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DIVIDED BY *La Manche*: NAVAL ENTERPRISE AND MARITIME REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 1545-1642

BY

BENJAMIN W. D. REDDING

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As part of the research for this thesis, I undertook a four-month research trip across France during the summer of 2015 that was kindly funded by the ESRC and the Society for the Study of French History. Having been apprehensive about the trip, I was fortunate to begin my archival research at the Archives Municipales de la ville du Havre, where all members of staff were very welcoming and helpful in assisting someone with relatively rusty French at the time. Thanks to them for their helpfulness in the opening weeks of the trip, which placed me in greater ease as I travelled elsewhere in France.

Thank you to my friends and family for their constant support in the process. To my parents who have always supported my endeavours (both emotionally and financially), I hope that it has been worth it. To my wife, Sammy, I apologise: first, for my “insightful” knowledge of early modern history that has changed an interest of yours into a “hatred” and, second, for my prolonged research trips away from home (I am confident that you enjoyed the peace and quiet). Finally, to Eloise, who has always managed to make me smile whenever times have been difficult, it is to her that I dedicate this work.
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other university.
ABSTRACT

At different times between 1545 and 1642, the navies of England and France both grew in strength and declined. This thesis traces the advances and regression of both kingdoms’ sea forces and relates these changes to concurrent developments within the state. As a comparative study, it shows that, in sharing the Channel and with an increasing use of the early modern maritime theatre, English and French naval expansion was intertwined. First, approaching the administrative transformations of both navies and, then, progressing to discuss fiscal, technological, maritime and finally aesthetic developments, this thesis highlights the relationship between naval and state strength in early modern Europe.

As a comparative study of early modern state and naval development, this project has been particularly inspired by the research of Jan Glete. Consequently, through quantitative statistical analysis and other techniques, it accounts for naval and state growth. It uses a large source base of archival evidence from national and regional archives in England and France, printed documentation, and resources from museums and art galleries.

As well as engaging with the military revolution debate, where it is argued that early modern naval developments justly deserve greater prominence, the thesis also produces a framework that accounts for the rise and decline of naval strength. It suggests that three principal factors can account for these developments in early modern Europe. First, naval strength was reliant upon the will, enthusiasm and political stability of the monarch. Second, transnational influence and engagement helped to shape the size and appearance of state fleets. The English Channel was an international theatre of political and cultural exchange that facilitated English and French advances. Finally, the geography of both kingdoms is explored, because the size, composition, visual design and location of state navies were conditioned by it.
AABBREVIATIONS

AN – Archives Nationales, Paris, France.


BN – Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, France.


Edward and Mary - C. S. Knighton and D. M. Loades (eds.) The Navy of Edward VI and Mary I (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011).


Le Havre – Archives Muncipales du Havre, Le Havre, France.


Nantes - Archives Municipales de Nantes, Nantes, France.


PL – Pepys Library, Magdelene College, Cambridge, UK.

SP – State Papers.

TNA – The National Archives, Kew, UK.
The year is considered to have started on 1 January.

When possible the original spelling provided in manuscripts has been retained.

To aid the reader, all French quotes have been translated into English, with the original form provided in the footnote. All translations are the author’s own.

**English**

£1 = 20 shillings

1 crown = 5 shillings

1 shilling = 12 pence

**French**

1 écu au soleil (crown) = 2 ¼ livre tournois

1 livre tournois = 20 sous (sols)

1 sou = 12 deniers

**Conversion rates**

1535 - £1 = 10 livre tournois

1625 - £1 = 11 livre tournois

1645 - £1 = 16 livre tournois

Glossary of Ship Terms

**Brûlot** – (often recorded as bruslot). The term comes from the French ‘brûler’ (to burn). Brûlot was a term, typically used in France, to describe a fire ship: a vessel loaded with explosives, and/or other flammable materials, that could be set adrift amongst the enemy.

**Carrack** – A large sailing ship developed in the fifteenth century for merchant travel. It commonly included three or four masts, along with large fore and aft-castles. As a widely used vessel throughout Europe, the carrack came to be known by several names depending upon nationality: *nao, nef* and *kraak* being some of them.

**Flute (flûte)** – Term used to describe a ship to be used for transport and provisions, with limited - or no – artillery on board. Most often a mercantile vessel was designated to function in this role during war.

**Galiot** – Originally a small ship propelled by oars; its size resulted in it often being known as a *half-galley*. As was also the case with the *galley*, it was possible to arm the *galiot* with a small number of cannons for war. During the seventeenth century, *galiots* were increasingly built with lateen sails, alongside oars.

**Pinnace** – A small and light ship used to accompany a mother ship, typically with oars. Used to transport men and provisions between warship and land.

**Race-built Galleon** – Celebrated English vessel first constructed in England during the 1570s. Originally designed as a hybrid model (using the lower hull of a galley and the height of a carrack) the *race-built galleon* could be constructed with a large and imposing design, whilst also maintaining speed and manoeuvrability.

**Shallop** – A small cruising boat that accompanied a larger warship. It used similar methods of propulsion and had similar responsibilities to the pinnace.
INTRODUCTION

On 18 July 1545, a French invasion force of between 150 and 240 ships approached the coast of the Isle of Wight. Mariners, gunners and soldiers formed a force of around 30,000 to 50,000 men, which was commanded by Admiral Claude d’Annebault.¹ Both England and France had been preparing for this engagement since Henry VIII’s successful siege of Boulogne in September 1544. To Francis I, the ousting of the English from Boulogne was essential not only for his kingdom’s defence, but also for national pride. By launching an offensive on English territory, Francis hoped to force the Boulogne garrison to retreat.

With the English crown’s navy at its greatest size for over a century, Henry continued to expand his fleet whilst waiting for the appearance of his rival’s sea forces. Sightings, and rumours, soon circulated across the Channel of vessels being equipped for war in Marseille, Brittany and Dieppe, whilst French commissioners in the Italian provinces were recruiting mercenaries to support an invasion of England.² The English regime responded by also seeking the recruitment of armed Italian bands.³ Previous clashes of Henry’s and Francis’s reigns had shown that naval warfare was in its infancy, and soldiers were enlisted for both kingdoms in the belief that this conflict was likely to conclude on land and not by sea.⁴ Three armies consisting largely of militia under the Dukes of Suffolk and Norfolk, and the Earl of Bedford were intended to consist of an impressive 30,000 men each.⁵ Meanwhile the English fleet defending the Solent from Portsmouth had assembled between 80 and 100 vessels, over

² TNA, SP 1/198, f. 71; TNA, SP 1/199, f. 195; TNA, SP 1/204, f. 88; BL, Add MS. 28594, f. 189.
³ TNA, SP 1/197, f. 129; TNA, SP 1/198, f. 71; TNA, SP 1/199, f. 116; BL., Harleian MS 283, f. 305.
⁵ TNA, SP 1/203, f. 12.
half of which were warships owned by the crown. In contrast, despite consisting of a larger number of vessels, the French fleet’s royally owned warships and galleys were fewer in number than the English equivalent, although not necessarily weaker in military might. The majority of its vessels were privately owned and were primarily present to transport troops to land.

As was frequently the case in naval warfare during the Age of Sail, it was the weather that served as one of the deciding factors in the Battle of the Solent. According to the written account of Martin du Bellay, after an indecisive skirmish on 18 July, on the following morning:

with the aid of the sea which was calm, without wind or force of current, our [French] galleys could be steered and managed at their pleasure and to the damage of the enemies, who, being unable to move for lack of wind, lay exposed to the might of our artillery.

France’s fortune continued for the next hour, during which time the most famous event of the battle unfolded with the sinking of the Mary Rose. According to du Bellay, she ‘was sunk by cannon fire’, a claim that has been disputed to this day. The Mary Rose was substantially overmanned, with between 500 to 600 men on-board, over half being soldiers. With too many men, and equipped with heavy pieces of artillery, the Tudor warship’s stability was compromised.

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6 TNA, SP 1/205, f. 47; TNA, SP 1/205, f. 160.
7 M. Du Bellay, Les memoires de mess. Martin du Bellay, seigneur de langey (Paris, 1569), pp. 338-39; Martin du Bellay describes d’Annebault’s fleet as amounting to 150 large round ships, without counting sixty Florentine ships and twenty-five galleys.
8 ibid, p. 340. [car au matin à la faveur de la mer qui estoit calme sans vent ne fureur de courante, noz galleres se pouvoyent regir & manier à leur plaisir & au dommage des ennemis, lesquels n’ayans pouvoir de se mouvoir par faute de vent, demeuroyent appertement exposez à l’injure de nostre artillerie.]
At some point during this stage of the battle, the French fleet deployed troops onto the Isle of Wight; these men would not be conclusively defeated until the Battle of Bonchurch several days later. Du Bellay goes on to allege that Henry’s flagship the Henry Grâce à Dieu ‘was so damaged that, if she had not been supported and assisted by nearby ships, she would have had the same end [as the Mary Rose]; there would have been more memorable losses if the weather had not changed in their favour’. Soon, a wind arrived from the English mainland, pushing the English fleet towards the enemy and providing it with the opportunity under full sail to counter-attack:

this change was so sudden that our people had barely the time or the facility to turn our prows; for, during the calm weather and in the heat of battle, the galleys were so close that, when the ships came at them so suddenly and with such speed, they would have been caught and sunk without any remedy, had it not been for the boldness of our chiefs and the skill and experience of our mariners and oarsmen, who forcibly and quickly turned the galleys...[and] distanced themselves in a short time from the range of the cannon.

Commanded by Admiral John Dudley, the English navy chased the retreating French fleet, where at St. Helen’s Point, seventeen ‘of the [French] galle[y]s came in the order of battaile to the fight, of the which one was sunk and the shippes begane to retyrne’. Although minor maritime brawls would persist until the early summer of 1546, the indecisive Battle of the Solent would serve as the only major naval clash between the two kingdoms before the Nine Years’ War, a century and a half later.

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10 *ibid.* [Le Grand Henry qui portoit leur Amiral, fut tellement affligé, que s’il n’eust esté soustenu & secouru des prochaines navires, il faisoit une mesme fin: autres plus memorables pertes eussent ils fait, si le temps ne se fust tourné en leur faveur].

11 *ibid.* [Et fut ceste mutation si soudaine, que noz gens à peine eurent loisir ne la commodité de girer les proues: car au temps de la bonne que vous avez ouy, & à la chaleur du combat, les galleres estoient si fort approchées, venans si soudain les navires sur elles de telle impetuosité, que sans aucun remede leur passoyent par dessus le corps, & les mettoyent en fons. Si par une grande asurance des chefs, adresse & experience des mariners, & de la chiorme, on n’eust donné force, & celerité extreme à tourner les galleres. Et s’esloignerent en peu d’heure à la portée d’un canon].

12 TNA, SP 1/202 f. 101.
Introduction

In a turn of events, on 15 May 1546, d’Annebault and Dudley were walking together in a field near Calais during the Anglo-French peace negotiations.\(^\text{13}\) They reflected on the engagement in the Solent almost a year before. D’Annebault praised God for preventing the two fleets from truly clashing with more severe results and described to his English equal ‘that yf we hade yt wold have byn the nerest fight and the greatest ocassion of men that was this many yeres’. Modestly Dudley responded by complimenting the French fleet, acknowledging ‘that our Army was not in nomber of ships to be comparyed unto theyres…and yet as the Wynde and Wether dyd shew us we dyd present ourselves as moche as t[h]eye in us to the battayle’. Both admirals were aware of the potential destruction that the Battle of the Solent could have seen; it was now apparent from this conflict that sea power no longer only served as a means to assist land forces. Military strength on the sea was now a powerful arm of the state in its own right.

In 1642, the year that Armand-Jean du Plessis, Cardinal de Richelieu died and the English Civil War began, the importance of the navy, as a distinct martial arm of the realm was firmly understood in northern Europe. After a century of administrative and religious change, the English and French regimes emerged with stronger political infrastructures that permitted a firmer grip over national finance and regional disparity. As a result, strong standing navies in both kingdoms had emerged. This study will consider these two concurrent developments and, will argue that, although it is important to analyse them as distinct transformations, it is equally crucial to understand that both processes drove the other to advance.

Scholarship on naval history has often in the past been presented as a niche strand of research that is isolated from political, social, and cultural trends. Indeed, a reading of

\(^{13}\) TNA, SP 1/ 218 f. 143. These peace negotiations would conclude with the Treaty of Ardres on 7 June 1546. See TNA, SP 1/220, f. 41; Nawrocki, Claude d’Annebault, pp. 378-81
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naval historiography of the early-twentieth century reinforces this impression.14 Many of
the recent contributions to naval scholarship have been willing to continue with such
tailored accounts, whilst avoiding the broader importance of naval transformations to
other historical developments.15 Influenced by the work of Frederick C. Lane on
merchant protection rent, Jan Glete moved away from such trends to assess the role of
navies in the state building process and in ‘the creation of permanent, centrally managed
and bureaucratized organizations for violence and protection’ between 1500 and 1860.16
Moreover, N. A. M. Rodger among others continued Glete’s work by addressing the
importance of naval history to state development. For Rodger, the considerable and
continual cost of maintaining a navy was pivotal in the production of the British fiscal
state.17 Yet ultimately, the navy, for both kingdoms, remains an understudied institution
for the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, where early modern state consolidation
is concerned.

It is necessary here to define two terms that are central to this thesis: state and
nation. There is on-going debate concerning the expressions because they are often used
interchangeably, particularly for the early modern period when political infrastructures

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Introduction

were in their infancy. Nevertheless, in the confines of this work, when discussing political, cultural and social themes, the two terms will be considered to have different meanings.

Sociologists have clashed when using the word state, with Charles Tilly defining the term as a ‘coercion-wielding organization’, whilst Michael Mann avoided providing any rational explanation for the term altogether, given that it is ‘an undeniably messy concept’. Yet, in the context of early modern England and France, the monarchy should be construed, as the head and centre of the state, for power and authority were at its disposal. As the root of power within the kingdom, Louis XIV would not have been alone in considering himself as representing the state. Yet, such a basic definition is problematic when considering the other institutional bodies of the realm. Parliaments, courts and other judicial authorities remain essential components of the state that existed in the early modern period by the authority of the people as well as the monarch. It is with this in mind that this thesis will adapt Michael J. Braddick’s definition of the state. Braddick defines the state as a ‘coordinated and territorially bounded network of agents exercising political power…and Crucial to this definition is the idea that there is a distinct kind of ‘political’ power.’ As suggested by Tilly when reflecting upon state-sanctioned violence, political power includes coercion within it, for political power is ‘territorially based, functionally limited and backed by the threat of legitimate physical

\[\text{Footnotes:}\]

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force.’\textsuperscript{22} It is important to Braddick’s definition that, when conceptualising the state, political infrastructure is secondary to political power. In an early modern context, the state was a complex network with the monarch positioned at its centre, and political power was disseminated from its core. The crown, as the source of this power on earth, distributed roles and duties to its agents, who in turn delegated power regionally and locally. Anyone who handled part of this fragmented political power was incorporated into the vast network that was the state.

In contrast, the term \textit{nation} encompasses a far larger body of the populace. It is not concerned with political infrastructure, and it cannot be defined with the monarch as its head. Conforming to Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation as ‘an imagined political community’, the nation is a belief in a shared cultural identity that does not necessarily confine itself to geographical boundaries.\textsuperscript{23} The nation then, is a term suited to what Joseph R. Strayer misunderstood in the 1960s to be the state; it ‘exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life.’\textsuperscript{24} Consequently, bearing in mind that local identity was strongly held during the early modern period, a state can consist of several nations, when sentiment to a broader geographical ideal is weak. When considering attachments to localities, provinces such as Brittany, and towns and cities such as York and La Rochelle, are examples of areas that were nationally autonomous when using Anderson’s definition, whilst being subjected to a larger state authority.

With an understanding of these terms, it is essential to determine how they will influence and shape this study. Samuel Clark has argued that comparative studies of England

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{ibid}, p. 9.
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and France during the early modern era are unfair case comparisons, for the larger state structure of Britain is overlooked whilst still considering the entirety of France. This view has a teleological basis, holding that we should look at what the British political union would become, as opposed to its nature during the time span of this study. Such a comparison would be unjustifiable, however, for during this period Britain was an equivocal term, and although James I sought a political union, it was rejected by Parliament in April 1607. From Clark’s perspective, nevertheless, in a study of England, a fair comparison should only consider the core of France’s infrastructure – Paris and its surrounding regions – and not the entire French kingdom including its outermost peripheries. Comparative studies are often encouraged to isolate areas on which to focus, for in doing so it is possible to maximize ‘the accuracy of the results’. Yet in a naval and maritime study, the wider French kingdom and its various maritime provinces need to be included, for it was here, and not in Paris, that the navy was located. At the same time, a study that also integrates Scotland cannot be justified. It would be wrong to allege that the unity of the crowns in 1603 caused an immediate amalgamation of two state infrastructures, for the English and Scottish states were autonomous until the 1707 Act of Union. Despite James I and VI being the king of both realms, two very separate spheres of political and military power existed. There was a king of England and a king of Scotland and, despite James’s attempts, there would not be a single, united monarch of

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29 Although one could claim that the Cromwellian Republic also temporarily unified the two states politically.
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Britain during this period. For this reason it cannot be justified to combine England and Scotland when comparing with France.\(^3\)

It remains the case, however, that unlike Scotland, both Ireland and Wales were politically dependent on England, and operated through a political power network that originated in London. Ruling magnates maintained peace by enforcing the monarch’s law in their localities. Sheriffs, Justices of the Peace and feudal lords were appointed, although precarious in some areas, through their association with the leading landowners of each locality.\(^4\) Under the Henrician regime, London forced both Wales (since the two Acts of Union, 1536-43) and Ireland to incorporate this style of governance, and the Parliament at Dublin was subjected to *Poyning’s Law* (1495), requiring all proposed Irish legislation to pass through the English Parliament. After 1542, the political authority of the Irish Parliament was further reduced, and this has led John Morrill to suggest that the ‘problem for the Irish political nation in this period was thus not that they had a king with two bodies; it was that they had a king with no body at all.’\(^5\) On paper, both Wales and Ireland were governed by the restraints enforced in London. Yet as was natural with the early modern state, those areas on the periphery of the realm retained greater autonomy from state ideals. Just as in France, where Brittany and Provence enjoyed these liberties, the same can be seen in England with Wales, Ireland, and the northern frontier. Revisionist historians since the 1970s, including Steven G. Ellis, have reassessed the relationship between the Tudor state and its peripheries and have concluded that ‘it was not lack of resources but lack of interest which for so long prevented the Tudors from conquering Gaelic Ireland.’\(^6\)

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31 Indeed Murdoch has shown that Scotland continued to pursue its own maritime policy of violence into the eighteenth century.


33 J. Morrill, ‘The Fashioning of Britain’ in Ellis and Barber (eds.), *Conquest and Union*, pp. 15-16.

state was like any other network: it was condensed near its central node, yet the further it stretched, the more tenuous its connection. Unless specified, when England is referred to, both Ireland and Wales are included with it.

Having emphasised the autonomy of Scotland, declaring it a separate entity from the English state, questions are therefore raised concerning how the semi-independent towns and provinces in France should be encompassed within this study. France’s provincial structure upheld several *pays d’état*, including Brittany, Languedoc and Provence, each with the ability to resist state taxation, and follow their own system instead. The *pays d’état* are just one example of the fragmented political infrastructure of early modern France that has led Bernard Barbiche to assert that prior to 1789 ‘France had never been uniform’. In expanding this point, James B. Collins has claimed that ‘we might do better to consider it a polyglot empire, with a wide range of local institutions adapted to the many local cultures.’ Another example of this regional autonomy is in the *parlement* system. To aid the assimilation of newly integrated provinces into the French kingdom, provinces and duchies, such as Brittany and Burgundy, were provided with their own *parlements*, which remained subject to the authority of both the monarch and the Parlement of Paris. Meanwhile, even towns claimed their independence: Marseille and La Rochelle recognised no intermediary body between themselves and the crown. This was accentuated in 1576, when the monarchy relinquished its right to appoint a royal governor in La Rochelle and consequently


35 See chapter three.


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‘abandoned all direct control over the town’, which enabled the mayor to owe allegiance to the king alone.\(^\text{38}\)

The historiography is conflicted on the strengths of this French system. Through enabling each province (or town) to be directly responsible to the king, Charles Tilly argues that this autonomy provided the state with a greater level of internal coordination, reliant on the leadership of the crown, than was possible in England, and it was this model of statecraft that ‘led Europe through almost all the period after 1500’.\(^\text{39}\) In contrast, David Parker asserts that France was ‘a realm of powerful corporate bodies, of privileged orders and venal office-holders…[and] the crown itself lacked a truly centralized administration, uniform laws or uniform taxes.’\(^\text{40}\)

It is not the purpose of this thesis to determine whether English state administration was more centralised than the French equivalent, instead it will simply be accepted that the two kingdoms possessed disparate structures. Indeed, this thesis will work under the view that two separate forms of centralisation existed between them. For England, the state was centralised around its capital city, and the majority of naval developments unfolded there.\(^\text{41}\) In France, state conceptions of centralisation were based around the monarch and his chief ministers. Political power could move directly from the monarch to the localities, often without any secondary secular body being involved. In contrast, for England, this power was retained in London for far longer, and moved between monarch, parliament, council and statesmen before finally reaching the localities, whose responsibility it was to enforce policy,

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\(^{41}\) This is not to say that this system did not have its faults. For Ellis, the intense activity of London and its surrounding areas, and the consequent academic focus ‘on the south-east appears to vindicate the strategies pursued, to minimize the problems encountered or created, and generally to exaggerate the regime’s successes.’ S. G. Ellis, ‘Tudor State Formation and the Shaping of the British Isles’ in Ellis and Barber (eds.), *Conquest and Union*, p. 41.
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not to question or revise it. This crucial difference in state infrastructure was one of the main reasons for the divergences in naval design and strategy across the Channel.

A study of naval development also needs to provide clarity on what is meant by the term *navy* during a time when sea forces were evolving. In the twenty-first century, the expression refers to the military arm of the country, which is maintained at the state’s expense, and is used at sea. Yet, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this familiar definition cannot be attributed as easily. In this era the standing navy was a piece of private property that was owned and controlled by a prince or other figure of authority. In England and France, parliament had almost no control over the royal fleet. The leader of the state, not the state itself, owned it.

Primary documents concerning the navy suggest that there was a national awareness that warships constructed with royal revenue were the monarch’s personal property. A distinction between state-owned warships and private vessels was relatively clear. Nevertheless, this divide was problematized by the various sub-categories of decentralised armed warships authorised by the state to participate in war. State approved, yet privately sourced, maritime conflict included several types of warrants. First, when a royal fleet was on campaign it would traditionally be supported by at least an equal number of armed merchant vessels.42 Second, merchants could receive written permission to seek reprisal for stolen goods through violent acts that were often described by victims as ‘piracy’. Third, in the event of international conflict, a national pardon could be granted to all merchant vessels that wished to terrorise the enemy.43 Finally, Elizabeth I made famous the joint-stock expedition, where crown, merchant and

42 See chapter five of thesis.
43 David Loades explained that the first known occasion where a Letter of Marque was granted in England was in December 1544, for the king’s subjects to make war upon the Scots and the French at their own expense. D. Loades, *England’s Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490-1690* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), p. 42
gentry could financially contribute to a campaign against an enemy of the state.\textsuperscript{44} Understandably, permitting sporadic violence on the sea led to a highly decentralised maritime system, which neither crown nor parliament could completely regulate and control.\textsuperscript{45}

With the above tactics willingly employed by states at sea, maritime historians have recently sought to differentiate between private and state-led sea force. Alan James has pointed out that ‘a simple, binary distinction between private and royal can be misleading.’\textsuperscript{46} James provides an example with the French Azores campaign between 1580 and 1583, when Henri III had formally condemned the expedition, and yet still pressured merchants to ensure its successful preparation and departure. In such a case it is difficult to determine the legitimacy of this expedition, and indeed it is open to question whether these merchants were pirates or privateers. Considering that a vessel’s crew were deemed pirates by one kingdom, and yet were classified as agents of state by another, indicates that this terminology needs to be explained and refined for transparency. N. A. M. Rodger has suggested that the insistence by ‘generations of scholars’ on using this ‘vague, anachronistic and contradictory language about private naval warfare’ has resulted in vast difficulties emerging with clarity.\textsuperscript{47} Although Rodger may be exaggerating, he nevertheless makes an important point: the terms privateer and pirate serve as neither antonyms nor synonyms during this period and have caused problems for scholarship that employ the expressions. Even with cases where a Letter of Marque was given to an aggrieved individual after being signed by a leading officer of the state, classifying the


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holder as a privateer depended upon the position of the accuser. Understandably, from an international perspective, allegations of piracy, as opposed to lawfulness, would have materialised.

Other forms of authorised maritime violence include what Rodger calls ‘reprisal by general proclamation’. These were national proclamations for merchants to attack all enemy ships during war; they had been exploited by England in 1544, 1557, 1563 and during the Anglo-Spanish War (1585-1604). From this perspective, Spanish claims that English sailors attacking Spanish galleons were pirates are void; those sailors who held permits from the state had reason to believe that their actions were fully legitimate. Perhaps for historians, it is more important to consider how ‘legal’ this activity was, in order to obtain a clearer understanding of these terms, and this would only be possible on a case-by-case basis.

It is surely correct that the decentralised violence at sea, and the notorious reputation that the English would earn because of it, was the result of state deficiencies. With respect to state formation, Jan Glete fairly suggested that privateers only ‘had a market because the states often lacked the necessary administrative competence to run a navy.’ The level of legitimate violence on the sea (that is, lawful from the perspective of the individual who commissioned it) has to be associated with the naval strength of the state. With a smaller standing navy, a larger body of privateers was required to support it, which enabled mass uncontrolled violence on the seas to materialise. As warships were expensive to build, maintain, and equip in comparison to the generally

48 Known in England as Letters of Reprisal.
51 ibid, p. 13. Rodger then claims that because the term ‘privateers’ was not originally used until the 1650s, historians, as a result, should not use the term to describe ‘legalised piracy’ before this date. This is too extreme for the scope of this thesis. In the twenty-first century the term privateer is associated more with pre-1650 notions, than after this date, and so the term will continue to be used to describe state endorsed, but decentralised, maritime violence.
52 Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 43.
smaller merchant equivalent, it is unsurprising that the privateer remained essential to both kingdoms’ war efforts well into the mid-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{53} Whilst the crown’s warships remained insufficient in number, privately armed vessels would supplement them. It will be argued that the advancement of the kingdom’s political and financial apparatuses provided the means for a larger standing navy to emerge, which in turn reduced state reliance upon privateers. Undoubtedly, the extent of legalised independent violence on the sea correlates to the strength of the state institution. With a stable and strengthened state infrastructure, a standing navy was able to develop, and in turn its reliance on private maritime resources declined.

Scholars of English naval history widely accept that a standing navy emerged during the sixteenth century. With the production of royal warships such as the \textit{Mary Rose} in 1512 and the \textit{Henry Grâce à Dieu} in 1514, David Loades claimed that ‘if a conscious decision was ever taken to establish a standing navy, then it must be dated from the very early days of Henry VIII’s reign, or even from those of his father.’\textsuperscript{54} Yet, without an administrative framework to preserve them, state navies were vulnerable to deterioration and could potentially disappear altogether. For this reason C. S. L. Davies emphasised the later years of the king’s reign in producing an administrative structure to safeguard the navy’s future.\textsuperscript{55} Davies’s widely cited 1965 article remains an essential contribution to naval historiography. It argues that the formation of the Council of Marine Causes in 1545-46 and ‘the multiplication of offices [that came with it] was an inevitable result of the growth of the size of the navy’ which by 1546 consisted of fifty-eight crown-owned vessels.\textsuperscript{56} With this said,

\textsuperscript{53} The privateer would remain an asset for state use, in one form or another, until the Declaration of Paris in 1856.
\textsuperscript{55} See chapter two of thesis.
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further changes made to its structure after 1547 were also pivotal to its continued success, and so emphasis should not only be given to the closing years of Henry VIII’s rule for the establishment of England’s navy. In a series of articles printed in The Mariner’s Mirror in the late 1960s, Tom Glasgow Jnr argued for the importance of the English wars with France between 1557 and 1564 in ensuring that the navy was sustained.\textsuperscript{57} During a period of prolonged peace after 1550, the English fleet was neglected and mothballed, whilst the state suffered from political crisis. For Glasgow, it was the reform that followed 1555 that ensured the English navy’s continued strength for at least the remainder of the century.\textsuperscript{58} War was crucial to naval development, and the war with France in the late 1550s was crucial for the establishment of future English sea power. However, the navy was not founded in just these few years on the incentive of one monarch alone. After all, a standing navy could only prove its permanency over successive reigns. The political instability that existed in mid-sixteenth-century Tudor England provided the perfect context for this emergence. Expanding on Davies’s original argument, a broader period from 1545 to 1564 should be considered as vital to the emergence of the English standing navy, whilst the seventeenth century served to test its resilience.\textsuperscript{59}

It is not possible to account for the emergence of a standing navy in France for the same corresponding years as England, for the Wars of Religion destroyed almost all traces of a standing royal fleet. Instead, Alan James, Pierre Castagnos and other historians have given


\textsuperscript{58} See chapter two of thesis.

\textsuperscript{59} Rodger has also focused on the years after 1547 for this growth, although he does not provide a date for when this change concluded. Rodger highlights the years following 1547 because of the former medieval practice of dissolving the preceding monarch’s navy after a new royal succession. Just because Henry V revived the navy, did not mean that his successors would sustain it. The fact that the navy was able to continue after Henry VIII’s death is an indication of the success of the Council of Marine Causes and the importance of the years after 1547. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 176.
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greater prominence to the reign of Louis XIII for this development, and this thesis will support the importance applied to these years.\textsuperscript{60} Bernard Barbiche has gone as far as asserting that ‘before Richelieu, the kings of France did not maintain a permanent standing navy.’\textsuperscript{61} With this said, La Roncière’s study of the French navy credited Henri II as being ‘the precursor to Colbert.’\textsuperscript{62} Henri’s accession in 1547 led to increased naval expenditure, and administrative reform that provided the means for a large galley fleet to be maintained. For this reason Glete argued ‘that the French King by that time intended to keep a centralized navy as a permanent part of the armed forces of the state.’\textsuperscript{63} This is likely to be true, yet Henri’s untimely death following a jousting accident in July 1559 prevented this idea from becoming reality because of the political uncertainty that followed his reign. During the Wars of Religion, the role and authority of the admiralty became one of mere status, and held a limited function because the crown’s fleet had decayed.\textsuperscript{64} The Wars of Religion showed that, for a strong standing navy to exist, either a well-structured administrative system that was not solely reliant upon the crown, or a sovereign who was willing to support and dedicate both time and revenue for naval development, was required. With this said, a navy could only temporarily thrive through an atypical level of interest from the throne. It was through institutional reform (which provided them with the means to become semi-autonomous) that navies became standing and permanent.

Louis XIII’s reign, then, is held in high regard amongst the majority of historians for its impact on French sea power. Yet historians have attributed French success to Louis’s

\textsuperscript{60} *Navy and Government*; P. Castagnos, *Richelieu face à la mer* (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 1989).

\textsuperscript{61} Barbiche, *Les institutions de la monarchie française*, p. 209. [Avant Richelieu, les rois de France n’entretenaient pas de flotte de guerre permanente.]

\textsuperscript{62} Glete, *Warfare at Sea*, pp. 142-43; *Histoire de la Marine*, III, p. 455. [le précurseur de Colbert.]


\textsuperscript{64} The insignificance of the French navy during the sixteenth century is illustrated in Alain Berbouche’s study of the institution, from the Middle Ages to Louis XIV’s reign. Berbouche’s work is largely a summary of existing literature. The attention paid to each monarch’s reign in his book reflects the existing literature. Whereas Louis XIII’s reign is covered in forty pages, the reigns of Francis I, Henri II and Francis II are combined in just eight. Berbouche, *Histoire de la royale*, pp. 106-14.
principal minister, and not to the king himself.\textsuperscript{65} The classic interpretation of Richelieu as ‘the first man of the French state to conceive the role of a navy in terms of \textit{sea power}, which provided the attributes for national power’, is still largely held today.\textsuperscript{66} Richelieu’s influence over maritime developments enabled a French naval force to emerge that could compete with any major power of the time. Although the navy thrived, this deeply personal connection between France’s \textit{grand maître} and its navy was not ideal, for the institution rested firmly upon his shoulders. If the \textit{grand maître} stumbled, the navy would instantly be affected. With this said, Richelieu’s competency and success facilitated the rise of the navy to a height that Henri II would have been proud to achieve. Criticism of Richelieu’s role in the production of future French sea power is accordingly scarce.\textsuperscript{67} Only G. J. Buisseret has challenged the importance ascribed to Richelieu’s involvement, by considering Louis’s father instead. Henri IV developed a French fleet that ‘was almost extinct’ when he inherited it, into a body of around twelve large galleys in 1610; supported by an experienced officer class which would survive under Richelieu.\textsuperscript{68} Buisseret has nevertheless accepted the importance of Richelieu to naval reform, but reiterates that one must also accept that ‘the fleet of Louis XIII…owed much to the effort which had been undertaken by his father.’\textsuperscript{69}

A clear trend surfaces when comparing the different methods used by England and France in producing and maintaining a standing navy. In France, the navy was closely connected with the head of the state; it prospered when under the helm of a leading state advocate: Henri II, Henri IV and Cardinal Richelieu. Consequently, it also floundered when


\textsuperscript{66} Berbouche, \textit{Histoire de la royale}, p. 129 [\textit{fut le premier homme d’État français à concevoir le rôle d’une marine de guerre en termes de sea power pourvu des attributs de la puissance publique}].

\textsuperscript{67} Daniel Dessert has taken a critical stance to the competence of French naval administration for the seventeenth century, especially under Colbert. D. Dessert, \textit{La royale: vaisseaux et marins du Roi-Soleil} (Paris: Fayard, 1996), pp. 278-82.


\textsuperscript{69} \textit{ibid}, p. 306.
this patronage weakened. In contrast, by 1564 in England, an administrative and financial framework had been established that enabled the preservation of the fleet in a reasonable condition, even when the monarchy was inattentive towards it. In theory at least, as long as it received its standard annual revenue, the English navy was self-sustaining because of the experienced officials who administered it.

The English departmentalised maritime infrastructure was the primary reason behind the two states’ contrasting naval strengths. The French state relied upon local and provincial governance to operate, and according to Alan James, its naval administration reflected this:

Governance in [France during] the early modern period was deeply personal, and so, by extension, the naval history of France is tied to the personal political, financial, and dynastic interests of its office-holders. It was indirectly, through the pursuit of these personal interests, not through grand-legislative initiatives, that the crown was able to maintain its influence in naval affairs.  

The French navy by 1642 was by no means a perfect model. If an individual with little experience, innovation or skills in leadership filled the office of grand maître de la navigation, the navy could regress. Although Richelieu’s involvement up until his death in 1642 was a vital chapter in the French navy’s progress, its future was volatile until a system was created where military force was not solely reliant upon the management of a single individual. It is easy to see why the systematic procedures that allowed a collective group to be responsible for the fleet, as was the case in England, had clear benefits to the development of a reliable standing navy.

The establishment and expansion of a standing navy, then, caused advances in the state apparatus, and these changes are therefore a central, if understudied component of the

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military revolution debate, first introduced by Michael Roberts in January 1955. Studying the Swedish army, Roberts claimed that a series of interconnected transformations in the armed forces were so considerable, that administration was forced to adapt in order to accommodate them.\(^{71}\) Despite over forty years of revision and criticism, the basis of the military revolution thesis is still contested and discussed, even if the original contextual foundations of Roberts’s argument are now disproved. Most challenges to the thesis have centred upon its chronological and geographical scope, applying greater focus to leading western European states, and expanding or advancing its timeline. This then is important in relation to the context of this thesis, and the states being discussed.

In his original paper, Michael Roberts declared that by ‘1660 the modern art of war had come to birth. Mass armies, strict discipline, the control of the state, the submergence of the individual, had already arrived.’\(^{72}\) Yet, criticism of Roberts’s thesis has asserted that the military revolution occurred far later than originally suggested. Indeed, although not necessarily agreeing with his alternative proposal, the majority of historians including J. S. Wheeler, Michael J. Braddick and David Parrott agree with Jeremy Black that ‘the situation in the last decades of the century 1560-1660 scarcely suggests that a revolution was nearly complete.’\(^{73}\) Meanwhile, others have agreed with Geoffrey Parker’s approach of widening the theory’s scope to a period that covers almost two centuries.\(^{74}\) This has enabled David Eltis to


\(^{72}\) ibid, p. 29.


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criticise Parker’s approach, for ‘by covering such a long time-span, his theory of change inevitably loses some of its edge, especially when quite separate and chronologically distanced events become conflated.’ 75 With this in mind, it is difficult to associate a period that covers almost two centuries as being revolutionary. A revolution, instinctively, is associated with timescale. It is an act achieved in a lifetime, and moreover possesses a beginning and an end. The long-lasting military revolution favoured by scholars, including Geoffrey Parker, is problematic by referring to a transitional phase that has been associated with the entirety of the early modern period. George Raudzens shares this perspective and argues that where maritime development is concerned it would be more fitting to use the working title ‘Maritime Evolution’. 76 Associating the military revolution with evolutionary theory is not unknown. 77 Clifford J. Rogers rather fittingly proposes such a concept by adapting the evolutionary biologists Stephen Jay Gould’s and Niles Eldredge’s ‘punctuated equilibrium’ theory.

They argued that evolution proceeded by short bursts of rapid change interspersed with long periods of near stasis rather than constant, slow alteration...[this] conception of punctuated equilibrium evolution, combining both incremental and “revolutionary” change, seems to describe the process of military innovation extraordinarily well. 78

This concept is supported in this thesis. The longevity of the military revolution made it anything but revolutionary. Instead a series of changes – the expansion of the infantry, Parker’s trace italienne, the exploitation of gunpowder, financial and administrative developments – are observable over a period beginning in the late-middle ages and ending at

78 Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War’, p. 77
the climax of the early modern era. This indicates that the changes experienced by the military and the state were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. With this in mind, the military transformations that unfolded during the years of 1545 to 1642 were part of the larger evolutionary changes that would see the development of warfare and the emergence of a modern political institutional framework.

Whilst criticism of the original military revolution thesis has focused on dating this process, historians have also debated where the revolution took place. This debate is predominately Eurocentric; nevertheless, Roberts’s original paper focused only on Sweden and the Dutch Republic, leading revisionist studies to revise his original claims.  

Geoffrey Parker and Jeremy Black have led the field in suggesting that the military revolution was a European phenomenon that was not instigated by any single country. Not ‘only did western European forces use the same weapons, they also employed similar tactics. It is a mistake to assume that while the Dutch and Swedes applied new tactics, other armies stood still’.  

It is also a fair supposition, considering the high numbers of mercenaries within the early modern military even during the Thirty Years War, that if the Dutch and Swedes founded modern infantry and tactical development, the hiring of troops would have guaranteed a swift distribution of methods, ensuring that any benefits would quickly become universal.  

Consequently, no state would have had a monopoly on innovation in war for any considerable length of time. This is not to say that states with access to large numbers of men and/or capital did not have a clear advantage on the battlefield. The richest states often possessed the strongest and largest militaries and were surely at the forefront of these transformations: Spain during the sixteenth century, the Dutch Republic during the

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81 Indeed, Parrott has shown that mercenaries remained the main constituent of the early modern military until as late as the eighteenth century, and so were part of these changes. Parrott, *The Business of War*. Parrott’s work has expanded, certified and provided new insight into Roberts’s incidental remark that it was mercenary armies that ‘carried through the military revolution’. Roberts, *The Military Revolution*, p. 15.
82 Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, p. 65.
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seventeenth century, England in the late-seventeenth century, and France also at a similar time.83

This has left one issue unresolved: few studies of the military revolution have given adequate attention to naval developments. Indeed, as a result of naval history often isolating itself from other fields, monographs produced in light of the military revolution are restricted, and commonly focus solely on British naval power, and this has allowed Jan Glete’s 1993 study to stand out.84 In his European and American project, Glete successfully contrasted the diverse turning points and size of naval expansion across different countries during the early modern period and nineteenth century. His research revealed that European naval developments conformed to the fragmented chronological and geographical system of military transformations determined by scholars for the army. Comparing the smaller naval institution to the army could result in the role of the navy being significantly overshadowed in this debate, despite its clear relevance. This is in part understandable, for the navy was initially produced as an auxiliary to the army, and its original infrastructure was thus designed as a replication of that on land. The navy served as a microcosm of the army’s design, for it was the role of the gentry to manage this organisation, and originally, conflict at sea would be instigated through hand-to-hand combat. In other words, naval conflict was land warfare at sea.

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This view is misleading, for the scale of maritime and naval technological and administrative change between the mid-sixteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries widened the division between the navy and army as institutions, in turn providing the means for military and administrative changes that were unique to naval warfare. In this period, naval developments were more fundamental to tactics and state consolidation in England than in France, because a standing navy was in existence at an earlier stage. Given the timespan during which these changes occurred, however, it is more appropriate to consider military changes at sea as evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary. A step-by-step process materialised where pre-modern naval activity progressed into an efficiently organised military force between 1500 and 1700. First, gunpowder became the focus of naval conflict, and this caused a demand for larger vessels to adapt to heavier artillery pieces being onboard. As this occurred, advances in shipbuilding caused the sailing vessel to become favoured over the galley. Next, state navies were expanded, simultaneously producing a heavy demand on state finance and other resources. Finally, this expansion forced the state to adapt, by exploring new methods to accumulate revenue to administer and maintain a fleet, and moreover strengthen the state apparatus.

In a study devoted to England and France, it will be shown that this progress was rarely achieved in unison. Whilst England undertook a significant step in advancing its naval administration during the mid-sixteenth century, a major change in France was not seen until the reforms of Cardinal Richelieu. Furthermore, even after Richelieu’s influence, historians including Daniel Dessert have argued that French developments were fragile and uninspired under Colbert.85 This is not to say that France remained a degenerate realm in terms of naval affairs for the majority of this thesis’s period. It merely suggests that the military revolution was evolutionary. For England, because La Manche divided it from the continent, it became

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85 Dessert, *La royale*, pp. 278-82.
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mandatory to adapt to survive in a highly aggressive world dominated by Habsburg-Valois rivalry. It was therefore important for a kingdom with imperial ambitions to adapt to its surroundings; in England, the navy was perceived as having greater significance than in the French continental kingdom. France’s evolutionary turn in the navy only unfolded once its leading statesmen found it vital to compete in a world that was becoming increasingly maritime-led. For both kingdoms, the story of naval expansion is one of adapting to survive. England was simply required to advance its navy at an earlier stage than France.

This thesis is divided into two sections, which together aim to provide a comprehensive account of naval development in early modern England and France. The first three chapters are devoted to the administrative framework that built, maintained and prepared the navy for service. Following on from them, chapters four, five and six are concerned with the fleet itself, considering warship architecture, size, decoration and fleet composition. Each chapter approaches naval advances through considering how the growth of the navy and state was interconnected.

In comparing two opposing state infrastructures, I will be seeking not only the similarities between the two naval institutions, but also their differences. This process is complicated enough when employed within a study that covers a much shorter period, yet in employing a large time period, and a comparative structure, this thesis has had many hurdles to overcome. In a study of such a size, some areas that concern naval operations, namely victualing, the running of shipyards and the role of heavy ordnance, have been discussed only briefly.86 The six chapters that follow cover a large amount of ground from administration and finance, to vessel architecture and fleet size. The main emphasis in the content that follows is on the relationship between state strength and naval capability.

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Any study that concerns naval development, especially one that takes a multi-national approach, raises problems of methodology. The advantage of the thematic approach taken here is that it allows the writer to record change over time, without having to provide the detailed chronology surrounding the events. Yet, it also has its disadvantages, for in applying a thematic approach the reader is assumed to have a basic understanding of the historical context surrounding the work. Of course, an alternative approach would be to produce the thesis as a series of case studies, which record the major naval operations of the period and make note of the changes that took place within them. This method would, however, be overly problematic in a comparative study where events were not always connected across borders. If this approach was undertaken, chapters would often have to discuss English and French developments in total separation, whilst also incorporating a larger discussion of other international developments relevant to the discussed operations. A thematic study therefore avoids these complications and allows the reader to obtain a much clearer understanding of not only change, but also the importance of transcultural developments between England and France. For a comparative study that covers a long period of time, the thematic approach is most suitable.

The most challenging issue encountered in this project was finding a balanced quantity of archival material relevant to naval studies for both kingdoms. There was a clear difference in how the navies of the two kingdoms were documented in the sixteenth century. For England, after the establishment of the Council of Marine Causes in 1545-46, the English navy’s record keeping was exemplary for the time, in contrast to the French equivalent. For example, between 1540 and 1547, at least three complete ship lists with partial inventories of the entire English navy royal are available, and after this date naval lists exist at regular intervals for the remainder of the period. Similarly, both income and expenditure of the English navy are almost completely recorded for every year and financial records are
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available in the Exchequer Records collection at the National Archives, Kew. By contrast, naval lists for France before the 1620s are extremely scarce, and when they are available, they are often incomplete. According to Glete, comparisons of the two navies prior to this date are difficult to record accurately. It must be kept in mind, therefore, that when having to deal with these problems, I have produced my findings based on a number of presumptions from the evidence available; this has been made apparent in the respective footnotes, when this is the case. Nevertheless, this study intends to fill some of these voids in known data, and hopes that its research will encourage others to continue expanding on this field in the future. Through accessing manuscripts in both local and national French archives, research conducted for this project has uncovered information that will allow historians to trace the strength of the French navy to at least 1573. After this date, the limited availability of records suggests that its navy did deteriorate rapidly until the crown’s warships were all gone. Records of the French fleet are extremely limited throughout the sixteenth century. This was most likely because it was not documented with the same level of rigour when compared to the English equivalent, as the French state did not perceive this process as fundamental to the state’s operation until the rebuilding of its fleet in the 1620s. The contrast between the volume and quality of French naval archival documentation in the sixteenth century and in the 1620s, suggests that this period witnessed the navy’s progress and consolidation.

Aside from its engagement with the military revolution debate, this thesis argues that three central factors were fundamental to the development of state navies. First, that naval development was intricately connected to the power of the crown because, ultimately, state warships were the monarch’s private possession. The strength of the state navy was dependent upon the stability and interests of the crown. Second, it will be argued that the size, location and composition of fleets were conditioned by the geography of the kingdoms.

87 Glete, Navies and Nations, I, pp. 94, 128.
Lastly, changes to both kingdoms’ navies were often the result of transnational, and sometimes even transcultural, affairs. Being separated only by the Channel, and as traditional adversaries, the English and French statesmen and merchant communities were in regular competition and contact, whether at war or not.\textsuperscript{88} Naval power was often shaped by how the neighbouring state’s sea forces compared. It was a healthy level of international competition and rivalry that fuelled naval advances. This interactive emergence was a key factor in the development of state navies and it will be shown that it deserves a far greater prominence in studies of naval progression than historians have provided in the past.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} R. Morieux, \textit{Une mer pour deux royaumes: La Manche, frontière franco-anglaise (XVI\textsuperscript{e}-XVIII\textsuperscript{e} siècle)} (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008).
\textsuperscript{89} Alan James has suggested that an international study that takes account of naval advances could have valuable results. This thesis is undertaken in the hope that as a systematic study, the author can present these findings with greater substance and results. A. James, ‘Raising the Profile of Naval History: An International Perspective on Early Modern Navies’, \textit{The Mariner’s Mirror}, 97:1 (2011), p. 193.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ADMIRALTY AND THE STATE

For the first quarter of the sixteenth century, neither Tudor nor Valois naval administration changed notably from its medieval predecessor. Apart from the state’s admiral, most officials overseeing the navy’s administration were employed on an ad hoc basis. When the navy was required for service, it was organised through using similar (and in some instances the same) private networks as the army. Yet, with the expansion of long distance trade, and increasing violence at sea attributed to piracy, the early modern period quickly witnessed a rising demand for naval resources. With the growth of armed sea forces, it soon became necessary to develop an administrative infrastructure to accommodate it. Yet, the political and geographical differences between England and France, covered in this chapter, led to two distinct administrative structures, which emerged at different times. The role and authority of the respective admirals, in particular, was reformed with significantly different results.

Scholarship that has addressed the role and authority of the two admiralties in this period has come to the same opinion. In comparing the two, Jan Glete argued that the French admiral held greater administrative responsibility than his English counterpart. The French admiral controlled and exercised his rights over the admiralty courts, whilst also being the principal orchestrator in organising maritime resources for war; in England the lord admiral’s role was more superficial. Indeed, although the English admiral was expected to command naval campaigns, the monarch and their professional administrative specialists pioneered administration after 1545. Unlike in France, England’s lord admiral according to C. S. L.

Davies was ‘remote from the day-to-day administration.’ With such a system in place, historians including Jaap R. Brujin have argued that England’s administrative system provided its navy with heightened control and centralisation. This statement, however, oversimplifies what was a less than refined structure, especially where the lord admiral’s office was concerned. N. A. M. Rodger and Andrew Thrush have both argued that the office was a redundant one, and that England’s naval administration was ‘quite capable of functioning without’ it.

This contrast in naval infrastructure is reflected in the obvious differences in state structure and control in the two kingdoms. In England, the monarch relied upon the nobility and office-holders to enforce commands and to ensure the upkeep of local governance, and in turn they were dependent on the monarch for advancement and privileges. For the aspiring noble, the crown was as reliant upon him, as he was on the crown. In France, the large and diverse system of autonomous rights held by the nobility and provinces had caused the crown to often be more reliant upon the nobles than they were on the crown. This would erupt with the civil war of the late-sixteenth century. With the French crown’s relatively recent acquisitions of territory – Burgundy and Picardy (1477), Provence (1482) and Brittany (1532) - the monarchy was eager to assert its authority, but had to acknowledge local rights and privileges. Provincial parlements were established in many of these provinces to continue the judicial traditions of the localities: Toulouse (1443), Grenoble (1453), Bordeaux (1462), Dijon (1477), Rouen (1499), Aix-en-Provence (1501) and Brittany (1553). Elite power in

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sixteenth-century French local affairs was thus considerable.\textsuperscript{7} Parlements had the means, at the very least, to serve as an obstacle to reforms enforced by the crown that they opposed, as would occur, for example, between 1582 and 1584 when Brittany initially refused to authorise Anne de Joyeuse’s appointment as Admiral of France in order to protect the legal jurisdiction of the admiralty of Brittany.\textsuperscript{8}

Most scholarship prior to the 1980s asserted that the French Wars of Religion concerned the political grievances of the nobility, which had materialised because of the threat to this state structure.\textsuperscript{9} It has only been with more recent historiography that - as Mack Holt rather fittingly entitled his 1993 article - history has put ‘religion back into the Wars of Religion.’\textsuperscript{10} Without firmly situating an opinion within this debate, the French civil wars of the late-sixteenth century serve as a striking example of the power of the early modern French elite. Niccolò Machiavelli’s description of the state in \textit{The Prince} expresses this:

\begin{quote}
the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

The autonomous power of both the nobility and local institutions in France, which the English crown had attempted to suppress through the fiscal and political measures enforced during the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries, had shaped how French naval administration was structured.\textsuperscript{12} Unlike in the English case, where a distinctive and


\textsuperscript{8} See pp. 45-49 of thesis.


departmentalised body of officials developed within London to maintain the navy, in France the crown was far more dependent on its noble subjects to sustain the fleet. This reliance upon its nobility was one of the central factors in the crisis that befell the navy during the Wars of Religion, when the crown’s warships were few and many simultaneous claims to the leading admiralty office were made. Even with the dissolution of the French admiralty in October 1626, France’s reliance upon its nobility to hold senior posts, and on venal offices for the navy’s upkeep, contrasted with the English equivalent that came to bond the navy to the very centre of state, along with experienced professional officers.

The following two chapters consider how the navies of England and France were administered, and they also assess the challenges faced in their institutional development. This first chapter focuses on the office of admiral, as the most senior post in naval administration. Nobles filled these offices, and it is shown that the high admiralty office was more honorary than functional; furthermore, it is suggested that the office was typical of state appointments at the time. A second chapter then follows discussing the administrative bodies that were combined to manage the navy; naval governance at both the local and regional levels is thus discussed. Together, these chapters highlight the vast disparities between English and French naval administration, which were fundamental in determining the size and design of both fleets, as discussed in later chapters.

1.1. The Appointment of an Admiral

The office of Lord High Admiral of England was typical of senior positions within the early modern state framework. It was granted to the holder through his status of noble birth, and
any virtues of knowledge, skill and expertise were secondary. In contrast to France, every lord admiral between 1545 and 1642 was expected to command the fleet in person, and so it is surprising that, although many English admirals held previous experience at sea, it was not mandatory. In both kingdoms, the admiral was more likely to have previously led forces on land, rather than at sea, before taking up the post. With the appointment of a noble with limited experience at sea, the office was highly susceptible to incompetence. Without the admiral having any significant previous knowledge in naval affairs, Andrew Thrush has asked what the official duties of the senior admiralty were. He stresses that for England, it was not until the Admiralty Commission formed in September 1628 that the responsibilities of the lord admiral ‘were committed to paper’ for the first time. It can be no coincidence that France had outlined the responsibilities of the grand maître position just two years prior to England doing the same. Indeed, it is most likely that the French admiralty reforms of 1626, explaining the function of the office, had also influenced the restructuring of the English equivalent. Before this date, the English admiral’s duties appear largely circumstantial, based upon his own will and self-perceived competence. Whether they contributed to the administrative upkeep of the fleet, or served only to authorise patents and command a squadron when necessary, depended upon the individual holding the charge. The consequences of these appointments have been highlighted by Geoffrey Parker when considering the service of Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, Duke of Medina Sidonia as commander of the 1588 Armada. Although Parker has equally stressed that both the technological

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limitations of the Spanish fleet, and its failure to prevent English intelligence from providing information, were major factors in the armada’s failure, he has also taken account of Medina Sidonia’s unsuitability for the role.\textsuperscript{17} The duke was appointed just four months prior to the fleet’s departure, and had previously openly reported on his lack of confidence in the campaign, due to his personal inexperience at sea.

The titular position of head of the navy, then, required neither experience nor expertise to fill, but instead was a position occupied most often by those who were able to use court influence. As one of the leading state offices in both kingdoms, the role was firmly grounded in nepotism. For England, the appointment of Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond – and Henry VIII’s bastard son – to the post, in July 1525 at the age of just six, was part of a wider scheme of measures designed to elevate him in the peerage and justify potentially legitimising him into the royal succession.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, the questionable appointment ‘was not a case of needs must’, for it forced the capable Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, out of the office. Meanwhile, in another English example, the granting of the office to James I’s favourite, and alleged lover, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham in January 1619, illustrates that the office was more concerned with prestige, honour, and loyalty to the crown, rather than the candidate’s relevant maritime merits.\textsuperscript{19} It could be countered that the candidate’s connection to the crown and high-birth were both essential for the high office to function, but it is equally important to stress that for an emerging maritime power, the individual who controlled and oversaw the fleet could further benefit the role if he had previous knowledge and experience at sea.

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By way of comparison, in France nepotism was also rife throughout the period. The appointment of royal favourites such as Claude d’Annebault and Anne de Joyeuse show the crown’s willingness to appoint men to the office on the basis of rank and self-interest and not by merit. Although it may be true that a high ranking, self-interested noble was required to break down the resistance of the money-making local admiralties, the men appointed to this office did not necessarily have previous knowledge in naval affairs. With this said, it would be wrong to agree with Michel Vergé-Franceschi that no admirals were appointed in sixteenth-century France with prior knowledge of maritime affairs, even if it is true that the majority had very little. Gaspard de Coligny’s service as Admiral of France by royal patent on 12 January 1553 must be highlighted. Vergé-Franceschi has argued that Coligny was a perfect example of how French admirals were typically appointed with no prior nautical experience. Despite studying cosmography, according to Vergé-Franceschi, Coligny had no major involvement in nautical matters before his appointment. This view can no longer be accepted, and although prior to taking the office, Coligny’s contribution to naval affairs was limited, he had more experience than other potential candidates. The future admiral commanded a galley during the Solent invasion attempt of 1545, and in the following year, he would accompany d’Annebault in the Anglo-French peace negotiations. Coligny’s prior maritime proficiency was nevertheless very limited, and so biographies of his life have provided little insight into his role as admiral, in spite of it being the most prestigious title he held. It could be concluded, then, that appointments to the position of Admiral of France were not as frivolous as Vergé-Franceschi has suggested. The high status of the incumbent was necessary for the crown to exercise its authority through them, and as a consequence, it

20 AN, Marine G 193, f. 1; BN, Moreau 1340, ff. 285-86.
was not viewed as essential for the senior admiralty to have previous maritime experience because holders of the post were not generally expected to command at sea. With this said, as shown with the case of Coligny, it was not unheard of for the French admiral to have practical experience at sea prior to his appointment, although it was rare and not mandatory.

It was the admiral’s responsibility to organise and encourage maritime programmes, not to personally lead fleets at sea. Archival evidence supports J. Shimizu’s claim that Coligny’s position provided him with a role that could support his political programme which covered ‘colonization in Florida, commercial ventures in Northern Europe, and the projected alliance with the Ottoman Empire’. Coligny as admiral gave more attention to maritime ventures than to naval affairs, which for the Ponant were restricted, in part since most naval activity focused on the Levant at the time. Coligny’s neglect of the navy was surely foreshadowed in the circumstances that led to his appointment; he was granted the position not as a reward for his services at sea, but rather as an outcome of his success on land. Following his achievements as Colonel-General of the Infantry during Henri II’s campaign that occupied the Three Bishoprics (the dioceses of Metz, Verdun and Toul) between April and June 1552, Coligny was rewarded with the post of Admiral of France, after Claude d’Annebault’s death. It goes without saying that as an outcome of the nepotistic nature of the office, although most individuals in these positions had the important characteristics of respect and authority because of their high rank, they had little experience at sea.

