The Securitization of Female Migrant Domestic Labour in Greece since the 1990s

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My dear grandmother whom I lost during the final year of my PhD, was the source of inspiration for this project. She was a sharp, clever and knowledgeable woman, but having been born in 1929 and coming from a very wealthy aristocratic family she was only given the chance to study until secondary school, was denied further education and was married off to my grandfather, a kind and loving man that I loved dearly, who was chosen by her family. All her life she remained thirsty for knowledge, yearning for a place in society other than a mother and a wife. She always encouraged me to move ahead in life and grab every opportunity for education and a career. With the encouragement came a word of warning that echoes in my mind every single day:

<quote>as a modern woman do not forget to respect all the rights our generation claimed for you! Move ahead but always respect what it means to be a woman and always remember why we fought for all the rights you are taking for granted nowadays.</quote>

I cannot thank her enough for being such a huge inspiration in my life and I am heartbroken that she was not here to see the completion of this project. I know she would have been proud!

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**DECLARATION**

I Theologia Iliadou declare that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been written for me in a part or a whole by any other person. That material that has been used from sources such as archives, books and articles has been cited and acknowledged. This thesis has not been submitted for any other degree of any other university apart from the University of Warwick.

26th October 2016
ABSTRACT

Despite the historically undervalued and yet politically charged character of domestic labour its contemporary emergence as a female migrant occupation exposes the group of female migrant domestic workers to comparatively to the past more intense exploitation and abuse. Within security regimes, which act as the primary means of management for female migrants, the national and gender identities of female migrant domestic workers are constructed as a threat to the national politics of social reproduction. This research project examines the lived inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers in Greece as outcomes of the politicization of migration as a threat to the national societal security. It does so by utilizing the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as the basis for the development of this project’s analytical framework and conducting research at the three securitization stages: negotiation, acceptance and institutionalization. It argues that the identified as characteristics of the contemporary migration wave, racism and xenophobia, rise in crime and growth of the informal economy, that have defined the experiences of both nationals and aliens are outcomes of the conceptualization and development of migration policies as exclusionary measures. Utilizing Huysmans concept of desecuritization the research project concludes by claiming that the conscious reorientation of the ethical basis upon which migration policy is established in Greece will result in the alleviation of the burdens of migration for both nationals and migrants.
ABBREVIATIONS

COPRI - Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
CSS – Critical Security Studies
DOY – Public Financial Office
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
EU - European Union
FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRONTEX – European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
IKA – Hellenic Social Insurance Institute
ILO – International Labour Organization
IMEPO – Hellenic Migration Policy Institute
IR – International Relations
KKE – Communist Party of Greece
LAOS – Popular Orthodox Rally
LSE – London School of Economics and Political Studies
MP – Member of Parliament
ND – Hellenic New Democracy Party
OAED – Hellenic Manpower Employment Organization
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PS – Political Spring Party
UN – United Nations
UNHR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction

This thesis is a case study of the feminisation of migration in Greece as a distinctive aspect of the contemporary migration wave whose starting point has been identified as the early 1990s. Scholars have documented, through research and data, that within this migration wave female migrant domestic workers have emerged as the migrant group experiencing the most intense exploitation and abuse. Despite the historicity in the emergence of domestic labour as an undervalued occupation, its contemporary emergence as a female migrant occupation exposes domestic workers to more intense exploitation and abuse. Within security regimes, which act as the primary means of management for female migrants\(^1\), the national and gender identities of female migrant domestic workers are constructed as a threat to the national politics of social reproduction. The aim of this project is to explore the securitization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece, the political process through which this phenomenon is politicized as a security threat, as a source of their experienced human rights violations.

The starting point of this research project was a personal interest in the global phenomenon of the feminisation of migration, a term first introduced in a United Nations working paper to describe the growth in the movement of women for the purposes of specific “female forms of migration – such as the commercialized

\(^1\)This will be developed further in the third section of this introduction which is the literature review
migration of domestic workers and care-givers, the migration and trafficking of women for the sex industry, and the organized migration of women for marriage” (UN-INSTRAW, 2006). Domestic labour has drawn research and political attention on its own merit on both national and international levels due to its almost exclusive outsourcing to female migrants and the intense conditions of vulnerabilities and inequalities it reveals in comparison to the rest of the migrant occupations. As established by the 2011 ILO Domestic Workers Convention, domestic work conducted in the private sphere, and as such in the shadows of the formal economy, continues to be undervalued and

*is mainly carried out by women and girls, many of whom are migrants or members of disadvantaged communities and who are particularly vulnerable to discrimination in respect to conditions of employment and of work, and to other abuses of human rights.*

~ ILO, 2011

The extensive research conducted into domestic labour on a global level, which will be discussed in section 3 of this introduction, has revealed mutualities in the conditions of vulnerability through which domestic labour emerges as a sector, and subsequent commonalities in its trends, patterns and basic characteristics. The choice to explore the phenomenon in the specific national context came from the fact that Greece has stood out as a case on both political and academic levels due to the comparatively higher to the international levels of illegality that characterize the experiences of this labour group in Greece. Illegality and the extreme conditions of political, social and economic vulnerability that migrants in general (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Cavounidis, 2004; Hatziprokopiou, 2005; Kolovos, 2003; Lamprianidis and Limperaki, 2001; Marvakis, Parsanoglou and Pavlou, 2001) and
female migrants in particular (Anderson, 2001; Liapi, 2008; Lyberaki, 2008; Riga, 2007; Topali 2001; Vaiou, 2006) experience in Greece have been researched and documented on both national and international levels. The social developments in which these observations are being experienced are constantly being featured in both the national and international press. Overall Greece is being reported as the main European country lacking an ability to address migration inflows and illegal economic migration through the development of responsive policies and infrastructure, in an era when migration is one of the top 10 priorities of the European Commission’s policy agenda (European Commission, 2016).

Within this national and international body of work the experiences of migrants have been predominantly linked with the absence of sufficient and responsive legalization policies. As argued by the OECD the main problems Greece has been facing is its inability to find “a way to bring migration legislation into line with the facts on the ground” (OECD, 2005), the practical legislative mechanisms to respond to the patterns and trends of the contemporary migration wave. The question that has arisen is: since illegal migrants are absorbed in the national labour market and illegal migration imposes a very big problem domestically, where does the inability to develop responsive policies in Greece stem from? Despite the difficulties in regulating work conducted in the private sphere, wouldn’t the legalization of female migrant domestic workers, as well as migrants in general, protect migrants themselves as well as the national interests? The core argument of this research project is that the politicization of migration and female migrant domestic labour in Greece has been developed as a security project aiming to protect
the existence, cohesion and wellbeing of the national population against the threat of other national identities and cultures. With migration as part of the national security agenda, migration policies play the role of elaborately developed exclusionary practices legitimizing inequality, vulnerability and the violation of the aliens’ human rights.

When reading about migration in Greece in national and international literature, one story dominated the media: the case of a female migrant working for a cleaning company in Greece who in 2008 was attacked and almost killed, reportedly due to her trade union activity as a female migrant worker. The identity and occupation of the victim, the nature of the incident, the political status of the specific migrant and her specific experiences in the Greek judicial system provided a helpful foundation for the development of this research project. As such, this Chapter starts in section 1 with an overview of Konstantina Kouneva and her attack, to establish the hypothesis upon which this research project was developed. In section 3, having the hypothesis in mind I navigate through the existing literature looking into the different disciplines and the ways they have approached firstly the problematization of the phenomenon as a whole, and secondly in relation to the specific national context. By doing so the aim of this section is to underline the characteristics of the phenomenon in Greece as they have been identified so far, to explain deductively the reasons behind the choice of this project’s analytical framework, and to situate this research project within academia. Section 4 starts with the research questions, then I will move forward to present the analytical framework,
research design and structure of the project. The introduction concludes with a discussion of this project’s contribution to research and literature.

1 BEING A FEMALE MIGRANT IN GREECE: THE CASE OF KONSTANTINA KUNEVA

On 22nd December 2008 Konstantina Kuneva, a Bulgarian legal female migrant working for a cleaning company in Greece, was attacked with sulphuric acid by unknown men as she was leaving work late at night. Apart from pouring the acid on her body, the attackers forced her to drink a significant amount, causing external and internal damage. She survived the attack despite permanent damage to many organs, but is still undergoing significant surgeries and treatments. At the point of the attack Konstantina Kuneva was the Secretary of the Attica Union of Cleaners and Domestic Workers and a spokesperson for her colleagues and herself, fighting to improve basic working conditions and safeguard basic labour rights in the workplace. The attack came after a period of tension between her employer and herself and anonymous telephone threats (Protagonists, 2009; The New Folders, 2009). A Hellenic Police investigation was launched after the attack, but the predators were never found. Through the police investigation the incident was labelled a domestic/family violence case contradicting testimonies of family and friends through which one of the attackers was identified as a police officer. Amnesty International characterized the investigation as undetailed and subjective (Amnesty International, 2009) as it allegedly ignored the hostility Kuneva was experiencing from her employers due to her migrant status and her trade union
activities (Protagonists, 2009; The New Folders, 2009). Despite the failure to identify the attackers and the inconclusiveness of the police investigation in July 2013, the Piraeus First Instance Court ruled in favour of Kuneva in a trial against her former employer Ikomet, deciding that they were morally liable for her attack. The basis of the ruling was:

1. the experienced hostility within the workplace stemming from Kuneva’s trade union activity
2. her late-night working hours which had been one of the safety concerns Kuneva had brought to the attention of her employers in the months prior to her attack (Mindova, 2013).

The case of Konstantina Kuneva attracted a significant amount of publicity both nationally and internationally. Nationally the printed press devoted a significant amount of its space as the case was not treated as just a newsworthy story on its own merit but also brought forward more general concerns with regards to employment conditions in Greece and migration. More specifically in the articles of the top two highest selling Greek newspapers and the most visited at the time online Greek newsagency six underlying areas of concern can be identified with regards to the Kuneva case:

1. the existence of black labour and the widespread abuse of labour regulation from companies in the legal employement of nationals and non-nationals in Greece (Giannitsi, 2009; In.gr, 2009; Karanikas, 2009; Kathimerini, 2009; Kopsini, 2009a; Mpitsika, 2009; Mrousali, 2009; Protopappas, 2009; To
Vima, 2009a; Vradelis, 2009) and especially in the employment of nationals from lower social classes (Danikas, 2009)

2. the connection of the emergence of the black labour market to the inflow of aliens to the country (Karakousis, 2008) and the identification that non-nationals are more susceptible to engage in black labour due to deportation threats under the established migration policies (Kopsini, 2009c)

3. the similarities between Kuneva’s case and other migrants’ experiences as victims of bias in the Greek judicial system (Katsounaki, 2009; Kopsini, 2010), the unwillingness of the Greek state to review migration policies (Aleksiou, 2009), act impartially and offer its full resources in finding the perpetrators and letting the legal system do its duty (Athinaiou, 2009; Kathimerini, 2009c; Kopsini, 2009f; Kopsini, 2009c; Mandravelis, 2009; Someritis, 2009; Triantafillou, 2009) and the ethical questions this raised with regards to the establishment of a culture where the value of migrants’ lives in Greece is questionable (Magklinis, 2009)

4. the significance of the means of the attack, sulfuric acid, as on one hand a method of intimidation and punishment used by the mafia operating in Greece, as argued by the Bulgarian Minister of Labour, (Kopsini, 2008c) and the other culturally as a means of punishment of unruly women (Kaplanis, 2009) since a female migrant trade unionist was chosen amongst the whole population of trade unionists as a target instead of a male specifically with the specific means of punishment (Kounalaki, 2009a)

5. the nomination of Kuneva as the face of cleaners and female migrant domestic workers in Greece (In.gr, 2009b; Kopsini, 2009b) due to the
politically reported similar daily exploitation and abuse of female migrant domestic workers by politicians and the church (Ta Nea, 2009b; Ntaliani, 2010; To Vima, 2010) and the significance of her example in bringing forward the existence of deeply embedded patriarchal structures. The discussion centered around the ways the presence of women in the labour market was treated as “unwanted because they had abandoned their ‘natural’ space, that is the family” qualifying them as a socially and politically disruptive unskilled workforce even within the hostile to them male dominated trade unions (Voglis, 2009).

6. The expression of solidarity by Greek trade unions, such as the Attica Union of Cleaners and Domestic Workers, and feminist groups (Kathimerini, 2009a; Kathimerini, 2009b; Ta Nea, 2009c) but also the absence of interest from major trade unions, such as the General Confederation of Greek Workers, in solidarity demonstrations (In.gr, 2009c; Kathimerini, 2009d; Kopsini, 2009a; Kopsini, 2009e; Ta Nea, 2009a; Ta Nea, 2010). The absence was reported “as awkwardness towards an issue that has drawn together people irrespectively of their ideology, political party beliefs or social class” supporting the idea that equality and unity of workers irrespectively of their gender and national identity through the slogan “migrants are the earth’s damned, Greek and foreign workers, united” scared them (Kopsini, 2009d).

Unlike the majority of female migrants that are informally employed as domestic workers in households in Greece, Kuneva was one of the few legal female
migrants employed as cleaners in the national formal economy. In a country with strong trade union activity, as a migrant Kuneva’s collective bargaining rights and her politically established legal status did not provide her any substantial physical protection but according to testimonies of co-workers, friends and family they were the igniting factors behind the threats and the incident (Protagonists, 2009; The New Folders, 2009). As reported in the printed press what triggered the attack towards Kuneva was her lack of complicity to submit to the illegal networks operating in Greece (Mpoukala, 2009; Theodorakis, 2009), the exclusionary migration policies and the misogyny as an inherent aspect of social, economic and political life in Greece (Kampilis, 2009; Tziantzi, 2009). In practice, she resisted the only acceptable fate of a female migrant in Greece, her employment as an unskilled illegal domestic worker in the underground labour market (Kalfelis, 2009; Leontaridis, 2009). Kuneva’s mother in one of her interviews stated that in Greece it is safer to work as a domestic worker than a legal female migrant worker (Kopsini, 2008b).

Due to the absence of an “open door policy” with regards to migration on a global level (ILO, 2014, p. 7), migrant illegality has growingly been associated with experienced inequalities, vulnerabilities and the subsequent violation of the migrants’ basic human rights. Inclusive migration policies have been acting as a tool to both monitor inflows but also to establish and protect the rights of legal migrants. The case of Kuneva and contemporary research on the case of Greece provide evidence that the prospect of inclusive migration policies are perceived as national threats that undermine legalisation. Legal status does not effectively manage to deter
the breach of the constitutionally safeguarded basic human rights of even legal migrants. The Director-General of the ILO recently argued that

*Migration has moved centre stage in national, regional and global policy agendas, bringing with it not only a sense of urgency in societies and among decision-makers, but also a set of controversies which can be damaging to social coherence if left unaddressed.*

~ ILO, 2014, p. 3

These controversies centre on differences between the “reality and perceptions” (ILO, 2014, p. 4) of each of the social, economic and political spheres and their subsequent diverse interests with regards to migration. Reality meaning the factual evidence at hand at any given moment of time and perceptions their interpretations by the different agents and actors filtered through their specific interests. In that sense the legalization of migration cannot be seen as just a political, economic or social project but as a project that acknowledges and reconciles these different interests.

*The ILO’s social justice mandate implies an urgent need to inject a social dimension into globalization – a goal which still remains elusive despite the international initiatives that have been taken. It is certainly possible to build migration regimes which respond equitable to the interests of countries of origin and of destination and those of migrant workers and members of existing national labour forces.*

~ ILO, 2014b, p. 3

## 2 Hypothesis

The case of Kuneva brings forward an alarming realization that for the case of Greece the legal status, in principle a nationally defined status under whose
conditions migrants don’t provide a threat to the host country, not only doesn’t guarantee on its own the protection of the migrants’ human rights and equality within the national population but also itself constitutes a threat. National identity transcends the rule of law. Given the fact that the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers have been linked on an international level with political illegality, which in the case of Greece defines the vast majority of this migrant group, the aim of this project is to join the discussion with the part of the literature that looks into the relationship between migration regimes and human rights violations and to re-examine it. More specifically it will explore the development of migration policies in Greece since the beginning of the contemporary migration wave in order to trace the controversies between “reality and perceptions” (ILO, 2014b, p. 4) that have led to the emergence of female migrant domestic labour as an unregulated occupation subject to extreme exploitation, social, economic and political inequalities, vulnerabilities and violations of their basic human rights. It wants to ask the tough question of whether the mismanagement of female migrant domestic labour resides in the purposeful neglect of the migrants’ rights in order to preserve the national identity and challenge the extent to which a de jure protection of migrants’ human rights can guarantee their protection.

