, most of the investors most of the Kurds were either in Europe or the States. They got education, they made money and they returned their money back and investing in Kurdistan now. That’s the key of our success. In the KRG government from 20 ministers, more than half of them were a diaspora at some stage.”

On the Shi’a side, several ministers formerly part of the UK Iraqi diaspora served in Baghdad and formed part of the UK Iraqi diaspora under the United Iraqi Alliance, made up of predominantly Shi’a Islamic Parties. These ministers were able to use their expertise and skills learned in the UK to affect change from within the government. One minister interviewed who served in Iraq from 2005 to 2013 used his experiences of the British system to develop similar institutions in Iraq. Respondent 25 reportedly helped develop Iraq’s security infrastructure by establishing CCTV for Baghdad and the Iraq-Syria border. With the help of the UK government a High Tech Project was developed so that Baghdad now enjoys the same security system as the UK. While these attempts to help rebuild the Iraqi state are laudable from an individual perspective, they nonetheless need to be contextualised within the neo-liberal framework from which the occupiers would gain the most lucrative business contracts in Iraq (see for instance (Billon, 2005; Barakat, 2008; Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Medani, 2004).

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77 Kurdish region of Iraq All-Party Parliamentary group website

78 Author interview with Respondent 1, 24 October 2013, London
Another system put in place by R25 was a method to tackle the widespread and insidious corruption, which had fomented during the years of sanctions under Saddam’s regime:

“So I created a system, whereby any company dealing with the Ministry had to sign a contract, so that if they were found to pay a bribe to any official the contract would be cancelled and that they would face a penalty of 30 percent of the overall contract and placed on a black list for three years. Those who didn’t sign we wouldn’t work with. Western companies were satisfied because they didn’t want to pay bribes and contracts were going to Chinese companies. These were one of the problems I faced in Iraq.”79

The majority of respondents I interviewed repeatedly cited corruption as a serious problem confirming reports from Transparency International, where Iraq has consistently ranked low on its Corruption Perception Index80. According to one diaspora it even penetrated the top echelons of power, “Maliki deals with people if they are loyal to him regardless of how corrupt or how much they steal”81. A feature of Maliki’s premiership, which has exacerbated sectarian tensions and corruption in the country (Dodge, 2012)

Another minister interviewed who served as Iraq’s Trade and Defence Minister in 2003 to 2005 and later Finance Minister in 2006, developed Iraq’s first economic development plan for the country, introduced a social security system and helped restructure Iraq’s USD 20 billion debt82. There were other attempts to curb corruption by introducing a vetting system on contracts and limiting the power of Ministers to sign off on USD 100 million contracts that failed, as did attempts to computerise Iraq’s government budget with the help of Transparency International.

Meanwhile, other UK diaspora who had contacts in Baghdad with the Shi’a government of Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki were able to organise, in

79 Author interview with Respondent 25, 6 January 2014, London
81 Author interview with Respondent 25
82 Author interview with Respondent 26, 10 January 2014, London
collaboration with the Iraqi government, an Iraqi expatriates conference in an attempt to bring Iraqi experts from around the world to Baghdad to help rebuild the country. Thus in 2008 the first international conference for Iraqi Expatriates and Experts was launched bringing together hundreds of professional and skilled Iraqis from different fields to meet with the government and help in the reconstruction of Iraq. The conference, which took place in Baghdad and was reportedly televised in Iraq, failed to make an impact. Maliki reportedly approached the diaspora at the conference as though they had a duty to serve Iraq rather than call on their expertise to help rebuild the country, “They said you know you are our sons and you have a debt to Iraq and I said no we don’t. In fact we could claim a debt to Iraq because it has made us feel like expatriates, “hejejtoone”.” Furthermore individuals who returned to Iraq and attempted to help rebuild the country repeatedly mentioned clashes between local Iraqis and diaspora returnees. Respondents described the challenges they faced from native Iraqis who were resentful of being governed by external Iraqis who’d not lived through the ravages of Saddam’s dictatorship.

Subsequently those disconnected from ethnic or sectarian powers are inhibited in their access to institution-building and governance, diverting their diaspora mobilisation towards supporting/challenging the state through civil society. As an example, supporters of the Iraqi Communist Party who did not win any seats in the 2005 election and Iraqis opposed to the US occupation were limited in their ability to influence or shape institution-building and governance in Iraq. This has not meant however that state-building has altogether been hindered, rather the lack of opportunity in the homeland has directed energies to political activism in the hostland by challenging domestic policies and undemocratic practices through protests, press releases and writing in the

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83 Author interview with Respondent 23, 21 November 2013, London and Respondent 27, 13 January 2014 – exact figures vary
84 The word hejejtoone in Iraqi Arabic means you made us flee. Author interview Respondent 21, 20 November 2013, London.
In other words, their mobilisation has been directed to challenging domestic policies or upholding democratic values through grass roots activism. In many ways their opposition years have continued, yet this time they face not a violent tyrant but a tyrannical ethno-sectarian system.

Similarly, minority groups such as the Turkmen or the Assyrians have also been limited in their ability to contribute to institution-building or governance in the country following the 2005 elections. Their marginalisation in Iraq has lead to an active lobbying in the UK against land grabs in Kirkuk and the Ninevah plains where disputes with the Iraqi government and Kurds are on-going problems. The difference between these lobbying efforts and the Kurdish and Shi’a lobbying parties is that their power and material resources are limited and therefore less influential with hostland governments, especially since they have no sway inside Iraq. This limitation has directed their political activism towards challenging the state through civil society, in effect acting like an Iraqi transnational civil society holding the Iraqi government to account through their hostland government. Respondent 18, a Turkmen party representative in London stated,

“We can’t get our land back from the government. Even if a Turkmen is more skilled than anyone else, they don’t have the right to be in a ministerial position. This made us in a democratic country like the UK and especially one that took part in regime change to demand our rights. The British promised us that after 2003 the democratic regime that was to take place in Iraq was to be inclusive of all and no one would feel their rights denied. But we still feel our rights are denied day after day, so we have to promote our case here.”

Meanwhile others excluded from the political system or have taken a moral and activist stand to avoid working with a corrupt government, have contributed to civil society building through personal initiatives and private resources in a bid to circumvent the domestic structures of power while simultaneously providing services otherwise the domain of the state. These invisible and ad hoc state-

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85 Author interview with Respondent 10, 6 November 2013, London
86 Author interview with Respondent 18, 14 November 2013, London.
building initiatives have supported diaspora’s local towns and cities and their needs in various ways. Interviews with UK diaspora revealed funding a travelling medical caravan in remote areas in Iraq where locals were unable to access medical assistance and immunisation. Other attempts have included setting up a torture centre to offer psychological support for Iraqis tortured during Saddam’s reign, funding for Iraqis orphaned by the 2003 war, training for local NGOs about their rights and human rights work, and support for women’s rights and gender based violence, amongst others.

Indeed, in a bid to provide local services to Iraqis in Baghdad, Respondent 26 (R26) who left Baghdad in the late 1950s returned to support the state by working with international civil society organisations to address social housing and public sanitation needs, and also provide medical and other educational textbooks equipment to Iraqi’s National Library. Amidst sectarian violence and corruption, the initiatives carried out by R26 were destroyed or opposed by government officials who more often than not refuse any applications or initiatives that they do not benefit or profit from.

In response to the security situation and the corruption some diaspora individuals attempted to support Iraq from the hostland by spreading the ideals of tolerance, human rights and democracy. A very active diaspora member who had worked extensively in the field of human rights and through an Islamic organisation had been an advisor to the Iraqi and UK governments since 2003 on various issues related to governance, democracy and human rights. He had also attempted to work directly with the Iraqi government to set up conferences to tackle the issues of democracy building, writing of the Iraqi constitution, human rights, fighting terrorism and the Kurdish question. Disillusioned with the ineffectiveness of the political class and culture, he decided that grass-roots activism to influence the minds of Iraq’s civil society would be more effective in changing the country and proceeded to establish the

87 Author interview with R26, 13 January 2014, London
The HDF was set up to build a “peaceful Iraqi society, human rights and civil society”\textsuperscript{88} from the outside to inside Iraq through live public lectures transmitted from London to Baghdad. Lectures are transmitted through the Al Selam satellite channel of its founder Hussein Al Sadr straight to an Iraqi audience. Lectures involving expert speakers have been organised to address issues in the fields of human rights, women’s rights, children’s rights, as well as economic, cultural, social and health education. Furthermore, videos of the lectures are uploaded on YouTube, the foundation website and emails of the links are sent to members in Iraq. Though the channel is funded by a Shi’a cleric, its mission is non-sectarian and aims to build tolerance and reconciliation amidst Iraqi society. Attending an HDF event in London, the author saw a mix of Jewish, secular, Shi’a and various Iraqis from different backgrounds.

While others have directed their politics outside the structures of power, the new and emerging Sunni diaspora largely made up of those who were historically associated or linked to the old Baathist regime, whether true party supporters or otherwise, have been particularly excluded from participating in Iraqi politics. For many mainly Sunni diaspora individuals in this position opportunities to contribute to state-building have been thwarted by previously cited de-baathification policies and sectarian politics that has until more recently denied true representation for the Sunni community. A Sunni diaspora individual interviewed stated that he has not been able to go back to Iraq and contribute to rebuilding the country because he is accused of being a Baathist and he can no longer return to the country\textsuperscript{89}. Denied a place in the new Iraq, former Baathists have been exiled into diaspora, their political rights and attachments severed by the new political classes.

The examples above demonstrate the limitations placed on diaspora individuals from hostlands with corrupt, ethno-sectarian governments that practice

\textsuperscript{88} Human Dialogue Foundation website [http://www.hdf-iq.org] [Last accessed 1 August 2014]

\textsuperscript{89} Author interview with Respondent 29, 6 May 2015, London
exclusionary politics. Nonetheless they show that in such circumstances mobilisation may be directed to supporting/challenging the state through civil society by privately funded individuals or civil society organisations that work outside the structures of power to provide for state and society. Significantly these transnational links also show that they are more often than not rooted through a translocalism rather than transnationalism, i.e, local links between diaspora and the towns their families live or once lived, or their former political party branches or organisations they were formerly connected to prior to exiting the country of origin.

**Assessing diasporic interventions following the 2005 elections**

What becomes evident from research for this study is that diaspora mobilisation for state-building since 2005 has been shaped around ethno-sectarian lines that clearly demarcate who in the diaspora is able to influence institution-building and governance and who is denied. Confirming hypothesis 3, groups that are connected to ethno-sectarian ruling political parties in the homeland will have more opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance while those outside the structures of power are more likely to be involved by supporting or challenging the state through civil society, or in some cases prevented completely.

The Shi’a and Kurds, the powerful governing groups in Iraq have been able to maximise diaspora opportunities and gain from the UK relationship cementing their hold on power and the very structures that keep them there. Meanwhile other individuals in the diaspora who do not identify with an ethno-sectarian identity or are outside these structures of power have been limited by this exclusionary politics. Their mobilisation has not necessarily been denied but rather been channelled towards civil society focussed around holding the government to account, lobbying for minority rights, and providing services to towns, villages, political organisations and opposition groups where the weak Iraqi state has failed to deliver. The meeting of the Iraqi state and its multiple constituent parts, to refer back to Migdal’s definition of the state, means that
Iraqis on the outside have also been shaping the evolution of the Iraqi state, by continuing to support it, challenge it and shape its future outcomes.

A by-product of this exclusionary politics in Iraq has been the entrenchment of ethno-sectarian identities in the diaspora so that Assyrian Iraqis are now Christian Iraqis, and Iraqi Kurds are simply Kurds. Ethno-sectarian power dynamics have encouraged sectarian identifications if only to gain government or political positions. One diaspora member identified with the Iraqi Communist party stated that he had been approached by Islamists parties in Iraq who wanted him to join if only he would confess his Shi’a allegiance and identity. Examples of previously non-religious individuals who upon returning adopted a sectarian identity to engage in homeland politics abound in the diaspora.

Furthermore political activism in the diaspora on issues of human rights and democracy have gradually decreased since intervention. This has been largely due to the ethno-sectarian divides that have plagued the country as argued above but also because the majority of diaspora who were politically active prior to regime change have subsequently returned to take up government or political positions. This has left only those who have no place in the new Iraqi state to lobby, hold the Iraqi government accountable and fight for human rights. Yet even this diaspora network is shrinking due to an aging political class and hopelessness within the diaspora about Iraq’s political future. As an example, the UK’s National Health Service employs over 5,000 Iraqi doctors (‘Iraqi Doctors in Britain and the War on Terror’, n.d.), in 2003 there was a fear that these doctors would return to Iraq and leave the NHS in peril. Yet the vast majority have remained in the UK disillusioned with the corrupt nature of the political system and the lack of incentive for professionals. For many in the diaspora who wanted to contribute and help in rebuilding Iraq, the myth of return became a reality but quickly dissipated to be replaced by a beautiful

90 Author interview with Respondent 30, 1 May 2015, London Skype call.
memory that cannot be altered or taken away. It is an Iraq they can conjure up through memories, food, social and cultural rituals, but no longer the land they want to return to.

Similarly, for the diaspora’s second generation, there is a high level of engagement on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook towards Iraqi issues. Increasingly both through ethno-sectarian stances, as well as recently counter reactions through Iraqi national, non-sectarian positions. It remains to be seen whether the second and third generations of Iraqis in the diaspora will continue their links with Iraq and how. More recently, a new Iraqi Transnational Collective has been instigated between second generation Iraqis in New York, London and the wider Middle East suggesting that the 1.5 and second generation Iraqis are finding new ways of engaging in the politics of their homeland. Yet other than a couple of Youth Groups including the Iraqi Youth Foundation and university student Iraqi societies, who organise various social and cultural activities, there is very little in the way of political engagement and activism among Iraqi diaspora youth currently in London.

Another further reason why political activism has decreased in the diaspora may be attributed to the fact that there now exists an accessible Iraqi embassy in London that at least nominally represents all Iraqis and their concerns. Thus often protests, campaigns and letters of complaint to the Iraqi government are addressed to the embassy and less elsewhere.

**Conclusion**

Since 2005 when the new Iraqi political system was consolidated along ethno-sectarian lines, opportunities for diaspora to mobilise towards state-building have been divided between those linked to ethno-sectarian parties and those who are not. Thus opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance and Iraq’s on-going political process has been dominated by those

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in power. This has meant the Kurds and Shi’a parties, which have further consolidated their political positions in the country and their grip on power. Meanwhile, groups excluded and marginalized in Iraqi society directed their efforts by acting as a diasporic civil society, providing support for the needy or repressed in Iraqi society, challenging and holding the government accountable for its corruption, lack of human security and the ethno-sectarian political system, which has not lead to a democratic Iraq. What have emerged thus are two tiers in Iraq, those who are linked to the ruling class and those who are not. The reality of this exclusionary politics has been reflected in the diaspora, which has shaped and directed the state-building efforts of those involved. If included and connected they continue to be involved through the apparatus of the state, if excluded through civil society.

CHAPTER 6 - THE IRAQI DIASPORA IN SWEDEN
Following on from the UK chapter, let us turn our attention to the data gathered in Sweden. In this chapter it is argued that all three hypotheses
investigated in this study have impacted the capabilities of the Swedish Iraqi diaspora to mobilise for state-building. A lack of Iraqi elites in Sweden and non-involvement in military intervention and occupation directed the diaspora’s political engagement towards supporting the state through civil society in the period up to Iraqi’s first elections. This is because the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden is relatively new due to the fact that a big wave of Iraqis only arrived into Sweden in the 1990s. The majority of Iraqis were conflict-generated refugees who had suffered significantly from wars and destitution. They were not wealthy individuals or prominent political or religious families that maintained political links with Iraq. Political activists were few in number and without the resources or networks to organise seriously and lobby powerful actors. Nor was there enough time for new elites to surface that could have formed a strong Iraqi opposition to influence Swedish policy makers, or engage with UK or US state-building plans. As a result their energies were directed to supporting the state through civil society and grass-roots activity.

Similarly, Sweden’s non-involvement in military intervention diverted their policy in Iraq towards development, which created opportunities for the diaspora through diaspora-development initiatives, such as supporting democratisation in Iraq. Other hostland organisations also funded the development of democracy, education and human rights diaspora projects in Iraq.

Following Iraq’s first elections when ethno-sectarianism was consolidated in Iraqi politics, the situation changed for those connected to ruling ethno-sectarian parties as ethnic and sectarian kin recruited from the diaspora. Though not as widespread as in the UK, the Swedish case also confirms hypothesis 3 and shows that once Iraqis took over following Iraq’s first elections, only those who were connected to ruling parties had opportunities to contribute to institution-building, whereas those still mobilised but were excluded from this were directed to challenging the state through civil society.
The Iraqi diaspora in Sweden

The first part to understanding the puzzle of why the Swedish diaspora contributed more to supporting the state through civil society than institution-building and governance is related to the lack of Iraqi elites in Sweden and the generally lower socio-economic positions of those who migrated to Sweden. Unlike the formation of the UK diaspora, Iraqi migration to Sweden had a much later genesis and was discernible for having an entirely different profile.

