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**Introduction: Early-Modern Medicine and ‘The New Cultural History’**

A volume on the cultural history of medicine for ‘the Renaissance (1450-1630)’ immediately demands some chrono-linguistic clarification. The ‘Renaissance’ has typically been wedged between two other periods, the ‘Middle Ages’ and ‘Modernity,’ but its exact place has been much disputed. In fact, almost from its first usage in the fifteenth century, scholars wondered about the when and where of it, as much as what it actually encompassed. To complicate matters, ‘the Renaissance’ is used in alteration with the ‘pre-modern’ or ‘early modern’. In this volume we will avoid all such confusion by referring to our period as the ‘early modern’, a now conventional usage for the years concerned.

There is no disagreement, however, that it was in this period that modern man was ‘born’ -- man the modern individualist thinker. This view was articulated as early as 1860 by the Swiss cultural historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897), who argued, that ‘the individual’ -- male, autonomous, increasingly rational, curious, creative, and in control of itself and the world -- emerged during ‘the Renaissance’ (Burckhardt, 1860; see also, Hinde, 2000; Sigurdson, 2004). Roughly a hundred years later the English historian Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979), while agreeing with Burckhardt about the rise of a ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ modern mind, sought to tie it to the so-called Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth century (Butterfield, 1949; see also Bentley, 2001). Thus was framed the idea of the origins of modern man, albeit with the difference of a few hundred years. Exactly where the mental revolution took place was left vague. For Burckhardt it was in the sunny city states of fifteenth-century Catholic Italy, whereas for Butterfield it was in wet Reformation Britain of a century later.

The view that the individual modern self was ‘born’ in the early-modern period has stubbornly stuck. Indeed, it was substantially reinforced in the 1980s through the work of the literary scholar Steven Greenblatt. In his *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare*, Greenblatt re-emphasised the timing of the birth of modern individualist man, but added that this was neither fully independent from society, nor autonomously creative (Greenblatt, 1980, 1989). Rather, the modern individual that then emerged, he submitted, was a ‘cultural artefact’-- the product of an active appropriation of multiple social, economic, institutional and political forces. What was new in this formulation was not the idea of identity/the self/the subject as an ‘artefact’ (or a social-construction) for that, in various ways,
had been articulated by scholars at least since the 1970s. What was distinctive was the articulation of identity politics through Renaissance ‘texts and documents;’ it was through these that Greenblatt imagined his own identity as being in a constant process of ‘making’ and ‘re-making’. This was a view quite unlike the ‘universal’ and ‘fixed’ self that was assumed by Burckhardt, and it was to prove inspiring for scholars over the following decades. Among them, for instance, was the historian of science Mario Biagoli who portrayed Galileo Galilei (1570-1612) as one such entrepreneurial and manipulable ‘artefact’.

In Biagoli’s, bestselling Galileo Courtier: The Practice of Science in the Age of Absolutism (1994) the Italian mathematician was no longer to be seen as a scientific genius standing outside his own time and society: rather, he was regarded as a clever, calculating social and economic manipulator who used the patronage system to his own advantage. Strategically exploiting the conventions of the seventeenth-century gift-giving court culture (at the same time as being moulded by them), Galileo ‘self-fashioned’ a successful career at the Medici court in Florence.

The work of Greenblatt and Biagoli is in many ways paradigmatic of history writing since the 1980s, especially in the Anglo-American world. It beckons to what is often simply referred to as the ‘new’ cultural history – the umbrella under which most historians now situate themselves unquestioningly (Burke, 2008). With reference to the early-modern period, I want in this Introduction to review the genesis of some of the main strands of this new cultural history. In part this historiographical exercise is intended simply to draw attention to what is becoming increasingly unknown or forgotten. But it is also intended, ultimately, to shed light one of the new cultural history’s more recent reformulations, the so-called material turn. The latter cannot be understood without knowing the former As we shall see, the material turn moves the new cultural history on in significant ways, just as the making of the ‘new’ cultural history itself was both an extension and important departure from pre-existing historiographical traditions.

The new cultural history was really a composite of older historiographical traditions (some evolved from the ‘new’ social history of the 1970s) and methodologies borrowed from the neighbouring disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, and literary criticism. To do justice to this mix of old and new I will refer to it throughout as the new sociocultural history. Its scope and perspectives considerably widened what had gone before. For the early-modern period, and for early-modern science and medicine in particular, the emphasis shifted from description and structural analysis to how men and women at all social levels lived their daily lives. Crucial became the concern, à la Greenblatt, with how peoples’ experience shaped their
identities. New spaces were discovered for these enterprises: princely courts, alchemical laboratories, family households, convents, monasteries and religious societies, cabinets of wonder, museums, anatomical theatres, dissection rooms, elite salons and artisanal workshops, botanical gardens and menageries, colonial administrative offices, and the medical market places of villages and towns. A multitude of new source materials was also revealed: scientific and medical imagery, medical case books, doctors and patient diaries, recipe collections, catalogues of medical and scientific specimens, anatomical collections, travel accounts, and so on. From these were extracted a wide variety of voices from all social spheres, genders and ethnicities, as well as objects from the material world such as air pumps, hospital beds, clothing, medical instruments, anatomical and botanical specimens etc. Such studies greatly enhanced not only our knowledge about who produced medical knowledge and where, but also, the constituents of this knowledge and the contemporary means of its apprehension. Historians of the early-modern period, eager to understand medicine and science before they took modern shape, began serious inquiry into the epistemic nature of such knowledge. What, for example, did early-modern contemporaries actually mean when they increasingly appealed to the senses and personal sense experience in their investigations of nature? Scientific and medical practice, it came to be argued, was local and specific, shaped by its own rules, categories and boundaries, and supported by criss-crossing networks of power which organised the relationships between humans, non-humans and things. The recognition that early-modern medical and scientific knowledge followed its own epistemic rules, also encouraged scholars to investigate the many powerful continuities in the production and dissemination of knowledge from the Middle Ages. Additional studies strove to ‘de-Europeanise’ and ‘de-universalize’ the processes of knowledge-making by stressing the importance of the wider world, indigenous cultures of knowledge, the technologies of imperialism and global commerce and trade.

Thus did the new sociocultural history impact on the modern ‘mentality narrative’ of the early-modern period, while not abandoning the narrative altogether. As the early-modern historian of science, Lorraine Daston, and the historian of medieval and early-modern medicine, Katharine Park, have reminded us, so long as the ‘myth of modernity’ – and its ‘modern’ individual, subject, self, and identity -- continues to cast its powerful spell over today’s post-industrial societies, the ‘myth’ of the formation of such modern mentalities as the inauguration of modern culture in the early-modern era is likely to stay with us (Daston and Park, 2006, p.6) This is not the place to take up why Anglo-American sociocultural historians of medicine and science the 1980s came to believe that modernity is ‘a myth’.
Suffice it to say that the categories for social thinking and practice were problematized in history writing as they were in society and culture more generally. Individual and collective behaviour was no longer to be explained in reference to structures in ‘society’, but rather, in reference to the workings of ‘culture’. Individuality and sociability in the past, as in the present, became increasingly marked by choice, fluidity, competitive performance and desire. At the heart of these changes was a re-conceptualisation and re-evaluation of human nature which was transposed onto the study of human experience through multiple cultural practices (Rodger, 2011; Jay, 2005; Dear, 2006; R. Smith, ???). The how, why, where and when of individual and collective experience, and its relation to the making of medical and scientific knowledge, moved to centre stage and has remained there ever since.

