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The normative foundations of defamatory meaning

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Slavny, Adam (2018) The normative foundations of defamatory meaning. Law and Philosophy, 37 (5). pp. 523-547. doi:10.1007/s10982-017-9321-5

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-017-9321-5

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Abstract

This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dual view - can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views. The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory, but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached. Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views. The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: K Law [Moys] > KN Common Law, Private Law
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Libel and slander, Torts
Journal or Publication Title: Law and Philosophy
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 0167-5249
Official Date: October 2018
Dates:
DateEvent
October 2018Published
18 December 2017Available
29 November 2017Accepted
Volume: 37
Number: 5
Page Range: pp. 523-547
DOI: 10.1007/s10982-017-9321-5
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access

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