During the 1970s Iraqi migration to Sweden was minimal and consisted largely of Kurds and Iraqi Christians. Kurdish migration to Western Europe was as a result of European demands for guest workers in the 1960s. Most of these were Turkish Kurds who went to Germany but later migrated to other countries including Sweden (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005). Iraqi Kurds migrated to Europe as a result of the defeat of the autonomous Kurdish movement from 1961-1975 (Hassanpour and Mojab, 2005). The autonomous Kurdish movement reached its crescendo in 1974 when successive conflicts between the Iraqi state and the KDP ended in a civil war. The war was provoked by the proposal put forward by the Iraqi governments terms of an autonomy agreement, which the Kurds rejected (Tripp, 2007; Khayati, 2008). The conflict took its toll on both sides and eventually led to the exile of the KDP and the flight of over 100,000 civilian refugees to Iran. This along with the expulsion of 40,000 Shi’a Faili Kurds, due to their supposed Iranian descent (taba’iya) in the 1970s (Tripp, 2007), led to a wave of Kurds to flee Iraq, some of whom would eventually make their way to Europe. By the 1970s there was a mixture of Kurds from Turkey, Iraq and Iran in Sweden (Khayati, 2008; Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014).

For Iraqi Christians, some of whom were also living in the Kurdish region and often caught in the midst of the Iraqi states’ war with the Kurds, the 1970s proved to be a perilous time (Rassam, 2005). Not only did the war in Iraqi Kurdistan create refugees but also the Iraqi government’s stringent laws denied

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92 Author interview with Respondent 21, 23 June 2015, Stockholm
the right to the use of the Syriac language and identity. This led to many persecutions and a feeling of insecurity that drove many to find settlement elsewhere. Respondent 6 captures this trend with his own personal story,

“I left Iraq for political reasons but I wasn’t politically active. I was working for the Syriac radio. The Syriac radio meant that I made programmes in the Syriac language about our issues, but at the time this was not permitted during Saddam’s time.”

Many Iraqi Christians who had fled Iraq previously migrated to Lebanon where a Christian population also exists, which facilitated their settlement in Lebanon. However, the onset of the 1975 Lebanese civil war meant that many found their security compromised yet again and attempted to flee to other parts of the world. It was during this time and in an attempt to help the plight of Iraqi Christians that the Assyrian Universal Alliance allegedly decided to host their annual conference in Sweden as a means of facilitating Assyrian entry into Sweden where they could then seek asylum. Many who attended did not leave and instead started a new life.

During this time, respondents recall that there were very few Iraqis in Sweden, so much so in fact that as one diaspora respondent recalled when any Iraqi had a wedding all of the Iraqis in Sweden would be invited. Another meanwhile recalled that his Iraqi accent was becoming more Lebanese due to mixing with other exiled Arabs as there were so few Iraqis.

This reality changed however in the 1980s when Iraqi migration to Sweden increased due to several events and persecutions leading to a diverse group of Iraqi migrants. This migration wave saw middle class but impoverished Iraqi

93 Author interview with Respondent 6, 9 October 2014, Stockholm
94 Author interview with Respondent 6, 9 October 2014, Stockholm, See also Assyrian Universal Alliance website www.aua.net where it states that the 1976 conference was held in Stockholm, Sweden. In fact the conference helped bring discriminated Assyrians from Turkey as well as those caught in conflict in Lebanon.
95 Author interview with Respondent 5, 8 October 2014, Stockholm
96 Author interview with Respondent 6, 9 October 2014, Stockholm
97 There were also Lebanese migrants and refugees who had fled the Lebanese civil war, which commenced in 1975.
98 Author interview with Respondent 5, 8 October 2014, Stockholm
families flee the Iraq-Iran war and make their way to Sweden where Sweden’s humanitarian reputation for taking refugees was now taking hold. Similarly during this time persecuted Iraqi communists who were leaving the Soviet Union or its satellite states were now also making their way to Sweden as the Soviet Union’s future was becoming more and more questionable. Many Iraqi Communists had previously migrated to the Soviet Union, either as students or politically persecuted dissidents but felt unsafe and no longer welcome in the crumbling and tense environment of the former Soviet Republic.

Further migrations were caused by the former regime who persecuted against Shi’a Iraqis, whether Arab or Faili Kurds, who were considered of Persian descent and were no longer welcome in Iraq especially as hostilities between Iraq and Iran took hold in the 1970s and 1980s (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001; Fattah, 2009). It is during this time that political party branches representing the KDP, PUK, ICP and the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) were formed in the Swedish diaspora reflecting the political persuasions of diaspora individuals who had fled the country.

Later in 1988 the Kurds were targets of Saddam’s Anfal campaign where thousands of Kurds were exterminated in chemical gas attacks, leading many to leave and head for the Turkish border (Bruinessen, 1998). Yet the first real surge in Iraqi migration to Sweden took place in the 1990s following the first Gulf War. Not only did the violence and destruction cause many to flee, but the Shi’a uprising that was crushed by the regime in 1991 saw the first wave of largely Shi’a families from the south arrive in Sweden. Many were escaping a vengeful Baathist regime or made their way from the infamous Rafha refugee camps in Saudi Arabia99. Similarly in 1991, after the failed and crushed Shi’a uprising, the Kurds also felt the wrath of Saddam’s security forces once again and fled to Iran and Turkey (Bruinessen, 1998; Tripp, 2007) and from there to Europe. Other families meanwhile escaped the harsh conditions of the

99 Author interview with Respondent 27, 5 November 2015, Skype call
economic sanctions by selling everything they owned and paying smugglers to get them out of the country. From 1990 to 1999 a total 26,156 Iraqis had arrived into Sweden100.

The final migration wave, and the largest, which has not abated in Sweden has been due to the 2003 Iraq war. With violence erupting as the coalition battled Iraqi forces and subsequent sectarian violence, many Iraqi families have been forced into refuge in neighbouring countries and beyond. Many made their way to Sweden as by now Sweden's open door immigration policy and reputation for taking refugees on humanitarian grounds was well known amongst Iraqi families. A series of chain migrations led many to make their way to Sweden and join family and friends who had already settled in Sweden in previous waves. Many were motivated by Sweden's family reunification policy that permits immediate family and or spouses to join once permit residence has been granted101. Since the year 2000 and up till 2014, 61,442 Iraqis have entered Sweden102. As of 2015, there are a reported 131,888 Iraqis in Sweden103.

Furthermore, since 2003, a new category of Iraqi migrants also formed part of the 2003 wave. The ousting of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime by the US led coalition meant that a class of top tier officials were now no longer welcome in Iraqi society, especially after the infamous de-baathification process in 2003. The changing power dynamics in Iraq brought a wave of former Baathists to Sweden and those associated with the regime. Interviews with Iraq embassy staff in Sweden and several diaspora reveal that many former Baathists live in isolation in Sweden without interacting in the social and cultural life of the diverse Iraqi diaspora104.

100 Statistical data provided from correspondence with Statistics Sweden www.scb.se
101 Author interview with Swedish Member of Parliament, 11 June 2015, Stockholm
102 Statistics Sweden www.scb.se
103 Statistics Sweden www.scb.se
104 Author interview with Iraqi ambassador to Sweden, 17 October 2014, Stockholm
Iraqis in Sweden live all over the country but there are large concentrations in Sweden’s capital city Stockholm, as well as Malmo and Gothenburg. A large Iraqi Assyrian, and Mandean community also reside in Sodertalje, a town south of Stockholm. There are reportedly 10,000 Iraqis living in Sodertalje since the 2003 War (Anon, 2009).

The above summary of Iraqi migration into Sweden reveals that the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden is still relatively new. Though many would have preferred to go to the UK, due to having some knowledge of English and some familiarity with an English education system, several interviewees stated that news had spread about the difficulties of gaining entry into the UK and its asylum system, while Sweden’s open-door policy meant that illegal migration routes were thus being diverted to Sweden.

For those of middle class origins however, who arrived in the 1970s and 1980s of middle class origins in the homeland have integrated well, especially as there were so few Iraqis to mix with and so their language skills and subsequent economic integration have developed more easily. Furthermore, for the Kurds and Assyrians who came in the 1980s, their integration was facilitated by their ethnic compatriots from other countries such as the Turkish Kurds and Syriani Christians who came in the 1960s to Sweden (Westin, 2003) and whose economic and social networks provided a platform into Swedish society. In this respect the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora in Sweden, and to a lesser extent the Syriani Christians, are the exceptions to the rest of the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden. The Kurds appear to have a large number of authors, novelists, poets, politicians, political leaders, intellectuals, scholars, artists, musicians, singers and journalists (Khayati, 2008; Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014; Baser, 2015). All of whom have contributed greatly to the social, cultural and political life of Kurdish diasporic life in Sweden. Sweden, in the words of Khayati, has been a “centre of gravity” for the Kurds (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014: 58), where Kurdish identity has become more pronounced and flourished (Alinia et al., 2014). The Kurds have thus been able to carve out a place for themselves in the
diaspora, which has reinforced their integration in Sweden. According to the KRG special representative to Sweden, there are 6 Kurdish MPs in Sweden, Kurds working in every municipality and 40-50 Kurds working for the Swedish National Radio⁴⁰⁵. In this way opportunities to contribute to the homeland have been far greater for the Kurds in the aftermath of intervention. This is in part due to their profile in the diaspora, but also the fact that they have been able to go back to Iraqi Kurdistan and maintain transnational links since the 1990s due to the ‘safe haven’ zone created after the failed uprising of 1991, where Iraqi forces were forbidden from entering the Iraqi Kurdish region (Tripp, 2007).

Yet for the majority of Iraqis who came in the mid 1990s and beyond as refugees, it was Sweden’s open door policy, which offered a safe haven and an opportunity for a new life. This largely Shi’a wave is important to consider as the profile of migrants differed in two substantial ways. Firstly, the majority were conflict-generated and discriminated against in the land they previously lived due to their sectarian background. As such, many were not able to be political or participate in any political activity unless it was in an underground fashion. This meant that the majority were not connected to political networks in the homeland. Secondly, the majority were of a lower social status; they lacked the material resources that might facilitate their integration as many were/are dependent on social welfare. Consequently their transnationalism has been largely defined by familial and religious links, which directed their political transnationalism to grass-roots activity.

**The Iraqi diaspora in Sweden and political activity before 2003**

Now that Iraqi migration into Sweden has been sketched out, we can turn our attention to how the profile of Iraqi Swedes has shaped their political transnationalism. As shown above, the majority of Iraqis who arrived in Sweden were conflict-generated refugees fleeing from the first Gulf war, repression due to the Shi’a uprising and later the economic deprivation created by the UN

⁴⁰⁵ Author interview with respondent 19, 10 October 2014, Stockholm.
placed sanctions. These were not wealthy individuals who chose to leave voluntarily but those forced to flee due to poverty, wars and personal persecution. Those who arrived to Sweden were of a lower social class and many had a low level education, especially those who arrived after 2003. Simply put the diaspora lacked the education, material resources, and the political and social networks to contribute to institution-building and governance, which directed those keen to mobilise towards supporting the state through civil society.

Migrants or refugees with less disposable income are restricted from certain forms of mobilisation because these require financial resources to set up. For example, creating political organisations, hiring event halls, and travelling nationally or internationally to lobby, all require significant time and money. And yet time and money are luxuries for refugees whose starting point in the hostland is effectively a retrograde clean slate whereby lives are to be built from scratch. They arrived with limited financial resources having sold what they could to escape the country. It therefore took some time for the diaspora to establish themselves in their new country of settlement.

Often placed in refugee camps outside the main cities either in the north or south of Sweden, newly arrived refugees awaiting their residence permit can expect anything from 3 months to a year waiting period before authorities are able to process applications. During this time the majority were dependent on the Swedish welfare system for their integration, housing and income.

Language barriers also hindered settlement. Interviewees with respondents and immigration officials stated that immigrants are only permitted to take the Swedish for Immigrants (SFI) language course once they have gained their resident permit. Once they do however they are faced with the difficulties of learning the Swedish language, which many still struggle with. Swedish municipalities offer different SFI courses depending on levels of education and
language proficiency but the state recommends 840 hours for beginners\textsuperscript{106}. Language barriers have made finding a job problematic and stalled economic integration. One diaspora reflected on the consequences of this on the diaspora at large and stated, “so we couldn’t go to school straight away and learn the language and residency and citizenship took a while, we were living in camps for a long time. This affected a lot of immigrants. They became passive not active in life.”\textsuperscript{107}

Secondly for the majority of Iraqis in Sweden who left in the 1990s and beyond, their education levels and skills took a downward spiral during the 1980-1989 Iraq-Iran war, the 1990 Gulf war and throughout the economic sanctions period (1991-2003). The effect of economic sanctions on Iraqi society and education levels is difficult to underestimate. According to the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq,

[A]t the beginning of the 1980s Iraq had one of the best education systems in the Arab world. The gross enrolment rate (GER) for primary schooling was around 100\%”, adding that “the Higher Education, especially the scientific and technological institutions were of international standard, staffed by high quality personnel” (United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, 2003).

Yet all education institutions in Iraq were affected by the economic embargo (Santisteban, 2005). According to UNICEF’s 2002 report, literacy rates for females had fallen from 87 percent in the 1980s to 45 percent in 1995. Meanwhile primary and secondary drop out rates had vastly increased, 23.7 percent of children of primary school age were not in primary school, with figures higher for girls and those in rural areas (quoted in Santisteban, 2005, pg 63). Families could no longer afford to send their children to school. Instead many were forced into work at a young age in order to support their families and help put food on the table.

\textsuperscript{106} Author interview with Respondent 3, 8 October 2014, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{107} Author interview with Respondent 10, 12 October 2014, Stockholm
The point here is that those arriving into Sweden had a low level of education. Having lived through successive wars, economic sanctions and foreign intervention, many of the refugees coming in the late 1990s and since 2003 were the product of the gradual degradation of the Iraqi state and society. Education under duress became a luxury for many impoverished families trying to survive and especially women’s education took a backseat (Jawaheri, 2008). Thus those who arrived in the 1990s had a low level of education, a fact supported by the average level of education of the majority of interviewed respondents who arrived during this time (of which only 3 out of 28 had a masters degree and several did not have a bachelors degree). Respondent three reflects, “In the 1980s the Iraqis who were here were few but what I would consider first rate Iraqis, from the oppressed intellectuals, academics. It was from the middle and above in terms of education and culture and politics. But after 1991 this changed, it became refugees.”

Indeed for many who arrived in the 1990s, Sweden was a first opportunity to gain a full-time education and relevant skills. Nearly a quarter of the 27 Respondents had not continued their high school education on arrival to Sweden. The rest who held a degree were not able to use them in Sweden due to the fact that Iraqi or Soviet degrees are not recognised by the Swedish state, which requires immigrants to re-do degrees or re-train outside of their chosen field. This was not the case in the UK, where degrees are recognised, even though some degrees, such as medical degrees, do require tests to prove that skills are equivalent to those practiced in the UK. In any case, this in combination with language difficulties has demotivated many from trying and yielding to accepting government funds instead.

108 Author interview with Respondent 3, 8 October 2015, Stockholm
109 Author telephone and email communication with General Medical Council, 10 November 2016.
Under these circumstances, it is not hard to appreciate that certain types of political transnationalism may be inaccessible to those who lack the material resources to organise, influence and lobby. Consequently in the early 1990s political activism was minimal in the Iraqi diaspora, with the exception of Iraqi Kurds who in 1991 were able to take advantage of the changing situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The no-fly zone agreement, which created a safe haven for Iraqi Kurds in the north of the country in 1991 (Tripp, 2007), created an autonomous region many could now return to and reconnect with their homeland socially, commercially, culturally and politically. Yet for the rest of the diaspora who were still denied return or in many cases contact with their homeland the only recourse were grass-roots political activities in the diaspora.

**Political activity following the first 1990 Gulf War**

Things began to change after the first Gulf war and into the mid to late 1990s when grass-roots activity increased. Diaspora groups had by now become more economically integrated, language skills had improved and Swedish society more understood. This was reflected in their ability to mobilise not only amongst themselves but also in solidarity with other Swedish civil society groups, politicians and the media. One respondent had joined the Swedish Left Party and had the support of other left leaning Latin American solidarity groups and Swedish civil society organisations. Others worked through the Swedish Red Cross or Amnesty International to raise awareness about family members imprisoned by the regime.