According to the conventional story in Anglo-American historiography, the new sociocultural history that emerged in 1980s was a radical departure from earlier history writing. It distinguished itself from two traditions in particular: the ‘old’ cultural history, largely shaped during the nineteenth and twentieth century and, second, post-war social history. The ‘old’ cultural history – typified by Jacob Burckhardt -- focussed primarily on the products of elite European culture (Kelley, 1996), while post-war social history was interested in quotidian life, or everything that was not elite. What most distinguished the post-war social history from the new sociocultural history was the latter’s increasing emphasis on the lived experiences of individuals. In the immediate post-war period, the social history of medicine was largely understood as a tool for policy formation in the re-organisation and restructuring of the public health and social care services (D. Porter, 1995; Reverby and Rosner, 2004). This was especially the case in Britain and continental Europe. It was yet another social science using the techniques of data collection and numerical analysis: church and baptism registers, coroner records, archives of charities, poor law distributions, hospital admission records, asylum casebooks, hospital admission records, doctors’ account, court proceedings, census return and so on. Much of its initiative came from the fast growing field of population studies with its focus on the collection of historical data on human biology, sexuality, fertility, and reproduction. Included was interest in epidemic diseases and death rates, stretching back to the fifteenth and sixteenth century when record keeping first began (Wear, 1986).

Important to this empirical exercise was the work of French scholars in the Annales School who took up a biologically and psychologically grounded ‘history of mentalities’ (Gelfand, 1986; Clarke, 1999). This was first proposed in the 1920s by the founders of the Annales School, the medieval and early-modern historians Marc Bloch (1886-1944) and
Lucien Fevbre (1878-1956). Critiquing the then dominant narrowly-based political and nationalist history writing, they addressed the wider social, geographical, cultural, biological, psychological, and economic factors that they thought shaped mindsets, views and feelings, including body perceptions and healing practices. Looking over long periods of time, their aim was an interdisciplinary ‘total history’ encompassing the humanities, social and natural sciences. This was further elaborated and developed under the leadership of the School by Ferdinand Braudel (1902-1985) after World War II. Authoritatively, Braudel placed emphasis on the study of almost imperceptible geographical, climatological, biological, or demographical changes over a long durée – an emphasis that set the pace for Annales scholars in the 1960s who were interested in the history of medicine. In the latter’s demographic works on epidemic disease, for example, the practice of retrospective diagnosis was common – that is, the reading backwards into the past of modern disease entities, classification and terminology. The idea elaborated by early-modern historians of medicine in the 1980s and 1990s, that disease might not be the same across time and place, was simply not on their resolutely positivist and scientistic agenda.

At the same time, coming out of Cold War America, sociologists began to be concerned with power in general, and the power of professions in particular. Questions of power had little direct bearing on the writing of early-modern medicine, for they had much to do with conceptualising an alternative understanding of power to that of Marxist materialists who imagined society in terms of underlying economic base and cultural superstructure (Eley, 2003). The concern with professional power was more germane to historians of medicine, in that it was the medical profession in particular who were one of sociologists’ main targets (Burnham, 1998). Medical sociology had evolved in the 1950s and 1960s and it came to be dominated by the functionalist theoretical approach of Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1951). Parsons articulated a normative conception of the ‘sick role’, one within which the laity submitted (cognitively as well as corporeally) to the authority of state-licensed physicians (Bloom, 2002). It was this model that came under serious scrutiny in the late 1960s and 1970s, in an era of political protest, leftist liberal politics, and ‘cultural revolution.’ The concept of ‘medicalization’ -- as the odious imposition of medical authority in society -- then came into widespread use as a critique of Parsonsian functionalism (Conrad, 1992; Nye, 2003). A famous elaboration of medicalization, which was to bear directly on the writing of early-modern medicine, was made in 1976 by the British sociologist, Nickolas Jewson: ‘The Disappearance of the Sick Man from Medical Cosmology’. In this historical account Jewson relied upon the classic Marxist causal relationship between underlying materialist forces of
production and the formulation of knowledges and practices, which he now transposed to medicine (Nicolson 2009). ‘The sick-man,’ he maintained,

may be said to have disappeared from medical cosmology in two related senses during the period 1770-1870. Firstly [sic], as control over the means of production of medical knowledge shifted away from the sick towards medical investigators[,] the universe of discourse of medical theory changed from that of an integrated conception of the whole person to that of a network of bonds between microscopical particles. Secondly, as control over the occupational group of medical investigators was centralized in the hands of its senior members the plethora of theories and therapies, which had previously afforded the sick-man the opportunity to negotiate his own treatment, were replaced by a monolithic consensus of opinion imposed from within the community of medical investigators. (Jewson, 1976, p.225).

For early modernists, Jewson’s article was less important for its Marxian critique of modern medical power (although ‘medicalization’ assumed importance for them), than for the attention that it drew to the pre-modern ‘patient’ and medical cosmologies. The early-modern period offered an alternative to modern medicine; it was a place where the historian could resurrect the voices of those who later became ‘silenced’ and ‘suppressed’. If modern medicine belonged to a ‘disenchanted’ or ‘rationalized’ world of medical encounter, pre-modern medicine belonged to an enchanted one. Very largely the aim of studying early-modern medicine became the filling out of this pre-modern ‘disenchanted’ world. It was a particularization of sorts of Keith Thomas’ pioneering, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Belief in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century (1971). Early-modern medicine was now to be linked to religious and magical beliefs and rituals within the God-controlled micro-macrocosm. In terms of empirical research, Jewson’s article also helped to shift the focus in the study of early-modern medicine away from elite practitioners and onto patients and the importance of their experience. Historians began to involved themselves with the variety of early-modern medical services, particularly those not under the control of elite male physicians (Pelling, ???; Whaley, 2011; Green, 2008). At the same time, epistemologically, Jewson’s article opened up the space for greater concern with the production of medical knowledge.

But much more was involved than long hours in the archives to bring back the voices of soothsayers, tooth-pullers, wise women, midwives, mad doctors, itinerant quacks, and
magical healers. In order for these hitherto historically marginalized groups to be brought into the picture and serve as sources of empowerment in the contemporary fight against injustices in capitalist medicine (the medicalization narrative), they needed to be ‘freed’ from the methodological shackles of the invisible, deterministic material forces which had kept them muted for so long. The solution, many historians began to believe, was to be found not in the analysis of ‘society’ but in the sphere of human individual and collective life that had hitherto far played little part in historical analysis, namely in ‘culture.’ Might individual and collective lives be the negotiated outcomes of a variety of human experience and practices in culture, rather than the causal consequences of underlying structures and bio-environment determinants? It began to seem so in an intellectual context in which ‘culture’ itself was coming to be re-valued and re-defined.