This project explores the feminisation of migration within the contemporary migration wave in Greece whose starting point has been identified with the early 1990s and whose end was lately observed with the sudden inflow of refugees in the summer of 2015. By focusing on the group of female migrant domestic workers and their established inequalities and vulnerabilities it aims to trace the politicization of
this migrant group in Greece and explore their experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities as products of purposeful political exclusions legally legitimized through migration policies.

There are three hypotheses on which this project is built:

1. Migrants are caught between an economic reality/necessity and the need of the state to preserve the national interests

2. Female migrant domestic labour in Greece has been politicized as a phenomenon conflicts with the national interests. What has informed this hypothesis is the exclusion of this migrant group from state structures and the subsequent high illegality that characterizes their political and economic status

3. Due to the existence of embedded patriarchal structures the gender identity and the occupation of female migrant domestic workers intensify the ways securitization of migration is experienced by female migrants.

In order to address this aim the developed theoretical framework of this project needs to be able to explore the politicization of female migrant domestic labour as an on-going national project that is based on identifiable national interests.
3 THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF FEMALE MIGRANT DOMESTIC LABOUR IN RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

3.1 FEMALE MIGRANT DOMESTIC LABOUR WITHIN DISCIPLINES

Across the disciplines the gendered character of the activities of the private sphere, the emergence of domestic work as a part of the peripheral labour market within the capitalist system, and the transference of domestic responsibilities to female migrants have resulted in the shift from the study of domestic work as such to the study of female migrant domestic labour as a contemporary global phenomenon. The new distinctive dimensions of this phenomenon have attracted the attention of scholars from various fields within social sciences, such as women’s studies, politics and international relations and migration studies. Within each field the problematization of this move in the reorganization of socioeconomic life takes place through different analytical reference points bringing forward the different economic, social and political aspects and dynamics of this phenomenon. After providing an overview of each of the approaches at the end of this section the advantage and disadvantages of each of them will be discussed in order to support the choice of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as the theoretical basis for the development of this project’s analytical framework.
Migration Theory

Migration theorists frame female migrant domestic labour, as Lutz has criticized, as “just another market relationship, created by the so called ‘supply and demand’ balance” (Lutz, 2008, p. 1) and provide an analytical interdisciplinary basis for the study of female migrant domestic labour as an occupation. Drawing upon the disciplines of anthropology, demography, economics (Zimmermann, 1996, p. 96), history, law, political science and sociology (Brettell, and Hollifield, 2000) and adopting rationalist and structuralist theoretical approaches, their aim is to look into female migrant domestic labour as an economic phenomenon whose basic characteristics of irregularity and informality align with the universal characteristics of the globalization of economic migration and the flexible and unregulated employment of migrants from peripheral states by developed states in low skilled and low waged occupations (Kritz and Keely, 1981, p. xiv). For migration theorists the growth in the economic interdependence between states, the increasing mobility of human capital to meet market needs and the dominance of the economic factor in shaping individuals’ decision making processes in regards to migration have resulted in determining current international migration patterns. The work of Rhacel Salazar Parrenas Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work is a good example of this body of work as it aims to look into the incorporation of Filipino domestic workers in the host countries by taking a migration systems theory approach and looking into the migration channels and flows of Filipino domestic workers without focusing on domestic labour as an “occupational issue” (Parrenas, 2001, p. 2). Despite the “normality” within which female migrant domestic labour is problematized in migration studies, the noted rise in the flows of female migrant
domestic workers has intensified the feminist debates in aiming to bring critical social theoretical themes to tackle the “invisibility” of gender in the study of migration (Marinucci, 2007, p. 11; Silvey, 2004). Feminist scholars criticize the field for failing to offer theoretical tools for the study of the role of gender in determining and affecting migration patterns as well as in shaping the experiences of female migrants as both independent agents as well as family followers (Bujis, 1993; Curran and Rivero-Fuentes, 2003; Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992; Kofman, 2000; Lutz, 2002; Mahler and Pessar, 2006).

Sociology

The interest within sociology, and specifically within the feminist scholars of the discipline, on female migrant domestic labour stems from the sociological dimension of the particularities of domestic work as a labour sector and its gendered character (Anderson, 2997; Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2008; Schrinzi, 2008). In practical terms domestic work consists of “the labour activities that sustain the daily maintenance of a household” (Lan, 2003), or more specifically “reproductive” activities

such as purchasing household goods, preparing and serving food, laundering and repairing clothing, maintaining furnishing and appliances, socializing children, providing care and emotional support for adults, and maintaining kin and community ties.

~ Nakano Glenn, 1992, p. 1

Due to the sociological value of reproductive labour and the sociological element in the performativity of reproductive activities, as Anderson has argued,
“domestic work is not definable in terms of tasks but in terms of a role which constructs and situates the worker within a certain set of social relationships” (Anderson, 2000, p. 21). Domestic workers in that sense primarily are bound by a social contract rather than an economic one in the conduct of domestic work. The focus of sociologists, and more specifically feminist scholars within the field, appears on three levels. Scholars such as Helm Lutz (Anderson, 2000; Ehrenreich and Ar. R. Hochschild, 2002; Isaksen, 2010; Lutz, 2012; Dahl, Keranen and Kovalainen, 2011), discuss the production of female migrant domestic labour as an outcome of the changing ‘cultural codes of social policy and social practice’ and the reorganization of the roles of the state, the labour market and the family within those processes (Lutz, 2008, p. 2; Williams and Gavanas, 2008) as much in the sending as in the receiving states.

On a second level, given the gendered dimensions of the occupation, the interest falls on the embeddedness of patriarchal structures and their role within those processes. Scholars such as Sylvia Walby have extensively problematized the reproduction of patriarchy in the capitalist relations of employment and the effects this reproduction has on female migrant domestic labour itself as well as the involved agents (Walby, 2986; Walby, 1988; Walby, 1990).

Thirdly, given the social value of domestic labour, scholars have also engaged with the identity of migrants in terms of race and class and the role it plays in defining the demand, supply and value of female migrant domestic labour as well
as migration patterns and experiences (Anderson, 2000, p. 5). For sociologists domestic labour is a labour sector that has a story to tell about:

- the socio-political context within which the demand and the supply of this labour sector are emerging in each national context
- the power the different regimes - gender regimes, care regimes and migration regimes (Lutz, 2008, p. 2) - exercise on the production of the occupation and in shaping the conditions of migration and the experiences of migrants on a micro level (Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2011)

➢ **Politics and International Relations**

Sociologists touch upon the role of the state over the production of domestic labour as a female migrant occupation through the discussion of the regulatory authority of states over the care of migration regimes. The problematization of female migrant domestic labour from scholars in politics and international studies has emerged on two levels. The first is the national policy level in relation to care regimes and the regulation of the private and public divide (Anderson, 2000, p. 19; Williams and Gavanas, 2012, p. 13; Zimmerman, Litt and Bose, 2006). The interest of states in the regulation of the welfare regimes aligns with the rules of the neoliberal capitalist organization of socioeconomic life as states are required to reorganize social relationships and the reproduction of capital in such a way to maximize their economic sovereignty (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003). As Agathangelou has argued, the state’s power is exercised through the regulation, “mediation and facilitation of labour markets” as they “become the means through
which the propertied class extracts the surplus-value of labour” (Aganthangelou, 2004, p. 3). The abstinence of the state to engage with the reproductive sector by developing a more engaged welfare system and the outsourcing of domestic work to female migrants is an expression of the economic interests of states and the embeddedness of patriarchal structures in the regulation of markets (Lutz, 2001; Walby, 1986; Walby, 1988; Walby, 1990). Given the universality of the neoliberal capitalist organization of socioeconomic life and the embeddedness of patriarchal structures in the capitalist system both the demand and the supply of female migrant domestic labour are shaped by different ends of the same structural forces. For migrants, the way care regimes are regulated have an immediate effect on the access of female migrant domestic workers to labour rights since as domestic labour emerges as part of the periphery economy access is compromised.

The second level is the security level and the management of migration regimes. Given the environment of unresolved conflict that characterizes the international arena, the relationships between states are in constant unrest. The involvement of migrants within the social, economic and political structures provide a threat to the national sovereignty of the host states (Sassen, 1996). National identity more than ever before plays a pivotal and explicit role, through regulations, in determining state membership and access to national structures and rights. In the process of managing economic migration “the state apparatus deploys a security paradigm to understand and respond to this phenomenon” (Munck, 2009, p. 6). The process of the securitization of migration consists of a distinctive state agenda and exercises parallel power to migrants (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Huysmans and
Squire, 2010; Buonfino, 2004; Ugur, 1995). Feminist scholars, such as Ruth Lister and Saskia Sassen, add to the discussion of security regimes by engendering the theorization of state membership and citizenship. State membership and citizenship protect and facilitate the right for social reproduction. Migrant “women are often targeted as one of the racialized, sexualized threats to nation-states’ ‘security’ and to a nationalist self” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 2). Within security regimes female migrants are expected to experience double marginalisation due to both their gender and migrant identities (Lister, 1997; Lister, 1997; Lister, 1998; Lister, 2003; Lister, et al, 2007; Sassen, 2006).

➢ Globalization

A cross cutting theme that emerges in the study of female migrant domestic labour across all disciplines is globalization. As a concept, it has been defined as multi-dimensional processes of economic, cultural and social change that have resulted in the “existence of cultural, economic and political networks of connection across the world’ and an ‘increased interconnection between states that border on each other’” (Held, 2004, p. 15). In the study of migration, globalization is being used to identify and discuss the subsequent processes that have resulted in the rise of migration flows, changes in the patterns of migration and changes in the power balances of the involved actors and agents in controlling migration. According to the discipline and research approach within which globalization is being introduced in the analysis as a structural component, it is theorized accordingly (Yeates, 2004, p. 370; Lutz, 2002; Chang, 2000). Arlie Hochschild (2000) introduced the
interdisciplinary term “global care chains” to problematize the impact “the transnational processes” have on “domestic care economies and the divisions of paid and unpaid care work” (Yeates, 2004, p. 370) in the face of the establishment of a global care regime. Authors such as Hochschild and Yeates have worked towards the theoretical and conceptual development of the term with the aim of “advancing research on the transnational care services economy” (Yeates, 2004, p. 370).

On a practical level, one of the main reasons behind the rise in the attention being drawn to this specific group of migrant workers from both governmental and non-governmental organizations and academia, are the vulnerable conditions within which care labour emerges. As stressed by the International Labour Organization, female migrant domestic workers move around the world seeking employment in a setting of social, economic and political captivity “unable to realize their human rights and to live in freedom. They often experience poor working conditions and are excluded from legal protection” (ILO, 2013). Within each regime – gender, care and migration – vulnerabilities and inequalities emerge through different social, economic and political processes. Extensive empirical research has been conducted to document the accounts of migrants and explore the experienced conditions of vulnerability and inequality of female migrant domestic workers as a distinctive labour group.

Empirical research on the experiences of female migrant domestic workers has taken place on two levels. The first level aims to look into the specific experiences of migrants of the same national group in different host states. This
literature explores the parallel “dislocations” (Parrenas, 2001, p. 3) of female migrant domestic workers of the same nationality by looking into their different integration experiences through exploring migration flows, settlement patterns, conditions of employment and community formation in the host state (Andall, 2000; Constable, 1997; Parrenas, 2000). The second level aims to look into the experiences of female migrant domestic workers within single national contexts (Anderson, 1993; Anderson 2000; Anderson and Phizacklea, 1997; Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Chin, 1999; Lesley, 1994; Lutz, 2012; Momsen, 1999; Moya, 2007). The aim of this literature is to explore the key variables that determine the migration processes and experiences of this migrant group by looking at the ways migration is experienced as a process by the same migrant group in different national contexts. Even though the nationality of migrants is not the main analytical lens for this part of research it is still being considered as a factor within the analysis as it helps in the exploration of the research objective.

Within this literature, despite the identification of the universality of the conditions of inequality and vulnerability associated with the occupation of domestic work, and which resemble realities of servitude and slavery (Anderson, 2000; Anderson, 1993), according to the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010, p. xii) in different national contexts there are disparities in the experienced vulnerabilities and inequalities for economic migrants of the same occupation depending on the following factors:

- Migration status
- Conditions of recruitment
• Growth of the informal economy and undeclared work
• Lack of freedom of association and of collective bargaining rights
• Discrimination and xenophobia

3.2 **Greek Case in Research and Literature**

Despite the presence of certain economic migrant groups in Greece up until the 1970s Greek literature and research focused on emigration, the issues Greek migrant groups faced in the receiving countries and the concerns around their repatriation (Kladas, 1965; Kasimati, 1989; Damanakis, 1993; Glitsos, 1991). Due to the start of the contemporary migration wave as a sudden and unwanted inflow of illegal aliens in Greece, it took a while for research and literature to engage with the phenomenon. Projects slowly started to appear after 1993 (Stratoudaki, 2010, p. 86) with the aim to reconceptualise the country’s identity from an emigration to an immigration country. The practical limitations of a lack of detailed data on the scale of the phenomenon explain the absence of systematic and centrally organized efforts to provide a critical analysis of the new migration wave. As such they are seen to have taken the form of individual approaches that look into single and profound first observations and experiences of the uncontrolled inflow of aliens and their gradual economic involvement in Greece. Once the illegal inflow of aliens was identified as an established phenomenon, the research projects are seen to aim to document its size, patterns and trends (Psimmenos, 1995; Baldwin-Edwards, 2002; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; KETHI, 2006). The high illegality that characterizes the first stages of the contemporary migration wave, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter,
has been a practical obstacle in the documentation of its scope and trends as aliens avoided interaction with governmental and non-governmental researchers in the fear of deportation. Consequently even though the presented data provided a clearer picture, they were approached as estimates rather than representational data.

Working through the obstacles and with more information in hand by 2000, and peaking in 2003 – 2004, research became more systematic, and problematized the phenomenon through the lenses of different schools of thought and theoretical strands covering in greater scope a range of observations and topics. The trigger behind the development of these projects has been the visible complex domestic social, economic and political effects, and the expression of concerns regarding the disruptive consequences of migration on Greece. The aim of the conducted research projects was to explore the scope, patterns and trends of this migration wave in relation to these issues and concerns. Having no prior theoretical and empirical basis to build research on migration, quantitative analysis was established on the existing data (Petrinioti and Patmanidou, 1993). Despite the lack of continuity in the research and the great diversity in methodologies and explored topics, certain themes can be identified. Due to this diversity, instead of discussing the existing literature and research projects in relation to the theoretical basis upon which they were developed, the identified themes will be used as a guideline: migration, racism and xenophobia, migration and integration, the politicization of migration and female migration in Greece. As already established, since female migrant domestic labour is being politically negotiated, managed and experienced within the migration wave, the
presented literature is on both the contemporary migration wave in Greece and female migrant domestic labour.

➤ **Migration, Racism and Xenophobia**

The theme that has dominated the literature on migration in Greece is with regards to the social experiences of migrants and nationals. The sudden, unplanned and uncontrolled inflow of illegal aliens from Albania was identified to have been met with discontent and a strong unwillingness to accept them as part of the country’s future. The specific social development that drew the attention of scholars and researchers was complacency towards a culture of violence towards aliens and a subsequent establishment of racism and xenophobia. Lina Ventura’s book *Migration and Nation: Transformations in Collectives and Social Positions* (1994) is one of the first projects that captures the social climate in the dawn of the current migration wave in Greece. Drawing upon the international literature on social groups, the processes of the construction of social identity, the endurance of collectivities and social and political structural reform, she explores the expressions of xenophobia and nationalist violence that characterized the social relationships between migrants and Greek nationals (Ventoura, 1994).

Initially racism and xenophobia were framed as responses to the nationally diverse population inflows and as characteristics of the initial stages of social restructuring (Ventoura, 1994). Within those lines a significant part of research and literature aimed to identify and look into:
1. the social processes of the production of racism and to identify
2. the practical manifestations in Greece
3. and the effect on migrants

From the mobilisation of language as a tool towards social exclusion (Koiliara, 1997) to the social processes of the production of migrants’ profiles as a threat (Charis, 2013), racism and xenophobia are identified by scholars to be reproduced on both micro and macro levels. Other projects explored how the strong racist discourse affected the experiences of migrants on a daily basis and determined their experienced social and political exclusions (Sakkoulas, 1998). With the persistence of racism and the failure of the social sphere to develop a positive stance towards migration despite its establishment in Greece, literature took a different approach to racism, arguing against its disruptive effects on nationals and Greece, and not just migrants. Within that context social divisions started to be framed as myths needing to be broken down (Lamprianidis and Limperaki, 2001; Kolovos, 2003) and their reproduction through a racist discourse was identified as a source of the intensification of the existing social dichotomies. A significant number of scholars basing their research on existing social observations, attempted to break down these social myths through a cost–benefit analysis underlining the economic contribution of migrants to the Greek economy.