As was typical of sixteenth-century office, the chief admiralty posts of both kingdoms were repeatedly considered as attainable by birthright, rather than appointed according to

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merit. Despite the controversial circumstances that led to the assassination of Coigny on 24 August 1572, many of his relatives from the House of Montmorency would go on to inherit the office of Admiral of France, as well as other senior maritime positions. Most notably, after sixteen years in the post, Charles de Montmorency passed the role on to his nephew, Henri de Montmorency in July 1612, who would retain the position until its dissolution in 1626.\(^{26}\) Both Charles and Henri were favourites of the crown, with the latter even being the godson of Henri IV. It is consequently clear that the relationship between monarch and admiral was one of the most important factors in an admiral’s appointment. Without previous experience in naval affairs, in military strength this could obviously be a hindrance, yet, for state control of the institution this was central to a successful regime. Henri III’s trust and friendship with Anne de Joyeuse was a major factor that led to his appointment in June 1582, and Joyeuse was expected to command and reform the navy according to the king’s instructions.\(^{27}\) This relationship was no different in England. James I, and his son, would have been confident in the abilities of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, and surely had regular consultations concerning the fleet. Other examples of the close relationships between admiral and monarch include the appointment of Charles Howard, later Earl of Nottingham, a cousin of Elizabeth I in May 1585.\(^{28}\) Nottingham was actually the fifth Lord High Admiral from the House of Howard, a noble family closely connected to the seat of the crown throughout the sixteenth century.\(^{29}\) Even Edward and Thomas Seymour occupied the position, whilst their family sat comfortably at the foot of the throne, thanks to the birth of

\(^{26}\) AN, Marine G193, f. 1; Histoire de la Marine, IV, pp. 559-61.

\(^{27}\) AN, Marine B^4_1, ff. 35-38, cited in Navy and Government, p. 33.


\(^{29}\) John Howard (1483-58), Edward Howard (1513), Thomas Howard (1513-25), William Howard (1554-58), Charles Howard (1585-1619).
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Prince Edward.\textsuperscript{30} Combined, the appointments discussed suggest that the senior admiralty offices of England and France were filled by men of high birth to not only complement the personal power and prestige of their holders, but also to provide the office and naval institution with status and authority. The offices certainly had benefits for their occupants, as reflected by Émilie Dermenghem’s claim that d’Annebault’s appointment in June 1543 made him ‘the most important person of the kingdom after the king’.\textsuperscript{31} In turn, through appointing a close confidant as admiral, the monarch could be as closely involved in the coordinating and administering of the navy as he or she wished.

Bearing in mind the relationship between monarch and admiral, this rapport could have dire consequences for the state when it faced a crisis. The instability of the French crown during the late-sixteenth century is an example of this that eroded the foundations of the office. From 1589 to 1595 the office of Admiral of France was highly unstable, with six different candidates obtaining the position in as many years.\textsuperscript{32} This was because of the flawed system in which a multitude of claimants attempted to justify their rights to inherit the position, and it was also an outcome of the power vacuum in Normandy during the final years of the Wars of Religion.\textsuperscript{33} Both Alan James and Vergé-Franceschi have explored the complexity surrounding these appointments, with Vergé-Franceschi offering a degree of humour in the rather farfetched historical situation that is ‘beyond difficult’ to explain.\textsuperscript{34} Yet, the situation illustrates that the office was a useful political asset for the holder. Moreover, it shows that it was a sought-after post that caused contention amongst rival noble families. The complication originated from Henri III’s decision to grant both the offices of admiral and

\textsuperscript{30} TNA, SP 10/1, f. 28. Edward Seymour (1542), and Thomas Seymour (1547-49).


\textsuperscript{34} Vergé-Franceschi, ‘l’amirauté de France’, p. 41. [La situation devenait alors au-delà de difficile.]
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governor of Normandy to court favourite, Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, duc
d’Epernon on 7 November 1587.\(^{35}\) The crown perhaps intended to exacerbate the antipathy
between the Guise and Epernon factions through this appointment, and so limit Guise
influence.\(^{36}\) Epernon’s voluntary retirement in February 1589, however, led to the office’s
quick change of hands, first to his brother, Bernard de Nogaret de La Valette, and then to
Antoine de Brichanteau, the future marquis de Nangis. In turn, Charles de Gontaut, duc de
Biron, under the pretence that La Valette had personally recommended him as successor,
hotly disputed the appointment of Nangis; in October 1592, Henri IV confirmed Biron as
admiral.\(^{37}\)

Biron’s appointment did not, however, end the great debacle, but instead exacerbated
it through conflicting with the aims of the Catholic League that dominated Normandy. André
de Brancas, supporter of the League, and governor of both Le Havre and Rouen, laid claim to
the office. Brancas had already shown his worth as a naval commander when successfully
defending the League’s hold of the Seine against the royal siege of Rouen between 1591 and
1592. This situation was only resolved in April 1594, when, tired of war and aspiring to unite
his kingdom, Henri IV accepted Brancas as admiral in return for the pacification of Rouen.\(^{38}\)
Henri had renounced his faith and converted to Roman Catholicism in July 1593.\(^{39}\) The
acceptance of Brancas was an additional step towards pacification. Brancas would die in
1595, but his successor, Charles de Montmorency, would have a considerably longer and
more successful tenure lasting more than twenty-five years.\(^{40}\) The complexities surrounding
the admiralty of France during the final years of the Wars of Religion demonstrates the

\(^{35}\) BN, français 5156, ff. 9-11.
\(^{37}\) AN, Marine G193, f.1.
\(^{40}\) BN, Moreau 1340, ff. 219-23.
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detrimental effect that the civil war had taken upon the naval institution. As an office of high political value, the post is an indication of the crown’s continued attempts to defend its central position during the difficult political times. That the crown-endorsed office holders were still being contested by their peers and rivals, is proof of the decayed and complex fabric of the state itself at this time, and shows the clear political value of the office. Meanwhile, this instance of noble rivalry for the post indicates that the office was perceived as one to be filled according to birthright, with fewer requirements for skill and competence being seen as mandatory. It is true that the crown had little option at the time, for the granting of the office was an opportunity for the crown to counter the existential threat of the Guise faction, by attempting to balance political power in the realm. As a result, the office served as a pawn in the broader political crisis of the time, which reduced the navy’s ability to rise as a potent military force whilst its senior office was so unstable.

In England, nobles did not expect to inherit the office, as had become the case in France in the late-sixteenth century. Instead the office was appointed at the sole discretion of the monarch. With this said, court factions could dominate the role, as shown with the Seymour and Howard families. Figures such as John Dudley, Viscount Lisle’s and Edward Clinton, Earl of Lincoln’s eligibility for the office was determined according to both their noble status and, as a secondary factor, any experience at sea. As was also the case in France, however, it was generally following their appointment that most knowledge of maritime affairs was gained. On both sides of the Channel, the knowledge of more experienced captains, who served as advisors in strategic decisions at sea, could compensate for the admiral’s inexperience. Even with admirals of greater experience, such as the Earl of Nottingham, it was unwise not to seek counsel with other proficient commanders. This was the procedure for the English fleet in 1588, when Nottingham was accompanied by the experienced seadogs: Francis Drake, John Hawkins and Martin Frobisher, who served as
squadron commanders.\textsuperscript{41} The same was also the case with the Earl of Essex’s campaign on Cadiz in 1596, when Walter Raleigh led a squadron of six men-of-war.\textsuperscript{42}

Although records are less accessible for French naval command, partially on account of the confusion surrounding the high command of the navy in the late-sixteenth century, a consideration of naval expertise under Louis XIII reflects similar trends. Although Claude d’Annebault was the only French admiral to command a major campaign at sea during the period, records from Louis XIII’s regime show that steps were always taken to ensure that commanders of French squadrons were men of practical sea experience. Command at sea was delegated to men such as Claude de Launay-Razilly. Razilly was one of three brothers who held an interest in maritime matters (both François and Isaac would pursue French colonial interests in New France) and as a member of a minor noble family, he was qualified to pursue his interest in naval affairs whilst the French navy was reforming.\textsuperscript{43} Between 1622 and 1623 he led a squadron of three warships, as part of a larger \textit{armée navale} commanded by the duc de Guise.\textsuperscript{44} After the admiralty’s dissolution in 1626, Razilly remained an active naval officer in French campaigns and participated in a series of conflicts from the Siege of Saint-Martin-de-Ré in 1627 to the Battle of Guetaria in 1638, where he was captain of \textit{la Couronne}.\textsuperscript{45} His regular participation in naval activity, and his gradual promotion to captain of Louis’s largest warship, indicates that he was a well-seasoned, skilled and respected officer at sea, and his experience was unlikely to be matched in Charles I’s England.

The presence of individuals such as Drake and Razilly as naval officers suggests that, even with an incompetent admiral, experienced advisors aided in ensuring the navy’s progress. With this said, evidence suggests that English admirals, on the whole, were more

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[42] BL, Add MS 48152, ff. 198-99.
\item[44] BN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}, ff. 53-54, 55-56.
\item[45] \textit{ibid}, ff. 184, 235-36.
\end{footnotesize}
likely to have previous experience at sea before filling the office than in France, most likely on account of the post requiring the occupant to command at sea. Before his appointment as admiral, John Dudley served as Vice Admiral of the English Navy from 1537, where he had proved to be a competent and keen commander.\(^\text{46}\) His interest in naval affairs (as shown by his brief reinstatement in the position in October 1549) most likely guided the administrative reforms of 1545–46 that would see the emergence of the Council of Marine Causes.\(^\text{47}\)

Meanwhile, Edward Clinton, Earl of Lincoln, who served as admiral from 1550 to 1553, and again from 1558 to 1585, also had previous experience as vice admiral against Scotland during the Rough Wooing years from 1544 to 1547, and subsequent Scottish war.\(^\text{48}\) Examples of prior experience in France are far scarcer, and the only office-holder with comparable experience was perhaps André de Brancas, who died in the post just one year after his official appointment. Brancas’s occupation of the governorships of Le Havre and Rouen, and his successful defence of the Seine between 1591 and 1592, made him a suitable candidate for the post. Together this suggests that, although not mandatory, English admirals were more likely to have prior experience in naval affairs before taking the office than the admirals of France. Indeed, the Admiral of France was more likely to be a high-ranking noble with no experience at sea than the English equivalent.\(^\text{49}\)

Previous experience at sea was not mandatory because ultimately, especially in France, the office was an administrative one. In both kingdoms, the admiral was the principal officer responsible for issuing letters of reprisal (congés) and overseeing the running of the naval machine, including the admiralty courts that could be a considerable source of income for the admiral. For this reason, the office was even more sought after because of its lucrative rewards. Indeed, even Richelieu soon after taking up the office of grand maître, was keen to

\(^{46}\) TNA, SP 1/123, f. 176; TNA, SP 1/116, f. 222.
\(^{47}\) TNA, SP 10/9, f. 97.
\(^{48}\) TNA, SP 50/1, f. 70; TNA, SP 11/12, f. 106; Edward and Mary, pp. 22-26, 67-76; APC, 1550-52, p. 24.
\(^{49}\) This is not including the admirals of Guyenne, Brittany or the Levant, who, because of their proximity to the coast, may have had more direct involvement with naval affairs.
stress what was considered a natural right of the admiralty. On 13 January 1627, Richelieu published his various rates for the issuing of congés across the Atlantic coast, which made clear that the admiral’s rights over congés would continue in the newly developed grand maître office.\textsuperscript{50} Equally, the additional administrative duties attached to the French office of admiral, requiring the occupant to organise fleets for service, did not in itself necessitate previous military experience at sea. As the period progressed, this is where the English and French offices began to clearly differ. After 1546, the establishment of the Council of Marine Causes in England reduced the administrative duties attached to the office of Lord High Admiral that concerned preparing a fleet, whilst continuing to depend upon him to command the fleet in battle, and for this reason previous experience at sea is more regularly witnessed in its occupants.\textsuperscript{51} The underlying feature that remained the same for both kingdoms in the appointment of admirals, was that as one of the most prominent offices of the kingdom, the title was filled by a candidate of noble birth, who was well respected and obeyed within the realm, to prevent their authority from being questioned and in attempt to ensure their obedience to the crown. As a result, in their appointment, blood continued to be valued over expertise.

1.2. The Jurisdiction of the Admiral

Unlike in England, France’s provincial autonomy had a detrimental impact upon the admiral’s authority in the peripheries of the kingdom. It was not until 1613 that the office’s jurisdiction reached further than Normandy and Picardy without being contested by the localities. With the exception of France’s Mediterranean coast – which remained autonomous because the Levant remained a separate theatre of war requiring its own apparatus to function

\textsuperscript{50} AN, Marine C\textsuperscript{4}225, f. 167.
\textsuperscript{51} Davies, ‘The Administration of the Royal Navy’, p. 270.
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- France’s fragmented admiralty was the product of the kingdom’s equally complicated political structure. This is patent from the integration of the duchy of Brittany into France in 1532, when a special contractual agreement, to which the crown was bound, permitted the duchy to be incorporated as a separate kingdom under the French crown, retaining greater political rights than both Wales and Ireland across the Channel.\textsuperscript{52} Bretons continued to maintain their own laws and institutions, whilst receiving royal guarantees that their privileges would not be violated by the unification.\textsuperscript{53} The western province organised its own taxation system that was self-directed and semi-autonomous from the French state, and in the same custom, Brittany also possessed its own admiral. This position was traditionally held by the provincial governor, who controlled local commerce, judged maritime affairs in the courts, and was responsible for raising merchant vessels for campaigns.\textsuperscript{54}

Meanwhile, the autonomy of the admiralty of Guyenne would prove to be a major obstruction during the French Wars of Religion, when the Protestant princes of Navarre controlled it. The rights of the admirals in Guyenne and Brittany to issue congès became a major obstacle in the crown’s efforts during the civil wars. Not only did congès arm the sea with insurgents, but they also enabled the issuer to claim one tenth of all prize money taken, enabling a constant stream of income for the Protestant admiralty faction in Guyenne. As an office of the crown of Navarre, the admiralty of Guyenne was a separate institution from the broader model of the French state. Until the two crowns were unified in 1589, any claim that the French state made upon the office was tenuous at best, considering that it was a hereditary office attributed to the kingdom of Navarre since the mid-fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{55} Granted to


\textsuperscript{53} Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, pp. 158-64.

\textsuperscript{54} BN, français 17329, f. 161.

Henri II d’Albret, King of Navarre in 1529, d’Albret was succeeded in the role by his son-in-law, Antoine de Bourbon in 1555, before in turn being passed to Henri de Navarre in 1563, the future Henri IV of France. Despite his right of inheritance, because of the expanding feuds of the late-sixteenth century, from 1568 the French state refused to acknowledge Henri de Navarre’s authority as Admiral of Guyenne. Yet, this had no effect, for both Navarre and his cousin, Henri de Bourbon, prince de Condé, continued to widely distribute congés as part of the rights of the admiralty of Guyenne – not only to their loyal French subjects, but also to other nationalities with Protestant sympathies including several English - much to the annoyance of the French king. It was only with his controversial succession to the French crown, following Henri III’s assassination in August 1589, that Henri IV retired from the office and passed the admiralty post to François de Coligny, the son of Gaspard de Coligny, as a reward for his victory over the duc de Mayenne and his subsequent assistance at the Battle of Arques in September 1589. François de Coligny in turn handed the office to his own son - also named Henri - in 1591, further illustrating the personal and nepotistic structure of the admiralty office in early modern France.

Unlike in England, then, the upper tier of the French admiralty was divided and decentralised. Such a gulf naturally caused a rift in communication, when organising national maritime campaigns. This is not to say that the state was unaware of the complications that arose through the admiralty’s disparate nature. Indeed, the gradual development of centralisation in naval infrastructure, particularly during the seventeenth century, was a result of the known advantages from uniting. Alan James has emphasised the attempted reforms of

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Henri III and Anne de Joyeuse, between 1582 and 1584, as an example of this increased understanding. Following on from the destructive seventh bout of the civil wars, it was the purpose of Joyeuse’s appointment in June 1582 to unite both the French and Breton admiralties through a common figure. Joyeuse was quickly confirmed as the Admiral of France and of Brittany by the parlement of Paris and was provided with extensive military control over coastal fortifications, ships and ports, whilst also being granted the financial independence to extract money from the royal treasury for the construction and maintenance of vessels. The newly appointed admiral used this new found financial freedom to repair vessels in Le Havre in spring 1583. This amendment also permitted him to name vice admirals that acted on his behalf in his absence, a privilege traditionally exclusive to the crown. Thus, the Admiral of France’s administrative and military responsibility was increasing at the same time as the English equivalent was being scaled down.

The new admiral’s authority was not universally accepted, however, because the kingdom’s provincial infrastructure rallied against any attempts to reduce regional independence. It was nevertheless possible that the reform to the office of Admiral of France would have passed through the Breton parlement with little disruption, if it were not for Joyeuse being granted authority over maritime justice within the Breton domain. The 1582 revision prevented the local authorities in Brittany from obtaining a proportion of all prizes authorised by the Breton admiralty, a right that Bretons had held since 1532. With Joyeuse’s entitlements infringing upon the provincial governor, Philippe-Emmanuel de Lorraine, duc de Mercœur’s rights, the Breton parlement refused to pass Joyeuse’s reform when it was

61 AN, Marine D 7, f. 22.
62 BN, français 17329, ff. 155-56.

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issued. For Mercœur, the Breton endorsement of Joyeuse’s appointment would have meant the suppression of his own rights to regulate local commerce. In February 1584, a solution was devised between the two parties that the judges of the local provincial courts in Brittany could preside over maritime affairs within the province, on the condition that they would work under the title of lieutenant d’amiral and that they recorded all proceedings separately for Joyeuse, so that he could regulate them as admiral. Meanwhile, Joyeuse’s confirmation as Admiral of Brittany by its parlement included an ambiguous conditional clause that he was not to undermine the powers of Mercœur as governor. Although the friction between province and state had prevented the initial plans from succeeding, the admiralty of France nevertheless appeared to be gradually progressing in a policy of centralisation. Joyeuse’s rights and responsibilities were confirmed by an extensive edict on the jurisdiction of the admiral, the rights of prizes, the fishing of herring [and] the maintenance of ships formulated in March, and registered by the parlement of Rouen on 17 April 1584. This document was rare at the time because, unlike in England, this document was able to clearly outline the role of France’s admiral.

Immediately following this resolution, however, the admiralty stumbled with a devolutionary u-turn in policy. This was likely to have been a result of the changing nature of the Wars of Religion, when the Catholic League overran the Breton province. With the Breton parlement and provincial governor remaining unsatisfied with the resolutions of February 1584, given that many of the autonomous maritime rights of the province were still revoked, joining the League was considered as a route to restoration. Aggrieved by these changes, both the crown and the League considered Mercœur as a potential defector, and so the decision was made to appease Mercœur by revising his rights in Brittany, to retain his

63 AN, Marine B4, ff. 39-40, 43-44.
64 BN, MS Colbert 292, f. 24.
loyalty to the crown. In April, the admiral agreed to share the maritime responsibilities of maintaining the province with Mercœur; Joyeuse was to control military affairs, and Mercœur would handle commercial matters. Yet with the threat of the League continuing to escalate, even these limited reforms did not suffice, and on 26 April it was agreed by *lettres patentes* that the provincial governor’s maritime rights would be returned to that originally determined in 1532, as long as Mercœur held the office. The political and social autonomy of the Breton population had prevented the proposed centralisation of the admiralty in northern France, through the threat of Mercoeur defecting.

On 17 August 1588, following Joyeuse’s death in battle, the rights of the admiralty of Brittany were restored to its governor indefinitely. Mercœur’s decision to remain on good terms with both the League and royalist factions had served him well, and it was only shortly after the assassination of his cousin, the duc de Guise in December 1588, that he became fully committed to the League’s cause. Within the context of the Anglo-Spanish Wars, it is important to highlight that the official restoration of Mercœur’s rights was declared immediately following the failure of the Spanish Armada. At this time, Brittany was forced to defend its coasts against the Spanish who endeavoured to use Brittany as a base of operations against England. It seems more than likely that the French crown repealed Joyeuse’s jurisdiction over Brittany in October 1587, not only to dissuade Mercœur from opposing the crown, but also to counter future Spanish aggression. Internal conflict, therefore, ultimately prevented naval reform of the admiralty from being implemented in France; the Wars of Religion were an obstacle that blocked political advances in the maritime arena, even if some of the concessions worked to the crown’s benefit. The devolution that occurred in Brittany between 1584 and 1588 cannot however be attributed solely to the crown’s policy of

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67 *Navy and Government*, p.36.
68 BN, Colbert 292, f. 30v.
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retaining the loyalty of Mercœur during the civil conflicts. The decision was made under the influence of several factors, including the Spanish threat in Brittany during the late-sixteenth century.

As the navy was reliant upon the stability of the state, any significant admiralty reform was difficult to achieve until the kingdom returned to a period of peace and recovery. It was not until 1612 that the admiralty again sought to expand and consolidate its authority over the maritime resources of France’s various provinces. At this point, Charles de Montmorency had been admiral for seventeen years. Brittany soon became the source of Montmorency’s discontent, when he requested the royal council’s opinion on the right of the teenager, César de Bourbon, duc de Vendôme - and Henri IV’s illegitimate son – to the admiraltyship of Brittany that was claimed through his marriage to François de Lorraine, daughter and heiress of Mercœur. Vendôme’s admiralty rights had been confirmed by royal edict in April 1609 following his marriage in the previous year. Although Montmorency’s original objection to Vendôme did not instantly result in the transfer of the office, when the short-lived rebellion of the prince de Condé ended in May 1614, and the young Vendôme was revealed as a conspirator, a strengthened zeal to strip the maritime privileges of Vendôme emerged. With her son’s defiant half-brother as governor of Brittany, it became easier for Marie de Medici to authorise the integration of its admiralty into the larger office of Admiral of France, whilst negotiations were being held, which was officially sanctioned on 17 January 1615. Henri de Montmorency was sworn in as Admiral of France and Brittany, on the condition that the crown agreed to not create any new admiralty offices or courts in the

70 Mercœur had died on 17 February 1602.
71 BN, français 17329, f. 116.
73 Navy and Government, p. 61; details on the exact date of this appointment are scarce. Although Alan James provides the date of 17 January 1615, George Fournier suggested 2 July 1612 through Henri not Charles. Fournier, Hydrographie, p. 336. La Roncière using Fournier’s work, also used this same date. Histoire de la Marine, IV, p. 559.
province. This was an exponential leap in the admiralty’s development, which was made even more significant by Montmorency having purchased the office of Admiral of Guyenne in November 1613.\(^\text{74}\) By 1615, then, Henri de Montmorency controlled, for the first time, the framework of a united French admiralty for the Ponant. These developments were occurring at the same time as the state was refashioning itself, by returning to an aggressive pro-Catholic stance that would eventually witness the defeat of the Protestant resistance in the following decade. By this period France’s western coast was experiencing an increased threat from both Huguenot and Ottoman forces, and its navy had begun to strengthen to counter this. In 1616, the king was arming the western coast, especially in the waters surrounding Nantes, which had found itself a target of piratical activity.\(^\text{75}\) The consolidation of the admiralty would have made these preparations easier to organise. It was with Montmorency, not Cardinal Richelieu, that the French admiralty had first begun its expansion and enhancement. Pierre Castagnos is right to suggest – as Alan James has agreed – that Richelieu’s administrative changes were only possible because of the amalgamated administrative framework that had been produced by his predecessors.\(^\text{76}\)

Even with this said, at the time of the creation of the \textit{grand maître} post in 1626, the French admiralty still did not operate through a single administrative organisation. The situation in the south of France remained disparate, and no notable attempts at integrating the southern admiralty of the Levant with the north had yet unfolded. The generalship of the galleys remained a great and honourable maritime office of the state which independently maintained and commanded the Levant fleet. The \textit{général des galères} had:

\(^{74}\text{BN, Moreau 1340, f. 33.}\)

\(^{75}\text{Nantes, EE216, ff. 7, 9, 10, 11: ‘Lettres du Roi aux maire et echevins de Nantes pour les encourager à armer des vaisseaux, February 1616’.}\)

\(^{76}\text{Castagnos, \textit{Richelieu face à la mer}, pp. 63-65; \textit{Navy and Government}, p. 55.}\)
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absolute command of all the charged officers [in the Levant] in all actions of war and peace, and of finance, because he is the senior authority, independent of all other powers except the king, from whom he receives commands.\textsuperscript{77}

Between 1544 and 1557, Antoine Escalin, more commonly known as Captain Paulin, held this position.\textsuperscript{78} Paulin was renowned for his military feats in the Mediterranean and had proved himself worthy of the office through his participation in maritime activities, most notably the invasion of Corsica in 1553. Yet, reflecting state trends for office holders, the rising Guise faction at court allegedly persuaded Henri II to obtain his resignation, and on 8 March 1557 François de Lorraine, \textit{grand prieur} of the Order of Malta for France, replaced Paulin.\textsuperscript{79} This appointment reflects the importance of noble power and influence over these offices. For the Guise faction, it was important to control as many state offices as possible, especially whilst Coligny held the northern admiralty. Under their control the \textit{général des galères} quickly became an office manipulated by the House of Guise, and in June 1563, following his death at the age of just twenty-nine, François de Lorraine’s brother, René, marquis d’Elbeuf, succeeded him.\textsuperscript{80} Although the post would change hands again, the House of Guise would maintain the title until 1573, when it was passed into the hands of the Gondi family, who retained the position – except for a short interval between 1574 and 1579 when it was held by Henri III’s half brother, Henri d’Angoulême – until 1635, by which point five members of the Gondi family had occupied the office.\textsuperscript{81}

For both England and France, then, senior admiralty offices were highly politicised appointments, which for France restricted all attempts at uniting the admiralty under one

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{6}77, f. 95. [Commande absolument tous les officiers de la charge, tant pour les actions, de la guerre, & de la paiz, que des finances, de toutes lesquelles il est ordonnateur, independant de toute, autre puissance que celle du roy duquel seul, il reçoit les commandemens.]
\item \textsuperscript{78} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{6}77, ff. 12-13.
\item \textsuperscript{79} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}, f. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Le grand dictionnaire historique}, V (10 volumes, Paris: Libraires Associés, 1759), p. 127. See also AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}1, ff. 10-12v, 12v-13v.
\item \textsuperscript{81} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}, ff. 1-3; AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{6}77, ff. 13-14.
\end{itemize}
office. Admirals were subjected to the orders of the crown and its principal ministers and were required to keep in regular correspondence with these leading figures. This relationship meant that the noble status of the figure in the office was very important. With this said, the monarch could be as involved in operating the institution as he or she wished. In reality as with all secular offices of state, it was the monarch who held overall control over the state navy: they were, after all, royal navies. Any jurisdictional instructions imposed by the admiral could consequently be altered according to the crown’s will. Whether the monarch chose to take advantage of this relationship was at their discretion and was determined by their own character. A monarch, in theory at least, always held overall authority over the admiralty’s jurisdiction, and in turn the ruler’s commitment to the navy could ultimately result in its advancement.

The role of the monarch is most evident in England. Before the creation of the Navy Commission on 21 June 1618, in their administrative duties lord admirals were primarily expected to serve as chairmen of the Council of Marine Causes, a role that was regularly delegated to the Lieutenant/Vice Admiral of the Council in their absence. In a sense, before Buckingham’s appointment, lord admirals were responsible for being grand overseers of naval affairs, as opposed to truly dictating them. This, however, changed after 1618, when James’s court favourite, George Villiers, replaced the aged Earl of Nottingham. Buckingham’s relationship with the crown, and his youthful ambition and plans for the post, meant that, with his appointment, the administration of the navy was largely left to its own devices. The crown provided its near complete trust in Buckingham to dictate naval proceedings. When the Council of Marine Causes returned in February 1628, it was on Buckingham’s authority, after he had blamed the Navy Commission for the failure of the Île

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82 See chapter two of this thesis for the Council of Marine Causes reforms. APC, 1618-19, p. 179.
83 The official date of Buckingham’s appointment to the office was 18 January 1619. The transfer had clearly been in process for several months prior to this. On 24 October 1618, Buckingham and Nottingham were discussing the position, and the financial bursaries attached to it. TNA, SP 14/103, f. 62. For the official grant: CSPD, James I, III, no. 67a: ‘28 January 1619’.
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de Ré expedition. Buckingham’s definitive authority lay in his atypically close relationship with both monarchs under whom he served. James I would even write in his personal correspondence with the admiral that he would not oppose his appointments because of the respect that he held for him during the controversy surrounding Henry Mervyn in March 1623.

Buckingham then, proved himself to be eager and willing to make use of the authority that he held over the navy, perhaps more so than any other English admiral of the period. Indeed, Buckingham’s role shows that the holder of the nominally honorific office could actually decisively shape naval policy if he was so inclined. He retained extensive control over the naval expeditions that supported the French Huguenots between 1625 and 1628. In a draft warrant written in his hand, Buckingham planned to appoint the Earl of Essex and Viscount Valentia as the Vice Admiral and Marshal of the fleet respectively, in October 1625, in which he summed up his authority quite fittingly:

Whereas by his Majesties royal Commission under the great seale of England, I am appointed his Lieutenant general; Captain general and Governor of his royal fleet and arme; with ful power and authorite to rule and govern and dispose thereof for the advancement of his service.

His murder on 23 August 1628 by the officer John Felton left a considerable gap in the English admiralty that was not filled until the appointment of Northumberland, ten years later. During this period of hiatus it is a fair claim that England’s naval administration decayed, for Charles I was unwilling to find a replacement and instead endeavoured to direct his navy personally. That this decision was made just months before Charles’s personal rule commenced suggests that this action was influenced by the king’s political inclinations.

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84 Thrush, The Navy under Charles I, pp. 8-9; BL, Add MS 64897, f. 9.
86 BL, Egerton MS2541, f. 49.
There were, after all, three willing candidates for the vacant position: Edward Sackville, Earl of Dorset, Henry Rich, Earl of Holland and William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke. However, all three contenders were dismissed by Charles in January 1630, when he claimed they ‘were possibly the ones he had least in view.’ This left Charles with absolute authority over the office of the Lord High Admiral’s jurisdiction and enabled the recently revived Council of Marine Causes to operate ‘in effect [as] another Privy Council Committee’.

Buckingham’s death has to be seen as the catalyst that triggered Charles’s aspirations for his navy, and the event according to Andrew Thrush ‘transformed him from an admiring spectator [of naval affairs] to an active participant.’ By October 1628, Charles had made it his right to appoint officers in times of ‘great service’, and on rare occasions he attended meetings of the Council, when affairs concerning his navy were on the agenda. Whatever his motivation for not immediately appointing a new admiral, Charles’s decision to maintain the post in hiatus illustrates the degree of control that the crown could assert over the navy, if it wished.

It must be taken into account that Charles’s personal interest, and control over this position after 1628, took place whilst French naval administration was also being reformed. By 1628, Cardinal Richelieu had been confirmed by the parlements as grand maître, and the admiralty of France was suppressed. It is likely that naval reform in England, too, was being influenced by developments across the Channel. Indeed, the English expansion policy that followed the reforms to the admiralty commission and Charles’s decision to assume the role of admiral personally, were produced because of international pressure. However, claims for this influence cannot be made without assessing the reasoning behind the original French

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87 CSP Venice, XXII, no. 337: ‘11 January 1630’.
89 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 372.
90 Thrush, The Navy under Charles I, p. 34.
91 TNA, SP16/118, f. 1.
92 AN, Marine A’3, nos. 25-27.
reforms; through studying them it is clear that Anglo-French naval developments were transnational affairs, which often unfolded in near unison.

The French administrative reforms of 1626, for example, occurred within the context of the Duke of Buckingham’s naval offensive in support of the Huguenots. Alan James has suggested that it was this immediate threat that ensured that Richelieu included the authority of the admiralty within the office that he was building, in recognising ‘the need to exercise effective authority in the coastal communities of the kingdom, the seriousness of the English threat demanded correspondingly ambitious legislation.’ Under the threat of international hostility, James’s claim that the threat of an English invasion was a significant factor in the suppression of the admiralty is more viable than Louis-Augustin Boiteux’s belief that Richelieu absorbed the charge out of malice because of previous political rivalry with Henri de Montmorency. Furthermore, an additional motive for this development that requires consideration is the clear economic benefit that reducing and centralising the admiralty had for the state. The wages of the senior admiralty officers had long been a significant burden on overall naval expenditure, as shown by Antoine-Hercule de Budos, marquis de Portes, who, as Vice Admiral of France and nephew of Montmorency, received 6000 livres annually before Richelieu’s appointment. With such high expenses, Richelieu foresaw an opportunity to save revenue through the admiralty’s suppression and, in his first projected treasury record as grand maître, annual expenditure was estimated at a reduced 62,580 livres. The wages of the grand maître and Antoine Coiffier de Ruzé, marquis d’Effiat, surintendant des finances, for the year were recorded as zero. Yet, Richelieu did not find this possible to enforce and, in a revised report of the same year, d’Effiat was paid 6000 livres.

93 Navy and Government, p. 46.
95 AN, Marine C1193, no. 3.
96 ibid, no. 4.
and the total annual cost had increased to 91,200 livres. The cardinal’s ambition, therefore, encountered a major hurdle; yet this occasion nevertheless suggests that reducing administrative expenditure on the French admiralty was one of the original reasons behind its suppression. In view of this, the more immediate threat of Buckingham’s invasion surely served as the short-term and primary stimulus for the reform of 1626. Financial advantages and Richelieu’s feud with Montmorency were secondary in contributing to these developments.

The dissolution of the French admiralty in 1626, and its replacement with the office of grand maitre, has to be seen within the larger timescale of jurisdictional conflict discussed above. Through applying it within this context, the reforms of the grand maitre, rather than being considered as revolutionary for maritime affairs, instead become the peak of a gradual reformative process in naval administration that went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of the French state. What was unique and progressive under the cardinal in this maritime office was the relationship that he shared with Louis XIII, which provided him with near carte blanche through his increased ease of access to the revenue required for naval expansion and use. Richelieu was able to consolidate his grasp over both naval and maritime affairs in Brittany - furthering Montmorency’s prior success - by following two lines of approach. Firstly, he sought to make Brittany the base of naval operations for the Ponant, enabling the province to become more actively connected with state enterprises. This included the cardinal’s patronage of the trading Compagnie des cent associés based in the Breton department of Morbihan. This resulting increase in maritime activity in Brittany provided a welcome financial injection into the province that was further enhanced by increased employment through the construction of French warships, the majority of which, as

97 ibid, no. 6.
98 See pp. 44-51 of thesis.
d’Anville’s account illustrates, were being constructed within Brittany’s ports and harbours. Secondly, the cardinal was able to ingrain his influence into the political infrastructure of the province – as he had also successfully done elsewhere, including in Normandy – through employing a number of his relatives and associates in provincial posts of influence. Most importantly, Charles de Cambout, baron de Pontchâteau and Richelieu’s cousin, became governor of Brest in May 1630. Although impressive, it should not be forgotten that Richelieu was merely securing an office that had taken its initial steps under Henri de Montmorency. He was providing the supporting beams to consolidate the admiralty’s jurisdiction; a project that had its foundational framework already constructed by the early-seventeenth century. At the very least in theory, Montmorency had achieved political jurisdiction over the entire Ponant fleet, even if in reality, local resistance was able to continue. It could be argued that Richelieu was only able to consolidate the grand maître office’s control over local affairs through later purchasing the local and provincial maritime governorships.

Richelieu would continue to expand his influence on the affairs of the admiralty through its further amalgamation. On 17 February 1635, a royal edict confirmed the cardinal’s purchase of the général des galères office from Pierre de Gondi, duc de Retz, for the sum of 560,000 livres along with the marquisate of the Îles d’Hyères. Although Richelieu chose not to integrate the position into the grand maître office, instead accepting the post as a separate political entity, this was in many ways the final step to centralising the French state’s naval resources. It enabled Richelieu to have, theoretically, full legal jurisdiction over maritime and naval affairs on behalf of the French state. With their long divided history, the cardinal acknowledged the Ponant and Levant fleets as two different

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100 BN, français 6408, ff. 1-121.
101 Collins, Classes, Estates and Order, pp. 184-91.
institutions, with two separate identities; distinctive expertise was required when commanding galleys at sea, when compared to sailing warships.\textsuperscript{104} Even though the offices remained separate, Richelieu nevertheless had ultimate control over the galley fleet through admitting his nephew François de Vignerod, marquis de Pont-Courlay, to the post on 15 March, despite his lack of experience.\textsuperscript{105} Pont-Courlay’s inexperience would actually be of some benefit to Richelieu, for it guaranteed that he served as the puppet on which his uncle pulled the strings. Yet, Pont-Courlay’s incompetence did become patent to those around him, causing his relationship with Richelieu to become strained as time progressed. This led the cardinal to request that an experienced official and advisor, Albert de Forbin, control Pont-Courlay’s personal finances from July 1636.\textsuperscript{106} It was no surprise, then, that on 21 March 1639 Pont-Courlay was replaced with another of Richelieu’s nephews, and his intended successor as grand maître, Armand de Maillé, marquis de Brezé.\textsuperscript{107}

Although being rebranded, the administrative infrastructure of the Ponant admiralty changed very little under Richelieu. It remained divided from the Levant and enabled the Levant’s nobility and mariner community, who had culturally distinguishable perceptions of how to use sea power when compared to the Ponant fleet, to continue in their occupations. Yet despite being, in title, politically separate from the grand maître, by utilising nepotism, Richelieu remained the man in control of proceedings and so it could be argued that the admiralty was centralised around him, and not the office of grand maître. By retaining the two offices, yet keeping them detached, he was able to administer and orientate the two admiralties and their respective fleets to his will, whilst acknowledging and taking advantage

\textsuperscript{104} BN, français 10221, f. 227: Cardinal Richelieu, ‘Testament politique: section cinquième qui traite de la puissance sur la mer’.

\textsuperscript{105} AN, Marine B’77, f. 14; Fournier, Hyrdrographie, p. 353.

\textsuperscript{106} AAE, France 821, ff. 80-81.

of their differences for the benefit of the state. Although the *grand maître* office did not control the galley fleet, Richelieu engineered it whilst his nephews served as his enforcers.

**Concluding Remarks**

As this period progressed, the responsibilities of the admirals of England and France grew more and more disparate. For England, the occupant of the Lord High Admiral’s office was required to command the fleet, whilst general administrative duties were rarely performed by the office-holder himself. Yet in France, this model was practically the complete antithesis; the admiral served as the central organiser of fleet preparation, whilst delegating sea service command to other state figures. As a consequence, although leading members of the nobility filled both offices, the English position was far more likely to be held by a noble with prior experience at sea because of what the office entailed. The occupant of the French office did not need previous maritime experience, because its admiral rarely undertook service at sea. Although the English admiral had the right to impose himself on administrative proceedings, he rarely did, instead entrusting the skilled council of officials to manage the navy on his behalf. As the French admiral’s main responsibilities were the mirror opposite, Glete’s observation that he held greater administrative accountability than his English counterpart is fair.\(^{108}\) Yet, Rodger’s further criticism of the English admiral in suggesting that the office was not required for the navy to function, by 1560, is only partially accurate.\(^{109}\) The influence of the English admiral was dependent upon the competence of those above and below him: the monarch and the Council of Marine Causes. The navy was able to operate without an admiral under Charles I because of the control that the king exercised over it and the reforms to the council in 1628. However, with a weaker regime, the leadership of the admiral could be more

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paramount, if the admiral had sufficient enthusiasm for the post, as shown with the influence of Buckingham between 1619 and 1628.

It hardly needs to be said that blue blood was mandatory to the office, given that it was a characteristic trait of early modern high governance. The close relationship that the admiral often shared with the monarch ultimately ensured the candidate had prior influence at court. As the standing navy was the monarch’s personal property, the relationship between admiral and crown was often paramount to the navy’s success, as it could dictate the extent of royal patronage that the navy received. In this connection, the monarch’s authority over the fleet was total, but only if they chose to use it. Indeed, as was the case for most high state offices that required regular correspondence with the crown, the office of admiral could merely serve as an intermediary between crown and fleet under an assertive and interested monarch. For England, the relationship that the monarch could control is evident in Charles I’s decision to rule without an admiral after 1628. The same could be said for France, where one only needs to consider the impact of Henri II’s regime on naval development whilst d’Annebault and Coligny occupied the office. Yet, it also has to be remembered that the French admiral’s jurisdiction did not stretch across the entire kingdom, restricting even the crown’s capabilities in naval affairs. It is unsurprising that the provincial autonomy of both Brittany and Guyenne enabled hotspots of maritime conflict to emerge there during the civil wars and rebellions of the period.

It has also been shown that when the strength of the crown was compromised, and the state was in crisis, the admiralty office would be affected. In fact, the weakness patent in the state in late-sixteenth-century France is indicative of how national crisis could regress naval reform. This has been illustrated in the case of Brittany with the attempted reforms of Anne de Joyeuse during the 1580s, which failed because the
province was able to play upon the civil turmoil that was pandemic in the realm at the time. The mosaic-like nature of provincial France was a constant obstacle to state progression. It was not until the French admiralty consolidated its authority over these peripheries, as the seventeenth century progressed, that the navies of the French kingdom began to emerge as a centralised force.

Finally, although the English and French admiralties increasingly differed in their responsibilities for the majority of this period, it is interesting that changes to the senior admiralty offices were of paramount importance for both kingdoms in the late 1620s. Surely the parallel centralisation of naval administration under Richelieu in France and Charles in England, in these later years, did not occur by chance; instead these changes took place through transnational influences. It was international rivalry that was surely fuelled by the recent end of the Twelve Years Truce and the Thirty Years War, and also national aspiration, which accelerated English and French determination for fleet advancement. As Richelieu was taking on more responsibilities over the navy, Charles became equally determined to dictate how his navy progressed. Furthermore, the point also needs to be made that these developments were only possible because of the respective strengths of the state at the time. The stabilisation and expansion of the French state during the early-seventeenth century, and the near concurrent reforms to its admiralty, serve to illustrate this.
CHAPTER TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

In the previous chapter it was demonstrated that the senior admiralty office was a firmly established state institution; a vital part of the state’s political construct that cemented the relations between monarch and nobility. However, as the English and French navies expanded it became increasingly crucial to produce new administrative frameworks, which relied upon political networks to connect the admiral to the mariner. With a larger fleet, it was important that the admiral, as head of the navy, had a skilled and experienced team of mariners and administrators for its day-to-day upkeep. This chapter considers the enhanced, and wholly new, administrative devices produced in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries to ensure the navy’s survival. In doing so, it will be shown that these new apparatuses assisted the state in expanding and consolidating its grip on military resources, providing the means for a strengthened state to emerge.

Centralisation meant different things for different states, and whilst it is important, for this reason, to avoid a direct comparison between England and France that uses a single definition, it is nevertheless necessary for clarity, to address the discourse in its use. Accounts of state formation often implicitly seek to assess developments from the view that centralisation was always the intended outcome. Yet, centralised is a potentially complex term with a teleological underpinning, which implies that, in order to be ‘modern’, a state’s political framework must have a geographically central body.¹ Of course, no state is located in a single location, but is spread across a broad geographic landscape. As previously acknowledged, England and France controlled disparate political infrastructures, because of

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the size and diversity of their terrains. A direct comparison of the relative centralisation of each state would consequently be unfair, a view that is shared by Samuel Clark.²

It seems obvious to contend that geography was the overarching factor that shaped the political constitution of the state in early modern Europe. No state though was inherently centralised because where political networks did stretch across the peripheries of the kingdom, local institutions were only remotely, and weakly controlled.³ The larger the state, the more numerous its peripheries, preventing larger territorial domains, such as France, from being effectively governed by Paris alone. The provincialism of the French kingdom prevented the state from being constructed with Paris firmly at its political centre.

This approach is deterministic: the geographic restrictions of the kingdom influenced how naval administration was formed.⁴ Indeed, England’s navy could be considered centralised because it enjoyed easier access to its resources that were largely centred in the southeast, meaning that a kingdom with a population that was a fraction of the French equivalent could often match France militarily.⁵ Whereas England’s political infrastructure made it possible for the Council of Marine Causes to develop in London, along with its navy, for France, the geography of the kingdom did not allow its navy to be centred on Paris. Instead, France’s maritime provinces, Normandy, Picardy, Brittany, Guyenne, and Provence, naturally provided a location for its fleets, its admiralty and administrative framework. It was the geography of the realm that conditioned how the French state’s navy was organised, just as it did other aspects of governance. As opposed to being based around a location, France’s

administration was centred around its leading figures whose responsibility it was to organise and direct the fleets’ development and maintenance, even on the peripheries of the realm.

When discussing state building and centralisation, especially with reference to England, historians often perceive these developments as leading to the establishment of bureaucratic governing bodies. The three are synonymous, according to Jan Glete, for state building ‘is embodied in a centralized and penetrative bureaucracy’. For Edgar Kiser and Joshua Kane, England ‘developed aspects of bureaucratic administration’ before France ‘owing mainly to its relatively small size’. Yet using the term ‘bureaucracy’ has its complications. It refers to a body of non-elected governing officials, but defining an early modern institution as such has its problems because the entitlements and responsibilities of office could be very vague and conflicting. Providing a more precise meaning for the term in relation to early modern naval governance permits a greater understanding of state building at the time. In the case of the Council of Marine Causes, for instance, bureaucratic change was characterised by attempts to departmentalise an administrative unit with officers who, according to Glete, felt ‘a basic loyalty towards the state and the political aims pursued by the government… [and did not] use the power of the armed forces to promote their own political or economic aims’. Yet, allegations of corruption were rife during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, and for N. A. M. Rodger employing ‘men of proven competence who knew about ships…was only another way of saying that it was run by private interests’. Although it is important that this study does not let controversy over the use of the term overshadow the administrative changes to the navy that were undoubtedly unfolding, certain claims that relate to it can be made. In relation to the navy in this period, use of the term

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‘bureaucracy’ refers to the establishment of a departmentalised body of offices occupied by men of proven competence, experience and knowledge.

2.1. The Councils of the Admiralty

Below the Lord High Admiral, a second-tier of naval governance came into existence in England as this period opened – the Council of Marine Causes - and no comparable body existed in France. The council – later known as the Navy Board – had six founding principal officers and each held a particular function in the navy’s upkeep. For C. S. L. Davies the council was a bureaucratic style of government, unique within Europe at the time. Rodger has also applauded the council’s achievements, stating that it ‘was strikingly more efficient and “modern” than that of any other European state of the day’; whereas David Loades suggested that, although the council was ultimately superior because of the skill and experience of its officers, the French comparison by 1517 also held ‘centralised coherence’. Yet, as will be discussed below, this French equivalent can only be conceived as ‘centralised’ from the perspective that it was centred on the admiral. French high office in maritime affairs was largely filled according to birth and social ranking, not experience, and offices in the admiralty courts, along with judges and clerks were venal. Whereas the English equivalent could operate with autonomy from the admiral, the French model that Loades alluded to cannot be considered as a second-tier of naval governance that held any such rights. France continued to rely upon the personal authority of the admiral and administered the navy primarily at the local level. It did not create a similar departmentalised body that was situated in the capital, to exist

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as a second-tier of naval governance. This difference between the two institutions was one of the primary factors which enabled England to obtain a standing navy almost a century before France.

During the opening years of Henry VIII’s reign, Robert Brigandine, Clerk of the King’s Ships, was the only figure permanently employed for the maintenance of the royal warships. Yet Henry’s desire to expand the navy forced more administrative figures to be swiftly integrated into the administrative framework. With an increased demand upon the dockyards and storehouse by 1524, Brigandine’s office – following his retirement in March 1523 – had been divided into three individual positions: Clerk of the King’s Ships, Clerk Controller and Keeper of the Erith and Deptford Storehouses.12 The pressure on England’s naval administration continued to escalate as Henry’s demand for naval expansion progressed, which resulted in a natural requirement for more permanent offices, and in 1545-46, whilst coordinating a war, the Council of Marine Causes was created to support a fleet of fifty-eight warships.13 William Woodhouse was declared Master of the Ordnance, and Richard Howlett was Clerk of the King’s Ships. Meanwhile, Thomas Clere, as Lieutenant of the Admiralty, would regularly act as chairman, with Benjamin Gonson and Robert Legge under him as Surveyor and Treasurer of the English Navy respectively. Finally, William Broke occupied the already existing post of Clerk Controller. The council’s formation coincided with two major events: the French war that was draining the English economy, and the looming illness and death of the king, whose atypical support of the navy during his reign had been the greatest factor in its emergence. During a period of significant state insecurity, the council’s formation served to sustain the large navy whilst the state was at its weakest. Through existing as a permanent council, the navy could be maintained without the

considerable patronage of Henry VIII. Its development could be used to reinforce G. R. Elton’s *Tudor Revolution* thesis that during Henry’s reign a transformation in government occurred, which ‘created a revised machinery of government whose principle was bureaucratic organization in the place of the personal control of the king’.

Whether the council was truly bureaucratic (using the definition referred to earlier), as inferred by Davies, can be contested, and it is far simpler to refer to it as a departmentalised council that was in regular need of revision. This avoids R. J. Smith’s highly debatable view that ‘by the early 1560’s a sophisticated bureaucratic structure had evolved’. Indeed, even Glete, who sought to uncover the bureaucratic characteristics of early modern naval government, accepted that a ‘bureaucratic armed force existed nowhere’ by the end of the seventeenth century. The defined duties of the council’s principal officers are, during its early years, difficult to determine (as is also the case for the admiral), and it is likely that the officers’ duties often conflicted. Moreover, as the seventeenth century would show, officers would remain under the full control of the admiral and monarch, meaning that officers of the council held only restricted authority. Davies’s article, if we accept that the naval bureaucracy was far from perfect, remains an important source for this topic.

In arguing that, between 1509 and 1560, the foundations of a bureaucratic body for the English navy were laid, which coincided with a surge in naval expansion, Davies introduced the English navy into the military revolution debate. The financial investment

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18 *ibid*, pp. 269, 279. James Wheeler’s work on the English navy’s role in the military revolution does not acknowledge the importance of this administrative change to the debate. J. S. Wheeler, *The Making of a World
for naval advancement from the late 1530s was made, not only in the development of a fleet, but also in a permanent administrative infrastructure designed to ensure its maintenance. The foundations of the council were not developed overnight, but were most likely gradually introduced, with posts slowly emerging as required during the long reign of Henry VIII and his successors. The six principal offices established in 1545-46 were all likely to have been informally and temporarily introduced in the years prior to their official permanent establishment. Considering that there is no definitive evidence that provides an exact date for the foundation of the Council, it is possible that the structure of administrative governance gradually materialised in late Henrician England, when the navy was frequently needed because of invasion scares and warfare. Although Davies suggests that this body was founded in early 1545, it is more likely that the navy’s use, following Henry’s break from Rome and his war with France, would have resulted in the initial development of its offices earlier than Davies first suggested.19 Yet, he is surely right that the April 1546 patents officially designating the offices ‘merely gave permanent form to changes which had already taken place.’20 Uniting these English officers within a council where they could discuss and consult with their peers on the successful development and upkeep of the fleet ensured the navy’s future. It was the decision - possibly by John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, who had a good understanding of naval affairs - to unite these individuals into a conglomerated and departmentalised body, which separated the English and French navies’ administrative design.21

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20 LPH, XXI part I, no. 718: ‘April 1546’. For an outline of the responsibilities of each member, see: TNA, SP 12/15, f. 4.

21 Loades, The Tudor Navy, p. 77.
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Although no such administrative body was formed in France, naval expansion nonetheless encouraged Francis I to introduce organisational reforms for the upkeep of his warships. Gaston Zeller associated the creation of Le Havre as a harbour for the construction and maintenance of royal warships in 1517 with the first appearance of naval contrôleurs, commissaires, trésoriers de la marine and shortly afterwards gardes des arsenaux. In fact, the first recorded use of commissaires was shortly after the construction of Le Havre had commenced. On 13 April 1517, the first salaries of the commissaires were recorded at Le Havre, where they were responsible for recruiting men ‘and pioneers from the villages to work at the expense of the king’ in the construction of the harbour; by August, thirteen commissaires were in this service. Along with recruitment, the commissaires served as supervisors, responsible for managing and monitoring the workforce. Commissaires continued in a similar role under Richelieu and, by 1634, eighty-five were employed in the kingdom’s dockyards.

There was no intention, however, in the creation of these offices to amalgamate them into a single bureaucratic body. With this said, the creation of these posts demonstrates an awareness at the time of the need for administrative staff to maintain maritime forces, whilst the navy was expanding. The appointment of contrôleurs and commissaires can be associated with Francis’s intention to construct new warships in Le Havre, since they were responsible for overseeing and examining the harbours, dockyards and any newly constructed vessels. Yet, no comparable system of governance to the English Council of Marine Causes materialised in France, and thus any incentive to preserve the fleet emerged locally, at the dockyards themselves. In turn, those employed within the dockyards depended upon the

23 P. Lardin, Entre tradition et modernité: Les premières années du Havre (1517-41) (Rouen: Publication de l'Université de Rouen, 2003), pp. 36-37. [faire besogner les gens de villages venant à corvée et les autres pionniers à la solde du roi].
24 AN, Marine C193, no. 7, ff. 4-5.
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admiral and crown to fund it. However, without an administrative body like the Council of Marine Causes that bridged the gap between these two tiers, communication and direction could be erratic at best. Without this administrative framework to sustain it, the French navy became an irregular force which was constructed and hired when need arose in accordance with the admiral’s orders. It was this permanent administrative apparatus that provided the means for the English navy to become standing. This meant that, just as English naval governance ensured the continued upkeep of the fleet, in France, the civil disturbances of the late-sixteenth century would ensure that without an administrative framework designed to maintain it, the navy would suffer considerable disorder.25

Whereas the French Wars of Religion would threaten French naval strength, the English council would be sustained with occasional modification into the seventeenth century, and a similar body governed by Parliament existed during the Civil War.26 Moreover, England’s maritime council would include men of proven experience and skill at sea.27 William Winter’s impact upon the council requires further examination. Throughout his working career in the navy, Winter remained an active, experienced and vital figure for the navy’s continuation. Winter came from a maritime background, being the son of Bristol merchant and former treasurer of the navy, John Winter.28 He participated in the naval campaigns of the Rough Wooing and, by 14 July 1546, was Keeper of the Deptford Storehouse.29 This office was held by Winter until 28 June 1549, when he took the post of

25 The Levant fleet, on the whole, is excluded here. It should be remembered that the French galley fleet included vessels owned by nobles, who used their galleys outside of state activity, for profit. It was the owner’s responsibility to maintain these vessels - not only the state’s – which explains why the Levant fleet would continue to exist (however feeble it may have been) for the greater part of the civil wars.
28 Edward and Mary, pp. 570-72.
29 LPH, XXI, part I, no. 1334: ‘14 July 1546’.
Surveyor for the council instead.\textsuperscript{30} Winter clearly showed his competence and on 30 July 1557 had been promoted again to the post of Master of the Ordnance, an office that held some autonomy from the council.\textsuperscript{31} Through accepting this post, Winter was able to ensure that a constructive and efficient relationship between the Board of Ordnance and the Council of Marine Causes was upheld. This continued even during his relinquishing of control of the ordnances stores between 1569 and 1583, when he still served as a liaison between the two administrative bodies.\textsuperscript{32} It is also important to note that, whilst holding office, Winter regularly served at sea. Along with his celebrated expedition of 1559, he would also serve as captain of the \textit{Vanguard} in 1588.\textsuperscript{33} Winter then was highly qualified for the posts that he held, as were many of his contemporaries, such as John Hawkins. His role in sustaining and advancing the council was essential, for it became apparent that an administrative network that connected the council with the Board of Ordnance was essential for the fleet’s quick preparation.\textsuperscript{34} The Council of Marine Causes remained ‘firmly footed in the practices’ of late Henrician administration, although through ‘constant modification and review’ it assimilated more assets.\textsuperscript{35}

This is far from suggesting, however, that the Council of Marine Causes was not subject to weakness and corruption; it is easy to associate periods of English naval decline with concurrent deficiencies in its officers. By October 1630, John Coke’s report commissioned by Charles I complained that, whereas the council should have met at least once per week, in reality it would ‘meet scarce once a quarter’ and that its:

\begin{quote}
officers are so farre from constant attendance that they post over the whole trust of their places, to the faith and care of their clercks. And for such services
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{31} APC, 1556-58, p. 136; TNA, SP 12/15, ff. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{32} Rodger, \textit{Safeguard of the Sea}, p. 331.
\textsuperscript{33} BL, Egerton MS 2541, f. 1.
\textsuperscript{34} Smith, ‘Bureaucracy in Elizabethan England: The Office of Naval Ordnance’, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{35} Loades, \textit{The Tudor Navy}, p. 182.
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whe[re]in they ought to contribute their [own] joint skil and indevour (as in the
making of estimates, ratings of bils and such like) theis they also commit to
underminsters.\textsuperscript{36}

Such issues with the council’s operation had long been in existence during the late-sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries and led to it being replaced by the Admiralty Commission in
1618.\textsuperscript{37} This followed a report – by a younger John Coke – that had uncovered the vast
failings, decay and corruption that had bred within the council under Charles Howard, Earl of
Nottingham, and its treasurer Richard Mansell.\textsuperscript{38} The inattentiveness of officers at weekly
meetings had also been noted in 1618 as an issue that required swift resolution, along with
‘manie other enormous faults’. Coke consequently instructed that ‘you the principal officers
and Comissioners, are yourselves to attend your places, and to keep your constant meetings
twise a weeke, or as often as the business that require’.\textsuperscript{39} The Admiralty Commission which
replaced it was largely an expanded version of the council. Along with William Russell as its
treasurer, the commission consisted of twelve men determined to resolve the misdoings of
their predecessors. They appear to have been initially successful, enabling ten new warships
to be constructed in the next five years, whilst enjoying increased royal patronage.\textsuperscript{40}

Yet, by Buckingham’s admission, this accomplishment was short-lived, and by July
1627 he had attributed the failure of the Île de Ré expedition to the commissioners’
negligence in ensuring that adequate provisions were available for his fleet. The decision was
made to re-establish the council in February 1628. This, according to Andrew Thrush, was a
serious mistake which Buckingham would not live long enough to regret, for the revived
council included officers who lacked an understanding of naval administration, allowing the

\textsuperscript{36} BL, Add MS 64901, ff. 77-78, cited in A. Thrush, The Navy under Charles I, 1625-40, unpublished PhD
\textsuperscript{37} Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 339; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 384-87.
\textsuperscript{38} TNA, SP 14/98, f. 64.
\textsuperscript{39} BL, Egerton MS 2541, f. 180.
\textsuperscript{40} This was largely on account of the interest and encouragement of Prince Henry.
issues named in Coke’s report of 1618 to be repeated.\textsuperscript{41} The late 1620s were evidently a fraught time for naval governance, and a discourse on how to resolve these inadequacies soon developed. Captain Richard Gifford even proposed, in February 1627, that every dockyard should possess its own administrative council.\textsuperscript{42} This is a fascinating concept, considering that what Gifford was suggesting was not too dissimilar from how French naval administration operated at the time. He was proposing a devolved approach. Although no such scheme was put into effect, it had become obvious that reform was needed, and John Coke’s report of October 1630 indicated that change was on the political agenda. Following his report, the council was enlarged to include two extra assistants, and a gradual restoration of efficiency became apparent in the succeeding years.