The most influential historian contributing to this thinking on both sides of the Atlantic was the former member of the Communist Party, E. P. Thompson, the prominent pioneer of the ‘new’ social history of the 1960s. In The Making of the English Working Class (1963). Thompson posited that ‘the making’ of the English working class had not only political and economic roots but cultural ones. The ‘working class’ was not spontaneously generated through the forces of production, he argued; it emerged because it experienced its own dislocation and political repression through the cultural traditions it historically possessed and which provided it with its own ‘moral economy’ (Thompson, 1971). The working class mobilized these resources to bring their own experiences into consciousness; in Thompson’s famous phrase, ‘the working class made itself as much as it was made’ (Thompson, 1963, p????). This was a reading that went against deterministic/economistic Marxism, which had seen class conflict and historical change mechanistically, as the result of changes in the underlying systems of economic production. Thompson insisted on active negotiation and historical contingency in class formation (the use of ‘making’ in the title itself was a statement of this non-mechanistic causality). In many ways his thinking resonated with that of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci whose 1930’s prison notebooks on the making of cultural consent (hegemony) were soon to be re-discovered (Gramsci, 1971; Mouffe, 1979). Social relations, Thompson argued, were not established once and for all, but (as Gramsci maintained), were always open and subject to continual recreation by members of a social community. It was in the course of the daily activities of historical actors that their objective social conditions transmuted into meaningful subjective experiences, which, in turn, could be used to change the underlying social conditions.
The embrace of Thompson’s ‘socioculturalism’ in the Anglo-American academic world was quick and enthusiastic (Kaye and McClelland, 1990). Although it did not exclude socioeconomic studies from the study of culture (Roche, 2013, p.123; Briggs, 2004, p.2), its celerity was above all based on the rescue of forgotten people ‘from below,’ whose lived experiences and struggles became models for contemporary political empowerment. But more was going on in history writing at the time to make Thompson popular. In fact Thompson’s work was soon seen to fit nicely with another growing enthusiasm: symbolic anthropology. This was seeded through the publication of three anthropologists in particular: Mary Douglas, Victor Turner and Clifford Geertz (Douglas, 1966, 1970; Turner, 1974; Geertz, 1973a). While Douglas focused on the symbolic realm of nature and the human body, and Turner on the symbolisms of cultural conflict and crisis resolution, Geertz offered an semiotic approach to ‘symbolic culture’, defined as a ‘historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes towards life’ (Geertz, 1973b, p.89). Everything, including understandings of the human body and its feelings and emotions, Geertz’s argued, were ‘cultural artifacts’, or ‘man-made’ (Geertz, 1973b, p.8). Although Geertz did not actually say that all hitherto taken-for-granted categories and classifications system – such as ‘the social’ – were also man-made inventions or constructions, he helped to open the way for such thinking among historians. In retrospect, he can also be seen to have eased the way for the postmodern ‘literary turn’ in history writing through his idea of reading and interpreting cultures like ‘a text’ – a notion he drew from literary theory and semiotics. But his main contribution to historians in the late 1970s and 1980s was the importance he attached to the study of context. Geertz’ new interpretive method for the analysis of culture, ‘thick description’, recorded not only human behavior, but took meticulous note of the context in which it happened and made meaningful. Cultural context, not materialistic causes, became the sine qua non in historical writing (Walters, 1980; Keesing, 1987).

Geertz’ interpretive approach and his metaphor of reading culture as ‘a text’ was particularly successful among early-modern historians whose archives were now seen to be chalk-a-block with ‘texts’ of rituals (such as birth or death) and what could be interpreted as incorporating symbolic actions (gestures or facial expressions, dance or the expressions of physical pain) (Calvi, 1989; Jones, 1996). Previously, materialistic historical approaches had interpreted such expressions as ‘irrational’ or as ideological acts of alienation fostered through the hegemonic ruling classes; religion after all was the opium of the people.
Symbolic anthropology allowed early-modern historians to understand rituals as fundamental to meaning-making experiences. The early-modern historian of France, Natalie Zemon Davis, an outspoken activist for the rights of women and the socially suppressed, brilliantly captured the effect of Geertz’s ‘thick description’ on her own work in a lecture of 1997. Applying Geertz’s ‘thick description’ to her source materials for a collection of essays on Society and Culture in Early Modern France (the title alone, she recalled, was daring and provocative at the time because of its reference to ‘culture’), she realized that she could add categories of age to the social, economic, and religious groupings she had been thinking about before, including the grouping of the living and the dead. She wrote about Catholic and Protestant forms of burying and remembering their dead as contrasting ways for families to communicate between the generations. Now she could consider the social and cognitive meanings of symbolic and ritual forms of behavior, which she had accounted for only in terms of group solidarity. She wrote about Catholic and Protestant feast days, processions, and buildings as contrasting ways to mark city space, give rhythm to the year’s time, and experience the presence of the sacred. Now she could look at the non-literate with more discernment … and take more seriously the techniques and endowments of oral culture, such as proverbs and memory devices. She began to doubt her earlier commitment to a single ‘progressive’ trajectory toward the future, assessing Catholic and Protestant paths as alternate forms of movement, rather than see the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as generating more than ‘modernity’. (Davis, 1997, p.??)

In The Return of Martin Guerre (1983), the story of a sixteenth-century French impostor that Davis first presented as a movie in 1982, she extended her close ethnographic investigations of early-modern France. Moving away from data collecting and processing -- quantitative analysis -- she headed towards the investigation of ‘self-fashioning’ and explicitly drew on Greenblatt in her thinking (Davis, 1997, p.??). This was not incidental; Greenblatt was her colleague in Berkeley, as Geertz was to become when she moved to Princeton in 1978. At roughly the same time the early modernist French historian, Robert Darnton (who also taught with Geertz at Princeton) achieved prominence by going with what he called the ‘ethnographic grain’ (Darnton, 1984, p.3). Cultural history and its dealings with human experience, Darnton maintained, should be ‘not merely what people thought but how they thought – how they constructed their world, invested in it with meaning, and fused it with
emotions’ (Darnton, p.??).

The move to symbolic anthropology in history writing in general, and in the early-modern history in particular, also prompted local studies and micro-history. The work of Carlo Ginzburg is best known in this connection, especially his The Cheese and the Worms (1980), a detailed micro-story of cosmology of the sixteenth-century miller Menoccio from Friaul. Ginzburg’s study of Menoccio’s reading practices, however, was less a study in ‘self-fashioning’ than a careful reconstruction of the mental world of an individual member of the popular classes in a specific locality. Ginzburg located Menoccio in the ‘problem’ of defining popular culture and its relationship to the elites -- a Gramscian preoccupation at the time among sociocultural historians. That some of Ginzburg’s claims lacked evidence did not diminish the celebration of his work among Anglo-American scholars (apparently more so than scholars in his own country). Historiographically, his work also illustrates how ‘turns’ in history are never straightforward, or how that which is turned against continues to churn. For The Cheese and the Worms was also at root an exercise wedded to Marxism, albeit of a non-mechanistic kind shaped by the ‘anthropological turn.’ Ginzburg and fellow Italian micro-historians were in battle against the French Annales historians who were continuing to argue that ‘the integration of the subordinate classes into general history can only be accomplished through …, a quantitative study of society by means of demography and sociology’ (Ginzburg, 1980, p.xx). Strategically, Ginzburg and company turned not only to the new sociocultural history and symbolic anthropology, but also to works exploring the understanding of the medieval popular human body through religious myths and rituals, and the grotesque and the carnevalesque. They specifically forwarded the Marxist literary critic and semiotician, Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975), who famously, in Rabelais and His World (1968) investigated the politically subversive nature of late medieval literature to show how its authors aimed at undermining social and political authority.

The fame of Thompson, Davis, Darnton, Geertz, and Ginzburg, rested much on their extraordinary narrative skills. Story-telling was back in historical fashion, itself a further instance of the search for alternatives to the ‘dry’ deterministic accounts of Marxist material history and the scientific ‘histoire totale’ of the Annales School of the 1950s and 1960s. But the refreshment of story-telling as an innocent means to historical truth was relatively short-lived. In the shadow of literary critic Hayden White’s Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (1973), the would-be objective narrative of
History-writing was called into question. Through his investigation of the writings of leading late nineteenth-century empiricist historians, White demonstrated that historical claims to a ‘objectivity’ were ill-founded. History-writing, he argued, was a literary genre largely modelled on nineteenth-century novels. Historians’ narratives were always caught up in the grammatical rules and structures of language and were only expressible through a restricted number of historically-developed narrative plots, he claimed (White, 1973; White, 2000; Halttunen, 1999). (White was drawing on French structural linguistics, the impact of which on history writing we will come to in a moment.)

