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Making good cider out of bad apples - signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free-riders
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Nagatsu, M., Larsen, K., Karabegovic, M., Székely, M., Mønster, D. and Michael, John (2018) Making good cider out of bad apples - signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free-riders. Judgment and Decision Making, 13 (1). pp. 137-149. ISSN 1930-2975.
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Official URL: http://journal.sjdm.org/
Abstract
The present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boosts voluntary contributions to public goods, in particular from individuals who otherwise prefer to freeride. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects/Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information/No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the second phase. Common knowledge of selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics is triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and propose solution thinking as the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that the group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | |||||||||||||||
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| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | |||||||||||||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy | |||||||||||||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Public goods, Game theory, Cooperation -- Psychological aspects, Econometrics, Selfishness, Free rider problem (Economics) | |||||||||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Judgment and Decision Making | |||||||||||||||
| Publisher: | Society for Judgment and Decision Making | |||||||||||||||
| ISSN: | 1930-2975 | |||||||||||||||
| Official Date: | January 2018 | |||||||||||||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 13 | |||||||||||||||
| Number: | 1 | |||||||||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 137-149 | |||||||||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | |||||||||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | |||||||||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | |||||||||||||||
| Date of first compliant deposit: | 20 November 2017 | |||||||||||||||
| Date of first compliant Open Access: | 30 January 2018 | |||||||||||||||
| RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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