Whereas in the 1990s there was only the 14 July club that united the small and mixed Iraqi population in Sweden, in the 1990s as more and more Iraqis arrived, new Iraqi organisations were established to represent the diverse ethnic, religious and political group interests. For example, a Mandean Society

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110 Author interview with Iraqi Ambassador to Sweden.
111 Author interview with Respondent 20, 16 June 2015, Malmo
112 Author interview with Respondent 3, 08 October 2014, Stockholm
113 Author interviews with Respondent 9 and 21, 11 October 2014, Stockholm and 26 June 2015
was formed\textsuperscript{114}, as was a Turkmen association\textsuperscript{115}. Other organisations including a literary society and more women’s organisation such as the Iraqi Women’s League were also established\textsuperscript{116}. Furthermore in the 1990s the large Shi’a migration wave saw the creation of Islamic parties including the Da’wa and SCIRI who were now also involved in political activism against the regime.

The increase in political and social organisations meant that political activism towards the homeland also increased. By 1995 the Federation of Iraqi Associations in Sweden was established as an umbrella organisation to cater for and represent Iraqis in Sweden. It was actively working with Swedish civil society organisations such as the Swedish Red Cross to raise awareness about conditions in Iraq, economic sanctions and Iraqi refugees\textsuperscript{117}. One of its founders was referred to a European Union Migrants Forum where immigrants issues where discussed and where he could raise awareness about Iraq in quarterly meetings in Brussels and to a supranational body\textsuperscript{118}. Meanwhile, political party representations and other Iraqi organisations became more outspoken, meeting with Swedish politicians, parliamentary committees and protests became more frequent.

The difference between the early 1990s and the period before 2003 war was stark. With increased integration into Swedish society the diaspora were now connected to political networks with Swedish organisations, Swedish politicians and the Swedish media. Respondent 20 emphasised the difference between his political engagement during the early 1990s and the years before 2003.

\textit{“R20:} For example in 1991 we went out once to protest and it stopped, where as this continued throughout the period [2003] and we tried and influenced Swedish society and got them to stand in solidarity with us. We

\textsuperscript{114} Author interview with Respondent 8, 10 October 2014, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{115} Author interview with Respondent 22, 23 June 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{116} Author interview with Respondent 21, 23 June 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{117} Author interview with Respondent 25, 30 June 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{118} Author interview with Respondent 25
reached the big Swedish civil society organisations and got them to come out with us.

Author: Who for example?

R20: Nearly all the Swedish political parties, mainly the social democrats and the left parties, mainly the left as their line is always against America. Vänster and Socialdemokraterna and communists too. The biggest Swedish organisation was Attack, I think it also existed in the UK.

Author: Yes there was the Stop the War coalition.

R20: Yes. It was with liberal people but this was the biggest. Also through them and the media we were able to reach ordinary people who came out too [...] our activities were better with the Swedes not just the Iraqis because of the language. This was an important angle."

Improved language skills and understanding the political system opened up a new audience and new political activities targeted at raising awareness and calling for regime change. Language was repeatedly mentioned as a barrier and facilitator for political activity. Several mentioned that their good language skills helped them to mobilise with Swedish people and government119, while those whose language skills were weak were limited to working with Arabs or other ethnic groups.

The change between the early 1990’s and the 2000’s can be demonstrated using the following example. In 2003, just before the war, when the Iraqi Cultural Centre in Malmo heard that Anna Lindh, the Swedish Foreign Minister at the time, was visiting Malmo, they used their contacts with politicians and invited her to give a talk about Sweden’s foreign policy position towards Iraq. Anna Lindh reportedly gave the first formal and public address of Sweden’s position and stated that Sweden would be following UN agreements and laws120.

120 Author interview with Respondent 20, 16 June 2015, Malmö
Yet despite the increased integration and rise in political activity, the fact remains that the majority of the diaspora had only been in Sweden for a decade or so. This meant that the process of integration was still on going by the time that the Iraq war became imminent. This did not leave enough time for Iraqis to establish themselves, gain positions of power and influence in Swedish society and therefore be able to lobby effectively the Swedish government to intervene in Iraq, had there been such a desire. Nor did it necessarily leave enough time to become financially successful so that resources could be spent on opposition activities, and organisations.

As discussed in the theory chapter, the diaspora literature has expounded the important role of elites in diasporic life and political mobilisation due to their resources (Tölölyan, 2000; Koinova, 2013; Baser, 2012; Doraï, 2002b; Adamson, 2002) and as I argue in this thesis their social and political networks. The absence of elites affected the capability of the Iraqi Swedish diaspora to organise effectively and influence policy makers and thus take part in Iraq’s future state-building plans. Though there were political party branches representing the ICP, PUK, KDP, ADM and later Da’wa and SCIRI, their efforts largely focussed on raising awareness through ad-hoc meetings and protests due to their inability to access material resources, both financially and in terms of powerful social and political networks. When I asked political party representatives what they did before the war, one of them stated, “We used to go out to protest against the Iraqi embassy with other parties in a general sense about what was happening inside”\textsuperscript{121}.

The lack of prominent Iraqi political leaders based in Sweden did not create the means for a strong opposition centre to form in the country. As one diaspora respondent remarked, those who had money went to London to reap the benefits of a low tax system and where they already spoke English, meanwhile those seeking humanitarian assistance went to Sweden\textsuperscript{122}. Iraqi political party

\textsuperscript{121} Author interview with Respondent 9, 11 October 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{122} Author interview with Respondent 20, 16 June 2015, Malmö
representations in Sweden therefore acted as a support network but were not the drivers of strategy or action. They informed Swedish politicians about the situation in Iraq and their party’s positions vis à vis the war123.

Furthermore, seeing that the majority of Iraqis arriving in Sweden in the 1990s were conflict-generated Shi’a Iraqis, their transnational networks were largely social not political, consisting of friends and family or religious kin inside and outside the country because during Saddam’s reign the Shi’a were discriminated against and there was no way for them to be openly political during this time. It is these chain migrations that continued to flow into Sweden as extended families joined their relatives in Sweden and spouses and minors were re-united under Sweden’s family reunification policy 124.

It is not the case however that political engagement was impossible, but rather under this context it was rather limited. Many respondents interviewed stated that they were involved in political activity in the diaspora as soon as they arrived through their friends or ethnic compatriots, primarily for social reasons125, even during their time in the Swedish camps. Yet, with their restricted material capabilities, know-how of the Swedish system and language, gatherings, discussions, and meetings within the diaspora were the only activities they had access to.

**Sweden’s foreign policy and diaspora political activity during occupation**

While the profile of the Swedish Iraqi diaspora explains why political activity was limited prior to intervention, Sweden’s lack of involvement in military intervention explains why during occupation the diaspora were directed towards supporting Iraq’s fledgling state through civil society. Confirming Hypothesis 2, it is argued that the Swedish government’s anti-war stance and

123 Author interview with Respondent 9, 11 October 2015, Stockholm
124 Swedish Migration Agency, [www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Moving-to-someone-in-Sweden/Syria/Information-for-Syrians/Frequently-asked-questions-regarding-family-reunification.html](http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/Moving-to-someone-in-Sweden/Syria/Information-for-Syrians/Frequently-asked-questions-regarding-family-reunification.html) [Last accessed 19 October 2015]
125 Author interview with Respondent 1, 7 October 2014, Stockholm
non-involvement in military intervention did not create the political opportunities for the diaspora to contribute to institution-building and governance, which directed their political engagement towards supporting the state through civil society and grass-roots activity. By not engaging in military intervention and occupation, the Swedish government did not have a say in the building of the future Iraqi state. Consequently, the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden had no entry into the country during the occupation years, and therefore no stake in contributing to Iraq's political institutions and future governance.

Indeed, in the weeks leading up to the 2003 Iraq war, it was very clear that the Swedish public held strong anti-war views about the war in Iraq. Retrospective reports estimate that the global anti-war march on the 15 February attracted between 100,000 and up to 150,000 people in Stockholm (Vries and Engelien, 2007). Swedish organisations and citizens from all hues and colours joined the march, including politicians from all parties but mainly the Vänster (Left) and Green Party. A Left party member of parliament on the Foreign Affairs Committee who was an activist at the time recalled that on both sides of the political spectrum there was a feeling that this war was simply “wrong”\textsuperscript{126}.

This sentiment had a lasting impression on the Swedish government at the time. The government of Goran Persson, the Prime Minister, had taken the decision to follow the United Nation’s lead, and who later declared the occupation of Iraq illegal under the UN Charter (MacAskill and Washington, 2004). Interviews with parliamentarians and government officials state that Goran Persson's government was not necessarily against the war but that Sweden was following a long tradition of following UN multilateral channels to supporting peace:

“MP1: First of all to rely on the UN whether it is right or wrong as a principal idea is a long tradition in Sweden and is very convenient for

\textsuperscript{126} **Author interview with Member of Parliament 2, 30 June 2015, Telephone call to Gothenburg**
politicians here because you can use the UN to say well the UN says you are good and you are bad etc.

Author: Where does this come from?
MP1: One of the first Secretary General’s in the UN is Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld and Sweden is in all these years the most hardcore supporter of the UN. The idea of a small country who wants to support peace through multilateral relations and the super powers have to come down a little bit and sit down and all the poor countries have to be there as well, this Swedish idea of dialogue etc. But it has gone too far of course because what the UN did in Srebrenica is a disaster, but still you cannot go anywhere else in the world where the support for the UN, the moral support for the UN is bigger than here. Maybe Norway.”

Another government official meanwhile indicated that it was not a case of the government being against intervention, that this was more the public sentiment. Rather it simply chose not to send troops, though in an indirect way it did aid intervention since Swedish weapons were used in Iraq127.

The above extracts are revealing about Sweden’s foreign policy towards Iraq at the time but also help elucidate the cautious manner in which it engaged with the country in the aftermath of intervention. On the one hand Sweden was interested in helping rebuild the country, yet on the other it steered away from any direct political involvement with coalition forces during this period. Several interviewees indicated that the Left party, which was in a coalition government with the Social Democrats at the time and the Communist party saw the Iraqi Governing Council as a Vichy government128 or a Quisling government129. This was in reference to Norway’s Vidkun Quisling’s collaboration with the Nazi government during the Second World War, which was considered a puppet government. I asked several Swedish officials about this and most disagreed

127 Author interview with Government official 2, 11 June 2015, Stockholm
128 Author interview with Respondent 1, 7 October 2014, Stockholm
129 Author interview with Respondent 10, 12 October 2014 Stockholm
with the analogy of a Quisling government. One Parliamentarian from a liberal party suggested that puppet government was more appropriate\textsuperscript{130}.

In any case, Sweden clearly felt apprehension about working with an occupied government, as did other EU countries and embassies\textsuperscript{131}, so working through the UN provided Sweden a means of helping in the rebuilding of Iraq without directly involving itself with the coalition. Swedish foreign policy and development towards Iraq was thus directed largely through the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and other UN agencies\textsuperscript{132}. For instance after the Canal Hotel bombing in August 2003, which killed the UN Special Representative in Iraq, Sergio Viera, the UN asked the Swedish Rescue Agency for help, but as one Swedish Ambassador stated no official government team was sent:

“The Swedish Rescue Agency was a request from the UN, they asked if we could help. We need help to set up shop could you help us logistically? So we did not send any Swedish official government team in that sense this was a specific question from the UN officially, can you support us logistically? And of course when the UN asks for help Sweden tries to help and this is what we did in this specific case.”\textsuperscript{133}

Just as significantly, the Swedes did not have an embassy in Iraq during this time. In 2003 the First Secretary was based in Amman, Jordan and it was only once the IGC had regained its sovereignty under UN Security Council Resolution 1546 that Sweden decided to have an Ambassador for Iraq and one was sworn in. There was no embassy in Baghdad till 2009 when one was finally established in the Red Zone\textsuperscript{134}. The lack of a Swedish embassy in Iraq would act as a hindrance to cooperation between the two countries seeing that there was no Swedish representative on the ground to work with Iraqis or facilitate entry into the country for Iraqi Swedes.

\textsuperscript{130} Author interview with Member of Parliament 1, 11 June 2015 Stockholm
\textsuperscript{131} Sida Evaluation report
\textsuperscript{132} Author interview with former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, 25 June 2015
\textsuperscript{133} Author interview with Swedish Ambassador 1, 2 February 2014, London
\textsuperscript{134} Author Interview with Swedish Ambassador 2, 12 June 2015, Sweden, Skype call to Budapest.
Consequently for the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden opportunities to engage directly in institution-building or governance in Iraq were minimal during this time. Since the coalition was the governing body at the time, by not forming part of this coalition the Swedish government distanced itself from occupation and governance of Iraq, which limited the diaspora’s access to the political process inside the country. Their anti-war stance meant that very little political collaboration was occurring between Sweden and Iraq whilst it was still occupied. The author asked the former First Secretary to Iraq whether there was any political work with Iraq during the period 2003 to 28 June 2004 and he responded, “No. No new political initiatives, that is true.”

The anti-war movement that swept the country prior to the Iraq war thus influenced Sweden’s foreign policy. Large swathes of the Swedish public had made their feelings towards the war quite clear as witnessed by the 15 February 2013 global march, one of the biggest marches in Swedish history after the Vietnam War. This influenced the Swedish government’s foreign policy position, which was against intervention, and instead chose to follow UN protocol, which weakened any real power to influence or be involved in pre and post war state-building plans. It is no surprise then that prior and post regime change access to state-building inside Iraq was inaccessible for the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden.

In fact, research amidst the Iraqi Swedish diaspora only pointed to one diaspora individual who was able to return to Iraq during the occupation years and successfully enter the political process. Respondent 27, returned to Iraq in April 2003 to run a democratic movement. When I asked him how he was able to do this during occupation he stated that he was only allowed to enter through the Jordanian border because he had a UN identity card through his work with Swedish organisations. He stated that the Americans had asked the Jordanian government not to let any one in and only Iraqi diasporans who had been part

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135 Author interview with Swedish Ambassador 1, 2 February 2015, London. On the 28 June 2004 Iraq regained sovereign powers from the coalition forces.
of the opposition were able to enter the country during the time\textsuperscript{136}. Although this fact could not be triangulated, it remains the case that leading up to intervention and in the first year of occupation, the Swedish Iraqi diaspora was limited in what it could contribute to Iraq. Political activity was largely oriented towards anti-occupation protests in Sergels Torg\textsuperscript{137} in central Stockholm or in front of the Riksdag\textsuperscript{138}.

**Swedish diasporic political activity from 2004 to 2008\textsuperscript{139}**

Once intervention had taken place and the anti-war movement declined, the diaspora who were part of the anti-war movement faced a new reality. Either they could continue protesting against the coalition or start thinking about how to contribute to rebuilding the country. Sweden’s anti-occupation stance had cut any links to the coalition and thus contributing to institution-building and governance in Iraq. Instead this channelled their political contributions towards supporting the state through civil society by trying to support democracy in Iraq.

Knowing that Sweden’s foreign policy towards Iraq was directed towards development through the United Nations, diaspora groups saw an opportunity to urge Sweden’s democratic tradition to support Iraq’s transition to democracy. One such organisation, the Federation of Iraqi Associations (FIA), an umbrella organisation representing over 60 Iraqi organisations from different ethnicities, sects and political persuasions, started to lobby in 2004 the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It called on the MFA to organise a meeting alongside Sweden’s International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Ministry of Democracy in order to encourage Sweden’s involvement in supporting Iraq’s fledgling democracy. I questioned Respondent 25 what the goal of the meeting was, “the goal was that the Swedish budget had some

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{136} Author interview with Respondent 28, 19 June 2016, London
\item \textsuperscript{137} Literally means Sergel’s square in Swedish. It is a public square in central Stockholm
\item \textsuperscript{138} The Swedish Parliament is called the Riksdag
\item \textsuperscript{139} After 2008, the Swedish government’s Iraq strategy was changed from working with diaspora groups to contracting work to international organizations working in Iraq.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
money to put towards supporting democracy in Iraq but it didn’t know what to do with it so at least each person [from the federation] could present their views and they have a general idea”¹⁴⁰

Indeed by 2004, the Swedish government awoke to the fact that in their midst was a big Iraqi diaspora in Sweden they could tap into. Swedish politicians as well as MFA officials started to meet and listen to diaspora groups¹⁴¹.

“This unique relationship we have between our countries where so many Swedes are of Iraqi origin. I mean Olof Palme, Swedish prime minister was a negotiator in the Iraq–Iran war, and there were Swedish companies in Iraq since the 1950s. ABB built all the electricity basically that’s why the Americans had difficulty with the electricity grid because basically it was all European standards. And ASEA from Sweden and of course Erikson and these companies, all things taken together it was a unique relationship. The government wanted to move ahead on that. Mrs Roxman¹⁴² had very clearly that task.”¹⁴³

Subsequently, the MFA’s response to helping rebuild Iraq was to contribute to the long-term development of a democratic Iraq. As part of the programme, the Swedish government used the resource base of the Swedish-Iraqi community in Sweden to help with this strategy. Practically speaking, this policy translated into collaborating with Iraqi-Swedish diaspora organisations and their civil society partners in Iraq¹⁴⁴. The experiences and acquired value systems of the Iraqi-Swedish resource base were considered crucial and important for sharing with local Iraqi civil society organisations. As one government report stated, “Working through these Swedish-Iraqi organisations thus constitutes the immediate and main modality for providing support”¹⁴⁵.

