UNSPECIFIED (2003) Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 110 (1). pp. 87-120. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results. A fundamental new mathematical result, the partition-balancing effect of large numbers, which promises to have further applications, is contained in Appendix A. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
ISSN:	0022-0531
Date:	May 2003
Volume:	110
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	34
Page Range:	pp. 87-120
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/9664

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