Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets
UNSPECIFIED. (2003) Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 39 (5-6). pp. 421-431. ISSN 0304-4068Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00014-4
We extend an equivalence theorem proved by Forges and Minelli [Journal of Economic Theory 75 (1997) 388] to a market game, which does not require that a specific commodity is used as money. Under the assumption that the set of commodities is a net, we show an equivalence between the set of allocations generated by self-fulfilling mechanisms and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations. We construct an example, which shows that this equivalence breaks down when the net assumption fails to hold: in such cases, traders cannot obtain, through a self-fulfilling mechanism, the information revealed by rational expectations equilibrium prices. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Q Science > QA Mathematics
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA|
|Official Date:||July 2003|
|Number of Pages:||11|
|Page Range:||pp. 421-431|
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