In early 2000 a change by scholars is observed, where the role of external actors as facilitators of the cultivation of racism and xenophobia is identified. In the first instance Anastassia Tsoukala in her book *Migration and Criminality in Europe*, through a comparative analysis between different European states, explored the role
media plays in reproducing racist discourse through associating migrants to criminal activities (Tsoukala, 2001). A few years later in the book of Giannis Panousis, Georgios Chloupis, and Anastasios Roussis (2006) racism, xenophobia and migration were included in the discussion of the then major contemporary political problems Greece had to address alongside drugs. At the centre of this turn was a shift in the responsibility for the status quo from the social to the political sphere. Fragkakis and Ktistakis in their book *Migrants, Racism, Xenophobia: From Theory to Action* discussed how within the Greek democratic regime of governance migrant inclusion and equal treatment is by default a constitutional responsibility of citizens, challenging the absence of the state in developing measures to reinforce this responsibility and offer political and legal protection to aliens from racist responses (Fragkakis and Ktistakis, 2001). In more recent projects scholars pushed the research boundaries even further by exploring the reflection of racism and xenophobia in the economic life of migrants. More specifically these projects explored the processes through which the social characteristics attributed to migrants act as economic parameters and are translated into economic skills and qualifications determining migrant labour supply (Maroukis, 2010).

*Migration, Social Exclusion and Integration*

The second theme in the literature on migration in Greece examines the social experiences of migrants in relation to their integration in Greek society. Given the racist and xenophobic culture, the involvement of migrants in social structures was expected to be socially challenged. Psimmenos in 1995 was the first to conduct
research on the effects of the racist and xenophobic culture on the social organization of life in Greece. His research identified the social polarization of Greek society and by introducing the phrase “periphractic” space (from the Greek “fencing in”) he described the spatial dimensions of migrant marginalization and social exclusion. A few years later a few more scholars engaged with the practical effects of the exclusionary culture drawing similar conclusions (Romaniszyn, 1999). Floya Anthias and Gabriella Lazaridis in their book *Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe*, which presented a series of bodies of work that examine the stigmatization and the practical social exclusion of migrants in different European contexts, and discussed the experienced marginalization of Albanians in Greece (Anthias and Lazaridis, 1999). With a chapter entitled ‘The helots of the new millennium: ethnic-Greek Albanians and ‘other’ Albanians in Greece’ they compared the experiences of the Albanian population with the slave system and the social organization of life in Ancient Greek society.

After 2000, literature and research moves away from the descriptive approach and develops a challenging approach problematizing the experiences of migrants in relation to existent or non-existent efforts of inclusion, integration and assimilation. A critical approach to this literature identified that this change, rather than introducing new perspectives on the problematization of the migration phenomenon in Greece, in reality just communicates observed efforts of social and political reorientation of the conceptualization of the national agenda on migration. Koula Kasimati in her edited book *Migration Policies and Integration Strategies: The Case of Albanian and Polish Migrants* (Kasimati, 2003) through the use of
Interviews and policy analysis she identified the aims of migration policies in Greece and evaluate the extent to which in practice they promoted the political and social exclusion or inclusion of migrants. Starting with an acknowledgement of the scope of migration through the presentation of data she moved to evaluate the integration of migrants through exploring their experiences in relation to entry, employment, legal status and conduct with the national population. The aim of her project was to critically assess the political governance of migration on both national and EU levels. A few years later Triantafillidou and Maroukis (2010) developed a similar project adding one more variable, the national identities of migrants, in order to explore the extent to which national identities diversified the migration experience.

A national critical approach to the introduction of integration in the national discourse argued that the adoption of the concept was a by-product of the membership of Greece in the EU, the common migration policy that was emerging on an EU level and the subsequent directions. Projects incorporating a comparative analysis of the case of Greece with other European countries showed a more outward looking approach and aimed to enlighten Greece on a social and political level of what constituted the basis of responsive migration policies. For these scholars, under the constant negotiation between integration or exclusion, the profile of the migrant was under constant negotiation determining their immediate reality and experiences. Moving away from exclusion would also result in the invitation of the migrant into the negotiation of their immediate reality as it would welcome the acknowledgement of the existence of two different realities within the shared social, political and economic space. Mpakavos, Papadopoulou and Ventoura’s (2006) book is a great
example of these efforts as through it they aimed to look into the settlement and integration of migrants in relation to both the migrants’ and nationals’ experiences.

Moving away from a discussion of the experienced exclusions opened up the possibility for the conceptualization of the future of migrants in Greece in relation to the concepts of assimilation and citizenship acquisition. By the mid-2000s a series of projects moved away from exploring integration as a social experience and framed it as political rights, legal rights, access to education, cultural integration, religious freedoms and naturalization processes. In practice these projects explore the involvement of migrants in the Greek national structures in relation to the concepts of integration and assimilation by looking into the social, legal and political rights of first and second generation migrants, access to education, racism and social responses to migration, association between crime and migration, safeguarding of religious freedoms, citizenship rights and naturalization processes for different national and labour migrant groups (Pavlou and Christopoulos, 2004; Theodosios, 2008; Sirri, 2011; Ventoura, 2011). Identifying the weakness of the political sphere to take control over the migration developments and offer responsive policies, their aim was to act as the basis for the future reorientation of the national migration agenda and to argue for the shift in the reconceptualization of the basis of the development of migration policies.
The Politicization of Migration in Greece

One of the reasons the biggest part of literature and research focuses on the social aspect of migration is the limited role the state was identified to have been playing in the developments around migration and its failure to take ownership of the phenomenon in Greece. The literature on the politicization of migration is divided in two groups:

1. the literature that aims to critically analyse the success of migration policies in relation to the social, economic and political challenges migration has identified to have posed for Greece

2. the literature that aims to explore the rights and experiences of migrants as political subjects in Greece

Due to the emergence of migration inflows as a new phenomenon in Greece\(^2\), the country was found to be politically unprepared due to the lack of a migration agenda fitting national aspirations for Greece to become a migrant receiving country with a substantive infrastructure. The absence of continuity was also reflected on a research level and thus the first projects focused on offering comparative analysis between the politics of migration in Greece and the politics of migration on an EU level (Mousourou, 1991). It wasn’t until the mid-2000s that more detailed bodies of work emerged when there was enough evidence and research data to problematize the political developments of the matter. This literature’s preoccupation was to discuss the ways Greece was failing politically to develop migration policies that

\(^2\) Chapter 2 extensively discusses the emergence of the contemporary migration wave as a new phenomenon for the specific national context
would respond to the widely identified disruptions the unmanaged phenomenon was causing for Greece. The high levels of migrant illegality were used as the basis for the evaluation of migration policies and were linked to the disruptions they were causing to the smooth function of the national social, economic and political structures (Rompolis, 2007). Problematising the concerns around migration as a purely national problem that burdened Greece, they could not bridge the gap between the nationalist discourse and the practical pressures. It wasn’t until the mid-2000s that migration policies were evaluated in relation to what they offered to migrants themselves (Terzopoulou, 2009; Lamprianidis and Limperaki, 2005; Nitsiakos, 2010; Amitsis and Lazaridis, 2001). This research turn reflected once more the national developments in introducing a more outward looking approach to migration and the realization of the existence of the identifiable social, economic and political benefits of legal migration (Kanellopoulos, Gregou and Petralias, 2006).

The main driving force of the national migration agenda, the strong nationalistic culture, has been openly identified in research and literature as the main obstacle against the development of migrant-centred and inclusive policies (Amitsis and Lazaridis, 2001). During the past decade, a few projects have argued that this political failure stems from the nationalistic concerns of the social sphere rather than the will and aspirations of the political sphere. Karyotis and Patrikios in their paper ‘Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece’, employing the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, argued that in Greece the church is one of the basic non-political actors that intervenes to dictate policy by
reinforcing a discourse of ‘universalistic claims of primacy and infallibility’ (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010, p. 43-44). Swarts and Karakatsanis in their paper ‘The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s’ adopting the Copenhagen School’s securitization theoretical framework, argued that in Greece migration has been communicated in societal security terms from the national population and not from the political actors exercising pressure through elections (Swarts and Karakatsanis, 2012). For these bodies of work the politicization of migration as a societal threat has been a bottom-up rather than a top-down process.

➢ Female Migration

Literature on female migration and migrant domestic workers has recently been distinguished as a separate area of research in Greece. Generally the group of female migrants appears in a number of projects as a distinguished case within the study of migration in Greece due to the differentiated social, economic and political conditions under which it takes place (Lyberaki, 2008; Siokos and Sklavou, 2007; Topali, 2001). With the majority of female migrants identified to be employed as domestic workers, to a great percent live in domestic workers, their gender and occupation are framed to be intensifying the experienced exclusions, inequalities and abuses that the rest of the migrant population within the specific national context is experiencing. The majority of the projects use the same analytical and methodological tools to comparatively assess the ways female migrants experience the same challenges from racist and xenophobic national responses, limited integration prospects and absence of legalization practices (Psimmenos, 1995;
Iosifides, 1997). As such there is significant research on the documentation of the
everyday social experiences of female migrant domestic workers in relation to
“housing and urban issues, education and language skills, health and social security,
social and cultural integration, nationality, civic citizenship, respect for diversity”
(Dimoulas and Papadopoulou, 2006) and economic power (Economidis, Keramidas,
Stromplos and Sfetsos, 2007, p. 9).

Whereas there has been an example of an article on the gendered and sexual
dimensions of domestic labour in which Pothiti Hantzaroula (2010) documents and
discusses the existence of sexual violence in domestic work in Greece between 1880
and 1950 such project did not appear for the contemporary migration wave in Greece
and no exploration of the continuation, or lack thereof, of such experiences.
Generally a gap in research and literature that explores the specific role gender has
played in adding differentiated experiences and types of exploitation for this migrant
group in their economic, political and social contacts has been identified by several
scholars (Cavounidis, 2004: Tsatsoglou and Dobrowolsky, 2006). Moreover even
though research and literature explores the social and economic aspects of the
experiences it fails to address the fact that female migrant domestic workers are
actively excluded from political negotiations as under the current legalization
processes their labour status prescribes their political invisibility (Zavvou and
Kampouri, 2009, p. 228). In general most of the projects focus on Albanian migrants
due to Albanian being the dominant nationality within the migrant population. As
such there is lack of research on the remaining nationalities that even though don’t
dominate the labour market occupy significant proportions. This absence has
become more noteworthy and counterproductive the past years since Greece has started to attract more national groups from Europe, Africa and Asia.

3.3 **DIFFERENT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND THIS PROJECT**

From the above it can be concluded that the contemporary migration wave in Greece on a research and literature level has been theorized mostly as a social rather than an economic or a political phenomenon. The social sphere is being identified as holding power over the economic and political spheres and with the high levels of racism and xenophobia resists the legalization of migration. Even though female migrants in Greece do follow the global trends with regards to their underprivileged status and experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities, the conditions of the specific national context are intensifying the experienced social, economic and political challenges. The private sphere in which migrant domestic workers are situated to work even though unregulated, is highly politicized. Reflecting into the various disciplines and the ways they have problematized the feminisation of migration this projects accepts and values their insight. More specifically it values the insight of:

1. the migration theorists’ approach to the problematization of female migrant domestic labour and the economic interdependence between developing and developed states in labour exchanges
2. the sociologists’ approach and the social dynamics that on one hand form the demand and supply for this type of labour and on the other shape the experiences of migrants
3. the multidisciplinary globalization approach and the establishment of global care regimes.

The centrality of the private sphere as the place of social, cultural and national reproduction to preserve social cohesion exercises extra pressures on migrant domestic workers since respecting, understanding and communicating culture is part of their job specification. The social and political disruptions that create tensions between migrants and nationals are related to the labour culture of the specific occupation as conceptualized in the Greek culture and politicised through the politics of social reproduction. The state has vested interests in regulating the rights of female migrant domestic workers on a macro level as much as nationals have on a micro level. Baring in mind the three hypotheses on which this project was built, and have been outlined in section 2 of this introductory chapter, this project’s research puzzle is a political rather than an economic or a social one. Despite the universal underprivileged status of female migrant domestic labour and its emergence as a supporting occupation to the formal labour market, the high political illegality that characterizes this migrant group in Greece will be explored as a political problem and in relation to the role the national and gender identities of this migrant group play in its exclusion from the national structures. The example of Kouneva questions the extent to which illegality is the root of the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of this group in Greece. Joining the literature that argues that migrant “women are often targeted as one of the racialized, sexualized threats to nation-states’ ‘security’ and to a nationalist self” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 2) this project does not aim to challenge the role of legality
as a tool for the protection over migrants’ rights nor its relevance in the
problematization of the case of female migrant domestic labour in Greece. Instead
it will explore the national failure to legalize female migrant domestic labour as an
expression of the national standpoint on the disruptive role the presence of female
migrant domestic workers due to their national and gender identities has for the
security of Greece. Given the high levels of racism and xenophobia and the weight
scholars working on the case of Greece give to them as the driving forces behind the
social and political responses to the contemporary migration wave the chosen theory
within security studies aids in tracing their presence and reproduction on a political
level.

4 THE SECURITIZATION OF FEMALE MIGRANT
DOMESTIC LABOUR IN GREECE: DESIGN OF THIS
PROJECT

From the different schools within security studies, Welsh School, Paris
School and Human Security that will be discussed in relation to this project in the
next chapter, the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory has been chosen as the
basis for the development of the analytical framework of this research project. The
choice of the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory mainly lays on the
theory’s fundamental premise that security is not something fixed but rather takes
meaning through the social sphere. Under this premise in order to unmask the
politicization of an object as a security concern, a concern driven from “a sense of
urgency” (ILO, 2014b, p. 3) in need of containment, one needs to frame security as
a state of being, discursively constructed through social and political processes. This approach to security opens up the possibility for the researcher to:

- identify the involved actors
- trace the basic premises and arguments upon which the object is being defined as a threat and identify the interests behind them
- evaluate their relevance to the securitized object
- explore the effects of this process to the securitized object and the experiences of the securitized object within the specific national context.

Built on constructivism, the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory frames the politicization of a subject into a security threat as a socially constructed process. In this process agents holding political power are identified to employ “speech acts” (Huysmans, 2011) and use them as political moves with the aim to take the politics around a specific concern “beyond the established rules of the game’ framing ‘the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 23) and claim “a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver, 1995, p. 55; Huysmans, 2011, p. 374).

Within a securitizing move three units/levels of analysis are being identified (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35):

1. Referent objects
2. Securitizing actors
Under the Copenhagen School referent objects are defined as the “things that are seen to be existentially threatened or that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36) which in the case of migration is the national identity. Securitizing actors are defined as the actors performing the speech act with the aim to “securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Given the political context within which securitization takes place, for the speech act to have legitimacy securitizing actors must on the one hand be in a position of authority and on the other have the linguistic competence to perform the securitizing move (Balzacq, 2005, p. 191). Finally functional actors are defined as the “actors who affect the dynamics of a sector… without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Media holding “the dynamics of the relationship between governors and the governed in all types of political regimes” (Mughan and Gunther, 2000, p. 4) and acting as the facilitators who “are addressed – and speak back” (Vultee, 2011, p. 80) have been framed as the main functional actors playing a central role in the securitization process (Kuypers, 2002; Williams, 2003; Oates, 2008; O’Reilly, 2008: 66; Vultee, 2011). Their control over the communicated narratives of news stories (Bennett, 2000; Rushkoff, 2003), telling the public not just “what to think about” but also “how to think about any given topic” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 6), gives them power over the subject itself, the public and the political establishment and consequentially over the securitization process (Mughan and Gunther, 2000; O’Reilly, 2008).
The basic characteristic that defines the membership of migrants within the host country, as also demonstrated in the case of Kuneva, and determines their access to rights and shapes their experiences is their alien identity. For securitization theory the threat in relation to which migration is being securitized is this alien identity, “the defence of an identity against a perceived threat, or more precisely, the defence of a community against a perceived threat to its identity” (Wæver, 2008, p. 581). The emerging political and economic insecurities stem from the involvement of migrants in national structures as the expansion of access to state membership and the re-distribution of subsequent entitlement to rights compromises the purpose and the sovereignty of the nation-state system. The techniques of governance employed to securitize migration therefore aim to secure the relationship between political entitlements and national identity through the purposeful political exclusion of migrants legitimized through migration policies.³

Within security regimes female migrants are expected to experience double marginalization stemming from both their gender and migrant identities (Lister, 1997; Lister, 1998; Lister, 2003; Lister, Williams, Anttonen et al 2007; Sassen; 2006). Gender and gendered social codes of conduct play a central role in the national politics of reproduction (Brenner and Laslett, 1991; Glenn, 1991; Glenn, 1992) as they are the basis of the construction of national identity and nationhood (Hastings, 1997). Depending on how gender identity is experienced the existential threats will be experienced accordingly and will highly differentiate even in the absence of direct speech acts. For migrant domestic workers this marginalization is

³ Chapter 1 introduces and discusses this point further
experienced more intensively due to the social value of their occupation. As such their politicization as a security threat is conducted within three distinctive parameters:

1. national identity
2. gender identity
3. occupation

Huysmans argued that the securitization of migration has a dual role and is also used as a policy tool to further enhance the cohesion of the nation and strengthen the identity and functional integrity of the state (Huysmans, 1995, p. 55; Bigo, 2002; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Vukov, 2003, p. 337; O’Reilly, 2008, p. 67; Hansen, 2011, p. 8). Within this argument it is expected that the securitization of migration does not necessarily involve a response to problems emerging from the engagement of migrants with national structures but a nationally constructed reality which results in the intensification of national resistance and multiplication of the problems around migration. Huysmans’ argument also reiterates the social value of the process of the securitization of migration linking it to the cultivation of racism and xenophobia as an integral part of the national political mechanism managing migration.