Consequently, Iraqi diaspora member organisations that supported democracy and human rights, and that operated a non-sectarian agenda, were given the

¹⁴⁰ Author interview with Respondent 25, 30 June 2015, Stockholm
¹⁴¹ Author interview with Ambassador 1, 15 February 2015, London and Government official
¹⁴² The first Ambassador to Iraq appointed by the Swedish Queen in 2004.
¹⁴³ Author interview with Ambassador 1, 15 February 2015, London
¹⁴⁴ Author interview with Senior SIDA Director, 14 October 2014, Stockholm
¹⁴⁵ Evaluation of the Olof Palme International Centre’s support to Civil Society Organisations in Iraq, 2007, shared with the author by Senior SIDA Director via email exchange on 7 August 2015
opportunity to apply to receive funding for the rebuilding of Iraq’s state and society. The Olof Palme International Center (OPIC), the Social Democrat Party’s International Organisation working for peace and human rights, was chosen to administer an Iraq Programme between mid-2005 and mid-2008 with a total budget of SEK 35 million.

Table 1. Diaspora co-development projects in Iraq.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Geographical area in Iraq</th>
<th>Focus of activity</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Year of Activity</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Gender Equality - General Education and Citizen Rights</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 All of Iraq</td>
<td>Trade Union Rights</td>
<td>Trade Union Leaders</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
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<td>3 Najaf</td>
<td>General Education and Citizen Rights</td>
<td>Men and women with varying levels of education</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Baghdad</td>
<td>Media - Political and</td>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

146 Interview with Senior SIDA Director
148 Quoted from Swedish International Development Agency’s Mapping and Institutional Analysis of Civil Society Groups in Iraq report, December 2008 shared with the author by Senior SIDA Director via email exchange on 7 August 2015.
149 SIDA Evaluation Report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Project Title</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Diwania</td>
<td>Women's Centre in a new Democracy</td>
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<td>Sadr City</td>
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<td>Erbil</td>
<td>Political and Citizen Rights</td>
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<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>Gender equality Education</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>NGOs, Police and Security Personnel, Iraqi Ministry of Health</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>Organisational and Capacity Building</td>
<td>Youth and Student Groups</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Project Title</td>
<td>Target Group</td>
<td>Period</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Human rights</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Developing Democracy</td>
<td>Politically active people particularly youth and women.</td>
<td>2005 to 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, Mosul and Kirkuk</td>
<td>Election monitoring-Election observers</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>Gender Equality and Democracy development</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>Empowerment of young Iraqis</td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nasiriyah</td>
<td>Democracy and Girls with special needs</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 above shows that diaspora projects selected by OPIC focussed heavily on supporting the Iraqi state through civil society, with only one project (number 9) targeting state officials. Most of the projects are related to democratic development, improving the political participation of women and youth groups and human rights, whether labour rights or gender equality.

One such project ‘The children’s library for the springboard to democracy’ was considered one of the most successful under the programme as it simultaneously helped women’s participation and education whilst also educating children about democracy and freedom. Using the books of one of Sweden’s most celebrated children’s authors, Astrid Lindgren, the project encouraged children to role-play and use their imagination to help build a better future for Iraq. The idea was that the process of building a new state requires an imagination and a vision that for many Iraqis was repressed under the Baath’s authoritarian regime. After funding from Olof Palme ceased in 2008 the project continued with funding from other Swedish organisations including Forum Syd\textsuperscript{150}, a non-governmental member organisation, that works to promote democracy, gender equality and sustainability, and also Radiohjalpen\textsuperscript{151}, a foundation that also supports long-term international development.

It is clear that Swedish foreign policy funded the diaspora to support a specific kind of state in Iraq, one that respected democracy and human rights. This criteria for selection has thus conditioned the type of state-building that the Swedish Iraqi diaspora could involve itself in, if they wanted institutional support from the Swedish state.

\textsuperscript{150} Forum Syd \url{http://www.forumsyd.org} [Last accessed 24 June 2016]
\textsuperscript{151} Radiohjalpen \url{http://www.svt.se/radiohjalpen/} [Last accessed 24 June 2016]
Sweden’s tradition of supporting democracy around the world also created another avenue for funding democratisation in Iraq. In fact the tradition has been institutionalised into Sweden’s political party system as each of the established political parties has a corresponding foundation that works to support democratisation in other countries. The practice of having political foundations in Sweden commenced after the fall of the Berlin wall as a means to help spread democracy to the former Soviet Union satellite states. Instead of the Swedish government funding one party in each country it would be more democratic, it was reasoned, for each party to support a sister party in the chosen country\textsuperscript{152} or the multi-party democratic system\textsuperscript{153}. Each foundation is funded by SIDA in line with the number of seats each party has won in Parliament.

For one diaspora individual who was a member of parliament for the Swedish Centre Party, this was an opportunity to gain funding for the promotion of democracy in Iraq. Indeed Respondent 13, worked alongside her father on two political projects in Baghdad. The first, established in 2004, was to create a new political party called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), built on liberal and secular values. Funding for the project was to be spent on strengthening politicians and parties to have a broader impact on democracy and gender equality issues.

The second project started in 2007 to encourage the political participation of women and youth so that they form part of the debate in democracy and civil society\textsuperscript{154}. This was carried out by an organisation they created called the Iraqi United Nations Association. The association focused on supporting human

\textsuperscript{152} Author interview with Member of Parliament 1, 11 June 2015 and Foundation Secretary General 1, 25 June 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{153} Author interview with Secretary General of the Centre Party International (CIS) Foundation, 25 June 2015, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{154} Interview with Secretary General of CIS
rights and civil society initiatives, including educating and training women in computer skills and rights and youth political education\textsuperscript{155}.

Many other diaspora individuals and groups attempted to transport democratic practices from their experiences in Sweden through civil society by promoting gender equality. One successful initiative established by the FIA aimed to generate democratisation through sport for young girls and boys. Unable to return to Iraq, they instead invited 29 football coaches from Iraq over to Sweden for a training workshop so that they can return to Iraq and create football clubs in different cities. The organisation worked with Kista Football club and the Swedish football association, who funded the project. Workshops were held for 50 days in Stockholm with the aim of supporting democratic practices and gender equality through boys and girls’ sports education in Iraq. In the end reportedly nine football clubs were established all over Iraq\textsuperscript{156}.

Many others in the diaspora worked through civil society organisations in Sweden such as Qandil, Amnesty International, The Left Party (Vanster Partiet) to raise awareness and funding for women and minority groups in Iraq. Some even returned with the hope of re-building Iraq or restarting political organisations but returned traumatised from the destruction, culture shock and violence.

**Assessing diaspora mobilisation for state-building from 2005-2008**

In choosing not to intervene in Iraq, Sweden’s foreign policy was directed towards development. This created a different relationship with the Iraqi state, which opened up different avenues for the Iraqi diaspora in Sweden to influence Iraqi politics inside the country. The co-development initiatives were aimed at helping to raise awareness about democracy and human rights, strengthening the organizational capacities of local non-governmental organisations and supporting the training and education capacities of

\textsuperscript{155} Author interview with Respondent 13, 14 October 2014, Stockholm
\textsuperscript{156} Author interview with Respondent 25, 30 June 2015, Stockholm
individuals\textsuperscript{157}. All of which attempted to breed a participatory politics and a new relationship with the state.

Yet despite the noble efforts of many, interviews with diaspora who were recipients of hostland funding, as well as with programme managers and policy makers involved in its implementation reveal that though there were issues with diaspora capacity in development cooperation\textsuperscript{158}, the major obstacle that stood in the way was the security situation. This affected both participants and policy implementers from carrying out their work. Security conditions posed severe problems for diaspora participants, which meant that at times it was hard to find personnel to carry out the work. As one respondent remarked, diaspora women were not interested in risking their lives for a voluntary position\textsuperscript{159}.

For the Olof Palme Centre, the security situation made monitoring difficult to carry out, hence many projects could simply not be monitored, which meant funds were often hard to keep track of\textsuperscript{160}. In the lawlessness environment of Iraq this created opportunities for corruption, as there were no mechanisms for accountability. For example, the National Democratic Alliance received SEK 600,000 each year from the Centre Party International Foundation (CIS) foundation, between 2004 to 2010, before funding was eventually stopped\textsuperscript{161}. Similar to the situation faced by the Olof Palme Centre, the CIS could not verify where funds had been spent by the diaspora individual carrying out the tasks and what activities had actually occurred. This led to a government investigation, which lasted over two years. Danish investigators were eventually hired to carry out an evaluation but could not verify either way whether the activities had taken place. Despite the investigation, the General Secretary admitted that they were proud of the work they did in trying to support a

\textsuperscript{157} Author interview with Respondent 11
\textsuperscript{158} SIDA Evaluation Report and Interview with Senior SIDA Director
\textsuperscript{159} Author interview with Respondent 10
\textsuperscript{160} SIDA Evaluation Report.
\textsuperscript{161} Author interview with Secretary General of CIS
fragile democracy in Iraq with Respondent 13, but the lack of transparency and accountability for spending meant that the project could not be sustained.

Secondly, since no assessments could be made, no lessons could be learnt, adapted or changed during the project cycles, and thus projects could not be adequately supported. A Centre for Civil Society in Iraq was supposed to be built in Baghdad to support the work of the projects, yet this was to be moved eventually to Erbil due to the security situation[^162], which also impacted the support offered to diaspora organisations outside of Northern Iraq. It is thus no surprise that following this programme, diaspora co-development projects were not taken up by Sweden’s next government in 2009 and a new Iraq strategy was developed that worked through international organisations and foundations to support Iraqi institutions and civil society.

What these collaborations show is that though good intentions existed, and good ideas carried out, under conditions of continued violence and corruption, as was the case in Iraq, there are limitations to what diaspora can do without risking their lives and without failing the accountability and transparency conditions needed by hostland donors.

Ultimately however Sweden’s non-involvement in Iraq would stand Sweden in good stead as they forged a very different relationship with the Iraqi government and the Iraqi populace. So much so in fact that the Swedish embassy was one of the few who was situated in the Red Zone and not the heavily bordered and secured Green Zone. This enabled the embassy to be more in touch with Iraqis and their lives as well as work more closely during the elections[^163].

[^162]: Sida Evaluation Report
[^163]: Author interview with Ambassador 2
In comparison to the UK and US, Swedish staff were more able to be engaged on the ground because they were not perceived as occupiers but a country who had come to help. Sweden’s positive reputation in Iraq actually pre-dated their development cooperation as Sweden had been taking large numbers of Iraqi refugees since the 1990s and even greater numbers since 2003\(^{164}\). Consequently, many Iraqis had relatives in the Swedish diaspora and were aware of the support they’d received from the Swedish state in welcoming them and offering them a new home. This legacy would have its impact after 2003 as Sweden’s reputation appeared to provide more safety than any US or UK armoured truck. A former Ambassador emphasized this fact and reflected on his time in Iraq from 2006 to 2010.

“I can really stress at a number of occasions, especially during the elections that we were covering, we were much more out in the field. I remember during one of the elections, I had five different teams in five different parts of the country out in my small embassy compared to the big ones but we had different teams out in the country operating very well, coordinating with other countries as well, while some of the bigger embassies couldn’t leave the premises because of the security situation...[...]... the sheer fact that everyone in Iraq from the President, the Prime Minister to the single man in the street had a positive impression of Sweden because they had relatives in Sweden they knew we had been helping them under the Saddam years to take the refugees etc. and also helping them in the later stage when people had to flee with the insurgency and terrorism. So every single conversation I had in my four years in Iraq it started with them wanting to pay their respects to me because I come from Sweden and so on and that helped us both security wise and in facilitating contact.”\(^{165}\)

The relationship with Iraq after 2008 focused on development and investment, and though the co-development initiatives were stopped due to the security situation, Sweden’s relationship with Iraq created further opportunities for the diaspora in Sweden to act through civil society to influence politics. In 2008, Sweden hosted the first annual review of the International Iraq Compact conference, an initiative by the Iraqi government to collaborate with the international community on reform programmes related to Iraq’s political,

\(^{164}\) Statistics Sweden  
\(^{165}\) Author interview with Ambassador 2
economic and security sector\textsuperscript{166}. Several diaspora organisations were invited to the event by the Ministry of Foreign affairs to meet with the Iraqi delegation\textsuperscript{167}. During this conference diaspora Iraqi grass-roots organisations were invited to raise issues with the Iraqi government about minority issues, women’s issues and the elections\textsuperscript{168}. For example, a representative of an Iraqi women’s group was invited to the conference where a seminar on women’s issues was held. Respondent 15 was consequently able to discuss women’s issues with Staffan de Mistura, the former UN Special Representative to Iraq\textsuperscript{169}.

We have seen throughout this section that the migration waves of the Iraqi diaspora have limited what they were able to give back to Iraq both before and after intervention. Unlike the UK Iraqi diaspora that was established in the 1940s and 1950s, and whose backgrounds were affluent and prominent political and religious families, the Swedish Iraqi diaspora, with the exception of the Kurds, is still relatively new. Most of the families who arrived in Sweden were refugees with limited skills and education and were not from prominent political or wealthy families. Consequently this shaped what they were able to do in the run up to intervention as those who were integrated were few and far between. The majority were still in the process of integration as most had only been in the country for a decade and were still grappling with the language and Swedish society at large. Just as importantly they lacked resources and political networks for an organised opposition to form.

It has also been argued in this section that Sweden’s anti-war stance did not create the means by which the Swedish Iraqi diaspora could involve itself in institution-building and governance. As explicated above, Sweden’s non-


\textsuperscript{167} Author interview with Swedish Diplomat, 30 June 2015, Telephone call to Buenos Aires, Argentina

\textsuperscript{168} Author interview with Respondent 21, 23 June 2015, Stockholm, Sweden

\textsuperscript{169} Author interview with Respondent 16, 15 October 2014, Stockholm, Sweden
involvement in military intervention meant that the diaspora could not participate in institution-building and governance because there was no entry into Iraq during this time as we have seen and Sweden did not have an embassy till 2009. This channelled diaspora engagement towards supporting the state through civil society where initiatives were undertaken to transport experiences of democracy, human rights and capacity-building from Sweden to Iraq.

Following occupation and once regime change occurred, the diaspora encouraged the Swedish government to support Iraq’s democratic transition. This led to several collaborations, with the biggest funded by Sweden’s International Development Agency, which helped fund co-development projects that encouraged democratic governance, political participation, supporting political parties, human rights, women’s rights and youth groups. In doing so, both the Swedish government and the diaspora were able to contribute to state-building whilst bypassing the occupation and the sectarian government that followed by working through Iraq’s civil society organisations.

There is no doubt that Iraqis in the diaspora were strongly motivated to help in the rebuilding of their country of origin and many contributed greatly, or have in the very least attempted to transport their experiences of democracy and democratic practices in Sweden to Iraqis inside the country. By strengthening civil society organisations and informing them about their rights, developing capacity and helping minorities to participate in Iraq’s state-building process, they have contributed to the process of Iraq’s democratisation but also, at the very least, creating in the imaginations of the people they worked with a civic and democratic vision for Iraq.

Yet as we have seen the one thing that neither policy makers nor the diaspora could bypass was the escalating violence. Under the climate of insecurity and violence in Iraq, participation in projects proved extremely difficult to sustain. Not only were people risking their lives to contribute to rebuilding Iraq but supporting and monitoring projects were near impossible due to the escalating
violence. The instability that sectarian violence prevented projects from evolving and long-term partnerships from developing, which ultimately hindered Iraq’s democratic process.

**Diaspora mobilisation for state-building since 2008**

Ethno-sectarian power dynamics in Iraq have shaped state-building opportunities in the diaspora. The consolidation of power in Baghdad by a Shi’a government, and in the KRG by the KDP and the PUK, has meant that for these two ethnic groups in the diaspora state-building opportunities have increased. This is because politics in the homeland have taken an ethno-sectarian turn, where political positions, policies and action are conducted via cronyism and appealing to ethno-sectarian audiences.

Consequently this exclusionary politics in Iraq has marginalised a significant portion of the population who do not fall within its framework. For Iraq’s Assyrians, Yezidis, Turkmen, Sunnis and anyone with a liberal or alternative political agenda, opportunities to engage in the political process is near impossible. The diaspora who are on the peripheries of this political system are therefore denied the opportunity to contribute to shaping domestic politics inside the country. Lacking in representation and a voice within this ethno-sectarian politics, their state-building efforts are directed towards political activism associated with minority rights, women’s issues, democracy building, and acting as a transnational civil society at large.