Although White’s Metahistory threatened an end to history-writing as an objective means to critical inquiry, his work nevertheless proved immensely productive among some historians. Natalie Zemon Davis for one, in Fiction in the Archive: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century France (1990) experimented with the crafting of new forms of historical narrative and reflected on what was actually truth and what was fiction in archival sources, as well as the grounds for historians’ authority. Simon Shama did much the same in Dead Certainties: Unwarranted Speculations (1991).

While historians pondered and played with the disciplinary implications of White’s work, a respite of sorts emerged from a new generation of Annales scholars. Rejecting the efforts of their ‘elders’ to establish a strict correspondence between cultural cleavages and social hierarchies (or the characterization of human ‘mentalities’ as simply the expression of underlying deterministic environmental and biological forces) the new, self-styled ‘4th generation’ of Annales scholars claimed that human experience was a product of a multitude of social and cultural practices that were fluid and which circulated across social boundaries. Led by Roger Chartier, the early-modern historian of the book, publishing and reading, their claim was that the ‘materials that convey the practices and thoughts of ordinary people are always mixed, blending forms and themes, inventions and traditions’ (Chartier, 1989, 1994). In this the ‘4th generation’ were indebted to the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930-2000) who had written on social practices, distinction, and ‘habitus.’ The latter term he defined as a system of shared embodied dispositions that organise the ways in which humans perceive the social world around them and react to it. Habitus was gained (and re-generated), Bourdieu argued, through the body’s direct engagement with and internalisation of the symbolic order of the social world (Bourdieu, 1977, 1979; Lizardo, 2004). This idea permitted a fruitful rethinking of the relationship between structure and agency, which was more fluid and multi-directional than that pre-existing. Chartier’s Cultural History Between Practices and Representations (1988) and some of his later writings came to emphasize that human
individual experience and social identity were formed not only through the relations of production or by person’s location in a fixed social structure, but rather by historically specific ‘perceived’ identity properties acquired and negotiated in daily cultural life. Culture itself, he redefined as but a ‘representation’ of daily human practices (Chartier, 1988, p.47).

The new sociocultural history of early-modern medicine that came to be written from the 1980s reflected all these methodological tendencies. While methods from anthropology demonstrated that a variety of competing beliefs of sickness and health could exist at the same time in any given culture, literary studies encouraged early modernists to a focus more on individual self-fashioning. Both fields nudged historians towards Geertz’s view, that ‘man is an animal suspended in web’s of significance he himself has spun’ (Geertz, 1973, p.5). Interest in the shared experiences of ‘the collective’ or ‘the social’ was increasingly dampened. True, historians continued to believe that social life was materially conditioned, but they now emphasized, following Thompson’s lead, that these material conditions did not act directly or mechanically. Rather, material conditions affected human conduct through the cultural disposition and experiences of individual. Only a theory of society, based on the interaction between material attributes and symbolic properties, between the pressures of reality and the generative capacities of culture, between external coercion and individual initiative, was believed to be capable of explaining the workings and changes of human societies (Cabrera, 2004, pp.6-7)

At the same time as early-modern historians of medicine began to take up these ideas, they became deeply interested in matters of individual health and well-being. The early-modern sufferer, male and female, came to be seen as an active ‘participant’ in the daily pursuit of his or her own well-being – a modern consumer-like arbiter of dealings with the medical profession, ‘playing off’ different deliverers of health care. Encouragement for this came from an article by Roy Porter in 1985, ‘The Patient’s View’, in which was urged the idea that the early-modern patient exercised power over his or her dealings with healers ‘simply by possessing choice and the power of the purse’ (Porter, 1985, p.189). Since the early-modern medical elite lacked the gleaming technologies and miracle cures of today, early-modern patients were held to possess considerable bargaining power and control over their cures, Porter argued. Well used to self-diagnosis, self-help and household medicine, early-modern sufferers showed ‘initiative, resilience, and capacity to play the system’ (Porter 1985, 194; see also Porter, 1989). Thus was introduced a new cultural space for early-modern history of medicine: the medical marketplace (Jenner and Wallis, 2007; Wallis, 2016). In
turn, this linked medical history the history of consumption, on which Porter was also a
powerful voice (Brewer and Porter, 1993; Trentmann, 2012). The focus on the medical
marketplace and consumption patterns of health-related products also drew attention to the
production, advertisement, exchange, and display of materia medica which, in turn,
intersected with growing interest in the visual culture of medicine (Roberts, 1992; Kusukawa,
1997; Wolloch, 1999; Carlino, 1999). Through its focus on commerce and trade, the concept
of the medical marketplace also brought the connections between early-modern Europe and
the New World into focus – the explorations into the collecting and exchange of natural
objects, animals and the production of medical and scientific knowledge in the early-modern
period within an imagined rising global economy (Grafton et al, 1995; Jardine, 1996; Smith
and Finden, 2001; de Asúa and French, 2005; Bleichmar, 2007; Cook, 2007).

Such interests occasioned a re-definition of ‘medicalization.’ In 1987 the historian of
early-modern France, Colin Jones (one of the leading British representatives of the new
sociocultural history of medicine), suggested ‘freeing’ medicalization from its ‘structural
prison.’ He re-conceptualized it as ‘involving changing patterns of demand as well as the
provisions of medical services and the fixing of medical norms’ (Jones, 1987, p.74). The
earlier ‘top-down’ definitions, with their supposition of a passive population dominated by a
medical elite, would no longer do. Instead, Jones suggested that medical historians should
understand medicalization as a process of ongoing competition between elite academic
practitioners and local artisanal healer communities and even ‘outlawed’ charlatans such as
wise women, religious healers, travelling bone-settings and dentists, local wizards and so
forth for the favors of consumer patients (Jones, 1987, p.82). Along the way, the importance
of lay medical power was extended to the organization and running of early-modern
charitable health care institutions, such as hospitals and specialized institutions for epidemic
diseases (Brockliss and Jones, 1997; Russel, 1981; Park, 1985; Jütte [???] and Barry, 1991;
Cavallo, 1995). Jones demonstrated that the medical faculties, the traditional places of elite
education, had had increasingly to bow to public demands for special services such as
surgery. This ‘demand-orientated’ model of medicalization took final shape in his monograph
The Charitable Imperative (1989), and it was reflected in a growing number of historical
works that used this new medicalization model as a means to rethink the history of civic
health care.

But the same time that sickness and well-being (at both theoretical and empirical
levels) were becoming lively topics of discussion, the nature of ‘experience’ was becoming
increasingly blurred. Before we take a closer look at the theoretical foundations of this
blurring, it is worth summarizing what the fundamentals of human experience were for the majority of sociocultural historians in the 1980s and 1990s. Their central aim had been to rescue the individuals and groups ‘from below’ and, at a more analytical level, to rescue them from the oblivion which older structuralist history writing allegedly condemned them. While they may have granted a place of importance to individual experiences, and moved from ‘society’ to ‘culture’, few dispensed altogether with the idea that culture had some kind of causal force (Cabrera, 2004; Roche, 2013). Individual and collective experience, they perceived, were at least rooted in the ‘realities’ of material life. While the social environment was no longer seen to determine human thinking and practices, it still nevertheless conditioned the possibility of its emergence. People in the past were free to think, to act, to invent but within the limits of their sociocultural conditions and in accordance with the resources at their disposal as lent by their position in society. Practice, it now emerged, was the space where the meaningful interweaving between social and economic coercion and individual initiative took place. Culture, according to this view, was no longer epiphenomenon or derivative of deterministic material conditions; rather it was transmuted into a space of possibility for all sorts of meaningful human actions and individual and empowerment.