With this analytical basis securitization theory provides the researcher with the opportunity to evaluate whether the politicization of the securitized object as a security threat is not just developed on factual evidence but also runs the risk of including nationalistic “perceptions” (ILO, 2014b, p. 4), in other words national
interpretations of these facts, irrelevant to the securitized object. The outcome of this process is the magnification of insecurities distorting the understanding of the securitized object.

As an analytical tool the framing of the politicization of migration as a product of a security project is not just about “understanding the processes of securitization as such but the causal processes which produce the drama in the present context” with the purpose “to formulate possible actions to desecuritize the story of the migrant” (Huysmans, 1995, p. 66). In Huysmans’ (1998, p. 570 – 571) words “desecuritization, or the unmaking of the securitization of migration, is a critical strategy which should make it possible to relocate the question of migration to a context of ethico-political judgement in which one does not seek to found the political on the basis of an existential threat”. “‘Desecuritization’ involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the ‘security’ agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation” (Williams, 2003, p. 523).

Table 1. Securitization as a process (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014, p. 334)
4.1 **Research Questions and the Analytical Framework of this Project**

Bearing in mind the specific case study as well as the chosen theoretical framework the research questions that this project will address are:

1. How has the current wave of female migrant domestic workers been securitized in Greece in the context of the greater national securitization agenda?

2. How have the securitization processes shaped the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour and created the conditions for the abuse and exploitation experienced by female migrant domestic workers in Greece?

The purpose of this project is not just to ask questions in order to understand the current situation of migration and female migrant domestic labour in Greece, but to also act as the basis for exploring ways to resolve the observed problems surrounding the phenomenon. The data, insight and conclusions of the analytical chapters will then be used to offer potential policy recommendations for migration and female migrant domestic labour in Greece. Utilizing Huysmans’ desecuritization theory the question that will be explored in the conclusion of the research project is: given this analysis how can we argue and aim for the desecuritization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece?

This project explores the feminisation of migration within the contemporary wave in Greece whose starting point has been identified with the early 1990s by focusing on the group of female migrant domestic workers and their established
inequalities and vulnerabilities. Mobilizing the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory it aims to trace the securitization of this migrant group in Greece in order to explore their experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities as products of purposeful political exclusions legally legitimized through migration policies. Securitization theory was developed to explore the performative aspect of security on the one hand in relation to the rhetorical arguments that socially construct a reality in which issues are identified and politicised as security threats, and on the other in the ways the inclusion of the different added interests of the security agenda construct, alter and determine the national constructions of the securitized object. The first research question of this project is related to the first aspect of securitization theory and in this case it aims to explore the grounds upon which the politicization of female migrant domestic labour has been constructed as a security drama. The second research question refers to the second aspect and the effect the politicization of migration as a security threat has had on the reproduction of national insecurities in relation to migration affecting both the host state and this migrant group. The aim of both questions is to explore the specific narratives that have contributed in the construction of a social, economic and political environment resulting in on the one hand the documented high levels of political illegality, and on the other in this specific migrant group being subjected to extreme inequalities and vulnerabilities in the specific national context of Greece.

The first important step before proceeding with discussing the analytical framework and design of this research project is to set out its parameters and variables. Reflecting on the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the
securitization of female migrant domestic labour occurs in the societal sector as the national identity of migrants is the existential threat against which Greek identity, the referent object, has been successfully securitized. “Society is conceived as a social fact, with the same objectivity and ontological status as the state” (McSweeney, 1996, p. 90). McSweeney and Williams (1998) have stressed that the Copenhagen School’s approach to identity is neither constructivist nor objectivist. Identity “entails a decision based on a theory which relates some of the countless biographical facts of our collective past and present to a view of who we want to be” it is a product of the choices of individuals that build a “clear or vague collective image” with historical facts as the only constraint (McSweeney, 1996, p. 89 - 90).

For security, identity is an interest and the objective of securitization is to investigate how disruptions in the identity narrative affect the security interests of the collectivity in relation to their identity (McSweeney, 1996, p. 89 - 90). Despite the fact that gender is an identity itself it is framed as a proto-sector of the societal sector and thus it plays a secondary role in the securitization process. The security threat is not the gendered identity of migrants nor their occupation but the disruption the involvement of female migrant domestic workers in national structures is causing towards patriarchal structures. As such the securitized subject is female migrant domestic workers and the referent object the Greek society and more specifically national identity. Despite the fact that this project’s focus is the specific migrant group, its securitization has to be explored within the greater securitization of the contemporary migration wave in order to identify the role of gender identity and the specific occupation as additional securitizing parameters.
The securitizing actors within the Greek political regime, a representative parliamentary democratic republic, who have been trusted with the role of securitizing actors through legitimate electoral procedures, are the Members of the Parliament. Greek citizens endorse securitizing moves by extending their support to the political actors in elections, responding positively to policy frameworks and regionalizing securitization narratives. The parliament is an audience as well, in the sense that it constitutes the body that directly materializes securitizing moves endorsing securitizing narratives by voting proposed bills. The societal sector whilst it is being introduced “as a sector of the state” is also given a differentiated “status as an object of security in its own right” (McSweeney, 1996, p. 82). For threats such as military threats, securitizing actors can engage in speech acts at a distance from the audience, whereas the societal sector actors “become consequential on a political scale only when society actively backs them up” (Wæver et al, 1993, p. 188) as they become intrinsic aspects of culture and daily life. Consequently their success needs to be evaluated in relation to their acceptance by the political and social spheres as well as their institutionalization.

During recent decades the media has growingly been gaining a central role in “the dynamics of the relationship between governors and the governed” (Mughan and Gunther, 2000, p. 4) as “the connective tissue of democracy… the principal means through which citizens and their elected representatives communicate their reciprocal efforts to inform and influence” and as “key guarantors of elite accountability and popular control of government in democracies” (Mughan and Gunther, 2000, p. 1 - 4). Within the securitization process “in contemporary liberal
democratic nation states, the strategic mobilization of a sense of threat or other such affective processes cannot effectively take place outside of the mass media, particularly the news media” (Vukov, 2003, p. 338). Their identification as functional actors within securitization theory stems from their “agenda-setting function” that empowers them to act as “a centre of authority” (Vultee, 2011, p. 82). Their control over coverage (Oates, 2008, p. 8) empowers them on the one hand to “encourage, discourage, hide or expose” (Bennett, 2000, p. 205) news stories and on the other to frame them, “construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed (or ignored) in a particular manner, with some facts made more noticeable than others” in order to define the audience’s thinking and “understanding of any given situation” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 7). In order to identify the effect of media in the securitization of a specific issue the aim is to seek “how such a sense of threat has proliferated through the media, the discourses and social myths through which it has been represented and given meaning, how it has fuelled particular policies, as well as the difficult task of formulating strategies to contest its recuperation for aggressive governmental agendas” (Vukov, 2003, p. 339).

For the purposes of this research project and acknowledging that different types of media, ‘speech, print, and electronic, or – as Deibert terms it – “hypermedia”’, have a different “communicative impact” (Williams, 2003, p. 526) and despite the fact that within security studies scholars have been exercising criticism for the lack of incorporation of images and visual media in the production
of security⁴ the medium that has been chosen is the printed press. The decision is based on the following reasons:

1. despite the fact that we accept that images and visual media can speak security it’s their interpretation that matters in the making of security and not the images themselves. As such even though this project won’t explore the use of images as means and the specific ways they have been mobilized to speak security their effect will be traced in the acceptance of the securitization moves

2. the printed press is the data source which has documented the securitization moves and their acceptance since the beginning of the migration wave up until the end of the examined period

3. in the case of Greece, the loyalty of the audience has remained constant for the top selling newspapers since their emergence whereas visual media keep changing ownership and branding, showing weakness in audience loyalty.

⁴ This point will be explored further in Chapter 1 and section 2.6
4.2 Research Methodology

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Table 2. Adapted from Salter’s ‘Research Design: Introduction’ (Satler, 2013: 65)

The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory is developed upon constructivism. “Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997, p. 322). For securitization these interpretations are communicated through politically empowered linguistic speech acts. The research method that will be employed in the identification and analysis of these speech acts is critical discourse analysis, which approaching language as a form of social practice “examines the use of discourse in relation to social and cultural issues such as race, politics, gender and identity and asks why the discourse is used in a particular way and what the implications are of this kind of use” (Paltridge, 2012: 186). In other words it is interested in the way in which language and discourse are used to achieve social goals and in the part this use plays in social maintenance and change” (Bloor and Bloor, 2007, p. 2).
Discourse analysis is defined by many as a sub-field of linguistics (Jones, 2012: 2) that also contributes to the social sciences (Gee and Handford, 2012: 2). It was first introduced as a term by Zellig Harris (1952) with the aim to examine “language beyond the level of the sentence” (Paltridge, 2012, p. 2) and look into “the ways sentences and utterances are put together to make texts and interactions and how those texts and interactions fit into our social world” (Jones, 2012, p. 2). There is a variety of forms of discourse analysis depending on the research puzzle it is employed to address. Some of the forms are tied to linguistics, others are interested in description and explanation and others “in tying language to politically, socially, or culturally contentious issues and in intervening in these issues in some way” (Gee and Handford, 2012, p. 2). The latter form, which is of interest to this thesis, is called critical discourse analysis and “has become the general label for a special approach to the study of text and talk, emerging from critical linguistics, critical semiotics and in general from a socio-politically conscious and oppositional way of investigating language, discourse and communications” (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17).

Due to the utilization of critical discourse analysis as a tool by an array of scholars from different disciplines and for diverse concerns, whereas there is a shared objective and interest behind its employment (Kress, 1990, p. 84), it “subsumes a variety of approaches towards the social analysis of discourse (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Pecheux 1982, Wodak & Meyer, 2001) which differ in theory [and] methodology” making it ‘transdisciplinary’ (Fairclough, 2012, p.
Despite these differences certain mutual underlying criteria and principles have been identified:

- social and political issues are constructed and reflected in discourse;
- power relations are negotiated and performed through discourse;
- discourse both reflects and reproduces social relations;
- ideologies are produced and reflected in the use of discourse (Paltridge, 2012, p. 187)

Within the context of security, as Balzacq explains, the analysis requires to be broken down into three operational levels: discourse as text, discourse as action and the context of production.

- **discourse as text** focuses on the analysis of rhetorical arguments as statements and looks into the internal coherence of the text (intra-textuality), the linguistic connections between different texts dealing with the same subject (inter-textuality) aiming to identify the recurrent linguistic patterns that constitute the storylines (Balzacq, 2010, p. 66)

- **discourse as action** focuses on the analysis of the performativity of the text answering questions in relation to ‘what kind of action does it want to achieve (assertive, commissive, expressive, directive or declarative) (Searle 1977b). What are its communicative purposes and its domains of relevance? Which heuristic artefacts are favoured, for which meaning? What “map of world politics does it present? What kind of interactions are generated?” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 67)
• the context of production which is being distinguished in two types of relationships between context and discourse. First, the internalist approach in which the context is shaped by the use of the concept of security itself. Secondly the externalist approach in which the environment in receiving the discourse critically accepts it by selecting certain features of the concept, while rejecting others (Balzacq, 2010, p. 67).

With regards to this thesis the focus is on the part of critical discourse analysis that engages with the construction of identity. “Discourse plays an important role in the processes that go towards ’making up’ people as new categories of people and ‘new ways for people to be’ are brought into being” (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004, p. 237). Within this context identity is a continuous project shaped by social interaction as those that hold the discursive power “lay claim to various recognizable social or shared identities” (Ainsworth and Hardy, 2004, p. 237) which in turn establish boundaries that “keep some people ‘in’ and others ‘out’ and support the view of Self and Other” (Bloor and Bloor, 2007, p. 86). This research method will help in identifying (Vuori, 2013, p. 134) the linguistic narratives employed in the speech acts that conducting “the performative of securitization” (Vuori, 2013, p. 134) exercise political power over female migrant domestic workers through the attribution of characteristics that construct them as a threat. It is expected “(1) that official discourses will target certain foreigners as an existential threat to collective identity; (2) that bureaucracies will consistently institutionalize these discourses; (3) that identity-oriented groups will be crucial to any societal contestation over these discourses; and (4) that successful securitization produces regionalization” (Ilgit and
Klotz, 2014, p. 137). For the group of female migrant domestic workers, gender constitutes a secondary identity with social and political value and as such these linguistic narratives would also aim to shape their gender identities.

The establishment of securitization theory by the Copenhagen School as an on-going socially constructed project enables the researcher to unfold the securitization process by exploring its negotiation, its acceptance as well as its products as inherent parts of the same process. As such the data through which the questions will be answered has to be collected from sources representative of these parts of the process. Since securitization is an on-going process, data sources that have documented the historicity of its development throughout the researched period are valuable to this project. Consequently, archival research rather than a more sociological method such as interviews has been chosen. Despite the intimate connection of critical security studies (Froese, 2013, p. 118) with the study of history and as such research methods such as archival research and document analysis within critical security studies the case has been made for the use of alternative research methods within the field. Sociological research methods such as interviews have been used for projects such Ruth Blakeley’s research on “the impact that US training of Latin America military forces had on human rights during the Cold War and afterwards” (2013, p. 158) to explore a specific form or type of political practice and technique of governance and the subsequent experiences within those. Exactly because the aim of this project is to explore the process of the securitization of female migrant domestic labour overtime in Greece and the argumentative basis upon which they were constructed as a threat rather than focus on the experiences
of migrants and nationals in relation to a specific policy or technique of governance
the chosen research method is archival research in the form of: parliamentary
archives and media archives.

The three different sets of data upon which the critical discourse analysis will
be conducted are from legislative frameworks, parliamentary plenary sessions and
media coverage. Through the study of the legislative frameworks the aim is to
explore the institutionalization of the securitization narratives, through the study of
parliamentary plenary sessions the emergence of the securitization narratives and
through the study of media articles the endorsement of the securitization narratives
by the social sphere. The collection of the data took place during a personal visit to
the Library of the Hellenic Parliament, online research at the website of the Hellenic
Parliament and the electronic archives of the plenary sessions and online research at
Greek media archives. Parliamentary archives offered access to the legal
frameworks and parliamentary plenary sessions on migration and female migrant
domestic labour. Media archives were chosen for the collection of data on the printed
press articles. The choice to collect data from three newspapers, Kathimerini, Ta
Nea and To Vima, and one Greek online news agency, www.in.gr, was based on
their popularity as that reflects the social trust to the specific media sources and
suggests that the printed articles represent the most socially endorsed opinions,
responses and concerns on news stories.