Following Iraq's first elections in 2005, when state-building was officially handed over to the newly elected Iraqi politicians, it was evident that the ethno-sectarian power structures supported by the IGC and put in place by the coalition government were consolidated. Shi’a and Kurdish groups had successfully held their grip on power in their respective areas, while other ethnicities and sects in Iraq were unable to make any serious impact on Iraq’s now divisive and institutionalised ethno-sectarian system.
This political structure at home would have an impact on the ability of groups in the diaspora to contribute to certain types of state-building. For the Shi’ā and the Kurds, the ruling parties within this structure, this has been enabling. It has further opened doors both at home and in the diaspora, allowing those who are politically inclined to contribute to building political institutions in the homeland and governance.

In Sweden, the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora has enjoyed a strong relationship with their hostland government. This has in large part been a result of the active and strong mobilisation of the heterogeneous Kurdish groups in Sweden, who have over the last 30 years been very driven in developing cultural and social organisations, networks, online and off line, and various exchanges between the two countries (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014). In agreement with other scholars (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Van Houte et al., 2013; Baser, 2012) the Kurdish case demonstrates how political mobilisation towards the homeland can actually increase integration as the diaspora has to understand and be part of the system to make any real impact.

Just as importantly, it suggests that concepts of homeland for the Kurds are far more fluid and occupy a transnational rather than a nationalistic space, undermining a state-centric approach (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014). In fact, concepts of homeland have also changed for Swedes, where the concept now also includes citizens of other countries. As the former Social Democrat leader, Mona Salhīn reportedly declared, “Kurdistan is part of Sweden and Sweden is part of Kurdistan”\footnote{Author interview with Respondent 19, 17 October 2014, Stockholm, Sweden}. The Swedes have thus shown solidarity towards the large Kurdish diaspora in their midst, as well as sensitivity towards Kurdish issues related to independence and Halabjā\footnote{Halabjā is a Kurdish town in Iraq that was the sight of a chemical gas attack by the Baathist regime in 1988. Over 5,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands fled to neighbouring Turkey and Iran (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001)}. 
This solidarity however, has manifested itself further since the 2003 war in Iraq, and more specifically as Kurds have assumed further control and power of their autonomous region. There now exists a KRG representative in Stockholm who enjoys close ties with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Swedish ministries. He explained that for Kurds Sweden was a “role model for Kurdistan”, it thus gave the diaspora an opportunity to contribute their ideas, experiences and skills to state-building in multifaceted ways. This has included over 40 visits for Swedish politicians to visit the region, collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Health ministry where they have sought help with issues related to female representation in Kurdistan, courses on organisation and leadership, democratic elections and gender equality.\(^{172}\)

Furthermore the Kurdish political parties, PUK and KDP, have actively campaigned in the diaspora during Iraqi elections in 2005 and 2010, where the Kurdish Alliance received 10,000 votes from the diaspora for the 2005 elections and where the opposition party, Change List, has grown in part due to support from the Swedish diaspora (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014: 60). Furthermore, there are many Swedish Kurds in Kurdistan who have returned and assumed government positions in the KRG. A former Swedish Ambassador to Iraq interviewed stated, “In the KRG I remember we had 5 ministers of Swedish origin, so when I came I spoke Swedish to 5 of the ministers”\(^{173}\). The Ambassador stressed the contribution of these Kurdish Swedes and the important role they have played in building their country.

As a result, Iraqi Kurds were better placed to take advantage of a diaspora engagement initiative created between Sweden’s Trade Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2009 they launched the ‘Kosmopolit project’ designed to encourage Iraqi diasporans to invest in Iraq and create trade partnerships between Iraq and Sweden. Sweden’s Trade Minister at the time, Ewa Bjorling was reportedly keen to encourage business networks between Iraqi Swedes and

\(^{172}\) Author interview with Respondent 19, 17 October 2014, Stockholm

\(^{173}\) Author Interview with Swedish Ambassador 2, 12 June 2015, Sweden, Skype call to Budapest.
Iraqi businessmen in Iraq and particularly the Kurdish region. It was confirmed that the majority of partnerships nurtured during this time were those between Iraqi Kurds in the diaspora and the Kurdish region. Though there is no doubt that security concerns in the rest of Iraq influenced this outcome, there is no denying the important role and place of the Swedish Iraqi Kurds and the important connections they have made between the two countries.

The Iraqi Shi’a population is the second group in Sweden to enjoy the fruits of the ethno-sectarian political structure. As mentioned in the last chapter, the Shi’a parties won the majority of votes in both Iraqi elections, with the United Iraqi Alliance in 2005 and later the State of Law Coalition leading the country, despite gaining two seats less than the Iraqi National Movement. Though the Iraqi Shi’a parties in Sweden have opportunities for involving themselves in institution-building and governance due to their power position inside the country, their contributions have had less impact than the Kurds for several reasons.

Despite the strong connection to their homeland through the ruling Shi’a parties and Shi’a culture that has flourished in the diaspora, the profile of the Iraqi Shi’a as explained in the first section of this chapter differs in two important ways. Firstly they are largely semi-skilled or unskilled workers, with a low education and very little money, and secondly they are still a relatively new diaspora unlike the Kurds. While the Kurds have been in Sweden for over 40 years, and where there are prominent Kurdish families, the Shi’a population has only been settled in Sweden for half that length.

This has not meant that they have not been able to contribute but rather that the focus of their activities has differed. Their political engagement has centred around two important areas: supporting the needs of the diaspora in the hostland and helping to rebuild Iraq. Though there is a clear distinction in the literature between immigrant politics, related to improving the situation and rights of ethnic minorities and diaspora politics, related to political engagement
towards the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001), this study’s findings suggest that these categories are not mutually exclusive. As in the case of the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden, the more integrated a diaspora, the more it is able to manoeuvre in the political system of its hostland and make an impact. This was confirmed by Respondent 16, who explained his political work as encompassing integrating the Shi’a community, and especially encouraging the second generation to be successful, so as to improve their ability to contribute towards Iraq whether through skills or money transfers. He says,

“We want them to work and live in this country but also to contribute to their country. The important thing is that we provide the environment, the guidance that they can work with so they find themselves in a better position.”

Political and cultural engagement related to Iraq has been done through events at Islamic centres and gatherings called *husayniyat*, that have now been established all over Sweden. The Islamic centres provide a platform for the continuation of a Shi’a identity, which for decades was suppressed under the Baath regime but has found a strong and growing voice in the diaspora.

Increasingly however, and with the establishment of a political system whose architecture has been ethno-sectarian in nature, Shi’a identity has also come to inadvertently signify a Shi’a political identity. For the Iraqi Shi’a who are part of the political structure, maintaining Shi’a identity in the diaspora thus serves the interests of Shi’a political parties at home. A prominent example is the commemoration held by the Da’wa party every year on the 9th April, for Muhammad Baqir Al Sadr, the assassinated Iraqi Shi’a Cleric who was the ideological founder of the Islamic Da’wa Party, “this is a commemoration of the martyr Al Sadr, who was martyred in 1980 and remembrance of his ideas about Iraqi affairs and our view of the new Iraq and how to deal with the new Iraq. Lots of ideas are presented.”

\[174\] Author interview with Respondent 17, 15 October 2014, Stockholm

\[175\] Author interview with Respondent 17, 15 October 2014, Stockholm

\[176\] Author interview with Respondent 17, 15 October 2014, Stockholm
Shi’a identity has taken on further salience in reaction to the rise of ISIL and in the Shi’a diaspora. Furthermore, since Iraqi Shi’a communities now constitute hundreds of thousands of potential votes in national elections, they can make quite an impact to votes at home. Indeed, during the 2005 elections, Shi’a votes reportedly received the second highest total out of the 56,000 votes allegedly cast in the Swedish Iraqi diaspora. Furthermore, respondents belonging to these political parties explained that gatherings are used to spread party political messages and campaigns.

When I asked Shi’a political party representatives what their relationship was with their party inside the country it became clear that there was strong communication between political figures in the diaspora and those on the inside facilitated by mobile apps such as WhatsApp and free calls using Viber and Skype. Respondent 16 states, “There is constant communication with the party, between Sweden and Iraq. We have an audience here who are political. These people are in constant communication with the inside”. Respondent 16 also highlighted that their political work involved disseminating policy ideas to the party back in Iraq, “We also criticise and correct. The party is structured so that the ideas go up and then they go down. So everyone participates in the policies of the party and its ideas”.

In this way domestic politics in the homeland is no longer confined to the borders of the state, but is continuously being shaped by a network of transnational actors across multiple borders. In fact Shi’a political party branches are found all over the world, from Australia to Norway, due to the migration of Iraq’s Shi’a population during the 90s migration wave. Political Shi’a networks are used for recruiting sectarian kin for positions in the homeland, advocating or rejecting policy and disseminating political ideas in

177 Author interview with Respondent 27, 5 November 2015, London Skype call to Stockholm
the hostland and a multitude of political and social activities that link the diaspora to Iraq and vice versa.

Yet while the Shi’a and the Kurds are able to contribute to various forms of state-building, both institutional and those related to civil society, other Iraqi groups are limited due to their political exclusion in the homeland. As such, their political engagement has been directed towards challenging the state through civil society, holding the government accountable, fighting for political rights and acting like Iraq’s transnational civil society. Lacking in faith and trust in the new Iraqi state, Iraq’s others in the diaspora are resisting the politics of division by supporting their former communities, their political parties, and organisations through bottom-up approaches. These invisible but present networks are shaping the development and politics of Iraq and creating a state-building resource base that extends beyond borders.

Though at first glance this redirection of transnational politics appears limited, in the Swedish context, where the concept of civic engagement and social capital is considered strong (Ersson and Milner, 2000), those excluded in Iraq have been able to organise and campaign in a very active way towards their country of origin in the hostland through civil society. This is largely due to the role of interest groups, such as the labour and trade unions, the prohibition movement and women’s movements in Sweden’s history and their role in shaping democracy and politics at large (Anton, 1969). As one Swedish politician declared, in Sweden politics happens at the grass-root level178.

As a result of this politics of associations diaspora civil society in Sweden has thrived for those marginalised in the homeland due to their ability to organise, create associations, and lobby as interest groups for minority issues, women’s rights issues and human rights. According to the Federation of Iraqi Associations in Sweden, as of June 2015, there are 63 registered Iraqi

178 Author interview with Member of Parliament 2, 30 June 2015, Telephone call to Gothenburg
organisations under this umbrella group. Many more exist in the diaspora supporting their ethnic or sectarian or religious groups in the homeland through invisible transnational links that support communities, organisations, disenfranchised groups and much more.

The establishment of diaspora organisations in the hostland has been facilitated by Sweden’s liberal integration policy that financially supports ethnic language classes and associations that preserve ethnic cultures, but also their integration in the political decision-making process in Sweden (Khayati and Dahlstedt, 2014; Khayati, 2008). These are funded by various associations mentioned by respondents such as the government’s Nämnden för statligt stöd till trossamfund (SST) [the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith Communities], and non-governmental organisations such as the Workers Educational Association, Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund, (ABF), and SENSUS found at Swedish municipalities. It is important to stress that funding for these associations is to aid integration in the hostland. However, though they also provide platforms for raising issues about events in Iraq.

A good example has been the work of the Mandeans in Stockholm. Marginalised and persecutied in Iraq, they have been able to politically mobilise in Sweden to protect their communities through collaborations with both government agencies and other civil society organisations in Sweden.

The Mandeans were established in 1993 to cater for the social and religious needs of Mandeans, whose migration to Sweden saw a steady influx in the 90s and following the 2003 war. The organisation’s work steadily grew following the 2003 intervention, when Mandeans in Iraq began to be kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam by insurgents. This situation provoked the Mandeans to lobby Swedish and other international governments to protect Mandeans from violence but also to grant their asylum in the hostland.

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179 Author interview with Respondent 25
180 Author interview with Respondents 13, 13 October 2014 and Respondent 15, 14 October 2014, Stockholm
The Mandeans in Sweden Facing Persecution, but also an international Mandean Associations Union to lobby the UN and other international governments. After a concerted effort lobbying various political parties and meeting with government ministries in Sweden, the organisation managed to work with the Migration Ministry in Sweden to facilitate the asylum of persecuted Mandeans arriving at the time. The collaboration with the Ministry reportedly lasted from 2003 to 2010, and was also confirmed by the Mandean religious cleric who authenticated the papers. Respondent 8 described some of the issues he faced when lobbying the Swedish government,

"R8: “We achieved something. For example, one of our initiatives was targeting the Migration Ministry, we put a lot of pressure on them so much so we had many meetings with senior staff related to refugees and especially Iraq’s. The thing we could achieve in relation to this is raising awareness about the fact that there is a minority group in Iraq called the Mandeans and that Mandeans are facing extinction.”

Author: What was the Swedish government’s response to this?
R8: “Swedes are the type who take their time to reach a decision. They are very careful. For example when there was a mass immigration of Mandeans, they sent a team of Swedes to Iraq to fact check this situation. In the end they stood in solidarity with us. Then I was the President of the Mandeans Council in Sweden and I had a meeting with the Migration Ministry. They had a problem whereby they couldn’t tell whether Iraqis coming in, who were claiming they were persecuted, were really Mandeans or Christians. In order to distinguish between people they asked us to help them by authenticating their identity. They asked us how we would know who was Mandean if they depended on us to verify their identity. So we agreed on a number of details surrounding this issue with the Migration Ministry. This was a positive result for us, those who arrive and receive a verified identity paper from us would have their asylum claim facilitated.”

The above example is interesting on several levels because it demonstrates how minority groups who are denied protection from their homeland governments

\[181\] Mandeans Associations Union http://www.mandaeanunion.org/mhrg
\[182\] Author interview with Respondent 8, 16 October 2015, Stockholm
\[183\] Author interview with Respondent 8, 10 October 2015, Stockholm. Also verified by the religious Mandean cleric who authenticated the papers Respondent 8, 16 October 2015, Stockholm
have sought protection from the hostland government of where their kin group migrated. In the case of the Iraqi Mandaens in Sweden, their political engagement towards the homeland has been to call on the hostland to protect the lives of their ethnic kin whose protection has not been guaranteed by the homeland state. By yielding to the appeals of the Mandeans and facilitating their asylum claims, Sweden is also participating in a transnational politics by granting protection and rights to non-citizens who do not fall under its sovereignty. As such it is not only diaspora who are practicing a transborder citizenship by “reshaping the workings of several systems of law and governance” (Schiller, 2005; 52), but states too are shaping transnational citizenship by conferring rights to vulnerable communities due to pressure from their immigrant populations. This example also further highlights the false dichotomy between immigrant politics and diaspora politics.

Iraq’s other minorities in the diaspora have directed their political mobilisation towards the hostland because they have been excluded from Iraq’s divisive politics. Their political engagement has focussed on raising awareness and funds for their communities in Iraq, lobbying MPs and ministries and in some cases trying to launch opposition parties from afar in trying to support a new Iraqi state.

Yet even for Iraq’s others, opportunities to engage towards state-building has also varied not only because of positionality vis a vis the homeland state but also their positionality in the hostland (Koinova, 2012). Those who are better educated and integrated have been more able to engage in political activity as Guarnizo and colleagues have previously highlighted (Guarnizo et al., 2003). For instance, Iraqi Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans and Syriacs), whose mobilisation was encouraged after the 2003 war, have been able to take advantage of the fact that they have 6 members of parliament in the Riksdag. This has facilitated mobilisation\textsuperscript{184} as despite only one of them being Iraqi, the

\textsuperscript{184} Author interview with Respondent 5, 8 October 2015 and Respondent 6, 8 October 2015, Stockholm
issues they face as Christian minorities cut across boundaries. For the Christians of Iraq, their political engagement on the outside is also necessary because the majority of them no longer reside in Iraq due to persecution and instability.

“Our role is linking our diaspora and our organisations inside Iraq and between our community here and there. And don’t forget we are not the same as Arabs and Kurds. Arabs and Kurds the majority is in Iraq. Our majority is in the diaspora so those on the outside have a role.”

It is estimated that out of 1.5 million Iraqi Christians, only 300-600,000 remain in Iraq. The political engagement of Iraqi Christians in the diaspora has consequently thrived in Sweden where currently five political parties exist representing all the different Christian sects. Conferences in Stockholm are held every two years and there are constant liaisons with the parties inside. Furthermore, speaking to one active member, in 2003 there was an initiative to unite all the sects under one council called the Council of Chaldeans, Syriacs and Assyrians. Though the party was created in Iraq, they held a conference in 2005 in Stockholm and later the diaspora attended a conference in Erbil with the aim of forming a political party in the future.