To make matters more confusing, at the same time as this notion of practice was being adopted, there was dished onto the historian’s plate concerns over language. Through engagement with social anthropology and the debates over the ‘scientific’ and/or the ‘fictional’ nature of history writing, historians had already come to perceive language as not a simple or unequivocal means of communication -- a passive instrument through which human thinking was transmitted and turned into action. Rather, they had begun to conceive language as a cultural resource -- a reservoir of available concepts that individuals could call on at will, conferring whatever meanings they wished. But while many historians accepted that individuals (themselves included) always thought and acted within some linguistic constraints of language, they nevertheless continued to uphold the idea that human action was somehow free of such constraints (Cabrera, 2004). Humans were able to express and reveal their experiences, it was assumed, through the medium of language. It was this understanding that received a body-blow from French structuralism in the 1980s. Drawing on the work of the Swiss linguist and semiotician Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), they radically challenged the idea that language faithfully mediates the reality of any human experience. They also attacked the belief that acts of speaking or writing simply reflected a person’s conscious intent. Words, defined by Saussure as ‘signs,’ were part of a structured system that
received its meanings, not through reference to some kind of stable reality, but through the interrelation within the sign system and the conceptual difference between signs (Sanders, 2004). Saussure suggested that the system of signs always preceded and acted independently of the conscious will of any speaker. In other words, humans were not in control of their means of communication, but were ‘caught up’ in linguistic structures that mediated independently between the reality of human life and the realm of abstract ideas and conceptual thinking. This was serious stuff across the board; it radically off-centred the idea that the human knower was the conscious and rational agent of his or her thoughts and actions – an idea that had been at the core of the human sciences and history writing since the Enlightenment (???? here, Daniel, 2001; Arvangeli, 2012).

During the 1960s and 1970s leading French intellectuals enthusiastically applied Saussure’s structural linguistics to all areas of social life (Dosse, 1998). Among them was the anthropologist Claude-Levi Strauss (1908-2009), the psychologist Jacques Lacan (1901-1981), the cultural critic and linguist Roland Barthes (1915-1980) and the philosopher-historian Michel Foucault (1926-1984). It was the move to the structure of language as the fundamental explanatory model and the irreducible basis of all expressions of human experiences and knowledge that the American philosopher, Richard Rorty (DATES), coined the ‘linguistic turn’ in 1967 (Rorty, 1967 [your ref is to only to edited vol. –fix in biblio]; Toews, 1987). Twenty years later, the ‘linguistic turn,’ whether endorsed or opposed, had completely inundated Anglo-American scholarship. Among historians, what were once discussions around ‘ideology’ shifted to ‘discourse’. But by then, the leaders of ‘French Theory’ had come to argue that semiotics (its linguistic elements and the overall structural system) were historically conditioned. Binaries, such as man/women, nature/culture, mind/body, human/animal (which according to Saussure accounted for the logical coherence of any human utterance and form of expression), had now to be understood as time-specific ‘inventions’ which carried significant sociocultural and discursive baggage. One of the leading French theorists, Jacques Derrida suggested a method called ‘deconstruction’ as a means to detect and identify the logical components of a text and expose the constructiveness of their discursive complexity (Derrida, 1967).

The linguistic turn was a fundamental assault on the nature of history writing and the authority of the historian, far more serious than that supplied by literary critic Hayden White. French theorist, Jean-Francois Lyotard, called for the end of all large-scale theories and philosophies of the world, such as the ‘progress’ of history, and ‘freedom’ from labeling
them ‘meta-narratives’ or ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard, [need French date of publication here, not the 1984 date of translation]). Instead, they should now be called ‘micro-narratives’ and ‘language games’. Poststructuralism, as it came to be known in America in the 1990s (and only in America [Cusset, 2008]), suggested that the human subject did indeed have ‘experiences,’ but that these should be seen as the stuff of historically contingent linguistic categories and rules that were not universal. Essentialist categories, such as ‘nature,’ ‘the body’ (and eventually ‘society’) were questioned and routed. Poststructuralists also attacked the belief that any human experience and knowledge could be simply reconstructed by reference to some kind of ‘real’ sociocultural context. And it challenged the idea, still cherished by many historians, that experience linked the lives of those in the past with the lives and experiences of historians and their readers in the present. Along with causality, the historical importance of ‘context’ was now under fire.

How ‘deconstructive’ analysis was to be carried out in historical research was explained by the historian of gender Joan Wallach Scott in 1991, at the height of the debates over poststructuralism. In a germinal article, ‘The Evidence of Experience’, she argued that, it is not individuals who have experience but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced. To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to historicize the identities it produces. This kind of historicizing presents a reply to the many contemporary historians who have argued that an unproblematized ‘experience’ is the foundation of their practice: it is a historicizing that implies critical scrutiny of all explanatory categories usually taken for granted, including the category of ‘experience’ (Scott, 1991, pp.779-80).

‘Experience’, she insisted, ‘is a subject history [and] [l]anguage is the site of history’s enactment;’ historical explanation cannot separate the two. Poststructuralism thus offered historians not a theory about already existing linguistic order, but (in Scott’s words), ‘a theory about how categories are constructed to appear closed or fixed when they are not’ (Scott, 1991, p.793; see also Scott, 1993; Canning, 1994).

Scott’s call for a new history of the human subject owed much to Michel Foucault who, during the 1960s and 1970s, [historicized the deconstruction of human experience. He
accomplished this through the introduction of two new methodological toolkits for historians – ‘archaeology’ and, later, ‘genealogy’, both of which notably avoided any reference to ‘society’ or ‘culture’. The archaeological method, which was initially closely wedded to structural linguistics, challenged the underlying assumption in the philosophy and history of ideas in science and medicine, that the job of the historian or philosopher was simply to collect ‘original’ ideas of authors in texts and demonstrate how they had progressively contributed to the rise of modern rational thought. Foucault radically broke with this tradition by stressing ruptures or discontinuities in the production of human knowledge and classification. He argued that at any moment in time an apparatus of specific discursive formations (an ‘episteme’) permitted for all that could be conceived of or said. He began to investigate the rules of such formations and, at the same time, inquired into the emergence of shifts and transformations in understanding. These shifts, he argued, would arise at some point, as central features of a new episteme (Megill, 1987; Goldstein, 1994; Veyne, 1997; Gutting, 1989). In the first of his archaeological works, The History of Madness (1961), Foucault investigated how such underlying discursive formations in the knowledge of medicine, law, politics and philosophy guided the changing understandings and meanings of madness from the Middle Ages. Subsequently, in The Birth of the Clinic (1963), which focused on anatomical pathology, he explored the idea of ruptures in the understanding and investigation of the human body. This work also introduced the notion of the ‘medical gaze’ which was to be widely seized upon in the history and sociology of medicine. The medical gaze, he argued, was that which through anatomical pathology turned medicine into its modern would-be objective self – a viewpoint that resonated with ‘medicalization.’ In the Order of Things (1966) he moved beyond individual case studies in medicine to excavate the epistemic shifts in the classification, order and rules of knowledge in the human sciences and natural history from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. As he explained, his text was

[a]n inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards (Foucault, 1970, p.xxii).

