Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK
UNSPECIFIED. (2003) Is attack the best form of defence? A competing risks analysis of acquisition activity in the UK. CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 27 (3). pp. 337-357. ISSN 0309-166XFull text not available from this repository.
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies can use acquisition as a strategy to reduce their likelihood of take-over. The determinants of making an acquisition and being taken over are modelled for the first time within a competing risks framework using two large samples of UK manufacturing companies which together cover most of the post-World War II period up to 1990. Our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, companies which make acquisitions can significantly reduce their conditional probability of being taken over by around one-third, largely through the impact that acquisition has on corporate size. In this sense, attack, through acquisition, is the best form of defence against take-over.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||OXFORD UNIV PRESS|
|Date:||1 May 2003|
|Number of Pages:||21|
|Page Range:||pp. 337-357|
Actions (login required)