Although no intermediary body existed in France with a similar role to the English council, a comparison can be made with the conseil de la marine. Yet despite the similarities that it shared in its name, and that it was also located at the heart of the state, in Paris, the conseil had no influence on the maintenance of the navy itself. Instead it served only to enforce the admiral’s rights to the final judgement on disputes over prizes and reprisals at sea. The conseil was more comparable to the English High Court of Admiralty than the Council of Marine Causes. It lacked stability because of an absence of permanent structure, and its meetings were sporadic. It is on account of this that uncovering the initial formation of the conseil has become a troublesome task and is unlikely to be determined conclusively.\textsuperscript{43} This is not to say that reforms under Richelieu did not enhance the conseil. The appointment of Nicholas Potier, sieur d’Ocquerre, and Charles Le Beauclerc, sieur d’Achères, as members of the conseil and secretaries of the Ponant and Levant fleets respectively in March 1626, not


\textsuperscript{42} TNA, SP 16/54, f. 9.

\textsuperscript{43} Alan James has addressed the complications that surround dating the conseil's beginnings and has suggested that it may have its origins in the sixteenth century. \textit{Navy and Government}, pp. 56-59.
only introduced expertise into the conseil, but also closely connected it to the French fleets. Amongst his initial responsibilities, d’Ocquerre opened negotiations with the Dutch for the purchasing of several warships, including le St. Louis. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the conseil – to preserve the admiral’s rights - remained the same. At first glance, French naval reform in administration could be perceived as stagnant because of this emphasis on admiralty rights; yet it is important to consider why, in the process of state centralisation, this remained a crucial right to enforce. It was through asserting his rights and privileges over local jurisdictional disputes that the admiral was able to reassert his authority over naval enterprise along the coasts.

With a similar motivation, Antoine Coeffier de Ruzé, marquis d’Effiat, was appointed intendant-général de la marine in 1627; his responsibilities helped to further consolidate the grand maître’s control over the coastal provinces. By March 1631, d’Effiat controlled all naval finance (excluding the Levant), whilst being assisted by a group of lieutenants-généraux, who were distributed across the local maritime provinces. French naval administration was not departmentalised according to occupational duties, but rather was divided into a simple hierarchy in which each lieutenant was responsible for a given maritime locality. France’s segmented political infrastructure was provided with an administrative framework for its navy that reflected this. In comparison to the English model’s three-tier infrastructure (admiral, council and locality) that remained centred on London, France retained a model that was closer to a two-tier structure (admiral and locality), because its geography was better suited for it.

As treasurer of the navy, the office of intendant-général de la marine (surintendant des finances) was pivotal to naval development. Yet the responsibilities of England’s and France’s naval treasurers contrasted in function, jurisdiction and authority. It could be argued

44 Histoire de la Marine, IV, pp. 592-94.
45 D’Effiat was already one of Richelieu’s trusted officers, having previously been appointed intendant du commerce in January 1626.
that, in England, as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries progressed, the role of Treasurer of the English Navy became seen as the leading office of the council, whereas the French equivalent was the opposite. In 1965, Henri Legohérel produced a compelling criticism of the limited developments to the French navy’s financial administration, whilst transformations were taking place to both fleet size and the admiralty.\textsuperscript{46} Legohérel attributed this stagnation, which in his opinion barely altered from the office developed in 1517, to the deeply conservative, personal and nepotistic style of governance that continued throughout the period. With the intention to retain total control over the navy, the admiralty did not endorse a systematic administrative body alike the Council of Marine Causes. The deep-rooted traditionalist nature of the admiralty is reflective of a similar structure in the French army; David Parrott has argued that these same personal ties prevented the French army from evolving during the early-seventeenth century. According to Parrott, the army was unwilling to impose progressive administrative reform, as those who controlled the military body were aware that reform could impair their own rights.\textsuperscript{47} Considering that the naval treasury was modelled on that of the army, regularly reporting to the royal Council of Finances and the Chamber of Accounts, it was unlikely that transformations to the naval treasury of France would have occurred without similar developments first unfolding in the army.\textsuperscript{48}

The responsibilities of the English and French naval treasurers then were almost incomparable. First, whereas in England a single treasurer, assisted by two clerks, was responsible for the navy’s finance, in France with a widely dispersed fleet it was necessary to establish a greater number of financial offices to accommodate it. Even with Richelieu’s centralisation of the French admiralty, the Ponant and Levant fleets employed separate treasurers. A number of \textit{écrivains} worked under the treasurers as bookkeepers, to ensure that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item B. Barbiche, \textit{Les institutions de la monarchie française à l’époque moderne (XVI\textsuperscript{-}XVIII\textsuperscript{e} siècle)} (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), p. 218.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
expenditure was recorded and accounted for. The French treasurers were effectively master bookkeepers, responsible for establishing budgets and disbursing income as required. They were disconnected from the production and shaping of the fleet itself, where command still lay with the senior admiralty. In contrast, the appointment of John Hawkins as Treasurer of the English Navy on 18 November 1577 began a transformation of the office into one of significant authority over both the Council of Marine Causes, and the fleet itself.\footnote{TNA, SP 12/118, f. 28; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 115-18.} Under Hawkins, the office became the most dominant post within the council. Instead of the lieutenant traditionally chairing meetings, it increasingly became the responsibility of Hawkins. In 1589, William Winter and William Holstocke died and Hawkins was awarded the post of controller, in addition to that of treasurer.\footnote{J. A. Williamson, \textit{Hawkins of Plymouth} (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1949), pp. 314-15.} This second appointment certified his control over the council, whilst the office of treasurer gradually accumulated more and more power. Through being the representative of William Cecil, as Lord High Treasurer, the naval treasurer’s office under Hawkins accumulated more control over financial expenditure as the Elizabethan period progressed. No such authority was granted to the treasurers across the Channel.

It has already been shown, however, that an overreliance on one post – as occurred with the position of Admiral of France – could have detrimental effects upon the navy, depending upon the office holder’s competence. John Hawkins was evidently highly skilled, experienced and able in the office; his influence over the council began as early as 1570, whilst the \textit{race-built} galleon was being integrated into the fleet. Yet his death in November 1595 led immediately to a phase of decline following his replacement by the far less capable and experienced Fulke Greville.\footnote{M. Green (ed.), \textit{Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1598-1601} (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1869), no. 18, p. 269: ‘16 December 1598’.

\textit{49} TNA, SP 12/118, f. 28; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 115-18.
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disarray because of the state’s failure to fill the office with a candidate of similar abilities.\textsuperscript{52} Between 1604 and 1618 no Lieutenant of the Admiralty (Vice Admiral) was appointed to oversee the council, providing the corrupt Robert Mansell, as the council’s treasurer from April 1604 to May 1618, with near complete control over administrative proceedings.\textsuperscript{53} Following John Coke’s report on the failings of the navy, Mansell was forced to sell his office, but not before purchasing the lieutenancy instead. Aware of his misdeeds as treasurer, Mansell produced a sub-clause in his new contract protecting his office, so that he could not be relieved of it for any previously committed misdemeanours. With his former failings known, Mansell avoided abusing his new office following an enquiry into the navy’s failure. That the English navy’s rise and decline can be directly correlated with the office of treasurer is illustrative of how the English administrative model placed a greater reliance upon its treasury than its French equivalent.\textsuperscript{54}

Whereas the role of treasurer was both an important and permanent post on both sides of the Channel, officers of victualing for the navy were less stable. The victualing of the navy remained a major cause of concern in both kingdoms that was not resolved effectively. Despite the transformation of the navy by the Henrician administrative reforms, they contributed little towards the advancement of victualing organisation. Initially the Council of Marine Causes possessed no victualing officer, and during English preparations for the Solent invasion in 1545, victualing for the fleet was organised by George Powlett, a court figure with no prior experience in the affair.\textsuperscript{55} Powlett’s inexperience led to complaints of sickness within the fleet, caused by the poor


\textsuperscript{53} CSPD, James I, VII, no. 45: ‘20 April 1604’; TNA, SP 14/97, ff. 203-205.

\textsuperscript{54} Indeed for Henri Legohérel, the way that treasurers were structured in France was a major cause of long-term weaknesses for the state. Legohérel, Les trésoriers généraux de la marine.

\textsuperscript{55} TNA, E351/2477.
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quality of the food.\textsuperscript{56} According to Lisle and Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, the sickness was the product of ‘the greate hete and the corrupcon of the victual by reason of the disorder in the provisions and strayte and warme lying in the shippes’. It was not until June 1550 that Edward Baeshe (a victualler since 1545) was declared the first General Surveyor of the Victuals for the Seas, as well as becoming the seventh officer within the Council of Marine Causes.\textsuperscript{57} By 1558, Baeshe was an experienced administrator, who has been complimented by historians, including Rodger, as the figure who ‘was able to provide the essential knowledge and continuity which the system had lacked’.\textsuperscript{58} Yet, Baeshe’s relationship with the council was short lived; by January 1565 his accounts were being operated autonomously from the council’s, and the office remained a separate institution for the rest of the period.\textsuperscript{59}

The decision in 1565 to separate the administrative duties of naval victualing from the Council of Marine Causes was surely made because of the state’s trust in Baeshe’s own competence. The victualing office was provided with its own budget, enabling maritime victualing to be pursued and progressed in isolation from the council.\textsuperscript{60} Yet this did not mean that problems with victualing did not exist in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was never an easy business. Both of Baeshe’s successors, James Quarles and Marmaduke Darell, had a number of complaints brought against them, following outbreaks of disease during military campaigns.\textsuperscript{61} In 1599 Fulke Greville, Treasurer of the Council of Marine Causes, complained that ‘Our drink, fish and

\textsuperscript{56} TNA, SP 1/205, f. 26.
\textsuperscript{57} TNA, E351/2355; Calendar of Patent Rolls, Edward VI, III (6 volumes, London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1924-29), p. 309: ‘June 1550’.
\textsuperscript{58} Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{59} TNA, E351/2362; BL, MS Otho EIX, ff. 99-102v.
\textsuperscript{60} For this reason, treasury accounts of the navy do not include the costs of victualing from 1565. See chapter three.
beef is so corrupt as it will destroy all the men we have’.\textsuperscript{62} Meanwhile, years later, John Coke’s 1630 report applied particular attention to this negligence. Accounting for Henry Marvin’s employment as Admiral of the Narrow Seas with eight ships in the spring of 1630, Coke claimed that by 8 February the vessels and seamen were preparing for embarkation and if like care had been taken for victuals and munitions they might [have] put to sea in 14 daies. But they spent no less then five weeks before al was brought on board. And this great fault of your Officers, must needs bee reformed which falleth often times verie heavie uppon your service. When your wages and victuals are wasted in harbourother, which are provided for the sea.\textsuperscript{63}

Victualing remained a constant concern that would not be resolved in the early modern period. The process was also complicated because it relied on private resources to supply provisions and, as such, it is a clear illustration of the relationship between state and private enterprise. Even with administrative reform to the office, disease and poor supply would long remain a problem. Baeshe may have achieved efficiency that his successors did not match, but the victualler could only do his best with the materials at his disposal, and when long distance maritime travel became more regular, the outbreak of disease and corruption of victuals became of increasing concern and could not be solved through administrative reform alone.\textsuperscript{64}

France, too, struggled with victualing its fleets. Unlike in England, no designated office existed for victualing and, instead, like many elements of its naval structure, victualing was organised locally through employing local resources and men to provide provisions that were near to the fleet. It was the admiral’s responsibility to ensure that victualing took place,

\textsuperscript{63} BL, Add MS 64901, ff. 71-71v.
\textsuperscript{64} Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 144; Fury, Tides in the Affairs of Men, pp. 137-96.
a duty that he in turn delegated to local officials. The terms of Joyeuse’s appointment in June 1582 illustrate this, for Joyeuse received:

Total authority, order, administrative superintendence and command of all navigational organisation, and armed voyages and enterprises which are made by sea…and [he will] continue as the sole chief, and our lieutenant general and commander for arming, equipping and victualing [all the enterprises] prepared in our ports and harbours, including ships and vessels.65

It is understandable in the case of France why the admiral did not appoint a permanent victualler for the seas. France had no standing navy until Richelieu, and state expeditions at sea were irregular, so victualing was commissioned on short-term private contracts. Consequently, on 21 May 1586, Joyeuse was writing to the Vice Admiral of France, Honorat de Bueil, seigneur de Fontaines, requesting that he make the appropriate arrangements for raising ships and men in Brittany. Joyeuse asked Brittany to prepare for service vessels accumulating to around 3000 tuns, along with 2000 men of war and 1000 mariners. For these men, Joyeuse ordered Fontaines ‘to purchase biscuits and beverages and all other types of victuals and provisions that are necessary’.66 Fontaines in turn addressed these demands to the local authorities in Brittany (in particular to Saint Malo). With such a network of delegation, victualing remained part of the broader war effort orchestrated by the admiralty, in stark contrast to England, where an office was created to organise it. The expenses of victualing were included within the greater financial accounts for preparing ships, and were not remitted to another external body. In terms of expenditure, the costs of both wages and victuals were combined when planning the commissioning of men for service, unlike the

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65 AN, Marine B41, ff. 35-38. [totalle charge, conduit, administration superintendence et commandement de tout le fait navigages et des voyages armées et entreprises qui se feront en mer…et demeurer seul chef et notre lieutenant général et ordonnance des armemens, équipage et advitaillement qui seront faitz et dressez en nos ports et havres et aussi de Navires et vaisseaux].
66 AN, Marine B41, ff. 47-49. [pour faire des achasets du pair biscuits et bravaige et toutes autres sortes de vivres et victuailles y necessaries].
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English equivalent.\(^{67}\) As an example, of the 2115 livres assigned for the use of the 300-\textit{tun le Saint Jehan} in 1532, 433 livres were dedicated to victuals.\(^{68}\)

By delegating victualing to local authorities, food could be sourced near to where the fleet was located, permitting the process to be more reactive than in England. Even with victuals, London was at the centre of the English supply chain. Given that its fleet was mainly based there, supplies sourced from the shires, were sent to London. They were normally then subsequently sent from the capital, if the fleet was being operated from another port.\(^{69}\) Although issues with corrupt food and outbreaks of disease would naturally be a point of concern that was practically insoluble for both kingdoms, examples of victualing could be highly impressive to both the contemporary spectator and the historian. In preparing for the embarkation of the French fleet for the Solent, by June 1545, Normandy had - according to an English report - in readiness at Dieppe 20,000 sheep, 10,000 hogs and 10,000 cows ready for slaughter.\(^{70}\) The livestock was moved near to the fleet, where it would remain until required. The process of victualing then stands as an exception to general administrative progression in the period. Although both England and France retained contrasting systems for victualing, both changed relatively little from their former models, despite victualing remaining a major weakness of both fleets.

Apart from this exception, it is clear that naval administration advanced and expanded as the size of state navies increased. As ideas for national maritime growth developed (for England in the late Henrician period, and in France during the early-seventeenth century), naval administration was forced to develop, albeit with different structures, in order to accommodate such a growth. Without a permanent administrative infrastructure, no standing fleet was sustainable, and thus the navy was susceptible to disestablishment.

\(^{67}\) See BN, français 6408, ff. 285-92
\(^{68}\) BN, Moreau 737, ff. 44.
\(^{69}\) Rodger, \textit{Safeguard of the Sea}, p. 236.
\(^{70}\) TNA, SP 1/201, f. 185.
Yet, the forms that this administrative network took within the two kingdoms was evidently contrasting. Whereas France continued to use – albeit by enlarging the political network that controlled its naval governance - a two-tier structure that focused on admiralty rights and local/coastal governance, England on the other hand, developed a three-tier system: admiral, council and locality. The Council of Marine Causes appointed officers of experience and expertise to control specific administrative procedures – and for this reason Davies has argued that it was one of the first bureaucratic bodies – and its establishment ensured that a standing navy was retained. For whatever reason, this could suggest that France did not prioritise the maintenance of a standing navy to the same extent as the English island state. Located on the continent and bordering both the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, France did not have the strategic need to produce an administrative structure that ensured that a fleet was continually maintained. Instead, by continuing a two-tier system, it was able to consolidate a political network that relied upon the admiral’s communication with maritime regional centres to produce combined fleets of merchant and royal vessels.

2.2. Naval Developments in the Localities

One of the most defining features that shaped and characterised naval infrastructure in the two kingdoms was geography. Indeed, if it were not for the geography of England and France, naval administration would not have been so different. It is important to reiterate that the natural frontiers of France were divided by the Iberian Peninsula, which forced the state to develop two fleets, whilst England continued with one. In controlling two navies, two administrative structures existed to complement them, which served to oversee the continuation of the two fleets. Meanwhile, unlike in France, England’s warships were not
only stationed in close proximity to one another, but also located near to the crown and the Council of Marine Causes in London. A number of benefits came with the navy being so central in England; one of the most significant being that its preservation could be closely inspected and directed by the principal officers themselves. London was relatively easy to access by water due to the sheer size and depth of the Thames estuary, and the navy was docked near to the centre of the realm, stationed along the river in large royal dockyards such as Chatham and Deptford.71 In considering the importance of geography, Glete even proposed that in combining the centre of the navy with the centre of state, England ‘probably strengthened the permanency of the navy.’72

For France this relationship between capital and navy was not possible. Paris is located further inland, and the Seine was not navigable for the large naval warships that the state required. France’s navy could not be docked and maintained close to the heart of the court, and Le Havre, which was the nearest port to Paris, was still some 200 km away. Producing a single administrative board that was located in Paris, and was designed to organise the navy across the kingdom’s wide apparatus, would not only have been unfeasible, but illogical, considering the restrictions in communication present at the time. Instead, France relied upon provincial and local sources of authority to maintain the navy, because with the restrictions in travel prior to industrialisation, it would have been unmanageable to operate administrative proceedings in a city with no real naval presence that was several days’ travel from the nearest port or harbour. Contrary to the English example, where the kingdom’s geography naturally provided the means for naval governance to operate within the capital, in France, any form of centralisation was focused upon the admiral and the personnel that were located in the regional centres. As a result of natural obstacles, France’s navy became centred on the admiral – and the général des galères in the Levant – whose

71 BL, Otho EIX, ff. 181-82.
72 Glete, Warfare at Sea, p. 67.
responsibility it was to ensure that orders concerning maritime affairs were enforced throughout the realm. It was an added advantage for the state that the personal nature of naval government also served to overcome any local political and constitutional resistance, thus strengthening the political regime’s hold over the kingdom’s peripheries.

Selecting a location in northern France for a fleet to be based was not easy because France’s northern coast was largely inhospitable for shipping. Its shores were covered in dangerous dunes, marshland and mud flats, which caused the total destruction of several smaller ports over the years. This was also similar on its western coast, where even La Rochelle was confronted by regular difficulties. Described by Kevin C. Robbins, the land surrounding this ‘forbidding landscape’ consisted of ‘miles of tidal marine marshes, salt pans fed by ocean sluices, shifting mud flats, creeping dunes, fresh water bogs, and polders laced with a bewildering array of drainage channels [that] prevent any fixed demarcation between land and sea.’

With this in mind, the decision to commission and maintain Le Havre, located on the right bank of the Seine estuary, was only made after considerable surveying of the coasts. Built under the authority of the Admiral of France, Guillaume Gouffier, seigneur de Bonnivet on 7 February 1517, the future Le Havre - initially named François de Grace after the king - was located in close proximity to both Brittany and Dieppe. Bonnivet delegated the organisation of the town’s construction to the Vice Admiral, Guyon Leroy, seigneur de Chillou, who was instructed that the town was to be built ‘to securely hold our ships and vessels, [along with] those of our subjects navigating on the sea’. By 27 April, Chillou had employed sixty-one builders, principally from Brittany, to construct Le Havre as a royal port. On 6 September 1521 the town received its first royal charter, which declared

74 Le Havre, AA1, no.1: ‘Commission délivrée à l’amiral de Bonnivet pour construire le port du Havre, 7 February 1517’.
75 Ibid. [tenir en secrété les navires et vaissaux de nous et noz subjectz navigans sur la mer].
76 AN, Marine D7, f. 1.
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that it had been designed for ‘all the great ships of our kingdom’. With continuing to expand, Le Havre welcomed royal investment to develop its shipbuilding industry, and by 1521 the colossal la Grande Françoise was in construction. With Brittany maintaining its autonomy, the French crown lacked a large designated port and dockyard to situate its ships on the Atlantic coast, and Le Havre’s development was intended to resolve this, providing Francis with a permanent naval base in the north. This was demonstrated in May 1535, when more than 7000 livres was spent on the construction and arming of thirteen vessels docked there. Similarly, with Le Havre emerging as a major base on the opposite side of the Channel, and war with the English having been declared in July 1543, on 17 April 1544 it was from the new town that Francis employed two brigantines to survey the English coasts. The town was equally a vital resource during Francis’s invasion attempt in July 1545, where an estimated 800,000 livres was spent on the fleet’s preparation. From the outset, then, Le Havre was a town developed around naval activity.

This did not change as Francis’s reign came to a close. The English understood that Le Havre could potentially be used as a major strategic base against them with the revival of an Anglo-French war. In 1562, when the Huguenots requested English assistance, it was Le Havre that was accepted as the English base of operations on the continent, and it was to be exchanged for the return of Calais in peace negotiations. Once peace had been restored in France, Catherine de Medici was fully aware of the need to regain the town, if any war against England was to continue. Once the town was back in French hands after the successful siege between April and July 1563, it continued to be perceived as an important maritime stronghold for the defence of the northern coast. From its original commission, Le

77 ibid, ff. 3-12. [tant les grand Navires de Nostre Royaume].
78 Histoire de la Marine, III, pp. 173-76; BN, français 25720, f. 167.
79 BN, français 15632, ff. 170-71.
80 Le Havre, AA10: ‘lettre de François Ier au balli de Caux, 17 April 1544’.
81 Le Havre, AA10: ‘lettre de François Ier au balli de Caux, 9 May 1545’.
Havre was provided with tax exemptions from major French national taxes including the *taille*, *gabelle* and *aides* and, in 1594, Henri IV renewed these privileges because:

> The said town sits on the sea, [and] they are in continual danger of being pillaged and attacked. It is necessary that they continually spend on the defence of the town by having weapons prepared...[and] the town can continue doing this by the continuation and undertaking of its privileges.  

Le Havre remained a significant naval base in France throughout this period, and as a town its origins lay in the navy. Cardinal Richelieu would continue with the town’s patronage. The three ports that served to complement his fleet in the Ponant had been determined by 1631 – if not earlier – as Le Havre, Brest and Brouage. By this stage these three ports had become the obvious locations for naval development. Brouage had proved itself to be in a vital position to maintain royal authority during the Wars of Religion, meanwhile the size of Brest’s large harbour made it an obvious home for the navy, and the long history and merits of Le Havre have already been discussed. It is understandable why Le Havre would take such prominence when looking at sixteenth-century maps of the town. The town’s walls were constructed around a large tidal basin, where vessels could dock. Le Havre serves, then, as an example of the nation being built around the navy, and it was thus an important asset to retain and administer for the Ponant fleet.

Whereas Le Havre was constructed because Paris was almost inaccessible from the Channel, England had no such problems with the Thames. English dockyards were chiefly based in close proximity to London, in the Medway and Thames estuaries. Erith and

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85 AN, Marine A 3, no. 48.
86 Le Havre, fl.227: ‘la siege du Havre, 1563’; TNA, MPF 1/250/2.
Deftford were constructed as storehouses with the former also hosting a dock, in order to accommodate the expanding navy between 1512 and 1513.\textsuperscript{87} Dockyards and storehouses were also located at Woolwich, Limehouse, Barking Creek, and Gillingham (later renamed Chatham). Meanwhile, Portsmouth was the only major dockyard not situated upon or near the Thames, after a dry dock was constructed between 1485 and 1486.\textsuperscript{88} As the sixteenth century progressed, Woolwich, Gillingham, Portsmouth and Deftford emerged as the main dockyards for naval activity, with each gradually developing its own character. Woolwich was principally exploited for the construction and extensive repair of warships, which would continue throughout this period, with the \textit{Sovereign of the Seas} also being constructed there. Although the furthest upstream, Deftford was the closest to the heart of London and emerged by 1550 as the headquarters of naval operations.\textsuperscript{89} Along with being the seat of the Council of Marine Causes, it was used for the storage of provisions and the maintenance of vessels. Meanwhile, Portsmouth served as the base for coastal patrols of the Narrow Seas and for most of the fleet in times of war.\textsuperscript{90} Most importantly, Gillingham (first referred to as Chatham in 1562) became the main anchorage during the Elizabethan French war, once Deftford’s size was proved to be inadequate for the expanding fleet.\textsuperscript{91} Equally, whilst Chatham was located in the Medway estuary, Deftford was positioned far up river, causing complications for navigation. By 1600, Chatham was certainly the largest and preferred dockyard of the English kingdom, and it served thirty-nine of the forty-two warships in commission in that year.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{87} Loades, \textit{The Tudor Navy}, p. 68.
\textsuperscript{88} Oppenheim, \textit{Administration of the Royal Navy}, pp. 39-40.
\textsuperscript{89} TNA, E351/2194.
\textsuperscript{90} For this reason Philip II recommended shifting the home of the fleet, from the Thames to Portsmouth in 1556. TNA, SP 11/6, f. 26; translated in \textit{Edward and Mary}, pp. 306-307.
\textsuperscript{91} TNA, E351/2199. A general shift from Deftford to Gillingham (Chatham) was becoming apparent.
\textsuperscript{92} Bodleian, MS Rawlinson A.206, ff.1-41: ‘Naval Treasurer’s Quarter Book, 1600’.
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The character and reliance upon these dockyards remained fairly consistent for the remainder of the period. In 1605, 90 per cent of ordinary annual expenditure for the dockyards was spent at Chatham, whilst just 8 per cent was provided to Deptford and 2 at Woolwich.93 These figures reflect the continuity that was maintained in central naval administration, for in 1567, we find similar figures: 89 per cent of ordinary revenue for Chatham, 10 for Deptford and just 0.2 for Woolwich.94 The seventeenth century provides similar statistics; in 1615, 85 per cent was provided to Chatham, 12 to Deptford and 3 to Woolwich.95 Meanwhile, regular revisions and improvements to these royal dockyards were made. A series of enlargements to Woolwich in 1606, 1615, 1620 and 1626 made it possible to accommodate the construction of the Sovereign of the Seas.96 Deptford was reconstructed with a new pair of gates in 1574.97 It would then see the construction of two new docks in 1620, and 1623.98 Meanwhile, England’s decision to focus on its centrally located dockyards is reflected in the dry dock of Portsmouth being filled with debris in 1623. By 1632, through the combined figure of both ordinary and extraordinary expenditure the importance of the south-east, and in particular Chatham, was still clear: 71 per cent was allocated to Chatham, 1 to Woolwich, 11 to Deptford and 17 to Portsmouth.99

Although, by the 1560s, England had a firm policy regarding where its navy would be situated, France, on the other hand did not. With the Breton and Guyenne admiralty remaining separate from the broader French admiralty until 1615, establishing a permanent base controlled by the French admiralty on the western coast was difficult

93 TNA, E351/2243.
94 TNA, E351/2203
95 TNA, E351/2253.
97 TNA, E351/2215.
98 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 377.
99 TNA, E351/2271. Percentages determined in accordance with the statistics provided in Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 294. Portsmouth continued to be used in the subsequent years because of its accessibility for patrolling the Narrow Seas. In the remaining years of this study around £1500 was allocated to it annually by the naval treasury.
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because it continued to face political challenges. This matter was even more challenging
because of the civil wars, when much of the western sea border, including La Rochelle,
had turned against the policies of the crown and its admiralty, which forced Brouage to
play an increasingly large role in royal policy. Yet, once peace had returned, it did
become increasingly important for the state to regain control of the maritime resources
of the western coast, and to quickly establish a naval base there, especially as Spain once
again emerged as a major adversary of the state.\textsuperscript{100} With both kingdoms’ naval resources
growing, and Spain long perceived as France’s greatest threat, it was crucial for a strong
naval port to be established on the western border. With this danger known, the recapture
of La Rochelle in 1628 was crucial to state strength in enabling a strong French naval
presence on the Ponant border without risking internal conflict. The siege of La Rochelle
reflects how state consolidation could provide the means for the advancement of naval
power.\textsuperscript{101}

Richelieu’s ambition for both the navy and French maritime expansion was
dependent upon the development of the state’s principal ports. According to his
testament politique:

It seems that nature had wanted to offer the empire of the sea to France because
the advantageous positions of its two coasts has provided excellent ports for the
two seas [the Narrow Channel and the Atlantic] and the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{102}

With control over Brittany established, and with the Protestants of La Rochelle subdued,
the grand maître welcomed the opportunities that the province could provide for the
navy, being after all in the optimal and ‘most beautiful’ location for a fleet to be based.
His selection of Brest as the Ponant fleet’s main port was the logical option, even if his

\textsuperscript{100} BN, français 10221, ff. 229v-230.
\textsuperscript{101} BN, français 23960. For an account of the siege see this account by Pierre Meruault.
\textsuperscript{102} *ibid*, f. 130v. [Il semble que la nature ait voulu offrir l’empire de la mer à la France pour l’avantageuse
situation de ses deux costes égalemment pourvenues d’excellens ports aux deux mers oceane et mediterraneé].
control over the town remained delicate. The size and depth of Brest’s harbour was unrivalled in the Ponant, and no alternative could comfortably accommodate the large warships that were being produced.103 Under Richelieu, Brest quickly became the navy’s main base of operations and, by 1631, sixteen warships were recorded in its docks, all between 200 and 900 tuns.104 In contrast, at Brouage – the second largest accommodator for the Ponant’s warships at this stage – seven ships between 40 and 400 tuns were based there in the same year.105 Brest clearly remained France’s leading port in the Ponant; in a survey of 1640, both Le Havre and Brouage held eight of the crown’s warships between 80 and 400 tuns, whilst Brest maintained twenty-seven, including the 2000-tun la Couronne.106 By the end of the period then, whereas Chatham remained the major naval dockyard for England that was located firmly within its geographic centre, in France, Brest had become its equivalent, and was situated on its periphery.

Le Havre continued as a port for both military and merchant activity throughout the sixteenth century. With its sustained use, and its proximity to England and the Netherlands, Richelieu would have been unwise to abandon it, especially given that he held firm control of the town, as its governor since October 1626.107 Brouage’s governorship also fell into Richelieu’s hands in February 1627, whilst the siege of La Rochelle was unfolding.108 With a base on the Seudre and in Brittany, Richelieu could safeguard the Bay of Biscay from the troubling inhabitants of La Rochelle, and Spain.109

By 1630, then, Richelieu had secured the rights – however tenuous his claim – to the

103 BN, français 6416, ff. 203-204.
104 TNA, SP 16/198, f. 118.
106 BN, français 6408, f. 299.
navy’s settlement and control across several logistical locations along the Ponant coastline. Despite the smaller size of Le Havre and Brouage, which resulted in a considerable reliance upon Brest, it has been suggested that the two combined were also essential to Richelieu’s plan for naval advancement. For Alan James, they ‘provided the means of securing financial resources for future development… The collection of governorships, therefore, was an extension of the process of invigorating the authority of the grand-maître’.\(^\text{110}\) Consequently, once the Franco-Spanish War erupted in May 1635, as part of the Thirty Years’ War, France was fully prepared on the western sea border, with Brouage and Brest able to sustain the French fleet.\(^\text{111}\)

With these locations established, it was necessary to redesign a local administrative framework that connected naval governance at the coast with the grand maître. This was done through producing a network of lieutenants généraux de la marine, that were developed ‘in the provinces to keep an eye on how orders for the navy are being executed’.\(^\text{112}\) The lieutenants were placed under the direct authority of the surintendant des finances who, by 1627, was the marquis d’Effiat. Eight lieutenants were initially employed and spread among the coastal provinces: Normandy, Picardy, Brittany, Poitou/Saintonge, Languedoc, Guyenne and ‘two others at places where they judge most necessary’.\(^\text{113}\) By 1634, the number of lieutenants had increased to thirteen.\(^\text{114}\) Each lieutenant was in turn supported by a group of local administrators, who together formed a ‘small administrative army…[with] remarkable passion and efficiency’.\(^\text{115}\) In being agents of the grand maître, the creation of the lieutenants was intended to

\(^{110}\) Navy and Government, p. 75.
\(^{111}\) Glete, Warfare at Sea, pp. 180-84
\(^{112}\) AN, Marine C193, no. 4. [dans les provinces pour avoir l’œil à ce que les ordonnances de la marine sont exactement exécutées].
\(^{113}\) Ibid. [deux autres à lieux ou ils feront jugez plus nécessaires].
\(^{114}\) Ibid, no. 7.
\(^{115}\) P. Castagnos, Richelieu face à la mer (Rennes: Editions Ouest-France, 1989), p. 69. [cette petite armée d’administrateurs va montrer un zèle et une efficacité remarquables.]

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reduce the autonomy of local maritime governance in a similar fashion to the schemes pioneered under Joyeuse fifty years earlier. These reforms, then, were all intended to protect and strengthen Richelieu’s grip on maritime administration in the kingdom.116 This construction of the administrative network around the cardinal is reflected in the fact that to ensure their loyalty to this design, it was the grand maître who controlled the lieutenants’ appointment.

On 29 March 1631, it was declared that the ports of Brouage, Brest and Le Havre were each to be controlled by two separate officers, the chef d’escadre des armées navales and the commissaire général. The commissaire général ‘with officers under him’ was responsible for ‘receiving the vessels that arrive from the sea; taking care of the guard and workers who are resident in the port, and for bringing those [crew] to their captains, who are commanded to go to sea’.117 Meanwhile the chef d’escadre served as the equivalent of a vice admiral and assisted with the arming of the fleet and other fortifications. He was aided by ‘a captain of the navy, and two lieutenants who always stayed in the port’ to ensure the effective preparation of the artillery.118 The responsibilities associated with these two posts reduced the duties that the lieutenants généraux were accountable for, which suggests that Richelieu’s lieutenants were principally the administrative representatives of the grand maître, present to ensure that his commands and rights were respected and obeyed. Moreover, it has become apparent from the work of Roberto Barazzutti that many of these locally based officers would have held prior experience in maritime affairs. Barazzutti’s research suggests that officers were principally born in France’s maritime regions, and as little as 31 per cent of

116 Navy and Government, p. 76.
117 AN, Marine A’3, no. 48. [un Commissaire general, avec des officiers sous eux, pour recevoir les vaisseaux qui viendront de la mer; prendre soin de la garde et radoub de ceux qui demeurent dans les ports, et delivrer ceux qui seront ordonnéz aux Cappitaines qui seront commandes d’aller en mer]; Berbouche, Histoire de la royale, p. 161.
them came from the interior of the kingdom by the mid-seventeenth century. This would mean that most of Richelieu’s maritime officers were born in large maritime port towns such as Marseille, Toulon, Dieppe, La Rochelle, Le Havre, Brest, Saint Malo, Dunkerque and Nantes. By the mid-seventeenth century, then, experience and skill were of increased importance in the appointment of local maritime office.

Yet, despite the scale of Richelieu’s administrative expansion, James has argued that this framework was not fundamentally new. The admiral’s personal right to appoint capitaines et gardes des costes, who defended his rights along the coasts and collected revenue, had originated with Joyeuse’s appointment in 1584. Joyeuse was authorised to exercise his local authority in a very similar fashion, albeit not necessarily with the same level of success, as Richelieu. In assisting the admiral and grand maître, the capitaines et gardes des costes served as their personal agents to ensure rights over prizes were collected. Their employment would have instantly clashed with the responsibilities of the local admiralty courts, which were to resolve domestic and criminal cases at sea, and to collect financial penalties. Jurisdictional conflict had long been a problem and, for this reason, the state had attempted to clamp down on these inconsistencies by issuing a series of edicts under Henri II, which made the appointment of officers at these courts at royal discretion. Yet the establishment of capitaines et gardes des costes under Joyeuse implies that the edicts of Henri II came to no significant effect; evidently the amount of revenue that these courts were collecting on behalf of the admiral was still being disputed. Joyeuse’s right to appoint these individuals would have

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121 AN, Marine B31, f. 43. [nommer et presenter personnes capables aux Estats de judiciaire et officiers de ladite Amirauté].
been poorly received by the local courts, who perceived the *capitaines* as something of a permanent auditor, by examining their proceedings for errors. Considered in this light, there is little doubt that it was a persistent problem that the admiral’s and local court’s jurisdiction constantly clashed, and for this reason Richelieu decided to employ several *capitaines* for Brittany, even whilst his *lieutenants* were also working.\(^{123}\) With a limited degree of trust in Brittany’s admiralty infrastructure, which often conflicted with his own rights, the *capitaines* would have served under the *lieutenants* to ensure that the admiral’s privileges were respected. In other words, by employing both *lieutenants* and *capitaines*, Richelieu was attempting to enforce his authority as *grand maître* on the local level through expanding his administrative network.

English local governance, by contrast, was both less elaborate and expansive. Yet, these limitations mattered less because England’s maritime affairs were far more oriented around its capital than in France. Without a provincial infrastructure, England’s local naval framework was modelled upon its broader state organisation that relied upon Justices of the Peace. It was the responsibility of individuals with a high social standing to exercise the Lord High Admiral’s jurisdiction within the localities, and every coastal county possessed a representative of the admiral who served to enforce his rights. Those in these posts were commonly known as vice admirals of the coast. Their appointment was determined by letters patent by either the seal of the Court of the Admiralty or the Lord High Admiral’s office.\(^{124}\) Members of the gentry and aristocracy on the whole filled these posts, as was equally the case for JPs, and posts often remained tied to the same families through inheritance.\(^{125}\) This is notable in Cheshire, where the vice admiralship was held by the Stanley family (who also held the earldom of Derby) from

\(^{123}\) *Navy and Government*, p. 64.


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1558 to 1644.\(^{126}\) Similarly, in Dorset, appointments regularly fell into the hands of the Howards: Lord Thomas Howard held the post from 1551 to 1582, and several of his successors would hold it from 1603 to 1640.\(^{127}\) Many occupants of these posts also held other offices in the navy: Walter Raleigh was the coastal Admiral of Devon from 1585 to 1603 and was replaced by Richard Hawkins thereafter.\(^ {128}\) Meanwhile, several members of the Council of Marine Causes were also county admirals, including William Gonson (Norfolk, 1536 to 1541), William Woodhouse (Norfolk, 1549 to 1564) and William Winter (Somerset, 1558 to 1589).\(^ {129}\) Any jurisdictional or financial disputes not easily resolved were brought to the High Court of the Admiralty, whose role was similar to the table de marbre, in dealing with more serious maritime offences and disputes predominantly in London. It is also important to remember that the Lord High Admiral’s office was a privileged post conferred by the monarch, and once Charles I had put the admiral’s office into hiatus, all its profits were transferred directly to the crown.

Unlike in France, where local admiralty courts held dual loyalties to both province and admiral, in England, the vice admirals of the coast remained firmly devoted to the practices of the admiral, who retained the right to revoke these offices from those he considered undeserving. With the growth of the navy around its coasts, and away from the French capital, in a geographically and politically fragmented kingdom, it was vital for the state’s admiral to ensure the enforcement of his jurisdictional privileges. Through enforcing his rights over prizes and other financial gains the admiral/\textit{grand maître} was imposing his authority over the coastal localities. If the localities could be subjugated to their maritime courts, it was easier to obtain their respect and obedience in naval affairs.

\(^{127}\) \textit{ibid}, pp.15-16; TNA, HCA 25/1, pt.1, f. 318; HCA 49/106, pt. 1, nos. 31, 38.
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The expansion of French coastal offices commissioned by Richelieu, during the 1620s and 1630s, was not just limited to the emergence of capitaines and lieutenants. Through observing the available annual payrolls produced by the treasury prior to and during seventeenth-century naval expansion, it becomes clear that the growth of the fleet did produce a rise in the number of offices designed to accommodate it. In 1567, vice admirals – who were concerned with the administrative operation of the navy, and were not related to the English vice admirals of the coast - were recorded for France, Brittany, Picardy and the coast of Caux, whilst five further administrative officers were recorded: two treasurers, a controller general, and two guards of the storehouses. Given the continued weakness of the fleet in 1605, any change to this system was minimal: two vice admirals are recorded for France and Brittany, two treasurers for the Ponant, two controller generals, and two guards of the storehouses in Normandy and Brittany. Yet, a clear development had occurred by 1620, once the fleet had begun to recover. Whilst the unity of the admiralties had resulted in just one vice admiral for France, the navy’s administration was bolstered by an expansion of officers. Three treasurers, three commissaires généraux and two guards of the storehouses supported the intendant de l’admirauté. Finally in 1627, the officer class had multiplied in accordance with naval expansion. Five trésoriers généraux et garde des granges et munitions were recorded, one for each province in Normandy, Brittany, Picardy, Poitou and Saintonge (combined), and Guyenne. In addition to this, three general treasurers, two grand commissaires and the surintendant des finances accompanied these offices.

130 AN, Marine C193, no. 1: ‘Estat de la dépense de la solde, 1 January 1567’.
131 ibid, no. 2: ‘Estat de la Marine de Ponant, 15 July 1605’
132 Histoire de la Marine, IV, p. 561.
133 AN, Marine C193, no. 3: ‘Estat de la Marine de Ponant, 1620’. Andrew Godard is also recorded as an officer of the Ponant navy, in an unspecified role.
134 ibid, no. 4: ‘Estat de la Marine de Ponant, 28 January 1627’.
Meanwhile, the Levant fleet hosted its own administrative system, even following Richelieu’s purchase of the office. With a similar form to that which Richelieu employed for the Ponant, three triennial treasurers were present in the south as venal offices.\textsuperscript{135} Yet, apart from their existence alongside comissaires and the controlleur who ensured the upkeep of the galleys, the Levant fleet retained a divergent administrative infrastructure from its northern equivalent. A far simpler hierarchy existed, given that jurisdiction in the Levant was more geographically limited: the général des galères held absolute authority over the fleet, whilst the First Captain served as his deputy, and below him were the Ordinary Captains of the galleys, with the remaining crew serving under them.\textsuperscript{136} The serving treasurer was ‘to stand near to the général des galères...so he can receive his commands at all times’.\textsuperscript{137} Both the treasurer and général were connected with the central state governance, especially after Richelieu obtained control of the Levant fleet, yet the ultimate administrative infrastructure in the Levant remained relatively unchanged. The Levant continued to be centred on the authority of the général and continued to rely on the traditional infrastructure that had existed during the sixteenth century.

In France, by 1642, the grand maître served at the centre of a political web, and controlled an expanded infrastructure that relied upon – though not solely – the lieutenants to enforce his admiralty rights and survey warship development and maintenance. The complications of communicating across vast distances would not be resolved in early modern Europe, and it was not feasible to establish a single administrative body that operated out of one location. In France, therefore, the navy had to be dispersed across several dockyards across the kingdom.

\textsuperscript{135} See chapter three of this thesis, pp. 152-53 for more on venal offices in the navy.
\textsuperscript{136} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{77}, ff. 95-102.
\textsuperscript{137} ibid, f.101. [se tenir pres de monsieur le general des galeres...pour recevoir a tous momens, ses commandemens].
Naval administration in England and France served as a microcosm of their broader state infrastructures. The senior admiralty office continued to be filled by a candidate of high noble birth, and the office holder’s personal relationship with the crown was typical of the most prestigious offices of state at the time. Meanwhile, at the local level, just as England used a similar administrative network to the Justices of the Peace for enforcing the admiral’s rights, in France, the admiralty remained highly dependent upon provincial authorities, in parallel to the broader state institutions.

Naval expansion did not inevitably cause a departmentalised and geographically centralised body to form in France, as had occurred in England, because France’s state infrastructure was divided across a far broader geographic space that remained reliant on local governance. In contrast, the English alternative was able to produce a departmentalised body of experienced officials because its navy was situated close to the capital. This meant that the Council of Marine Causes could meet as a single body that did not need to be divided across the kingdom; so, one administrative board was feasible. It was the geography of the kingdom, as much as the reluctance of statesmen, which prevented a similar body from emerging in France. This ultimately suggests that both naval expansion, and administrative advancement were preconditioned by the geography of the state, and indeed, this was a primary factor in shaping how the two kingdoms’ naval administrations developed and diverged. It would be unfair to classify one system as more centralised than its counterpart because the processes and results of centralisation varied across states. Whereas England’s naval administration was largely located in London, France’s equivalent was focused on a small number of widely scattered state administrators.
Following on from this, it has been shown that because of its geography, administrative change in France was neither innovative nor radical. Any transformations relied upon the strengthening of political structures. Unlike in England, where an entirely new administrative construct was established for the upkeep and development of the fleet, in France administrative changes for the navy were dependent on reinforcing a traditional infrastructure that relied upon the admiral’s coastal rights, privileges and authority, and the localities’ entitlements to enforce them. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the changes to the French navy’s administration in this period, and particularly during the early-seventeenth century, were essential for future French sea power. Administrative developments that enabled the navy to expand and consolidate in Le Havre, Brest, Brouage and elsewhere, were the products of political manoeuvring that witnessed the grand maître and monarchy obtaining greater control over the kingdom’s peripheries.
Chart 3.1: Declared English Naval Expenditure: 1547-1641
Chart 3.2: Declared English Naval Expenditure, 1547-1602
Chart 3.5: Total French Naval Expenditure, 1530-1640
Chart 3.6: French Naval Expenditure, 1530-1562
Chart 3.7: French Naval Expenditure, 1604-1640
War was the largest demand on state expenditure in the early modern period. The sinews of war forced the state to stretch its fiscal resources and led to the production of new and innovative ideas for accumulating, and managing revenue. Historians, including Jan Glete and Jeremy Black, have argued for the importance of the military, financial and political changes in the second half of the seventeenth century, in establishing the fiscal-military state, but it is difficult to claim that such a system emerged earlier. Even David Parrott’s innovative study *Richelieu’s Army* concludes by disagreeing with any notion that the 1630s, and especially the years after 1635, witnessed the transformation of the state’s fiscal and military apparatus because of military demand. Parrott has argued - and Alan James has reinforced in the case of the navy – that, in 1642, France was still encountering one financial crisis after another. These issues were only being resolved through short-term solutions, in the same way that Henri II had practised almost a century earlier. With this said, during the period under investigation, changes to the state’s financial apparatus did take place as a result of military demands. The Italian Wars (1494 to 1559), the Spanish War (1585 to 1604) and

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1 For conversion rates see forematter, p. x of thesis.
the Thirty Years’ War (1618 to 1648) were long conflicts of attrition, fought at
great financial cost.\(^4\) In their longevity, they forced participating states to
experiment with their economic and administrative systems.

That new fiscal schemes more often than not failed, as would eventually
befall Charles I’s ship money, is more an indication of political and structural
constraints, rather than a lack of innovation. Financial reforms that held the
potential to alter the traditional social and economic structure, and customs of the
state, were opposed throughout society. Change, especially for France, was not
welcomed if it could upset the daily life of the nation. Nevertheless, that the latter
half of the early modern period, and not the years under investigation here, has
been characterised by historians as having witnessed the financial revolution,
does not discredit the fact that state reform was attempted during the period as a
result of the pressures inflicted by warfare. The basic principle and rationale of
fiscal and administrative reform designed to support the military most certainly
existed in this period, even if governments lacked the resources to bring this
vision to reality. The shape and intensity of these attempts were far more limited
in France, however, than in England for reasons that will become apparent. The
cost of war escalated throughout the period, as armies and navies expanded at
unprecedented rates. As the economic cost of war increased, the state struggled to
fund its expenses through the traditional rates of ordinary revenue. Whilst
engaged in a war of attrition against Spain, the Elizabethan state came to realise
this. Meanwhile, in France, a larger economy allowed the kingdom to continue

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sustaining its military resources, but not without increasing taxation and encountering significant financial strains.\(^5\)

As standing navies imposed heavy demands on state economies, states had little choice but to resort to supporting the decentralised activities of private maritime warfare.\(^6\) In both kingdoms, fleets were assembled almost entirely from private vessels, making it difficult to distinguish between private and state enterprise. The sizeable French Azores campaigns of 1580 to 1583 were mounted in this fashion.\(^7\) Scholars, including Parrott, have shown that armed forces largely consisted of mercenaries, a claim that is paralleled in the majority of fleets assembled at this time.\(^8\) Equally, it has been argued that this did not have a negative effect on state financial development, for large sums of revenue were required nonetheless.\(^9\) Although this holds true, the short-term policy of employing non-state forces did have long-term repercussions for future naval development. Unlike the army, a standing navy of crown-owned warships took many years to construct, requiring the state to commit to a long-term strategy that was economically burdensome. Financial preference for merchant fleets may have been an effective short-term measure, but it had significant ramifications for attempts to develop a future standing navy. That no clear, and sizeable, standing French fleet existed in France from the Wars of Religion until the 1620s is indicative of this.

This chapter addresses naval finance, and its impact on state formation, through considering three principal areas. First, it looks at expenditure, asking


\(^{8}\) Parrott, The Business of War, especially pp. 150-51, for maritime activity.

\(^{9}\) ibid, p. 17.
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whether state revenue, allocated to the navies of England and France, increased as the period progressed. And if so, when in this period, is this growth most observable? The chapter then turns towards crown income, looking at the complexities of state revenue. It first approaches ordinary revenue received by the crown and asks how the creation of standing navies changed this. A final section then explores atypical methods for raising revenue, exploring the techniques that the English and French states used, predominantly when at war, to fund the expansion and improvement of the kingdom’s maritime forces. In doing so, it is argued that the intention to maintain, and advance, a standing fleet was an impetus for state financial experimentation. That England was far more reliant on atypical income than France was a result of the variances in their already established economic models.

3.1. Naval Expenditure

Constructing, maintaining, and operating a navy was a major expense. In times of war, ships required regular maintenance; wages and victuals for officers and military personnel needed distributing, whilst warships needed equipping with weapons and other provisions. Even during times of peace, standing navies could be expensive. Ships that were mothballed required regular repair against rot and decay and, at the same time, shipyards and docks were maintained, as were employees’ wages.¹⁰ Meanwhile, small fleets were still used for coastal patrols, and warship construction

and rebuilding schemes continued. Any neglect of the navy during times of peace would be compensated for by an even heavier financial cost when preparing for war, when damaged vessels had to be repaired.

Francis I’s invasion of the Solent, in July 1545, was reflected in a staggering 1,929,945 livres spent on the fleet.\(^{11}\) Meanwhile, it has been estimated that the wars of the 1540s cost England some £3,200,000, with £500,000 spent on the navy.\(^{12}\) For both kingdoms, these figures represent as much as 10 per cent of the crown’s annual revenue, which was still inferior to that spent upon land forces at the time. In 1545, Francis’s military expenditure was expanded by a further 4,105,859 livres dedicated to his armies and garrisons.\(^{13}\) Thus, the expansion of state navies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries produced an increasing demand on state revenue for their upkeep and use. For England, this was more difficult to accommodate, for the crown’s annual revenue, discussed below, was far smaller than the French equivalent. Furthermore, whereas the French monarchy could rely upon its nobility and wealthy gentry to maintain its galleys, which were part of a joint state-noble enterprise, England had no similar system in place.\(^{14}\) Consequently, to maintain a standing navy, an increasingly essential tool for an island state, England reformed its navy’s financial apparatus. By 1557, England’s navy could boast a regular annual income. As a continental state embroiled in national emergencies since the mid-sixteenth century, France did not produce a comparable system for financial regulation until its fleet was expanded in the 1620s.


\(^{12}\) Rodger, *Safeguard of the Sea*, p. 188.


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On 8 January 1557, Benjamin Gonson, Treasurer of the English Navy, was approved through an Act of the Privy Council, the sum of £14,000 per annum for the upkeep of the navy. This was to be provided through bi-annual payments by the Lord Treasurer. Before this date, there was no regulation for naval expenditure, so that Queen Mary ‘hath been sundry times troubled with the often signing of warrants for money to be defrayed about the necessary charges of Her Highness’s navy’.\(^\text{15}\) Income for the navy was previously expended with little routine or restriction, and the Treasurer of the Council of Marine Causes requested payments as, and when, it was necessary. Consequently, naval expenditure pre-1557 was poorly recorded, with vast irregularities. The first declared account of the treasurer of the council was submitted in the year of 1546 to 1547, and permitted Robert Legge ‘full allowance of and for, all and every suche some, or somes of money which by the said Robart, by himself, or by his Deputie or deputi[e]s, shall disburse paye expende and layeout in and aboute oure said marine causes’.\(^\text{16}\) Legge’s initial report accounted for one year of expenses, a practice that would be strictly followed after 1560. However, his successor, Benjamin Gonson, in his first declared report accounted for three years and twenty-five days, from 29 September 1549 to 24 October 1551, showing no regularity.\(^\text{17}\) Prior to 1557, then, there appears to have been little intention to restrict expenditure, and have it consistently recorded. The treasurer possessed near carte blanche, especially during war.\(^\text{18}\)

In line with a revived French war, and warship construction scheme to support it, Mary and her council’s decision in 1557 to regulate both the revenue provided for

\(^{16}\) TNA, E351/2588.
\(^{17}\) TNA, E351/2194.
\(^{18}\) With this said, as Chart 3.1 shows, recorded expenditure during the years prior to 1557 was less than £50,000 per annum. This figure increased above £50,000 during the Marian and Elizabethan French wars.
the navy, and the sources of its expenditure, was an important event in the English navy’s development.\textsuperscript{19} In providing an ordinary annual sum of £14,000, Mary’s navy was to be made ‘serviceable with caulking and new trimmings’, and was to have new ships built, if they were required. The money was also dedicated to furnishing her ships with sails, anchors, and cables, whilst paying for the workforce in her royal harbour and ensuring that victuals were at all times prepared for 1000 men for one month. Mary’s fleet had been in ill repair since the end of her brother’s reign, and so an annual subsidy was intended to revive the fleet. Once achieved, the ordinary yearly sum was to be reduced to £10,000. With the official signing of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambréris, in April 1559, the first reduction in ordinary expenditure took place, reducing it to £12,000.\textsuperscript{20} Inconsistencies still remained, however, for ship construction in the following years was included within this ordinary price, showing that there remained an uncertainty about what the ordinary was for. Ordinary expenditure in 1562 included the £12,000 ordinary yearly assignment, whilst increasing its total value to £25,951 for the making of the \textit{Triumph} and the \textit{Victory}, and for an increased provision of cordage and canvas.\textsuperscript{21} Just £1050 was spent on extraordinary charges (extra revenue still attained from the treasury, yet not accounted for in planned yearly budgets) in the same year, a figure largely attributed to putting a small fleet to sea.