The conditions that made knowledge possible, particularly in the areas that most interested him, modern biology and medicine, and how those conditions differed over time,
was Foucault’s central interest in his archeological works. But none of those works dealt with the question how one episteme turned into another; they remained strictly synchronic (at one point in time), aiming first and foremost to describe the rules of a single episteme. To explain change over time, or how one episteme turned into another, a new notions of power needed to be introduced, Foucault came to see. Rejecting traditional explanations of power, he began to experiment with modes of authority and historical causality that were not centred on the idea of coercion, but were acted out both by people and upon them. He arrived at a view of power as productive -- as a force that was able to create the possibilities for the production of any experience and knowledge, including that of human self-understanding. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1975) was the first of his books to attempt this by borrowing Nietzsche’s idea of genealogy and applying it to a re-write of the traditional narrative of the rise of the Western penal system (Foucault, 1984). His point was to demonstrate that the change from one episteme into another was the result of contingent turns and ruptures in history, not (as hitherto supposed) the outcome of rationally conceived agendas and trends. Through his ‘genealogical method’ Foucault was able to emphasize the role of practices and materiality in the production of human experience, knowledge production, and the formation of individual subjectivity. ‘Genealogy’ was, as Gary Gutting has explained, ‘a historical causal explanation that was material, multiple and corporeal’ (Gutting, 2005, p.47).

Through this, Foucault arrived at the position that power, while not being ‘owned’ by people had a goal: the human body. While modern power no longer aimed to kill, it was intended at an inner transformation of the criminal’s ‘soul’ through the technologies of discipline targeting the individual body. Exercised in this way, power aimed at a subtle and pervasive yet complete control over the human body to the point that it came to seem ‘natural’ to the individual who experienced it. Always co-produced within emergent fields of new knowledge, this power created ‘docile bodies’: bodies that not only do what is wanted of them, without being visibly coerced. Discipline and its technologies of hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination, created a whole new form of individuality for bodies, enabling them to ‘naturally’ perform within the new forms of economic, political, and military organization emerging in the modern age. It was through the practices around the physical human body - through the various investments of knowledge and power invested into it -- that the modern subject and its experience were made, Foucault argued.

Foucault’s genealogical understanding of the nexus of power/knowledge as productive (even pleasurable, but also inescapable) gripped Anglo-American scholarship in
the 1980 and 1990s within what we might call the emergent culture of ‘corporal delights’ – synthetic drugs, gyms and aerobics, global foods, tanning salons, cosmetic surgery, and the exploding new media selling ‘the body beautiful’. It was fertile ground for the growth of an entirely new field of historical study – the history of the body – a genre that also did much to ‘sex-up’ the sociocultural history of medicine (Jenner, 1999; Jenner and Thaite, 2000; Cooter, 2013). Early-modern sociocultural historians contributed much to the overall success of this endeavor (Siraisi, 1990; Hillmann and Mazzio, 1997; Park, 1999; Ruggiero, 2001; Schoenfeld, 2003; Owens, 2005; Pomate, 2007; Stein, 2009; Weissner, ???). They demonstrated, not only the radically different (‘flexible’) constructions of the human body that reigned before ‘modernity,’ but also, the co-existence of its multiple understanding at the same moment in time and place. In the postmodern speak that was increasingly deployed, the body became a site of constant re-assembling. Ill-health and well-being, historians proved, were not only explained differently in the early-modern period but also experienced differently by sufferers, not least because of the many religious beliefs and rituals and ancient cosmologies involved. Increasingly, they turned to the manifold interactions between the human body in health and illness and its natural environment, subjects that earlier generations of scholars had simply taken for granted, either regarding them as part of the ancient theory of the six-non naturals, or as residues of irrational belief systems such as medical astrology (Grell and Cunningham, 1993; Kassell, 2005; Gentilcore, 2016; Cavallo and Storey, 2017).

Although early modernists continued to rely on methodological inspirations other than Foucault (Norbert Elias’ *The Civilizing Process* (1939) among them), all such sources were now Foucault-filtrated, as it were. Newly discovered older sources on the body, such as Marcel Mauss’ 1934 essay on, ‘Techniques of the Body’ were similarly processed. The postmodern publisher Zone Books (founded in 1985) produced in three hefty volumes on *Fragments for the History of the Human Body* (1989), which included Mauss’ essay. Literary scholars, such as Jonathan Swaday, were particularly active in ploughing through all manner of early-modern texts (including medical ones) in search of what he was to call the Renaissance ‘culture of dissection’, desire-driven and ritual-obsessed (Swaday, 1995). Art historians joined in, encouraged by an important ‘primer in the social history of pictorial style’ provided by Michael Baxendall’s 1972 study of painting and experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy. Baxendall’s concept of a ‘period’s eye’ was noticeably akin to Foucault’s ‘episteme.’ Early-modern visual studies began to flourish, much of it transposing Foucault’s textual insights on the rules and classification of knowledge and its intimate connections to power. The early-modern historian of Holland, Svetlana Alpers, for example (one of
Greenblatt’s co-founders in 1983 of the journal *Representations* contributed in an important study on the picture-making traditions of Dutch artisanal guild culture and its links to the new experimental medical and scientific communities and their technologies. In this Alpers claimed that the eye ‘was a central means of self-representation and visual experience, indeed, a central mode of self-consciousness’ (Alpers, 1983, p.79).

Meanwhile, Foucault’s thinking had moved on. In the first of his three volumes on the history of sexuality he introduced the concept of governmentality, along with a further development of his concept of power, which he termed ‘biopower.’ In the first of these works (*The History of Sexuality*, 1978), he argued that the modern experience of sexuality had slowly emerged as a twin product of disciplinary and regulatory powers that managed the whole of human populations. Since the seventeenth century biological life had become the target and focus of all governmental action, he claimed. In the following two volumes (*The Uses of Pleasure*, [give French date of pub.] and *The Care of the Self* [ditto], he brought his life-long project on the history of the making of the modern subject to a conclusion by investigating various ‘technologies of the self’ by which the human subject itself created its states of subjectivities.

By the time of his death in 1984, the coherence of Foucault’s project was still little understood. It was only much later, in the 2000s, with the publication and translation into English of his 1970s lectures at the Collège de France that the genesis and breadth of his ideas on biopower and the technologies of the self became clearer and gained wide purchase among Anglo-American scholars (Foucault, 2008, 2009, 2010).) Sociocultural historians of medicine were fortunate in having to hand from the sociology of medicine some major interlocutors. Among them was Nikolas Rose who, along with David Armstrong in the 1980s, had introduced Foucault to medical historians. (It was Armstrong who had provided the theory for Barbara Duden’s pioneering study in the history of the body, *The Woman Beneath the Skin: A Doctor’s Patients in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (1989) -- an unveiling of eighteenth-century female experiences and concepts of illness in full historical and sociocultural specificity [Armstrong, 1983, 1994].) Rose, too, had provided important work on the early Foucault (Rose, 1989) and he carried this through to the Foucault of ‘biopower.’ He, more than any other scholar, made clear how in modern ‘somatic society’ the body had became the privileged site of experiments with the human identity and the self and the focal point of all political power (Rose, 1996, 2007). Unsurprisingly, it was Rose, who came to question the concept of medicalization. The politics of health, he argued, could no longer be considered from the point of view of the medical profession and public health, nor as
working through the competitive forces of the market and/or the power of the consumer patient. In ‘Beyond Medicalization’ (date), he argued that it was time to dump such understandings in favor of the ‘makings’ of human subjectivity through the somatization of individuals in culture as a whole. ‘The practices of medicine have modified the very life form that is the contemporary human being;’ biology is now all there is and all we are. (Rose, date, p.700). Thus it is redundant, he maintained, to think of medicine or public health as an autonomous agents. While Rose was not thinking of the work of early modern historians of medicine, in many ways his in questioning of medicalization coalesced with what early modernists had been suggesting for the previous three decades in their search for what the body and medicine were before they came to defined by the modern medical sciences. With Foucault’s help they had already moved beyond earlier definitions of medicalization.

