UNSPECIFIED (2003) Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK. CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 27 (3). pp. 337-357. ISSN 0309-166X

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Abstract

The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies can use acquisition as a strategy to reduce their likelihood of take-over. The determinants of making an acquisition and being taken over are modelled for the first time within a competing risks framework using two large samples of UK manufacturing companies which together cover most of the post-World War II period up to 1990. Our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, companies which make acquisitions can significantly reduce their conditional probability of being taken over by around one-third, largely through the impact that acquisition has on corporate size. In this sense, attack, through acquisition, is the best form of defence against take-over.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Publisher:	OXFORD UNIV PRESS
ISSN:	0309-166X
Date:	1 May 2003
Volume:	27
Number:	3
Number of Pages:	21
Page Range:	pp. 337-357
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/9838

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