Early accounts of the English naval treasury show that confusion existed amongst the officers because of the ambiguity of ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, which would not be resolved until John Hawkins’s reforms after 1577. Even in February 1567, when ordinary expenditure was reduced to just £5714, following attempts to raise revenue to fund the navy through atypical methods, total

\textsuperscript{20} BL, Stowe 132, ff. 51-55.
\textsuperscript{21} TNA, E351/2198.
expenditure still failed to conform to these limits. Between 1567 and 1570, declared accounts record between £15,115 and £19,005 in naval expenses.\textsuperscript{22} Despite attempts at reform, then, Benjamin Gonson struggled to conform to a reduced ordinary budget, and his control over finances, when compared to his successors, was very limited. R. B. Wernham was amongst the first historians to stress that John Hawkins’s apparent revolution in the navy – with the integration of the \textit{race-built galleon} – occurred at the same time as naval expenditure was actually decreasing.\textsuperscript{23} Since his appointment as joint treasurer with his father-in-law, Benjamin Gonson, in November 1577, the treasury had greater accountability.\textsuperscript{24} Hawkins was commissioned to produce surveys of the queen’s fleet, and their findings encouraged Hawkins’s financial ‘bargain’ of October 1579, which agreed to a reduction of the ordinary to just £4000 per annum.\textsuperscript{25} Hawkins achieved such a drop through imposing a budget on each department dedicated to the navy’s preservation: the making of cables and rigging was restricted to £1200, whilst the cost of caulking and grounding vessels would be kept to £1000. Remaining ordinary expenditure was assigned to the maintaining of the royal dockyards and wages. In so doing, from 1577, the navy had a clear understanding of what ordinary expenditure was for; it was revenue for the general maintenance and upkeep of the queen’s warships. All other expenditure, from new builds to commissioning fleets for expeditions, was to be funded by extraordinary warrants commissioned by the Lord Treasurer or Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer. Simon Adams has shown that Hawkins succeeded in ensuring the reduction and consistency of ordinary expenditure from 1577, and in doing so he saved the exchequer some

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} TNA, E351/2203-2206.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} R. B. Wernham, \textit{Before the Armada} (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966), pp. 342-43.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} TNA, E351/2214.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} TNA, SP 12/132, ff. 87-88.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
£1,700 annually.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, total annual expenditure remained as low as £8,896 before the Spanish War.\textsuperscript{27}

Naturally, the Spanish War increased the revenue spent by the Elizabethan state on its navy. Yet, despite larger extraordinary grants during the war, there was an average annual wartime naval expenditure of £47,992.\textsuperscript{28} This was a low figure compared to her father’s, siblings’ and successors’ wartime equivalents, and is representative of Hawkins’s competence in naval finance. Under the peaceful reign of James I, when the navy was criticised for having been neglected, the average annual expense of the navy was £38,534, a high figure when compared to the Elizabethan wartime equivalent.\textsuperscript{29} Perhaps more astonishing by comparison is that, before the ship money levy was introduced, average annual expenditure for the early years of Charles I’s reign, between 1625 and 1634, was £83,416, because of the wars with France and Spain.\textsuperscript{30} By contrast, in the years of 1565 to 1585, when the Elizabethan state was at peace, annual expenditure had averaged just £11,439, demonstrating the competency of Elizabethan naval finance.\textsuperscript{31} This suggests, as presented in Chart 3.2, that the regime managed to find a method for maintaining a standing fleet at a reduced cost, by 1565, with the conclusion of the Anglo-French war.\textsuperscript{32} Although not the fighting force that Charles I would have been satisfied with, the Elizabethan navy was able to conduct a war at relatively low cost. Naval expenditure peaked at £90,837 in 1588, a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} TNA, E351/2216-2221.
\item \textsuperscript{28} TNA, E351/2226-2240.
\item \textsuperscript{29} TNA, E351/2241-2263; BL, Add MS 64889, f. 155v.
\item \textsuperscript{30} TNA, E351/2264-2273.
\item \textsuperscript{31} TNA, E351/2201-2226.
\end{itemize}
remarkably small figure considering the events of that year. Elizabeth did not initiate a large rebuilding scheme once the Spanish War was underway because, in trusting John Hawkins, her fleet had been sustained in good condition, and with minimal cost, since the late 1570s.

James and his son relied upon extraordinary expenditure for the increasing costs of the navy and continued with the Elizabethan precedent of a capped ordinary. Chart 3.4 shows that the costs attributed to ordinary spending remained largely stable during the early Stuart dynasty. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war, ordinary naval expenditure under the Stuarts averaged £9,426, a similar figure to its Elizabethan counterpart. The greatest ordinary expenditure under the early Stuarts was, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the first year of Charles I’s reign, when his war with Spain pushed it to £19,895. This unusually high figure was trumped by an extraordinary of £144,797. The naval treasurer’s ordinary was therefore, on the whole, fairly consistent since John Hawkins’s reforms of the late 1570s, as Chart 3.4 indicates.

That an increased extraordinary continued after 1604 suggests that the war had a permanent impact on English naval finance, in the same way that one could assert that Louis XIII’s siege of La Rochelle had a similar consequence. It is nevertheless surprising that naval expenditure exceeded the 1588 total, ten times between 1625 and 1642. Granted, inflation must be taken into account, but it remains true that Charles spent more than Elizabeth on his navy. This indicates that the role of the monarch was pivotal to naval growth and usage. Through presenting the total annual expenditure of

33 TNA, E351/2224; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 119-122. This figure excludes the cost of victualing, which was recorded separately by this point. According to Geoffrey Parker, a further £59,221 was spent on victuals in 1588. Parker, ‘The Dreadnought Revolution’, p. 289.
34 Chart 3.4: TNA, E351/2241-2284; Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, pp. 197, 294.
35 TNA, E351/2241-2284.
36 TNA, E351/2263.
37 TNA, E351/2263-2264, 2266, 2269, 2274-83.
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England from 1547 to 1641, the statistics displayed in Chart 3.1 illustrate this.\textsuperscript{38} With a lack of funds, and a conservative attitude, the Elizabethan state limited naval expenditure. Instead, through its employment of privateers, and other atypical maritime devices, the use of the navy in the defence of the realm in 1588 cost England less than £100,000.\textsuperscript{39} Elizabeth’s successor, the rex pacificus, continued to act conservatively with regard to expenditure and, through refraining from participation in any major wars, James I’s navy was maintained at a relatively low cost, albeit higher than the pre-1585 years. By contrast, James’s son adopted the opposite attitude towards his fleet. He spent heavily, even prior to the introduction of the ship money levy. The scale of this expenditure was influenced by the development of both the Dutch and French navies during the Thirty Years’ War and since the end of the Twelve Years’ Truce. Charles knew that the development of two maritime powers, both just a short distance from the English coast, was a significant threat to the kingdom. Tensions between England and France were high during the ship money levy’s introduction, and France was fully aware that it did not need to fear the English fleet because of its own naval capabilities.\textsuperscript{40} Yet, ultimately, the revenue raised for the navy under Charles would not have been possible without him. His interest in the fleet, and the creation of the peacetime nationwide ship money levy during his personal rule would not have materialised under Elizabeth or James. In this, then, the connection between navy and monarch is evident.

Mirroring this, Chart 3.5 shows that, in France, there was also an increasing willingness to contribute greater sums to the navy following Louis XIII’s coming of

\textsuperscript{38} TNA, E351/2194-2284; TNA, E351/2888; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 119-122; See Oppenheim, \textit{Administration of the Royal Navy}, pp. 161, 197, 294.

\textsuperscript{39} Albeit, this is without including the cost of victuals, which were recorded in separate treasury accounts that were autonomous from the council. In 1588, a considerable £59,221 was spent on victuals for the navy, compared to just £2,964 in pre-war years (1574). Parker, ‘The Dreadnought Revolution’, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Lettres de Richelieu}, V, pp. 66-67: ‘Lettre de Richelieu à M. de Manty, 25 June 1635’.
The increased expenditure for the years 1622, 1628 and from 1635 (following France’s involvement in the Thirty Years’ War), were all a result of large, state-led, maritime campaigns. The treasury of the Ponant processed over 4,235,000 livres during the La Rochelle siege of 1628, without even taking account of the treasurers of the Levant. This was the largest sum spent in a single year by either the English or French navies. This financial commitment represents increased attention to the Ponant fleet with Louis XIII’s majority, and especially during Richelieu’s time as grand maître. With his appointment, the cardinal had declared his intention to maintain ‘thirty good warships to guard the coasts’ at an annual cost of 1,500,000 livres. This figure would be achieved through the suppression of the admiralty, which would save some 400,000 livres every year. In peacetime, this figure appears to have been maintained, for, prior to France’s official involvement in the Thirty Years’ War, the Ponant fleet was spending around 1,250,000 livres per annum (from 1631 to 1634). Yet, proportionately more was being spent (around 2,400,000 livres per annum in 1629 to 1631) when Richelieu’s construction scheme was at its height. This would see the crown’s warships reach upwards of forty sailing vessels, and more than twenty galleys in the Mediterranean. An increase to around 2,000,000 livres per annum for the combined costs of both the Levant and Ponant fleets from 1635 was matched by England, but only through the ship money levy.

All in all, when excluding the exceedingly high expenditure during the La Rochelle years, it is apparent that there was a steady increase in financial support for

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42 BN, français 6409, f. 350.
43 Lettres de Richelieu, I, pp. 290-92. [Sa Majesté s’estant résolue d’entretenir trente bons vaisseaux de guerre pour tenir les costes nettes].
44 BN, français 6409, ff. 1-105.
46 BN, français 6409, ff. 264, 301, 339, 368-370v; BN, français 6410; TNA, E351/2276, 2278, 2280.
the French navy from the beginning of the Bourbon dynasty, as shown in Chart 3.7. More importantly, this increase accelerated with the involvement of Cardinal Richelieu. It was no coincidence that, from the 1620s, both the English and French navies increased the levels of financial aid dedicated to their fleets. The two states’ naval expansion policies in these later years, influenced one another, and served as a form of deterrent, forcing both to continually invest more and more revenue. Although the personalities and ambitions of Charles, Louis and Richelieu, were important to naval growth, equal stress needs to be placed on the maritime arms race that escalated between the English, French and Dutch, during the final decades of this study.

Before the new appointments and reforms to the treasury of the Ponant in 1631, thorough accounts of naval expenditure in France that are as extensive as the English alternatives are unavailable. A void exists that is filled only with partial and infrequent records from the Wars of Religion until 1622. Even before the commencement of the wars, records are sporadic (but, then again, so are the English), and available data deserves scepticism because of its infrequency, and lack of detail. Nevertheless, some broad conclusions can be drawn from the information available. Francis I’s invasion attempt in 1545 was, undoubtedly, the single greatest naval expense of the sixteenth century for France, a statement that is also most likely true for England. Given the size and scale of the 1545 campaign, Chart 3.6 shows that revenue attributed to the navy in subsequent years was significantly less, in spite of the renewal of the Italian Wars that would result in French naval campaigns to Naples and Corsica.47 Henri II’s greatest year of expense was in 1553, when 577,009 livres was spent on twenty-four French galleys participating in these campaigns; meanwhile,

the Ponant received just 17,490 livres. Nevertheless, total average expenditure for his two fleets pushed French naval spending to more than England’s during the mid-sixteenth century. From the records available, French annual naval expenditure during the 1550s averaged around 500,000 livres – in 1553 and 1558, documented expenses were 594,499 and 482,235 livres respectively – whilst in England, this was between £20-30,000. France was, however, participating in the final conflict of the Italian Wars at this stage.

That records are more limited, haphazard and irregular for France during the sixteenth century, especially during the Wars of Religion, causes complications for a comparative study. Available evidence suggests that the crown provided no standard ordinary annual revenue during France’s later years of turmoil, given that no permanent standing navy existed. By November 1592, Henri II’s galleys were long gone, and Henri IV was writing to the duc de Nivernois that ‘I will have to hang the [condemned] traitors, and if we had some galleys, I would condemn them there instead’. During this time, fleets were instead constructed largely from the local maritime towns’ resources, using private shipping by either hiring it, or purchasing vessels outright. Small sums would have continued to circulate through the treasury for a navy during these years, so that a maritime presence could continue. A rare account of the Ponant treasury in 1587, for example, provides a total of 30,560 livres being spent. By contrast, under Charles IX, there still existed what Marc Seguin has described as ‘an embryo of the royal navy’. Yet, it is clear that these royal vessels

48 BN, français 17329, ff. 96v-97, cited in Potter, Renaissance France at War, pp. 356-57.
49 TNA, E351/2194-2196; BN, français 17329, ff. 96v-97.
51 BN, français 4489, f. 128.
were disposed of after the siege of La Rochelle (1572-1573) and not replaced, leaving occasional state campaigns to consist of local merchant vessels, such as during the Azores campaigns of 1580 to 1583.\textsuperscript{53} Despite the crown owning no warships of significance by the later stages of the wars, it seems likely that a small source of income was still spent on the arming of the seas, through using coastal private vessels. Unfortunately, uncovering comprehensive figures during these years is extremely difficult, because of the lack of records maintained. Yet, this actually suggests something about early modern naval finance in France. That records were not preserved, or even produced in the first place with the same systematic consistency achieved in England, suggests that less importance was applied to the state-owned navy as a tool of early modern power. As a smaller institution, with far less prominence than the army, the importance of maintaining a small standing navy in the late-sixteenth century, with an annual income, was not considered as critical, especially in times of political crisis.

This difference between the two kingdoms’ approaches is also seen when considering French ordinary and extraordinary expenditure. Whereas, by the beginning of Elizabeth I’s reign, an ordinary budget for the English navy had been produced, in France, the available treasury accounts for this period show that no similar financial system was established. Although records declare \textit{ordinaire}, and \textit{extraordinaire de la guerre} for the fleet, these terms referred to something altogether different. The \textit{ordinaire} was the amount of money provided to the navy from the crown’s ordinary collected revenue, whereas the \textit{extraordinaire} was a separate treasury department, used during war to collect additional taxation. The 226,036 \textit{livres} provided for the Levant in 1560, was granted from the treasury of the \textit{ordinaire},

\textsuperscript{53} James, ‘The French Armada?’, pp. 1-20.
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whereas the additional sum of 28,078 livres was from the department of the extraordinaire.\textsuperscript{54} There was no system in place, then, that capitalised on restricting and regulating naval expenditure in France; references to the ordinaire and extraordinaire are misleading for a comparative study, as they signify the department of the financial grant’s origin, not the purpose of its expenditure.

This brings into question whether any standard annual fiscal revenue was provisioned for the French navy, or if it was assessed on a case-by-case basis. This appears to have depended upon the fleet in question. Available records suggest that the Levant did receive an ordinary revenue (from the ordinaire) to fund the contracts of the galley fleets by Henri II’s reign, and this spending continued into the early years of Charles IX’s. This income was of around 200,000 livres per annum, which peaked at over 339,000 in 1553, the year of the Naples and Corsica campaigns.\textsuperscript{55} Meanwhile, revenue received from the extraordinaire was always significantly less, being lower than 30,000 livres from 1560 to 1562. Nevertheless, except from the contracts between the crown and any galley owners, money attributed to fund the fleet was not budgeted for particular ends, as became the case in England. Instead, it was the responsibility of the Treasurer of the Levant, with the advice of the général des galères to determine where revenue was best directed.\textsuperscript{56} The Treasurer of the Levant had partial carte blanche, which would only have been restricted when national revenue was low and when Richelieu began to regulate expenditure with the conseil de la marine.

Interestingly, financial income for the Ponant during the same years shows a different picture. Whereas the Levant fleet – at least prior to the Wars of Religion – was granted a regular bursary from the ordinaire, the Ponant fleet had no such

\textsuperscript{54} BN, français 17329, f. 107v.
\textsuperscript{55} ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{6}77, ff. 101-102.
fortune. Revenue attributed to the Ponant during these years was far smaller. In both 1561 and 1562, the Ponant treasury recorded less than 40,000 *livres* being spent, compared to over 225,000 in the Levant.\(^{57}\) Furthermore, the majority of the revenue for the Ponant originated from the *extraordinaire* treasury, and not the typical *ordinaire*. This suggests that the Ponant fleet either controlled no, or at the most, a severely restricted, annual budget. In 1558, the Ponant received 72,135 *livres* from the *extraordinaire*, yet just 21,514 from the *ordinaire*, and in 1562, 26,884 from the *extraordinaire* and 13,015 from its counterpart. This is surprising, given that France was at war with England during these years, and suggests that the kingdom had only a small interest in the Ponant fleet in the mid-sixteenth century. These statistics support English reports of 1557 to 1558 that claimed there was no French threat in the Channel at the time, and any resources that the king did control were blockading Calais.\(^{58}\) French naval finance prior to the Wars of Religion, then, was far from the model developing in England. Financially, the kingdom prioritised the Levant fleet, and would continue to do so into the early-seventeenth century. It may be inferred from the figures that the state did not consider the financial regulation of the navy to be essential, unlike in England. The reasoning behind this difference was most likely because of the greater ordinary annual revenue that France enjoyed, when compared to England.

### 3.2. Ordinary State Revenue

The cost of maintaining navies increased as an arms race developed. With a greater demand on its revenue, states were forced simultaneously to seek new methods, or

\(^{57}\) BN, français 17329, f. 107.

\(^{58}\) TNA, SP 11/11, ff. 14, 22; TNA, SP, 11/12, f. 32; *Edward and Mary*, pp. 332-36. For this reason, the majority of the English fleet was commanded to return to Portsmouth: TNA, SP 11/13, f. 17.
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rely more heavily on traditional forms of ordinary income, in order to progress with military aspirations. Navies were not alone in becoming a greater financial burden as the period progressed. They were accompanied by the growth of armies, amongst other factors, in forcing the state to innovate. Yet, because of contrasting fiscal systems, both in size and structure, the development of standing navies affected England differently from France. In France, ordinary revenue acquired from taxation could enable the navy to operate – albeit, not without difficulty – without the need for innovative fiscal reform.

Unlike in France, at the start of this period, the English crown was expected to live from its land and other privileges, when at peace. This included the royal demesne and customs dues. As its property, the navy was maintained through the crown’s personal income. Ordinary naval expenditure was established with this in mind, and for this reason under Elizabeth I, reforms were undertaken to ensure that ordinary expenditure should seldom surpass £10,000.

Annual income from customs duties averaged between £30-40,000 between Henry VIII’s and Mary I’s reigns and substantially increased along with commercial developments under Elizabeth I. Nevertheless, customs rarely produced more than £100,000 in a year under the Tudors and expanded only gradually with the early Stuarts, reaching around £160,000 in the 1620s. Meanwhile, income from the crown lands (excluding the sale of monastic and royal property) also rarely increased above six digits. Combining these with the profits from judicial cases, and the sale of wardships, annual peacetime income for the English crown during the sixteenth century scarcely reached more than £300,000. It naturally reached its peak at the end

of the dynasty when, under Elizabeth, the crown’s revenue averaged £399,130.61 With a relatively slim budget compared to France, the crown found itself reliant upon techniques for extracting additional revenue when seeking to expand, extensively use, or remodel the fleet. In fact, the English crown’s ordinary peacetime revenue was less than 50 per cent of the French equivalent.

With the ambitious and militarily eager Henry VIII on the throne, England found itself perhaps too regularly collecting direct taxation to fund the crown’s wars. Due to this frequency, under Henry, England’s population became accustomed to paying what was an extraordinary tax, which resulted in a lack of resistance to what G. R. Elton argued was the emergence of peacetime taxation. In continuing to focus upon the political changes of the 1530s, Elton argued for the importance of the year 1534 - when he claimed the first parliamentary subsidy was authorised in peacetime - as the beginning of the extension of ordinary direct taxation outside of war.62 Although, it has been countered that, well into the early-seventeenth century, there remained a clear distinction between ordinary and extraordinary taxation, Elton’s emphasis on the conformism that followed from both parliament and populace, still deserves attention as a moment of fiscal change.63 R. W. Hoyle’s study of the preambles that accompanied the peacetime subsidies from 1534 has shown that, until Elizabeth’s reign, explanations for direct taxation in peacetime still referred to the demands of war. The expenses attributed to the preambles of the 1534 and the 1540

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subsidies were characterised by military requirements, although focusing upon improvements for defence.\textsuperscript{64} The preamble of 1540, for example, explained that additional taxation was required for the upkeep of the navy and the redevelopment of Dover harbour.\textsuperscript{65}

That Henry would spend even more than that granted by this taxation, during the 1540s, is representative of his wartime policy, and not of the incompetence of the state. After receiving both a parliamentary subsidy, and fifteenths from the laity, in 1542 the crown still sought a forced loan, for it had ‘disbursed a far greater sum of money than he [Henry] hath or shall receive by the same’.\textsuperscript{66} Despite not being sufficient to accommodate all of Henry’s vast expenditures during the late 1530s and 1540s, it seems plausible that the original English ‘peacetime’ subsidies provided both its parliament and the masses with an introduction to ordinary direct taxation that would be vindicated with ‘little of substance’.\textsuperscript{67} Although Elton applied too great an emphasis on the grant of 1534, which could be seen as a subsidy for war during peacetime, the years between Henry’s break with Rome and the early Elizabethan period witnessed the state becoming accustomed to peacetime direct taxation, despite its extraordinary title. There was, then, as suggested by Roger Schofield, ‘a strong identity of interest between parliament and crown’ in Henry’s late reign, which prevented any general opposition to the crown’s demands for taxation.\textsuperscript{68}

It is important to turn to the navy’s role as a basis for justifying taxation within these early preambles. By this time, the navy had begun to emerge as a defensive tool designed for the kingdom’s protection, and not just the weapon of the king’s

\textsuperscript{66} BL, Add MS 70518, f. 4v, cited in Hoyle, ‘Crown, Parliament and Taxation’, p. 1185.
\textsuperscript{67} Hoyle, ‘Crown, Parliament and Taxation’, p. 1192.
continental ambitions. Thomas Cromwell reported in June 1536 that, since coming into office, he had rebuilt the Mary Rose, the Peter Pomegranate, the Lion, the Katherine Galley, the Bark, the Minion, the Sweepstake, whilst work was also soon to begin on the Henri Grâce à Dieu and the Great Galley.69 These ships are likely to have been the products of the peacetime subsidy’s collection. The navy, then, was a crucial stimulus in encouraging direct taxation outside of war, and the decision to produce an ordinary annual income for England’s navy in 1557 should be considered as part of a new movement for political reform through peacetime finance. The establishment of an ordinary budget for England’s navy was part of a larger financial transformation in England that also witnessed the birth of peacetime direct taxation.

Even with these ideas beginning to materialise, both the historiography and statistics show that the navy had not transformed England into a permanent fiscal-military state by 1642. With the long Spanish War requiring annual direct taxation in the late-sixteenth century, parliamentary grants accounted for a greater proportion of overall income during Elizabeth’s reign than her successors’: 42.54 per cent for 1558 to 1603, 33 under James and 34.3 his son.70 Instead, with the state’s control of commerce, and overseas spheres of interest in the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, indirect taxation from customs duties, such as tonnage and poundage, increased rapidly. The establishment of The Levant Company in 1592 led English mercantile expansion from which the state could profit. Between 1570 and 1620, the English share of the Ottoman market increased by 15 per cent at the expense of the Venetian equivalent.71 As a result, customs duties became the largest source of state

69 LPH, X, no. 1231: ‘June 1536’.
income by 1642: 23.62 per cent of total state income under Elizabeth, 39.49 under James, and 44.6 under Charles.\textsuperscript{72} Maria Fusaro has recently argued that England’s growth as a world power was a result of the state’s understanding that it needed to prioritise its investment in commercial enterprises and then use its profits to adequately maintain its navy and other defences so that they in turn could protect the realm’s maritime communities.\textsuperscript{73} Advances in indirect taxation that were fuelled by an expansion in overseas trade went hand-in-hand with naval expansion, a system that Cardinal Richelieu would also advocate when he provided the \textit{Compagnies des cent associés} with its charter in 1627. With this in mind, it cannot be claimed that state finance was dependent upon military developments, although it could encourage its advance.

This has not prevented Michael J. Braddick from arguing that, despite these developments in commercial expansion, the English state’s fiscal system was far from transformed. For Braddick, early Stuart finances were poorly administered because of the incompetence of the agents upon whose shoulders the burdens of administration fell.\textsuperscript{74} Stuart finances were ‘like a patchwork of remedies each of which had particular problems’.\textsuperscript{75} Instead, Braddick has argued that it was not until the English Civil War that a financial transformation of the English state occurred. During the conflict, governmental resources funding the war increased considerably, because the English Parliament enforced greater rates of direct taxation that were collected by the armed

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{ibid}; European State Finance Database Project (ESFDB), ‘English state taxes and other revenues, 1604-48’ prepared by P. K. O’Brien and P. A. Hunt. By 1613 indirect taxation was the largest source of state revenue, more than doubling the value of any other source of income in that year. From 1636 to 1640, revenue from indirect taxation rose considerably, representing some 58.32 per cent of total revenue in 1640.

\textsuperscript{73} Fusaro, \textit{Political Economies of Empire}, pp. 354-55.

\textsuperscript{74} Braddick, \textit{State Formation}, pp. 278-84.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{ibid}, p. 284.
forces. This suggests that developments in commerce during the early-seventeenth century provided the stimulus and fuel to sustain the English navy during times of peace, yet it did not have the potential to support the increased expenditure during war. Before the outbreak of civil war, when the navy was required for more than coastal patrols, the English state funded it through a series of irregular and problematic expedients that were only short-term solutions. On this basis, Braddick’s argument that there was no (fundamental) revolution in finance prior to 1642 should be accepted.

Unlike in England, the French monarch ordered and collected taxation directly, without having it authorised by parliament (except in the provincial estates, where contractual agreements prevented such measures, such as in Brittany and Languedoc). The monarch’s ability to do so, made the taxation of the populace far easier to achieve and, since the Hundred Years War, the nation had been accustomed to annual taxation, even in peacetime. The kingdom had three main forms of taxation: the taille, aides and gabelle. The three combined had been a regular method of income since the fifteenth century and contributed up to 90 per cent of the crown’s revenue. The aides were taxes levied on the sale and manufacture of goods, specifically, although not exclusively, on wine, fish and wood. Meanwhile, the gabelle was a tax on salt. The gabelle was particularly lucrative, and yet unpopular, in northern France, where the majority of its population had to tolerate the sel de devoir, whereby it was compulsory for each person to purchase a certain amount of salt.

The taille, a direct tax, was undoubtedly the most rewarding of the three, producing over 50 per cent of the state’s revenue. Rates varied between north and

77 See below, pp. 138-49 of thesis.
south, and the nobility and clergy were largely exempt from paying it. Naturally, revenue raised through the taille increased during times of war, which then inflated post-war figures. Of the 7,000,000 livres raised in taxation in 1547, around 60 per cent came from the taille, whilst over 15 per cent came from the aides, and 5 from the gabelle. Similarly, in 1559, when almost 11,000,000 livres was raised, around 50 per cent came from the taille. These values were the results of the demands of war, and under Francis I, the taille increased from 2,400,000 to 5,300,000 livres per annum because of the demands of the Italian Wars. Similar to the English preambles accompanying parliamentary grants, any tailles of irregular financial demand were accompanied with lançons for the same purpose, blaming war for its growth. Periods where war increased the size of the taille rarely permitted taxation rates to return to pre-war conditions after. As an example, in Dauphiné, the taille collected 44,428 livres in 1542, before increasing substantially to 307,580 the following year. It was reduced in 1550, but only to the greater value of 80,000 livres. Evidently, along with inflation, war was a significant factor in advancing, or radicalising, the fiscal system.

War, then, brought both the English and the French fiscal systems into flux, and both states struggled to produce enough income for their military efforts. France developed a system that relied on its tax farmers, by requiring them through

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81 ibid, ff. 29v-41.
84 R. J. Knecht, Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 186. It is for this reason unsurprising that, in the short and war-ridden reign of Henri II, annual royal income rose on average by 5.7 per cent each year, compared to 1.44 per cent under his father.
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obligation of office to deliver advances on tax yet to be collected. Tax farms had long been established in France for the collection of indirect taxes (most importantly the gabelle) and, in 1632, the générale des gabelles de France was established as a single farm, which served all of the north and northwest of France, where the purchasing of salt was compulsory.85 The crown leased its farms, producing a good stream of profit for the tax farmers in the long term, but in the short term, the tax collectors provided the crown with a regular stream of revenue to fund its wars and of course its navy. This was in essence the privatisation of fiscality, enabling the French monarchy to receive customs revenue often prior to its actual collection. Daniel Dessert has coined the phrase système fisco-financier to describe the process whereby the crown could obtain, in advance, tax that had yet to be collected, through taking it directly from the wealthy tax farmers’, and other office holders’ own pockets.86

This is not to say that France was alone in resorting to the services of tax farmers. Elizabethan England briefly employed tax farming, before James I and his son used the system extensively, primarily, but not exclusively for the collection of customs revenue, in order to obtain short-term loans.87 As English tax farming was part of a far broader and complex system of early-Stuart income, England was fortunate enough to avoid the fiscal crisis that France would later witness. Yet this is not to say that the system was entirely beneficial for the Stuart crown. Both kingdoms used a system that, in its very nature, produced short-term funding but at the cost of reduced income, after the tax farmers had received their cut.

86 ibid, pp. 33-34; idem, Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle (Paris: Fayard, 1984).
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Tax farmers were also dependent upon the economic strength of the state, and large loans provided to the crown were not always repaid in full from customs revenue. In France, although tax farmers were not at risk to quite the same extent as other office holders who were forced to provide loans, because the farmers’ ability to collect taxes served as a financial guarantee, they were to some degree insecure. Some 18 per cent of French tax farmers would see bankruptcy during the seventeenth century.

Yet, although the use of tax farmers reduced the total revenue that the state collected, the broad taxation system described did have variations across the French provinces. In one example, Brittany’s ability to govern itself was agreed upon as a condition of its integration in 1532, and the crown permitted its estates considerable freedom as to how taxation was collected. Brittany met most of its fiscal obligations to the crown through customs duties. Its tax on wine was the heaviest in France, but thereby, it avoided contributing towards the gabelle. This was particularly beneficial for the province considering that Brittany produced large quantities of salt. Furthermore, its heavy tax on wine enabled the taille to be less substantial than for other provinces. Landowners rarely contributed more than 10 or 15 livres per annum, prior to 1643. This system took a decentralised approach but, as James B. Collins has suggested, it ‘provided a very rational adaptation to the practical realities of the early modern state’.

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In other cases, estates were exempt from collecting certain taxes altogether. Following a revolt in Guyenne against the gabelle in 1548, Henri II eventually agreed to the tax being abolished in the southwest of France, but not before the people paid him almost 1,750,000 livres in commutation to fund his war in the Mediterranean. Most importantly for this study, Le Havre was also granted special provisions. Since its original commission for construction in 1517, Le Havre was provided with tax exemptions from the major French national taxes: the taille, gabelle and aides. As a frontier harbour and northern maritime town, in 1594, Henri IV renewed these privileges and justified their continuation because:

The said town sits on the sea, [and] they are in continual danger of being pillaged and attacked. It is necessary that they continually spend for the protection of the town by having weapons prepared…the town can continue doing this by continuing to undertake its privileges.

Le Havre, Guyenne, and Brittany were not alone as financial centres; Paris and Lyon were also exempt from the taille, as was Marseille. Since 1257, Marseille had been granted exemption from France’s main direct tax, and this privilege was for the same reasons as Le Havre. It makes an excellent contrast that, whereas these French maritime and naval capitals were granted exemption from taxes, so that local efforts could focus on defending the kingdom’s coasts, in England, a similar concept was developed for protecting the realm through ship money. However, England’s ship levy did not provide the fiscal privileges to those applicable counties like those

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93 Le Havre, AA2, ff. 1, 2, 16, 26: ‘Lettres patentes, attache des généraux des finances…confirmation des privilèges, 1517-1610’.
95 AN, Marine B’ 484, no. 3.
exempted in France, and the money collected was sent to London, preventing the localities from experiencing its benefits. In France, it remained the responsibility of the localities to provide an adequate amount of coastal protection; it was their money, spent on their resources, and used to patrol their coasts.

As systems such as these were in place that resulted in money being collected and spent locally, without ever reaching the French crown, it is difficult to accurately assess annual revenue accumulated through taxation. Total tax declared in 1559 was 10,755,241 *livres*, yet this was only for the central treasury. The local revenue collected, and used at source, for expenses including coastal defences, is challenging to account for, making it difficult for historians to produce accurate figures for national taxation. There is little doubt that ordinary annual income in both England and France was problematic to collect and record. Controlling a standing navy required revenue both in peace and war. Whatever the size of the state’s economy, neither England nor France found sufficient revenue to continue a sustained military campaign and produce a larger, standing fleet without considering alternative methods for obtaining money that would result in social, political and economic strain.

3.3. *Atypical Income*

As large navies became more integral to European military efforts during the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, states, and specifically England, were forced to consider new methods for producing revenue intended for their upkeep. Initially, the English fleet was sustained through extraordinary taxation, and high interest rate loans, yet this could not continue; as navies expanded in size, states were

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96 BN, français 17329, f. 41.
led into economic turmoil. Like an army, maintaining a standing navy was expensive. France, having long known and adapted to the fiscal pressures of controlling a large army, was able to use its already established system and stretch it to accommodate its navy (although not without difficulties). French taxation and loans increased as the period progressed, in step with military expansion. Yet England was forced to look towards other, often previously untested methods, to fund naval development. Here, the demand for naval expansion and sustenance had direct ramifications on state progress. Through applying experimental methods to accumulate revenue for the navy, the state had the potential to reshape and advance its infrastructure.

By 1545, both kingdoms were in a poor financial position because of Henry’s and Francis’s willingness to plunder their realms and take out loans to fund their wars. Francis I was one of the first monarchs to exploit venal offices as a method of covering his debts, often debasing the status of his own officers in the process. Francis was not alone in exploiting such devices, Henry VIII on several occasions debased the coinage; between 1545 and 1551, the English crown raised £1,270,000 through this means.97 Meanwhile, between 1539 and 1543, the dissolution of the English monasteries raised a further £250,000, and there is no doubt that without these funds, Henry would have been unable to expand his fleet for the French war. Henry’s desperation for income and resources to fund his wars is illustrated in an act passed in 1541 that forbade the exporting of bell metal ‘into any parte beyond the Sea, or into anye outward Realme or D[omi]nion whatsoever it be; upon payne to forfeyt the double value of the same mettall so carried and conveyed’.98 Brass bell metal could be recast into heavy ordnance and fitted on the king’s warships. The wars of the

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1540s were costly in both money and material resources and it is estimated that at least one sixth of the revenue spent in both kingdoms was allocated to naval affairs. 99

By 1547, the English and French crowns faced substantial deficits because of the high interest rate loans obtained to fund the war. In 1546, Francis owed the bankers of Lyon 6,860,844 livres. 100 Loans were short-term solutions increasingly relied upon, despite the debt that they created. Neither Henry nor Francis was likely to quickly retreat from a conflict that was part of a historic feud between the two crowns, and so loans were the lesser of two evils when the alternative was to seek peace. Francis borrowed from merchant bankers across Europe: Antwerp, London, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and, of course, his homeland, would all provide loans, in spite of 16 per cent interest rates. Meanwhile, Henry was willing to borrow through London’s livery companies, although most debt was owed to Antwerp’s moneylenders. Antwerp was the only major source of northern European credit, leaving England with little choice but to borrow there, whilst France’s location in Europe allowed it easier access to additional markets. Between 1544 and 1547, Henry borrowed almost £1,000,000 from Antwerp with interest rates of up to 18 per cent. 101

Resolving the financial deficit accumulated by both kingdoms’ wars was not easy, and both crowns remained in debt to merchant bankers by the time that new conflicts began after 1547. Although John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland’s financial skill had begun to balance the crown’s books, by Edward VI’s death in 1553, the English crown owed £61,064 to Antwerp, and both Mary and Elizabeth’s

99 It has been estimated that the wars of the 1540s cost England £3,200,000, whilst French expenditure for the war effort was comparable, at around 30,000,000 livres. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 188; Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 235.
100 Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, pp. 504-505; idem, French Renaissance Monarchy, pp. 52-53; BN, français 17329, ff. 26v, 28v.
101 Gunn, Early Tudor Government, p. 143. Most of these loans were short-term, and needed to be paid back within six months. Henry owed £75,000 to Antwerp’s moneylenders at the time of his death.
French wars only served to exacerbate the situation. Royal debt from Antwerp reached £279,000 in 1560. It therefore became apparent to William Cecil, Secretary of State, early in Elizabeth’s reign that, for the English navy to survive, it was imperative for a new source of income to emerge to fund it.

England was not alone in this problem during the mid-sixteenth century; indeed, it never faced a financial crisis on the same scale as France. Henri II’s ambitions led France into two wars with the Habsburgs, and that of 1551 to 1555 cost the state some 45,000,000 écus. The king had little choice but to resort to larger loans to fund his war, one of which, from Italian bankers, amounted to a colossal 900,000 écus. By renewing a war whilst already in debt, Henri had no option but to look to alternative methods for raising revenue. He issued new rentes on the hotel de ville, which served to guarantee future interest payments to those loaning money. Yet, even with rentes, Henri was still borrowing heavily from both the international and Lyonaise bankers. In 1555, the state reorganised how it dealt with money borrowed on the Lyon market through establishing the grand parti de Lyon, a consortium of Lyon-based bankers who raised money for the crown. Instead of the merchant bankers of Lyon offering loans as individuals to the crown, this new system allowed them to unite and offer the crown consolidated, medium-term loans. This reliance upon loans continued to increase Henri’s debts and, after the peace attempts of 1556 had failed, the crown became so reliant on the grand parti to fund its war efforts at land and sea that it eventually declared bankruptcy.

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102 TNA, SP 11/1, f. 24.
104 Potter, *Renaissance France at War*, p. 213.
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By the end of his reign, Henri was struggling to raise revenue, even through borrowing at high interest rates, because of the crown’s financial unreliability that had resulted from its bankruptcy. The peace at Cateau-Cambrésis in April 1559 was welcomed by a French state in financial ruin. France certainly generated a greater income than England, allowing it to sustain a limited, yet lengthy war, but ultimately, it too suffered from the fiscal constraints encountered in England. With war in early modern Europe, national expenditure was almost always greater than income, forcing states, when all other resources had been consumed, into crisis. David Potter is right to assert that the state was ‘by its nature…arcane and unresponsive to emergencies’ and only through ‘sometimes superhuman efforts’ was France able to continue its wars under both Francis and Henri.  

This was until France could no longer default on payments by the end of the 1550s. Elizabeth may have inherited a heavy debt through her sister’s loans, but France’s equivalent surpassed this by Henri II’s death: by 1561 the royal deficit stood at 41,000,000 livres. With the sinews of war taking their toll, it is hardly surprising that France was unable to retain a sizeable standing royal fleet in the subsequent years.

With this said, England’s maritime finances were far from stable whilst the French Wars of Religion were playing out. To resolve this, in a rare and well-recorded string of events, an extraordinary scheme to collect revenue was plotted by William Cecil between 1567 and 1569. Following additional parliamentary subsidies granted for the earlier French wars, and a subsequent subsidy voted in 1566, Cecil was burdened by the knowledge that further revenue was required for vital repairs to the harbours of England. Given the recently granted subsidies, and the difficulties that would be faced in justifying an additional tax assessment to fund this programme,

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107 Potter, Renaissance France at War, p. 235
Cecil knew that it was unfeasible to request a further subsidy.\textsuperscript{109} According to his assessment, £200,000 was required to repair the harbours, a figure twenty times greater than annual ordinary naval expenditure at the time. Cecil thus sought alternative methods for raising revenue - as an indication of the ‘experimental nature of early modern governance’ – and proposed a new method of taxation that would raise income solely for repairing the harbours from Portsmouth to the Thames.\textsuperscript{110}

Whatever the reaction to this may have been, this scheme did not come to fruition, and plans were instead made for England’s first national lottery. Influenced by Italian ideas, Cecil’s national lottery was officially endorsed by the queen on 23 August 1567, and was in the same month promoted publicly through printed broadsheets. Each ticket cost ten shillings and the state intended to sell 400,000 lots in order to accumulate the full £200,000 required. The first prize was £5000 and, to increase sales, each ticket holder could use their ticket as a pardon for all crimes except murder, felonies, piracy and treason. Moreover, the first broadsheet promoting this opportunity, printed by Henry Bynneman, ensured that all were aware of its purpose:

the same Lotterie is erected by hir Majesties order, to the intent that suche commoditie as may chaunce to arise thereof after the charges borne, may be converted towards the reparation of the Havens, and strength of the Realme, and towardes such other publique good workes.\textsuperscript{111}

Although an example of financial reform, Cecil’s scheme was ultimately too unconventional for the English populace to endorse. David Dean has argued that the portion of the English population able to afford these tickets were reluctant to

\textsuperscript{109} Dean, ‘Elizabeth’s Lottery’, p. 590.
\textsuperscript{111} Anon, \textit{A very rich Lotterie general} (London: H. Bynneman, 1567); Dean, ‘Elizabeth’s Lottery’, pp. 592-93.
purchas something that was so very ‘strange to the people of Englande’.\footnote{112 TNA, SP 12/47, f. 27; Dean, ‘Elizabeth’s Lottery’, pp. 587-99.} This was in spite of the queen’s subjects being reminded that the lottery was for the good of the Commonwealth, an attempt to play to patriotic emotions. However, the state struggled to find contributors, and the drawing of the lots was delayed three times to encourage more participants.\footnote{113 Anon, \textit{By the queene. Where as in the chart} (London: H. Bynneman, 1567); \textit{Anon, By the queene where as the queenes most excellent Majestie by her hygghes proclamation, geven at her manour of Hauering the xiii of July last…} (London: Richard Jugge and John Cawood, 1568).} When held on 11 January 1569, Cecil, the queen and the ticket-holders were all left disappointed. Less than 10 per cent of the original 400,000 tickets were sold, preventing the crown from obtaining the revenue required to repair the kingdom’s harbours. Two days before the draw, a royal proclamation announced the failure of England’s first national lottery and attributed the loss to ‘some mistrust or doubtfull interpretation of the proceedings in the saide Lotterie’.\footnote{114 Anon, \textit{Whereas the Queenes most excellent Majestie…the reading of the Lotterie} (London: H. Bynneman, 1569); Dean, ‘Elizabeth’s Lottery’, p. 605.} The queen, on behalf of the lottery’s initiators, used this disappointing result to account for the delay in its drawing, and for a substantial reduction in the value of the originally declared prizes:

\begin{quote}
all Adventurers in the same Lotterie [are to understand], that the very certaine summe of money collected, and chargeable to the same, is a twelfth part of the whole masse first by the said Chart appointed…all Adventurers shall be duely answered of their Prises accordingly after the saide rate: That is to say, to him that shall win the best and greatest Lotte, the summe of foure hundfreth and sixteene pounds, thirteene shillings and foure pence, which is the just twelfth part of five thousand pounds, before appointed to have bene given, if the whole summe had bene collected.
\end{quote}
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Although, England’s first national lottery shows how developments in naval and maritime affairs could stimulate state enterprise, it was a complete failure. With this said, its result does not detract from the fact that this attempt was a product of the pressure that materialised from England’s growing reliance on the maritime theatre.

No discussion of early modern state income and its relationship with naval expansion can be complete without considering the ship money levy. Before discussing the infamous Caroline scheme, attention must again be turned to Elizabeth, for the 1628 proposal was neither innovative nor original. In a series of events, which deserve far more attention from historians than has been received hitherto, a scheme for ship money was first produced in the aftermath of the Spanish Armada of 1588.\(^{115}\)

The demand to defend the realm against the Armada was deeply burdensome, and although the crown’s treasury paid for the majority of the vessels that served, the ‘greatest parte’ of twenty-three vessels from the coast were paid ‘by the Porte towns’.\(^{116}\) Furthering this, an additional thirty ships were paid for by the city of London.\(^{117}\) Following the Armada, the Elizabethan state continued to rely upon coastal towns to pay for the use of merchant vessels defending the shores. Coastal counties were obliged to contribute whilst the Spanish threat was at its highest, and also during the Azores and Cadiz campaigns of 1591 and 1596 respectively. This system, according to D. L. Keir, was far from ‘comprehensive or national’ as quotas were sporadic and no universal system was in place.\(^{118}\) Demands on the coastal communities were unpopular and were never wholly fulfilled and, overall, the vessels


\(^{116}\) BL, Egerton MS 2541, f. 4.


contributed by the coasts were ‘of little value to major operations’.\textsuperscript{119} It was only in February 1603, just a month before Elizabeth’s death, that a plan was drafted to permanently sustain a fleet through a regular ship money levy.\textsuperscript{120} Having experienced a war of endurance that was now in its eighteenth year, Elizabeth wrote that:

> this burden of expense (whatever it shall amount unto) must be for the most part raised and maintained by the voluntary contributions of our subjects…you may procure a speedy collection and disbursement of all things necessary for the providing and furnishing of ten or twelve ships.\textsuperscript{121}

Elizabeth’s death ensured that this scheme never came to fruition, and James’s peaceful reign removed all traces of a ship money levy. Nevertheless, that Elizabeth had prepared for the introduction of such a system, suggests that Charles’s original proposal in 1628 was not conceived as a radical and totally unfeasible scheme.\textsuperscript{122} That the English Parliament rejected it in 1628 was reflective of the attitudes towards its purpose, following England’s offensive failure at La Rochelle. As an atypical method for financial extraction, parliament was unlikely to sanction it when it had little desire to start a war.

Although English ship money is better known, records indicate that the French crown was also willing to exploit its coastal towns and provinces for similar ends. Although infrequent and produced only when necessity required, coastal payments in France for defence could accumulate large amounts, as was the case in Brittany in

\textsuperscript{119} Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{120} For this reason, Andrew Thrush has stated that before 1603 ‘there was no such thing as ship money, properly understood.’ A. Thrush, ‘Naval Finance and the Origins of Ship Money’ in M. C. Fissel (ed.), War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 133.
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1621. Under threat from increased Huguenot piracy, the Breton estates agreed to Louis XIII’s request for 500,000 livres to arm ships against the Rochelais. This revenue was raised through increasing duties imposed on wine in the province. Although the immediate Huguenot threat was greater than that along the English coastal lines during the Caroline ship money years, the casual nature of Louis’s request, and its immediate acceptance, suggests that specific taxation schemes for naval defence were more commonplace than often thought. Convoy de mer taxation schemes were repeatedly used in France, although detested. In 1557 the Breton estates paid 60,000 livres in order to be excluded from a tax of 20 sous per tun on ships. The revenue from it was intended to sustain a fleet patrolling the Bay of Biscay. Other examples include Francis I taxing the population ‘one sou per livre through the principle of the taille’ in 1532, for the construction of at least twelve galleys, built between 1532 and 1534 to defend the kingdom against an impending Ottoman attack. Irregular forms of taxation, such as these designed for maritime defence, appear more frequently than in England because the relationship between monarch and locality provided the means for them to be easily enforced. The duc de Guise was able to propose in 1585, and again in 1588, a customs tax on the Garonne river of Bordeaux of ‘20 sous on each tun of wine’ to fund the setting forth of a navy to sea. As the crown possessed greater authority to impose atypical taxes in France, the populace, in turn, was more accustomed to paying them, and so they were not scrutinised to the same degree as in England.

Charles I’s notorious ship money levy gained its reputation for two reasons: first, it was imposed without the authority of parliament, on 20 October 1634, and,

123 AN, K112, no.2, ff. 3, 10, 12, 25, 28, 29.
124 Collins, Brittany, p. 178.
125 ibid, p. 124.
127 BL, Lansdowne MS 57, f. 76. [xx si de chachun tonneau de vin]; AN, Marine G193, ff. 64-65.
second, its subsequent extension in the following year, to all landlocked counties and
towns was previously unknown and strongly contested. Yet, in spite of the critical
claims of contemporaries towards it, and it being abolished by the Long Parliament on
7 August 1641, Kenneth Andrews has argued that the ship money years were an
important step in the evolution of the navy, towards a professional English armed sea
force. Andrews is not alone, with both Kevin Sharpe and Alison Gill suggesting
that the ship money levy was highly successful. It is easy to understand why, for,
despite the resistance to it, on average, 90 per cent of the total demanded by each
annual writ was collected. Moreover, the ship money fleets were more powerful than
their predecessors. For the first time, the English fleet consisted almost entirely of the
king’s purpose built warships, without needing to rely on private vessels as Elizabeth
had done. The summer fleet of 1636 consisted of twenty-seven of Charles’s own
warships and just three merchants. This was a considerable difference from
Charles’s early years; Buckingham’s La Rochelle fleet of 1627 included just twelve
royal warships and eighty private. Both in revenue, and in the progression made
towards a permanent and professional state fleet, it is understandable why historians
have concluded that the ship money levy was a success.

Such an assessment, though, is not without its challengers. Henrik
Langelüddecke has alluded to the deeply unpopular nature of the levy and has
highlighted the difficulties that the state had in collecting ship money, even if the

129 Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 11.
131 Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 382.
132 Anon, A Catalogue of all the Kings Ships, as also of all other Ships, and Pinnaces, together with their Squadrons, Captaines, burthen, Seamen, and Land-men, set forth in his Majesties Service, the 27. Of June, 1627 (London: John Wright, 1627).
large majority of it was eventually gathered.¹³³ Langelüddecke has shown that ship money never arrived in London on time and took, on average, between six and nine months longer than the three months’ collection time originally intended. This was, according to Langelüddecke, a result of the widespread resistance directed towards the tax. There are many recorded instances of violence aimed against the levy, such as in September 1638, when Francis Sawyer of Kettering attacked a bailiff after refusing to contribute 16s 1d to the tax and ‘he did beate him and both break his head and bruised his Armes drawing bloud at severall places.’¹³⁴ Even the levy’s enforcers were known to be far from content, as shown in the accounts of Simonds D’Ewes, Sheriff of Suffolk. D’Ewes considered the levy fraudulent because it requested ‘under the pretense and couler to provide shipps for the defence of the kingdome, although wee were now in peace with all the worlde, and the roiall fleet was never stronger’.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, despite available evidence suggesting that views such as this were endemic, it is important to stress that ‘with less than perfect zeal’, sheriffs and other local state officials who collected ship money, on the whole, continued in their expected duties as part of a culture that centred on the duties of obedience.¹³⁶

In truth, Charles attempted to counter resistance to ship money, through classifying it as a service, and not a tax. According to him, the kingdom was in great fear of piracy and other potential hostile forces in its surrounding seas, and the ship money fleets were developed to counter this. The initial declared account of the treasury for the first ship money levy explained how the levy was legal for, it was not

a tax, but rather an agreement whereby the king was loaning his warships to the people:

Whereas by our severall writts under our greate Seale of England bearinge date the Twentieth of October last [1634], we have speciall comand that the Townes and places therin menconed should sett out severall shippes of severall burthens furnished with men and munycons for the full tyme of six moneths at their owne charges to be in readinesse at Portesmouth for the Safeguard of the Seas and defence of this Realme. And whereas the said maritime townes and places have represented unto us that they cannot of themselves finde shippes of soe greate a burthen as is requisite for this service, And therefore howe made their humbles suites unto us that wee would furnish them with the said shippes. Wee gratiously inclinnige to their humble request, and for the furtherance of soe greate a worke [we] are well pleased to lend unto [the people, the crown’s warships].

This suggests that, originally, the Caroline ship money fleets were produced by the same methods as their Elizabethan predecessor, but, because the counties were unable to supply vessels of a large enough tonnage, other measures were enforced. Each county was instead forced to provide the money to hire the crown’s warships for the defence of the kingdom, at a rate of £10 per ton. In 1636, Devon was to pay £9000 for a 900-ton warship, whilst Cumberland and Westmorland together contributed £1000 for a vessel of 100. The crown’s attempts to advertise ship money as a service, however, failed to convince a significant swathe of the nation.

Nevertheless, ship money payments produced an unprecedented amount of naval revenue. In the late 1635 writ, the Privy Council requested £202,998 and, by 1

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137 TNA, E351/2275.  
138 TNA, E351/2276.
October 1636, £149,511 (73.6 per cent of the intended amount) had been collected. Similar figures are present in the following two years, prior to John Hampden’s trial in October 1637, and the Scots’ War when the charge was reduced to accommodate increased ordinary taxation to fund the conflict.\footnote{Langelüddecke, ‘I finde all men’, pp. 533-41. For a discussion of the split decision on Hampden’s trial, and the criticised legality of ship money, see C. Russell, ‘The Ship Money Judgments of Bramston and Davenport’, \textit{The English Historical Review}, 77:303 (1962), pp. 312-18.} Comparing these figures to the navy’s income prior to the introduction of the levy illustrates the scale of the economic influx that ship money provided. In the year prior to ship money’s implementation, ordinary expenditure for the navy was just £14,628, whilst a further £34,338 was included from the extraordinary.\footnote{TNA, SP 16/226, f. 35; TNA, E403/2567, ff. 10-35; A. Thrush, \textit{The Navy under Charles I}, 1625-40, unpublished PhD thesis (University College London, 1990), p. 124.}

Naval revenue more than doubled during the ship money years.\footnote{The impact of ship money is shown in Charts 3.2 and 3.4.} Yet, unlike typical income provided to the navy’s treasurer, all revenue raised under the ship money levy was designed exclusively for raising and maintaining a standing fleet that was used annually. Larger peacetime fleets than ever before were patrolling the Channel, enhancing ideas of what it meant to have a standing navy. This may have acted as an effective deterrence; while the Thirty Years’ War spread across Europe, and both France and the Netherlands were expanding their fleets, Charles’s ship money squadrons protected the realm.\footnote{This may have been needed with tension high between England and France, as shown by the French capture of the \textit{Pearl} in 1635: TNA, SP 16/341, f. 8; TNA, SP 71/12, f. 223.} The side effect of proclaiming the levy as a service was that money raised could not be used to build new warships for the king’s navy, and only two pinnaces, the \textit{Expedition} and \textit{Providence}, are thought to have been constructed through this income.\footnote{TNA, SP 16/366 f.183-85; Thrush, \textit{The Navy under Charles I}, p.172} Revenue raised for the service was explicitly to be used to equip Charles’s warships to defend the kingdom. It could not be spent on the expansion of the king’s personal arsenal. As a consequence, of the £64,000 spent on
the making of the *Sovereign of the Seas*, just £86 10d can be attributed to ship money.\(^{144}\) The Caroline levy consequently had little impact on naval construction: in 1634, Charles’s navy consisted of forty-two ships of 21,000 tons and, in 1642, this had hardly changed (with forty-two ships of 23,000 tons), although these warships were better maintained for service.\(^{145}\) In this sense, contemporary criticisms of ship money are understandable, for it did not enhance the strength of the English navy, at a time when expansion was vital because of French and Dutch developments.

By producing ship money exclusively for the upkeep of a standing fleet, Charles was accused of wasting income by fabricating unused auxiliary squadrons.\(^{146}\) With this said, Charles had found the means to ensure that England’s coasts were adequately defended, for between 1635 and 1639 – and especially in its first two years – ship money provided England with a sizeable and well-maintained standing fleet that was capable of safeguarding its surrounding seas. Contemporary criticism, such as from Simond D’Ewes, was largely aimed at what was considered a needless expense during peace. Raising and operating a large standing fleet outside of war, for what was, in essence, basic sea patrols, was considered futile. Charles’s critics rarely considered that it was commissioned under the fear of the growing maritime threat to England, but of course this threat never materialised. Although Charles’s ship money fleets had no military feats to celebrate – except, perhaps, for William Rainborowe’s small expedition against the Barbary corsairs of Salé in 1637 - criticism of the levy

\(^{144}\) Thrush, *The Navy under Charles I*, p.172; Some £40,833 8s 1d is recorded from extraordinary grants for the *Sovereign’s* construction in 1636 alone. TNA, E351/2277.


\(^{146}\) In 1635, a ten ship auxiliary fleet was prepared. See, TNA, SP 16/289, ff. 165-66; TNA, E405/284, ff. 134v, 159.
might have been subdued if the navy had clashed with a major foreign power during these years.\textsuperscript{147}

The collection of ship money relied upon the state’s established political network for its operation. Each year, the crown and Privy Council produced a writ declaring the national figure to be secured by the levy; the Privy Council then assessed each county/town, providing each with a sum to be raised.\textsuperscript{148} It was the responsibility of sheriffs to organise the collection in each locality by nominating officers from the parishes and boroughs to collect it. Once he had received this revenue, the sheriff sent the money directly to William Russell, Treasurer of the Council of Marine Causes.\textsuperscript{149} Through sending the revenue produced directly to Russell, rather than to the lord treasurer, the message was made clear: money collected in this levy was separate from ordinary state taxation. By not being sent to Charles’s coffers, ship money was to be perceived, not as a central tax, but instead as a service for the protection of the people.

With Charles’s ship money levy, the entire English realm was consciously contributing to the navy’s upkeep. More importantly, unlike in regional defence efforts – particularly in provincial France, and in the previous attempts of Elizabeth I - the contributors of the 1634 to 1639 levy were paying for the king’s warships to defend the entire nation and not just their own locality. For many unwilling taxpayers, they were forced to pay rent on a service that they would never see, let alone use. Although ship money was ultimately a failure, it remains an example of how military aspiration can guide state development.

\textsuperscript{148} See individual writs for October 1634, for example: TNA, SP 16/276, ff. 11, 31, 36.
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Although Charles’s personal aspiration was a factor in the establishment of ship money, the international theatre also played its role. It has already been discussed how the ship money fleets were produced as a response to French competition. Yet, unlike in England, French expansion had occurred without any new and extraordinary fiscal scheme being developed to raise revenue for the navy. Through continuing to rely upon, although with increased intensity, the traditional economic system of the realm, neither Richelieu nor his predecessors radically reformed the sources of the navy’s income.\(^{150}\) Lacking sufficient ordinary revenue to sustain the fleet, England’s continued dependence upon the navy resulted in Charles I’s attempts to impose the ship money levy, whereas the French equivalent was, for Alan James, ‘in a better position’ to develop without enforcing similar measures.\(^{151}\) Even with naval expenditure at its peak during Richelieu’s occupation of the grand maître post, spending on the army was more than three-fold that of the navy. With such great sums being annually provided to the military, it was easy to divert resources to the navy, instead of the army. This system was not without its problems, and expenditure during war was so great that Louis XIII’s France faced a series of economic crises that were fiercely criticised by contemporaries and were overcome only to be replaced by others. Although Richelieu endorsed a policy that aimed to make cuts to the crown’s expenditure, by reducing the number of financial officers that the crown employed (replacing them with intendants), whilst also decreasing the number of venal offices, and attempting to limit borrowing, in the end, he could not prevent the critical weakening of the state’s financial capacity.\(^{152}\) In July 1630, writing to Richelieu, Michel de Marillac confessed ‘that I tremble with fear that there will be some

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\(^{151}\) *Navy and Government*, pp. 124-35.

Moreover, in December 1635, Claude de Bullion was writing that when attempting to acquire taxes that had been authorised to fund the conflict ‘the debtors evince good will, but whatever they do they are unable to receive the money…if the shortage of money continues, as there is strong reason to suspect…then I consider that we will have to decide to manufacture copper coins’.

