Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Corporate governance of banks and financial stability

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Anginer, Deniz, Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Huizinga, Harry and Ma, Kebin (2018) Corporate governance of banks and financial stability. Journal of Financial Economics, 130 (2). pp. 327-246. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.011

[img] PDF
WRAP-corporate-governance-banks-stability-Ma-2017.pdf - Accepted Version
Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only until 30 December 2019. Contact author directly, specifying your specific needs. - Requires a PDF viewer.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives 4.0.

Download (785Kb)
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.011

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and systemic risk in the banking sector. Specifically, shareholder-friendly corporate governance results in higher risk for larger banks and for banks that are located in countries with generous financial safety nets as banks try to shift risk towards taxpayers. We confirm our findings by comparing banks to non-financial firms and examining changes in bank risk around an exogenous regulatory change in governance. Our results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail guarantees in thinking about corporate governance reforms at banks.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Finance Group
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Asset-liability management, Corporate governance, Stockholders
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Financial Economics
Publisher: Elsevier Science BV
ISSN: 0304-405X
Official Date: November 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
November 2018Published
30 June 2018Available
26 October 2017Accepted
Date of first compliant deposit: 30 October 2017
Volume: 130
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 327-246
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.011
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us