Yet while Iraqi Assyrians’ have gained influence in hostland domestic politics, conflict with Kurds in relation to land grabs in the Ninewa plains where they have traditionally resided continues. This has meant that their ability to affect Swedish politicians is limited because Kurds outnumber them and also enjoy good relations with the Swedish government. This is a problem also faced by Turkmen and Yezidis who face persecution and land grabs by Kurds in Kirkuk (Parkinson, 2014) and in Yezidi areas (Hudson, 2014). Their political

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185 Author interview with Respondent 5, 8 October 2015, Stockholm
186 Author interview with Respondent 5, 8 October 2015 and Repondent 6, 8 October 2015, Stockholm
187 The other parties mentioned were: Nahrain democratic party
Majlis al Sha3bi al Kildani al Syriani al alshuri
Hizb ul watani wal Ashuri
Majlis Al Qawmi al Kildani
Mumbar ( mesrah) al Democrati al Kildani
188 In Arabic the name is Majlis il Kildani il Syriani il Ashuri
mobilisation for state-building has therefore focussed on raising awareness, lobbying, protests, petitions and collaborations with other civil society groups, which are the only avenues open to them. Their problems in the homeland have thus been compounded in the hostland because a more powerful, influential and populous diaspora group, they are in conflict with in the homeland, is also residing in the hostland. For these minorities this has led to a steady decline in political engagement in the hostland and the homeland.

As for Iraq’s secular and liberal diaspora individuals and groups, many of whom were or still are Communist sympathisers, there is very little hope left. Many see the Islamization and corruption rife in Iraq’s political system a real impediment to democracy. Yet in the face of sectarianism and muhasasa in Iraq, the seeds of a new democratic party, the Iraqi Democratic Movement (IDM), was born in the diaspora in Stockholm in 2011 that would eventually establish itself in Iraq in 2012. One of the founders explained how the party came to be established,

“There was muhasasa, sectarianism and corruption, democracy became just a token. All these groups that were taking over everything and between themselves dividing everything up and controlling everything. There was more destruction than anything else. A group of us representatives of ICP, and other Iraqi democratic organisations such as the Mandeans, 14 July club, Iraqi Women’s League, Union of Iraqi writers, Association of artists.

Author: So not just political groups?

“Parties, civic associations and democratic personalities. Because there are personalities who are not members of any party or organisation. A representative of each sat down developed the idea and we had the idea of holding a conference. We created the internal organisation and a programme. The conference created the formation and a managing committee was selected. And afterwards committees were created in other parts of the world and especially after the Democratic Wave was created in Iraq.”

The above demonstrates that due to a lack of ability to penetrate the political system in Iraq, liberals and secular Iraqis in the diaspora have been more successful in creating an opposition party in Sweden. While the diaspora

189 Author interview with Respondent 8, 10 October 2015, Stockholm
literature has stressed how homeland political parties are recreated in the diaspora (Fennema and Tillie, 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2000, 2001), in this case the reverse has been true. Lacking the political space in Iraq, politically engaged liberals in the diaspora have used their experience of democracy in Sweden to create a political party that was later transported inside the country. The party now enjoys party branches all over the world that help support its political campaign from the outside in;

“We did a lot of work with the Iraqi elections. Lots of media work, handed out flyers, events, met with candidates, had meetings over the Internet, such as through Viber, we invited people to vote. We brought over the IDM’s slogans and goals in relation to the context of Iraq now. To support the Democratic Movement to gain in the elections and support the IDM inside.”

And yet despite the success of the IDM in transporting their democratic ideas to Iraq the majority of the diaspora activists on the fringes of Iraq’s political system have largely given up hope. The respondents of all the ethnic, political and religious parties, and organisations interviewed for this study talked of the hope and enthusiasm in 2003, which gradually gave way to disillusion and despair as the country descended into sectarian politics and violence. Furthermore, with the exception of the Kurds and the Shi’a, all lamented the second generation’s disinterest in Iraq or in attending diasporic events. This is pertinent especially for Iraq’s minorities who no longer have family residing in Iraq and therefore have no familial links left in the country.

**Conclusion**

As shown above, after the period of foreign intervention and state-building in Iraq, a new era dawned when Iraqis took over and dictated the new rules of the game. Those connected to powerful groups and parties in Iraq have been able to take advantage of their political positions both in the hostland and the homeland to affect political change and mobilise towards institution-building and governance inside Iraq. As the case of the Kurdish Iraqi diaspora demonstrates, opportunities to contribute to various aspects of state-building

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190 Author interview with Respondent 8, 10 October 2015, Stockholm
have been possible due to their powerful position in the homeland, which has
opened up doors with hostland governments to transport knowledge, ideas and
systems to be enacted in Kurdistan. Furthermore, as the Kurdish diaspora
included intellectuals and middle class professionals, the Kurds were also able
to transport professionals back to Iraq who have since gone on to become
ministers or work in government.

In contrast, while the Shi’a have been the true rulers of Iraq in the post-Saddam
era, their contributions to institution-building and governance have been
limited due to their profile. In theory they enjoy the same opportunities to
politically engage both in the homeland and hostland. Yet the difference
remains in the socio-economic profile of those who arrived as the majority were
impoverished and had a lower level of education. Only a few have been able to
return and assume political positions due to their ethnic or sectarian links. This
of course became a lot easier once the Shi’a consolidated their power and as the
practice of muhasasa in Iraq opened doors for those connected to the
leadership. Consequently their contributions to state-building have been
largely advisory in nature, sharing ideas from Sweden’s democratic tradition,
critiquing and supporting certain policy positions back home.

As for the rest of Iraq’s minorities and those marginalised by the political
process in the homeland, indeed their political engagement has been directed
towards challenging the status quo by supporting democratisation in Iraq,
fighting for rights, land and an opportunity to participate in the political
process. Like a transnational civil society they have held protests, petitions,
conferences, marches, raised money and funds for their impoverished,
supported communities and organisations, lobbied the hostland and homeland
to speak on their behalf.

There is no doubt that the Swedish Iraqi diaspora has been very active since
2003, contributing and supporting Iraq’s state-building process through
translocal and transnational links that are occurring in ad hoc but consistent
ways. Yet with time political activities have declined and many have lost the will and hope. Not only has political engagement reduced and been replaced with more cultural and social activities, but gradually since the new ethno-sectarian system put in place, their political engagement has reflected the politics inside Iraq characterised by fragmentation. Most Iraqi ethnic or sectarian groups no longer mobilise for Iraq but for their kin inside the country, with only a minority of liberals raising their voices for all Iraqis. The majority have consequently accepted their future will not reside in Iraq but will continue in the diaspora.
CHAPTER 7- CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to look at a relatively little discussed area in the diaspora and state-building literature related to diaspora mobilisation for state-building. Using the methodological tools of social science, it has sought to compare the state-building contributions of Iraq's largest diaspora in Europe, the UK and Sweden, and attempted to provide answers to how both have attempted to mobilise towards this endeavour and why their contributions have been directed to different forms.

The thesis commenced by outlining the puzzle of this study, which sought to investigate how the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden mobilised towards state-building following the 2003 Iraq war and why there was variation in their approaches. In order to delineate my subject matter and the dependent variable of this study, the second chapter of this thesis discussed the concept of diaspora and defined how it was to be used and understood throughout this thesis.

Next, I explored the concept of diaspora mobilisation past and present, for an overview of what this has entailed within the diaspora politics literature over the past 20 years. We saw that diaspora mobilisation has involved ethnic lobbying, diaspora-development projects, sending remittances, organising protests and many other political actions so that a clearly demarcated definition of diaspora mobilisation for state-building was necessary before the study could proceed. In order to do this I analysed the state and state-building literature for clarity on the concepts of the state and state-building.

Using Migdal's helpful definition, it was clear to see that the state was an amalgam of both the apparatus of the state and its meeting with its multiple parts in society (Migdal, 2001). Contrary to the state-building literature, which only stressed the need to build state institutions of governance and legitimacy, I argued that state-building needs to be understood as a two-level process that
involves both building state institutions of governance and legitimacy, as well as civil society. The important role of civil society and how its interactions shape the type of state that is being built has been neglected in the literature.

I thus developed and put forward two categories of state-building related to institution-building and governance and supporting/challenging the state through civil society. The first relates to building state institutions, governance, and involvement in the political apparatus of the state. As much of the state-building literature has emphasised, this requires building the institutional capacity of the state so that the rule of law can be enacted, authority can be imposed and governance can take place (Fukuyama, 2004, 2005; Chesterman et al., 2005; Sisk, 2013). A much-overlooked aspect of this process in the state-building literature was the role of civil society in state-building. While gaining legitimacy is emphasised through local ownership and security provision (Diamond, 2005; Chesterman, 2004; Lake, 2010) little attention has been paid to the bottom-up approaches related to the political participation of citizens in contributing to state policy (Andersen, 2012; Paris and Sisk, 2009). I therefore proposed a second category of state-building, which addresses bottom-up political practices that also shape states and their evolution. Civil society actors, as is argued in this study, are necessary for holding governments accountable, giving a political voice to citizens and providing quasi-state services, which are often lacking in weak or post conflict states. This is particularly relevant for countries attempting to transition from authoritarian rule, such as Iraq, which need the full participation of the public for putting pressure on governments, informing their policy-making and holding them to account (O’Donnell et al., 2013)

I applied these two categories of state-building to the diaspora literature. I explored the ways that diaspora have contributed to each political process, but also drew out from within the limited diaspora/state-building literature an understanding of the factors that may account for why some diasporas may have more opportunities to mobilise towards institution-building and
governance, while others may mobilise towards supporting/challenging the state. As well as inductive reasoning, I also deductively extrapolated from the case of Iraq, as the literature was rather limited in helping me explore my research question. Therefore I developed three hypotheses for investigating throughout my thesis:

**H1:** Diaspora who were connected to elite socio-political networks in 2003 and had monetary resources had more opportunities to engage in state-building through institution-building and governance, while those who were not connected to elite political networks and had insufficient resources were directed to supporting the state through civil society.

**H2:** If a diaspora hostland’s foreign policy supported militarily intervention and occupation then there will be more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to institution-building and governance where as if the hostland’s foreign policy supported development than it will create more opportunities for diaspora to contribute to state-building through civil society.

**H3:** Diaspora connected to ruling ethno-sectarian political parties will have more opportunities to support the state through institution-building and governance where as those unconnected to the ruling ethno-sectarian parties will have more opportunities to support/challenge the state through civil society.

I argued throughout this study that all three variables affected the capabilities and thus the forms of diaspora mobilisation for state-building in which diaspora in each of my case studies could engage at different periods in time. Profiles mattered before intervention took place as this affected who could influence US/UK policy makers and insert themselves in Iraq’s pre-intervention state-building plans.
It was clear to see from the data gathered that the two diasporas differed significantly. The UK Iraqi diaspora was formed from older migration waves that were initially connected to Iraq’s colonial past. Thus those who came to Britain in the 1940s and 1950s were those supported by the British colonial powers in Iraq and who were able to take advantage of this colonial link to migrate to the UK once the political situation in Iraq worked against them. This included the Monarchists, who were ejected during the 1958 revolution, the Assyrian levies, who no longer felt welcome due to their close ties to the colonial powers, and finally the Jews of Iraq who found a shelter in Britain during their expulsion as anti-Zionist feeling spread across the Middle East. In the 1960s and early 1970s, professional and middle-class Iraqis followed bringing intellectuals, political leaders, doctors, lawyers and businessmen. Their political, material and educational backgrounds facilitated their integration into the hostland and afforded them the time and resources to mobilise towards Iraq’s political affairs. This mix of intellectuals, political leaders and wealthy individuals gave rise to a burgeoning social and cultural scene, as Arab media outlets spread and London became the Middle Eastern capital in Europe. In time, an opposition centre grew with a mix of secular Arabs, Shiite and Kurdish leaders and ex-Baathists who were able to influence and lobby UK and US governments using their political and social networks both inside and outside the country and importantly those having the material resources to do so.

By comparison, the Swedish Iraqi diaspora is still relatively new. The first large wave arrived in Sweden in the 1990s following the first 1990 Gulf War and the 1991 Shi’a uprisings. The profile of the diaspora was markedly different from that of the UK. These were largely conflict-generated, discriminated against, impoverished, less educated Iraqis who lived through the Iraq-Iran war, economic sanctions and the first Gulf war. They were the products of the contexts they lived through in Iraq, where jobs were hard to come by leading to a rapid decline of living standards and plummeting education levels. For the
Shi’a this also meant sectarian discrimination, while other minorities faced discrimination based on their ethnicity, religion or practices.

In any case, their integration and settlement in Sweden was prolonged by their lack of skills and material wealth. It took at least a decade before many had the language skills, and societal know-how to become politically active towards the hostland public. By the time the 2003 Iraq war was imminent, their activity increased but was directed to grass-roots activity because they lacked the networks and material resources to mount any serious opposition to influence Swedish, UK or US policy makers or be approached by them.

During intervention and occupation, the foreign policy of the hostland towards the homeland affected the capabilities of the diaspora to be involved in state-building in Iraq as the UK case study shows, military intervention created various openings for the UK diaspora to be involved in the pre and post-intervention state-building process, where as the Swedish diaspora had no access to Iraq since their government did not form part of the occupation.

In the first instance, we have seen that prior to intervention the coalition’s decision to militarily intervene meant that it needed diaspora individuals to provide sorely needed intelligence, formulate a post-intervention plan and legitimate the case for regime change. This collaboration with the opposition diaspora individuals and groups opened the door to be involved in governance and building state institutions once the Anglo-American coalition intervened and regime change had taken place. Diaspora leaders who had worked with the coalition were able to enter the country during this time and one of the foremost protagonists of the diaspora leaders, Ahmed Chalabi, was even famously flown in by a US fighter plane (Bonin, 2011).

Once intervention turned into occupation the coalition sorely needed political leaders to govern the country, opening opportunities for the diaspora leaders they had worked with before the war. An Iraqi Governing Council was hence
set up based on ethnic and sectarian quotas reflecting the opposition groups in London, which led to their recruitment (Allawi, 2007). This event would mark a critical turning point in the history of Iraq’s new state as the IGC helped to establish an ethno-sectarian system in the country. Seeing that many leaders on the council were from the UK diaspora, this provided a transnational recruiting ground from within the UK diaspora as each leader was tasked to appoint a minister, and further political appointments as the political process wore on.

The recruitment of diaspora from the UK for political positions was further exacerbated following the controversial and devastating policy of de-Baathification, which saw the four top tiers of Iraq’s military civil service staff, as well as teachers and professional staff sacked from government. The vacuum created by this policy created a desperate need for civil servants, which the coalition governments looked to the diaspora to fill. Finding skilled native Iraqis proved difficult as Iraq’s state apparatus was run by Baathists and only those who were members were able to gain government jobs irrespective of their loyalty to the party. Additionally, many Iraqis did not want to work for an occupation government, which made the task of finding Iraqi substitutes even harder. Consequently, political staff were recruited directly by the diaspora leaders from members of their own party, breeding once again a politics of patronage and cronyism witnessed throughout Iraq's history (Tripp, 2007). This time however it was tainted by ethno-sectarianism, the new order of the day.

Coalition programmes, such as the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council meanwhile recruited others from the diaspora, specifically experts and highly skilled Iraqis to supposedly run Iraqi governorates. In the end diaspora leaders’ role were downgraded but they worked in various ministries and government institutions supporting Iraq’s fledgling democratic state (Allawi, 2007). Intervention also created opportunities for the diaspora in the hostland to contribute from afar ideas and influence policy makers now in power. This was witnessed through the policy conferences held in London, as well as the opportunities that Iraqi women had in the diaspora to influence UK policy
makers with regards to women’s rights and threats to Iraq’s 1959 personal status law.

On the other hand the Swedish government’s position on the Iraq war was mixed, as has been shown, though ultimately public sentiment against the war prevented the government of Goran Persson from intervening in Iraq. Sweden thus distanced itself from the coalition and its foreign policy towards Iraq was to support the work of the United Nations through the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Sweden’s position not to involve itself in military intervention and subsequent occupation meant that the diaspora had no access into the country and no stake in its future political process. Only in 2004, once Iraqis reclaimed full powers of sovereignty, did the Swedish government and Iraqis in the diaspora move to help Iraq’s democratisation process. Sweden’s foreign policy towards Iraq during this time was to offer development support.

This opened up an opportunity for the diaspora to influence the Swedish government and to collaborate on democracy-building initiatives through civil society in Iraq. A diaspora co-development project was launched by the Swedish International Development Agency under the management of the Olof Palme Centre, the Social Democrat’s political foundation. Twenty-two diaspora organisations were selected to work on issues related to democracy-building, human rights and women’s rights across Iraq but predominantly in the Northern region of Kurdistan.

Working from the bottom-up with Iraqis on the ground, these organisations worked to strengthen democratic governance, and the capacity of Iraqi non-governmental organisations and individuals. Other hostland organisations also funded political projects in Iraq that supported the political development of Iraq’s civil society. Effectively, Sweden’s choice not to intervene in Iraq carved a different path for relations between the two countries, which directed the Iraqi diaspora’s contribution towards supporting the state through civil society.
Empirical evidence from my case studies finds a conjunctural account that incorporates both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 for explaining the puzzle of why there were differences in the state-building approaches of the Iraqi UK diaspora and the Iraqi Swedish diaspora up until Iraq’s 2005 elections. We have seen, for example that both the elite networks and resources available to the UK diaspora, as well as the foreign policy of intervention in the UK, facilitated their involvement in governance and building state institutions. Meanwhile a lack of networked elites and resources, as well as a foreign policy of non-intervention diverted the Swedish Iraqi diaspora’s engagement towards civil society and grass roots activism. This conjunctural explanation may well hold for the two cases under study. However, uncovering which of the two variables holds more explanatory power would require us to test the data with a third case study that either had elite diaspora profiles and non-intervention or non-elites in a hostland that did intervene in Iraq.