The wars that occurred under Richelieu’s ministry drained the state of capital, leaving its officers with pessimism about its survival. To overcome this and enable the upkeep of a large fleet, naval expenditure was regulated through budgeting, something that England had introduced fifty-nine years earlier. In June 1627, an arrêt forbade the treasurers of all state departments in France, including the navy, from exceeding the financial limits set out by annual royal états, without prior authorisation. François Le Conte was the first Treasurer of the Ponant to be given sole responsibility for its revenue (before him a system of triennial treasurers existed as venal offices), and was also the first to experience the rigour of this reform. From 1631, Le Conte’s duties were formalised and all income and outgoings of the Ponant fleet were to be recorded in a single document, in a similar fashion to the declared accounts of the English Council of Marine Causes. This system was enforced as part of Richelieu’s attempts to reduce corruption, regulate finance, and improve overall competency in financial management. As part of this process, Le Conte’s accounts were to be audited by both the conseil de la marine and the chambre de comptes.

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Le Con
te remained treasurer until 1636, when Louis Picard replaced him as part of the larger administrative reforms that united the Levant and Ponant fleets.\textsuperscript{157} For Le Conte, this decision was probably a relief, for soon after his replacement it was discovered that his annual report for 1635 had failed to account for a deficit of 173,369 \textit{livres}.\textsuperscript{158} Moreover, as Le Conte had not previously requested an advancement of income, he was assigned personal responsibility for resolving the debt. Le Conte could not afford such a large sum, and the issue was only resolved through the crown accepting his auxiliary venal offices of \textit{tésorier alternative} and \textit{triennial} – worth 150,000 \textit{livres} - as payment, which it sold in 1641.\textsuperscript{159}

The French state’s reliance upon venal offices throughout this period prevents them from being considered atypical, even if they can be deemed as an untraditional source of revenue.\textsuperscript{160} Nevertheless, the selling of public offices did assist in easing the financial difficulties of the state on several occasions, with Le Conte’s being an example of their worth. The reliance on venality has been argued to have been one of the most significant factors in, what J. B. Collins has claimed was the total reordering of France’s financial and socio-political system.\textsuperscript{161} Indeed, although calls to refrain from selling offices were made by the nobility, war, and no doubt naval administrative expansion, ensured their continued use. Despite gradually accepting them as a necessary evil as his time in office progressed, it has already been stated that Richelieu began his career as Chief Minister in opposition to venality.\textsuperscript{162}

Although the cardinal had some success in avoiding the further expansion of these

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{ibid}, p. 138.
\textsuperscript{158} BN, français 6409, f. 266.
\textsuperscript{160} Knecht, \textit{Renaissance Warrior}, p. 191.
offices, Richard Lachmann has estimated that, by the time of France’s entry into the Thirty Years’ War, half of all the crown’s revenue derived from the sale of venal offices, and from their respective paulettes.\textsuperscript{163} There is great irony that, to unite the French admiralties, Richelieu had to purchase the général des galères office from Pierre de Gondi, duc de Retz in January 1635.\textsuperscript{164}

French naval developments, then, were largely funded through pre-existing taxation and other financial operations already discussed. Louis XIII’s fleet did not require atypical and experimental forms of revenue collection that can be paralleled in England. This is not to say that changes to income did not occur where the navy was concerned, just that these transformations were superficial and not innovative. Richelieu called for an increase in tariffs on foreign merchants to reflect those imposed on the French abroad as well as establishing three major trading companies.\textsuperscript{165} Through obtaining the governorships of Normandy, Picardy, Brittany and Guyenne, the cardinal established a relationship between trading companies and the grand maître office, and in doing so, encouraged maritime enterprise and an increased income from customs duties. The greatest of these was the Compagnie des cents associés, based in Brittany.\textsuperscript{166} Ann M. Carlos and Stephen Nicholas have argued that the production of these companies demonstrates the range of institutional

\textsuperscript{163} R. Lachmann, ‘Elite and State Formation in 16\textsuperscript{th}- and 17\textsuperscript{th}-Century England and France’, \textit{American Sociological Review}, 54 (1989), p. 152. The paulette was an annual fee paid by the office holders in return for the right to resell or bequeath the post.


\textsuperscript{166} P. Castagnos, \textit{Richelieu face à mer}, p. 19; H. B. Biggar, \textit{The Early Trading Companies of New France: A Contribution to the History of Commerce and Discovery in North America} (Toronto: The University of Toronto Library, 1901).
experimentation in seventeenth-century Europe. Yet, for France, this is difficult to support. Joint-stock regulated companies, such as the Compagnie de Montmorency, had handled trade since the second half of the sixteenth century. The development of merchant companies did provide further income to the crown that was easier to transfer directly to the navy. This was, however, simply an expansion and reemphasis on traditional schemes and, of course, similar structures were in existence in England.

Even Richelieu’s policy towards his admiralty rights on congés reflects this. His decision to modify and publish the rates of congés in 1628 was merely a revision of a long-existing method. In financial affairs, then, Richelieu’s ministry did not revolutionise the measures used to produce revenue for the navy. It continued to adapt existing financial practices. The experimental nature of early modern governance cannot be attributed to France with this in mind. Although adapting traditional measures such as tariffs, the navy was not the stimulus for fiscal reform under Louis XIII, in the same way that it was in England under Charles I. Richelieu’s fiscal policy was reactionary, jumping over economic hurdles as they materialised, and always relying upon conventional financial schemes to do so.

Whereas France had very little need to innovate its fiscal system with what can be classified as experimental measures, England in contrast had little option. When at war, the French monetary system verged on collapse several times; yet, the state nevertheless cleared these hurdles, even if it stumbled on the way. Through a series of loans, both from internal and external sources, an increased reliance on taxation and the sale of offices, the crown was able to boast a powerful navy by 1642. England, on the other hand, being an island state, found it unnecessary to sustain a standing army, for it was a reactionary force, not a permanent one, and it

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168 AN, Marine A’3, no. 34; AN, Marine C’225, f. 167.
consequently lacked the fiscal structure to maintain a standing navy before the mid-sixteenth century. For this reason, financial schemes such as the Elizabethan lottery, and the infamous ship money levy, represented a new type of fiscal thinking that was aimed at naval development and defence.

Concluding Remarks

England and France possessed two fundamentally contrasting financial systems, with ramifications for naval development. The French state controlled a larger economy, providing it with a significant annual budget for its military. Revenue typically provided to the army could be outsourced to the navy without having to resort to new methods of raising it. The demand of the navy upon France’s state revenue was consequently insubstantial in light of the greater demand from the army. There was little need for the experimental financial developments that began to shape English thought under Elizabeth and Charles I.

Nevertheless, prior to the English Civil War, Michael J. Braddick and Jeremy Black have been right to argue that neither England, nor the rest of Europe, had developed fiscal-military states; England did not have the financial resources to sustain standing forces, or even small garrisons, which led to its experimental attempts to innovate.\(^\text{169}\) Although the establishment of the Council of Marine Causes in 1545-46 provided an administrative infrastructure that would maintain a standing navy, Henry VIII also provided his successors with a substantial deficit, and no structured fiscal system to ensure the continuation of the fleet. The final years of Mary I’s reign and the early years of Elizabeth’s were pivotal in establishing an

\(^{169}\)Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe, pp. 22-28; Black, A Military Revolution?, pp. 29-31; Braddick, ‘An English Military Revolution?’.
economic scheme for the upkeep of the queen’s warships. The formation of such a system in England, when it did not emerge in France until much later, was purely because of the financial limitations that the English crown permanently faced. Furthermore, the atypical financial schemes, such as the Elizabethan lottery, and the ship money levy, were all part of a wider project, in which England aspired to retain its navy with as little financial burden on the state as possible. These transformations, the majority of which were cases of trial and error, suggest a clear awareness of the need for financial advances and suggest that a broader period of fiscal change was ongoing between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. With this said, developments in England in this period were experimental, and it would take both the civil war and, later conflicts with the Dutch, for fiscal change to be conclusive.

There is little doubt that the expansion in overseas trade had a substantial impact on national revenue accumulated for England from the late-sixteenth century, and for France perhaps from the early-seventeenth century. The prospect of state endorsed maritime expansion that led to the establishment of the East India Company in 1600, and the French Canadian companies shortly after, was always planned with hope for high profit. Even though the impact of overseas revenue on total state income was limited when compared to late-seventeenth and eighteenth-century standards, its contribution nevertheless provided cause for the state to adapt. Increased merchant activity and its income caused the state to employ an increased reliance on customs farming to accommodate this expansion and, also, to increasingly support its navy in order to protect its commerce.170

It is, moreover, important to emphasise the relationship between England and France which encouraged fiscal reform. In sharing the Channel, and by being natural

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adversaries, it is no surprise that naval expenditure was often at its highest when the two kingdoms were in competition with one another. 1545 marks the greatest naval expense for both kingdoms during the sixteenth century, and equally the 1570s represents one of the lowest. Future studies on naval finance for both kingdoms should particularly address the late 1620s and 1630s, when naval expenditure, and the apparatus designed for raising it, was reformed in both states. The fact that the only way for England to compete with France, and other developing international maritime communities, in the 1630s, was through producing the ship money levy, is representative of how financially restricted the English state was at this time, when compared to its French equivalent.

Indeed, transnational competition was essential in shaping the two navies, and combined with two further factors, first, the role of the monarch, and second, traditional state structures, it is possible to account for how, and why, the two navies diverged. Controlling both the navy and finance, this chapter has shown, a zealous monarch could easily pour money into the fleet, often with little regard to how it affected the realm, and had the authority to determine the strength of the crown’s navy. Moreover, it has been suggested that, for France, its pre-established economic models that were shaped by geography and the political structure of the realm, did not need to drastically alter in order to accommodate for the navy, in contrast to English naval finance. When turning to the navy and its warships in the following chapters, it will be shown that these three factors would also shape the character of the fleet.
CHAPTER FOUR

WARSHIP DESIGN AND STATE CONTROL

So far, this thesis has explored the relationship between naval and state development by focusing on administrative changes and limitations. This chapter will demonstrate that the state’s control over the navy can also be illustrated through a study of warship architecture; specifically, by showing that the style of vessel design was directly connected to the character and influence of the monarch, as the head of state. Moreover, in discussing warship design and overall fleet composition, it will become apparent that these vessels were built not only as part of the crown’s political and military strategy, but also because of interstate competition. At the same time, historians including Louis Sicking and Hervé Coutau-Bégarie have suggested that a cultural and ecological divide existed between the northern and southern European maritime theatres. Indeed, this is shown through such themes as warship architecture, maritime expertise and tactics deployed in warfare. Although accepting the importance of these two separate theatres, especially during the sixteenth century, it is suggested that warships could at the same time be the products of international engagement that crossed this barrier.

An assessment of warship design needs to highlight the complications surrounding the measuring of a vessel’s size during a period of experimentation in calculating these figures. At least five techniques could be used in determining a

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vessel’s size and, depending upon the system applied, it is possible to assign a vessel to a certain period. The earliest form of measurement, the tun – the spelling being important here – originated in fourteenth-century France, as a method to measure the quantity of wine that a ship could carry. It was during the early-fifteenth century, whilst Aquitaine remained under English control, that the technique also began to be used in England. The volume of the tun was declared by an Act of Parliament in 1423 to be 252 gallons.² It did not take long for the technique to be used for other purposes. By the second half of the fifteenth century, it was being employed to measure vessels transporting other goods, and even warships that were not designed for commerce at all. It was not feasible to literally test the quantity of tuns that a vessel could carry, because of the time and resources required, and so it became the norm to estimate the tunnage of a warship. Measurements would have thus been subjective, with a vessel being declared as 600 tuns by one surveyor, whilst being recorded as 450 by another.

The inaccurate tun system was eventually replaced by a rule attributed to an Elizabethan shipwright, Mathew Baker, henceforth known as the Old Baker Rule. This mathematical formula, which was conceived in England around 1582, provided a degree of accuracy which the tunnage system could not achieve, and permitted shipwrights to calculate in advance of production, the dimensions of a vessel required to achieve a certain tonnage.³ More importantly, the Old Baker Rule was conceptualised with warships in mind, instead of focusing solely on merchant shipping.

³ PL, MS 2820, f.153. Baker’s technique enforced the use of tons, as opposed to the winecasks known as tuns.
The Old Baker Rule did not, however, complete the revisions made to the measuring of warships in tons. During the early-seventeenth century tons and tonnage was introduced in order to accommodate the weight of men, supplies and other goods within a warship, by adding an additional third to the value determined according to a form of the Old Baker Rule.

Nevertheless, Baker’s formula established a method from which future estimates were derived, and enabled a scale of precision previously unknown. Yet, given that it required specific measurements in feet/inches, which were not always simple to obtain, there remained variances in declared data. For example, the Nonsuch was declared in July 1618 as 500 tons, whilst, in an alternative source recorded around the same time, it was declared as 636. Variations in tonnage also existed in France, where rudimentary, and often seemingly exaggerated, estimates appear to have been made. La Couronne was often referred to as 2000 tons. This highly improbable claim is likely on account of the rarity of vessels larger than 800 tons in northern Europe, causing estimated measurements to be based on pure speculation, rather than empirical fact. The larger a figure, the more susceptible it was to inaccuracies. Table 4.1 shows that the lack of colossal warships for both kingdoms affected the accuracy of measurements on warships over 800 tons. In fact, if the dimensions recorded for her in 1636 can be trusted, then, using the Old Baker Rule, la Couronne would

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4 The Old Baker Rule.
5 TNA, SP 14/98, f.66; BL, Add MS 9294, f. 505. See also, M. Oppenheim, ‘The Royal Navy under James I’, *The English Historical Review*, 7:27 (1892), pp. 484-87.
6 BN, français 6408, f. 299. It is also likely that la Couronne’s high degree of inaccuracy is on account of France trying to claim that it possessed the largest warship in Europe.
have been recorded as 1087 tons (1449 with tons and tonnage) – a considerable difference! In comparison, by using the same system for the *Sovereign of the Seas*, Charles I’s warship measured 1285 tons (1716 with tons and tonnage) – making her almost 200 tons larger than her French rival. Furthermore, the Old Baker Rule had been modified in May 1628 in England, altering the original divisor from 100 to 94 by Order in Council. This caused a level of confusion over tonnage recorded in the surrounding years and, in her original assessment, the *Sovereign* was declared as 1141, 1285 and 1521 tons, according to three different rules. It is apparent, therefore, that no single system for adapting tonnage measurement was universally employed throughout Europe in the period.

Although assessing tonnage can therefore be difficult, it is possible to use these various forms of tonnage measurement to compare warship size, not only across borders, but also through time. Though a 600-tun warship of 1545 would have been calculated as a different tonnage using either Baker’s or other seventeenth-century formulae, their differences would not be so antithetical that they could not be compared. After all, it is important to consider that the original purpose of the Old Baker Rule was to assist shipwrights in planning the construction of vessels to meet the cargo-carrying criteria of clients, which would have initially been requested in the traditional tun format. Nevertheless, differences in measuring techniques would

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7 *ibid*, ff. 469-72; TNA, SP 78/106, f. 422. This measurement, if correct, would more closely conform to d’Infreville’s original estimate of between 1200 and 1700 *tuns*. E. Sue (ed.), *Correspondance de Henri d’Escoubleau de Sourdis*, III (3 volumes, Paris: L’Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1839), p. 204: ‘Voyage et inspection maritime de M d’infreville, 23 March 1631’.
8 TNA, SP 16/361, f. 134.
10 TNA, SP 16/361, f. 134. The divisor of 94 appears to have remained official policy however, for the *Sovereign* was measured using this adapted rule, albeit, the formula was still being referred to as ‘the Ould way’. With this said, the document that declared the *Sovereign’s* tonnage also included another rate ‘ordered by the Lords of his Majesties Privy Councill’ which determined her to be 1141 tons before tons and tonnage, and 1521 after. See W. Salisbury, ‘Early Tonnage Measurement in England: IV. Rules Used by Shipwrights, and Merchants’, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 53:3 (1967), pp. 251-64.
naturally result in data variation, and we should account for a deviation in tonnage of between 5 and 25 per cent.

**Table 4.1: Tonnage Measurements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keel (Feet)</th>
<th>Breadth (Feet)</th>
<th>Depth (Feet)</th>
<th>Fournier (tons)</th>
<th>Baker (tons)</th>
<th>Baker w/tons and tonnage</th>
<th>Baker w/divisor of 94 (tons)</th>
<th>Divisor of 94 w/ tons and tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52 ¼</td>
<td>18 ½</td>
<td>7 ½</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>102.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9 ½</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>213.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>27 ½</td>
<td>10 ½</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>292.5</td>
<td>233.5</td>
<td>311.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>321.7</td>
<td>403.1</td>
<td>321.7</td>
<td>428.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>526.1</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>559.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14 ¼</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>519.9</td>
<td>651.5</td>
<td>519.9</td>
<td>693.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>36 ¼</td>
<td>14 ¼</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>560.5</td>
<td>702.3</td>
<td>560.5</td>
<td>747.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>37 ½</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>622.3</td>
<td>779.8</td>
<td>622.3</td>
<td>829.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107 ½</td>
<td>38 ½</td>
<td>15 ¼</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>671.4</td>
<td>841.3</td>
<td>671.4</td>
<td>895.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>39 ¼</td>
<td>15 ½</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>705.5</td>
<td>883.9</td>
<td>705.5</td>
<td>940.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15 ½</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>725.5</td>
<td>909.1</td>
<td>725.5</td>
<td>967.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1400-1500</td>
<td>898.7</td>
<td>1126.1</td>
<td>898.7</td>
<td>1197.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1078.5</td>
<td>1351.3</td>
<td>1078.5</td>
<td>1437.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, where tons and tonnage was included – as became increasingly the norm for seventeenth-century warships – an additional third was combined with this figure, which sixteenth-century ships did not include.\(^{12}\) Similarly, with a comparative study, we should expect differences between statistics in England and France, albeit

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\(^{11}\) G. Fournier, *Hydrographie contenant la theorie et la practique de toutes les parties de la navigation* (Paris, 1643), p. 23. All tonnage calculations based upon Baker’s formula are the author’s own.

\(^{12}\) Where tons and tonnage figures are used, this will be clearly specified.
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evidence suggests that these would be, for the most part, minor in scale, and would not affect end results.\(^{13}\) This is demonstrated in Table 4.1, where a significant difference in seventeenth-century tonnage measurement is only observed in warships over 800 tons.\(^{14}\) Table 4.1 suggests that French tonnage estimates by 1642 conformed to the Old Baker Rule – with the original divisor of 100 – whilst including an additional third for tons and tonnage. It is most probable that this system had been the standard practice for French warships since at least 1620. The peculiarity of warships over 800 or 1000 tons can only be attributed to presumptive guesswork on warships of this magnitude, which neither Fournier, nor his predecessors, had substantial experience in handling.\(^{15}\)

To further complicate matters, galleys and oared-vessels – the subject of this chapter’s first section – were not measured in tonnage at all, as they had just one deck. This is just one reason why oared vessels must be considered as a separate entity from the sailing warships that were evolving during this period.

4.1. Galleys And Oared Vessels

Based in the Mediterranean, the French Levant fleet experienced relatively calm weather at sea, which permitted the galley and other oared vessels to continue being used into the eighteenth century.\(^{16}\) No such policy was pursued on any large scale in

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\(^{13}\) See TNA, SP 16/166, f. 50, for example. This is an English report of Louis XIII’s fleet in May 1630, where the vessels’ reported tonnage is near identical to French reports.

\(^{14}\) As shown in Chart 5.1, France possessed a very small number of these warships, reaching their apogee with five. They will thus not hinder results.

\(^{15}\) Indeed a French recording of the English fleet around the same time, over-estimated the size of the Sovereign at 1800 tons. BN, français 15950, f. 68. It is not surprising that a simpler system for categorizing warships was being introduced during the final stages of this study’s scope. Both England and France began organizing warships according to class/rank – which in turn was generally based on the quantity of heavy ordnance onboard vessels. BN, français 6408, f. 302; TNA, SP 16/305, f. 123.

England, however, where the open waters of the Atlantic prevented the sustained use of galleys, and so produced a reliance on sailing vessels. In 1554, Giacomo Soranco described how the English ‘do not use galleys, owing to the strong tide of the ocean’.\footnote{CSP Venice, V, no. 934: ‘18 August 1554’.} Meanwhile, the French Atlantic fleet, especially during the seventeenth century, also looked towards the sail and not the oar. This natural division between northern and southern European vessel propulsion techniques created a fissure in marine administrative infrastructure and maritime culture in the French kingdom. In many ways for France, this division between the Levant and the Ponant served as an illustration of the crown’s support for both the past and future: the oared vessels of the Levant were a continued demonstration of traditional European trading techniques, whereas the sailing vessels of the Atlantic were the route to empire, both in the New World and in the East.

For Henry VIII, however, there was more to dislike about a galley than just its poor functionality along English shores. The galley possessed few decks, and was consequently unable to hold a large quantity of ordnance.\footnote{For an assessment of artillery use on galleys: J. Eliav, ‘The Gun and Corsia of Early Modern Mediterranean Galleys: Design Issues and Rationales’, \textit{The Mariner’s Mirror}, 99:3 (2013), pp. 262-74; \textit{idem}, ‘Tactics of Sixteenth-Century Galley Artillery’, \textit{The Mariner’s Mirror}, 99:4 (2013), pp. 398-409.} For a king who relished war during a revolutionary period where naval warfare was altering to accommodate the use of heavy ordnance, the galley would have been perceived as inadequate.\footnote{A. Hildred (ed.), \textit{Weapons of Warre: The Armaments of the Mary Rose} (Exeter: The Mary Rose Trust Ltd, 2011).} Meanwhile, whereas the sailing galleons of the late-sixteenth century would become the essence of trans-oceanic travel, galleys could not be adapted to pursue such feats. The oared vessel was also expensive to maintain, especially when convicts or enslaved people were not available; Elizabeth’s \textit{Bonavolia} drained the state of £514 per month in contrast to the 400-ton galleon, the \textit{Dreadnought}, which was maintained...
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at sea for £300. The same was the case in France, even with the use of the *chioume*. In 1640, the galley *la Rèale* drained the state of 8500 *livres* per month when in service, whilst maintaining a sailing vessel of 500 *tons* during the same year, such as *l’Europe, le Cigne* or *le Coq*, cost 5045 *livres*. This did not prevent the continued French endorsement of galleys in the Mediterranean. Galleys were a long-standing tool of both royal and noble power that the state was reluctant to remove, especially given the Ottoman, Spanish and Italian galley threat that remained in the area.

England experienced the oared threat presented by these powers, and although they never outnumbered sailing vessels, the state was not opposed to maintaining a handful of galleys within its fleet to counter the enemy. For Henry VIII’s navy, a galley was completed in July 1543, and was named the *Galley Subtle*. According to its illustration in the *Anthony Roll*, she possessed just one deck, along with her cargo hold, making her infrastructure low and, thus, less vulnerable to artillery fire. She also possessed a heavy *cannon* and two *sakers*, displayed at the bow of the vessel in a similar approach to that of the French *basilisks* controlled by Pregent de Bidoux in April 1513. In its career, Henry’s only galley, at the time, participated in the Scottish expedition of 1544, and the defence of the Solent, and was active in the Channel in 1549, before being renamed the *Red Galley*, and finally being decommissioned in 1560 or 1561. Her construction must have been influenced by the impending threat of the French galleys that formed the vanguard of the enemy’s fleet in 1545. Yet, despite possessing only one galley within his fleet, Henry ambitiously aimed to control more when preparing for the French onslaught.

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21 BN, français 6408, f. 287.
22 TNA, SP1/180, f. 57; *The Anthony Roll*, p. 73. In a rare case, this galley is recorded as 200 *tons*.
24 *Edward and Mary*, p. 514.
Following the conquest of Boulogne, on 17 December 1544, the Privy Council requested that Emperor Charles V provide England with:

the number of tenne gales eyther to be lent by the sayd Emperor unto his highness well furnished with maryners and ordenannce and in all other things so equipped as is requisite for the warre to serve his highnes upon these seas; or else to sell hym so many by his money with slaves and all things appertaining.  

The Emperor quickly refused this request, for he required all his galleys in case of war against the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Charles ‘sayde that the peace was so late made betwixt The empereur and the frenche king, that it could not be thoughte that he wolde so soone do enye maner of things, wherby he shuld seeme to breake it’. Nonetheless, in making this request, the Henrician establishment had acknowledged the importance of galleys. England, here, was not accepting the superior military potential of these ships, but instead was coerced into incorporating oared vessels into its fleet, because of a forthcoming galley threat that needed to be countered. The large, heavy and bulky carrack was not as nimble and manoeuvrable as the galley, and was designed to engage with vessels of a similar size and capability. Consequently, although restricted to northern European waters, it was necessary for England to retain a small number of galleys, as long as its adversaries continued to use them.

25 TNA, SP1/195, f. 223.
26 TNA, SP 1/196, f. 17.
27 BL, Harleian MS 283, f. 315.
28 Prior to the Armada, an additional galley would be incorporated into the English navy: the Black Galley, which was captured from the French near Dover in October 1548. This vessel was originally named la Noire Galère. Alongside the Red Galley – the renamed Galley Subtle – the vessel was used, according to Tom Glasgow Jnr, to navigate the narrow passageways of Le Havre, during the 1560-62 expedition. T. Glasgow. Jnr, ‘Oared Vessels in the Elizabethan Navy’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 52:4 (1966), pp. 371-74.
England’s monarchs did not wholeheartedly succumb to the galley however; instead, oared vessel architecture was experimented with, enabling hybrid warships to emerge. Henry VIII’s modified *galleass* was a product fashioned from new and old ideas, of northern and southern European concepts that were combined to produce a vessel devised by the king. This is evident in a letter written by the Imperial Ambassador Eustace Chapuys to Charles V, following the king’s request for Venetian shipwrights to assist in the construction of galleys in 1541. Chapuys claimed that Henry ‘will not make much use of their science, as for some time back he had been building ships with oars, according to a model of which he himself is the inventor’. Henry’s completed design could be witnessed with the *Tiger*, the *Bull* and the *Antelope*, depicted in *The Anthony Roll*. Each warship possessed three decks, with their lowest bearing small openings in the side of the hull for oared propulsion if required. Yet, their primary method of movement remained from their sails, whilst it would have been unlikely that their oars would have been used unless found in an area difficult to navigate. Oared propulsion, then, remained of secondary preference to the sail in England and was used only when the need arose.

For France, galleys were an integral element of the military apparatus, being essential to maintaining and exploiting sovereign authority, as well as trade in the Mediterranean. Prior to the mass colonisation of the New World, the Mediterranean was the primary theatre of trade, and also of maritime conflict in southern Europe. Given its importance, John F. Guilmartin has described the period from 1530 to 1570 as the era when the galley fleets’ ‘tactical power and strategic potential reached their

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29 *CSP Spain*, VI, part I, no. 173: ‘16 July 1541’. [Aussi a ce dit roy fait venir d’italie trois maistres experts pour fere galleres, et crois qu’il ne les mectra en œuvre mesmes puisque il a commence a fere faire navieres avec environs dont luy seul a este l’architecte et deviseur.]

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apogee’. 31 Louis Sicking has also asserted a similar claim for the years 1520 to 1580, although continuing to argue that the galley dominated the Mediterranean Sea until the 1630s. 32 With this in mind, the thirty-six galleys recorded in the French fleet in 1543 are proof that oared vessels were prioritised in the Levant during these early years. 33 A significant portion of these galleys were constructed in 1532 and 1533, when Francis I spent at least 79,040 livres on the construction of between fourteen to sixteen galleys at Marseille and Le Havre. 34 According to Sicking, these galleys and their successors were not only the golden jewel of the Levant, but also, when employed for use at Le Havre, ‘represented the cream of the crop of French naval forces along the Atlantic’. 35 The prominence of these galleys in combat can be observed in the accounts of the Battle of the Solent, and in their employment in the St. Andrew’s Castle expedition in July 1547. 36 Their proven worth in these expeditions would have subsequently influenced Henri II’s decision to permanently maintain ten galleys within the Ponant in 1548. 37

Similarly, after the decline of the Ponant and Levant fleets during the Wars of Religion, Henri IV and his council were quick to consider the reconstruction of the galley fleet once the civil disturbances had drawn to a close. Writing to the French king in August 1597, the council revealed his support for the galleys, writing that it had agreed ‘to make a fund for the construction of a number of galleys, like you have

33 BN, français 17329, ff. 192-93; whilst 32 are recorded between 1544 and 1545.
34 BN, Moreau 737, f. 43; BN, français 15628, ff. 66r-67r; BN, français 15629, f. 16; BN, français 25721, f. 417.
35 Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare in Europe’, p. 244.
37 BN, français 18153, f. 39r.
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asked of us’.  

38 The first Bourbon king of France had an interest in rebuilding the French galley fleet, which, by 1610, may have consisted of more than twelve vessels.  

39 This was a considerable improvement on a fleet which may have been erased during the final years of the civil wars. With an active interest and knowledge of naval affairs, after having been the Admiral of Guyenne, Henri IV selected Toulon as the base for his Mediterranean fleet and, between 1604 and 1610, spent on average 304,000 livres per year on the construction and maintenance of these galleys.  

40 When the state was stable, French galleys were an integral element of the navy that were always prioritised.

Even when the age of sail was in full swing, and France was developing a transatlantic commercial empire, Louis XIII’s kingdom nonetheless maintained a substantial fleet of galleys, which by 1640 numbered twenty-two.  

41 In the following year, twenty of these galleys were employed in the Mediterranean fleet fighting Spain.  

42 An essential part of French maritime identity in the Mediterranean, Richelieu perceived them as a continuing form of maritime power, writing that ‘the light galleys which row with force, perform a great diligence in the most calm of seas’.  

43 The galley fleet was well preserved and funded under Richelieu’s watch, with 1,200,000 livres being provided in 1636 alone.  

44 In this year, alongside the largest galleys, such as la Réale and la Regine, the Marseille shipyards were also completing the

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41 AN, Marine B41, ff. 353-57. Also see, ibid, f. 430, for a drawing, which includes dimensions of a French galley in 1641.


43 BN, français 10221, f. 231. [les galleres legeres qui a force de rames font de grandes dilligence dans les Calmes plus ordinaires dans la mer de devant].

44 AN, Marine B41, ff. 104-10.
construction of five additional galleys. As a patron of galley power — indeed the cardinal owned his own galleys used by the state - Richelieu ensured the continuance of the Levant fleet. He even proposed that 'with 30 galleys your majesty will not only change the balance of power from Spain, which can with the assistance of its allies, build a body of 50 [galleys], but it will also threaten the union [Spanish-Portuguese] which doubles the strength of its forces’. Even with the advances in sailing warship design during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, the French state continued to perceive its galleys as a fundamental component of the kingdom’s strength, both as a representation of state power, and as a key strategic resource on the international scene.

Given that the Mediterranean was characterised by the use of these vessels, with Venetians, Genoese, French and Spanish all employing them, it was unlikely that France would discard them. Ownership of a galley could be a lucrative and highly prestigious trade, and many members of the French nobility took advantage of the opportunities. With many in the private ownership of the nobility or wealthy, the French state’s fleet often employed them for service, through private contract. They were, in this way, a method for the rich and powerful to extend their authority, whilst also reinforcing Mediterranean culture, in which galleys were firmly situated. One such contract, in February 1603, between Henri IV and the Genoese financier Ambrogio Lomellini, provided the king with control of six newly constructed galleys,

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45 BN, nouv. acq. fr. 4967, f. 123.
46 BN, français 10221, f. 231. [Avec 30 galleres vostres Majesté ne balancerà pas seulement la puissance d’Espagne qui peut par l’assistance de ses allies en mettre 50 en corps, mais elle la surmontera par la raison de l’union qui redouble la puissance des forces quelle unit].
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which were to be at Lomellini’s disposal for two months each year for private trade.\(^{50}\)

Such a system perhaps indicates Henri IV’s desperation at the time, yet the common use of galleys owned by the nobility and wealthy gentry (or in joint-ownership with them) throughout this period suggests otherwise. In fact, the crown often relied upon the might of the Knights of Malta to reinforce its own force with vessels.\(^{51}\) As a highly prestigious Catholic military order, French noble families regularly aspired for their younger sons to obtain a place with the Knights, sometimes reserving places for them ‘on the very day of [their] birth’.\(^{52}\) In doing so, the French elite continued a long established tradition that connected its nobility with galleys (the weapon of the Knights of Malta). Celebrated French naval commanders, including Isaac de Razilly, were not only of noble birth, but also distinguished officers of the Knights of Malta. Moreover, the order was a significant influence on Richelieu’s expansion, and the cardinal even dispatched his own private galley, *la Cardinale*, to Malta to seek advice on the construction of Provence’s galleys.\(^{53}\) It was the elite’s interest in the Mediterranean’s sea forces that made it logical for the oared vessels in the French fleet to combine private and royal ownership. It was not until 1665 that Louis XIV officially proclaimed that the French galley fleet would aim to consist solely of royally owned vessels.\(^{54}\)

Under Louis XIII, then, oared warships were still being considered as an integral component of naval efforts, as was the case at the beginning of this period. Indeed, Henri II took great pride in his oared warship fleet of thirty-six galleys and

\(^{50}\) Buisseret, ‘The French Mediterranean Fleet under Henri IV’, p. 301.


\(^{52}\) *ibid.*, p. 429; F. Riou-Perennes, *Les chevaliers de Malte dans la marine royale sous l’ancien Régime, 1626-1642*, unpublished thèse de doctorat (Université de Tours, 2004).


\(^{54}\) Bamford, ‘The Knights of Malta’, p. 449.
three galliottes, which later reached, and possibly even surpassed, forty galleys.\textsuperscript{55} Meanwhile, he also constructed twenty rowbarges, which were produced to counter the English small oared vessels, built during the final years of Henry VIII’s reign.\textsuperscript{56} Henri II must have found benefit in their use in the Mediterranean, for in the Narrow Sea, Edward VI’s small oared vessels were perceived as having a restricted operational use, and they were sold in the winter of 1549.\textsuperscript{57} Edward’s council’s perception of their ineffectiveness is reflected in the price at which they were sold, with the greatest sum being just £18. This is indicative of how England and France were following different paths to maritime power.

In the final decades of the sixteenth century, the use of oared warships in England diminished. In 1588 only one galley was in service: the \textit{Galley Bonavolia} which did not play any major role against the Spanish threat.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, considering their sleek and low framework, and their abilities to navigate through the difficult internal waterways of the realm, galleys still posed a threat to the kingdom. Elizabeth was aware of this, yet the queen did not use the same approach as her father to counter oared enemy vessels by building a cheap oared alternative to counter the enemy’s ships. In a document entitled \textit{The Manner Howe the River Thames Shalbe Kepte Assured Against Any Attempt of the Gallyes}, written between 1587 and 1588, the Spanish galley threat was planned to be countered by encouraging the watchmen of the Thames to ensure ‘a very carefull and dilligente watch, be heedfully kept, when the tyde fall out in the night; the galley [could] ryde benathe the [Thames] chayne’.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[56] BN, français 20008, ff. 12-13; Glete, \textit{Warfare at Sea}, pp. 142-43.
\item[57] TNA, E351/2194.
\item[58] BL, Egerton 2541, f. 1.
\item[59] BL, Otho EIX, ff. 181-82. Elizabethans had the strong, and understandable, belief that an attack on England would focus on the south-east. Also see T. Digges, \textit{England’s Defence: A Treatise concerning...}
\end{itemize}
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To compete against any Spanish galley that might enter the Thames, it was suggested that no less than five vessels including the Victory, the Lyon and the Bear were strategically placed along it. For Elizabeth and her council, there was no effort to construct a sizeable galleys force that could stand against the Spanish equivalent. During the Armada years, rather than building oared vessels that would be largely unused, it was strategically devised that warships would be placed where galleys could inflict the most damage.

Nevertheless, one galley, the Mercury, was constructed in 1592 and was primarily stationed along the Irish coast. Yet, following Elizabeth’s death, it was neglected and, between 1608 to 1611, was recorded as ‘lyinge in harbow’ in Dublin. This led to Captain Thomas Vaughan declaring, in 1611, that ‘I find her much decaied and rotten by reason she hath not bene trimed theis three yeares’. James I and his council demonstrated no knowledge of how to exploit the galleys for national advantage. On 3 January 1612, with the Mercury ‘being utterly unserviceable’, the decision was made to sell her. The galley, then, found little purpose in late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century England, and it is surprising that, despite this, four new small galleys (la Superlativa, la Advantagia, la Volatilia, and la Gallarita) were constructed between 1601 and 1602. These galleys rarely put to sea, spending most of their careers mothballed and, according to the Treasury Accounts, none were used for coastal patrols or campaigns between 1603 and 1618. Consequently, in July 1618, all four were declared unserviceable, and were to be put out of charge on

\*
\* Invasion; or A brief Discourse of what Orders were best for repulsing of Foreign Forces, if at anytime they Should invade us by Sea in Kent, or elsewhere (London: F. Haley, 1588).
\* TNA, E351/2246-2249.
\* TNA, SP12/286, f. 90.
\* TNA, E351/2241-2256. This is in spite of the ‘pryming and colouring [of] the after partes of the cabons’ of each galleys for 8s each in 1609, and the painting of the prow of the Volatilia in 1610.
account of decay.\textsuperscript{65} Although remaining at Chatham, no attempt was made to repair these galleys in the following years; it was not until 18 June 1629 that a decision was finally made that ‘his Majesties foure Gallies…are altogether unfit for his Majesties service, and are held better to bee sold’.\textsuperscript{66} The last galleys employed for the service of the English navy had a prolonged and undignified end. Small, and highly manoeuvrable sailing vessels such as the \textit{Lion’s Whelps} replaced them. With the Spanish War, maritime warfare became global, and the use of galleys became even more restricted as a result. The manoeuvrability of the \textit{race-built} galleon diminished the advantages of the galley, causing there to be no demand for such a vessel within the British Isles. Furthermore, the New World and the Atlantic ended the superiority of the galley, in favour of long-distance sailable vessels.

There was, then, a clear divide between the type of warships employed in northern and southern Europe. Despite the advantages of sailing vessels where transatlantic and other long distance travel was concerned, it was necessary to maintain galleys in the Mediterranean. Cardinal Richelieu was fully aware of this split, writing that ‘it is necessary to consider the ocean and the Mediterranean sea as separate entities, and also to make a distinction between the round vessels used in these two seas [the Atlantic and Northern Sea], and the galleys whose use, because of their construction, is expressly restricted to sail near to land to expose them as little as possible to storms’.\textsuperscript{67} Richelieu, here, openly accepted the division between France’s two frontiers and the need for different naval systems. Unlike in England, the French navy was to be divided, with each frontier’s navy being shaped according to its

\textsuperscript{65} TNA, SP 14/198, f. 64; TNA, SP 14/100, f. 72.
\textsuperscript{66} TNA, SP 16/145, f. 9.
\textsuperscript{67} BN, français 10221, f. 227. [il faut considerer l’ocean et la mer mediteraneé separement et faire distinction de vaisseaux ronds et utiles en ces deux mers, et des galeres dont l’usage n’est l’on qu’en celle que la nature/seemle avoir reservée expressemnt entre les terres pour l’exposer a moins de tempestes].
disparate maritime communities and character. This divergence between north and south was well known in France, as shown by Nicholas d’Arfeville’s survey of European coastal shipping in 1582.⁶⁸ There was, as Alain Cabantous suggests, ‘a dual frontier: a partition…between the navigators of the Levant and of the Ponant’.⁶⁹ With galleys in the Mediterranean and sailing ships in the Atlantic, the division of the French domain continued to create distinctively separate entities, in both cultural and political terms. Galleys were historically engrained into the French national consciousness as tools of both military and royal authority. They provided the monarch and state with a means to exercise power, and were still considered as an important asset for French maritime power long into the seventeenth century. Moreover, galleys also served as an expression of noble power, especially along France’s southern coast where the political autonomy of the area, and its connection to the Knights of Malta, reinforced their importance. Being far from the Mediterranean, England in the early modern era never needed to properly adopt galleys into its fleet. This was in spite of the fact that galleys remained a potential threat to the British Isles, as long as England’s adversaries still retained them within their ranks.

4.2. Warship Size

While the service of galleys divided the two states, sailing warships were in constant and increasing demand by both powers as the northern European maritime theatre began to strengthen. Whether they were known as naves, carracks, galleons or simply great ships, the demand for large state-owned sailing vessels increased during the

⁶⁸ BN, français 20008, ff. 4-26.
⁶⁹ Cabantous, Les citoyens du large, p. 194. [une double frontière : une partition…entre marins citadins et campagnards, entre navigateurs du Levant et du Ponant].
period following architectural advances in the previous century that were led, according to J. Bernard, by northern France, particularly Bordeaux, that would see the development of carvel designed ships.\(^\text{70}\) As the expansion of naval resources became something of an arms race, to lag behind in warship strength was to take a serious military risk. Even in the opening years of their reigns, both Henry VIII and Francis I kept a watchful eye on both their friends and foes developing naval resources, and responded by developing their warships accordingly.\(^\text{71}\)

Early-sixteenth-century naval growth in Europe was driven not by English or French influence, but rather by ideas that originated with England’s northern neighbour, and France’s ally, Scotland. The construction of two sizeable and well-armed warships – the *James* and the *Marguerite* – alongside an even greater vessel, the *Michael*, between 1510 and 1513, motivated the young Henry VIII and his French counterparts to consider similar building schemes. When launched in 1511, the *Michael* was probably the largest ship afloat in Europe, and possessed twenty-seven heavy guns – presumably all *serpentines*.\(^\text{72}\) With an awareness of these vessels, Henry VIII was both envious and fearful of the threat that James IV’s main warship could pose. This suspicion would only grow when the *Michael* was used to accommodate


\(^\text{72}\) R. Norton, *The Gvnner Shewing the Whole Practise of Artillerie: With all the Appurtenances there vnto belonging. Together with the making of Extraordinary Artificial Fireworkes, as well for Pleasure and Triumphes, as for Warre and Service* (London: A. M., 1618), pp. 44-45. According to Robert Norton a *serpentine* was a type of *bastard culverine* cannon which could shoot as much as a 24 pound shot. The *serpentine* was the predecessor to the standard Elizabeth *culverine*. 
the French Ambassador, Charles de Tocque de La Motte, on 10 December 1512.\textsuperscript{73} La Motte – on his own mission to encourage James to declare war on England – gave the Scottish king several gifts designed to entice him to turn against Henry. These included eight large brass \textit{serpentines} which impressed the English ambassador in Scotland, Lord Dacre, and he wrote to Henry that they ‘wold shote a stoon as moche as a swan egg or more’.\textsuperscript{74}

Though James succumbed to La Motte’s aspirations by renewing the Auld Alliance, his small but powerful fleet amounted to little, for Scotland was soon financially exhausted and politically disrupted by the war that followed in 1512 to 1514. Consequently, the decision was made to sell both the \textit{Michael} and the \textit{Marguerite} to France in the following years.\textsuperscript{75} The \textit{Michael} was the first to be purchased on 2 April 1514 for just 40,000 \textit{livres}, a sum that was perhaps less than half of what she originally cost to produce half a decade before.\textsuperscript{76} Yet, despite George Buchanan’s claim, made in the late-sixteenth century, that soon after this transfer ‘she was laid up to rot in the harbour of Brest’, evidence now suggests that she did become a major part of France’s navy.\textsuperscript{77} In 1527, ‘the great nave of Scotland’ – as she came to be known in France – was recorded in Normandy as the second largest vessel within the king’s fleet at 1000 \textit{tuns}, and ‘the Marguerite of Scotland, which is of 450 \textit{tuns}’ was also present.\textsuperscript{78} Far from immobile and unused weapons, these colossal Scottish warships were intended for the ‘making of a royal army [of the sea] for going against the enemies of the Catholic faith, or other enemies [of the French king]’.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{73} Histoire de la Marine, III, pp. 90-91.
\textsuperscript{74} BL, Caligula BIII, f. 28.
\textsuperscript{75} Glete, \textit{Warfare at Sea}, pp. 138-39.
\textsuperscript{76} BL, Caligula DVI, f. 90.
\textsuperscript{78} BN, Clairambault 326, ff. 555-56. [la grande nef d’escosse qui est du port de mil tonneaulx ou environs… La Marguerite d’escosse, qui est iiijc l tonneaulx].
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid}, f. 555. [faire une arme Royalle pour aller contre les ennemys de la foy catholique, ou autres ses ennemys.] This could support Norman MacDougall’s claim that the \textit{Michael} may have survived and
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The Scottish warships of James IV then, set a benchmark for England and France to try to counter and surpass. Discussing the Michael, George Buchanan presented the warship’s influence by suggesting that:

When Francis, King of France, and Henry VIII, King of England, stimulated by emulation, endeavoured to outvie her, and built each a vessel a little larger, they, after being finished and fully equipped, when launched, were immoveable from their magnitude, and unfit for any useful purpose.\(^80\)

Both England and France were conveying an outward show of maritime power, even if in reality their strength was weaker.\(^81\) There is no surprise that these “white-elephant” warships were being commissioned when the monarchy was being refashioned, and the state apparatus was being tested.\(^82\)

A study of the *Henri Grâce à Dieu* and *la Grande Françoise* makes this point most apparent. Early in his reign, Henry VIII set to work developing a warship of an unprecedented size to compete with, and surpass his competitors’ designs. Construction of the “Great Harry” commenced in 1512 at Woolwich and, when completed in 1514, over £8000 had been spent on the vessel that originally displaced...
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1500 tuns. Yet, her design was formulated with very little thought to military tactics and seaworthiness. Instead, her size was reflective of the king: built to create the appearance of great power, and intended to make an impact on the European stage. Her size would not have benefitted her crew and captain, and as a result of her high castle infrastructure, she possessed a remarkable and illogical seven tiers. With such high castles, she was difficult to manoeuvre, and was thus more susceptible to damage, such as in storms in 1522, which resulted in her grounding for repairs at Portsmouth until 1524. This would have increased the English state’s understanding of the poor sailing capabilities of Henry’s namesake warship and, during a major refit of her hull between 1536 and 1540, her size was reduced to 1000 tuns through modifying the height of her castles. The English flagship depicted on both the Cowdray drawing and the Anthony Roll was a redesigned model. It was significantly different from the highly flawed warship of 1514 that had been designed to assert the monarch’s power and prestige.

Upon hearing of Henry’s great carrack, Francis I reacted with a similar show of resolve by commissioning the construction of a vessel of at least an equal size, la Grande Françoise. Intended for launch between 1523 and 1524, the ‘great French nave’ was originally intended to be employed against the Ottoman Turks and Emperor Charles V. This was despite having in his possession the two warships

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83 TNA, E36/5; TNA, E36/13. TNA, SP 1/8, f. 180. The total expense for constructing the Henri Grâce à Dieu and three small oared vessels amounted to £8,708 5s 3d from 1512 to 1514.
84 LPH, I, no. 3018: ‘19 June 1514’.
85 BL, Caligula DVIII, f. 243.
87 Unknown artist(s), c. 1545-48, The Encampment of the English Forces Near Portsmouth, Together with a View of the English and French Fleets at Commencement of the Action between them on the 12th July 1545, The Mary Rose Museum, Portsmouth. The original painting was destroyed in a fire at Cowdray House in 1793.
88 There is a significant amount of ambiguity surrounding this vessel due to a lack of historic documentation. As a result, her date of completion has often confused scholars. Roger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 204, Knecht, Renaissance Warrior, p. 367 and Sicking, ‘Naval Warfare in Europe’, p. 251 have credited the vessel’s attempt at launching to 1520/1, this is probably a result of Guillaume de
previously owned by the late James IV. At around 1500 tuns, this vessel was intended to accommodate an equal number of men.\(^\text{89}\) In every trait, \textit{la Grande Françoise} was designed to surpass Henry VIII’s warship. Her keel measured almost 100 metres, greater by a third than Henry’s warship, and she reportedly cost more than 100,000 \textit{écus} (\textit{c. 200,000 livres}).\(^\text{90}\) Yet, she was one of Francis’s greatest mistakes for, when launched, she was too large to get out of the newly built harbour of Le Havre. The depth of the small harbour did not provide a sufficient draught of water for her to enter the open sea. Schemes were devised where Francis provided at least 15,000 \textit{livres} to attach a large quantity of empty foists to her sides, and detach her ‘overbuildings’ to make her lighter, yet all were unsuccessful.\(^\text{91}\) Consequently, despite being the largest warship that the nation had ever seen, \textit{la Grande Françoise} became an immovable spectacle, imprisoned within Le Havre. Her immobility eventually became a subject of ridicule from Francis’s adversaries. The Italian Captain Hippolyte de Nobily, when serving Henry VIII, devised a scheme to burn the French king’s colossal ship in June 1525.\(^\text{92}\) Several other attempts were made during the following years to provide the means for her departure, including a major effort in the high-tide

\(^{89}\) Marceilles’s memoire on the foundations of Le Havre written in 1586. Yet, this seems unlikely, as David Potter has recently brought to the surface, D. Potter, \textit{Henry VIII and Francis I: The Final Conflict, 1540-47} (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 355. On 18 August 1522 the vessel was still being prepared (TNA, SP1/25, f. 123). However, by 17 March 1523, Francis had openly declared that the ship which was ‘somewhat bygger than our [the English] ship [Henri Grâce à Dieu]’ would be ready by mid-summer (BL, Caligula DVIII, f. 22). Whether she was completed in 1523 is open to question, but clearly \textit{la Grande Françoise} was not launched before this date. In a list of the navy at Le Havre in 1522, the largest vessel mentioned is ‘la grant nef Loyse’ of 650 tuns, and no mention of the great new warship is made. Similarly, on both 12 December 1520 and 15 September 1521, when calls were made to prepare the fleet, there was no mention of \textit{la Grande Françoise}. It was not until 1524 that references in Le Havre ‘de fait de la grant nef’ are made. Le Havre, EE78, ff. 4-15: ‘lettres de François 1er à Chillon et les échevins de Rouen, avec des dépenses de la marine, 1520-26’.

\(^{90}\) By 1516 an \textit{écu au soleil} was worth 2 \textit{livre tournois}.

\(^{91}\) BL, Caligula EII, f. 22; BL, Galba BVIII, ff. 26-27.

\(^{92}\) BL, Vitellius BVI, f. 160.
equinox of September 1533, but all failed, and during a storm later that year, the ship
was badly damaged, and was eventually scrapped in 1538.93

In the long run, by never sailing more than a few hundred metres, *la Grande Françoise* saved the French kingdom money, time and labour. As known from the
“Great Harry”, warships of this size spent most of their careers in the dock, where
they underwent regular heavy maintenance, and there is no evidence to suggest that
they were of significant benefit in naval combat. The opposite is actually more likely
for, as Walter Raleigh remarked, ‘a ship of six hundred tons will carry as good
ordnance as a ship of twelve hundred tons; and though the greater have double her
number, the lesser will turn her broadsides twice before the greater can wind once’.94
With this said, although the failure of *la Grande Françoise* left his reputation
tarnished, Francis I’s navy still included great ships that were slightly smaller, yet
more nimble, such as the 800-tun *la Carraquon*, which remained an essential warship
within the French fleet until a fire in its galley incinerated the warship days before the
1545 squadron at Dieppe departed for Portsmouth.

It was not until the seventeenth century that warships of a near equal size re-
emerged in the two kingdoms. Though, on Henry VIII’s death, the *Henri Grâce à
Dieu* was renamed *the Edward*, a fire in 1553 destroyed the ship when moored at
Woolwich, paralleling the event on-board *la Carraquon* almost a decade prior. This
event marked the end of “white elephants” for over half a century.95 For England,
Edward VI’s reign contributed little, and Mary’s short rule only began to produce new
warships in its final years, when the *Philip and Mary*, the *Mary Rose* and the *Golden

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93 TNA, SP1/86, f. 86.
94 W. Raleigh, ‘Observations Concerning the Royal Navy and Sea-Service. Dedicated to the Most
Noble and Illustrious Prince Henry, Prince of Wales’ in W. Oldys and T. Birch (eds), *The Works of Sir
95 The largest warships constructed during this time were the Elizabethan vessels the *Triumph* and the
*White Bear*. Both vessels were less than 1000 tuns, and few complaints were made regarding their
sailing capabilities, unlike their predecessors.
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*Lion* were launched, alongside rebuilding a handful of smaller vessels.\(^{96}\) Mary’s largest new contributions appear to have been well built, for all three were still in service in 1588, and there was no need to refit the *Mary Rose* until 1589.\(^{97}\) All three, however, were no larger than 600 *tuns*.

Across the Channel, Henri II inherited several large warships, including *la Grande Maitresse* and *la Cardinale*, although these were considerably smaller than *la Grande Françoise* and even *la Carraquon* and, like Mary’s new vessels, were no larger than 600 *tuns*.\(^{98}\) Furthermore, by March 1549, Henri also controlled five new warships that had been built in Normandy and Brest; the largest, *l’Hermine* and *l’Henry-le-Grand* (later known simply as *l’Henri*), were no larger than 500 *tuns*.\(^{99}\) Although these warships were hardly overwhelming in size, Henri II was clearly ambitious in his naval programme. By July 1555, preparations were being made ‘to make and equip the great *Carracon*’, which was to be accompanied by a ‘great number of ships from all the ports and harbours of our kingdom’.\(^{100}\) This warship must have been built in honour of Francis I’s lost vessel, and it is probable that it would have been of a similar size. Although Henri’s dedication to galleys has already been discussed, the construction of sailing vessels under his reign does suggest that he understood their significance. Henri’s untimely death, then, was a critical factor in the French navy’s subsequent demise, for with his passing, the navy lost its patron. During the naval campaign of 1572 to 1573 against the rebels of La Rochelle, of the seven vessels initially armed for the service of Antoine Escalin, baron de la Garde on


\(^{97}\) TNA, SP 12/3, f. 131; BL, Egerton MS 2541, f. 1.

\(^{98}\) BN, français 18153, f. 34.


\(^{100}\) AN, X\(^{1A}\) 8620, ff. 66-68.
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11 November 1572, the largest, *le Charles*, was only 500 *tuns*.¹⁰¹ Experiencing the pressures inflicted by the Wars of Religion, the French monarchy did not possess the revenue, time or resources to construct unnecessarily large warships, designed primarily for royal prestige.¹⁰²

Meanwhile, England was experiencing the opposite of this decline during the long reign of Queen Elizabeth. Yet, despite the navy’s high standing, the queen and her council’s decisions were not swayed by the desire of Elizabeth’s father to construct unnecessarily large warships.¹⁰³ Indeed the largest vessels constructed for Elizabeth’s navy were all built during the early years of her reign. The first of these was the *Elizabeth Jonas* (800 *tuns*), a warship commissioned in the final months of her sister’s reign and launched on 3 July 1559 at Woolwich.¹⁰⁴ The *Elizabeth* was followed in 1562 by the *Triumph* and the *Victory* at 1000 and 800 *tuns*, respectively.¹⁰⁵ Combined, these two vessels cost almost £14,000 to construct, an impressive sum considering that ordinary annual naval expenditure in 1561 was set at £12,000.¹⁰⁶ Finally, the *White Bear* was launched in 1564 and was estimated to be 900 *tuns*.¹⁰⁷ Consequently, by 1603, Elizabeth possessed a navy which included five vessels of 800 *tons* or more, four of which were built prior to 1565, and the fifth was purchased from Walter Raleigh in 1587.¹⁰⁸

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¹⁰¹ BN, français 4554, f. 78.
¹⁰⁵ TNA, E351/2199.
¹⁰⁶ TNA, E351/2198.
¹⁰⁷ TNA, E351/2200.
¹⁰⁸ BL, Otho EIX, f. 94. The *Triumph*, 1000 *tons*; the *Elizabeth*, 900 *tons*, the *White Bear*, 900 *tons*, the *Victory*, 800 *tons* and the *Ark Royal*, 800 *tons*. These figures do appear to be at the top end of estimates, and it is likely that actual vessel tonnage would have been below this.
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After 1565, then, Elizabeth’s desire for large and imposing warships disappeared. This was likely to have been influenced by two factors. First, 1565 marked the end of war with France and, after this date, France largely ceased to be a threat on account of its own internal instability. This enabled Elizabethan England to enter a twenty-year period of general peace and prosperity. Second, the impact of John Hawkins cannot be ignored. Hawkins’s involvement and increasing control over the navy from 1570, allowed England’s naval power to be directed by maritime expertise and logic, rather than by a monarch’s or a noble’s desire for glory. His race-built galleons were constructed according to the view that warships ranging in tonnage from 350 to 650 tuns were more effective.¹⁰⁹ A smaller vessel was both faster and easier to manoeuvre. This understanding of the importance of warship size can be observed in John Montgomery’s tracts of 1570 that concern the design and purpose of a proposed newly modified English fleet. Montgomery suggested that out of a proposed forty-warship fleet to permanently defend the realm, the largest were to be three 800-tun vessels.¹¹⁰ This underlines the fact that there was no commitment to the idea of constructing warships of the calibre of the Henri Grâce à Dieu in Elizabethan England. By becoming less involved in the operation and design of her navy than her father, Elizabeth permitted individuals such as John Hawkins and Mathew Baker to commence a revolution in ship design. It was the medium-sized vessels of England’s fleet that were celebrated, and their success should be associated with the trust that Elizabeth invested in her advisors.

