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Hard and soft equilibria in Boolean games
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Harrenstein, Paul, Turrini, Paolo and Wooldridge, Michael (2014) Hard and soft equilibria in Boolean games. In: AAMAS '14 Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, Paris, France, 5-9 May 2014. Published in: Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems pp. 845-852. ISBN 9781450327381.
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WRAP- hard-soft-equilibria-Boolean-games-Turrini-2014.pdf - Accepted Version - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (633Kb) | Preview |
Official URL: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2615867
Abstract
A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to eliminate such undesirable equilibria, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a preplay negotiation phase. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal, and are secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. The preference structure of these games allows us to distinguish between hard and soft equilibria, where hard equilibria arise from goal-seeking behaviour, and cannot be eliminated from games by, e.g., taxes or subsidies, while soft equilibria are those that arise from the desire of agents to minimise costs. We investigate several mechanisms which allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable equilibria from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility.
Item Type: | Conference Item (Paper) | |||||||||
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Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Electronic computers. Computer science. Computer software | |||||||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Computer Science | |||||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Multiagent Systems, Game theory | |||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems | |||||||||
Publisher: | ACM | |||||||||
ISBN: | 9781450327381 | |||||||||
Official Date: | 5 May 2014 | |||||||||
Dates: |
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Page Range: | pp. 845-852 | |||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | |||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | |||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | |||||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 18 May 2018 | |||||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 18 May 2018 | |||||||||
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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Conference Paper Type: | Paper | |||||||||
Title of Event: | AAMAS '14 Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems | |||||||||
Type of Event: | Conference | |||||||||
Location of Event: | Paris, France | |||||||||
Date(s) of Event: | 5-9 May 2014 | |||||||||
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