One area of scholarship that was initially unaffected by Foucault because it had little interest in medicine and bodies was the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Yet it was soon to have crucial bearing on the sociocultural history of medicine. SSK was extolled in the 1970s by the sociologist of knowledge Barry Barnes in Edinburgh, in company with Donald MacKenzie, the philosopher David Bloor and the historian Steven Shapin. Working in the shadow of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) -- the book that introduced the concept of ‘paradigm shift’ in science, whilst at the same time doing much to shift the paradigm of contemporary thinking on science -- the ‘Edinburgh School’ also build upon Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s pioneering The Social Construction of Reality (1966) in order to promote the anti-positivist notion of the social construction of scientific thought. ‘Successful’ scientific theories that were believed to have won out because they were untainted by external socio-political factors, were shown to have no such immunity; they were no less ‘contaminated’ by social and political interest as ‘failed’ science or pseudo-science. In rubbishing the notion of ‘internal’ factors versus ‘external’ ones, the Edinburgh School preached that all scientific and medical ‘facts’ were sociocultural constructs that necessarily mediated values. In this they rehearsed the idea of the physician-epidemiologist-cum-philosopher, Ludwik Fleck (1896-1962), that modern scientific and medical facts were

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not only facts but were always constitutive of the social contexts of their production. Fleck’s work on the social construction of scientific reality had in fact largely informed Kuhn’s, although it was not until the 1980s that his *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact* (1934) became better known.

The ‘making’ of scientific facts, particularly through experimentation, impacted on the study of early-modern science and medicine; after all, it was during the so-called scientific revolution of the seventeenth century that the practice of experimentation first emerged as sacrosanct. An early landmark publication proving it to be a socio-political construction was *Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (1985) by Shapin and Simon Schaffer. Focused on a new technological object of seventeenth-century science, the air-pump, *Leviathan and the Air-pump* undermined the neutrality/objectivity of the practice that lay at heart of modern science. It opened the way for further early-modern studies around medicine as much science on the social construction of ‘truth-making’ and ‘credibility.’ (Shapin 1995; Lawrence and Shapin, 1998). One of the effects of this was to move the physical body and knowledge-making into closer proximity; another was a turn to artisanal knowledge production, involving hands as well as heads. Artifacts and facts were now united as early modernists increasingly explored the vernacular literature for clues how medicine and science was performed (Leong and Rankin, 2011; Rankin, 2013; Stobard, 2017).

Works in the sociology-cum-historical study of scientific and medical knowledge increasingly overlapped with interests in the epistemology of such knowledge. Most notable here was the work by Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park on the place of wonder in natural philosophy and history from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment – a long durée historical inquiry into the past orders of nature and collective sensibilities of naturalists (Daston and Park, 1998). Daston went on to focus on the ideals and modes of natural inquiry, which culminated in her monumental study on the history of objectivity, co-authored with Peter Galison. *Objectivity* (2010) traced the transformation of epistemic virtues of scientific communities from the early-modern period to the present to show how they fused with the workaday ‘mangles of practice’ in the making of scientific images, to draw on Andrew Pickering’s metaphor. (Pickering, 1995). Grappling with Kuhn’s paradigm shifts and Foucault’s early ideas on epistemic rules and ruptures, Daston and Galison argued that ‘epistemic virtues’ needed to be understood as embodied ideals, formed and cultivated by
historically distinctive ‘scientific selves’ wherein the experience of knowledge and those of the knower converged.

Bruno Latour, the French sociologist, anthropologist and public intellectual, took SSK investigations a step further by questioning the relationship between knowledge making and understandings of the human self. An early enthusiast of ‘science-in-action’ or the ethnography of laboratory life, Latour made few references to Foucault and often proclaimed that his interventions must not be considered part of postmodern critique of the modern human subject (Latour, 1987, 1993). Nevertheless, his work had in common with postmodernists the notion of human identity as entirely fragmented – indeed, as forever in the ‘making’. His ‘actor-network-theory’ (ANT), however, which he developed with the sociologist Michel Callon in the 1980s (Callon, 1986), radically departed from the business of social construction in science studies. For one thing it was a-historical, and for another it flatly denied that a social or political context could explain anything. Last, but not least, by extending the postmodern challenge to the binary culture/nature, ANT more or less eradicated ‘culture’ by placing human ‘actors’ on the same ontological plane as animate and inanimate objects (Latour, 2005; cf Haraway, 1985). By Latour’s reckoning, scallops, bacteria, keys, laboratory benches, petri-dishes etc., were all an equal footing with humans in terms of their possible endowment with agency in the translation and mediation of relations and social networks. ANT refuses to seek out ‘meaningful’ patterns to prioritize any particular agency, or to lend causal power to one thing over another. The ‘sociology of association’ or ‘translation’ or ‘networks’ aimed only to observe and describe the ever-changing relationships that human and non-human things establish at one moment in time and which (allegedly) dissolve in the reconfiguration of the next. From a very different angle than the postmodernists who emerged out of the linguistic turn and who pronounced ‘the death of the social’, Latour sealed the fate of the social. His ‘material turn’ went further, to the ‘death of the cultural’ as relied upon in the identity politics of cultural studies. Thus Greenblatt’s configuration of identity as ‘self-fashioning’ through its engagement within a ‘human-made’ cultural environment was superfluous in the world according to Latour. (Cooter and Stein, 2016).

Yet early-modern historians of science and medicine have begun to take up Latour, albeit broadening and blending his ideas with those of other contemporary theorists from geography, economic history, anthropology and the social sciences, as well as their own prior interest in animals and ‘social things.’ This is reflected in the current emphasis on the ‘flow’ of information, capital, concepts, persons, animals, and goods in our globalized capitalistic
world pointing to the ‘hybrid’ character of the production of all knowledge and the multiple modes of its translation and embodiment (Gupta ad Ferguson, 1992; Baba, 1994; Appadurai, 1996; Tomlinson, 1999). Historian of medicine, Harold Cook, for example, has fruitfully applied these ideas to the early-modern period in his Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch Golden Age (2007) and, more recently, in a volume on Translating Knowledge (2012) edited with early-modern art historian Sven Dupre (Cook and Dupre, 2012). The historian of early alchemy, material culture and craft knowledge, Pamela Smith, is another who has been researching the global and ‘translation flow’ of scientific and medical craft knowledge. However, in her ‘Knowledge and Motion: Following Itineraries of Matter in the Early Modern World’ (2014), Smith extends the ‘material turn’ in a way that is fast becoming a sign of the times.