Yet, developments in ship construction in the late-sixteenth century did not prevent the re-emergence of larger warships in subsequent years, that were designed chiefly to reflect the monarchy’s power. In 1608, £5068 3s 4d was provided during

¹⁰⁹ See pp. 193-94 of this thesis.
¹¹⁰ BL, Add. MS 20042, f. 6.
the term of Michaelmas for the ‘new buyldinge and repayring’ of five warships in England’s navy, including the 800-ton Victory.\textsuperscript{111} In the case of the Elizabethan Victory, James I’s intention was not simply to repair and enhance her, but instead to completely redesign her at Woolwich. Once there, she was disassembled and then built anew, with some of the Victory’s original timbers amongst the new warship’s hull. The new warship cost the crown £4860 8s 3d in 1610 alone, and accrued a total expense of nearly £20,000.\textsuperscript{112} When completed in 1611, the newly named \textit{Prince Royal} of 1200 tons was incomparable to the vessel that she replaced.\textsuperscript{113} The warship was 300 tons greater than any other vessel during James’s reign.\textsuperscript{114} Her size however remained a major issue for her utility, for as had been realised during the sixteenth century, large warships were too expensive to man and operate. Consequently, treasury accounts show that she was fully manned for service on only two occasions under James. The first of these was between March and May 1613, when she served under the Earl of Nottingham for royal spectacle, to transport the newly married Princess Elizabeth and her husband, Frederick V, across the Channel on their way to Heidelberg.\textsuperscript{115} Indeed, the \textit{Prince Royal} was neglected in dock after this date, where her timbers decayed requiring her to be rebuilt in 1621.\textsuperscript{116} It was exactly a decade after her last official use that, in 1623, the \textit{Prince Royal} was used again for very similar purposes, when a staggering £20,714 12d was spent to employ her, and nine additional warships of the king, to fetch the future Charles I from Spain.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111}TNA, E351/2246.
\item \textsuperscript{113}TNA, SP 14/100, ff. 3-7; TNA, SP 14/98, f. 64. 1187 tons by Baker’s measurement.
\item \textsuperscript{114}TNA, SP 16/13, f. 106.
\item \textsuperscript{115}TNA, E351/2251.
\item \textsuperscript{116}TNA, E351/2259.
\item \textsuperscript{117}TNA, E351/2261.
\end{itemize}
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With Louis XIII’s *la Couronne* and Charles I’s the *Sovereign of the Seas* both being larger than the *Prince Royal*, it is unsurprising that similar issues over cost persisted for the remainder of this period. To maintain 505 men on board her, by 1638 *la Couronne* was draining the state of 57,630 *livres* every three months, a figure over 20,000 *livres* greater than the admiral’s 1000-ton *le Gallion (Vaisseau) du Roi*. In this context, *la Couronne* was a burden on state revenue, and her continued retention was associated with the monarch’s patronage, for her superiority in battle was never expressed in the available records. This was increasingly the case considering that *la Couronne*, like other vessels of a similar size, proved difficult to handle and consequently was of limited benefit in combat. Even with reduced fore-and-aft castles when compared to her predecessors, she was not the most agile vessel within the fleet. *La Couronne* suffered from the same constraints as those warships a century earlier because of her size; in June 1639, near to Belle-Île, she was caught in a storm, causing significant damage to herself and several other accompanying warships. The other damaged vessels were quickly fixed, whilst the scale of the damage to Louis XIII’s warship of valour - including the loss of her main mast – meant that she was unable to be repaired in the same year.

*La Couronne*, then, was restricted by ‘the technological limitations of the age’, and yet the French regime’s commitment to the warship through her construction, maintenance and use shows that it must have valued her. Despite her wide-ranging limitations, *la Couronne* was an investment by the crown, and just like the *Henri* 


120 AN, Marine B3, ff. 291-94.

121 *ibid*, ff. 323-24. *La Couronne* was still not back in service by 27 July 1640.

122 *Navy and Government*, p. 117.
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Grâce à Dieu, and la Grande Françoise, she was unlikely to be abandoned whilst she found favour in the crown. That la Couronne was decommissioned shortly after Louis XIII’s death, on 14 May 1643, shows the extent of this patronage: the warship’s lifespan was just seven years, at least one of which was spent being repaired.

Across the Channel, Charles I’s Sovereign of the Seas equally reflected the issues that France experienced with la Couronne. Despite costing £40,833 8s 1d to build – and a further £24,000 for her ordnance – she suffered from many of the typical problems associated with colossal warships.123 With a keel measuring 127 feet, a breadth of 46 feet 6″, and a depth of 19 feet 4″, Charles’s vessel was easily the largest in the fleet.124 Yet, as has already been illustrated, size did not necessarily equate to effectiveness. The Sovereign was top-heavy, and required a major rebuild in 1651, which reduced her upper works by six feet, and amongst other trimmings removed the after round house.125 For Andrew Thrush it was ‘unwise to build a ship whose primary function was to impress at the expense of more important projects’.126 At the time, the English navy’s warships were predominantly used to defend the kingdom and its shipping, against the small and nimble ships used by the pirates of North Africa and Dunkirk, and the Sovereign’s large size prevented her from being employed for this purpose.127 It was not until the Battle of Kentish Knock, on 28 September 1652, that the Sovereign would be used effectively in action against the larger Dutch warships. By this point the Sovereign had undergone a major rebuild,

123 TNA, E351/2277; TNA, SP 16/378, f.109; Sephton, Sovereign of the Seas, p.15. As Michael Oppenheim first highlighted in 1896, this staggering sum is best understood on the assumption that the average 40-gun ship of the time would have cost just £5500 to £6500. M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Temple Smith, 1988), p. 260.
124 TNA, SP 16/361, ff. 132, 134.
125 Sephton, Sovereign of the Seas, p. 141.
which reduced both her size and armament, in effect making her a different vessel altogether.

Given the time and cost required to construct and maintain them, warships such as the *Sovereign* were not designed primarily for military benefit. Instead they were built as a front – or even deterrent – which was intended to be projected against all potential enemies of the state. They were the monarch’s prized asset, and shining trophy, and were present among the monarch’s ships for prestige.\footnote{For more on this, see chapter six.} This is observable in an annotated letter from Phineas Pett, the *Sovereign*’s master shipwright, to Charles on 13 June 1637.\footnote{Thrush, *The Navy under Charles I*, p. 38; TNA, SP 16/361, f. 135. Thrush was uncertain on a precise date for this document, although State Papers are now more confident in dating it.} Pett wrote to the king requesting that the launching of the *Sovereign* be delayed for:

> if your Majestie have a resolution to send the shipp to sea this present Sommer, Shee will growe very fowle under water to ride in the River till the Springe of the yeare, and it wilbe held necessary to have hir into docke againe to grave and cleane hir under water which wilbe some trouble and a double charge.

In the margin of the letter, Charles responded ‘I am not of your opinion’. After continuing to list the advantages of delaying the *Sovereign*’s launch, Pett left the matter to the king’s ‘princely consideracion, and tymely resolution’ to which Charles concluded ‘I will; and therefor it is fitt that the new Ship be launched as soone as may bee’. By ignoring the advice of Pett, Charles demonstrated his persistence, and perhaps even ignorance, in overriding his advisor’s expertise. His ambition was likely to have been influenced by *la Couronne*’s launch in the previous year. Not wishing to be outrun by his French rival, Charles applied pressure on Pett and the shipyard workers of Woolwich for the launch of the warship with haste. This
decision resulted in the failed launch of the ship on 25 September 1637 because of poor currents.\textsuperscript{130} It was only with a second attempt, three weeks later, that the \textit{Sovereign} began her maiden voyage in a totally unspectacular fashion, by being launched at night. From her launch to her rebuild in 1651, Charles I’s warship had a largely unsuccessful career. Its failure as a warship has to be attributed to the prioritising of the monarch’s prestige and honour over maritime logic and expertise, which so often transpired with warships of a similar size.

Having recognised these flaws, and with the relationship between monarch and “white elephant” now firmly established, it is important to also refer to the remaining large vessels that were incorporated within the navies of England and France. In both kingdoms, it was not until the seventeenth century that significant developments in this upper tier of warships are observed. By the time of his death in 1625, James I could boast of a fleet that included nine warships of 800 \textit{tons} or greater. Alongside the \textit{Prince Royal}, the king’s ships comprised the \textit{Bear} and the \textit{Triumph}, both of around 900 \textit{tons}, and six further vessels of a lesser size including the \textit{Anne Royal} and the \textit{Merhonour}, both of 800 \textit{tons}.\textsuperscript{131} These large, though by no means disproportionate, warships were more actively deployed for service; for example, the \textit{Anne Royal} led an expedition against the pirates of Algiers in 1619.\textsuperscript{132} In another example, a fleet of nine royal warships, and a number of private vessels – with the \textit{Anne Royal} as admiral, and the \textit{Swiftsure} and \textit{St. Andrew} (both 900 \textit{tons}) as vice admiral and rear admiral respectively – failed to resolve the La Rochelle conflict in 1625.\textsuperscript{133} By 1642, the English crown owned eleven warships of 800 \textit{tons} or greater,

\textsuperscript{130} Sephton, \textit{Sovereign of the Seas}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{131} TNA, SP 16/13, f. 106.
\textsuperscript{132} TNA, E351/2257.
\textsuperscript{133} BL, Add MS 48152, f. 255; TNA, SP 16/13, f. 59.
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whilst France controlled four.\textsuperscript{134} In France, \textit{la Couronne} was accompanied by \textit{l’Amiral d’Espargne, le Gallion de Guise} and \textit{le Vaisseau du Roi}, all of which were estimated at 1000 \textit{tons}.\textsuperscript{135} It is also interesting to note that the admiral’s flag was typically flown in \textit{le Vaisseau du Roi}, and not in \textit{la Couronne}, which was captained by Launay de Razilly when serving as vice admiral.\textsuperscript{136}

Chart 5.1 shows that an increase in large state warships did take place in both kingdoms during this period.\textsuperscript{137} Far from being gradual, this change only occurred in

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Tons and tonnage} was standard in all measurements by this point.

\textsuperscript{135} BN, français 6408, ff. 279-80.

\textsuperscript{136} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}1, ff. 235-36.

\textsuperscript{137} The following chart is the result of a large collection of primary and secondary sources. Where an asterisk is present, the data presented is produced by estimates of my own accord. These estimates are an outcome of both sources available and statistical trends. Most oared vessels only contained one deck and, therefore, did not have their tonnage recorded because of a significantly reduced capacity to store \textit{tons} of cargo. For consistency, all vessels that were primarily propelled by oar have been separated in this chart from ‘sailing vessels’.

Small vessels such as pinnaces, flutes, shallops and brûlots have not been included in the following charts. Given that their primary purpose was to transport troops and provisions, and that the majority were not armed with cannons, it would be unfair to include them in these lists. The exception to this rule is galiots; given that these vessels were small-armed galleys, it is fair to include them when they are mentioned in source. Another reason for their inclusion is that it is only fair when the lesser rowbarges of England for 1545 are also integrated. Where there is evidence that these vessels were armed, and thus could be used for other purposes than to just transport goods, they have been included.

For England:


1605: TNA, SP 12/285, f. 85, [1602]; BL, Otho EIX, f. 94, [1603/4].

1625: TNA, SP 16/13, f.106, [1625], BL, Add MS 48152, f. 255, [1625].

1633: TNA, SP 20/15, f. 207, [1632]; TNA, SP 16/305 f. 123, [1635]; TNA, SP 16/368, ff. 216-17, [1637]; BN, français 15950, f. 68, [1640].


For France:


1565: BN, français 17329, ff. 196-97, [1560-71]; BN, français 15882, ff. 103-106, [1566]; BN, français 4554, ff.78-81, [1572]; AN, Marine C\textsuperscript{1}193, ff. 1-3, [1566].
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England between 1585 and 1637, and in France during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. This demonstrates the close relationship between warships and the state, for it was in periods of state consolidation and progress, when the monarchy was at its strongest, that these warships materialised in the greatest numbers. Additionally, naval expansion was connected to international rivalry; for both states it was necessary to integrate more warships of a ‘first rank’ status when they faced similar competition from their adversaries.

There are four factors to consider when asking why warships larger than 800 tons were scarce in either navy prior to the early-seventeenth century. First, it was their expense to construct, maintain and arm, that made them unviable to prepare for service frequently. Second, it was difficult to provide the necessary resources to construct these vessels, and fit and man them, especially when two, or more, warships of a lesser size could have been built for the same money and resources. When *la Couronne* was demasted in June 1639, the length of time taken to repair her was likely on account of difficulties in finding the necessary bespoke parts and labour to repair her colossal mast. Third, as has already been noted with *la Grande Française*, these vessels were so large that there were few harbours and dockyards that were capable of accommodating them. Finally, there was no demand for warships of this size in fleet actions because very few other powers possessed similar vessels to...

*1585*: This year and its surrounding period is particularly difficult to uncover records of the fleet’s size. Consequently, this year is almost solely an estimate that has been produced in the knowledge that all found records suggests that improvised fleets were exploited. BN, français 4489, [1587]; AN, Marine B1, ff. 35-38, [1582]; BN, français 17329, ff. 197-98; A. James, ‘The French Armada? The Azores Campaigns, 1580-1583’, *The Historical Journal*, 55 (2012), pp. 1-20.


1625: AN, Marine B1, ff. 53-56 [1622-23]; *ibid*, f. 61, [1625]; BN, français 17329, ff. 199-200, [1622-25]; BN, français 6409, f. 275, [1626].


See also, *Histoire de la Marine*, III-IV; Masson, *Les galères de France; Navy and Government*, pp. 169-75; Glete, *Warfare at Sea*, pp. 188.

*1605*: AN, Marine B1, ff. 291-94.

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oppose them. At the same time, “white-elephant” warships had little impact against the smaller and more nimble vessels between 100 and 200 tons, which took to the sea far more regularly. In a time when boarding a vessel was still a preferred tactic, warships such as the Sovereign would not have been able to directly board vessels of a considerably smaller size, and so these large warships had little choice but to delegate responsibility to a more suitable ship. Furthermore, a smaller vessel could almost always outmanoeuvre the slower and larger warships of a fleet, as was the case in July 1545, when the French galleys attacked the Henry Grâce à Dieu. As a result, even by 1642, the great warships of England and France held no military purpose at sea that their lesser kin could not also achieve; they were the product of an arms race fuelled by deterrence and royal prestige. The largest of the monarch’s warships were, consequently, only used for large military expeditions and royal ceremonies, and were not employed for typical coastal patrols.

What becomes apparent, then, is that those warships used by states for service most frequently were of a smaller size, being cheaper and easier to operate. For England, in 1546, the average size of a Henrician warship was 215 tuns, a figure that was severely reduced by eighteen vessels in the fleet below 50 tuns. By the year of the Spanish Armada, the average size of Elizabeth’s warships was 325 tons. This tonnage gradually increased during the early-seventeenth century, and by 1642 the average sized warship in England was 365 tons. In France, the early-seventeenth century provides statistics that are similar to those presented for England. In 1623, the

139 The Anthony Roll. Chart 5.1 shows that combining both oared and sailing vessels, Henry VIII’s fifty-eight ship fleet included thirty-two vessels under 200 tons that undermined its strength. These smaller warships were a product of the monarch’s desperation during the final years of his reign. Small warships, namely his rowbarges, were cheap and quick to construct, and both were crucial factors in an already expensive and prolonged period of conflict.
140 BL, Egerton MS 2541, f. 1.
141 Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics, p. 152; TNA, SP 16/328, ff. 216-17. This figure has had one third subtracted from its original value of 548 tons, given that tons and tonnage had been added.
French fleet’s average ship tonnage was 319 *tons*, whilst in 1640 an average of around 350 was achieved.\(^{142}\) This data suggests that, throughout the period in question, the average and perhaps ideal size for a state ship was between 300 and 400 *tons*. A warship of this size was capable of fulfilling all the necessary requirements that an early modern naval vessel was expected to accomplish. It could transport a large number of troops across water, and could carry and deploy a significant amount of heavy ordnance, whilst still being able to manoeuvre. Meanwhile, it was important that warships of this calibre could sail vast distances, including in trans-Atlantic travel. Unsurprisingly, then, a great proportion of Mathew Baker’s *race-built* galleons such as the *Foresight* and the *Swiftsure* were of this size. They were also far less costly than the largest vessels of the state that have been discussed, and were a favoured size for annual sea service patrols.\(^{143}\)

Given that it was a smaller type of warship, which averaged between 300 and 400 *tons*, that was relied upon for defending the kingdom’s borders, the larger warships of England and France were more accustomed to being mothballed within a dock or harbour, than experiencing the open sea. The largest and most imposing warships of this period were not simply a military apparatus, but were in many ways – and more importantly – a trophy designed to encapsulate and assert the power of the monarch. They are consequently one of the best tools that historians have at their disposal to demonstrate the intimate relationship between navy and monarch.

\(^{142}\) AN, Marine B^4^, ff. 55-56; BN, français 6408, f. 299. For 1640, the available ship list recording appears to have inconsistencies with the methods used for recording tonnage. Whereas some warships, such as *la Couronne*, were recorded with *tons and tonnage*, other vessels in the fleet do not appear to have included it. This is most likely because different estimators were used for different parts of the country. By excluding *tons and tonnage*, it is estimated that the average French warship under Richelieu was between 300 and 400 *tons*. With this in mind, the median value of 350 has been adopted.

\(^{143}\) See the year of 1610 when the *Adventure*, the *Assurance*, the *Rainbow*, the *Answer*, the *Crane*, the *Advantage*, the *Lions Whelp*, the *Spy* and the *Moon* were selected to serve in the Narrow Seas at a cost of £5354. TNA, E351/2248.
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4.3. Vessel Architecture and the State

The monarch’s patronage of large and imposing warships influenced their architectural design. The imposing fore-and-aft castles incorporated on Henry VIII’s large carracks were built not only for their military value but also to signify the crown’s authority, because size equates to power, despite their architectural flaws hindering the ship’s sailing capability. The career of the Henry Grâce à Dieu indicates that the Elizabethan regime was correct to reduce the superstructures that were one of the most defining characteristics of the carrack, through designing the race-built galleon. Yet this model was not designed overnight; it was the product of trial and error. Just as Henry VIII’s main carracks were reduced in size during the late 1530s, Elizabeth’s warships were also adapted as they aged. This occurred even with her most successful vessels, such as the 360-ton Dreadnought and the 350-ton Swiftsure, both of which were rebuilt between 1592 and 1593.

Although influenced by the Henrician Anglo-Venetian galleass hybrid, such as the Great Galley and the Antelope, the race-built galleons that became the basis of northern European naval architecture into the late-seventeenth century were designed by strict mathematical logic and planning. Mathew Baker, Master Shipwright of England from 1572 to 1613, was one of the first shipwrights to plan the preliminary design of a ship by using complex mathematical measurements and algorithms, before

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146 Anderson, Men of War; TNA, E351/2230; TNA, SP 12/242, f. 151.
any construction began. Without using mathematical formulae in the planning stage, Baker claimed that ‘it is impossible to make a perfect plot for a ship’.  

Baker’s ideas on shipbuilding were promulgated amongst his contemporaries, including Thomas Harriot and Walter Raleigh. Through Baker’s notes, it is possible to pinpoint exactly when these changes began to transpire, for in them the shipwright declared that ‘the first ship that ever was made by this order was the Edward of Mr Williams, and the second was the Forsyet of the Queen’s’. Elizabeth’s 300-tun Foresight, launched 30 July 1570, was the first in a new line of sailing warship. Baker’s new model was of hybrid design, and combined the height and sailing propulsion of the carrack with the longer, yet sleeker hull of a galley. It had a length to beam ratio of 3:1 (compared to the Henrician carracks 2 ½:1), whilst possessing drastically reduced fore-and-aft castles.

Mathew Baker, then, in his position as Master Shipwright, was the chief advocate and innovator of the new race-built galleon design. With the support of John Hawkins, whose influence over the Council of Marine Causes in the subsequent years enabled a level of efficiency and quality in the royal shipyards that was previously unseen, the queen’s warships were advanced. Although Elizabeth’s role in these transformations was minimal, she was far from ignorant of them, for her patronage enabled them to proceed. Elizabeth’s image as the mother of her navy would have

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148 PL, 2820, f. 22.
149 BL, Add MS 6788, ff. 1-10.
150 ibid.
152 PL, 2820, f. 160.
been popularised by her willingness to endorse experimentation and progression in ship design.  

The English queen was not alone, as French monarchs also patronised the newly developing art of shipbuilding. As was typical of treatises in the period, the monarch’s patronage of works of shipbuilding was recorded by dedicated forewords in texts. *Stolonomie* was produced in honour of Henri II, and discussed ‘the form, and manner of dressing, preparing, equipping and undertaking an army of galleys’, which – according to *Stolonomie* – should consist of sixty *galley subtiles* for the French forces in the Mediterranean. As has previously been discussed, Henri certainly advocated the maintenance of a strong galley fleet. The king was quick to emphasise the importance of oared vessels to the French realm’s military apparatus for, within months of inheriting the crown, Henri had ordered Leon Stossi to construct twenty-six new galleys at Marseille, alongside a further six at Rouen. By doing so, Henri II showed his support for the French galley construction industry in the form of regular financial payments. That shipbuilding in the French Mediterranean continued to flourish, even after ‘The Age of the Galleys’ had passed, was the outcome of the royal patronage that it received, principally under Henri II and Henri IV.

English naval architecture was also influenced by this Mediterranean design. When Henry VIII employed several Venetian shipwrights to assist in the construction of his vessels, he set a trend that would continue throughout the century. Obtaining knowledge of ship construction from the Mediterranean centres of maritime expertise,

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154 J. Dee, *General and Rare Memorials pertayning to the Perfect Arte of Navigation* (London: John Daye, 1577), frontispiece. This image was designed to depict Elizabeth as the mother and patron of her navy.  
155 BN, français 2133, f. 1. This work was not the first of its kind; a similar manual that focused on shipwrightry entitled ‘Description au vray de la construction du corps d’une Gallere neufve, subtile, ou Bastardelle’ is dated 1521. AN, Marine B777, ff. 18-23.  
156 BN, français 17329, f. 194.  
157 TNA, SP 1/182, f. 192; *CSP, Spain*, VI part I, no. 173: ‘16 July 1541’.
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such as Venice, Genoa and Malta, was not solely initiated by England. France, even more than England, was accustomed to constructing warships under guidance. Given France’s geography, this is hardly surprising, the kingdom was well connected to these southern European maritime powers. That England was also able to do so is perhaps more important to show. Thus, Mathew Baker had sailed to southern Europe in 1550, where he gained invaluable Venetian shipbuilding knowledge. Considering that the race-built galleon was built with the shape of a galley’s hull as its foundation, the celebrated English achievement must be deemed as a product of southern European design as much as it was of its northern counterpart.

Meanwhile, developments in northern Europe during the late-sixteenth century provided a further stimulus for the race-built galleon’s production. Protestant groups principally drove these advances, when Dutch, Huguenot and English forces cooperated against the Spanish Catholic empire, and enabled an increased exchange of ideas that were predominantly Protestant in character. In one case, with the Earl of Essex’s failed expedition to Ferrol in 1597, at least twenty Dutch vessels assisted the English fleet. Naturally, new and innovative military tactics would have rapidly spread across nations after witnessing them, whilst advanced ship architecture would have influenced both a friend and foe’s future designs. As was the case in the

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159 International proposals for combined military efforts between these Protestant factions were endemic during the late-sixteenth century. See BL, Galba CV, f. 12; ‘A project how to make War upon Spain, written in the Queen’s Time, and presented to Sir Robert Cecyll, by her Majesty’s Appointment’ in M. Oppenheim (ed.), The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson, V (6 volumes, London: The Navy Records Society, 1914), p. 54; K. R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 138.

160 TNA, SP 12/ 262, f. 23.

161 In July 2015, Alan James presented a paper at The Emergence of a Maritime Nation, Greenwich entitled ‘France as Foil: Domestic Turmoil and Politicization of Naval Power’. He illustrated exactly this. James highlighted how Walter Raleigh acknowledged that his statement ‘for whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the
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Mediterranean, a transcultural theatre for shipbuilding ideas also existed throughout northern Europe. England experienced the benefits, as Huguenot communities with shipbuilding expertise were established in Bristol, Rye, Sandwich and London as the period progressed. With this in mind, the celebrated English race-built galleon should be seen as a transnational product; founded in England, but built according to a wealth of knowledge and expertise that was sourced from a variety of locations throughout Europe.

Even though Baker’s work should be held in high regard, ship architectural advancements were by no means the product of just one man. Portuguese-born Fernando Oliveira was writing Livro da fabrica das naos during the 1570s, whilst in France, Ithier Hobier, Treasurer of the Levant Navy, published De la construction d’une gallaire et de son equipage in 1622, and both integrated mathematical formulae into their discourse. With graphs and dimensions included in both pieces of work, it is clear that Baker was not the sole originator of what was an early maritime scientific revolution. Perhaps the most recognised work that followed in Baker’s footsteps was Georges Fournier’s extensive volume Hydrographie contenant la theorie et la practique de toutes les parties de la navigation, which employed mathematics to...
present ship design as a science.\textsuperscript{165} England, then, did not lead Europe in shipbuilding design, but rather, given the sea-routes from the Mediterranean to north-western Europe, was part of a transcultural community that provided the means for a constant flow of information and expertise to be circulated. This system of interchange would have prevented any one kingdom from possessing and exercising new shipbuilding knowledge in isolation for any significant period of time. This would have been particularly the case for those nations that bordered the Channel, for a near constant transfer of knowledge between the Huguenot, Dutch and English communities would have prevented new shipbuilding knowledge from being withheld. Nicholas d’Arfeville’s survey of European vessels in 1582 suggested that this was certainly the case as ‘in England, Scotland, and Ireland, they have similar ships to ours in Normandy, and Brittany’.\textsuperscript{166}

The availability of this knowledge, however, especially amongst Protestant communities, was of little use, if states could not apply it for military gain. France undoubtedly suffered from these complications as a result of the Wars of Religion, and the limitations of the French state’s shipbuilding abilities were self-evident in the kingdom’s reliance upon foreign ships of war during the early-seventeenth century. The first five vessels incorporated into Richelieu’s expanding navy in 1626 and 1627, including \textit{le St. Louis}, were all purchased from the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{167} By purchasing warships, Richelieu was able to quickly expand the navy, whilst his shipyards in

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] Fournier, \textit{Hydrographie}, pp. 17-20, 23-26 et. al. The Royal Society would continue to pursue new knowledge in ship design under this perspective.
\item[166] BN, français 20008, f. 6. \textquote{en Angleterre, Escosse, & Irlande, Ilz se servent de Navires semblables aux nostres de Normandie, et de Bretaigne}.
\end{footnotes}
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Brittany, Normandy and Guyenne prepared to recommence the construction of large naval warships.

Before Richelieu’s grand expansion, the crown’s dependence on hiring vessels had reduced the realm’s incentive to construct and maintain large warships at home. Writing in 1642, Georges Fournier declared that before Richelieu and Louis’s naval growth, France ‘had formerly so few vessels, [which were] also badly equipped…[and so] it was necessary, with shame for this dependence, to borrow, or rent Spanish, Maltese and Dutch vessels’. It was not until March 1626, following the initial campaigns in Genoa and La Rochelle, that France experienced:

difficulties by being assisted by the English and the Dutch vessels, [and these issues] have revealed the degree that armaments on the sea are necessary for the grandeur of this crown, and for the security and growth of its subjects’ trade. That is why one is considering various propositions made by companies, rich in goods, to obtain a great number of vessels for the Atlantic Ocean.

There is little doubt, therefore, that those first warships constructed in France, between 1628 and 1631, were not only influenced by the architectural designs of the Dutch and English, but were actually modelled on them. This suggests that French warships under Richelieu were not distinctly French in architectural design. The Knights of Malta’s ability to inspire galley design, discussed earlier, is an important

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168 Fournier, Hydrographie, p. ix. [Elle avoit autrefois si peu de Vaisseau, & si mal équippez…[que] il fallloit dans la necessité, avec non moins de honte que de dépence, emprunter, ou loüer des Espagnols, des Maltois, & des Hollandois, des Vaisseaux]. English warships were also hired by France, before being recalled for Buckingham’s campaign at La Rochelle. In 1625, seven English vessels were hired for two months at a cost of 54,780 livres. AN, Marine B1, f. 61.

169 AN, KK1363, f. 191. [les difficultez que nous avons euës avec les Anglois et Hollandois pour estre assistez de leur vaisseaux ont fait cognoistre combien de bons armemens de mer estoient utiles et necessaires pour la grandeur de cette couronne, et pour la seurete et acroissement du negoce de ses subiectz. C’est pourquoi l’on escoutte divers propoons qui sont faictes par diverses companies puissantes en bien pour arriver un grand nomb: de vaisseaux pour la mer oceane, et de galaires pour la mediteranée.]
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example of this. These similarities, perhaps most apparent in Dutch and French warships, have caused confusion amongst scholars who have previously mistaken the appearance of *la Couronne*.170 Georges Fournier’s depiction of a warship (Plate 6.3), based upon an image of *le St. Louis* (a Dutch warship purchased by France in 1626) has regularly been misconceived as *la Couronne*, when it most certainly was not.171 Nevertheless, their considerable likeness is evidence of the Dutch influence on Richelieu at this time, and indicates that shipbuilding in northern Europe was produced through international engagement.172

This further supports the view that advances in shipbuilding, such as the production of the *race-built* galleon, were not the products of a single state’s effort. Warship construction was the result of transcultural interactions, which were more frequent in northern European waters because of the emergence of aspiring Protestant states. That some state navies excelled, whilst others floundered, was the result of available resources, and variations in the patronage of navies amongst states. It was ambition, rather than innovative knowledge – albeit, the one often led to the other – that enabled states to surpass the naval capabilities of their rivals.

**Concluding Remarks**

It was rare in warship design, for strategic or tactical advantage to be prioritised over the international pressure felt most strongly by the monarch, to deter and impress.173

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170 Sephton, *Sovereign of the Seas*, p. 29.
172 Furthering this, France was not alone in purchasing Dutch warships and employing Dutch shipwrights. The Swedish *Vasa* was constructed under the supervision of Dutch shipwrights.
173 See chapter six of thesis.
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At sea, warships represented their monarchs, and size did matter. The largest warships of sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century England and France were potentially both the most impressive, and representative of the crowns’ self-perceived power. Vessels such as the *Sovereign of the Seas* and *la Grande Françoise* demonstrate that the navies of England and France were literally *royal* navies, for their appearance showed that they were the property of the crown. In studying them on a state comparative basis, it has been shown that it was often interstate competition that was the primary motive for the construction of the largest of these warships. Yet with rivalries high, both kingdoms were prone to the same errors when transcultural exchange ensured that there was very little difference in construction techniques across kingdoms. As a result of European knowledge exchange, no state had a particular advantage over ship architecture for a prolonged period of time because shipwrights were internationally employed. That monarchs were willing to sacrifice seaworthiness in exchange for the visual appearance of royal power, demonstrates how much of an impact they had on warship design.

Furthermore, early modern European naval activity and development has to be considered with a distinction between two geographic frontiers: northern Europe and the Mediterranean. The cultural distinctions between northern and southern maritime Europe, manifest in warship design, were largely the result of the differences of the seas. For this reason, Louis Sicking, amongst other historians, is right in claiming that a Mediterranean style of warfare existed in the period.\(^{174}\) This division caused a rift in French maritime affairs, which forced the kingdom to maintain both oared and sailing warships. This distinction in turn fragmented the French navy by producing two separate institutions to maintain these two types of vessel. Whereas, in England, oared

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vessels were rarely used in the crown’s sea forces after 1547, in France they were favoured, and it was not until the appointment of Cardinal Richelieu as grand maître in 1626 that sailing warships actually began to outnumber galleys.
Chart 5.1: Navy Size in England and France, 1545-1642: Arranged by Tonnage
CHAPTER FIVE

NAVAL EXPANSION, PRIVATE VESSELS AND STATE CONTROL

War, whether by land or sea, is a game of numbers. Strategy, military genius and weaponry are all crucial components that determine victory or defeat, but ultimately, as Carl von Clausewitz acknowledged, ‘superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement’. Clausewitz’s On War concerned land-based warfare, without reference to the sea, albeit the importance of a fleet’s size was also paramount to success in battle. Julian Corbett was perhaps the first scholar to adapt Clausewitz’s ideas for the maritime environment and, within his work he suggested that although fleets expanded during the period in question, privateers performed most of the work. The actions of decentralised armed forces at sea were pivotal to military outcomes on the maritime frontier. It cannot be forgotten that decentralised maritime violence endorsed by the state, was not limited to the activities of privateers. States also employed merchant vessels to act as mercenary forces. Through their employment, states could assemble numerically superior fleets when large campaigns were initiated. Both England and France, then, not only relied on private vessels for privateering to aggravate and hinder the enemy, but also ensured that they were integrated within the state’s fleet when necessary. Although naval construction schemes provided the means for states to reduce their reliance on private vessels in war, royal warships were not in great enough abundance for states to totally abandon private recruitment. As the size of a fleet could reflect its strength, early

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modern states aimed to expand when it was possible, in order to deter and defeat their adversaries.

Naval growth and warship advancement did not progress in a simple upward trajectory; instead development often stumbled along its path. In a study covering almost one hundred years, it should be obvious that naval expansion fluctuated in accordance with political, economic and social contexts. When naval progress faltered, it is possible to correlate these problems to coexisting state weaknesses and strains. The French Wars of Religion is one example, where political instability resulted in the neglect of the kingdom’s sea forces. Meanwhile in England, the same is observable during the years of Edward VI’s reign, and the opening years of the succession crisis under Mary I. On the other hand, the expansion of navies was intertwined with political strength and stability, and so it was possible for the standing navy to benefit from a stable political regime. An obvious, yet often undervalued factor that caused the expansion and advance of militaries was the will of the state. Navies were at their most powerful when the strength of the state was at its strongest, as discussed in theories of absolutism.3

An expansion of the crown’s warships provided the means for a reduction of the number of privately owned vessels hired by the state in times of war. This process of curbing decentralised violence, Janice E. Thomson has argued, marked the transition from ‘heteronomy to sovereignty’, strengthening the state apparatus.4 This is difficult to contest, for as the state reduced its reliance on private forces, it in turn,

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was able to strengthen its control over the expanding and centralised maritime arsenal owned by the crown. Any reduction in the state’s dependence upon private forces was, however, gradual, and both England and France still continued to use them, albeit in smaller quantities, at the end of this period. Given that the majority of state-led naval activity employed private vessels, James Scott Wheeler has a point when declaring that England’s naval campaigns for the first forty years of the seventeenth century were ‘semi-private affairs’, and the same could also be said for France.\(^5\)

Equally, the endorsement of privateering permitted forces to operate independently, without the express directive of the state itself.\(^6\) Yet, private maritime affairs were often difficult to distinguish from those of the state, not only because of joint-stock expeditions, but also due to large-scale naval campaigns that employed private vessels. In both offensive and defensive national naval campaigns, the crown’s warships were combined with private ships in order to produce a more potent fighting force.

For some historians, including Michael Duffy, the growth and use of both private and state-armed ships during the late-sixteenth and seventeenth centuries makes any notion of a military revolution ‘not clear cut’ and at the very least indicates that the ‘military revolution at sea differed from that on land’.\(^7\) The role of private vessels does perhaps complicate notions of a military revolution, yet the private sphere was important to military transformations at sea nonetheless. This concept has gained attention from John F. Guilmartin, who has suggested that the military changes

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at sea were ‘inseparable from changes in the economics of maritime commerce.’

Guilmartin’s assertion supports Frederick C. Lane’s concept of protection rent being one of the defining factors in the relationship between military and merchant, and suggests that military developments by the state could still occur whilst it hired and supported private-armed vessels. With this said, it is important to draw attention to the role of private and merchant maritime activity when considering naval growth and state advancement.

This chapter will assess the relationship between state reform and fleet transformations. It will do this by first discussing the impact of private vessels on state naval enterprises, and then accounting for the growth of the English and French standing navies during the period. It will argue that, although a reliance on private resources at sea decreased during the seventeenth century, when a larger state-owned fleet replaced it, merchant and other forms of private vessels continued to play a fundamental role in naval developments nevertheless. Without the availability of private vessels, states might have collapsed. Meanwhile, the strength of the monarchy dictated the power of the navy, and was instrumental in the expansion of its personal warships, which in turn, provided the means for the state to reduce its reliance on private-armed ships.

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Chapter Five

5.1. Merchant Composition

Both England and France remained dependent upon private shipping as a means to strengthen their military resources. Even whilst under the authority of a forceful monarch who patronised the state navy, the crown’s warships were on the whole numerically inferior compared to the private vessels that were leased to bulk out the fleet during campaigns. This is observable even in the largest of national wartime efforts. Of the 197 English vessels that participated in the Armada conflict of 1588, just thirty-four were warships owned by the queen.¹⁰ Such a dependency on decentralised violence has enabled David Childs to demonise the Elizabethan regime as deeply piratical in its maritime approach.¹¹ In France, moreover, of the 203 vessels that participated in the siege of La Rochelle during 1628, the crown owned scarcely more than thirty.¹² These figures show that both kingdoms relied heavily upon hired vessels when pursuing war at sea, and it was for this reason important that the state maintained a good understanding of its population’s maritime resources. Elizabeth I, for example, initiated a large survey of the English coasts in 1588. The report declared that 1392 private ships of 10-80 tons existed in the English kingdom, with an additional 180 of 80-100 tons.¹³ Most importantly, the report determined that there were 183 vessels of 100 tons or more that could potentially be employed for the defence of the kingdom. The fiscal pressures associated with

¹¹ D. Childs, Pirate Nation: Elizabeth I and her Royal Sea Rovers (Croydon: Seaforth, 2014).
¹² AN, Marine B³¹, f. 59.
¹³ BL, Otho EIX, f. 144; for a similar report of 1582, see TNA, SP12/156, ff. 76-105. In 1582: 1204 vessels of 10-80 tons, 73 of 80-100 tons and 178 of 100 tons or more. For more on these lists, see the AHRC funded project ‘The Evolution of English Shipping Capacity and Shipboard Communities from the early 15th Century to Drake's Circumnavigation (1577)’ at The University of Southampton, being investigated by Dr Craig Lambert. See p. 227 of thesis for a discussion of seventeenth-century progress.
pursuing a large construction scheme of royal warships could be alleviated, because there was a clear abundance of private shipping available for the state to exploit.

The same was also the case in France, where the frailty of the state during the second half of the sixteenth century ensured that a reliance on decentralised maritime violence continued. During the final years of the Anglo-French war that ended with the siege of Le Havre, the inhabitants of Dieppe were asked ‘to arm and equip a good number of ships to put to sea for the defence of the king’s subjects’. On France’s western coast, ten years later, the inhabitants of Nantes were required to equip ‘four or five of the best and largest ships which are in harbour, to join with the others that have been armed by the cities of Vennes, Auray, le Croisic and others…for the enterprise that is being led by my Lord, the brother of the king [the future Henri III], against the enemies of Belle-Île’. Indeed, by 1573, the royal fleet consisted of as little as seven warships and less than ten galleys. This situation grew worse as the French Wars of Religion progressed. In May 1586, the Admiral of France, Anne de Joyeuse, began his most determined attack on Huguenot maritime resources by ordering the seigneur de Fontaines, Vice Admiral of Brittany, to raise a fleet of merchant vessels. Considering that in 1587, the king’s warships consisted of two recently purchased vessels of 300 tuns and a 50-tun patache, it is clear, that the state was relying upon its merchant communities

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14 BN, français 17832, f. 4r. [armer et equipper ung bon nombre de navires et a se mettre en mer pour deffendre les subjectz du Roy].
15 Nantes, EE221, f. 3: ‘L’estat pour la ville de Nantes, 5 May 1573’. [quatre ou cinq des plus belles et grandes navires qui soient en leurs havres, pour se venir joindre avecq les autres qu’avons faict armer par les villes de Vennes, Auray, le Croisic et autres, que nous faisons tous assembler a Morbihen, pour l’entreprise qu’il plaixt a Monseigneur, frère du Roy, faire chasser les enemys de Belisle]. The city of Nantes would eventually agree to arm four vessels. The largest of which was 150 tuns. See: Nantes, EE221, ff. 19, 21, 33-34: ‘Mémoire des munitions et avitaillements qu’il faut pour la navire nommée La Lucraisse, May-July 1573’.
16 BN, français 4554, ff. 78-81; Navy and Government, p. 17.
17 AN, Marine B°1, f. 25.
and international support for its armed forces at sea.  

Large grants were offered to equip these mercenary vessels, such as the 25,000 livres provided on 3 May 1586 by the duc de Mercœur, Governor of Brittany, to the town of Nantes ‘for arming the sea to resist the piracy and depredations of the Rochelais’. Mercœur requested ‘four or five vessels of two hundred and one hundred [and] fifty tuns, so that they make in total the burden of eight hundred tuns, and eight or ten pataches’; these were to be armed with eight hundred men, and victualed for six months. Five ships from the town of Vannes also accompanied these vessels, each of 200 tuns. Presuming that ships from Brest and St. Malo, along with other ports and harbours across the Breton coast, also assisted this fleet, it is likely that it consisted of thirty or more, privately owned vessels. If this were the case, then this figure would have met the quota requested for Brittany in the same month, for ships totalling 3000 tuns, with 200 soldiers and 1000 mariners for the ‘security and conservation of their subjects and for purging the sea of the great number of enemy vessels’.

The French state, then, like its northern rival, was able to raise and enhance fleets through its maritime communities. Yet, unlike in England, grand surveys of the coastal resources of the realm were not commissioned until the late-1620s. Instead, France depended on the state’s local maritime network of

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18 BN, français 4489, f. 110.  
19 Nantes, EE217, f.5: ‘Lettre du duc de Mercœur aux habitants de Nantes, 3 May 1586’. [armement de mer pour resister aux pirateries et depredations des Rochelois].  
20 ibid. [quatre ou cinq vaisseaux de deux centz et cent cinquante tonneaux, tellement qu’ils puissent faire en tout le port de huit centz tonneaux et huit ou dix pattaches].  
21 ibid. f. 8.  
22 AN, Marine B41, ff. 47-49. [pour le bien de son service, seureté et conservation de ses sujets et pour purger la mer du grand nombre de vaisseaux enemisties].  
23 The first known thorough survey of the maritime resources of the French realm was not completed until 1631, following an inspection of the Atlantic coast between 1629 to 1631 by Louis le Roux, sieur d’Infreville. BN, français 6408, ff. 1-121; A. James, ‘Voyage et Inspection Maritime de M. d’Infreville sur les Côtes Françaises de l’Océan, 1631’, French History, 15 (2001), pp. 448-90. Smaller surveys are available, albeit more patchy and dubious, for example a list of vessels at Rouen in 1547, BN, Moreau
officials, who were responsible for retaining an awareness of the resources that the locality had at its disposal. Through the employment of vice admirals in areas such as Brittany and Normandy, France’s naval administration operated within the structures of its provincial autonomy. For this reason, given the state’s dependency upon private vessels, vice admirals were fundamental to military efforts at sea. As Alan James has suggested, they were ‘the truly active naval players involved in administration and in campaigns’. Throughout this period, then, and especially during the French Wars of Religion, France was at least as dependent as England on the autonomous maritime resources of its coastal towns, for they were the only permanent fixtures in the crown’s campaigns at sea.

Both the French and English states, then, were at least partially dependent on decentralised maritime force. Constructing warships required time and money, both of which were limited when warfare was on-going. By employing private ships, rulers could avoid the larger costs associated with pursuing a construction scheme that would continue to be a financial burden on the state even during peace. Outside of war, it was only impetus from the central state to develop a large naval construction scheme that could result in its creation. This was more the case, because early modern maritime warfare had shown that the hiring of private vessels would mostly suffice. This is not to say that the hiring of merchant vessels did not have its disadvantages. The contracting of twenty vessels, with an average size of 115 tons, from St. Malo for four months in 1622, cost a

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24 See chapter two of thesis.

25 A. James, ‘Between “Huguenot” and “Royal”: Naval Affairs during the Wars of Religion’ in K. Cameron, M. Greengrass, and P. Roberts (eds.), *The Adventure of Religious Pluralism in Early Modern France: Papers from the Exeter Conference, April 1999* (Bern: Lang, 2000), p. 103. This is not to say that English vice admirals did not also possess similar job specifications.

considerable 523,607 livres. Private ships, then, still came to a significant cost and led to debt that could only be repaid by reduced spending in peacetime, which would have thwarted plans to construct new crown warships after peace had been restored. Considering the regularity of warfare in early modern Europe, there was little opportunity in England or France to pursue a large construction scheme without political and financial obstructions affecting developments. Both kingdoms, therefore, had no option but to follow a system that had barely changed since the late medieval period. A larger body of hired private vessels supported a smaller core of the crown’s warships. Only during the final two decades of this study’s period, when state reform was actively pursued, were England and France able to begin changing this composition.

States relied upon their merchant and coastal communities to form a major part of their fleet, especially during the first half of the sixteenth century. At this earlier stage, the English fleet’s primary purpose was to transport troops to the continent, and reinforce the army with supplies; it was in every sense an auxiliary to the army. The role of the navy did not fundamentally change until the mid-sixteenth century, when warships became armed weapons in their own right and ceased to serve only to support conflict on land. Yet, hired private vessels continued in a supporting role after this date, despite the majority of them not initially being equipped with ordnance low within the hull. Most were not designed for combat when constructed, and were not therefore built in the same fashion as the bespoke warships of the crown.

To consider this in more detail, it is useful to return to the size of the French invasion fleet of July 1545, for the number of state-owned warships within

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27 AN, Marine B41, ff. 53-54.
it was very small indeed. Although there is a degree of ambiguity surrounding the actual size of the French fleet in 1545 – both in the number of ships, and their tonnage – certain statements related to its composition can be made. According to Martin du Bellay, ‘the number of ships ordered for the army [of the sea] was one hundred and fifty great round vessels, without counting sixty Florentine [vessels], and twenty five galleys’, making a total of 235 vessels.\textsuperscript{28} These figures provided by du Bellay are, however, summations, and provide no differentiation between armed warships of the crown, and the merchant vessels that were principally present to transport men and other goods.\textsuperscript{29} Given that these figures lack a substantial body of evidence to support them, Jan Glete was right to approach them with caution.\textsuperscript{30} Yet, what can be deduced from du Bellay, and by the supporting evidence, is that Francis’s fleet was decentralised. It was predominantly a conglomeration of merchant and other private vessels that originated from the coasts of Normandy to Bordeaux, and Marseille, as well as from the Italian states.\textsuperscript{31} Alongside the twenty to twenty-five galleys under the authority of Captain Polin, général des galères, which departed from Marseille for Normandy on 14 May 1545, were a further forty hired vessels of Biscayan, Genoese and French origin.\textsuperscript{32} Stationed at Rouen, Le Havre and Dieppe was a reported fleet of 150-200 vessels that consisted, for the most part, of small ships

\textsuperscript{28} M. du Bellay, \textit{Les memoires de mess. Martin du Bellay, seigneur de Langey} (Paris, 1569), p. 339. [Le nombre des navires ordonnez pour l’armée mótoit [montrent] à cent cinquante gros vaisseaux ronds, sans compter soixante Flouins, & vingt-cinq galleres]. Francis’s reasoning behind producing such a large fleet was most likely formed after witnessing the size of the Turkish fleet two years earlier. The Turkish seas forces were ‘une armee maritime de cent cinquante galleeres avec artillerie pour faire de s’entres de Trente fustes ou galleres & deux baches pour porter leur equipaiges’. BN, Moreau 778, ff. 151-52. See also, BN, français 20449, ff. 13-17.

\textsuperscript{29} BN, nouv.acq. fr. 4966, f. 116.

\textsuperscript{30} J. Glete, \textit{Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650: Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of Europe} (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 141-42. ‘The size and composition of the French invasion fleet is obscure, but there were about twenty galleys and at least 150 sailing ships in the Seine estuary in early July 1545’.

\textsuperscript{31} Potter, \textit{Henry VIII and Francis I}, p. 355.

\textsuperscript{32} TNA, SP 1/198, f. 71; TNA, SP 1/199, f. 195; TNA, SP 1/202, f. 30.
designed to transport and supply the army.\textsuperscript{33} There was only a small number of royal warships, and \textit{la Carraquon} was ‘as great as any shipe within this [English] navy except the harry’.\textsuperscript{34} The handful of large French royal warships such as \textit{la Carraquon}, \textit{la Grande Maîtresse} and \textit{la Gallaire Royalle}, may have towered over the fleet, but these warships were significantly outnumbered by smaller hired vessels.\textsuperscript{35} Taking even the smallest number available for the quantity of men in this fleet, and the largest estimate offered by du Bellay for the number of ships present, an average of almost 130 men per vessel is still obtained. There is little doubt, with this figure in mind, that the majority of private vessels employed by the French state in 1545 were being used solely to transport troops across the Channel, reducing the need for the crown’s armed warships during the campaign.

Private vessels remained a key component of the early modern English and French naval fleets, and their involvement only declined in the final decade of this study’s period. During the Earl of Essex’s Cadiz campaign in 1596, of the ninety vessels that accompanied him, just seventeen were the queen’s own; providing a ratio of one royal warship for every 4.3 privately owned ships.\textsuperscript{36} Meanwhile, Elizabeth’s successor did nothing to alter this, for of the eighty-three - or eighty-seven according to another source - strong fleet sent to Spain on 8 October 1625, the crown owned just nine.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, on 27 June 1627, the Lord High Admiral, George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, was preparing an expedition to La Rochelle in which only twelve royal

\textsuperscript{33} TNA, SP 1/202, f. 39. All three towns were provided with a considerable sum of money from the crown, in order to prepare this fleet, with at least 800,000 livres being spent on the ships docked there; Le Havre, AA10, ff. 8-9: ‘Lettre de François I\textsuperscript{er} au balli de Caux, 9 May 1545’. The grand total for this campaign amounted to 1,929,945 livres. BN, français 17329, f. 86v; P. Hamon, \textit{L’argent du roi: Les finances sous François I\textsuperscript{er}} (Paris: Ministère de l’Économie, 1994), p. 36; see p. 111 of thesis.

\textsuperscript{34} TNA, SP 1/204, f. 88.

\textsuperscript{35} BN, Moreau 737, ff. 169-73, cited in Potter, \textit{Henry VIII and Francis I}, p. 355. This planning document for the fleet after the 1545 campaign, indicates that the king’s personal sailing warships were unlikely to have surpassed twenty by 1547, and ranged in size from holding 400 men to just thirty-five. See also, BN, français 17890, ff. 82-83.

\textsuperscript{36} BL, Add. MS 48152, ff. 198-199.

\textsuperscript{37} TNA, SP 12/237, f. 25; BL, Add. MS 48152, f. 255.
warships were present within the ninety-two strong fleet. By this point, warship architecture had advanced and created a considerable gap between the military capabilities of private vessels and tailor-built warships, and contemporaries had become aware, especially under Charles I, of the disadvantages attached to relying on merchant auxiliaries. One particular critic, Captain Richard Gifford, found it abhorrent that the state relied upon private vessels. He proposed, in February 1627, an expansion of the king’s own fleet from its current state of thirty-four warships to ‘70 Shipps of Force, and 30 small Pinnaces to attend them’, so that Charles ‘shall have no occasion to be served with Merchant Shipps'. According to Gifford, who had experienced a long career on the sea, merchant vessels:

are built altogether for Merchandizing, and for Burthen, yet [are] good for Defence, but not to offend, because they are not good of Sail, as Shipps of Warr ought to bee, so as by them no good Service can bee performed or expected. And to take up Merchants Shipps for warr, may bee great hurt to the Common wealth, and unprofitable Charge to the king.

Experienced seamen’s recommendations, such as Gifford’s, rarely appear to have been given much attention at the time, despite addressing the expansion of the fleet in order to strengthen the state. For statesmen, an expansion of the fleet on an unprecedented scale like that which Gifford suggested was immensely expensive, burdensome on resources and, thus, unfeasible. Expanding the crown’s navy was dependent upon revenue, and as demonstrated earlier, the state did not have the money.

38 Anon, A Catalogue of all the Kings Ships, as also of all other Ships, and Pinnaces, together with their Squadrons, Captaines, burthen, Seamen, and Land-men, set forth in his Majesties Service, the 27. Of June, 1627 (London: John Wright, 1627).
40 TNA, SP 16/54, ff. 18-21.
41 ibid, f. 18.
Nevertheless, voices such as Gifford must have contributed to Charles I’s attempt to impose the ship money levy in 1628. When the first ship money writ was issued six years later, the revenue from it provided the means for Charles’s royal fleet to continue in good strength and order. The crown’s warships did not increase in number because, as Kenneth R. Andrews has argued, the ship money levy ‘did not, nor was it intended to create a larger force’. Comparing the years 1634 and 1642 shows that ship money did not provide the means for a naval expansion that avoided the hiring of private vessels altogether. With this said, although not necessarily expanding after 1634, the English crown’s warships could be maintained to a high standard that permitted their year-round use. This allowed for, as Andrews points out, a decline in the state’s reliance upon the merchant community. Of the thirty-one vessels employed in 1637 to patrol the sea, twenty-one were the king’s own: two royal warships for every merchant vessel. Meanwhile, during the same year, William Rainsborough’s campaign against the pirates of Salé included a fleet of six vessels, four of which – the Leopard, Antelope, Providence and Expedition - were the king’s own. This suggests that, in order for the crown’s navy to become independent from private shipping, it was necessary for the state to reform and strengthen its financial apparatus. In this regard, it is unsurprising that private vessels were still being used – in smaller numbers – at the end of this period, whilst the economy was still developing. Controversial as it was, the ship money levy shows that state reform was vital to the survival and advance of naval forces.

Financial reform also provided the basis for France to experience similar changes to its fleets. The cardinal had a clear understanding of the importance of finance for military affairs, writing ‘money is not only the sinew of war, but also the

43 TNA, SP 16/368, ff. 216-17.
44 Meanwhile, the Hercules and the Mary were merchant ships.
stimulus of peace’. In his position as principal minister, and grand maître, Richelieu had the freedom to manipulate state finance, at his bidding, as shown by his decision to increase the annual revenue provided for naval affairs. At the year of his death, the expanded royal fleet cost 4,300,000 livres to maintain and operate. With the crown’s naval expansion, France’s reliance upon private vessels decreased, and state operations at sea by the mid-1630s consisted largely of the king’s warships. Of the forty-five strong fleet (excluding the accompanying flutes) assembled in June 1636, the crown’s warships outnumbered hired auxiliary support by more than four to one. In another example, the main constituents of the three squadrons assembled in 1639 for the proposed offensive on la Coruña were Louis XIII’s personal warships.  

As in England, with greater emphasis on state-owned warships for military campaigns, there was a considerable reduction in the number of private vessels employed by the French state by 1642. It was, then, state reform and advances that eventually provided the means for the English and French navies to reduce their reliance on hired private vessels. The 1630s witnessed the erosion of the state’s dependence on them because of the extensive reforms that were initiated within the state apparatus at this time. Yet, it was not until this later period, when the arms race for advanced warships had begun, that it became necessary for states to depart from the use of private vessels within their navies. Prior to this, the tactics used in warfare at sea enabled a balance that could incorporate both types of ship within fleets of war. By expanding the crown’s navy, both French and English military strength at sea

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45 BN, français 10221, f. 231. [l’argent qui est non seulement le nerf de la guerre mais aussi la graisse de la paix].
48 AN, Marine B*1, ff. 235-308.
became more dependable, and geared to maritime conflict, and this accelerated the demise of decentralised state warfare at sea.

5.2. Numerical Growth in State Navies

By 1642, the French navy consisted of an astonishing sixty-four warships (when combining galleys and sailing vessels), allowing Louis XIII’s own warships to outnumber Charles I’s by a ratio of almost three to two.\(^49\) This was a staggering turn of events considering France’s maritime weakness at the turn of the seventeenth century, and reflects the importance of state stability and control to naval advancement.

Three principal elements served as the catalysts for naval expansion: an abnormal degree of patronage by leading statesmen, state centralisation (whether focused upon one office/council or a location) and friction in international affairs. Potentially, all three could occur simultaneously, and when this was possible – such as in France between 1626 and 1632 – naval growth witnessed its most rapid progress.

State stability and the expansion of sea forces are directly correlated then. When naval expansion was underway, the state was simultaneously consolidating its political framework. As one of the last Huguenot strongholds in France to capitulate in 1629, La Rochelle is a clear example of this relationship. Its defeat was not only vital to state centralisation following the domestic turmoil of the late-sixteenth century, but it also acted as a stimulus for the reconstruction of the navy. As a fortified maritime base on the Atlantic coast that was controlled by the Huguenots, La

\(^{49}\) BN, français 6408, f. 299; AN, Marine B\(^4\)1, ff. 353-57. See Chart 5.1.
Rochelle served as the hub of Huguenot maritime activity. It was consequently an internal threat that needed eradicating in order for the French state’s naval power to strengthen. The city’s location on the sea lines of the Bay of Biscay was a constant threat to maritime trade that was passing between the Channel and Iberia. Moreover, in facing the Atlantic Ocean, La Rochelle was a potential base for embarkation to North America, making its suppression essential to any future plans of an overseas commercial empire. The successful siege of 1628 to 1629, concludes David Parker, opened the way ‘for the ruthless extension of royal authority at home which was to characterise the next decade and for the aggressive foreign policy to which Richelieu’s mind was already turning’. Louis XIII’s success after prolonging the religious wars provided the means for the consolidation of French monarchical power, which in turn enabled a centralised policy to develop around leading statesmen. As a consequence, the aggressive internal policy of the French state between 1625 and 1629 provided new energy and drive for naval expansion. To overthrow the Huguenot defenders in a maritime citadel such as La Rochelle, the state needed to fight fire-with-fire. To do this, it developed its sea forces, and also commissioned Cardinal Richelieu as grand maître in October 1626. Additionally, in the previous year, Louis had purchased a handful of vessels from Charles, duc de Nevers for 150,000 livres to counter the Huguenot threat, and these vessels would form the foundation of the future French fleet. Richelieu’s testament politique shows that he had a well-constructed understanding of naval power, and historians have agreed that he quickly devised a plan for naval and maritime growth in France. Pierre Castagnos has even

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50 TNA, MPF 1/250/2.  
53 AN, Marine A13, no. 25.  
54 *Navy and Government*, p. 28; BN, français 4726, ff. 19, 54.
suggested that he planned this scheme prior to his appointment, and the siege of La Rochelle was the very first stage on this path.\textsuperscript{55} It can be said with conviction that without the La Rochelle campaign, French naval expansion would not have taken a colossal leap forward in the years ahead.