As mentioned in the opening statement of this introduction, the starting point
of this research project is identified with the early 1990s when the feminisation of
migration appeared as a sub-phenomenon of the contemporary migration wave in Greece and as such data was collected from these different sources for the period between 1990 and 2011. Migration policies were easily sourced since their title represented their subject matter. The collection of data from the plenary sessions and news articles was conducted through the following search terms: ‘Αλλοδαποί’ – Aliens’, ‘Μετανάστες – Migrants’, ‘Μετανάστριες – Female Migrants’, ‘Μεταναστευτική Πολιτική – Migration Policy’, and ‘Οικιακές Βοηθοί – Female Domestic Workers’. Wanting to explore the direct and indirect politicization of female migrant domestic labour collection of data in the plenary sessions was conducted through the glossary and under these terms rather than thematic categorizations, such as migration, in order to source all plenary sessions with related mentions. Due to the availability of most of the plenary sessions for that period only in hard copy format all plenary session transcript volumes were researched with the use of the glossary in the back. The relevant plenary session chapters were photocopied for analysis. The collection of data from the printed press and the online news agency was much simpler as all articles for the specific newspapers are in online format and as such could be searched online. The articles were saved and printed for further analysis.

Once data was collected the aim was to identify emerging thematic categories. Due to the length of the plenary sessions, analysis was conducted manually rather than with the use of software. Despite the bulk of data the themes that were emerging with regards to migration and female migrant domestic labour were specific and fit under the proposed categorization by Ayse Ceyhan and
Anastassia Tsoukala (2002, p. 24): the socioeconomic axis, the securitarian axis, the identitarian axis, and the political axis. Seeing that this categorization could help to structure the analysis of data it was adopted right before the analysis was conducted. For Chapter 4 on the plenary sessions within each thematic category the quotes that were used were carefully selected to represent the different argumentative approaches and narratives to a specific topic, taking into consideration the reflection of the varied interest dynamics of the political parties holding parliamentary representation. For Chapter 5 and the discussion of the newspaper articles all the articles communicating opinions on migration and news stories on the presence of aliens in Greece were included and organized under the proposed categorization by Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002, p. 24). The utilization of this thematic categorization on both chapters helped to comparatively discuss the differences and commonalities in the narratives employed by the securitizing actors and the functional actors.

Despite the fact that the historicity of the politicisation of female migrant domestic labour as a security threat is of importance, the chapters were not structured chronologically but reflected the categorization by Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala (2002, p. 24). With regards to the chronological aspect the development in terms of continuity and change will be discussed. Since securitization as a process has to be evaluated in relation to the interplay between the three different analytical levels the final part of the analysis will be the conclusion of this research project where the findings of each of the analytical chapters will be discussed in relation to each other.
In terms of language the research design and methodology were set out in English terms. These terms were then translated into Greek and were used for conducting the archival research. In turn research and thematic categorization of the collected data were both conducted in Greek. The abstracts and quotes used from the plenary sessions and printed press articles were then translated to English. The discussion and analysis were conducted in English. In the process it was observed that linguistically in the case of migration in Greece certain terms, such as aliens, illegal migrants and black labour, are discursively charged and hold power within the negotiation of non-nationals’ presence domestically.\(^5\) As it will be discussed in Chapter 2 the contemporary migration wave in Greece was accompanied by the repatriation of population groups of Greek ethnic origin from Turkey, Russia, Cyprus and the Balkans. Due to their prolonged stay in these countries repatriates were to a great extend assimilated and as such were facing similar difficulties with non-nationals in terms of language and social integration. Due to the identitarian challenge this plethora of groups was posing to a nationalistic Greece, as scholars have identified, these different groups were seen to be organized “in concentric circles around the ethnonational core” constructing a “hierarchy of Greekness” (Triandafyllidoy and Veikou, 2002, p. 189). With illegal Albanians dominating the category of non-nationals present in Greece the term alien was associated with their nationality and over time acquired as a term an intrinsically negative meaning of an illegal third-country national with criminal intentions. There is lack of research with

\(^5\) this point will be made clearer through the analysis chapters where it will be discussed how some words of the Greek language changed due to the presence of migrants
regards to the linguistic aspects of the communication of migration in Greece despite the recognition of the observed changes. Terms in this thesis are being communicated exactly as they have been employed in the speech acts. Due to the limitations of space of this thesis it is difficult to fully critically engage with this aspect of problematization of the contemporary migration wave but it will be acknowledged in the conclusion in the context of future research for the case of Greece.

4.3 Structure of this Project

This thesis is divided into five chapters, excluding the current introduction and conclusion. The first chapter discusses securitization theory in more detail. The chapter is divided into three parts. It starts by providing an overview of the sub-discipline of International Relations, Security Studies and presents its different schools discussing their relevance to this research project. In the second part it discusses the chosen school which is utilized as the basis for the development of this project’s theoretical framework, the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, and presents the gendered critiques to the specific school as well as the ways migration has been framed within this school. Taking into consideration the aims of this project the chapter concludes by discussing the critiques of the Copenhagen School that are relevant to this project and acknowledges the challenges they pose for research and analysis.
Having discussed the chosen theoretical framework upon which this research project was developed, the second chapter acts as the background chapter of this research project. Before moving to the core analytical chapters this chapter introduces the case of Greece as a receiving country of female migrant domestic workers through the available data and helps the reader get a feel of the scope of the phenomenon within the specific national context. The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part it starts by introducing the emergence of the feminisation of migration as a global phenomenon and sets out its global patterns and trends as they have been documented on an international level. In the second part it then moves to present the case of Greece within these developments and discusses the feminisation of migration in Greece as part of the contemporary migration wave since the 1990s. The second research question aims to explore the extent to which the politicization of female migrant domestic labour as a threat has determined its patterns and trends. As such this chapter will help to answer this specific research question.

Chapter three is the first of the three core analytical chapters of the thesis. The aim of this chapter is to look into the regulation of female migrant domestic labour on both international and national levels. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the international legal framework on female migrant domestic labour while identifying the specific regulatory needs of this migrant group as those have been identified by the international governmental bodies, United Nations and the European Union. The second part presents the series of migration policies in Greece from the beginning of the contemporary migration wave up until the start of this project. In order to answer the research questions the aim is to trace
the institutionalisation of securitization narratives. The presentation of migration policies focuses on the rights and responsibilities of migrants in Greece towards the state the established institutional arrangements that support their implementation. During the analysis the development of special regulations with regards to female migrant domestic workers for the case of Greece is explored. The chapter concludes by evaluating the national migration policies in relation to the international standards as those were presented in the first part of the chapter.

Chapter 4 consists of the second part of the analysis and looks into the politicisation of female migrant domestic labour as a security threat within the parliament. By examining the parliamentary archives’ minutes of the plenary sessions, the aim is to identify the production of securitizing narratives by the securitizing actors, Members of Parliament, and monitor their change over time. Structured around the categorization proposed by Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 24) it will detect and categorize the identified securitization narratives in the socioeconomic axis, securitarian axis, identitarian axis and political axis. Through the analysis it will explore the existence of any narratives that diversify the politicization of female migrants and female migrant domestic workers.

Chapter 5 is the third and final part of the analysis. This chapter examines the role of the printed press as a functional actor in the securitization of migration and female migrant domestic labour in Greece. Through research that was conducted in media archives the articles on aliens, migrants, female migrants and female migrant domestic workers were sourced and thematically analyzed under the Ceyhan
and Tsoukala (2002, p. 24) and proposed categories that were used in Chapter 4. The aim of the analysis of the articles is to identify the ways in which migration is being communicated as a phenomenon on a social level in Greece, in relation to the main problems and concerns. This has the purpose of exploring:

1. the role of the printed press as a functional actor in the securitization process in Greece
2. the acceptance of the securitization moves in the social sphere
3. the documentation of the experiences of female migrant domestic workers and the national population in relation to this migrant group and linkages between the securitization process and these experiences.

Chapter six is the conclusion of the analysis and is divided into two parts. In the first part, by cross-referencing the information provided in chapters three, four and five, this chapter will answer the first and second research questions. It will

1. trace the acceptance of the securitization narratives by the social sphere
2. evaluate the role of the functional actors in the securitization process
3. identify the narratives that have been institutionalised in the form of policies
4. identify the power relations between the securitizing actors, functional actors and social sphere with the aim of evaluating the extent to which securitization is a bottom-up or a top-down process
5. identify the role gender and occupation play in the securitization process
6. explore the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers as by-products of the securitization process
7. explore the relevance of the concept of desecuritization for future policy development in the case of Greece given the findings of this research project. Having discussed the findings of each chapter and having pieced together the different parts of the process of securitization for female migrant domestic workers in Greece, this chapter will act as the conclusion of this research project. It will provide an overview of the current developments of migration in Greece and the refugee crisis that have signalled the start of a new phase in the migration history of the country the past months. It will discuss the new challenges the country is facing, especially in the context of the existing securitization narratives, and outline the ways in which this research project can be used as a basis for further research on the challenges around the feminisation of migration as well as the case of Greece.

5 CONTRIBUTION TO RESEARCH AND LITERATURE

The contribution of this research project to research and literature can be identified on three levels and in relation to:

1. the existing work on the specific national context and the feminization of migration within this national context
2. the utilization of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory for the problematisation of migration
3. the feminist critiques on the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as those will be discussed in Chapter 1 and section 2.2
4. the problematisation of the feminization of migration as a global phenomenon.

With regards to the specific national context there is extensive literature on the data on migration in Greece and accounts of the distorted ways they are experienced through the social and political lenses. This project builds on the existing literature and aims to make a connection between the reality of the migration wave, as this is set out through the available data, and the interpretations of nationals which are based on personal sentiments, understandings and experiences. It wants to challenge the basis upon which the absence of responsive migration policies is being problematized in Greece from a practical problem, to emphasizing this as a strategy established on the basis of the nationalistic culture that is dominating the Greek case.

Greece’s membership in the EU, since 1981, had also changed the role of the country as a migrant destination in terms of the constitution of the migrant population due to the country’s geographical position as an exterior EU border. Consequently the pressures with regards to the case of migration in Greece don’t only have national weight but also affect the country’s EU position. As such, this research project engages and contributes to the literature on migration policy as a common European Union project. The role of the nationalistic hypothesis upon which this research project is developed aims to question the extent to which a common European migration policy agenda can be achieved in relation to both agreed targets and principles and if not unfold the reasons behind such failure.
Within this line of inquisition addressing the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers and the violations of their basic human rights is transformed into an ethical question and not an impossible task for the Greek political sphere. Especially for the group of female migrant domestic workers whose presence in Greece is culturally burdened, this project wants to reiterate the need for the political sphere to take control over social relationships and structures. Finally it also wants to redirect the current research from projects that only aim to document the reality and experiences of female migrant domestic workers in Greece to projects that aim to expand the problematization of the occupation. Generally the utilization of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory for the problematization of female migrant domestic labour instead of looking into the phenomenon from a single standpoint provides the researcher with the opportunity to simultaneously approach it from the sociological, economic and political lenses and explore their interconnectedness.

The strengths in the use of securitization theory in the development of the analytical framework is based on its ability to trace the political processes that legitimize the violation of the migrants’ basic human rights and reproduce the experienced social, economic and political inequalities and vulnerabilities. As a project in the first instance it adds to the usefulness of securitization theory and Hyusman’s concept of de-securitization by addressing human rights violation through the national management of migration. Secondly it aims to argue for the usefulness of desecuritization in addressing the political challenges and policy
dilemmas that the contemporary refugee and intensified population movements pose for states as well as international governmental organizations on a global level. Thirdly it adds to feminist research and arguments for the need of the broadening of security in relation to gender as it enhances the argument that gender is socially experienced rather than objectively defined (McSweeney, 1999) and as such the way its perceived as a threat is constructed through negotiation and experience.
Chapter 2
Securitization Theory and this Project

INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a detailed account of how the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory has been selected within the discipline of Security Studies as the basis for the development of this project’s analytical framework. The previous chapter situated the research project in its immediate historical, geographical and disciplinary context. It discussed that the major root of the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers in Greece has been identified as the inadequate management of migration, a by-product of the development of unresponsive and problematically implemented migration policies. Parallel to this reality and on a social level migrants were facing an environment of racism and xenophobia, which, being on higher levels in comparison to other European countries, was intensifying their negative experiences. Even though the relationship between political illegality, its direct effects on migrants and female migrant domestic workers has been identified many questions emerge from the data, testimonials and literature especially with regards to on one hand the role gender has played in offering diversified experiences for female migrants and on the other the political incentives behind the development of migration policies, given their identified incapacity to solve the national problems they are aiming to address.
Moreover what has remained unexplored is the relationship between the politicisation of migration, the economic exploitation of migrants and the social responses of racism and xenophobia which on a domestic level are multiplying the related to migration problems and on a migrant level indirectly intensify their experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities.

By definition within host countries the alien status of all non-nationals acts as the basis of their political management. For each alien group host countries have different interests and responsibilities which are related primarily to the nationality of the group, especially with membership in the EU and the free mobility agreement, and secondarily to the purpose and the duration of stay. With regards to economic migration and even though states have diversified economic interests for each of each types of economic activities and labour sectors the development of individualised policies and techniques of governance for each of the numerous different migrant groups is an impossible task. Due to the practical difficulties it is expected that migration policies will have a universal aspect that aligns with the basic security interests of states in relation to migration. Within Critical Security Studies the different schools, Welsh School, Paris School, Human Security, Feminist approaches and the Copenhagen School, have engaged with the study of migration as a security threat in different ways depending on its theoretical stance.

The choice of Buzan and Wæver’s Securitization Theory as the theoretical basis for the development of the theoretical framework of this project lays on the fact that by providing a theoretical basis which frames security as the product of
social and political processes it enables the researcher to identify the involved actors, trace the basic premises and arguments upon which this politicization takes place and explore its effects on the securitized object (Wæver, 2011, p. 466; Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998, p. 27). Despite the role of the national security agenda as the basis for the development of migration policies these policies are also products of a mixture of shifting parallel social, economic and political developments and interests. The securitization of female migrant domestic labor is expected in that sense to reflect these multiple interests, which add to the complexity of the phenomenon and burden the ways female migrant domestic labor as an economic phenomenon is experienced by nationals and migrants and is managed politically. For securitization apart from the alien status for female migrant domestic workers gender is also an experienced identity that defines them as a “significant group” within states (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004, p. 155). Depending on how gender identity is experienced on a national level the existential threats will be experienced accordingly and thus will highly differentiate amongst different national contexts.

This chapter starts off by providing an overview of how migration has been approached by Security Studies the sub-discipline of International Relations. Navigating through the different schools of Security Studies, the Welsh School, the Paris School, Human Security, Feminism and Critical Security Studies it concludes by giving an in depth presentation of the Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory which has been used as the basis of this project’s analytical framework. More specifically it explains how migration is socially constructed as a societal threat on national levels. It then moves to discuss gender in the context of securitization and
more specifically how for security studies gendered threats are framed in relation to
the existence of patriarchal structures developed to protect “a specific way to be a
woman or non-hegemonic forms of masculinity” (Wæver, 2011, p. 589). As
“patriarchy normalizes constructed gender dichotomies” and leads to the
development of “dominant masculinities” in the form of “patriarchal structures”
(Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004, p. 164) gendered existential threats are being
constructed in reference to those structures. The embeddedness of patriarchal
structures within the social, economic and political spheres can be identified through
the existence of gendered power inequalities, in this case gender and care regimes.
Gender in that sense is incorporated in the analysis automatically due to the gendered

By utilizing securitization theory research can identify the actors that take
part in the securitization process, the basis upon which the securitization of
migration takes place and the interests that drive the securitization moves in order to
evaluate the responsiveness and relevance of the established techniques of
governance. A very important aspect of the work of an advocate of securitization
theory for the study of the politicization of migration, Huysman, is his pledge
towards the desecuritization (Huysmans, 1998, p. 571) of migration. For Huysman
framing the politicization of migration as a product of a security project is not about
“understanding the processes of securitization as such but the causal processes
which produce the drama in the present context” with the purpose “to formulate
possible actions to desecritize the story of the migrant” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 66).
The chapter concludes by discussing the criticisms of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory that are relevant to this project and address them accordingly.

1 Security Studies and Migration

Within Security Studies, migration as a research area emerged as part of the territorial security agenda of the state reflecting national concerns in relation to the state’s power to maintain control over the inflow of migrants and consequently their geographical sovereignty (Heisbourg, 1991; Loescher, 1992; Widgren, 1990). The engagement of Critical Security Studies with migration came as a part of the broadening of the concept of security and as a response to the observed reorientation in the politicization of migration. Changes in the drives behind population movements, the engagement of migrants with state structures outside state’s control, due to globalization and the neoliberal capitalist organisation of economic life, and the subsequent increase of migrant inflows beyond state control have reoriented the ways migration is securitized (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 21^6; Huysmans and Squire, 2010, p. 173 – 174). Along with changes in the processes of the politicization of migration as a security threat there was also a swift in the technologies developed for the governance of migration. The securitization of migration is now a response to social, economic, political and not just geopolitical disruptions (Ceyhan and

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^6^ the construction of the European Union, the emergence of new economic agreements such as NAFTA, the deterritorialization of markets, physical borders, and identities, the increase of migration flows, the construction of the Schengen area, and the fragmentation of major states (e.g. the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia)
Tsoukala, 2002).\(^7\) Whereas originally the management of migration was associated with the control of borders nowadays especially with economic migration states have developed varied interests with regards to the involvement of aliens in national structures and as a result have been pressured to develop more complex practical and legal techniques of governance (Blake, 200; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Zureik and Salter, 2005).

