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The burden of attention : CEO publicity and tax avoidance

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Duan, Tinghua, Ding, Rong, Hou, Wenxuan and Zhang, John (2018) The burden of attention : CEO publicity and tax avoidance. Journal of Business Research, 87 . pp. 90-101. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.010 ISSN 0148-2963.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.010

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Abstract

We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO’s name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may engage in tax evasion activities to meet investors’ performance expectations; on the other hand, they are more concerned with public image and avoiding being labeled as tax avoiders. Based on the CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011, our finding supports the former and shows that CEOs with higher publicity manage to have a lower effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate. Such effect is moderated by board independence. Finally, firms with higher CEO publicity pay auditors higher tax fees, suggesting that these CEOs tend to use more tax planning services from auditors.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Tax planning, Tax evasion, Chief executive officers -- Taxation, Standard and Poor's corporation
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Business Research
Publisher: Elsevier Inc.
ISSN: 0148-2963
Official Date: June 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2018Published
22 February 2018Available
6 February 2018Accepted
Volume: 87
Page Range: pp. 90-101
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.010
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 7 February 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access: 22 August 2019
Open Access Version:
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