Glazer, Jacob and Rubinstein, Ariel (2019) Coordinating with a "problem solver". Management Science, 65 (6). pp. 2445-2945. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2018.3078 ISSN 0025-1909.

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Abstract

A “problem solver” (PS) is an agent who when interacting with other agents does not “put himself in their shoes” but rather chooses a best response to a uniform distribution over all possible configurations consistent with the information he receives about the other agents’ moves.

We demonstrate the special features of a PS by analyzing a modified coordination game. In the first stage, each of the other participants—who are treated as conventional players—chooses a location. The PS then receives some partial information about their moves and chooses his location. The PS wishes to coordinate with any one of the conventional players and they wish to coordinate with him but not with each other. Equilibria are characterized and shown to have different properties than those of Nash equilibria when the PS is treated as a conventional player.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Management Science
Publisher:	Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (I N F O R M S)
ISSN:	0025-1909
Official Date:	19 March 2019
Dates:	Date Event 19 March 2019 Published 21 February 2018 Accepted
Volume:	65
Number:	6
Page Range:	pp. 2445-2945
DOI:	10.1287/mnsc.2018.3078
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	22 February 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access:	28 March 2019

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