Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Making good cider out of bad apples - signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free-riders

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Nagatsu, M., Larsen, K., Karabegovic, M., Székely, M., Mønster, D. and Michael, John (2018) Making good cider out of bad apples - signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free-riders. Judgment and Decision Making, 13 (1). pp. 137-149. ISSN 1930-2975.

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP-making-cider-bad-apples-boost-expectation-Michael-2018.pdf - Published Version - Requires a PDF viewer.
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

Download (554Kb) | Preview
[img] PDF
Making-cider-Michael-2017.pdf - Accepted Version
Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (382Kb)
Official URL: http://journal.sjdm.org/

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boosts voluntary contributions to public goods, in particular from individuals who otherwise prefer to freeride. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects/Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information/No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the second phase. Common knowledge of selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics is triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that the group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Public goods, Game theory, Cooperation -- Psychological aspects, Econometrics, Selfishness, Free rider problem (Economics)
Journal or Publication Title: Judgment and Decision Making
Publisher: Society for Judgment and Decision Making
ISSN: 1930-2975
Official Date: January 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
January 2018Published
3 November 2017Accepted
Volume: 13
Number: 1
Page Range: pp. 137-149
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 20 November 2017
Date of first compliant Open Access: 30 January 2018
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
26166Aarhus Universitethttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100007605
679092H2020 European Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010663
UNSPECIFIEDAcademy of Finlandhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002341
UNSPECIFIEDAalto-yliopistohttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002666
Open Access Version:
  • Publisher

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us