Ma, Sinong and Safra, Zvi (2019) Fairness and utilitarianism without independence. Economic Theory, 67 (1). pp. 29-52. doi:10.1007/s00199-017-1093-5

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Abstract

In this work we reconsider Harsanyi’s celebrated (J Polit Econ 61:434–435, 1953; J Polit Econ 63:309–321, 1955; Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977) utilitarian impartial observer theorem. Departing from Harsanyi’s individual-centered approach, we argue that when societal decisions are at stake, postulates must not be drawn from individualistic behavior. Rather, they should be based on societal norms. Continuing this line of thinking, we state and prove a utilitarian result that, rather than being based on the independence assumption, is based on the societal norm of procedural fairness.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Utilitarianism -- Mathematical models, Game theory
Journal or Publication Title:	Economic Theory
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0938-2259
Official Date:	February 2019
Dates:	Date Event February 2019 Published 12 December 2017 Available 30 November 2017 Accepted
Volume:	67
Number:	1
Page Range:	pp. 29-52
DOI:	10.1007/s00199-017-1093-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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