Throughout my analysis I have argued and stressed that there is the issue of temporality, which also was a significant factor to how things developed in Iraq. With each new phase in Iraq’s development, before intervention, during intervention, during occupation, following Iraq’s 2005 elections and beyond, there were different political dynamics at play which also influenced what each diaspora was capable or not capable of becoming involved in. For instance, we have seen that during occupation, the Swedish Foreign Ministry worked through the United Nations and distanced itself from the coalition, which limited opportunities for engagement during this phase. Nonetheless, when there was a clear Iraq strategy put in place in 2004, after Iraq regained its sovereignty, this then opened up opportunities for development projects for the diaspora in collaboration with the Swedish development agency. As such, understanding how and why there are divergences in diaspora mobilisation for state-building during conflict or intervention requires also looking at the political dynamics between the hostland and the powers governing the
homeland. These are liable to change in time, and with each change different opportunities may arise or be inhibited as seen in Iraq.

This was particularly felt following Iraq’s first democratic elections, politics was seized by a new political elite that was fragmented along ethno-sectarian lines so that those who had connections to these groups were able to mobilise towards state-building, where as those who were unconnected to it where excluded and were directed to challenging the state by acting as an Iraqi transnational civil society.

As we have seen, when Iraqis took over the state-building process, ethno-sectarianism had become institutionalised in Iraq under the CPA. The head start the diaspora leaders had, as part of the Iraqi Governing Council and the quick turnaround towards Iraq’s first elections, meant that new political figures and native Iraqi parties had very little time to establish themselves and make an impact (Dodge, 2005).

Consequently, it mattered little whether one had expertise, skills or political acumen if you wanted to contribute to Iraqi’s institution-building and governance. Rather, what took precedence, was whether you were connected to the ruling ethno-sectarian political parties or not. Indeed, in both countries the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 3 that those connected to ruling ethno-sectarian political parties had more opportunities to contribute to institution-building and governance while others excluded by virtue of not belonging to Iraq’s new ethno-sectarian political elites were directed towards challenging the state through civil society.

In the context of Iraq, we have seen that this meant increased opportunities for the Kurds and Shi’a in the diaspora to contribute to both categories of state-building, as their majority status in the country led to their empowerment. Opportunities to contribute were increased both in the homeland and the hostland as their position of power not only increased domestically, but also
transnationally impacting the opportunities for their diaspora to impact hostland policy.

Many were also able to return to assume political positions in ministries or as Members of Parliament through their links to parties including the KDP, the PUK, ISCI and Da’wa. A transnational resource base was thus opened for the recruitment of political staff, with only loyalty to the party and leader in question as prerequisite. Simultaneously, those in the hostland were also able to help their kin back home through collaboration with hostland parties, investment opportunities, state-capacity building, transporting ideas and acting as lobbyists for their political parties at home. Power at home thus created power in the hostland, which has further entrenched ethno-sectarian positions back home and reinforced the ethno-sectarian political party system.

As has been evidenced through the empirical chapters, those excluded from this ethno-sectarian conception of the Iraqi state; Turkmen, Assyrians, Chladeans, Syriacs, Mandaeans, Shabaks, Sunnis, Yezidis or those holding a different view of politics, have been unable to enter Iraq’s political process through formal politics and thus their engagement in Iraq’s state-building process has been directed to challenging the state. With no effective representation for several minorities in Iraq, the diaspora has sought to challenge, hold the government to account and contest the very nature of Iraq’s political system.

This has entailed supporting local communities and projects by providing quasi-state services through civil society organisations or challenging the political development of Iraq through grass-roots activism. Various organisations and groups, in a bid to hold the government accountable, have championed political rights, minority rights, women’s rights, labour rights and democracy. The very system put in place by the coalition and supported by the diaspora leaders has also been opposed by Iraq’s others who continue to fight and campaign for a more civic and truly democratic Iraqi state. In many
respects, the diaspora has returned to its opposition politics from afar, as the window of opportunity for real democratic change opened in 2003 but firmly closed down in 2004.

Though homeland political parties have impacted who in the diaspora is able to contribute to state-building processes inside the country, the two country cases demonstrate that the UK diaspora remains a bigger recruiting ground for the Shi’a where many senior politicians including Iraq’s Prime Minister, Haider Al Abadi and current Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Al Jaafari formerly resided. Seeing that few Shi’a elites resided in Sweden, returnees are fewer in number than the UK diaspora. As such, elite networks still matter but only for those connected to the ruling ethno-sectarian parties in the ethno-sectarian political system.

Homeland political parties have thus not only shaped who can contribute to state-building but has also shaped the politics of state-building. While Iraq’s minorities and others have struggled to build a civil society that advocates for rights and tolerance for all Iraqis, it has eventually also led to a fragmentation of Iraq’s imagined community. As ethno-sectarian violence, land grabs and repression torments communities in Iraq, including the Mandeans, Turkmen and Assyrians, protectionist and isolationist attitudes are spreading within the diaspora, as groups have come to identify more with their religion or ethnic kin, rather than an Iraqi identity. For example, violent episodes against Christian Iraqis have led to the formation of a Christian army (BBC News, 2016) and Turkmen in Iraq have looked to Turkey for assistance (Ataman and Owens, 2015). These developments affect politics of the diaspora as those on the outside attempt to support their kin inside the country through lobbying regional or hostland domestic governments leading to the further fragmentation of Iraq and its state-building project.

There are of course those who are fighting for a civic conception of the state, as we have seen. A new civil society is emerging in Iraq and networks of organisations including labour unions, women’s groups, and various non-
governmental organisations are collaborating in a bid to overturn the ethno-sectarian system (Issa, 2015). *Al Tethamun al Medeni*, loosely translated as civic solidarity, a new network of civil society organisations has been established. In the last few years there have been continuous protests in Baghdad, Basra and various Iraqi cities against the ethno-sectarian state, the corruption, muhasasa and the political class that has not delivered on its promises. The marches and protests have been supported through transnational networks in the diaspora who stand in solidarity by spreading the word through writing and critiquing the government in Arab media outlets and social media, but also by joining in parallel protests in the diaspora.

In summary, what this study has shown is how diaspora profiles, hostland military intervention and links to homeland ethno-sectarian parties can affect diaspora mobilisation for state-building albeit in different forms. Materially resourceful diaspora and those connected to powerful social and political networks, a hostland foreign policy of intervention in a diaspora homeland and links to ruling ethno-sectarian parties create more opportunities for diaspora mobilisation for institution-building and governance. As we have seen through the case study of the UK Iraqi diaspora, it can create opportunities for mobilisation towards both categories of state-building, both institution-building and governance as well as supporting the state through civil society. Meanwhile, insufficient resources and a lack of powerful political networks, a hostland foreign policy of non-intervention and no links to ethno-sectarian parties in the homeland will likely steer diaspora mobilisation towards supporting/challenging the state through civil society and grass-roots activity, as has largely been the case in Sweden.

**Conceptual, theoretical and methodological implications**

The study's findings have several theoretical implications. While the diaspora literature has stressed the difference between immigrant politics and diaspora politics (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001), my study has found that there is in fact a false dichotomy between these two supposedly distinct processes. Often, the
two processes worked in tandem. As Iraqi immigrants put pressure on hostland government for rights for their compatriots in the hostland, they were also able to highlight and raise awareness about their situation back home, as the case of the Mandeans in Sweden has shown. Similarly, the rights granted to Iraqi immigrants to enjoy their social and cultural events in the diaspora through funding in Sweden, often opened a space to discuss homeland politics with fellow Swedes and thus raise awareness about homeland issues through their social and cultural events. More attention needs to be paid in the literature to this relationship and how the two processes are linked and reinforce one another.

As demonstrated throughout this study understanding the profile of the diaspora in the hostland is crucial to understanding the links that people have with their country of origin. We have seen that the different migration waves between the UK and Sweden affected what the diaspora were able to do leading up to the Iraq war and beyond. The findings from this study support the findings of Guarnizo and colleagues that those who are better educated and integrated are more likely to contribute to political transnationalism (Guarnizo et al., 2003). The higher socio-economic position of those who fled in the early waves meant that integration was facilitated, leading to a smoother integration process in the hostland. Ultimately in the diaspora, those who were most successfully integrated were the ones who were able to give back more to their country of origin, whether through institution-building and governance or through civil society. This study however extends this literature by showing that the backgrounds of diaspora actors upon exiting the country of origin can play an important part in who becomes politically active but also the type of political activity they are able to engage in.

While the case has been made that conflict-generated diaspora’s emotional bonds to the country of origin encourages their transnational mobilisation (Lyons, 2007, 2006; Portes, 1999; Bloch, 2008), this study shows that the concept of conflict-generated is too broad a term to capture the relationships
of a wide variety of diaspora who may react to conflict in different ways. The majority of diaspora in Iraq were conflict-generated, yet what mattered was their profile upon exiting Iraq. This includes their socio-economic position, past political activities and whether they had been personally persecuted by the regime before they left.

Many who left in the 50s to 70s were also conflict-generated diaspora but had a rose-tainted memory of Iraq. They left during its Golden Age, when the economy was starting to boom due to Iraq’s growing oil revenues, and society at its most liberal with progressive personal status laws and women’s higher education and work in the labour force (Al-Ali, 2007; Efrati, 2012). Their memories and emotional links to Iraq are thus from this period, which created a strong myth of return narrative throughout their lives, propelling their political mobilisation. Similarly those expelled or left during this time were political leaders and activists from prominent families who maintained their links with the parties and organisations they were members of. Some were lucky to escape unscathed while others were personally persecuted, tortured, or had family members executed by various regimes and so their links to Iraq are indelible. Past traumas, nostalgia and strong political links were the key ingredients that made for a political transnationalism of yearning, to return to the Iraq that should have been.

By contrast those who fled from conflict in search of a better life, as in the majority of those who left for Sweden, had a very different relationship to Iraq. They did not leave with the hope of coming back. They were conflict-generated, impoverished refugees seeking asylum and settlement in a new hostland. Many did not have a desire to return but were seeking a better life elsewhere for their families and children. Thus while both sets of diaspora were conflict-generated what mattered more was their links to the country upon exiting and their socio-economic backgrounds and networks.
Understanding the profiles of diaspora in the hostland is also important for understanding the type of transnational links that are made. We know from the literature that migrations and the diaspora communities they create tie people to transnational social fields between their real or perceived homelands and their hostlands (Adamson, 2002; Levitt, 2001; Faist, 2000). Yet what we need to see more from the literature is an understanding of the types of social fields and networks that are created by people occupying different positions in society and the power bases they tap into. My study has furthered our understanding of this phenomenon by demonstrating that while elite networks span across political, religious and business elite worlds in more than one state to influence domestic and international governments, grassroots political transnational networks operate more locally between diaspora and their familial locales or former political associations. The fields tap into different networks and their sources of power are constituted differently. This not only affects what they can do but how they contribute to their countries of origin and the politics they can shape. Elites are more likely to pursue positions of power while grassroots activities respond to needs and injustices. In state-building missions, both top-down and bottom-up approaches are important and necessary for state formation in transition societies.

There are also implications for understanding how opportunities and obstacles shape the mobilisation of diaspora towards state-building processes both during foreign interventions and during domestic state-building missions. In the first phase, the foreign policy of each hostland affected the type of state-building that diaspora could engage in, as UK intervention and Sweden’s non-intervention in Iraq presented different political opportunities for the diaspora in the UK and Sweden. In the second phase, it was dictated by the ruling ethno-sectarian ruling class in Iraq. Ultimately those in power and their state-building agendas for the homeland decreed it, whether neo-liberal or ethno-sectarian. Each created inclusivity criteria for who could become involved while those excluded re-directed their work outside the structures of the state.
Certainly hostland states and their citizenship and integration policies may account for why some diasporas are more active towards homeland states than others as the literature has previously demonstrated (Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 2001; Odmalm, 2009; Van Houte et al., 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Baser, 2015). Only a few studies have looked at the position of diasporas vis à vis their homeland states and how this impacts the transnational channels they use (Koinova, 2014; Lampert, 2009), but the body of literature has largely neglected how homeland contexts can also shape who can be involved in certain forms and the type of political transnationalism.

This study has explored a new hypothesis and brought new insights to this area arguing that homeland politics and political parties are also necessary for understanding which diasporas can contribute to state-building and how. It is no good looking simply at the open political spaces to mobilise in the hostland if the diaspora individual in question is excluded or lacking in representation in his or her homeland state.

As has been demonstrated through the case of ethno-sectarian divisions in Iraq, homeland politics can shape political transnationalism creating opportunities for some while denying them for others. For those denied a place in the homeland, the hostland takes greater salience as a political space for contestation, as has been witnessed in both the UK and Sweden among Iraq’s excluded others. Yet we have also seen that the politics of exclusion in Iraq has been reflected back into the diaspora where identities and mobilisation have also been fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines. This reality is reflective of the crumbling Iraqi state, which has privileged the few at the expense of the majority who have relied on their ethnic and sectarian compatriots in Iraq and abroad for support and survival.

Homeland political parties also elucidate differences in the political behaviour of diaspora groups from the same country of origin. If minority groups are excluded from participating in the political process and feel they have no
avenue to express their concerns, political transnationalism may, as in the case of Iraq, lead to other forms of engagement outside the structures of power or lead to a weakening of political engagement as has been exemplified in this study. As such we can begin to understand perhaps why some diasporas outlive others if their connections to their former homelands are obstructed or denied, such as the Mandeans of Iraq, whose numbers outside Iraq now exceed those inside. Diaspora politics can only be viable for those who have representation in the country of origin. For those diasporas who do not have active political links in the homeland, raising political issues from the hostland becomes yet more difficult. In these cases diasporic connections may retreat into the imagination, the symbolic, or gradually lead to assimilation in the country of settlement, especially for second and third generations.

Furthermore, my research confirms the need to treat diaspora communities not as homogenous groups but rather as heterogeneous individuals or groups with diverse links to their country of origin. There is no Iraqi diaspora but many Iraqi diasporas linked to different political periods, migration waves, towns and cities and just as importantly imaginations and memories of what Iraq is to people today. In approaching diaspora in this way we can better assess diaspora individuals and groups’ point of departure for why, how and what they politically mobilise for.

We can also thus avoid simply focusing on the hegemonic diaspora discourses or seeing them as the legitimate voice of the community if we can understand how transnational politics is constituted and who it privileges. This is especially the case for ethnic diaspora groups in the hostland who are in conflict in the homeland, such as the Turkmen and Assyrians, who are in dispute with the Kurds about land rights. The power asymmetry at home has impacted their power to mobilise in the diaspora as their political and financial resources cannot compete with the Kurds. Nor can they offer the same level of political and economic interests that the Kurds can leverage for their own political gain with hostland governments since being in power.
Finally, an important theoretical contribution of this study is understanding the temporalities of different variables. Different time periods, and the political dynamics that shape them, can impact, elevate, or influence specific variables, which may create positions of power during one time period but be meaningless in another. For example, elite networks and resources created opportunities for the UK diaspora to be involved in state-building plans both prior and post intervention. Their profiles were agreeable to the coalition in power, which elevated their status and opportunities to be involved in governance during occupation. However, this variable mattered very little following Iraq's 2005 elections when a different political dynamic was instituted. The new state of Iraq was founded on ethno-sectarian grounds, which directed power away from skilled, resourced or technically able persons to those who had links and supported their ethnic or sectarian kin and their vision for the country.

This finding suggests that in times of military intervention, conflict and where political dynamics are unstable and undergoing change, it is important to consider how different variables are affected and in turn affect diaspora mobilisation for state-building. The temporalities of variables are an important consideration for understanding why some groups are successful and others aren’t and why some diasporic initiatives are successful, while others fail.

Conceptually for the state-building literature the implications of this study suggest that it is not only states that are engaging in external interventions and state-building missions. Whether on the back of foreign intervention, individually or through hostland collaborations, state-building in developing and weak states such as Iraq’s is also being shaped by diasporic non-state actors. Through top-down and bottom-up approaches as we have seen, the Iraqi state has been subject to a plethora of political forces that are shaping state formation. Diaspora individuals constitute one such partner that can be used in state-building, especially in weak states.
Nonetheless, we have seen through the empirical evidence the perils of parachuting diaspora leaders to take positions of power. It is clear to see that diasporic interventions to institution-building and governance during occupation have been problematic to say the least. The diaspora lacked legitimacy and were seen as collaborators with the Coalition Provisional Authority, who became the occupiers of Iraq. The diaspora leaders supported the CPA’s state-building plans and lost all credibility with the native population who did not see them as either acting in the interests of Iraq, representing the voices of the population, but rather motivated by self interest.

