UNSPECIFIED. (2003) Corporate governance and game theoretic analyses of shareholder power: the case of Spain. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 35 (7). pp. 847-858. ISSN 0003-6846

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Abstract

The definition and implementation of control is at the heart of the corporate governance debate. The paper approaches the issue by using power indices derived from the theory of cooperative games. An application to Spanish listed firms shows that incentives for large shareholders to form controlling blocs are high. In the Spanish system of corporate governance ownership concentration is therefore the main mechanism to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers. Moreover, these results suggest that the Shapley-Shubik index is not an appropriate measure of shareholder power.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	APPLIED ECONOMICS
Publisher:	ROUTLEDGE TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
ISSN:	0003-6846
Date:	2003
Volume:	35
Number:	7
Number of Pages:	12
Page Range:	pp. 847-858
Identification Number:	10.1080/0003684022000026593
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/9747

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