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Epistemic insouciance

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Cassam, Quassim (2018) Epistemic insouciance. Journal of Philosophical Research, 43 . pp. 1-20. doi:10.5840/jpr2018828131 ISSN 1053-8364.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr2018828131

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Abstract

This paper identifies and elucidates a hitherto unnamed epistemic vice: epistemic insouciance. Epistemic insouciance consists in a casual lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality or are adequately supported by the best available evidence. The primary intellectual product of epistemic insouciance is bullshit in Harry Frankfurt’s sense. This paper clarifies the notion of epistemic insouciance and argues that epistemic insouciance is both an epistemic posture and an epistemic vice. Epistemic postures are attitudes towards epistemic objects such as knowledge, evidence or inquiry. Epistemic vices are defined as character traits, attitudes or thinking styles that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping or sharing of knowledge. Epistemic insouciance is not just a posture but an affective posture. Such postures are distinguished from epistemic stances, which are policies that one can adopt or reject. Epistemic malevolence, as Jason Baehr describes it, is an example of an epistemically vicious epistemic stance that issues in active attempts to undermine the knowledge possessed by a specified group of individuals. An example of epistemic malevolence in action is the so-called ‘tobacco strategy’. I argue that epistemic malevolence undermines knowledge by instilling doubts about respectable sources of evidence.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Knowledge, Theory of, European Union -- Great Britain -- Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Philosophical Research
Publisher: Philosophy Documentation Center
ISSN: 1053-8364
Official Date: 29 August 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
29 August 2018Published
24 May 2018Updated
23 December 2017Accepted
Volume: 43
Page Range: pp. 1-20
DOI: 10.5840/jpr2018828131
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 18 January 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access: 18 January 2018
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
UNSPECIFIED[AHRC] Arts and Humanities Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000267

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