Dissatisfied with history writing that restricts itself to written sources and identifiable individuals, Smith encourages historians to venture beyond the recent human past. After all, she says, this past ‘only captures 7,000 of the approximately 200,000-plus years since Homo sapiens appeared.’ Treating human evolution, -- the ‘struggle for survival’ -- as an unquestioned ‘fact’, she uses this as a transhistorical leitmotif for a history of the ‘human hand’ that goes back at least to the ‘Neolithic Revolution’ (when humans first ‘manipulated animal and plant varieties to control nature’). Historians are invited to ‘deepen’ their work by contributing to ‘a long story of incremental developments at the interface of the human hand with the material world’ (Smith, 2014, p.133). Although Smith does not specify exactly how historians are to conduct their inquiries, her direction is similar to that promoted by the

‘Presidential Scholars in Society and Neuroscience’ at Columbia University, of which Smith has been the Chair (and on whose committee sit, interestingly, David Free???, the influential early modern historian of art who promoted neuro-aesthetics [Free???, 20?? –add to bibliog]). More particularly, the direction is similar to that advocated in the work of the postcolonial and global historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty, on the human condition in times of climate change (Chakrabarty, [x3 need dates]), and that of the medieval historian, Daniel Lord Smail, in his controversial neuro-enthusiasm, Deep History and the Brain (2008). The cultural historian of early-modern France, Lynn Hunt, is another who has recently made the turn to evolutionary biology in her work on the ‘emotional’ history of the French Revolution (Hunt, 2007, 2014). Their views are rehearsed in a ‘Roundtable’ in the American Historical Review (20??) on in the relationship between history and biology. As the Introduction to the ‘Roundtable’ (co-authored by Smail) states confidently, ‘it is no longer possible to think of history simply as
the story of humanity, or of ecology only as the story of non-human organisms and their interaction with one another and with habits and climates’ (p.1492). Alas, this (Latourian) inability to think of history as a story of humanity, may be becoming only too true.

Promoted by banalities such ‘human history and natural history are intertwined,’ [n]either can be understood without the other’ (source??? page?), and sold with emancipatory glee, the introduction of evolutionary biology into history writing fundamentally challenges the aims and methodologies of sociocultural history as it has been known since the 1980s. Both the new social history of the 1960s and the new sociocultural history of the 1980s had kept a careful distance from the natural and life sciences, except as objects for historical study. Only twenty years ago cultural theorists and historians, influenced by social constructionism, excluded the findings of biology from their investigations of human identity. There was good reason for this in a context in which biology, in the form of the new genetics, was proving itself entirely deterministic (sociobiology). Deconstructionism, as practiced by the historian of gender, Joan Scott, or the philosopher of gender and queer studies, Judith Butler (in Bodies that Matter (1993)) loudly decried any transhistorical biological universality and essentialism in human ‘experience’. It was deemed hostile to the possibilities of the new emerging conception of a continuous transformative and performative quality of a cultural identity and the self, as proposed by Greenblatt and others. Early-modern historians of the body, such as Greenblatt’s co-editor of the journal Representations, Thomas Laqueur, repeatedly showed that knowledge about sexuality, disease, pain, and the human passions defied transhistorical and universalist scientific claims (Laqueur, 1990). In tandem with the scholars in social science studies revealing the social constructiveness of presumed ‘objective’ scientific and medical ‘facts’, these historians demonstrated that such understandings were intimately enmeshed in multiple operations of a non-causally operating power/knowledge network.

Today, however, its seems that it is precisely this poststructuralist and social constructivist approach that is considered an intellectual straightjacket. The historian of science, Ruth Leys, observes that it is the postmodernist emphasis on language, in particular, that is now blamed for the neglect of the ‘lived materiality’ of the human body (Leys, 2010; see also Papoulias and Callard, 2010). Not that this critique is new; it emerged in tandem with the rise of poststructuralism during the 1990s; famously, in 19??, the medievalist Carolyn Walker Bynum challenged the reduction of corporeal experience to just language
(Bynum ????). However, it is only now, by relying on the widely visible and publicly discussed brain-sciences, that it has fallen on more fertile soil. ‘Neuro-history’ and/or environmental history based on the climate sciences are considered by an increasing number of historians to be a means to escape the ‘cul-de-sac’ into which the discipline of history has been led since the linguistic turn. For Lynn Hunt, a neurological-based history of emotions that interrelates the historical investigation of the transformation of ideas, feelings, and behaviors with a consideration of neurons, neural networks, hormones, and neurotransmitters, will finally explain human selfhood, identity, and cultural change. She argues that lived experience ‘is not just a linguistic event’ (Hunt, [date?]). With a bit of help from the ‘cognitive revolution’, she believes, cultural history will simply be better.

Not everyone, however, accepts that the evolutionary or neuro-biological re-reading of culture will generate better history. In, for example, a recent edited volume on Early Modern Emotions (2017) in which over 100 contributors corral every topic from war to poetry, a staggering variety of approaches can be seen to compete for recognition. While its dustjacket advocates the analysis of emotions as itself offering a ‘new perspectives on the early modern period,’ and while the volume overall is informed by Latour’s re-working of nature, agency and socio-politics, Early Modern Emotions also demonstrates an ongoing reliance on social-constructionism, linguistic theory and semiotics, and Bourdieu’s praxeology. A number of other recent works in the rapidly developing field of the history of emotions demonstrate a similar reliance, not least those focused on the early-modern period (Alberti, ???; Carrera, 2013;Weston, 2016).

Yet, undeniably, a malaise hangs over the cultural paradigm, partly predicated on a yearning for a return to some new master narrative. Such is detected by the eminent American historian of Latin America, labor history, and social inequality, Barbara Weinstein. In ‘History Without a Cause? Grand Narratives, World history, and the Postcolonial Dilemma?’ (2005), Weinstein notes the sweeping success of the ‘cultural turn’ over the last thirty years, but laments that it has rendered historians skeptical of ‘grand narratives’ and historians who position themselves as omniscient narrators (p.72). However, the very success of cultural history’s devaluation of explanatory narratives has generated a craving for ‘new imaginative ways to narrate the past and to address the question [of] ‘Why?’ without reverting to excessively positivist master-narratives’. It remains to be seen whether there will be a ‘return’ to new master-narratives and whether human evolution and neuro-biology will
be among them. (How evolutionism can be imagined non-positivistically will certainly be a challenge.) Recalling Daston and Park’s claim that the early-modern period will always provide a ‘mythical’ foundation narrative of modernity, one wonders what the evolutionary narrative or the meteoric rise of the ‘emotional turn’ will reveal to us about our own understanding of selfhood and identity in these global times. What is almost certain, however, is that the sociocultural history of the early-modern period will continue to inform debate for many years to come.

The essays in this volume build upon and, to different degrees, exemplify these discussions and debates through the broad categories of authority, experience, environment, disease, animals, material objects, food and mind/brain. They go to prove that the sociocultural history of medicine of the early-modern period, far from dissolving into the ‘hot air of deconstructionism’, as some once predicted, or into the ‘fresh air’ of evolutionary biology as some now hope, continues to be a robust and multi-layered source of critical enquiry into practices, thinking and experiences of people in sickness and in health. Challenging more traditional models of individuality and sociability, as well as the older primacy of reading, books and book learning, the contributions reveal how scientific and medical knowledge was constituted and how it travelled the globe. Further, they point to the multiple moves whereby materia medica in the broadest sense of mediated objects, humans, animals, texts, images, practices, and experience – both quotidian, and in knowledge production and understanding – were constantly transformed, translated, distorted and modified. ‘Culture’ – questioned, applied, indigenous, and European– in the sociocultural history of medicine has permitted us to move far beyond Burckhardt and Butterfield as well as beyond the politics of identity and self-fashioning of Greenblatt. Whether the notion of ‘culture’ will be come to be accepted in its re-definition as evolutionary, is a battle to be fought over in the future. In the meantime, the cathedral of early-modern cultural history of medicine remains as open as it has been for the last four decades or more, and remains just as inviting.

End.

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Footnotes to Stein, ‘Introduction’ to Volume 2