Iraq’s state-building project thus confirms the importance of legitimacy, which ultimately means that local actors are key to driving any state-building mission and not merely supporting it as much of the literature has underlined (Chesterman, 2004; Diamond, 2005; Lake, 2010). Neither foreign nor diasporic interveners can impose this, but rather can only play supporting roles towards this endeavour. In this regard, there is a place for diaspora to be involved in state-building once political conditions have stabilised. Diaspora skills and resources, as we have seen, can be utilised to support native political leaders, policies as well as civil society initiatives in times of political stability and peace.

The state-building literature’s focus on institution-building (Fukuyama, 2004, 2005; Chesterman et al., 2005) has largely neglected the role of civil society as a component of state-building. In post-conflict or conflict contexts like Iraq, civil society is paramount for the inclusion and political participation of the public in the decision making process, and for engendering legitimacy (Andersen, 2012). Furthermore in weak and fragile states it is often civil society that supports local communities in the absence of effective state services. In the Middle East civil society can and often does play necessary quasi-state services (Clark, 2013), defending and supporting the vulnerable, developing democratic norms, as well as encouraging the ideals of tolerance between competing
interest groups (Norton, 2005). All of which are necessary for democratic governance, especially for countries like Iraq transitioning from authoritarian rule.

Therefore, conceptually, beyond a normative ideal, or a description of associational life, or a public sphere where public policy is debated (Edwards, 2004), we have seen that the Iraqi case shows that the concept of civil society must not be understood in isolation of the state but rather intrinsic to its formation. This is especially the case in countries facing contested sovereignty, regime change or transitioning from authoritarian rule such as Iraq. As the case of the Iraqi diaspora shows, civil society has performed quasi-state services, filling out the gaps that the state cannot fill. Essentially, civil society has played the part of a de facto emergency state that provides in times of need to communities, to infrastructure projects, and to vulnerable minorities.

This has been witnessed through various diaspora initiatives to support local community needs, provide public services and strengthen democratic governance amidst a wide variety of social organisations and actors. The diaspora has acted like a transnational civil society, utilising the public spaces of the hostland to support the homeland by challenging its politics and the very system the new Iraq was founded on.

Simultaneously, civil society in Iraq has also come to mean a political opposition movement, which is being supported transnationally by the diaspora. Much like the governance structures of two party parliamentary democracies, Iraq's civil society is performing the functions of an official opposition, by holding the government to account, challenging its policies and attempting to shape its very foundations.

This is not to say that Iraqi transnational civil society has been able to counter the ethno-sectarian structures and corruption that are so pervasive in Iraqi society. The power differentials between those in power and those outside it
still remain unequally balanced. However, a transnational civil society under such conditions can still make a difference by showing solidarity with social movements that counter the status quo inside the country, supporting local initiatives transnationally, spreading new ideas and democratic norms and maintaining pressure on the Iraqi government.

The case of Iraq thus shows that in different political contexts and periods of regime transition, civil society can and does play different roles, which are in direct response to not only the level of social, economic and political development of a state but to the shaping of the kind of state that is being built. The balance of power may be uneven, yet civil society remains a key and important component to the evolution of the state, its players and its values. As Migdal has rightly stated, the state is in a constant state of flux, it is not fixed and its partners, allies, and rules change continuously (Migdal, 2001).

For the diaspora literature this study also raises several methodological implications. Firstly, the study shows that a wide spectrum of Iraqi diaspora individuals and groups have actively been engaging in the state-building process in Iraq in various multi-level ways. Many of these efforts are under the radar, and operate through familial, social and political transnational networks and associations, which are contributing to the spread of new ideas, avenues of funding, solidarity and ultimately to the vision of a new state. Understanding state-building processes for countries in transition, such as Iraq, thus requires looking more closely at the transnational links being made between diaspora communities and their countries of origin, especially bottom-up approaches that are difficult to detect or understand without qualitative research.

Furthermore, without qualitative research methods, and particularly interview methods, whether semi-structured or open ended, depending on the research question at hand, it is hard to appreciate the variation and divergent experiences, links, relationships that individuals in the diaspora have with their homeland and amongst each other in the diaspora. This would prevent
homogenising accounts of diaspora and their political mobilisation and instead capture the nuances and power dynamics at play that affect diasporic lives and political attachments to the homeland.

**Policy implications**

There are also practical policy implications that this study can offer policy makers in engaging diaspora in state-building missions. First, it is in the interests of governments to have a better understanding of the diaspora in their hostland, so as to assess if and how they can help in the re-building of their former homelands. In doing so policy makers will be better placed to understand the political dynamics within groups and between groups and the relations that each have towards their country of origin.

Organisations like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have conducted mapping exercises of diaspora organisations for some time to better understand the capabilities within diaspora communities. These have encouraged various capacity-building projects in Africa and beyond. It would be in the interest of governments to do a similar exercise and to work with individuals and groups who are already actively engaged with their homelands. This would facilitate co-development projects, or at the very least allow policy makers to build the capacity of diaspora, who are already involved in the development of their homelands, but who may lack expertise, capacity or resources as the case of the Swedish case study has demonstrated.

Perhaps more significantly, the diverging state-building attempts by the UK and Swedish governments to help Iraq offer an interesting insight into the best use of diaspora in cases of foreign intervention. As has been shown, the UK government’s support for diaspora leaders during the occupation was premised on those who it could work with, who supported its goals and not necessarily individuals that were welcomed and certainly not those who had any real legitimacy within Iraq. The legacy of the UK and other diaspora leaders can still be felt today, where corruption and ethno-sectarianism has thrived and Iraq
remains a fragmented and weak state unable to provide safety or even the most basic services to a still suffering population.

Under the umbrella of the UK and US military, the diaspora leaders were able to insert themselves into Iraq's state-building project but in doing so they acquiesced to a neo-liberal vision and a politics of exclusion. An opportunity dreamt of in opposition was realised but tragically wasted by those supported by the coalition. As a result, the reputation of those who led Iraq has been forever tarnished; the UK and the US have lost credibility with the Iraqi population, which ultimately compromised their security and state-building plans. Any further efforts to affect change in the country will most likely be met with hostility at best and violence at worst as the recent past has shown.

In Sweden, the lack of involvement in military intervention led to a different outcome. The Swedes took their time in formulating a strategy for Iraq and Iraqis that aimed to help develop their fledgling democracy and civil society. The choice to follow the United Nations, and not occupy Iraq meant that the Iraqi population welcomed Swedish efforts to aid the country’s progress. Many interviews with diaspora, diplomatic and government officials repeated this fact when they met with Iraqis in Iraq who vocalised their appreciation of the role Sweden played in welcoming Iraqi refugees in Sweden. Especially as they had been welcoming refugees since the 1990s and they took on more Iraqi refugees than both the UK and US combined following intervention (Milne, 2015). This positive reputation thus aided the relative safety of Swedish diplomatic staff and their work in Iraq, because several people had relatives in Sweden. Thus they were able to do more for Iraq, for Iraqis and with Iraqis on the ground during elections and beyond.

Reflections on this study and its limitations
In this study I set out to show the external state-building contributions of the Iraqi diaspora in the UK and Sweden towards Iraq in the aftermath of
intervention. The aim was to investigate how Iraqis in the diaspora have been contributing to the state-building process of Iraq and to show how their actions have had far reaching consequences for the Iraqi state and society. For better and for worse, the diaspora has been part of Iraq’s state-building project and have contributed to its political trajectory both on the macro and micro level.

The study achieved its goals in gaining an overview of the ways that both the UK and Swedish Iraqi diaspora have attempted to help in the rebuilding of their homelands. It was also able to answer why the two diaspora cases contributed in different ways by looking at their profile, hostland foreign policy and the homeland political system, for understanding diasporic state-building both during foreign intervention and endogenous phases.

This posed some difficulties initially as most of the literature on Iraq dealt with how and why foreign intervention failed. Very little existed about the diaspora, particularly about the Iraqi Arab diaspora in Sweden. Thus this thesis relied heavily on the interviews conducted with diaspora individuals, policy makers and diplomatic staff for understanding the story of the diaspora and their state-building initiatives, as well as drawing out the arguments made in this thesis. This posed its own problems at times since intervention occurred over ten years ago and interviewees struggled to remember dates, and the order of events, which I had to triangulate via other interviews, policy documents and literature to be certain.

Another unforeseen obstacle faced in this research was the UK Chilcot Inquiry, which was a public Inquiry looking into the country’s role into the Iraq war. The inquiry made it harder to meet with top senior politicians and diplomats in the UK. Many were afraid to talk about the Iraq War, which meant that much time and persistence was needed (several months and years in some cases), to convince leading figures to participate by reassuring them about the focus of this study and the anonymity of their testimonials. Though I was successful in
gaining access to leading figures at the FCO, the CPA and diplomatic staff, some politicians refused to meet with me.

One of the key limitations of this study, however, has been the inability to return to Iraq due to security concerns and meet with diaspora returnees about their involvement in state-building. Though I was able to meet several in the diaspora who returned regularly to the UK, my study would have benefitted greatly from seeing their involvement on the ground and meeting with other individuals who had returned to Iraq to contribute towards Iraq’s political process.

Similarly, it would have been useful to visit the organisations and groups that diaspora individuals worked with in Iraq, so as to be able to assess not only their contributions and work, but how Iraqi organisations and individuals perceived them. In what instances were they considered a hindrance or help? How do they view the role of the diaspora in state-building processes?

**Future Research**

An obvious continuation of this research would be to further test the hypotheses developed in this thesis on cases of mobilisation for state-building of other Iraqi diaspora communities around the world, especially the US Iraqi diaspora whose government was the principal architect of the Iraq war. It would be interesting to see whether military intervention created more opportunities for the US Iraqi diaspora to be involved and whether the profile of the US Iraqi diaspora played a part. This study has found supporting evidence for this in initiatives such as the IRDC and the Local Governance programmes (Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, 2008). What other opportunities presented themselves for the US Iraqi diaspora to become involved with the coalition?

Similarly, research into other diaspora communities, whose homelands have undergone foreign interventions, such as Afghanistan and Libya, would also be
interesting to compare with Iraq. How did the profiles of diaspora from these countries shape types of contribution to state-building? Did opportunities for diaspora from hostlands that intervened differ with others who did not?

Furthermore, understanding how homeland political parties impact the political transnationalism of diaspora from plural or divided societies is still lacking, and my study offers the first comprehensive look at how this variable affects diasporic contributions to state-building. This study’s findings may be tested in other cases in the African continent and the wider Middle East where tribal, clan and religious divisions exist. How do ethno-sectarian or ethno-national dynamics play out in the diaspora and affect how and which diaspora are able to mobilise for state-building in their countries of origin? How do ethnic conflicts in the homeland affect the capabilities of competing ethnic diaspora groups and interests in the hostland? Hopefully these questions will be addressed in future research.
UK Interviews with diaspora conducted between October 2013 to August 2015

Respondent 1, 22/10/2013, London, UK
Respondent 2, 24/10/2013, London, UK
Respondent 3, 24/10/2013, London, UK
Respondent 4, 24/10/2013, London, UK
Respondent 5, 31/10/2013, London, UK
Respondent 6, 01/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 7, 01/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 8, 05/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 9, 05/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 10, 06/03/2013, London, UK
Respondent 11, 06/03/2013, London, UK
Respondent 12, 07/03/2013, London, UK
Respondent 13, 08/03/2013, London, UK
Respondent 14, 10/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 16, 12/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 17, 13/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 18, 14/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 19, 14, 11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 20, 18/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 21, 20/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 22, 21/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 22, 21/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 24, 23/11/2013, London, UK
Respondent 25, 06/01/2014, London, UK
Respondent 26, 13/01/2014, London, UK
Respondent 27, 13/01/2014, London, UK
Respondent 28, 14/01/2014, London, UK
Respondent 29, 22/04/2015, London, UK
Respondent 30, 06/05/2015, London, UK
Respondent 31, 01/05/2015, Skype call to Iraq
Respondent 32, 01/05/2015, London, UK
Respondent 33, 01/05, 2015, London, UK
Respondent 34, 13/08/2015, London, UK
Respondent 35, 25/08/2015, Skype call to Canada
Respondent 36, 28/08/2015, Birmingham, UK
Respondent 37, 30/08/2015, London, UK

Interviews with British diplomats, government officials and NGOs

Interview with Arab-British NGO Director, 06/03/2015, London, UK
Interview with Director of Media Strategy in Iraq, 07/04/2015, London, UK
Interview with British Diplomat 1, 09/04/2015, Cambridge, UK
Interview with FCO official 1, 08/04/2015, London, UK
Interview with British Special Representative in Iraq 1, 14/04/2015, London, UK
Interview with British Special Representative in Iraq 2, 28/04/2015, London, UK
Interview with FCO official 2, 30/04/2015, London, UK
Sweden Interviews with diaspora conducted between October 2014 to July 2015

Respondent 1, 07/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 2, 08/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 3, 09/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 4, 10/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 5, 11/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 6, 12/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 7, 13/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 8, 14/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 9, 15/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 10, 16/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 11, 17/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 12, 18/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 13, 19/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 14, 20/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 15, 21/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 16, 22/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 17, 23/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 18, 24/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 19, 25/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 20, 26/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 21, 27/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 22, 28/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 23, 29/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 24, 30/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 25, 31/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 26, 01/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 27, 02/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 28, 03/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 29, 04/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 30, 05/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 31, 06/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 32, 07/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 33, 08/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 34, 09/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 35, 10/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 37, 12/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 38, 13/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 39, 14/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 40, 15/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 41, 16/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 42, 17/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 43, 18/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 44, 19/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 45, 20/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 46, 21/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 47, 22/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 49, 24/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 51, 26/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 52, 27/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 54, 29/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 55, 30/11/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 56, 01/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 57, 02/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 58, 03/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 59, 04/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 60, 05/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 61, 06/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 62, 07/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 63, 08/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 64, 09/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 65, 10/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 66, 11/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 67, 12/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 68, 13/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 69, 14/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 70, 15/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 71, 16/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 72, 17/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 73, 18/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 74, 19/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 75, 20/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 76, 21/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 77, 22/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 78, 23/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 79, 24/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 80, 25/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 81, 26/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 82, 27/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 83, 28/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 84, 29/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 85, 30/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Respondent 86, 31/12/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Interviews with Swedish diplomats, politicians, government officials and NGO Directors.

Interview with Head of Iraq Unit, Swedish International Development Agency, 16/10/2014, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Swedish Ambassador to Iraq 1, 02/02/2015, London, UK
Interview with government official 1, 11/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Swedish Ambassador to Iraq 2, 11/06/2015, Call from Sweden to Hungary
Interview with Politician 1, 11/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Government official 1, 24/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Government official at Swedish Migration Board, 24/06/2015
Interview with Government official 2, 25/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with General Secretary of Swedish Political Party, 25/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Government official 3, 25/06/2015, Stockholm, Sweden
Interview with Politician 2, 30/06/2015, phone call to Gothenburg from Stockholm
Interview with former Head of Gulf Section at Swedish Foreign Ministry, 30/06/2015, phone call to Buenos Aires from Stockholm, Sweden

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APPENDIX 1

Questions asked during interviews with diaspora individuals.

Background information:

Name:
Age:
Education:
Ethnicity:
Religion:
Employment status:

1. Tell me about yourself and how you came to migrate to the UK?
2. Why did you choose to come to the UK?
3. What has been your experience of the UK immigration system?
4. Do you feel integrated into UK society socially?
5. Do you feel integrated into UK society economically?
6. Do you feel integrated into UK society politically?
7. Do you feel integrated into UK society institutionally?
8. Has any institution, organisation or group helped or hindered your integration?
9. Which country do you identify with? Iraq, the UK/Sweden or any other?
10. When and why did you get involved in political activism towards Iraq?
11. Were you politically active in your homeland? If not what influenced your involvement now?

12. Describe the political activities you have been involved in?

13. Why do you mobilise for ... issue? Was your choice inspired by the hostland or homeland?

14. What is the aim/goal of your political mobilisation?

15. Do you feel you are reaching your goal? If not what obstacles are standing in your way? Are they Institutional, Resources, Societal, Leadership?

16. Have any policies (state level, local, foreign policy) influenced your political choices or your choice of activities? If so in what way?

17. Do you get help from the government or other organisations?

18. Do you work with other transnational or supranational organisations?

19. Do you work with other European branches of your organisation?

20. Where does your funding come from?

21. How did you feel about the intervention in Iraq in 2003? How do you feel about it now?

22. How did the 2003 intervention affect your ability to mobilise? Did the war create opportunities/obstacles?

23. Were you mobilised in 2003 or later? What affected your choice?