2 **CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES**

Security Studies is identified as a sub-discipline of IR which as “a sub-field is also multidisciplinary […] driven by agendas of disciplines other than IR” (Croft, 2013, p. 37). Security being its core concept has emerged as “an interdisciplinary enterprise” (Walt, 1991, p. 211) and subsequently not only lacks a clear definition but also, as Bary Buzan and Richard Little have argued, security is “a contested concept” (Buzan, 1991; Little, 1981).\(^8\) The roots of that theoretical aspect of security are identified with the political and historical developments that drove the move within IR from Strategic Studies to the emergence of the sub-discipline of Security Studies and the redefinition of its focus of study. The end of the Second World War and the post-Cold War era saw a turn from a strict identification of security with

\(^7\) “the changes have recast the domestic order, challenged traditional structures, modified social arrangements, transformed the forces of integration and fragmentation, and accelerated the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, existential and conceptual anxieties and fears about their identity, security and well-being” (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002)

\(^8\) building upon Gallie’s work on “contested concepts” Gallie, (1955 – 1956), for criticisms on the characterisation of security as an “essentially contested concept” instead of “a confused or inadequately explicated concept” (Baldwin, 1997: 10 – 12)
“the study of the threat, use, and control of military force” (Wyn Jones, 1999) to the reconceptualization of national security as a “‘military plus’ field of knowledge” (Wæver, 2010, p. 652) and the incorporation of non-military internal and external threats (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Buzan, 2009; Huysmans, 1998a, p. 227; Walt, 199, p. 213). Security Studies emerged in order to address the analytical challenges the political developments of the post-Cold War were posing to the classical realist/liberal/constructivist approaches within International Relations.

Barry Buzan and Ken Booth (Booth, 1991) were the first to respond to this challenge by broadening the scope of security to incorporate political, social, environmental, economic and military threats (Buzan, 1983) and extending it to eschew statism and define human individuals as the “irreducible base units” of ‘sites of insecurities” (Buzan, 1991). These responses were not just aiming to challenge intellectually Kenneth Waltz’s traditional approach to security (Waltz, 1979) but through the employment of new theoretical frameworks were starting to redirect the field. The work of the engaged scholars sparked academic debates resulting in the birth of a new subfield, Security Studies. The new questions that were emerging in relation to security were:

- what is security
- what does it mean to be secure
- whose security
- what are the means of security etc

were explored through different theoretical paradigms drawing “on elements of Marxism, feminism, Critical Theory, critical constructivism and post-structuralism”
In the mid-1990s these new approaches had developed into clear distinctive schools of critical approaches leading to the emergence of a new ‘orientation’ in Security Studies, instead of a “precise theoretical label”, under the umbrella of Critical Security Studies (Kraus and Williams, 1997, p. xii). Geographic location also played a part in their subsequent development and some of these schools started to be identified through the location from which they emerged and grew. The subsequent schools are: Welsh School, Human Security, Feminist Security, Paris School and the Copenhagen School. Despite their differentiated theoretical orientations, as it will be described below, many scholars have tried to argue for the partial commonalities (Floyd, 2007a) between the schools which can be justified through their common origination.

2.1 Welsh School

The introduction of critical theory in the field of International Relations came by Robert Cox in the early 1980s (Floyd, 2007a, p. 330; Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 1). For Cox the main problem of the traditional approach to security was the utilization of problem solving theory as a theoretical framework. The conservatism of problem solving theory and its basic characteristic to break down the analysis into the study of the “various parts of the complex whole” (Cox, 1981, p. 129 – 130) segmenting the object of study and its acceptance of the realist premises in relation to the nature of the international arena and the competing relationship between states had as a consequence the legitimization of the security problems the theory was employed to study. The practical consequence was that military threats and war were framed as
the logical and unavoidable consequences of the realist assumptions reproducing the problems the analysis was aiming to resolve.

Critical theory on the other hand “contains problem-solving theories within itself, but constrains them in the form of identifiable ideologies, thereby pointing to their conservative consequences, not to their usefulness as guides to action” (Cox, 1981, p. 130) strengthening the ability of the scholar to transcend the existing order, was opening up for the study of politics. Echoing on the work of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas (Floyd 2007a, p. 330; Held, 1990) critical theory gave Cox the theoretical basis through which he challenged the realist assumptions of a) the nature of man, b) the nature of the states and c) the nature of the state system (Cox, 1983, p. 130). This new direction within International Relations was initially associated with the ‘Institute for Social Research’ based in Frankfurt and thus was identified as the Frankfurt School.

Ken Booth (2007) and Wyn Jones were the first ones to engage with critical theory in the context of security studies forming the subfield of the Welsh School within Critical Security Studies. In the words of Wyn Jones the conceptualization of security under critical theory is one that:

- eschews statism
- recognises that military threats are far from the only phenomena with major security implications and, therefore, that other issues have a place on the security agenda
• anchors the theory and practice of security in a broader concern with human emancipation (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 5)

Despite the fact that the questions the Welsh school was aiming to answer remained the same, what security, who securitizes, what do they securitize, with what means is security achieved, the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of security studies had changed. Security itself was no longer identified with the study of military acts. Instead security threats were defined as rationalized political processes through which the actors sought to securitize their objects from a variety of macro and micro threats through the use of specific practices. Drawing upon the central questions within security studies he categorized the theoretical shifts in the content of the study of security under four concepts: the “broadening”, “deepening”, “extending” (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 112 – 117), and “focusing” (Vaughan-Williams, and Columba Peoples, 2010, p. 17) of security studies.

Building on Buzan’s (1991) “original case for broadening the conceptualization of security” with “broadening” Wyn Jones (1999, p. 104 – 112) refers to the inclusion of political, social, economic and environmental issues, alongside military ones, as security concerns. The “deepening” (Wyn Jones 1999, p. 102 – 104) of security studies addresses the epistemological criticisms against the main assumptions of traditional approach to security, i.e. “the nature of politics and the role of conflict in political life” (Wyn Jones 1999, p. 102). “Extending” refers to the move away from statism and towards a redefinition of the referent objects of security. For the Welsh School the state remained the central actor holding the political power within the international arena. What changed is the fact that states as
political units seek securitization on behalf of human individuals. States were no longer defined as rigid and solid entities but were recognized to be constituted by political beings with varied interests and power. Security became a more exciting and challenging field as the analytical consequence of the broadening, deepening, extending and focusing of security was the multiplication of the variables whose study had to be “historicized and particularized through the analysis of specific issues in specific areas” since the “referent objects varied from case to case” (Wyn Jones 1999, p. 116).

Emancipation refers to the teleological aspect of security. For the Welsh School security does not refer to the processes where actors race towards the acquisition of more power but instead to those processes through which actors seek “the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others” (Booth, 2007, p. 112). Epistemologically it is this reorientation that distinguishes the Welsh School from the rest of the approaches within CSS and offers an opposing approach to the realist conceptualization of the international arena as an anarchical field. “Critical Security Studies is ‘for ‘the voiceless, the unrepresented, and the powerless’ [in world politics], and its purpose is their emancipation” (Vaughan-Williams and Columbia Peoples, 2010, p. 29) and thus as Kenneth Booth argued “security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security” (Booth, 1991, p. 319). Due to its introduction within an expanded framework of security seeking to break from the rigidity of the problem-solving theory there is no single definition for emancipation. It has remained a
reference concept, a securitizing premise which critical theorists use to define security problems and analytically address them. “It is only when specific, historical examples are addressed that the discussion of emancipation can proceed to the consideration of particular institutions and forms of life” (Wyn Jones, 1999, p. 121). This realization signifies the fluidity of the boundaries of the Welsh School which even though can be criticized that stem from theoretical weaknesses its lack of clearly defined boundaries is itself an advantage as it aims to encourage the expansion of the field to new understandings of security.

In recent years the Welsh School has been utilized in a series of projects for the study of migration due to the focus of this school to the role of practices and technologies of governance in order to identify the dynamics through which an issue is being securitized and subsequently institutionalized. Despite the insight this school offers for the understanding of the politicization of migration as a security threat its focus on practices and techniques of governance silences the role non-political actors play in acknowledging, accepting or dismissing the securitization of an issue. As Skleparis argued the school’s “focus on practices has been argued to be more appropriate for the analysis of securitization processes specifically in the context of the EU” (2011, p. 7 - 8) rather than national contexts due to the role in the securitization process of the techniques of governance and institutions rather than social processes.
2.2 PARIS SCHOOL

Post-structuralism emerged within IR in the second half of the 1980s with the work of James Der Derian (1987)\(^9\), Richard Ashley (1987), R. B. J. Walker (1987)\(^10\) and Michael Shapiro\(^11\). Post-structuralists themselves refrain from naming their work a theory in itself as there are “irreconcilable, interpretations of security and its political effects which, in turn, inform different view of politics” (Aradau and Munser, 2012: 81). What defines them is their common aim to act as critics of the realist take on International Relations. Within Security Studies post-structuralism started to grow in the early 1990s (Aradau and Munser, 2012, p. 73). The focal point of the rest of the approaches within Security Studies is the realisation of the need for the analytical expansion of the concept of security, in relation to its actors, objects and processes, in order for it to “correspond to ‘real security’, to make the concept fit ‘reality’” (Hansen, 1997, p. 385). These approaches accept security as a “noun that names things” (Dillon, 1996, p. 16) and are developed on the grounds that security is an inherent characteristic of the international political arena and the nature of the relationships between states either due to power politics or social practice and interaction (Finnemore, 1996, p. 2). Post-structuralism distinguishes itself within CSS as it does not aim to explore security by remaking it but aims to work towards “unmaking” it (Huysmans, 2006b).

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\(^9\) employing continental political theory problematizes the historicity of diplomacy in relation to symbolization, language, power and existential dilemmas

\(^10\) in this paper Walker introduces the dependence of political theory on identity and difference

\(^11\) where Shapiro discusses the fashioning and social production of reality in static representations
Building upon continental philosophy and the work of Jacques Derrida (2002), Emmanuel Levinas (Hand, 2011), Michel Foucault (1980), Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jean Baudrillard (Mutimer, 2012) post-structuralism as a subfield of Critical Security Studies aims to a) question identity, b) question ethics and c) discuss the biopolitics of security (Mutimer, 2012, p. 51) drifting away from “the epistemological, methodological and ontological assumptions of traditional security studies” (Smith, 1999, p. 93; Hansen, 1997, p. 372 – 373). David Campbell’s (Campbell, 1992; Campbell, 1998) work on US security policy is a good example of the post-structuralism thought within Security Studies and is considered the starting point of that swift within CSS. In his book *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* Campbell started by stating that “danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently of those whom it may become a threat” (Campbell, 1992, p. 1). Using a Foucauldian analysis he aimed to unfold the relationship between the construction of national identity and the notions of danger and risk. Following Campbell’s footsteps Walker further explored the “relationship between security and liberty in the European response to terror as a ‘technique of government’” (Mutimer, 2012, p. 51).

The social construction of identity and the exploration of its role in security policy is a common theme in security studies for both constructivism and post-structuralism with the difference that whereas for constructivism identity has a performative character (Mutimer, 2012, p. 51; Smith, 1991, p. 72 – 101), for post-

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12 Constructivism will be explored later on in the chapter where the case of the Copenhagen School’s Securitization theory is presented
structuralism it is a technique of government. Thus whereas for structuralism power takes meaning from the social realm, for post-structuralism security gives meaning to the social and political realms.

With regards to migration the focus of the Paris School in the theorization of security as a technique of governance through which states exercise their power over migration has been utilized by a series of authors and researchers aiming to explore the incentives behind the development of migration policies and practices. With a focus on the instrumentality of securitizing practices this school does not touch upon the “role of audiences outside the field of professionalism… how do citizens, politicians, or targeted immigrant groups react to certain regulations, policy procedures, or control techniques?” (Boas, 28, p. 2015) failing to problematize the social power in the interpretation of the techniques of governance, the social practices around them and the ways they determine the daily experiences of nationals and migrants with regards to migration.

2.3 **Human Security**

Human Security was introduced within Security Studies in the early 1990s as a contrast to the traditional state centric approach to security (Kerr, 2012, p. 115). The origins of Human Security trace back to 1993 where it first emerged as a policy “language” (Paris, 2004, p. 370) through the *United Nations Development Report* (1994a). It was coined to mean “first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities” (UNDP, 1994b, p. 23). Despite the fact that a single definition for Human Security was never developed it has been identified to comprise by seven sources of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. The “language of Human Security” (Paris, 2004, p. 370) was welcomed on a political level and it was largely adopted by organizations and politicians. The subscription of states to Human Security was perceived as recognition of the failure of traditional politics to address the expansion of global power inequalities between developed and developing countries and a commitment towards a reorientation of the priorities of states in the contact of world politics.

Thomas and Tow (2002, p. 178) have engaged with Human Security on an academic level and their work has been an effort to contextualize security in relation to the study of International Relations and Security Studies. For them Human Security as an approach aims to reorient security from the study of threats of states towards the study of “transnational threats” towards humans. Human insecurity is transnational in the sense that it as it stems from the inability of states to respond to the challenges of the realist conceptualization of the nature of the international arena it transcends national borders and national contexts. The main argument is that by developing an understanding of security through the study of the interests of the states the study of security will never be explored in relation to the ways securitization processes compromise the security of the inhabitants of states.
This approach to security is closely related to the literature on globalization and the new world order and politically it supports the need for the development of a strong supranational interventionist civil and political society (2002, p. 178). It is not surprising that the ‘language of Human Security’ has found a strong audience:

- in academia in the Development Studies subfield of IR (Bellamy and McDonald, 2002; Inge, 1995; Suhrke, 1999)
- in politics amongst advocacy groups, governmental and non-governmental organizations
- discursively in advocates of humanitarian intervention

According to the original quest of CSS, to move away from statism and the traditional paradigms of international relations with aim to broaden and extent the scope of security, Human Security as an approach consists a successful response to that quest. One of its most common criticisms is that despite its fit in relation to the revisited focus of security studies “from the state to the individual” (King and Murray, 2013, p. 588 – 589) it has nothing new to offer as its seven elements have already been incorporated in other critical security schools (Rothschild, 1995). Suhrke’s criticism of Human Security is that as long as states remain the basic units of power in the organization of the international arena the discourse of human security will be subjected to relativism and on a national level as it will be mobilized as a neorealist political ideology to “mask, sustain or advance the power-oriented interests of states” (Suhrke, 1999, p. 265; Bellamy and McDonald, 2002; Thomas
and Tow, 2002, p. 189\textsuperscript{13}). Thus despite its discursive employment by states and its popularity on an international policy level, it still has not intrigued academics and academically it has yet to be fully embraced as a strong alternative paradigm within Security Studies (Paris, 2004, p. 370; Paris, 2001). One of the basic consequences is that as an approach it has remained epistemologically underdeveloped. Looking into the work of scholars engaging with Human Security we realize that it consists of research that explores it as a political discourse used and mobilized as a facilitator of national interests (Jolly and Ray, 2007; Liotta, 2002; Suhrke, 1999) rather than an alternative paradigm.

\section*{2.4 Feminism and Critical Security Studies}

The launch of feminism in IR has been identified with the 1988 Millennium: Journal of International Studies LSE conference whose proceedings were initially published in the Millennium journal’s special issue ‘Women and International Relations’ and then published further in the book Gender and International Relations by Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland. The conference acted as a trigger leading to the organization of two more conferences, the 1989 University of Southern California ‘Gender and International Relations’ conference and the 1990 Wellesley conference whose papers were then published by Peterson in her book Gendered States: Feminist \textit{(re)visions of International Relations Theory} (Grant and Newland, 1991; Sjoberg, 2009, p. 183; Tickner, 1992a, p. ix-xi; Wibben, 2004, p. 98). The

\textsuperscript{13} here Thomas and Tow criticize the argument that human security delegitimises state sovereignty
presence of feminist scholars within Peace and War Studies preceded their involvement in IR with a gendered reconceptualization of the concept of power in the late 1960s, a gendered analysis of security in the 1970s and a theoretical development of the relationship between patriarchy and war in the 1980s (Boulding, 1992, p. 56 – 57; Wibben, 2004, p. 99). Nevertheless these efforts remained under-represented within the subfield and it wasn’t until 2009 that feminist critiques to Security Studies were acknowledged as competing approaches. Their introduction and official engagement with the field came in the form of a special issue in the journal Security Studies (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 185).