Indeed, the campaign convinced both monarch and principal minister that maintaining a strong standing navy was crucial to upholding the strength of the state. This became apparent by 1625, when, amongst the other risks associated with hiring vessels, the English ships that had been employed by Louis were recalled, and instead used in the Duke of Buckingham’s campaign against the king.\textsuperscript{56} It was soon evident that the hiring of vessels, especially from foreign communities, was not of much financial benefit to the state when it was possible to construct and employ the state’s own. After all, the forty-one ships and pataches hired for Henri de Montmorency’s command in 1626 cost the state 702,768 livres for four months of service.\textsuperscript{57} Even when the French fleet was at its numerical peak during the La Rochelle campaign, when it consisted of 221 ships in June 1628, it was hardly a fleet of war, considering that it consisted principally of barques, shallop\textsuperscript{s} and other small ships. Only thirty-three grand et petite vaisseaux hired from nearby coastal towns were possibly heavily armed, and would have been of military value to reinforce the royal warships.\textsuperscript{58} Thus, very few purpose-built warships were present, a weakness that would manifest itself to the grand maître. Richelieu’s awareness of the need to expand the king’s fleet became one of his priorities, especially with the escalating Thirty Years’ War in Europe. As a result, whilst the La Rochelle siege was ongoing, Richelieu negotiated

\textsuperscript{55} BN, français 10221, ff. 226-36; P. Castagnos, Richelieu face à la mer (Rennes: Ouest-France Université, 1989), p. 46.
\textsuperscript{56} AN, KK1363, f. 191.
\textsuperscript{57} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{3} 1, f. 63
\textsuperscript{58} ibid, f. 59; Nantes, EE180, f. 16: ‘Lettre de Louis XIII aux habitants de Nantes de conserver les canons, 10 November 1627’. 

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the purchase of Dutch warships, and also commissioned construction projects in France, principally in Brittany and Normandy.\footnote{Le Havre, AA18, f. 2: ‘Ordre de Louis XIII d’envoyer des charpentiers au seigneur de Beaulieu, 17 July 1627’; BN, nouv. acq. fr. 4966, f. 178; BN, français 17329, f. 428.} D’Infreville’s report of the Atlantic Coast taken between 1629 and 1631 shows the extent of the French navy’s expansion in the years following the surrender of La Rochelle.\footnote{BN, français 6408, ff. 1-121.} Without considering the cost, Richelieu authorised the construction of forty-six warships in no less than ten harbours and ports of the French Atlantic coast. They ranged in size from la Royale of 900 tons, to a small patache of just 80.\footnote{TNA, SP 16/198, f. 118.}

This is not to say that, after this initial build, which concluded in around 1632, the French state ceased all naval expansion. Additional ships were integrated into the fleet during the 1630s. La Couronne was launched in 1636, whilst six ships were purchased from the Netherlands in 1638, at a cost of 218,000 livres, continuing France’s reliance upon the international community.\footnote{Le Havre, AA18, ff. 19-24: ‘Lettres de Sourdis au sujet des vaisseaux Hollande, February-May 1638’; BN, français 6408, ff. 469-72.} Nevertheless, the exponential growth of the French navy between the years 1626 and 1642 – as shown in Chart 5.1 – was predominantly a product of the increased maritime activity of the crown that led to La Rochelle’s submission. Those warships commissioned or purchased during the 1630s were incorporated mostly as replacements for already existing French warships, which had far shorter life expectancies than the English models.

With regard to Richelieu’s naval expansion, then, French advances were driven by simultaneous political developments. Naval growth was influenced by ideas of state centralisation and expansion, and warfare (both internal and international), whilst being orchestrated by enthused statesmen. The cardinal understood the importance of sea power to state strength, and the pace at which naval transformation
occurred is reflective of both his expertise and the concurrent consolidation of the state. Perhaps this was because France, unlike England, had a clear idea of what its naval power should look like during these years, which had materialised from the La Rochelle campaign. The French navy’s size and composition in 1642 was not too dissimilar from the ambitious proposals set out in the *Code Michau* of 1629, where it was proposed that the kingdom should maintain a fleet of ‘fifty vessels of the burden of four to five hundred tons, armed and equipped in war.’ Writing several years later in his *testament politique*, Richelieu’s ideas were relatively similar when he wrote that, ‘his majesty [should] always have in his ports 40 well armed and equipped vessels, that are ready to put to sea when occasion presents itself…with 30 galleys’. The revolutionary leap that France had undertaken between 1626 and 1632 restored the kingdom to a prominent place in naval affairs, a position that it had lacked since the mid-sixteenth century.

For England, international warfare was the primary catalyst for naval growth. When threatened by a potential invasion, as England was on no fewer than five occasions between 1538 and Elizabeth I’s death, the state had no option but to act decisively and hastily to protect the kingdom. Of the fifty-eight vessels that Henry VIII owned in 1546, forty-one had been integrated into the fleet between 1544 and 1546, whilst England was apprehensively awaiting a French invasion. Of these forty-one vessels, which amassed a gross total of 7275 *tuns*, six were purchased, three

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64 BN, français 10221, f. 231v. [Si vostre majesté a toujours dans ses ports 40 bons vaisseaux bien artillers et bien equippers prests de mettre en mer aux occasions qui s’en presenteront…avec 30 galleres].

65 England prepared for an invasion by Spain and France in 1538, France in 1545, Spain in 1588, 1596 and 1597.

66 *The Anthony Roll*. Compared with records available during the late 1530s, the differences are clear. TNA, E101/60/3.
were prizes from the conflict, and the remaining thirty-two were constructed in England. Their significance can, however, be overstated, for only thirteen of these warships were 300 tuns or more and, of this number, six were purchased including the Mathew and the Jesus of Lubeck. Reducing their significance further, twenty-two were below 100 tuns because they were rowbarges. The configuration of the 1544 to 1546 expansion, then, suggests that it was entirely caused by the French war, and the threat of invasion. Large and powerful warships required both time and revenue to build, and England possessed neither. With the outbreak of war against France, the money that Henry had extracted from the dissolution of the monasteries was quickly spent, leaving the kingdom with neither the revenue nor time to construct a good quality fleet of ships to defend it. As time was restricted, Henry had little option but to build small vessels, the majority of which had just one deck, and would serve primarily to bulk out the fleet, despite having very restricted use in battle. Numerically, the navy of the aged Henry VIII was of an impressive size as the Anthony Roll was commissioned to show, yet as an armed sea force it was substandard, when compared to some of the Mediterranean fleets of the time. Historians, assessing their size and restricted functionality, have supported the Edwardian and Marian regimes’ decision to sell Henry’s rowbarges that represented over a third of the total warships that the crown possessed.

With similar military ambitions to Henry VIII, Charles de la Roncière acknowledged the role of Henri II in French navy developments. It is difficult to

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67 The Anthony Roll, pp. 160-68.
68 TNA, SP 1/194, f. 121; TNA, SP 1/445, f. 26.
70 Histoire de la Marine, III, pp. 432-569.
disagree with La Roncière that the aspiring king reformed the French navy, with noteworthy results. On 12 July 1548, Henri ordered the development of a new construction scheme designed to maintain a fleet of forty galleys.\(^{71}\) This oared fleet was largely located in the Levant, where thirty of these vessels were situated, with the remaining ten based in the Ponant. Meanwhile, also in the Levant, Henri ordered the creation of a number of rowbarges that were similar to those constructed under Henry VIII.\(^ {72}\) It is understandable that the new king viewed southern Europe as a greater threat to the realm given that, since 1494, France had been in a near constant conflict during the Italian Wars. In fact, it is debatable if Henri held any interest in naval expansion in the Ponant, which was starved of maritime resources when compared to its southern equivalent. In January 1549, Henri decided ‘that the number of eighteen galleys currently being maintained in the [Ponant] sea’ were to be ‘reduced to ten as this is of great expense’.\(^ {73}\) Henri, then, appeared to reduce French naval strength on the Atlantic front, despite having the resources to expand it. Instead, his attention to the galley fleet of the Levant continued throughout his reign.\(^ {74}\) This was perhaps unwise. Northern Europe was developing into a major area of sailing vessel advancement at this time, and France had begun to recognise its potential for exploration and empire.\(^ {75}\) Yet, Henri ensured that France’s sea forces were largely retained in the south. In doing so, France’s southern frontier was well defended from all enemies based in the Mediterranean, meaning that, in the short-term, Henri secured a reputation as a ‘warrior king’. This reputation was perhaps justified, for Henri was willing to use his galleys in conflict whether in southern, or northern waters, and

\(^{71}\) BN, français 18153, ff. 38r-40.  
\(^{72}\) BN, français 20008, ff. 12-13.  
\(^{73}\) BN, français 18153, f. 52. [Que le nombre de dix huict gallaires quil entretient de present en lad mer soit reduct a dix attendu quelles sont de grand despense].  
\(^{74}\) AN, U754, ff. 89-91. Henri II valued galleys highly, and into the final years of his reign, they were still being constructed for his royal forces.  
schemes for how they would be operated ‘in case of emergency’ were drawn up as early as August 1548.\textsuperscript{76}

This is not to say that the French crown owned no sailing warships during Henri’s reign. Francis I’s successor inherited at least seven of this type, including \textit{la Grande Maîtresse} and several smaller vessels, such as \textit{le St. Jehan}, whilst also possessing \textit{pinnaces} and \textit{flutes}.\textsuperscript{77} \textit{La Grande Maîtresse} was the largest vessel at between 600-700 \textit{tuns}, and remained in Henri’s service until July 1557, when she was sold in Marseille.\textsuperscript{78} As his reign progressed, Henri also integrated a handful of new sailing warships into his fleet, and \textit{le Grand Carracon} was most likely the largest of these. The warship that was presumably constructed to replace the great ship destroyed by fire in July 1545 is first recorded as being prepared for service exactly a decade later, in July 1555.\textsuperscript{79} Yet, even with these vessels taken into account, France’s galley fleet outnumbered its sailing warships whilst Henri reigned, and it is unlikely that they amounted to more than ten. Presumably, for this reason, sailing vessels were rarely employed for military expeditions under Henri II. In the French naval expedition to Scotland in 1549, for example, the fleet recorded at Le Havre on 22 July consisted of nine galleys each armed with one culverin or cannon, alongside two rowbarges for providing provisions.\textsuperscript{80} Accordingly, although the sixteenth-century crown navy was at its strongest under Henri II – standing at around fifty vessels – its galley composition, and its focal distribution within the Levant, hindered French naval progress in the coming years, when northern Europe became an increasingly

\textsuperscript{76} BN, français 3050, ff. 108-109.
\textsuperscript{77} BN, français 18153, ff. 34-35; BN, Moreau 737, ff. 169-73; BN, nouvel acq. fr. 4966, f. 126.
\textsuperscript{78} AN, X1A 8621, ff. 218-19.
\textsuperscript{79} AN, X1A 8620, ff. 66-68. \[pour faire et equiper le grand carracon]. It is possible that \textit{le Carraquon} of Francis I was rebuilt using the framework of its fire ridden hull.
\textsuperscript{80} BN, français 3118, ff. 11-12.
active theatre for maritime activity and sailing ships became the more popular model – especially for long distance travel.

With this said, the number of warships constructed under Henri was considerable when compared to what followed after the king’s death, and this was similar to England during the 1540s. Naturally, the expansion of the fleet relied upon the nation’s shipbuilding communities, and when the crown endorsed major ship construction schemes, the impact upon shipwrights and workers was considerable. Naval expansion held the potential to not only enlarge the shipbuilding industry, but also to enhance the competence and skill of those involved within it, for royal patronage encouraged wider participation and opportunities within the field. In England, advances in ship construction techniques and designs, headed by Mathew Baker, materialised because of the increased demand for shipbuilding. It was not only naval expansion, however, that enabled a prominent shipbuilding industry to emerge in England, for concurrent developments within the merchant marine often made use of the same shipwrights and workers. The expansion in English merchant vessels during these years is observable through an analysis of two national surveys of English shipping, made in 1582 and 1629. Although excluding Falmouth, Plymouth, Dartmouth and Wales, the royal survey of 1582 recorded over 67,000 tons for the realm, from 1,641 ships. Meanwhile, the Caroline survey - although imperfect by missing almost the entirety of England’s north, alongside Somerset, North Devon, West Sussex and Wales - records almost 101,000 tons from 1,423 ships. Considering the areas excluded in this study, it is likely that if both surveys were complete an increase in tonnage by between 40 and 60 per cent would still be evident. At the beginning of this period, when Henry VIII’s expansion of the navy began,

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81 See BL, Otho EIX, f. 144, for the year 1588.
82 TNA, SP 12/156, ff. 76-105.
83 TNA, SP 16/155, ff. 82-123.
Chapter Five

London’s shipwrights and carpenters were scarce, forcing the crown to recruit workers from as far afield as Plymouth, Dartmouth, York and from overseas. It was only in the following decades, when England’s naval policy was redeveloped, that a larger shipbuilding community emerged in the capital. In this regard, naval expansion contributed to state centralisation through aiding London in becoming the epicentre of shipbuilding.

Nevertheless, although maritime expansion led to the enlargement of the shipbuilding industry, both Cheryl Fury and Kenneth Andrews have argued that the professional competence and skill of seamen and workers was compromised by the intense and urgent demands made upon them.84 English shipbuilders were ‘less adaptable and enterprising’ because of the sudden concentrated royal demands to compete against Spain, and then later to protect the kingdom in the sea routes made dangerous by the Thirty Years War.85 Under these pressures, shipbuilders did not have the time or opportunity to train in what was a difficult trade, affecting the competency of labourers. In addition, skilled workers had reason to seek private employment, rather than work for the crown, which gained a reputation as a poor and inconsiderate employer. Although royal shipwrights’ wages increased in step with sailors’ - from between eight pence to one shilling per day in 1559, to one shilling to seventeen pence in 1588 - Fury has highlighted how expansion had pushed the crown’s financial resources to their limits.86 The Elizabethan regime often failed to pay men, and provide them with adequate provisions. The fact that James I inherited forty-nine warships has enabled the Elizabethan shipbuilding industry to be portrayed as highly competent, yet the success of the Elizabethan navy overshadows the social

86 Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, pp. 134, 151; BL, Otho EIX, ff. 100-102. See also PL, 1266, ff. 293-99, printed in Edward and Mary, pp. 107-109 for 1548 dockyard wages.
complications that arose from its attempted expansion. In reality, these constraints present a very different picture of the military revolution debate, in which the state is shown as being pushed to its limits, without being able to find immediate methods to transform its apparatus and resources.

Turning to Richelieu’s expansion, an earlier discussion of seventeenth-century French finance has shown that France did not suffer from the financial constraints that Elizabethan England encountered. With a flourishing market for shipbuilding, especially during the initial years of Richelieu’s naval expansion, the kingdom was able to develop a community of experienced shipwrights and dockyard workers that regularly worked with shipwrights of international origin (namely Dutch). This is notable in the treasury accounts. Whereas in 1566, just four carpenters were recorded with wages in the Ponant financial accounts, which had doubled in 1605, a exponential leap to fifty carpenters were ‘employed for the construction of vessels, [and] paid 50 livres each’ in 1627. France’s intense naval growth provided the means for the formation of manufacturing centres, particularly in Brittany, which had become the centre of its shipbuilding industry by the late-1620s. Yet, in a similar trend to England, Martine Acerra has argued that French expertise in ship design did not develop until the later half of the seventeenth century, and that instead under Richelieu, the kingdom remained reliant upon foreign expertise, particularly from the Netherlands. The majority of Louis XIII’s largest warships were purchased from Dutch shipyards, and those that were not, had been influenced or designed by

87 BL, Otho EIX, f. 94; TNA, SP 12/285, f. 85.
88 See chapter three of thesis.
89 AN, Marine C’193, nos. 1, 2, 4, 6. [emploiez en la construction des vaisseaux chacun cinquante livres].
90 James, ‘Voyage et inspection maritime de M. d’Infreville’, pp. 448-90.
international shipwrights.\textsuperscript{92} Indeed, although French shipbuilders were paid between twenty-two and thirty sols per day by the end of this period, any signs of a large and permanent shipbuilding industry that was led by naval developments were slow in emerging, given the state’s continued reliance upon foreign assistance.\textsuperscript{93} Thus, although naval expansion stimulated the shipbuilding industry, it only succeeded in facilitating short-term employment. For both kingdoms, any claim that naval expansion transformed the shipbuilding industry can only be accepted in light of developments over a longer timeframe that also takes into account the later seventeenth century.

5.3. Naval Decline

The legacy of Henry VIII, whose impact on English naval strength has been highlighted by Geoffrey Moorhouse and this thesis, led to both the creation of the Council of Marine Causes, and a fleet of fifty-two warships.\textsuperscript{94} Yet, by the autumn of 1555, Mary’s fleet had fallen to just twenty-eight, and a number of these were unserviceable because of rot and decay. In France, the long period of political crisis in the late-sixteenth century shattered its navy, with G. Moedlski, W. R. Thompson and Glete, claiming that, by 1600, the French monarchy possessed no warships.\textsuperscript{95} In truth, this claim is mistaken. Although the French crown’s warships plummeted in the immediate years following the siege of La Rochelle (1572 to 1574), more systematic

\textsuperscript{92} Navy and Government, pp. 111-16.
research undertaken for this study has proved that the crown did purchase merchant vessels when it was necessary in these later years, although the number of vessels that it owned was restricted, and was unlikely to have been more than a handful.\textsuperscript{96}

To prevent a decline in the size of the fleet, two lasting resources were required: a regular stream of revenue, and a permanent administrative naval framework. Yet, both navies were subjected to the deficiency of one, or both, of these assets preventing their maritime forces from maintaining an effective strength. Although an abnormal degree of patronage under one sovereign could result in the state navy flourishing, in turn, in the reign of a monarch whose enthusiasm towards the navy was limited, the strength of the navy could plummet. There is, then, a clear correlation between periods of unstable political power and naval decline. In England, the navy was at its weakest during the reigns of Edward and Mary, and whilst James I, \textit{rex pacificus}, occupied the throne. In contrast, for France, it has already been suggested that the navy decayed during the Wars of Religion, especially in its latter years.

Chart 5.1 demonstrates that both kingdoms’ naval resources declined before 1565. England’s naval warships decreased as stated above and in France an even sharper reduction was experienced, with its maritime arsenal plunging from around fifty ships to just thirteen galleys and five sailing warships (before decreasing even further after the events of La Rochelle in 1572 to 1574).\textsuperscript{97} Yet, naval decline was not a slow process that gradually transpired over the entirety of this twenty-year period, but instead was subjected to flux because of its relationship with state power. After all,

\textsuperscript{96} BL, Caligula EVII, ff. 26-27; BN, français 4554, ff. 78-81; BN, français 4489; AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{1}1, ff. 4-32; M. Seguin, ‘Un rêve saintongeais déçu: Les armements de Brouage (Été 1572)’ in M. Acerra and G. Martinière (eds.), \textit{Coligny, les protestants et la mer} (Paris : Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1997), pp. 119-29.

\textsuperscript{97} BN, français 15882, ff. 103-106; AN, Marine C\textsuperscript{1}193, no. 3, f. 3.
both states underwent three royal successions in these twenty years, and with each change of regime, the navy was affected accordingly.98

The reduction in the size of the English navy during the reign of Edward VI and the early years of his Catholic sister unfolded because of its neglect. The political instability experienced in England between 1547 and July 1555 (the royal marriage) had dire ramifications for the fleet, when the state had neither the time nor the motivation to support its preservation. Comparing the navy’s composition at the time of Edward’s succession, with its strength before the war with France was declared on 7 June 1557, serves to illustrate the detrimental effect of state fragility on naval development. Although Tom Glasgow Jnr’s article on Mary’s late war with France is approaching fifty years in age, it nevertheless provides some important statistics.99 Whereas, in 1546, the English crown owned twelve vessels of 400 tuns or more, in 1555, this figure had diminished to three.100 This was principally an outcome of ‘a prolonged period of peace and national poverty’ that followed the signing of the Treaty of Boulogne on 24 March 1550, which ceased hostilities with Scotland and France.101 Instead of maintaining vessels and initiating new rebuilds, many of the crown’s warships in the following years were mothballed, in dock, and left to rot. The Henri Grâce à Dieu was stored and disregarded by the state, allowing her to fall into disrepair until she was ‘bornyd…at Wolwych, [by] neckelygens and for lake of oversy[gh]th’ on 25 August 1553.102 Meanwhile, many of Henry’s smaller vessels were sold between 1548 and 1551. Shipwright Martin Dawcwy purchased the Three Ostrich

98 This is excluding Lady Jane Grey.
100 ibid, p. 322.
101 ibid; TNA, SP 11/4, f. 85; BL, Otho IX, f. 97; TNA, SP 68/5, f. 14; BL, Caligula EIV, f. 238; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 188.
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Feathers for just £14 on 5 December 1549. Mary continued with this process on her succession by selling the Primrose for £1000, and ‘the old hulls of Grande Mistress, £35, the Hynde, £8, the Unicorn, £10, [and] the Maidenhead, £12’.

This is not to say that Mary’s reign contributed nothing to naval affairs. Indeed, the Marian French war from 1557 was a turning point that began to restore English naval power. Mary initiated a new construction scheme in the final years of her rule, in response to the conflict, that produced three warships of 400 tuns or more – the Philip and Mary, the Mary Rose and the Golden Lion – and also rebuilt the Jennet and the Swallow, both of 200 tuns. Nevertheless, although the Marian French war had brought new energy to the English navy, the fleet that Elizabeth inherited remained numerically inferior to the fleet of 1547. Following her sister’s death, Elizabeth I received a fleet of thirty-two warships, ranging from 60 to 800 tuns, and ten – including the Jesus, the Anne Gallant and two galleys – were ‘very muche wonne and [are] of no contynewance with owt great Repar[ati]ons to be done upon them’. With French hostilities continuing after Mary’s death, the newly crowned queen continued a major construction scheme that her sister had introduced in the final years of her reign. The navy’s strength, then, was rooted in royal enthusiasm and its importance to state strategy at the time. During the short reigns of Edward and Mary, the English state was in a weakened and unstable condition. This instability had severe effects for the preservation of the English navy. Prior to the Anglo-French wars of 1557 to 1564, the English navy was largely neglected. Yet, wars against its traditional enemy provided the fuel to revive the fleet, which prospered as a result.

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103 TNA, E351/2194.
104 TNA, E351/2195.
106 TNA, SP 12/3, ff. 130-42.
Although the French crown still owned a small fleet of warships at the time of the 1572 siege of La Rochelle, it is nonetheless true that the numerical decline of the French navy had begun in the immediate years following the death of Henri II in July 1559.\textsuperscript{108} In these years, France faced warfare both internationally and internally, with the latter becoming a major cause of the navy’s collapse.\textsuperscript{109} The civil war drained the crown of its income, and removed any opportunity to construct a fleet because of domestic turmoil. Indeed, for Alan James, the navy’s decline was not only a result of ‘endemic regionalism in maritime government and competing noble interest’, but also ‘entrenched confessional divisions’ that characterised the late-sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{110} It was easy for its sea forces to decline with the monarchy in crisis, especially considering that the Ponant fleet was already small at the time of Henri II’s death. Consequently, as early as 1563, the crown’s available armed sea forces were restricted, leaving the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medici with little option but to request assistance from the merchant and city communities of France’s northern provinces to remove the English forces based within Le Havre.\textsuperscript{111} By January 1566, France’s naval resources had not improved, and the king’s warships in the Ponant consisted of \textit{l’Henri, l’Hermine, le Leopard, l’Aigle} and \textit{la Trinité}.\textsuperscript{112} Meanwhile, the neglect of the French galleys in the years following Henri’s death, when many were

\begin{flushright}
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\textsuperscript{108} BN, français 17329, f. 198.

\textsuperscript{109} BN, français 3174, f. 30r. This late seventeenth-century report of the navy’s history draws the same conclusion. The exception to this was Francis II’s purchase of \textit{la Caracque} from Coligny in the opening months of his short-lived reign, for 13,300 \textit{livres}. This purchase suggests that the crown had become aware of the need for sailing vessels outside of the Mediterranean when competing against northern adversaries; yet, it did not have the opportunity to fully recover because of political instability.


\textsuperscript{111} AN, Marine G193, ff. 53-54, 55-56; BN, français 17832, ff. 4r-5r, 24r-25.

\textsuperscript{112} AN, Marine C’193, f. 3.
\end{flushright}
sold or left to decay, had resulted in the Levant fleet quickly reducing to less than half of that controlled by Henri.\textsuperscript{113}

The political instability of late-sixteenth-century France and, most importantly, the weaknesses of the monarchy that allowed only limited commitment to its sea forces, prevented significant naval growth from being restored until Henri IV’s reforms of the early-seventeenth century. It is important to reiterate, however, that a standing French maritime force continued to serve the crown during the fourth French civil war (1572 to 1573). In other words, although its navy was largely neglected during the earlier civil conflicts, and its fleet had been reduced in size, it was not until after the siege of La Rochelle that the French crown’s fleet lost its status as a standing, permanent sea force. After this event, the strength of the royal forces becomes lost in the records, suggesting that a permanent sea force did not exist, with only small armed forces revealed sporadically. Only in short bursts, such as the Azores campaign of 1582, were improvised French fleets assembled.\textsuperscript{114} When makeshift fleets were assembled, it was not the king’s ships that formed their body, but hired vessels. Instead of records referring to the ‘ships of the king’, the ships are referred to as being ‘maintained for the service of the king’ under Henri III.\textsuperscript{115} In 1587, 3000 livres was provided to Jehan le Roy and Claude de Beaufort for the use of their ship la Joyeuse Marguerite of 300 tuns, for the defence of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{116} Alongside another vessel of similar burden, and a patache of 50 tuns, these three ships were the king’s main contribution to maritime defence around the Ponant in this year. This instance demonstrates the limitations of the French crown’s sea power during the final years of the religious wars. Without the patronage that Henri II and his father

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} AN, Marine B\textsuperscript{5}1, ff.10-12; BN, français 15882, ff. 103-106.
\item \textsuperscript{115} BN, français 4489, f. 9r. [entretenus pour le service du Roy].
\item \textsuperscript{116} \textit{ibid}, ff. 106r-114.
\end{itemize}
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had provided for the navy, and with domestic instability rife, the French navy was practically obliterated in the later stages of the civil wars, and did not return in strength, until the early 1620s.

Concluding Remarks

Returning to Chart 5.1, naval developments did not gradually advance in an upward trend throughout this period. Instead, the extent of the navy’s growth fluctuated according to state strength and patronage. Naval power, as Jan Glete concluded, ‘rose, disappeared, rose again and declined as a reflection of changing interest aggregation, changing policy and more or less well functioning political decision-making’. Developing this, naval expansion occurred when there was a stimulus that justified its improvement. This chapter has suggested that there were three principal incentives for naval growth, all of which were dependent on state strength: international war, state centralisation, and atypical aspiration from a monarch or leading statesman. All three were restricted by time, because policy could change from monarch to monarch, and for this reason naval expansion was intermittent. At the same time, in most cases, naval expansion was undertaken through rapid instances of exponential growth. For England, 1544 to 1546, 1556 to 1564 and 1585 to 1603 were crucial periods for this development, whereas, for France, Henri II’s reign and 1626 to 1642 are the most critical phases to emphasise. In turn, during periods without any of the stimuli referred to above, navies were doomed to decline, and so the state became dependent upon merchant and private vessels when arming the sea. The deterioration of France’s navy during the Wars of Religion, especially after 1572, and the reduction of

England’s fleet between 1547 and 1555, was representative of the state crises that they experienced. In acknowledging this, it can be accepted that any naval advances could also be set back by periods of state vulnerability.

This is not to say that the merchant vessels employed by the state were not part of these military and administrative transformations. Just as David Parrott has argued that mercenary forces led the military revolution on land, this was somewhat similar for the sea.\textsuperscript{118} Although a decentralised form of warfare, these vessels still required the men, sustenance and, most importantly, money that the state supplied, and so were part of the administrative and fiscal transformations. Demand for larger fleets continued as the period progressed, and crown-owned warships were not yet sufficient in number to form them in their entirety. Therefore, private vessels had to be hired if numbers were to be achieved on a short-term basis. Constructing warships was a costly and time-consuming activity and building a large fleet could only be achieved through a long-term policy. Consequently, it was only in the final decade of this study that both English and French military forces at sea were decreasing their reliance upon armed merchant ships, in favour of purpose-built, and state-owned warships. In this process, it became possible for the state to acquire firmer control over its sea forces, providing the means for stricter regulations and conformity in its fleet. At sea, the process would mark the transition from ‘heteronomy to sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{119}


\textsuperscript{119} Thomson, \textit{Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns}, p. 4.
By 1545, warships were becoming a tableau on which ideas of national identity were inscribed. Heraldic, historical, mythological and ecclesiastical emblems that served to assert state supremacy were reflected on these vessels. Thus, these warships served as portable canvases that radiated the foundational thoughts of national identity. For France, there was little progression from this point, and royal ships continued to reflect ideas of identity through their association with the monarchy. Yet, in England, as a consequence of the celebrated victory of 1588, the navy began to represent liberty, Protestantism and, arguably, Englishness.

The exploitation of warships to present and promote the monarchy is patent when considering the largest vessels in the early modern fleets, which often served as flagship. Northern European carracks such as the Henri Grâce à Dieu, la Grande Françoise, and the Swedish Elefant were warships of a colossal size (around 1500 tuns) that were impractical at sea. Aside from being a large financial strain on state revenue, their size and bulky fore and aft-castles hindered their manoeuvrability.\footnote{See chapter four of thesis, pp. 178-81.} The sleek and slender galley, pinnace and race-built galleon were cheaper to construct, and surely more effective in maritime combat.\footnote{J. F. Guillemartin, *Galleys and Galleons* (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), pp. 20-21, 163-64.} With this in mind, these colossal weapons’ greatest service to their kingdom was in fostering prestige rather than having actual military function.

This continued into the seventeenth century, when both Charles I and Louis XIII competed to have the largest warship: *la Couronne* was launched in Brouage in
1636, whilst the *Sovereign of the Seas* followed in 1637.³ Their size, decoration and service history suggest that their primary purpose was not to serve as the most essential weapons of the state fleet, as might be presumed. Instead, these colossal men-of-war were present in both English and French armed forces to attract respect for, and appreciation of, the monarch who owned it. In turn maritime communities would naturally serve and obey their sovereign, whose power radiated from the vessels. Similarly, these emblematic ships served as a deterrent to an international (or domestic) rival. It was not only in times of war that a foreign adversary might encounter these warships. Ambassadors, merchants, mercenaries and other international representatives would have experienced the power symbolised by these warships during royal ceremonies, and informed those at home.

This suggests that warships such as *la Grande Françoise* and the *Sovereign of the Seas* were tools of propaganda at a time of state formation and the emergence of national identity. This supports the work of Kevin Sharpe, who argued that both the Tudor and Stuart monarchies sought to ‘sell’ and ‘promote’ their image as a way to gain popular support from their subjects.⁴ Similarly, for France, Anne-Marie Lecoq has argued that from the reigns of Francis I to Louis XIV, symbols of state were exploited for national support, even though these symbols were merely products of heritage. For Lecoq, where identity is concerned, nothing new was created to represent the kingdom, but instead, icons of the past were exploited and consolidated.⁵ This therefore implies that the navy was not able to integrate itself into French

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³ In a slightly unfair criticism, Oppenheim claimed that the *Sovereign of the Seas* ‘until she was cut down, was the largest, most ornate, and most useless ship afloat.’ M. Oppenheim, ‘The Royal Navy under Charles I’, *The English Historical Review*, 9 (1894), p. 93.
identity until at least the late-seventeenth century. Until then, it served as a publicist of national thought, as opposed to being part of national identity. Nevertheless, through decorating these ships with English or French emblems, it can be said with confidence that a large proportion of the community who saw these vessels were able to associate the warship with the monarch who owned it. At a time when literacy rates were limited, common images, symbols and colours would have been easier to identify and translate. As the navy helped to drive state formation and expansion, monarchs established themselves at the epicentre of this activity. Embodying warships in their image was part of this process.

6.1. Name and Reputation

Throughout this period, warships were personified with names designed to evoke power. Vessels were named in association with the realm’s historic, heraldic and ecclesiastical connections, or according to ancient mythology that had re-emerged with the Renaissance. By relating a royal warship to strong national themes, the navy justified its actions on behalf of the crown.

The Henri Grâce à Dieu is a perfect example here. The Tudor warship’s title incorporated religious and historic ideals (Henry V also possessed a vessel of the same name) and also signified a link with the crown.6 Henry VIII’s great ship became so renowned throughout the English kingdom for being the maritime representation of the king that, in time, it became commonly known as ‘the Great Harry’. It is unsurprising that, as a result of its name and size, the largest warship in England (and possibly northern Europe at the time of its launch) became famously associated with

the king himself. This would continue with Henry’s successor, as the vessel was renamed the *Edward* in 1547. The royal personification of warships continued in England throughout this study’s scope, the *Mary and Philip*, the *Elizabeth Jonas* and the *Charles* were all large and powerful ships of the English navy.\(^7\)

France implemented a similar strategy with its largest warships: *la Grande Françoise*, *l’Henri*, and *le Charles*. Like the Great Harry, *la Grande Françoise* was intended to be the largest vessel within the navy, and was equipped with various novelties to serve the king, including a chapel, a tennis court and a windmill. It was a marvel to the spectator, and was described by La Roncière as ‘the most triumphant thing that a mariner had ever seen’, but these features also restricted its operability, as previously discussed.\(^8\) Warships such as *la Grande Françoise* were designed to appear formidable; yet, their power existed symbolically, not physically, where they were robust, but slow.

Naming a vessel after the reigning monarch was just one tradition shared by both kingdoms. Associating vessels with the symbolism of heraldic beasts, animals and mythological creatures was another. The *Antelope* was an English galleass originally constructed in 1546, which served several successive monarchs.\(^9\) The heraldic symbol of the antelope was associated with the arms of the Lancastrian kings, and continued to serve the Tudor dynasty as an expression of their rights of sovereignty. Of the fifty-eight vessels included in the *Anthony Roll*, thirty-five had a

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\(^7\) This act continues today with the *Queen Elizabeth* class of aircraft carrier. The *HMS Queen Elizabeth* is scheduled for commission in 2017, and continues a trend of being the largest warship ever built for the Royal Navy (at an impressive 65,000 tons).


\(^9\) HMS *Antelope* sank because of Argentine bombs in May 1982, and was the last of twelve different Royal Navy vessels to inherit the name of the original English galleass constructed in 1546.
name directly associated with heraldry. The Bull, the Cloud in the Sun and the Greyhound, amongst others, were named as such in order to assert power, authority and fear. Meanwhile, similar ideas were also present in France; by 1636, at least sixteen of the warships in Louis XIII’s navy had names directly related to heraldic origins.

The French and English navies, then, were intertwined in their approach towards naming warships, as can be shown with the unicorn emblem. The first warship named the Unicorn to be integrated into the English navy in 1543 was originally a French designed vessel. The Unicorn and the Salamander (the widely associated symbol of the French king) were generous gifts given to James V of Scotland by Francis I, which were later captured as prizes during an English invasion of Scotland in 1543. The unicorn symbol was not alone in being exploited across both kingdoms; in 1545 Thomas Poyning reported sighting in Dieppe the French ‘great shippes’ the White Greyhounde and the Black Lyon. In another example, in September 1568, an unarmed ship of the king was recorded in Bordeaux under the name l’Ours of 300 tuns, after the Elizabethan warship the White Bear had been launched four years earlier. Indeed, progressing into the seventeenth century, both kingdoms possessed a warship named Unicorn/Licorne during the 1630s. Evidently, symbols of animals in heraldry were exploited on both sides of the Channel to provide a warship’s physical strength with an iconographic persona to support it.

10 For example: the Peter Pomegranate, the Bull, the Swallow, the Greyhound, the Lion, the Dragon, the Merlion, the Double Rose, the Portcullis, the Three Ostrich Feathers, the Gillyflower, the Harp, the Hare, the Sun, the Antelope and the Phoenix.
11 Le Coq, le Ceyne, le Faucon, la Perle, l’Hermine, La Licorne, le Lion Couronne [d’Or], la Laisse d’Orée, l’Aigle, le Griffon, la Lerette, la Primerose, le Corail, la Marguerite, le Pélican, le Sallemandre.
12 TNA, SP 1/202, f. 135.
14 TNA, ADM 180/20, ff. 2-4; BN, français 6408, ff. 1-12; TNA, SP 16/198, f. 118.
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Through constructing a character for these vessels that was shaped by royal and elite symbolism, it was possible for the foundations of a national identity to be built. This was not necessarily intentional, however, for naming warships as such was part of a long engrained historical tradition, but it was seemingly a factor in the production of identities nonetheless. It is no coincidence that the lion and unicorn were exploited on English ships, at the same time as they were being combined on the Royal Coat of Arms under James I. The personification of warships was, thus, part of broader political trends.

The French kingdom was aware of the importance of vessel personification to national consciousness. Georges Fournier expressed in 1643 that:

It is a custom practiced of all antiquity, to give a name to each vessel, in order to be able to distinguish one from the other, and furthermore to dedicate it to God, and to place it under the protection of some Saint. French saints’ names were regularly employed as titles for warships. During an era of religious conflict, the use of a saint as the embodiment of a vessel permitted an indication of the ecclesiastical stature of the prince that owned it. The 350-tun le St. Louis, that was equipped for service against the Protestant rebels in 1572, conveyed the military abilities of the French Catholic monarchy. Accordingly, the French crown personified vessels with French saints such as St. Louis, St. Jean, St. Genevieve and St. Michel in order to consolidate a French identity that was centred upon the Gallican principles established by the crown. The number of warships with

16 G. Fournier, Hydrographie contentant à theorie et la practique de toutes les parties de la navigation (Paris, 1643), p. 44. [C’est une coutume practiquée de toute antiquité, que de donner un nom à chaque Vaisseau, afin de pouvoir distinguer les uns des autres, & de plus de le consacrer à Dieu, & le mettre sous la protection de quelque Saint.]
17 BN, français 4554, f. 78.
18 TNA, SP 16/198 f. 118.
names that had connotations connected to saints supports Colette Beaune’s view that religion was the first and principal element of any conception of French identity.19 Throughout the period, vessels were being named according to this trend, which stands in contrast to England. Even with the return to Catholicism under Mary I, all the warships constructed during the Marian regime were named with association to secular foundations, and not Catholic culture. In France, the power and authority that the saint could assert did not transfer across the Channel. Excluding the Scottish and English patron saints whose namesake vessels were built in 1622, England did not manipulate saint culture to characterise the navy.

Where the exploitation of saints contrasted across the maritime forces of the two realms, associations with Renaissance mythology did not. As François Bardon has suggested, the French Renaissance established ‘a culture of imitation’ centred on aspects of Antiquity, and this was present within the navy.20 Although focusing upon the reigns of Henry IV and Louis XIII, Bardon continues:

if I had had the opportunity to extend this study to a long period, that of 1550 to 1630 would have served very well, for one would have been better able to see the slow and steady evolution of humanist mythology into a political mythology.21

Mythology from the Age of Antiquity was exploited by both kingdoms’ political regimes to consolidate and justify state authority. From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, successive monarchs manipulated mythological attributes in order to

21 *ibid*, p. 1. [si j’avais eu le loisir d’étendre l’enquête à une longue période, celle du 1550 à 1630 eût fort bien convenu, car on aurait mieux saisi la lente et sûre évolution d’une mythologie humaniste à une mythologie politique].
justify power, and in doing so assisted the construction of a national identity. For Lecoq this process was philosophical justification:

modern history and the visible world are both constructed as repetition and reflections...The supreme glory consists for him [the monarch] to reincarnate one or more figures of ancient history, biblical, or from the very distant national past, or finally to imitate one of those figures of fables invented by the Ancients as ideal role models.22

Lecoq’s statement is supported by the scope of this research. L'Hercule, le Griffon, and l'Aigle (which also had Christian connotations) were strong motifs of Renaissance culture, which quickly became symbols of the French court.23 As a result, these symbols were also used as titles of French warships.

Similarities existed in England, although not to the same extent where symbols of Antiquity are concerned. Under Elizabeth I, the English navy included small vessels with names such as the Achates (the hero’s loyal companion in Vergil’s Aeneid), the Mercury and the Eagle. Most famously, the Tudor queen became associated with the phoenix, as a symbol of chastity and longevity, and a vessel of 70 tons sharing the name was constructed to honour this.24 The queen was so successful that Sharpe has recognised that by the 1590s ‘Elizabeth had acquired what all her successors would aspire to emulate: brand recognition and an identity that would outlast disillusion’.25 The Greek mythological bird had actually been associated with vessels in England’s navy since 1546 and future warships would continue this trend,

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22 Lecoq, ‘La symbolique de l'état’, p.147. [Justification philosophique: l’histoire moderne et le monde visible sont conçus comme répétition et comme reflet. Tous a déjà eu lieu exemplairement et le héros (le roi) ne peut que répéter. La gloire suprême consiste pour lui à réincarner une ou plusieurs figures de l’histoire antique, biblique, ou très lointain passé national, ou encore à incarner une de ces figures de la fable inventées par les Anciens comme modèles idéaux].
24 TNA, SP 12/3, f. 131.
25 Sharpe, Selling the Tudor Monarchy, p. 402.
in Elizabeth’s honour, after her death. The phoenix became as important to England as a symbol of power, as the salamander (that other creature of immortality) had been for Francis I. Lecoq has reinforced that ‘the French applied a degree of national vanity to show the superiority of the salamander, which remained alive in the fire, whilst the phoenix dies and is then resurrected’. Even with state allegoric design then, there existed a degree of competition between the two crowns, and the navy magnified this rivalry.

It is now evident, that the naming of a warship was an important process of cultural production. This is perhaps clearest when contrasting the two flagships of the 1630s: la Couronne and the Sovereign of the Seas. Before continuing, the debate led by the Dutch lawyer, Hugo Grotius, over maritime law during the seventeenth century, needs to be considered, for it was a central factor in the conception of their names. Grotius’s work Mare Liberum, first published in spring 1609 in Leiden, attempted to justify the Dutch seizure of a Portuguese vessel laden with bullion by arguing that ‘the sea could not have any servitude imposed on it because by nature it should be open to all’. With this claim, Mare Liberum attacked English sovereignty on the seas, an argument that struck a nerve across the Channel. Notably, the English crown had laid claim to the self-titled English Channel for centuries and, unsurprisingly, Charles I perceived Grotius’s work as a direct attack on his sovereign authority. Consequently, Charles was eager to patronise the writing of John Selden,

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26 BL, Add MS. 48152, f. 255. In both 1612 and 1647, warships were named the Phoenix.
27 Elizabeth I was not the first to take the phoenix as her personal emblem, before her Eleanor of Austria had manipulated it. Lecoq, François Ier imaginaire, p. 49. [Les français mirent-ils une certaine coquetterie nationale à montrer la supériorité de la salamandre, qui reste toujours vivante dans le feu, sur le phénix qui y meurt ressusciter ensuite.]
28 H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (The Free Sea), trans. R. Hakluyt, ed. D. Armitage (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2004), p. 31
29 It is unclear when the term ‘English Channel’ was first used, although English claims to the Channel were justified through manipulating the tales of Alfred the Great and Edgar I. It is also interesting to consider that France to this day does not use either the terms ‘English’ or ‘French Channel’, but rather La Manche.
who dedicated his work, *Mare Clausum*, to the king in 1635.\(^{30}\) Selden claimed that the Channel was part of the English crown’s domain, ‘[w]e having continually possessed the whole *English* shore in its full latitude under one entire Empire for above a thousand years’.\(^{31}\) Such views were disseminated and supported throughout England, and the growing argument was encapsulated in the *Sovereign of the Seas* herself.\(^{32}\) With her name, the *Sovereign* asserted the political stance of the kingdom: Charles I’s authority existed over the seas. In a poem drafted before her maiden voyage, whilst her name was undeclared, the importance of providing this vessel with a prestigious title was made apparent:\(^{33}\)

Then tell me thou seems’t a floating isle  
What name doest thou aspire to? What high style  
Which in a few gold Letters may comprize  
All Beauties and presage thy Victories  
Since thoua art so much greater then The Prince\(^{34}\)  
(Which to Thee only sayes I serve;) and since  
The meaner Charles usurpes our Souveraignes Name\(^{35}\)  
What canst thou be except The Charlemaigne  
Or will thy Royall Master Christen thee  
The Edgar to revive his memorie

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\(^{32}\) D. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 118. Armitage has argued that the Rump Parliament would later reprint and endorse these two sources in order to assist in consolidating a British Identity. In a later edition published in 1739, the foreword claimed that the 1633 edition ‘hinted’ that the *Sovereign* should be built, and in doing so, that Boroughs’s work became its namesake.  
\(^{33}\) BL, Egerton MS 2982, ff. 155-56. With an active interest in the *Sovereign* as the designer of its carvings, it is possible that Thomas Heywood was the author of this work. I have found no evidence to suggest that this poem was published.  
\(^{34}\) The *Prince Royal* (commonly known as the *Prince*) was built in 1610 of 1200 *tons*.  
\(^{35}\) The *Charles* built in 1632 at a burthen of 810 *tons*, was an impressive size, but was inferior to the larger *Sovereign of the Seas*. 
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Charles I’s flagship was constructed in name and design, to radiate terror, authority, virtue and respect. During this period, and especially during the reign of Charles I, English warships were regularly designed to support clear political ideology, such as representing the English stance towards Grotius’s *Mare Liberum*.

Whilst Charles I’s regime opposed *Mare Liberum*, the same was not true of France. Having been a leading maritime power throughout the period, England was in a heightened position to challenge Grotius’s work. In contrast, the grand maître supported Grotius’s legal arguments and even attempted to hire the lawyer as a commercial expert in the French kingdom, because his work on free trade was overtly anti-Habsburg.\(^\text{36}\) With France in a militarily weaker maritime position at the time of its admiralty’s dissolution, compared to both England and Spain, Eric Thomson has argued that Grotius provided the ‘intellectual foundation’ for Richelieu’s ‘maritime and commercial statecraft’.\(^\text{37}\) Nonetheless, *la Couronne*, by not possessing a name that inferred ownership of the seas, did not relate to Richelieu’s anti-Habsburg free trade ideology. Instead, the name represents Louis XIII’s imperial power. In a similar fashion to the *Sovereign*, Louis XIII’s flagship attempted to embody the power of the king, and so Alain Berbouche is correct that ‘primarily, *la Couronne* flattered royal pride’.\(^\text{38}\)

For an aspiring European state, the right name for a warship was important in encapsulating the power and virtues of its monarch and people. The construction of large warships that did not necessarily have a major impact in battle could nevertheless hold cultural advantages as a representation of the state. By constructing


\(^{37}\) *ibid.*, p. 394.

state warships and providing them with symbolic national names, the state was able to create the appearance of naval strength which, as Alan James has argued, ‘was so important to the actual exercise of military power’.39

6.2. Decorating an Early Modern Warship

The name was merely one element in personifying a vessel; decorating it was also important. The fleets of England and France were painted in royal, national or provincial colours, and often flaunted symbols and emblems of secular authority upon their hulls. These warships were decorated not only to suggest royal ownership, but also to show that they were fit for royal presence. According to Ann Payne, ‘there could be few more telling vehicles for dynastic display than a warship’.40

In both kingdoms, vessels were painted colours associated with the realm. One can speculate that the contemporary onlooker could gaze upon these colours and patterns, and relate them to their owner, or at the very least associate them with power. The six heraldic colours – black, white, blue, green, red and yellow (gold) – were commonly included on their hulls, with green for the Tudor dynasty, and blue for the French monarchy, being most typical.41 Yet, on the whole, painting was minimal, and a vessel’s hull was not painted from its keel to the upper deck during the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries.42 Typically, the paint on a vessel was restricted to the exterior walls of its upper decks, leaving much of the hull’s timber exposed, most probably because the paint was susceptible to deterioration in seawater.

Nevertheless, whilst limited, paint provided the state with the opportunity to employ an early form of propaganda by using colours that the early modern spectator would, in time, associate with a given kingdom. The colour red, for example, not only corresponded to the House of Lancaster, but also served as the main body of the St. George Cross. In 1562, John Lyzarde of London was commissioned to paint ‘Her Majesty’s great new ship’, the *Triumph* ‘in colour red, done in oil, by agreement’ for £13 6s 8d, and was also paid to do the same to the *Galley Speedwell* and the *Galley Tryright* at Chatham.\(^{43}\)

According to the available evidence, painting on French warships, as shown with Images 6.6 and 6.7, was even more limited than in the English case.\(^{44}\) There were small streaks of the national blue, white and red colours, which corresponded with their banners. However, these appeared in such small quantities, that it is fair to suggest that less prominence was given to decorating warships than in England. Reports indicate that, when paint was used on French warships, it was often not intended to represent broad national power and identity. In June 1545, Thomas Poynings reported that at Dieppe he ‘founde in the haven xv or xvj great shipps being paynted...blacke, yellowe and grene’.\(^{45}\) Given that the black, yellow and green colours reported by Poynings were not directly related to the Valois dynasty, it is more likely that they were linked to a more autonomous source, connected to Dieppe and the Normandy province. It is most probable that these warships were painted in these colours to divide the large French offensive fleet into smaller squadrons, which were organised according to localities. These colours, therefore, would have held a heraldic

\(^{44}\) BN, français 25374, ff. 28-29.
\(^{45}\) TNA, SP 1/202 f.39; TNA, SP1/202 f.135.
value that related to a local maritime town, province or noble, rather than the
monarchy.

Available visual sources from the period provide a window into maritime
exchange across the Channel. The fact that the French kingdom painted its vessels
provided the English kingdom with cause to do the same, even if there were
differences in its approach. It was arguably the dissimilarity between the two
kingdoms’ geography, that provides the reason for a difference in painting design.

Given that the fleet was located in close proximity to the centre of state in England,
this is a likely reason for decoration having greater prominence there.46 During the
Anglo-French peace negotiations of 1546, £637 11s was spent ‘for gilding and
painting of the ships at the coming of the Admiral of France’.47 England, and most
likely the king himself, wished to assert the prowess and power of the standing navy,
and this was to be done by dressing its warships. Up to a point, even when all else
failed, as the physical capabilities of both fleets did in the Solent in July 1545,
symbolic power could be demonstrated by decoration.

The stern was regularly perceived as the focal point of the armed state ship,
and it was consequently decorated to assert national prestige. Maritime artwork in
both kingdoms demonstrates the truth of this claim, as the stern of the ship frequently
took centre stage in maritime art, such as in Peter Lely’s Peter Pett and the Sovereign
of the Seas.48 The stern’s transom was flat, broad, and unlikely to have artillery
protruding from it, and so served as a blank canvas. Ithier Hobier, Treasurer of the
Levant Navy, wrote in 1622 that ‘the stern which is the section out of all those in a
galley, which is seen the most, throughout the port, has a structure that is no less

47 TNA, E351/2588.
48 See Image 6.4.
pleasant than the decorations’. Indeed, Hobier recommended decorating the stern ‘with varied figures from fables or of history; and most of them with the other pieces that surround the stern, are to be painted and gilded’.

The stern was a potential canvas for the state to decorate in accordance with its own desired image. Although written accounts of a warship’s decoration are often scarce, as can also be accurate visual representations, we can nonetheless often create in our minds a vessel’s stern by considering its name. Just as the *Golden Hind* was decorated with a hind, in honour of Christopher Hatton’s heraldic arms, it was typical for a French warship named after a saint to have its stern adorned with the same figure. Georges Fournier’s work suggests that this is true:

The protecting Saint of the ship is always painted on the stern, with an inscription, for example, God will lead the Saint George: Often also, the name takes that of some Hero, of some animal, of some other virtue, of some country of which they are based, or of something natural which is painted, engraved or cut on the prow of the vessel.

In France, decorating a warship in this way not only personified it, but also provided a holy blessing to comfort and bring fortune to its mariners.

It was also common practice to include the royal coat of arms on the stern. In 1562, Richard Rowlande of Southwark was paid £5 ‘for the workmanship, carving and setting up of the Queen’s Majesty’s arms of wood in Her Highness’s ship the *Aid*’, whilst James Coke of London was occupied with the ‘painting of Her

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49 I. Hobier, *De la construction d’une gallaire, et de son equipage* (Paris, 1622), p. 31. [la poupe qui est la partie de toutes celles de la galeire qui paroit le plus, sur tout dans le port, dont la structure n’est pas moins agreable que les ornementes.]

50 *ibid*, pp. 32-33. [diversement figurez de fables ou d’histoires; & la pluspart avec les autres pieces qui environnent la poupe, peintes & dorees].

51 Fournier, *Hydrographie*, p. 45. [Le Sainct protecteur du Navire est tousiours peint dans le Mirouer de la Pouppe, avec cét Escriteau, par exemple, Dieu conduise le Sainct George: Souvent aussi le nom se prend de quelque Heros, de quelque animal, de quelque vertu, du pays d’où ils sont, ou de quelque chose naturelle qui est peinte, gravée out taillée sur la Proue du Vaisseau.]
Highness’s said arms of England in colours and gold, now set in the same ship stern. Meanwhile, in France, *la Couronne* is now known to have sported both the royal coat of arms, and Cardinal Richelieu’s coat of arms on its stern. The stern of the warship was perceived, then, as providing an opportunity to assert the nation’s cultural, political and religious virtues by means of visually depicting them for representation at sea.

Moving on from the rear to the front of the warship, the figurehead was slowly introduced as the period progressed. A figurehead could serve as the focal point of a vessel, and often represented its namesake. The *Anthony Roll* provides two examples of perhaps the earliest English figureheads on the *Salamander* (Image 6.2) and the *Unicorn*. As the head of a vessel, the figurehead possessed an important symbolic role: to lead and become the very essence of a man-of-war. Yet, in the case of these two vessels, their history shows the importance of transcultural influence. For Francis I, the salamander was the anthropomorphic representation of his royal power, and as earlier discussed, these vessels were originally French creations produced as gifts to James V of Scotland. At 300 and 240 *tuns* respectively, the only two warships depicted in the *Anthony Roll* with figureheads were, in fact, French creations.

The salamander was not only used to decorate warships’ figureheads, but, during Francis I’s reign, was also engraved on heavy ordnance. Those of low-birth,

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52 Bodleian, Rawlinson A. 200, f. 53.
53 See Image 1, p. xi; Musée de la Marine, B99-41632: ‘Un plan du modèle de la Couronne’.
55 *The Anthony Roll*. H. S. Vaughan also emphasised the importance of these two vessels, stating that ‘I believe, [that they are] the earliest known instances in the English Navy – as individual ships – of the figure-head in its modern sense of a decorative attachment to the bow or beak’. H. S. Vaughan, ‘Figure-Heads and Beak-Heads of the Ships of Henry VIII’, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 4 (1914), p. 37.
56 It has recently been suggested that the *Mary Rose* may also have sported a badge/figurehead that ‘may be considered the starting point of a long figurehead tradition’. D. Pulvertaft, ‘The Figurehead/Badge of the *Mary Rose* 1510-45’, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 102:3 (2016), pp. 331-35.
57 In addition, Francis’s *la Réale* was decorated, presumably on the stern with ‘all the royal emblems: the salamander, fleur-de-lis and the crown’. BN, Moreau 737, f. 169. [tous aux emblems royaux, salamandre, fleur de lis et couronne.]
foot soldiers, mariners and gunmen, would have observed the salamander on heavy artillery, and been aware of the engraving’s allegorical significance. Artillery pieces in the *Musée de l’Armée*, Paris, with the salamander on them, indicate that the salamander was a royal emblem intended to be recognised throughout the kingdom (Image 6.8). Although no ordnance that was bespoke to the navy existed at this point (it was not until Richelieu that this would occur), heavy artillery, whether it was for the army, fortifications or the king’s fleet, embraced this emblem. The emblem reminded those operating the ordnance (be they French nationals, or just as likely foreign mercenaries) that they were working for the king.

The salvaging of the *Mary Rose* in 1986 has provided many heavy ordnance pieces for examination. All recovered cast brass weapons are embellished with royal emblems ‘of which the most common (found on seven guns) is the Tudor Rose encircled by the Garter and surmounted by the Crown’. These three heraldic emblems were associated not only with Henry VIII, but also with his royal ancestry, and justified his right of sovereignty (Image 6.9). Of equal importance is the royal shield that is cast on three of the weapons recovered. The shield is quartered and displays the three lions and three *fleurs-de-lis*, representing England and France respectively. Other Tudor symbols of heraldry that are engraved on these weapons include the Tudor Welsh dragon, the greyhound - which was a symbol of loyalty first adopted by Edward III - and finally, the lion. Employing a similar strategy to his

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58 *Grande couverine* and *coulverines moyennes* of Francis I in *Le Musée de l’Armée*, Paris; The origins of the salamander symbol in France are uncertain, it was used by Jean d’Angoulême, Francis’s grandfather; and it was from his grandfather that Francis would have understood and began to exploit the power of the emblem.


French rival, Henry VIII and his successors ensured that royal heraldic emblems were integrated within the Navy Royal.

Progressing into the seventeenth century, it becomes obvious that figureheads had become standard on large warships in England. The *Prince Royal*'s hull was not only decorated in a superior manner to its Elizabethan predecessors, it also possessed a figurehead of St. George standing victorious over the defeated dragon. For one of the first times, a clear description of a figurehead is available: seventy shillings was paid for the ‘bridle, sworde, lanceheade, and spurres for the George in the Beakeheade and a tounge for the Dragons mouthe’ that were made out of iron in 1610. The warship served to embody the Prince of Wales, Henry Stuart, and the English patron saint. In this case, St. George was used in the same manner as those saints on the stern of French warships, by serving not only as an icon of the nation, but also as the protector of the vessel and its company.

