The Library

Guessing imagined and live chance events: adults behave like children with live events

Tools

Robinson, Elizabeth J., Pendle, J. E. C., Rowley, M. G., Beck, S. R. and McColgan, Kerry L.. (2009) Guessing imagined and live chance events: adults behave like children with live events. British Journal of Psychology, Vol.100 (No.4). pp. 645-659. ISSN 0007-1269

Preview

PDF (Main Article Text)
WRAP_Robinson_robinson_and_pendle_2008.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Download (96Kb)

Microsoft Word (WRAP Coversheet)
WRAP_coversheet_logo.doc
Download (86Kb)

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000712608X386810

Abstract

An established finding is that adults prefer to guess before rather than after a chance event has happened. This is interpreted in terms of aversion to guessing when relatively incompetent: After throwing, the fall could be known. Adults (N=71, mean age 18;11, N=28, mean age 48;0) showed this preference with imagined die-throwing as in the published studies. With live die-throwing, children (N=64, aged 6 and 8 years; N=50, aged 5 and 6 years) and 15-year-olds (N=93, 46) showed the opposite preference, as did 17 adults. Seventeen-year-olds (N=82) were more likely to prefer to guess after throwing with live rather than imagined die-throwing. Reliance on imagined situations in the literature on decision-making under uncertainty ignores the possibility that adults imagine inaccurately how they would really feel: After a real die has been thrown, adults, like children, may feel there is less ambiguity about the outcome.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Chance, Decision making, Decision making in children, Guessing games, Choice (Psychology), Choice (Psychology) in children
Journal or Publication Title:	British Journal of Psychology
Publisher:	The British Psychological Society
ISSN:	0007-1269
Date:	November 2009
Volume:	Vol.100
Number:	No.4
Page Range:	pp. 645-659
Identification Number:	10.1348/000712608X386810
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)
Grant number:	RES-062-23-0335 (ESRC)
References:	Amsel, E., &Smalley, D. J.(2000). Beyond really and truly: Children’s counterfactual thinking about pretend and possible worlds. In P. Mitchell and K.J. Riggs (Eds.) Children’s Reasoning and the Mind. Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press. (pp121-147). Beal, C. R. (1988). Children’s knowledge about representations of intended meaning. In J.W. Astington, P.L. Harris & D.R. Olson (Eds.)Developing theories of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University press. (pp 315-325). Beck, S.R. , Robinson, E.J., Carroll, D. & Apperly, I. (2006) Children’s thinking about counterfactuals and future hypothetical as possibilities. Child Development, 77, 413-426. Braine, M. D. S., & Rumain, B. (1983). Logical Reasoning. In J. H. Flavell & E. M. Markman (Eds.), Cognitive Development (4th ed., Vol. III, pp. 266-340). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Brun, W., & Teigen, K. H. (1990). Prediction and postdiction preferences in guessing. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3, 17-28. Chow, C. C., & Sarin, R. K. (2002). Known, unknown and unknowable uncertainties. Theory and Decision, 52, 127-138. Ellsberg,D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity and the savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 643-669. Fay, A. L. & Klahr, D. (1996). Knowing about guessing and guessing about knowing: Preschoolers' understanding of indeterminacy. Child Development, 67, 689-716. Fox, C.R. & Tversky, A. (1995). Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 585-603. German, T. P. & Nichols, S. (2003). Children’s counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains. Developmental Science, 6, 514 – 523 Gilbert, D. (2007). Stumbling on Happiness. London: Harper. Guajardo, N. R. & Turley-Ames, K. J. (2004). Preschoolers' generation of different types of counterfactual statements and theory of mind understanding. Cognitive Development, 19, 53-80. Guttentag, R. & Ferrell, J. (2004). Reality compared with its alternatives: Age differences in judgments of regret and relief. Developmental Psychology, 40, 764-775. Harris, P.L., German, T., & Mills, P. (1996). Children’s use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning. Cognition, 61, 233-259. Heath, C. & Tversky, A. (1991). Preference and belief: Ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, 5-28. Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 383-451. Kirkpatrick, L.A. & Epstein, S. (1992). Cognitive-experiential self-theory and subjective probability: further evidence for two conceptual systems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63 534-44. Klahr, D. & Chen, Z. (2003). Overcoming the positive capture strategy in young children: Learning about indeterminacy. Child Development, 74, 1275-1296. Pacini, R. & Epstein, S. (1999). The interaction of three facets of concrete thinking in a game of chance. Thinking and Reasoning, 5 , 303-25. Robinson , E.J. & Beck, S.R. (2000). What is difficult about counterfactual reasoning? In P. Mitchell and K.J. Riggs (Eds). Children’s Reasoning and the Mind. Hove, U.K.: Psychology Press. (pp101-119) Robinson, E.J., Rowley, M., Beck, S., Carroll D., & Apperly, I. (2006) Children’s sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty. Child Development, in press. Rothbart, M. & Snyder M. (1970). Confidence in the prediction and postdiction of an uncertain outcome. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 2, 38-43. Taylor, M. (1988). Conceptual perspective taking: Children's ability to distinguish what they know from what they see. Child Development, 59, 703-718. Trautmann, S.T., Vieider. F.M & Wakker, P.P. (in press) Causes of ambiguity aversion: Known versus unknown preferences. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/934