Herrera, Helios, Reuben, Ernesto and Ting, Michael M. (2017) Turf wars. Journal of Public Economics, 152 . pp. 143-153. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002

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Abstract

Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory experiment confirms the model's main predictions.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory, Cooperation -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Public Economics
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0047-2727
Official Date:	August 2017
Dates:	Date Event August 2017 Published 4 July 2017 Available 12 June 2017 Accepted
Volume:	152
Page Range:	pp. 143-153
DOI:	10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.002
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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