When we discuss Feminist Security Studies as an approach within the CSS sub-field of IR, we are referring to feminist strands/critiques of security rather than a uniform theoretical approach to security. The focal point of feminist research is the critique of the absence of women and gender in the study of security. Through their work feminist scholars are not only interested in exploring the relationship between patriarchy and security and its differentiated effects on gender but also to argue that Security studies is not just a “gender blind” (Peterson, 1992, p. 49) or “gender neutral” sub-field but a “gender biased” sub-field within IR (Smith, 1999, p. 9; Sjoberg, 2009, p. 202; Whitworth, 2008, p. 104). Consequently the aim of feminist research is not a quest towards the examination of the “gender-based insecurities” (Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, 2010, p. 37). Instead by challenging the power assumptions (Steans, 1998, p. 5)\(^\text{14}\), framed as “constitutive of

\(^{14}\) Stean here discusses how gender is a form of social power relation that shapes international processes
the global political world”, on which the understanding of security has been constructed its aim is to reconstruct it by:

- exploring the power of gender as a “set of discourses that represent, construct, change and enforce social meaning” within security studies
- discussing how power is gendered and exploring the “normative and empirical concern that the international system is gender-hierarchical” (Connell, 1995; Sjoberg, 2009, p. 189, 205; Tickner, 1992b, p. 5)

Smith (1999, p. 92) has categorized the work of these scholars under four strands: work on the masculinized nature of the language used in strategic discourse\(^\text{15}\), research on the recreation of the gendered division of the private and public spheres within security\(^\text{16}\), questions on the perceptions of the fit of women in international relations\(^\text{17}\) and work on the results the relationship between militarism and sexism in society has in an uneven distribution of resources and protection between genders (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 187). Epistemologically there is great variety within the work of these scholars and “the object, method, and consequences of critique vary considerably” ( Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, 2010, p. 36).

Liberal feminism, feminist empiricism, standpoint feminism, post-structural gender approaches, postcolonial feminism have been employed with the same aim, to discuss how security is a “gender biased” sub-field within IR.

\(^{15}\) scholars such as J. Tickner (1992b) and L. Wilcox (2010)

\(^{16}\) scholars such as J. True (1996: 229–230)

3 THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND SECURITIZATION THEORY

Constructivism first emerged in IR in the late 1980s with the work of Onuf and his publication World of Our Making. In his work Onuf disputes the anarchical nature and the rigid materialism that constitutes the realist discussion of the international arena and the relationship between states. He coined the term constructivism to argue that reality is not given and instead is socially constructed as people build their understanding of their own being and the world around them through social interaction (Onuf, 2012).

Buzan and Wæver were from the first to introduce constructivism in the study of security. Similar to the Welsh and Paris Schools, this approach to security was named after the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) where Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver were based when they first developed this new framework of analysis within security studies around 1998. The trigger for the Copenhagen School to develop this new framework of analysis was the failure of the existing approaches to security to engage with questions beyond the expansion of the content of security and the subsequent weaknesses that failure had in the understanding of the concept of security. In Huysmans words, despite the fact that the main aim of the rest of the CSS approaches was to broaden the concept of security, the theoretical basis on which its expansion was developed was just “adding adjectives – such as environmental, world, democratic, societal – to a noun” without exploring what this noun “security” itself involves as a political mechanism (Huysmans, 1998a, p. 227).
Buzan and Wæver introduced securitization theory as a framework to explore security as a state of being, constructed through social and political processes to answer questions in the form of “who does what kind of securitization, how, with how much success and what side-effects, and resisted by whom, and so forth?” (Wæver, 2011, p. 466; Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998, p. 27). Building on constructivism this status of security is being achieved through the employment of “speech acts” (Huysmans, 2011) by agents holding political power and are used as political moves aiming to take the politics around a specific concern “beyond the established rules of the game” framing “the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 23), as an “existential threat” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 25; Buzan and Wæver, 1997; Matti, 2006; McDonald, 2008). This status does not only reflect a discursive move in the political language used for the negotiation of a specific issue but it is a strategic act producing an outcome, the legitimation of “the use of exceptional political measures” (Vaughan-Williams and Columba Peoples, 2010, p. 76).

The objective of securitization theory is dual. By exploring the performative aspect of security on one hand it aims to look into the rhetorical arguments upon which security threats are being constructed and on the other to explore the ways that through securitization, changes in “our understanding of the objects of security change our understanding about them” (Huysmans, 1998a, p. 227). The

18 in this article Hysman discusses further the above criticism bringing up the work of Baldwin (1997: 5 – 26)
Copenhagen School aims to move one step further from the rest of the approaches within Critical Security Studies as the study of security as a social construct can aid in the identification of the interests behind securitization processes. The evaluation of the incentives of securitizing entities enables the exploration of the validity of the realist assumption that security is a condition of the nature of the international arena, the critical evaluation of threats and the legitimation of the political premises on which exceptional measures are introduced.

The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory as a framework identifies securitization processes as those speech acts that result in successful securitizing moves. The next parts will discuss the different elements of securitization processes as framed by the Copenhagen School.

3.1 **The Speech Act**

As mentioned earlier the speech act does not consist of a bare linguistic sign aiming to just discursively describe a reality. The speech act is an act with a specific rhetorical structure, performative power and a teleological purpose. Wæver introduced the speech act in securitization theory drawing upon the field of linguistics and the category of “performative utterances” within speech act theory that was first introduced by John L. Austin and was then further developed by John R. Searle (1969). According to Austin the concept of performative utterance aims to distinguish those speech acts that consist of linguistic expressions of an “assertive kind” (Austin, 1976, p. 40; Sbisa, 2009, p. 230). For the study of security this
assertiveness is associated with political power and is reflected upon the purpose of the employment of speech acts which is the move of “a particular development into a specific” and the claim of “a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver, 1995, p. 55).

Linguistically the identification of a security speech act is not associated with the words security or threat but with the political insecurity it is trying to invoke. The employed words take meaning from the sociopolitical context in which the speech act is being uttered and despite the fact that Wæver drew upon the field of linguistics to introduce the concept of speech acts the aspect of its performative power has to be conceptualized in relation to the work of Bourdieu and Butler on the legitimacy of power (Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1996). In their book Security: A New Framework for Analysis Buzan et al stress that the key in the study of securitization is the exploration of the relationship between “language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech” (Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, 1998, p. 32).

The engagement of political agents in security speech acts adds “a strategic practice” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172), a political practice to them and thus the political urgency that they invoke consists an inherent characteristic. Security speech acts are different in that sense as they distinguish themselves from political negotiations that aim to inform or discursively change perceptions of the issues in question. The utterance itself introduces political urgency as it calls for a swift in the balance of power and a threat to the sovereignty of the securitized object. Through the speech
act the agent also aims to relate the “existential threat” to a specific set of security politics in order to reinstate the sovereignty of the state or the existentially threatened referent object.

3.2 Securitizing Moves. What Constitutes a Successful Securitizing Move?

 Securitizing Moves: Three Units of Analysis

The purpose of speech acts is to invoke securitizing moves. Within a securitizing move we have to specify three units/levels of analysis (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35):

1. Referent objects
2. Securitizing actors

Under the Copenhagen School referent objects are defined as the “things that are seen to be existentially threatened or that have a legitimate claim to survival” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Within the traditional understanding of security states are identified as the only referent object. The broadening of the concept of security and the introduction of non-military threats has resulted in the recognition of more referent objects such as a populace, collective identity, territory, military capacity, biosphere, markets, resources, organizational stability, ideology and social order.
( Vaughan – Williams and Columbia Peoples, 2010, p. 80). Nevertheless having discussed the significance of the relationship between speech acts and legitimacy of power the securitized objects relevant to the study of security are usually medium to large in size as those are seen to be able to yield legitimate political power (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36).

Securitizing actors are defined as the actors performing the speech act with the aim to “securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – existentially threatened” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Given the political context within which securitization takes place for the speech act to have legitimacy securitizing actors must on one hand be in a position of authority and on the other have the linguistic competence to perform the securitizing move (Balzacq, 2005, p. 191). Despite the fact that in theory the definition and characteristics of securitizing actors are very clear in practice, as Buzan and Waever have pointed out, there are two weaknesses in their identification. The first challenge stems from the fact that as securitizing actors act and “speak security through the reference to the need to defend their own survival” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 40) they may identify themselves with the referent object. The second challenge is related to the interests of securitizing actors. Due to the competitive nature of the political arena the political actions of securitizing actors are infused by their personal interests. As such the Copenhagen School introduced the concept of the “organization logic of the speech act” to distinguish between the interests of the referent objects and the interests of the securitizing.

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19 the referent objects will be further discussed in the next section ‘Security Sectors’
actors in relation to the political opportunity speech acts offer for them (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 41).

The Copenhagen School has defined functional actors as the “actors who affect the dynamics of a sector… without being the referent object or the actor calling for security on behalf of the referent object, this is an actor who significantly influences decisions in the field of security” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Buzan, Wæver and Wilde do not offer a more detailed definition of functional actors as according to the explored security sector they are identified to differ. Media holding “the dynamics of the relationship between governors and the governed in all types of political regimes” (Mughan and Gunther, 2000, p. 4) and acting as the facilitators through which “are addressed – and speak back” (Vultee, 2011, p. 80) have been framed as the main functional actors playing a central role in the securitization process by a series of other researchers especially with regards to the topic of migration (Kuypers, 2002; Williams, 2003; Oates, 2008; O’Reilly, 2008: 66; Vultee, 2011).

As an increasing number of analyses have argued, and as events in the world of security seem daily to demonstrate, modern media is a central element of security relations… a consideration of the role of contemporary communications media in the representation and conduct of security relations is almost inescapable.

~ Williams, 2003, p. 524

Their control over the communicated narratives of news stories (Bennett, 2000; Rushkoff, 2003), telling the public not just “what to think about” but also “how to think about any given topic” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 6), gives them power over
the subject itself, the public and the political establishment and consequentially over the securitization process (Mughan and Gunther, 2000; O’Reilly, 2008). Media as functional actors will be discussed further at the final part of this chapter where the analytical framework of this research project will be presented.

➢ Securitizing Moves: Three Components for Success

As a socio-politically performative process a securitization move is comprised by three components:

- The first is the identification of an existential threat towards a specific referent object by a securitizing actor (existential threats)
- the second is the utterance of the need to securitize an existential threat by the securitizing actor (emergency action)
- and the third the acceptance that the securitizing move will disrupt the inter-unit balance of power and the status quo breaking free from existing rules and norms (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 26)

The Copenhagen School has identified three facilitating conditions for the acceptance of a securitizing move which are related to these three components. The first condition is in regards to the speech act itself as linguistically it has to follow the grammar of security. Balzacq gives a step by step description of a linguistically and grammatically successful securitizing speech act. Such an act is one in which:

- Patterns of heuristic artefacts (metaphors, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions etc)
• Are contextually mobilized by a recognized agent, who

• Works persuasively to prompt a target audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts and intuitions), that concurs with the enunciator’s reasons for choices and actions, by

• Investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that

• A customized political act must be undertaken immediately to block its development (Balzacq: 2010, p. 63)

The second condition is related to “the social conditions regarding the position of authority” of the securitizing actor “and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt” and the third condition is related to the “features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” (Balzacq, 2010, p. 33; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The conceptualization of security as a social construct empowers the role of the social context within which securitization processes take place. Whereas the traditional approach to security perceives it as a legitimate political mechanism acting upon the audience within securitization theory the legitimacy of security is being derived from the social environment and the audience itself. Going back to the work of Bourdieu and Butler, as it has been discussed earlier, the success of the securitizing move has to be evaluated through the study of the relationship between the securitizing actor and the target audience. Thus despite the linguistic expertise and the high level of articulation invested in a speech act within the political arena the credibility of the actor is not only dependent on his expertise but is related to political
ideology and power. As Vaughan – Williams and Peoples rightfully argue, the political identity and power of securitizing actors “can radically impact upon the chances for success in any securitizing move” (2010, p. 79).

The content of speech acts and securitizing moves is expected to differ according to the referent object, the security sector, the nature of the threat, the relationship between the securitizing actor and the target audience and the role of the regimes of power. Securitization theory is a framework that acknowledges disparities in the conceptualization of the meaning and role of security as a concept and thus it rejects universalist approaches and can only be explored on smaller levels. Security sectors, which will be discussed next, were introduced to facilitate the breaking down of the study of security in relation to different referent objects.

➢ Security Sectors

The traditional conceptualisation of security as a privilege of the states was dictating the very narrow conceptualisation of securitization interactions. The introduction of “security sectors” within securitization came as a part of the Copenhagen School’s response to the broadening and extending of the concept of security. The analytical purpose of security sectors is ‘to differentiate types of interactions’ in the study of different referent objects as:

- different units and values are rooted in particular sectors
- and the nature of survival and threat are different across different sectors and units (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 27)
These sectors are the military, societal, economic, political and environmental sectors and are identified with the referent object that is being securitized.

Within the military sector the most common referent object is the state. Nevertheless, depending on the type of military regime the state operates through, the referent object can be identified with the specific types of political and military entities acting on security (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 22). The political sector refers to every ideological or structural threat that threatens the “recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority” of the securitizing entity, i.e. states, international regimes or the international society (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 22). The referent object within the economic sector is harder to pin down due to globalization and privatization that characterize the contemporary organisation of economic life. Given the political element of security the referent object on a national level is identified with the welfare state and on an international level with threats toward rules and norms of global economic institutions (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 22, 103). The societal sector refers to “large, self-sustaining identity groups capable of reproducing themselves independently from the state” that vary “in both time and place” (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 22). Within the contemporary international arena, due to economic, social and political conditions, states have transitioned into more ethnically diverse political entities. The constant internal and external pressures for the reconstruction of their identity have established the issue as a constant policy concern in their national political agendas. Due to the fluidity of identity societal existential threats have to be distinguished from expressions of resistance during periods of societal transition (Wæver, 2008, p. 583). The last security sector is the environmental sector.
Conceptions about the environmental sector continually change due to the environmental interdependence between states. Decisions of states on the use of national resources, technological developments, scientific research and trade of natural resources change the balance of power on an international level on a daily basis. It is expected that environmental securitization of national or global environmental threats depends on where and how states identify their interests at any given point in time (Waever, 2008, p. 583).

The introduction of the ‘security sectors’ came out of the analytical need to identify the different “security dynamics” in the securitization of the different referent objects and does not aim to introduce a segmented approach to security. Security sectors are different pieces of one puzzle and security developments in one can trigger reactive securitization in others (Waever, 2008, p. 581).  

3.3 **Securitization Theory and Gender**

Feminist approaches to security have been introduced in this chapter as a distinctive approach within CSS. The claim of feminist scholars is that security studies is not just a gender blind sub-field but a gender-biased subfield. Despite the fact that feminist scholars engage with securitization theory in the form of feminist critiques to the theory the Copenhagen School itself cannot fall under the category of the gender-biased approaches as it has incorporated gender in the agenda of

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20 this point is further developed in relation to this project in the Securitization Theory and Migration section
securitization theory. Gender as a referent object is defined as an identity “door” that defines a “significant group” within states (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004, p. 155). Despite the fact that gender has “distinct features and core concerns that are sufficiently original” to define it as a separate sector, it also generates “societal sector dynamics” and thus it is framed as a proto-sector of societal security (Wæver, 2008, p. 587).

The main concern in the incorporation of gender within securitization theory is that our understanding of gender is constructed through personal experience. McSweeney has argued, and criticized the Copenhagen School for framing of identity as an objective variable with this argument, that “identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups” (McSweeney, 1999, p. 73). Gender is an experienced identity and within gender studies we can identify a plurality of differentiated approaches to what gender identity constitutes. Depending on how gender identity is experienced the existential threats will be experienced accordingly and thus will highly differentiate. For security studies gendered threats are framed in relation to the existence of patriarchal structures developed to protect “a specific way to be a woman or non-hegemonic forms of masculinity” (Wæver, 2008, p. 589). As ‘patriarchy normalizes constructed gender dichotomies’ and leads to the development of “dominant masculinities” in the form of “patriarchal structures” (Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004, p. 164) gendered existential threats are being constructed in reference to those structures. The embeddedness of patriarchal structures within the social, economic and political
spheres can be identified through the existence of gendered power inequalities and thus securitization has to be studied in relation to them (Wæver, 2008, p. 589).