The figurehead created a bespoke persona for each vessel, based upon elite and popular national culture. In contrast, flags and banners were designed to unite the fleet into one or more squadrons. As a source of national unity, the importance of flags can be seen through Charles I’s international demands that all flags be lowered on first-sight of an English warship in the Channel. Meanwhile, in France, clear instructions were followed under Richelieu for the flags displayed on royal warships. Indeed, the French admiral’s ship was decorated so ‘the main mast is white taffêta, the Crest of Arms of his Majesty is in the middle, and dotted around is the *fleur-de-lis*

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62 TNA, E351/2248.
and L[for Louis]. Next to the main mast, the ‘mizaine masts are of blue taffeta dotted with the crown and *fleur-de-liz* and L’, whilst the flag on the prow was red, with the royal arms central and the *fleur-de-lis* and L dotted. There is a glimpse into the development of national identity here, as the royal emblems included could connect all men who served on these warships, and also the people that they were protecting. This said, given the infancy of the fleet, Richelieu proved less committed to the French flag on warships, than his English counterpart. In 1635, under the international pressure of the Thirty Years’ War, Richelieu combined twelve French warships (many of which had been constructed in the Netherlands) with those of the Dutch. Writing to Théodore de Manty, *chef d’escadre*, on 25 June 1635, he requested that those ships ‘with the Dutch will not fly the French flag, [and] the seigneur des Gouttes, who will command, will have no problem passing under the Dutch flag’. Furthermore, France’s provincial autonomy conflicted with royal identification, as demonstrated in a set of instructions and regulations that were enforced in 1642. In order for the French fleet to divide into squadrons, each group was to be identified by its own individual flag: ‘each squadron should bear the florets and coloured banners that are worn by the provinces, for their colours’. The navy was manipulating France’s provincial autonomy, using its mosaic structure in military operations, in exactly the same fashion as had been done with paint in 1545.

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63 BN, français 6408, f. 385. [ceux du grand mast est de taffetas blanc, Armoirie des Armes de sa Maj[es]te au millieu d’elluy, et parsemé de fleur de liz d’or et L].
64 ibid. [ceux des Masts de Mizaine et d’artimon som de taffitas/ bleu parsenné de Couronne et fleur de liz d’or et L].
65 *Lettres de Richelieu*, III, pp. 66-67: ‘Lettre de Richelieu à M. de Manty, 25 June 1635. [qui seront avec les Hollandois n’ayant point de pavillon françois, le seigneu des Gouttes, qui les commandera, ne fera nulle difficulté de passer sous pavillon hollandois].
67 ibid. [chaque escadre portât les flouettes et enseignes de la couleur que portent les provinces pour leurs couleurs].
In the case of England, there is significant evidence to suggest that a more uniform system for naval flags existed in the period. Visual evidence such as the *Anthony Roll* and *The Embarkation of Henry VIII from Dover* supports written accounts confirming the prominence of St. George’s Cross on English naval flags by the opening of this period.\(^{68}\) Timothy Wilson has argued that, by 1546, the cross was ‘the principal national emblem of England’; if this is true, then it is possible that a large body of the English populace, and perhaps even the broader western European body, would have associated it with the English realm.\(^{69}\) This is easy to support with evidence such as the fighting instructions issued by John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, on 10 August 1545.\(^{70}\) In a naval offensive against the failed French invasion, Lisle divided his fleet into three squadrons. Every ship of the first rank was to fly St. George’s Cross on the fore topmast, whilst those of the second rank were to do the same on their mainmast, and finally ships ‘of the third rank shall bear a like flag upon his mizen mast top’. Whereas France identified its squadrons by reproducing its provincial identities, England was doing the same thing, but with a single national symbol.\(^{71}\) This emphasis on St. George’s Cross continued throughout the period, and the treasury’s Quarter Book of 1562 to 1563 shows a dependency on these flags for the navy - Stephen Andros of London produced thirty-three such flags for the navy in 1562 alone.\(^{72}\)

As the period progressed, the designing of warships with allegorical decoration took greater precedence. This is evident when returning to the contrast

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\(^{68}\) See Images 6.1 and 6.2 for examples in *The Anthony Roll*; Image 6.3 for *Embarkation of Henry VIII from Dover*; for a history of the St. George Flag and its exploitation on sixteenth-century vessels, see W. G. Perrin, *British Flags* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), pp. 33-46.\(^{69}\)

\(^{69}\) T. Wilson, ‘The Flags’ in *The Anthony Roll*, pp. 28-30.\(^{70}\)

\(^{70}\) J. S. Corbett (ed.), *Fighting Instructions 1530-1816* (London: Navy Records Society, 1905), pp. 20-22.\(^{71}\)

\(^{71}\) D. Hobbs, ‘Royal Ships and their Flags in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries’, *The Mariner’s Mirror*, 80:4 (1994), pp. 388-94.\(^{72}\)

\(^{72}\) Bodleian, MS Rawlinson A. 200, ff. 39, 55; TNA, E351/2199.
between *la Couronne* and the *Sovereign of the Seas*. The *Sovereign* was a mobile national emblem that epitomised England’s historic valour at sea. Its importance as a source of national pride was implied in descriptions of its figurehead. Thomas Heywood, the designer of its carvings, in *A True Description of His Majesties Royall Ship* published in 1637, described that ‘upon the Beak-head siiteth royall King Edgar on horse-backe, tramp’in upon seven Kings...[Edgar] being indeed the first that could truely write himselfe an absolute Monarch of this Island’.  

Heywood’s description of Edgar is extended with ‘he did (as justly he might) write himself Lord of the Foure Seas’. Edgar’s seventeenth-century portrayal was intended as an obvious parallel to Charles I’s own ideology of sovereign power at sea. By constructing the *Sovereign*, Charles was showing that he was a descendant of Edgar, King of Wessex, founder of England and builder of a celebrated fleet of 3,600 ships. Edgar was the role model and influence for the king, and became the spirit of the warship, as presented in its associated poem:

[Edgar]Who so long since on Land and Ocean raiigned  
Scepter and Trident (joyne) with Sword maintaineid.  
Upon thy gorgeous Beake when I behold  
That warlike King completely arm’d in gold  
Whilst att his feete seven Vassayle-Kings doe throw  
Their crowned heads, me thincks it must be so.  

With Edgar as its figurehead, England was making a claim to its self-perceived maritime superiority, a policy that held the potential to conflict with French ambitions.

74 *ibid*, p. 33.  
75 BL, Egerton MS 2982, f. 155.
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In contrast, *la Couronne* had a figurehead of Hercules slaying the hydra.\(^{76}\) The symbolic purpose of this design was twofold. First, as Corrado Vivanti and François Bardon have discussed, the use of Hercules was part of the *renovatio* that had developed in France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^{77}\) Henri IV was regularly portrayed as Hercules for his victories in the civil wars, and was commonly depicted slaying Cerberus (as a representation of the Catholic League). The use of Hercules and the hydra on *la Couronne* was a similar symbolic representation in light of the recent defeat of La Rochelle. It could well be seen, as Vivanti has suggested for Henri IV’s exploitation of Hercules, as ‘the final flickerings of a political and cultural flame, once a blaze…drawn from the humanist heritage elaborated and revived round the myth of the Gallic Hercules’.\(^{78}\) In addition, a second factor explaining the choice of Hercules can be found in French imperial power at the time, for the figurehead showed man defeating the sea. This makes for an obvious comparison with the *Sovereign*, and yet, *la Couronne*’s approach was less internationally aggressive, perhaps on account of Richelieu’s Grotian influence. Whereas the *Sovereign* declared that Charles owned the sea, *la Couronne* implied that France could overcome it. This is reflected in the two ships’ figureheads: Edgar on horseback was aiming to conquer the sea, whereas Hercules was defeating the hydra, proving that France had the means to overcome the sea’s wrath. For Charles I, as the ruler of an island state whose history was dependent on the sea for protection, it was necessary for the English


\(^{78}\) Vivanti, ‘*Henry IV*’, p. 197.
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crown to lay claim to it. Whereas in France, the crown merely needed to ensure that the sea was not an obstacle to its strength, and this was reflected in la Couronne’s motto embedded on her stern Subdidit Oceanum.\textsuperscript{79}

Both crowns ordered the founding of tailor-made ordnance for these warships that reflected the crown’s attitude towards the sea. In April 1638, a commission for the engraving of 102 brass pieces for the furnishing of the Sovereign of the Seas required ‘the graving of every one of those Peces with the Rose and Crowne, the sceptre and trident, the Anchor and Cable, and a Compartement under the Rose and Crowne with this inscription (Carolus Edgari Sceptrum stabilivit aquarum)’.\textsuperscript{80} The cost for each engraving was £3, with a total price of £306. Continuing the virtues of the Tudor era, the rose and crown remained on these pieces, yet there were also several key symbolic alterations from the time of Henry VIII. The sceptre and trident represented Charles as master of both land and sea, whilst the anchor and cable demonstrated the importance of the navy to the state. Meanwhile the artillery pieces’ Latin inscription returned to Charles’s reflection on Edgar, and his desire to control the sea.

Louis XIII and Richelieu also integrated artillery on board la Couronne with similar intentions. The Musée de l’Armée exhibits one of these original weapons (Image 6.10). The piece bears the arms of France and Navarre, with an L for Louis, and the chain of the Order of the Holy Spirit. It is completed with the crown placed on top of this crest. Whilst asserting the authority of the crown to whoever was operating this weapon, these pieces also possessed another emblem that both England and France integrated into their naval ordnance at the same time: the anchor. As well as having obvious relations to maritime affairs, the anchor was used to associate the

\textsuperscript{79} TNA, SP 78/106 f. 422. [He has subdued the ocean].
\textsuperscript{80} TNA, SP 16/387, f. 159. [Charles like Edgar rules the established seas].
weapon with the grand maître, who had integrated the anchor into his coat of arms. This very same coat of arms was also displayed below the royal equivalent on the warship’s transom. Under Richelieu, the anchor as a symbol was used to separate maritime resources from the army, and it also served to show that the navy was controlled through the patronage of two sources of power: the king and his second in command.

The early modern flagship did not need to be the most manoeuvrable, powerful or generally effective warship in battle. It merely needed to suggest these qualities to create an image that would encourage others to believe. For example, in 1624, it was written that despite the inferiority of its navy, which was in need of ‘new builde and repaye’, England controlled in its arsenal the ‘Prince-Royal, a Ship’ so powerful that ‘England needed not feare all the Fleetes of the World’. France understood the symbolic power that could be demonstrated by decoration as much as England, yet provincial autonomy was an obstacle that hindered the development of a united national identity. At the same time, France’s superior military strength on land meant that there was little need to impress and deter its adversaries through decoration. The strength of its land forces was highly intimidating in itself. The militarily weaker English state, by contrast, believed that it needed to decorate its vessels in order to provide them with a false exterior, which would enable the crown to appear as an equal to the greatest European powers.

81 Image 1; Musée de la Marine, B99-41632: ‘Un plan du modèle de la Couronne’.
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6.3. Audience and Popular Representation

By comparing England and France, it has been shown that England – as an island state – used its warships to represent and promote the monarchy and the realm’s heritage, and in this process, the seeds of national identity were formed. When compared to France, England was both economically and militarily inferior, and its navy served to compensate for these weaknesses. Furthermore, England’s success in 1588 was used as an opportunity for the kingdom to display its cultural heritage. Following the defeat of the Spanish Armada, the state planned to expand globally and strengthen internally, and these policies relied on the navy for protection. As a result English national identity became increasingly associated with the navy and maritime power. Following the kingdom’s success in preventing an invasion by Catholic Spain, the navy continued to embody the power of the crown, but also came to be seen as a symbol of liberty and Protestantism. By contrast, France controlled an overtly successful army, and its navy did not need to serve as the great liberator of its people in the same way. In England, the navy became something far more fundamental to the foundations of the emerging state.

Yet, none of this was initially intentional, and when the navies of both kingdoms first expanded during the early-sixteenth century, they were intended to enhance the prestige and power of the monarch. The nation referred to the navy as the ‘king’s navy’. This is reflected in the decoration of these warships, discussed above. Paint and symbols adorned them, to contribute to the sovereign’s glory, virtue and immortality. This was the navy being moulded to the image of the state. Yet, the

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events of 1588 began to alter this in England, as slowly the navy became a celebrated image of English power as popular forms of art and public display embraced the navy. Through defeating Catholic Spain, England’s navy was celebrated as a champion of the Protestant faith.

If 1588 was a turning point when the English populace began to embrace the navy as part of its collective identity, a question needs to be asked: who was the targeted audience for this decoration, prior to 1588 in England, and throughout the period in France? One possible answer is that decorating warships served to promote the monarchy in the peripheries of the kingdom. Considering the fractured nature of both states at the time, this strategy was a logical method in presenting the power of the crown, yet it was restricted. For England, the navy was based primarily in London and the south-east, and its ships rarely docked at the smaller local ports of the north and west. Several of its warships were too large, and would have displaced too much water to show their presence in these areas. Of course, Portsmouth was accessible, and it was used during times of war, and Newcastle also occasionally hosted royal vessels, but for the most part, the navy remained at Deptford and Chatham, meaning that the majority of people who saw the crown’s most imposing warships were from the south-east. Yet, being located here had its advantages: magnates, ambassadors, statesmen and artisans based near could witness the monarch’s sea power in the dockyards. Where nationalism was concerned, this was fundamental. Kevin Sharpe argued that it was these ‘subjects – who had agency in the making’ that determined ‘the meaning of royal pronouncements and display’. 84

There was a considerable difference in France, because as already discussed, the geography of the realm prevented its navy from being situated in the capital. By

84 Sharpe, Selling the Tudor Monarchy, p. 22.
being situated at the periphery of the realm, the monarch could be represented through his warships without actual presence. It could be suggested, then, that any decoration of the navy was orientated towards the local coastal populations of France. This is not suggesting that the navy was used to establish a united identity between the Ponant, Levant and crown. The Iberian Peninsula’s geographic location was too large an obstacle for any such concept. With two maritime frontiers, as a result, two different navies formed, and both differed in design and culture. Alain Cabantous has expanded upon this, by suggesting that even a simple binary divide between Ponant and Levant is too simplistic, as each maritime community was autonomous and distinct.\(^85\) Previous chapters on administration and finance have supported this. Brittany, Guyenne, Marseille and Normandy were all autonomous political and cultural spheres that existed throughout the period. Looking at royal warship names in 1640 demonstrates the existence of regional cultural autonomy: *l’Hermine*, *le St. Louis de St. Malo* and *le Courant de Brest* all have clear ties to Brittany. Royal and local cultural identities were therefore forced to work together if a state navy was to exist in France. This meant that a central identity, or nation, was more difficult for the French monarch to establish, and for the French people to conceive, preventing the navy from having the same level of impact in promoting a national identity as England.

C. S. L. Davies has argued that the production of prestigious work such as the development of warships was not designed with the intention of being promulgated to a wider national audience. According to Davies, there is an ‘unrealistic assumption by scholars of the sheer learning and sophisticated interpretation attainable by sixteenth-
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century audiences’. 86 Davies has continued to question whether the symbols and other representative devices discussed ‘would have had any meaning for more than a tiny number of exceptionally learned and sensitive people’. 87 Although this criticism has to be accepted for some of the more obscure and complex allegories discussed (for example, the three ostrich feathers or the greyhound), many of the widely exploited devices do not conform to this. A good example of this is the famous John Gipkyn painting of 1616 that portrayed James I’s warships sailing on the Thames, and flying the new union flag. 88 Rare examples of early modern propaganda, such as this, provide a real indication of the public importance of the visual appearance of ship design. During a period when literacy rates in both kingdoms were low, images and colours would have been easier for subjects to interpret. At its most basic level, the Tudor green and the *fleur-de-lis* would have been commonly understood and associated with the monarchy. There is no reason to doubt that the communities of England and France would have been able to relate to at least some of the most basic symbolic devices incorporated onto these warships. It must be reiterated, however, that these representative devices served first and foremost to represent the monarch, and to obtain prestige. Even after 1588 in England, warships were still decorated to represent the power of the crown. It was with the crown that the populace immediately identified, through the embodiment of its warships.

This is not to say that maritime activity - as opposed to just its navy - did not play its part in developing national culture in France. A look at popular culture along the coasts shows a populace that identified with the sea, although not necessarily


87 ibid.

88 John Gipkyn, 1616, ‘Old Saint Paul’s (diptych, recto of left panel)’, Society of Antiquities of London, Burlington House.
dedicated to the French navy itself. Legendary vessels such as the *Argo* were widely celebrated in French elite and popular culture alike. This is perhaps most patent in accounts of royal progresses and celebrations. Louis XIII’s arrival in Bordeaux in 1615 was planned so that the king entered the city as the legendary Jason on board the *Argo*. Louis had ‘entered by water’ with ‘the crew of this vessel all renamed the brave Argonauts’. The vessel itself is described with ‘galleries, rooms and porticos, with rich velvet inside, and paint outside, and emblems throughout’, and ‘it was the form of the first emblem, which was visible at the exterior of the side of the Prow, which made the vessel the parallel of the *Argo*’. By relating Louis to Jason on the *Argo* this royal progress was justifying his authority. All the same, this was not the navy being used and promoted, but rather a mythological vessel that was not directly related to the French kingdom but instead to legendary maritime power.

Louis XIII was not the only French monarch to use the sea during royal progresses in France. During Charles IX’s grand tour of the French kingdom, the king and his mother arrived in Nantes in October 1565 by sea. For this occasion, the town of Nantes constructed a specially designed *galiot* for the king’s entrance, and when he reached the city a mock battle was staged using a combination of *galiottes* and *shallops*. It is important to reflect that in this example, and in the 1615 Bordeaux case, these royal ceremonies were attempts by maritime localities to impose their own cultural perceptions of the crown onto the throne. This is as opposed to the crown imposing it on them. They were both organised and funded by the towns where these

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89 S. Millanges, *La royalle reception de leurs majestez tres-chrestiennes en la ville de Bourdeaux, ou le siecle d’or ramene’ par le alliances de France & d’Espaigne* (Bourdeaux, 1615), pp. 20-21. [aborder par eau] with [à la fabrique de ce vaisseau tant renommé des Braves Argonautes] the vessel itself is described with [galeries, chábres & portiques, enrichy de veloux au-dedans, de peintures au dehors, & d’Emblemes par tout] whilst finally Louis’s vessel [ce fut du premier Embleme, qui se voyait au dehors du costé de la Proüe, faisant le parangon de ce vaisseau avec celuy d’Argo].

90 The same ship would be sold by the city in the following year. Nantes, AA33, ff. 7-18: ‘Entrée du roi Charles IX à Nantes, October 1565-January 1566’.

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events took place. This suggests that these ceremonies were reflecting regional, as opposed to central identity, which supports the view that regional identity was powerful in provincial France and that the crown’s identification with maritime power was dubious at best.

This contrasts with English examples. In 1613, the naval treasury accounts recorded the cost of £4734 15s 8d for the ‘Navall fight above the bridge at the late Triumphe represented before his Majesty at the Marriage of the Lady Elizabeth’ on 13 February. Londoners and the courts watched a mock sea battle on the Thames that recreated the Battle of Lepanto. Indeed, the spectacle was so enthralling that one spectator wrote that thirty-six vessels were ‘so trimmed, furnished and painted, that I believe there was never such a fleet seen’. Total ordinary expenditure was set at just over £10,000 for this year, and the new construction of two warships, the Merhonour and the Defiance, came to a combined cost of less than that of this royal display. It was not until 1617, four years later, that the navy’s budget had recovered from the debt that this event had triggered. Jason White has argued that the choice of Lepanto was designed to reflect James’s broader political aims of uniting Christian Europe against the Turks, a view that he would abandon by the following decade. White’s suggestion certainly holds true given James’s publication in 1591 of the poem, The Lepanto, that reflected similar themes, yet it also needs to be taken into account that this staged battle was used to signify the importance of the navy to English identity. At the end of James’s mock battle, the events of Lepanto were reimagined, when an

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91 TNA, E351/2251.
92 J. G. Nichols (ed.), The Progresses, Processions, and Magnificent Festivities of King James the First, His Royal Consort, Family and Court, II (4 volumes, New York: Burt Franklin, 1828), pp. 539-41.
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English navy attacked the Ottoman fleet and successfully defeated the Turks. Following on from the victory against the Spanish Armada, the navy continued to be seen as a symbol of liberty, defence and faith.

Sea power was also used as part of a public and diplomatic ceremony during Claude d’Annebault’s visit to London in 1546. According to the chronicle of Charles Wriothesley, on 20 August 1546, d’Annebault reached Greenwich in the Great Zacharie of Dieppe, along with fourteen galleys ‘richly hanged and laden with ordnance, and set with pennons and banners of diverse colours, with no galley like the other’.  

95 Henry’s warships were ‘richly decked with streamers and banners’ and lined from Gravesend to Deptford to welcome the admiral as he sailed past them. When in the waters of Greenwich, the admiral’s galley met the king’s new royal barge ‘with trumpets blowing on both sides’. Edward Stanley and the queen’s brother William Parr, Earls of Derby and Essex respectively, received d’Annebault on the royal barge and brought him to the king’s palace at Greenwich. The following day, the admiral departed from Greenwich and headed upriver towards the Tower of London. Wriothesley reported that in his honour the admiral witnessed ‘great gonne shott of the King’s ships, and [also shot] at every wharf to the Tower’, which when he reached it also ‘shot such terrible shot as heaven and earth should have gone together’.  

96 D’Annebault’s progress continued for a further nine days, when, after his stay with the king at Hampton Court Palace, the Admiral of France returned home.

François Nawrocki, in a recent project that has studied the life of d’Annebault, has emphasised the symbolic importance of this event.  

97 By inviting the French admiral to the English court, following an invasion attempt that was still in the

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96 ibid, p. 172.
memory of the English, this event represented a new relationship between the two kingdoms. Just a year after the French naval invasion attempt, some of the very same warships that were used against England in the Solent were welcomed into the very centre of the English kingdom.

At the end of the war, the Henrician state was economically unstable. This naval display was the product of two considerations. First, the navy was decorated and displayed to d’Annebault to convey the power of the realm, and most importantly the king himself, at a point in time when this was being questioned. It must not be forgotten that by August 1546, the English king had just a few months left to live, and was rarely seen in public. On account of his weight, and his infected leg, Henry could barely walk, and was transported around his palaces in a wheelchair. His health suggested neither elegance nor power, and his role in the proceedings was minimal as a result, even leaving it to his nine-year-old son to formally greet the admiral on his approach to Hampton Court.98 The role of Henry’s fleet, then, in these proceedings, became increasingly important, when the power of the king was in question. Henry’s warships lined the river from Gravesend to Deptford to convey the power of the kingdom, and more importantly the monarch, in a way that the king could no longer do in person. Second, the navy’s presence was representative of its growing importance as part of England’s (or at least the crown’s) cultural identity. Although, the 1545 Solent conflict could be classified as a failure for the English because of the loss of the Mary Rose, the navy ultimately staved off the French invasion. The navy’s presence, then, in an event designed to mark the end of the conflict and the renewal of English and French relations, also celebrated the developing importance of England’s navy, in a way that would gain far greater prominence after 1588. Through being an

essential part of d’Annebault’s ceremony, the navy, by representing the crown’s power, was becoming a central component of the English realm.

It is for the above reasons that, in England, artwork began to more regularly include the navy as its subject, as a symbol of state strength. Artwork such as *The Embarkation of Henry VIII at Dover* (1545-46), *The Armada Portrait* (c. 1590) and Peter Lely’s *Peter Pett and the Sovereign of the Seas* (c. 1645-50) illustrate how warships at first came to assert the power of the crown, and then later became a source of national power in their own right.99 Indeed, *The Armada Portrait* is a perfect example of how the navy was celebrated as a symbol of liberty and Protestant faith after the defeat of the Spanish Armada.100 Of course, fine art was a part of elite culture that would not be witnessed by a large popular audience, but it nevertheless could have significant political importance. It is most likely that *The Embarkation of Henry VIII at Dover*, for example, was commissioned after the failure of the French invasion, and in the knowledge of d’Annebault’s arrival at court in August 1546, where he is almost certain to have seen it. Paintings such as this had political power and celebrated the connection between monarch and navy.101

Although in France, paintings of French warships are rare before Louis XIV’s reign, available artwork that does depict similar themes naturally targeted the same audiences. Indeed, the most visually appealing and skilled portrayal of a French warship of the time is not from France, but from the Netherlands, where French warships were constructed and one, most likely Louis XIII’s *le Neptune*, was

100 England was not alone in exploiting its navy to project ideas of faith and liberty. The recovery of the Swedish *Vasa* has shown that similar ideas were projected on Gustavus Adolf’s ship. On the warship’s bow, next to the ship’s heads (toilets) two Catholic Polish nobleman were carved crouching underneath tables. F. Hocker, *Vasa: A Swedish Warship* (Riga: Medströms Bokförlag, 2015), pp. 69-72.
101 In *The Embarkation of Henry VIII at Dover* (Image 6.3), Henry VIII can be seen standing in a regal pose on board the *Henri Grâce à Dieu*. 
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painted. Even in the case of La Rochelle, where Louis XIII’s victory over the French Protestant stronghold was widely celebrated, Philippe de Champaigne’s portrait of the king commissioned to mark the 1628 victory plays down the navy’s importance. The 1635 painting presents Louis XIII alongside the Roman goddess Victory, whilst La Rochelle and its surrounding warships are only in a small subsection below the goddess’s feet in the bottom-right corner of the canvas. Even in this celebrated French victory, where both land and sea forces were employed to defeat the La Rochelle Huguenots and the English fleet, the navy’s role was downplayed. Contrasting this painting with The Embarkation of Henry VIII at Dover, or even The Armada Portrait, suggests that there was a clear difference applied to the prominence of the navy. These paintings, and even the lack of them in the French case, imply that, whereas the English kingdom viewed the navy as a major source of military power that enhanced the prestige of the crown, the French kingdom granted far less prominence to it.

This claim is also supported when turning to printed sources, where again in England there was a larger visual source base portraying the navy. The frontispiece of John Dee’s The Perfect Arte of Navigation of 1577 is a perfect example. Queen Elizabeth sits at the helm of one of her warships, where she commands and protects both the navy and kingdom. The Roman goddess Diane is shown riding the waves alongside the queen’s vessel, whilst Britannia is pictured below, kneeling upon the shores of the realm and pleading for Elizabeth to defend her borders through the strength that she possesses in maritime resources. Dee’s frontispiece, then, presents the navy as the protector of the English people and as a symbol of hope and liberty.

104 J. Dee, General and Rare Memorials pertaining to the Perfect Arte of Navigation (London, 1577).
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The same ideas are conveyed in an engraving of Elizabeth I, of 1596, most likely by the engraver Crispin van de Passe, where the queen stands in the foreground and is surrounded by royal iconography such as the portcullis and pelican. Meanwhile, Elizabeth’s navy sails behind her, protecting the queen and her people. Similar sources in France are very limited, suggesting that, although the crown represented itself on warships, the navy, in turn, was not considered by the monarch or populace to be a symbol of power in its own right.

It is possible to see this trend even with more commonplace items of material culture, such as with coinage. The Marian regime's attention to re-establishing the intrinsic value of the coinage resulted in the Marian Gold Royal depicting the queen ‘in a masculine and martial pose steering the ship of state’ (Image 6.5). An English monarch’s depiction within the ship of state was a long established device, and both Mary’s father and brother introduced coins displaying this pose. Even James I continued this tradition with a gold coin being minted that depicted the king holding the new British coat of arms whilst on board a ship. Whereas in France, no examples have been found where warships were illustrated in a similar fashion on its coinage.

Altogether then, there is little doubt that England attached greater importance to the role of the navy as a source of representational power. During this period, in state ceremonies and progresses, England’s navy developed from being a symbolic tool designed to represent the martial power of the monarch, to becoming a symbol of defence, liberty, Protestantism, and even Englishness after 1588. Indeed, this is

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106 Sharpe, Monarchy Transformed, p. 280.
107 Sharpe, Image Wars, p. 84.
108 It was not until 1636 that a brass jeton was minted and paired with the French coat of arms and a three-mast ship.
Chapter Six

reinforced when considering other forms of elite and popular culture in which the navy was portrayed including artwork and print. In France, the same cannot be said. Given its location on the European continent, France always had a greater threat to counter on land, rather than by sea, and its navy was thus an auxiliary force. Royal ceremonies that sought to exploit the maritime resources of the realm, such as in Nantes (1565) and Bordeaux (1615), were actually organised by the local city councils to compliment the crown’s power by comparing it to maritime mythology.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has argued that the series of naval developments that led to the formation of the English and French standing navies also had repercussions for concepts of nationhood. Indeed, in England, the navy as a symbol of defence, liberty, Protestantism and power was identified with pre-modern concepts of ‘Englishness’ after 1588. The successful defence against the Spanish Armada, and the wider Spanish War from 1585 to 1604, resulted in the cultural transformation of England’s navy, from the crown’s source of power into the nation’s military arsenal and safeguard. Meanwhile, in France, it has been suggested that the navy was unable to integrate itself into the nation’s character in this period. Unlike in England, France witnessed no equivalent to the 1588 Armada that held the potential to overthrow the political and religious regime through an overseas invasion. Although the French navy was used by the monarch as a portable canvas of sovereignty, the navy never became a symbol of French identity during this period, largely because it was not relied upon to the same degree as in England, but also since it was located at the peripheries of the kingdom.
Aside from the Spanish War acting as a turning point that divided the two kingdom’s approaches to maritime cultural identity, this division was also influenced by the three central factors that shaped naval development, discussed in this thesis. First, the influence of the monarch remained pivotal to concepts of the state and national identity. Warships continued to be decorated to represent and promote the monarchy both in the open sea and in the docks. Second, it has been shown that warship design was often produced in response to international competition. This is most evident when considering the decoration of *la Couronne* and *the Sovereign of the Seas*, both of which were designed with the clear intention to outdo their rival. Third, and most importantly here, warship decoration was preconditioned by geography. With the English navy located centrally within the state, the monarch’s influence on these warships’ appearances could be more imposing. Yet in France, without an infrastructure that was based in the country’s core, the crown’s navy was influenced by regional identity just as much as it was produced in accordance with royal demand. France’s navy was divided between two frontiers, and its warships were accordingly influenced by different ideological designs. Without a central imposing identity, the navy remained fragmented, and the crown’s influence was always limited by distance.

A study of the decoration and projection of warship design, then, largely supports the ideas of Kevin Sharpe. The Tudor and Stuart dynasties used imagery embedded on warships to promote the monarchy, and in the process develop ideas of identity. Unlike in France, where scholars including Anne-Marie Lecoq have argued that the monarchy similarly exploited symbols of state, but only through employing pre-established concepts, England formed new perceptions of Englishness, in this period, which were associated with Protestantism, and also, increasingly, with
maritime and naval strength. The late-sixteenth century should be considered as the turning point when these new ideas emerged.
CODA AND CONCLUSION

The similarities and differences in the strength, size and appearance of early modern state fleets cannot be explained by a single generalisation. One reason for this is that the administration and construction of both the English and French fleets were sophisticated and complex, especially as the period progressed. Consequently, naval development was influenced by a number of factors. Amongst them, it has been continually reiterated that between 1545 and 1642, the strengths of the English and French state navies were shaped by the monarch’s interest and patronage. First and foremost, the standing navy’s warships were the property of the monarch. Warships constructed for the kingdom were not declared in documentation as ‘England’s’ or ‘France’s warships’ or even the ‘state’s warships’, but instead were identified as the king’s (or queen’s) personal property. This distinction is fundamental to understanding the navy, for its strength was dependent upon the political power and will of the monarch. As a consequence, the standing navy has to be distinguished as an entity that was owned by the sovereign, not the state, which was bolstered by private ships for campaigns.

It is important to return to the opening of this thesis where, using Michael J. Braddick’s definition of the state, it was determined that the monarch was the centre of the state’s power and thus a critical component of it.¹ At the same time, however, the monarchy was not ultimately the state itself. In this context, up until 1642, the standing navy (often referred to in records as the ‘Navy Royal’ and ‘La Royale’) was a resource that the state and its merchants relied upon for

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protection, but it was ultimately the property of the monarch. In this sense, F. C. Lane’s work on *protection rent* still has value because the crown’s personal sea forces (although not necessarily exclusively) were employed to protect and defend the nation as part of its sea service. As a consequence, by safeguarding the seas, the monarch’s warships and subsidiary private vessels employed by the state, offered some stability for merchant trade and the economy. The crown’s warships were regularly employed by the state for protection, as was the case during the ship money years, but they were clearly understood as being the crown’s property. Between 1545 and 1642, this relationship was not questioned. 

*Post-1642*

1642 marks the end of this thesis’s period because, in the following years, extensive political change in both kingdoms unfolded that could counter the argument made above. In these years, the predetermined understanding of the navy’s ownership was undermined for the first time, when both realms witnessed the king’s warships being used against the monarchy. In mid-seventeenth-century England and France, the men who worked for the crown’s navy began to question their loyalty to their sovereign and state. Mass dissent became endemic, and uprisings questioned the notion that the navy was the absolute property of the monarch.

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Coda and Conclusion

It is surprising that the historiography concerned with the navy’s role during the English Civil War addresses only briefly why the navy sided with the Parliamentarians and not its official owner. It is possible after all that, if Charles I had retained control of the fleet, the royalist factions could have blockaded London, inflicting considerable economic pressure on the parliamentary stronghold and forcing it to seek peace. For J. R. Powell the navy had fallen into Parliament’s ‘hands like a gift from the gods’ because of the competency, and political inclination, of Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, who was appointed Vice Admiral of England in March 1642. This is surely an oversimplification of the events, and Bernard Capp has instead suggested that the navy’s loyalties began to shift prior to the outbreak of war because, since 1640, Parliament had been provided with a voice in the appointment of senior naval commanders. Yet, Charles’s decision to flee London, in January 1642, was at least as important a factor for, in doing so, the king left his navy open to its subordination by England’s Parliament. Chapter Two has discussed how crucial the spatial relationship between the centre of state and the navy was to maritime strength; yet, by moving away from his fleet in London, Charles was corroding this link.

Charles first experienced the naval ramifications of his decision when, in March, talks began on who to appoint as Vice Admiral of the Summer Guard fleet. Nearing York, he endorsed the known royalist, John Pennington. Yet the king, by fleeing London, had limited any pressure that he could exert on the Lord High Admiral, Algernon Percy, Earl of Northumberland (who was responsible for

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the final appointment) when the Earl of Warwick was instead selected. Upon hearing this news, Charles dismissed Northumberland as admiral on 1 July 1642, and Parliament took advantage of this decision by quickly promoting the pro-parliamentarian Warwick in his place. In a series of political manoeuvres, Charles alienated himself from his own navy. Indeed, recent scholarship agrees with Michael J. Lea-O’Mahoney that the navy was lost because of politics. The men on board the king’s ships lost faith in the crown, and it was for Richard J. Blakemore ‘the outcome of a political wrangle over the appointment of officers’ that the king lost his navy. It is also important to stress that the seamen’s change of allegiance was only possible because Parliament was in far closer proximity to the fleet than the crown. This not only meant that Parliament and the admiralty could correspond more easily, but it also led to wages switching from the royal coffers to the parliamentary, ensuring the general support of most seamen. Ever since the decision had been made to maintain an English standing navy, from 1545 or earlier, London and the southeast was firmly seen as the navy’s home. Yet, in fleeing London, Charles abandoned his fleet to the hands of his enemies.

France also experienced significant political change immediately after 1642 that had repercussions for its navy. After Richelieu’s death in December and Louis XIII’s the following May, it was likely that the navy would fall into neglect without firm leadership. Yet, although Cardinal Mazarin provided the navy with little attention, it would be a mistake to presume that his disregard resulted in its

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failure, as Geoffrey Treasure previously suggested.\footnote{G. Treasure, *Mazarin: The Crisis of Absolutism* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 336.} Richelieu ensured that the navy was his dynastic legacy by planning for his nephew, Jean Armand de Maillé-Brézé, to inherit the office of *grand maître*\footnote{Navy and Government, p. 90. Maillé-Brézé was already *général des galères* since 1639, a move Richelieu had implemented in order to train his nephew to be his successor.}.\footnote{AN, Marine B’1, ff. 25-26, 30.} By the time of Maillé-Brézé’s untimely death in June 1646, the Ponant fleet consisted of some twenty-four warships of 200-1000 *tuns*, eight *bruslots* and four *flutes*.\footnote{AN, Marine B’1, ff. 25-26, 30.} His unexpected death in combat off Tuscany was however, a turning point in France’s recent revival in maritime power for, as expressed by La Roncière, it ‘ushered in a formidable crisis for the navy’.\footnote{Histoire de la Marine, V, p. 125. [La mort de Brézé avait ouvert pour la marine une redoutable crise].} The crisis was deepened because France lacked a monarch who could support the navy, as Louis XIV was but a child. Without an alternative, the Queen Mother occupied the *grand maître* post, and the navy was set on a path of deterioration that was exacerbated by the Fronde.

The Fronde paralysed French naval activity.\footnote{Glete, *Warfare at Sea*, p. 184.} From 1648, the rebellion expanded and affected three of France’s greatest maritime provinces: Normandy, Guyenne and Provence, causing complications for the navy’s preparation and use.\footnote{Histoire de la Marine, V, pp. 151-55. For example, during the first Fronde, the navy remained in dock, except for the use of nine royal warships from Brouage during the siege of Bordeaux in late 1649.} As the French naval institution was almost entirely dependent on both the local and senior nobility for its leadership and maintenance, the navy, as a consequence, was gravely affected by the noble revolt. This was especially the case in the Levant where its sea forces included many galleys owned by the nobility. It was drained of its ability to rise in defence of the crown for a large period of the rebellion, as illustrated by the difficulties that César de Vendôme (appointed *grand maître* in March 1650) initially encountered when organising a
force to counter Louis de Bourbon, duc de Condé after 1651.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, to add insult to injury, in the same year the duc de Richelieu, governor of Le Havre and \textit{général des galères}, also joined the \textit{frondeurs}, whilst Condé entered an alliance with the crown’s Spanish enemies.\textsuperscript{16}

As a military force that had little option but to be distributed over a vast landscape, the French navy was greatly impaired by the widespread civil conflict. This was particularly the case because the personal dynastic network that Richelieu had developed for the navy had been disassembled (largely by accident) in the years following his death, leaving the navy’s infrastructure with divided loyalties as the Fronde took hold. The main reason why the English navy did not initially encounter similar internal divisions during its civil war was also the result of the geography of the state. In being located in, and around, London, the navy was one unit, and was therefore far less susceptible to the political disagreements of the kingdom.

This is not to dismiss the problems that the English Parliament faced between 1648 and 1649, with nationwide riots against the heavy taxes, military domination and oppressive governance that burdened the populace after Charles’s capture in January 1647.\textsuperscript{17} The situation was exacerbated by a number of senior dockyard officials in Chatham supporting the rebels’ cause, providing the means for the dissenters to take control of a number of parliamentary warships along the Downs. The mutineers found refuge in the Dutch port of Hellevoetsluis in


\textsuperscript{17} Powell, \textit{The Navy in the English Civil War}, pp. 152-60.
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September.\textsuperscript{18} In the port, the mutineers gained royal patronage and Prince Rupert was appointed vice admiral of its fleet. Yet, trapped in the port by Warwick’s naval blockade, the mutineers became disordered and restless, with many deserting their posts. By 21 November, the rebel fleet was in such disarray that Warwick made the decision to lift the blockade and return to England.\textsuperscript{19} Warwick’s decision provided the means for a royalist threat to rematerialize at sea, although it never amounted to a force of any major significance.\textsuperscript{20}

Historiography that addresses the causes of this event is largely united in arguing that the naval revolt was principally motivated against political radicalism and not changes to the admiralty.\textsuperscript{21} Although the appointment of the divisive Thomas Rainsborough as Vice Admiral of England, in place of the popular William Batten, in September 1647, would have been in the minds of many dissenters, the political grievances of the revolt are far more pivotal to this study.\textsuperscript{22} A significant proportion of naval workers retained their loyalty to the crown during the Civil War and continued to perceive their duties as being on behalf of the king. During the First Civil War, although the navy sided with the Parliamentarians, any instructions commanded of it were still ordered for the service of the kingdom, its parliament, and crown. When, on 8 February 1648, a summer fleet was commissioned as ‘the Parliament’s ships’, omitting the king’s

\textsuperscript{19} Capp, \textit{Cromwell’s Navy}, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{22} Lea-O’Mahoney, \textit{The Navy in the English Civil Wars}, p. 204; Anderson, ‘The Royalists at Sea in 1648’, p. 36.
name and title, it provoked an unpopular response.\textsuperscript{23} For Capp and Donald Kennedy, this clause was a major factor in stirring the grievances that surrounded the initial naval revolt.\textsuperscript{24} In response to the exclusion of the monarchy in this commission, the mutineers declared that the English Parliament had committed an unjust ‘disherison of his majesty and his children’.\textsuperscript{25} This suggests that it was not until after Charles had lost the war that the navy was forced to question its own loyalties to the crown.

After this event, the English Parliament’s navy took the unprecedented step of an enormous increase in its size through a series of fiscal reforms.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast, without participating in this fiscal-military leap, France’s navy lagged behind the English equivalent. Without Richelieu’s interest, patronage and ambition regarding French maritime developments, France quickly became overwhelmed by English and Dutch activity as trade routes became heavily militarised.\textsuperscript{27} Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s description of the navy in 1661, although exaggerated, cannot be too far from the truth. He described the navy as being reduced to a pitiful state of some twenty sailing vessels, many of which were unfit for service, and without the resources in the naval warehouses to repair them.\textsuperscript{28}

When a fleet commanded by Edward Montagu sailed to the Netherlands in May 1660 to restore the British monarch, the royal prince was right to be merry. The navy that Charles II’s father had advanced as a symbol of royal power was

\textsuperscript{23} Kennedy, ‘The English Naval Revolt of 1648’, p. 250.
\textsuperscript{24} ibid; Capp, 
\textsuperscript{26} 207 vessels were integrated into the state’s fleet between 1649-60, but at a cost, at the time of the Restoration, the navy was in debt some £1,200,000. Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, pp. 9-10.
\textsuperscript{27} Navy and Government, p. 148
now at the centre of politics as it sailed to restore the monarchy.\textsuperscript{29} Charles received a fleet some three times larger than that which his father had lost. In a symbolic act, the \textit{Naseby} was quickly renamed the \textit{Royal Charles}, and its figurehead of the Lord Protector was hung from a gibbet and later burned. As the navy returned to its traditional relationship with the crown, official statutes were declared that enforced stricter regulation and competency on the English navy.\textsuperscript{30} In them, the crown ensured that the kingdom was aware that the state’s armed forces at sea were ‘His Majesties Navies, Ships of Warr and Forces’.\textsuperscript{31}

Until Charles I was executed in January 1649, the English navy continued to be perceived by many as the property of the monarch. Once its monarchy had been restored, England moved quickly to reinstate this principle. That the navy sided with Parliament during England’s civil war was largely on account of Charles’s decision to flee the location where it was based. Equally, although the French monarchy was willing to permit its councillors, and most importantly the \textit{grand maître}, control of its naval resources, its warships remained the king’s property. This was even the case during the Fronde, when the navy was susceptible to division because of the kingdom’s geography and the monarch’s age. Louis XIV was barely a teenager at the end of the Fronde and, as a consequence, the fleet was his in name, but not in deed. With a weakened monarchy, divisions between his councillors led to the split of his navy. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Davies, \textit{Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men & Warfare 1649-1689}, pp. 18-26.
\end{itemize}
strength and actions of the monarch were thus crucial to the future of the fleet.

*Creating a State Navy*

Through considering the fluctuating rise and decline of early modern English and French naval power, it has been suggested that naval developments deserve a prominent place in discussions that concern military advances and state building. It is hoped that the importance of navies in future debates concerning early modern military developments will receive greater attention. It was no coincidence that standing navies emerged at the same time that states were consolidating and improving their political frameworks. As a comparative study of two developing future world powers, this thesis proposes an argument that can account for national variations in naval growth.\footnote{Discussed below, pp. 293-98 of thesis.} In addition, it is important that this approach can be applied to a broader European, and perhaps even global model.

Particular importance has been given to the collection and analysis of quantitative statistics, largely due to the availability of ship list records and treasury accounts. It must be accepted that this information is more accessible and abundant for England than France, prior to Richelieu’s appointment as grand maître. As a consequence, direct comparisons made from statistical data have not always been straightforward to make. Figures produced for France have, in some circumstances, been established through educated estimates formed with close reference to the patchy manuscripts found. This was a particular problem between 1560 and 1620, when the Wars of Religion reduced the crown’s fleet to its bare
minimum and, according to some historians, to absolute extinction.\textsuperscript{33} For this reason historians have, on the whole, held French naval strength and actions during the Wars of Religion in low esteem. Yet, although records are scarce, irregular and incomplete during these years, this thesis has contributed to a developing field that suggests that it is unfair to claim that no French navy existed in this period of political crisis.\textsuperscript{34} Although it must be accepted that the crown’s navy was reduced in size after Henri II’s death, it is nevertheless possible, thanks to a number of incomplete records of the fleet in the following years, to identify a small force of royal warships during the 1560s and early-1570s. Even after the siege of La Rochelle, between 1572 and 1573, when the crown’s last warships were retired from service, royal naval expeditions were still possible, as Alan James has shown.\textsuperscript{35} Small, restricted and temporary fleets of hired, purchased and privateer vessels did materialise when need required them, even during the latter years of the conflict. Indeed, their size, frequency and composition illustrate the relationship between state strength and naval power in the period. It is possible that further research on the maritime resources of the French crown in these troubled years could uncover greater detail than was previously known for late-sixteenth-century royal naval policy. It is, therefore, important to continue the research techniques employed in this thesis, that were


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also used by Jan Glete, when assessing naval strength, for with quantitative statistical analysis it is easier to correlate naval advancement with state strength and reforms.36

This thesis has argued that three principal factors were primarily responsible for determining the shape, scale, effectiveness and cultural importance of the state navy. As a result of their varying prominence, the English and French navies not only emerged, but also sometimes declined. Moreover, where the two models contrasted, differences were also the result of these factors.

First, the strength and interest of the monarch in the navy was critical to its size, resources and development. It has been shown that naval expenditure correlated with the reigns of monarchs. Indeed, the political regimes of early modern kings who sought glory in war resulted in an increased use and development of the navy. For England, Henry VIII’s and Charles I’s reigns witnessed increased spending on the fleet to fund their wars and enhance their appearance of power at sea. In France, the reigns of Francis I, Henri II and Louis XIII have attracted considerable attention because they were periods of naval growth and aggressive foreign policy. The charts presented in chapters three and five record both expenditure and naval growth and, through them, it has been shown that naval power directly correlated to the reigns of these individuals.

Equally, these charts show that during periods of internal political weakness, or with a monarch who had reservations about war and naval affairs, a navy was likely to decline and decay. The reigns of Edward VI and James I have been highlighted for experiencing a significant reduction in naval power, which is hardly surprising, considering that Edward was a minor, and James had pacifist

sentiments. Likewise, a lack of documentation available for the Wars of Religion has been linked to a severe reduction in the French crown’s naval resources when the state was politically and economically unstable. This was because the political strength of the state (and more specifically the monarch) was intrinsic to the power of the navy. With the exception of the merchant and city vessels employed by the state, the navy remained, ultimately, the crown’s personal property, and the admiralty served as the crown’s agents on naval affairs. As a result, the monarch could impose his or her own will upon naval developments as much, or as little, as they wished.

Second, it has been argued that England and France developed largely contrasting administrative models for naval governance that were shaped by the geography of the two kingdoms. In other words, naval development was adapted to the physical composition of the realm. With the Iberian Peninsula dividing French maritime resources on two fronts, the kingdom had no option but to divide the crown’s naval resources into two departments: the Levant and Ponant. This structure contrasted with its English equivalent, which was situated centrally in the southeast, in close proximity to the court.

Geography was also a central factor in the type of warships that were constructed for the crown. Indeed, given the strong currents of northern European waters, England gave very little attention to galleys and oared infrastructure after 1545, with the large majority of its royal warships being propelled through sails alone. This allowed the kingdom to become one of the leading developers of sail-propelled warship design by the end of the sixteenth century. In contrast, the French Levant and Ponant fleets were characterised by opposing ship architecture. The Ponant fleet experienced the same tides and weather as England,
and its warships were thus propelled through sail, while in France’s south, galleys were far more numerous. The calm waters and shorter distances travelled in the Mediterranean suited oared propulsion techniques in the medieval era, and galleys continued to characterise Mediterranean warships for most of the early modern period. As a result, France controlled two fleets that were characterised by contrasting forms of propulsion. This had implications for the two states’ administrative capabilities. Whereas England controlled a single military body that could be closely supervised by the centre of the state, France had no similar opportunity. Instead, its navy was administered through the orders of the admiral (and grand maître after 1626) that were then carried out across the provinces, where the navy was situated. This system was most suited to the geographic structure and resources that the French navy had at its disposal.

The importance of the establishment of the Council of Marine Causes, and it being located at Deptford House, cannot be overstated, for the English navy could be directed, maintained and developed under the watchful guidance of the council’s officers. This opportunity, which was only possible because of the kingdom’s geography, also affected the production of cultural identity for, in London, the navy could be closely attached to the influence of the court. In contrast, with the navy situated across several maritime provinces in northern, western and southern France, the French fleet remained characterised and identified by regional distinctiveness. It is clear, then, that the production and visual appearance of early modern fleets were designed with influence from the geography of the kingdom in which they were based. The country’s terrain was a determining factor in the formation of the state navy’s administration and martial strength.
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Finally, it has been suggested that transnational competition and influence also affected the size and structure of state navies. A navy was not produced in national isolation, but instead, emerged through interaction with other maritime states. Particular prominence has been given to the coupled reigns of Henry VIII and Francis I, and of Charles I and Louis XIII for this argument. Indeed, the importance of transnational influence on naval design has been examined through considering the flagships of each monarch’s respective fleet: the Henri Grâce à Dieu, la Grande Françoise, and the Sovereign of the Seas and la Couronne. It has been suggested that la Grande Françoise was built to surpass the architectural achievements of England, and the same can be said when considering the Sovereign’s relation to la Couronne. I have argued elsewhere that English naval expansion in late-Marian and early-Elizabethan England was a direct response to anticipated conflict with the strengthened French fleet of Henri II. A similar stimulus for naval development has been identified in this study with reference to other times during this period, such as in 1545. Arguably, the most important years for transnational naval developments were the military and administrative transformations of both kingdoms from 1626. French naval expansion and reform under Cardinal Richelieu was instigated in response to English strength at sea during the Île de Ré invasion attempt; following this, the introduction of the English ship money levy in October 1634 was justified because of an increased threat from French maritime forces. This argument, then, expands and reinforces Alan James’s suggestion that an international perspective is important ‘if we are to use naval history to identify and explore the cultural influences and

perspectives that account for different strategic assumptions in the past’.\(^{38}\)

Through producing a comparative study of English and French naval developments, it is clear that, by sharing the Channel, both kingdoms’ fleets were naturally subjected to the cultural and political influences of their neighbour. Bodies of water, such as the Channel, served as international spheres of interaction, as Renaud Morieux has discussed, and this facilitated an interactive phase of naval development in England and France.\(^{39}\) It is essential that future maritime research acknowledge this, for naval development was never insular.

Combined, these three factors account for the rise, decline and differences in early modern state navies. Yet, this study has only accounted for English and French developments. There is an opportunity with future research to explore how these factors applied to other leading states; it would be especially worthwhile to adopt this approach in the case of the Dutch Republic and Spain. Indeed, Jan Glete introduced this approach with his general study of naval developments and state building. For Glete, global naval advances can only be accounted for by using a fragmented chronology and geography, which addresses military transformations on a state-by-state basis.\(^{40}\) In many ways, this approach is exactly what this thesis has adopted. It has been made clear that naval development was not a simple trajectory from medieval to modern state navies, but rather was open to rapid change and decline, and fluctuated over the period. At the same time, just as European state building was not simultaneous across all countries, the same applied to early modern navies. This study has shown that a standing navy had emerged in England by 1546, but, in France, the same could


\(^{40}\) Glete, *Navies and Nations*, I, pp. 8-12.
not be said until Richelieu’s appointment as grand maître. Differences in naval design, strength, size and appearance were, however, determined by the three primary factors discussed above.

Additionally, it has been argued that the visual representation of warships played a significant role in the development of national identities. Warships were political instruments used to display power, history and nationhood. Today, we are fortunate to be able to experience this when looking at the enthralling carvings of the Vasa, but chapter six has also shown that this is possible through accessing the wide range of available imagery and descriptions of both English and French warships from the time.\textsuperscript{41} Combined, it is clear that early modern warships were increasingly designed to serve as propaganda through their visual form. Their appearance was shaped through the influence of the same three factors that led naval expansion: transnational (or more appropriately transcultural) influence, the aspirations of the monarch, and cultural variations that were shaped by the realm’s geography.

Moving on from this, given that the administrative transformations that enabled the effective upkeep of the crown’s warships were neither chronologically nor geographically uniform across Europe, it is important to stress that claims of a single European military revolution are too generalised. It is more fitting, within the context of broad European studies, such as this thesis, to avoid using the term ‘revolution’. Yet, we can still agree with Glete’s view that we should perceive the change as an extension of state-building activity, where it gradually increased its monopoly of violence.\textsuperscript{42} The state’s control over military

\textsuperscript{41} F. Hocker, \textit{Vasa: A Swedish Warship} (Riga: Medströms Bokförlag, 2015).
\textsuperscript{42} Glete, \textit{Navies and Nations}, I, pp. 7-8.
resources was of paramount importance to state development over a long period of change that outlasted even the seventeenth century.

The transformation of the state’s political and financial apparatuses, then, was connected to changes to the military, fuelled by an increased demand for its use. Although both developments depended upon each other for their advance, it is also important to observe that administrative progress was a separate programme of change from transformations to warfare. The organisational and financial modifications discussed in the first half of this work were separate from a broader set of technological and tactical changes, which were the focus of Geoffrey Parker in the military revolution debate, and have been discussed in relation to the navy in the final three chapters. The series of technological transformations that affected how warfare was fought conforms to the theory of punctuated equilibrium evolution, an idea first devised by Clifford J. Rogers, and discussed in chapter five. Technological punctuated equilibrium introduced gunpowder, the *race-built* galleon, and broadside tactics to naval warfare. It also influenced the state’s monopolisation of violence and its consequent political development. However, to find some clarity in what has become an over-elaborated and messy debate, it should be seen as a separate series of changes from state formation. As a result, it would be wrong to adopt Louis Sicking’s proposal that these developments could be described as a ‘naval transformation’ as opposed to ‘naval revolution’, because generalising these developments as one


event still problematizes the terminology. David Parrott’s argument is perhaps the most useful for this trend of thought. In proposing that ‘the most unambiguous practical example of the direct increase in state control over armed force’ came with navies, Parrott also accepted that changes in how the state was able to control its navy were only possible after a technological change in warfare at sea: the introduction of artillery. Technological transformations led to changes of an administrative nature. At least in the context of naval affairs, it is appropriate to describe the early modern European transformations explained in the military revolution debate, as such: first, a technological evolution of punctuated equilibrium, and second, a broad system of state administrative change assisted by the state’s attempts to monopolise maritime violence.

This argument is similar to Glete’s suggestion that there were two revolutions in warfare: a technological revolution and a bureaucratic one. However, both forms of revolution as defined by Glete, need refining; whereas technological changes should not be classified as revolutionary, but rather evolutionary, because of the great number of technological changes to warfare during the early modern period, the second form of revolution – bureaucratic – can scarcely be used at all. Glete’s conception of a bureaucratic revolution was entirely teleological and, as discussed in chapter two, state naval administrations cannot be classified as bureaucratic by the end of this period. Indeed, naval administration in England and France continued to be operated through principally private networks that were centred on the nobility. The roles of monarch, admiral and grand maître continued to dictate policy, and resulted in

quick and often irrational decision-making that undermined institutional bodies (namely the Council of Marine Causes, which remained responsible for serving and respecting the authority of the crown and its leading statesmen). Indeed, it is fair to argue that, by 1642, the role of Charles I and Cardinal Richelieu in naval affairs was more absolute than at any preceding time in this period.

With this said, a number of administrative and financial transformations to the English and French states (discussed in chapters one to three) did occur because of attempts to monopolise violence at sea, and these changes closely conform to the framework of the military revolution outlined above. To suggest that these developments were part of an intentional movement of modernisation and bureaucratisation, however, would be mistaken. The impact of naval developments on state formation is perhaps most noticeable, in agreement with N. A. M. Rodger, in that the cost of maintaining a navy was an important factor in the development of the British fiscal state in the eighteenth century. This is not to suggest that such a system existed by 1642, but as chapter three has shown, the willingness of the state, especially the English, to experiment with its financial governance in this period was important to the progress made in the remainder of the seventeenth century and beyond. Any claims of a military revolution process must accept the change as a long drawn-out process.

The development of standing navies, then, was connected to the construction of the early modern state. Advances in the size and strength of the navy assisted the development of the state, but these two prolonged transformations did not form a single revolution, but instead, were interconnected movements. The size and appearance of an early modern fleet was dependent on

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Coda and Conclusion

three principal factors (state stability, geography and transnational influence) that together ensured a continuing contrast between the English and French models. The period between 1545 and 1642 witnessed the fluctuating rise and decline of both kingdoms’ navies, and because the three factors continued to vary in their influence, maritime strength would also continue, thereafter, to be susceptible to change.
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