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Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

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Pulford, Briony, Colman, Andrew and Loomes, Graham (2018) Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better. Games , 9 (1). 4. doi:10.3390/g9010004

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9010004

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Abstract

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight 3 × 3 and four 4 × 4 normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Game theory, Incentive (Psychology), Experimental economics, Factors of production, Decision making
Journal or Publication Title: Games
Publisher: M D P I AG
ISSN: 2073-4336
Official Date: 18 January 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
18 January 2018Published
11 January 2018Accepted
Volume: 9
Number: 1
Article Number: 4
DOI: 10.3390/g9010004
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
ES/K002201/1[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269
RM43G0176Leicester Judgment and Decision Making Endowment FundUNSPECIFIED

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