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Electric Boolean games : redistribution schemes for resource-bounded agents

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Harrenstein, Paul, Turrini, Paolo and Wooldridge, Michael (2015) Electric Boolean games : redistribution schemes for resource-bounded agents. In: AAMAS '15 Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Istanbul, Turkey, 4-8 May 2015. Published in: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems pp. 655-663. ISBN 9781450334136.

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Official URL: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2772879.2773238

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Abstract

In Boolean games, agents uniquely control a set of propositional variables, and aim at achieving a goal formula whose realisation might depend on the choices the other agents make with respect to the variables they control. We consider the case in which assigning a value to propositional variables incurs a cost, and moreover, we assume agents to be restricted in their choice of assignments by an initial endowment: they can only make choices with a lower cost than this endowment. We then consider the possibility that endowments can be redistributed among agents. Different redistributions may lead to Nash equilibrium outcomes with very different properties, and so certain redistributions may be considered more attractive than others. In this context we study centralised redistribution schemes, where a system designer is allowed to redistribute the initial energy endowment among the agents in order to achieve desirable systemic properties. We also show how to extend this basic model to a dynamic variant in which an electric Boolean game takes place over a series of rounds.

Item Type: Conference Item (Paper)
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Electronic computers. Computer science. Computer software
T Technology > TA Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Science > Computer Science
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Multiagent systems, Artificial intelligence
Journal or Publication Title: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Publisher: ACM
ISBN: 9781450334136
Official Date: 4 May 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
4 May 2015Published
28 January 2015Accepted
Page Range: pp. 655-663
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
291528 (“RACE”) H2020 European Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010663
FP7-PEOPLE-2012-IEF, 327424 “NINA”)Seventh Framework Programmehttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100011102
Conference Paper Type: Paper
Title of Event: AAMAS '15 Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Type of Event: Conference
Location of Event: Istanbul, Turkey
Date(s) of Event: 4-8 May 2015

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