3.4 **Securitization Theory and Migration**

Initially migration entered Security Studies as part of the territorial security agenda reflecting national concerns in relation to the states’ power to maintain control over the inflow of migrants and consequently their geographical sovereignty (Heisbourg, 1991; Loescher, 1992; Widgren, 1990). The engagement of CSS with migration came as a part of the broadening of the concept of security and a response to the observed reorientation in the politicization of migration. Changes in the push – pull factors and the conditions of population movements associated with globalization resulted in the increase of migrant inflows beyond state control (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 21\(^1\); Huysmans and Squire, 2010, p. 173 – 174). The politicization of migration expanded in the form of new surveillance technologies, tighter techniques of governance and politics of exception (Blake, 2003; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Zureik and Zalter, 2005) as it was trying to respond to nationalistic views of social, economic, political and geopolitical disruptions (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002\(^2\)) threatening state sovereignty. Each of the schools

\(^1\) ‘the construction of the European Union, the emergence of new economic agreements such as NAFTA, the deterritorialization of markets, physical borders, and identities, the increase of migration flows, the construction of the Schengen area, and the fragmentation of major states (e.g. the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia’

\(^2\) ‘the changes have recast the domestic order, challenged traditional structures, modified social arrangements, transformed the forces of integration and fragmentation, and accelerated the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, existential and conceptual anxieties and fears about their identity, security and well-being’
within SCC has engaged with the study of migration as a security threat in different ways depending on its theoretical stance.

The basic characteristic that defines the membership of migrants within the host country is their non-national identity. Within the traditional approach to security migrants were perceived as a major threat to the political sovereignty of the state as violators of the national borders. For securitization theory the referent object in relation to which migration is being securitized is not the political sector but the societal sector. Wæver makes this clarification by explaining that,

*societal security is closely related to, but nonetheless distinct from, political security, which is about the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy. Societal security is defined as the defence of an identity against a perceived threat, or more precisely, the defence of a community against a perceived threat to its identity.*

~ Wæver, 2008, p. 581; McSweeney, 1996

Despite the observed relation of migration to economic and political disruptions the primary referent object actors are aiming to secure through the securitization of migration is national identity. The political and economic insecurities stem from the involvement of migrants in national structures as it is on the interest of the state to secure the ownership of its national resources and the exclusiveness of their use by its national population. National identity does not just signify membership in a group but it qualifies access to political entitlements. The

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"McSweeney explores more the relationship between identity and security within securitization theory in his paper"
techniques of governance employed to securitize migration therefore aim to secure
the relationship between political entitlements and national identity. The
 politicization and regulation of migration have to be researched as products of the
securitization of migration as a threat towards the national identity. Buzan et al in
their discussion on security sectors have explained the connection between the
different sectors and how security developments in one sector can trigger reactive
securitization in others. The securitization of migration has to be broken down in
relation to this understanding of security sectors.

Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, have defined securitization as a
“symbolic process” in which “rhetorical arguments” develop “myths” that are
employed for the establishment of securitizing measures. For them the politicization
of migration as a security threat is broken down in four axes of “rhetorical
arguments”:

- A socioeconomic axis, where migration is associated with unemployment,
  the rise of informal economy, the crisis of the welfare state, and urban
  environment deterioration
- A securitarian axis, where migration is linked to the loss of a control
  narrative that associates the issues of sovereignty, borders, and both internal
  and external security
- An identitarian axis, where migrants are considered as being a threat to the
  host societies’ national identity and demographic equilibrium
• A political axis, where anti-immigrant, racist, and xenophobic discourses are often expected to facilitate the obtaining of political benefits (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002, p. 24)

This categorization identifies the national structures seen to need securitizing because of the threat migration poses to the political entitlements stemming from national identity.

Despite the political justification for the need of the securitization of migration in relation to societal security the developed links between migration and social, economic and political disruptions on a policy level are highly criticized from scholars. There are four thematic categories of the problems stemming from this basic criticism identified by scholars that have to be acknowledged in the study of the securitization of migration. These four categories are:

• The securitization of migration as a political project rather than a defensive mechanism
• The inclusion of migration in the greater securitization agenda of states and consequently the association of migration with other threats
• The reproduction of national insecurities related to migration
• The institutionalization of discourses of racism and xenophobia

Jef Huysman was the first to argue that the securitization of migration does not necessarily involve a response to a real existential threat. For Huysmans the securitization of migration is used as a policy tool to further enhance the cohesion of the nation and strengthen the identity and functional integrity of a state
(Huysmans, 1995, p. 55). In his chapter contribution to Miles and Thranhardt’s (Huysmans, 1995, p. 53 - 73) book he examines how the threatened referent object, national identity, is politically politicized as the identity “of insecure individuals” (Huysmans, 1995, p. 53). In his analysis the securitization of migration is situated in the political sector and the referent object is not identified with national identity but national security. The construction of “an insecure collective identity unites the insecure individuals” (Huysmans, 1995, p. 53). Alessandra Buonfino shares Huysman’s approach and in her paper ‘Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe’ locates the securitization of migration in the agenda of democratic politics where the creation of dichotomies is “a strategy for maintaining the harmony of the ‘community’” (Buonfino, 2004, p. 24). Migration provides states with a great opportunity to strengthen its political sovereignty as democracy, as a regime of power, “requires unity but it is only thinkable through diversity” (Laclau, 2001, p. 4).

Within the literature on the securitization of migration there is a dominant position that the European Union’s integration project is built upon a securitization agenda reflecting national approaches to migration. Both Buonfino and Huysman engage with that approach discussing how the European Union’s conviction to legalize the free movement of populations between member states in order to strengthen the Union’s economic sovereignty could only be established parallel to the development of restrictive migration policies. In his article ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’ Huysman looks into how in the 1980s for the
Third Pillar of Justice the European integration project was socially constructed as a security question (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 571). Through “a dynamic interplay of public opinion, mass media and governments” (Buonfino, 2004, p. 48) migration was established “as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labour market stability” (Huysmans, 2000, p. 752)\(^{24}\). In the book *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum* Huysman (2006) explores further the securitization of migration as a technique of governance in Europe (McSweeney, 1996, p. 92\(^{25}\)).

Buonfino continues to argue that the conceptualization of the securitization of migration as a constant balance between democratic unity and democratic plurality risks to implode into a project that will have the exact opposite results to its aims. Irina Angelescu shares Buonfino’s concern and builds upon Huysmans paper on EU and the politicization of migration as a security project to explore the case of Romanian immigrants in Italy. In her paper ‘All New Migration Debates Commence in Rome: New Developments in the Securitization of Migration in the EU’ (Angelescu, 2008) she argues that this approach to the politicization of migration reproduces the threats it aims to secure diluting societal homogeneity, weakening the identity of EU and limiting integration prospects. Maggie Ibrahim and Gwendolyn Sasse claim that the politicization of migration as a security threat does not just reproduce the insecurities it is aiming to eliminate but produces racist and xenophobic discourses leading to the institutionalization of violations of human


\(^{25}\) McSweeney shares this argument and discusses further how identity is used for tougher policies
rights (Ibrahim, 2005, p. 163; Sasse, 2005). National identity is acting as a means of control and established inequality amongst population groups within specific political units. Robert Dover in his paper ‘Towards a Common EU Immigration Policy: a Securitization Too Far’ (Dover, 2008, p. 113) adopts a similar approach and explores the political, economic and social consequences of the securitization of migration for both EU and African migrants.

Scholars have also argued that problematizing the securitization of migration in relation to the democratic regime and identifying it as part of states’ security project associates it with referent objects pragmatically not linked with it. As mentioned before securitization theory frames security interests and the identities of actors as social products. One of the main arguments is that despite the fact that existential threats are real as the “noun security” itself and the requirements for a successful securitization move change, “our understanding of the objects of security” change “our understanding about them” (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 227) 26. Thinking about migration as part of a greater securitization policy agenda endangers its association with irrelevant political problems. Terrorism is an example of a security threat that has been linked to migration. The 9/11 incident has triggered a hegemonic discourse linking terrorism and migration and calling for the stronger securitization of migration. Buonfino and Christina Boswell (2007) identify that “today, the border between security, terrorism, immigration and social fear has become very thin” (Buonfino, 2004, p. 23) as terrorism has been associated with the

26 in this article Hysman discusses further the above criticism bringing up the work of Baldwin (1997)
violent acts of non-nationals on state territory. Containing competing ideologies under a common rule of law has always been a challenge for states. Terrorist acts in the form of the 9/11 incident and the increase in the number of migrants have changed the agenda of national securitization projects turning their politicization into co-dependent parts of national security projects.

States are not the only modes of power that have their own agenda in relation to the securitization of migration. The key agent in a successful securitization move is a competent, qualified and respected securitizing actor. Bigo argues that

*the security professionals themselves, along with some academics, tend to claim that they are only responding to new threats requiring exceptional measures beyond the normal demands of everyday politics, however, the transformation of security and the consequent focus on immigrants is directly related to their own immediate interests (competition for budgets and missions) and to the transformation of technologies they use*

~ Bigo, 2002, p. 63 – 64

Successful securitizing moves have to be evaluated in relation to the political processes through which the securitizing actors establish their political power. If Huysman and Buonfino approach the securitization of migration as a state project Bigo’s work relates it to securitizing actors’ interests. The politicization of migration is no longer identified with the interests of the states but with the interests of the social, economic and political players that will provide securitizing actors with the electoral power to maintain their political status. For Bigo political power is still central in determining the politicization of migration but differs on the processes it refers to.
Within the societal sector human collectivities of a substantive size are qualified as groups able to politically secure their rights. The disruptive power of migration on national levels is an expression of the political efforts of migrants, as a human collectivity, to secure their rights. Hansen questions the extent to which these efforts can lead to successful securitizing moves as the state is proactively stripping migrants from their rights and a sovereign voice through which they could potentially express their interests within the formal political channels of the state. Migrants “are constrained in their ability to speak security and are therefore prevented from being subjects worthy of consideration and protection” (Hansen, 2000: 285). The growth of governmental and non-governmental organisations and the development of the discourse of human security can potentially act as facilitators of migrants’ voices. Nevertheless within states, despite the fact that public opinion can be influenced by these agents, these discourses are less likely to be adopted, endorsed and employed by securitizing actors due to conflicts of interests. Convenient silence of a strong securitizing actor can be a strategic choice for the prevention of discourses to be endorsed on a political level. Researching the ways these voices emerge and how they are being endorsed or ignored on a political level brings forward the interests of the actors and helps to trace the political processes through which the regimes of power emerge on a state level.

3.5 Securitization Theory and the Politics of Exception

Existential threats are defined as threats to the sovereignty of the referent object. Carl Schmitt in his book *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept*
of Sovereignty discusses how within the contemporary political system sovereignty emerges as problematic concept. For Schmitt “the authority to suspend valid law – be it in general or in a specific case – is so much the actual mark of sovereignty” (Schmitt, 1985, p. 9). The sovereign is not seen as the one acting in the name of the law but deciding on the exception. Agamben built upon Schmitt’s work to argue that if political and judicial measures are built upon the politics of exception then the law does not have legal form (Agamben, 2005, p. 1). In Huysmans words “Schmitt’s work grounds the political in a conception of the exception, Agamden seeks to ground it in a conception of the exception-as-the-rule” (Huysmans, 2008, p. 167).

Huysman connected the politics of exception with the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. He argued that securitizing moves are the “rhetorical devices” through which exceptional policy measures are politically legitimized (Huysmans, 2006a, p. 139). For him the politicization of migration was a good example of that connection as it has involved the establishment of measures, new surveillance technologies, tighter techniques of governance and exclusionary policies, that trespass the constitutionally protected basic human rights. In his paper ‘Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK’ along with Alessandra Buonfino they discuss how the parliamentary debates in the UK employed a securitization discourse to legitimize “politics of exception” redefining the relationship between freedom and security within liberal democracies (Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008, p. 771).
Within securitization theory two of the conditions for the success of a securitizing move are the existence of an audience that accepts the speech act and a securitizing actor respected by the audience. Despite the fact that this condition has a pluralistic character for Schmitt and Agamben due to the political meaning of exception “the one who holds the actual power to impose a decision must prevail over the objectified normative processes” (Huysmans, 2008, p. 168), thus delegitimating the liberal democratic character of the collectivity. In the case of migration the national population is being empowered to act against the constitutional objectives in relation to equality and the respect of the basic human rights. Politics of exception emerge in the form of social and economic exclusions, cultural norms and not just political exclusions.

3.6 ARGUING FOR THE DESECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

A very important aspect of Huysman’s work is his pledge towards the desecuritization (Huysmans, 1998b, p. 571) of migration. Framing the politicization of migration as a product of a security project is not about ‘understanding the processes of securitization as such but the causal processes which produce the drama in the present context’ with the purpose “to formulate possible actions to desecuritize the story of the migrant” (Huysmans, 1995, p. 66). In terms of political practice desecuritization is “a critical strategy” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 570 – 571) and “involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the ‘security’ agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation” (Williams, 2003, p. 523).
Security scholars have extensively problematized the process of the politicization of migration as a security threat, as a socially, economically and politically failing strategy because it burdens the politics of migration with non-related threats. The ones that engage with desecuritization employ Huysman’s concept not to challenge the responsiveness of securitization as a policy strategy but aim to question the association of migration with the “looming Schmittian politics” (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014, p. 333) and the implication this has to the institutionalisation of human rights violations. By reconceptualising the “normative question of how political government should be organised” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 574) they aim to move away from questions of efficiency to an

ethico-political judgement of a particular form of organising the political. One does not primarily oppose securitising migration because it is an ineffective way of dealing with the question of migration but because one cannot ethically justify the specific organisation of the political community articulated through security practices.

~ Huysmans, 1998, p. 574

This turn requires the conscious realization that “the representation of the migrant as an existential threat has implications for how a community defines its good and just way of life” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 570), which in turn has implications in fuelling radical right-wing ideologies. As the securitization of migration is closely linked to the ways nationalism is experienced on a social level the desecuritization of migration demands for the redirection of the state’s strategy with regards to the identitarian politics, “the way people relate to themselves and to others” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 573) and the way identity and belonging are intrinsically linked to state
membership and human rights. “Then the securitization of migration becomes linked to the general question about the political integration of a community”, about participation in state structures and “about definitions of the good and right way of life” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 573).

3.7 **Securitization – a Positive or a Negative Concept?**

For many scholars desecuritization has been criticized as an ‘underspecified’ concept (Aradau, 2004: 388) with debatable effectiveness as a counter strategy. These criticisms have opened a debate on whether securitization is an inherently negative or open to positive prospects, concept. In 2004 Claudia Aradau published an article that has been identified to have defined this debate. In the article entitled ‘Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation’ Aradau argued that to respond to this debate the theorization of securitization/desecuritization had to be tackled first on a political level and then proceeding on an analytical level. For Aradau in securitization the political processes that call for “exceptional politics of speed and enemy exclusion” bypass democratic political processes and principles (2004: 388) producing new enemies. Desecuritization within this context “becomes an ethical political choice which refuses to let democratic politics to slip into exceptional politics” (Aradau, 2004: 393). This approach establishes securitization as an inherently negative concept as the question furthers from the ‘effectiveness’ of securitization/desecuritization as political processes and “becomes one about the kind of politics we want. Do we want politics of exceptional measures or do we want democratic politics of slow
procedures which can be contested?” (Aradau, 2004: 393). As a way forward Aradau introduces a new conceptualization of the concept of emancipation, as an alternative to desecuritization, that is distant from the Welsh School and is linked to democratic political processes.

Floyd contributed to the debate on “an evaluative bifurcation of the concept of securitization into positive and negative securitization” (2007a: 327) in 2007 with her article ‘Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies’. Moving away from discussing the process of securitization and focusing on the outcome after establishing that the two schools have no “forbidding epistemological and methodological hurdles” that would prohibit a dialogue between them (2007a, p. 327) Floyd attempts a bridge-building with the purpose to argue that securitization “is neither mainly ‘negative’ as suggested by Waever, nor necessarily “positive” as suggested by Booth and Wyn Jones, but rather issue-dependent” (Floyd, 2007a, p. 328). As a response she introduces a third approach, a strategy, that, taking on board arguments from both schools, “corresponds to what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics” and argues that the whether a securitization is positive or negative depends on “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation” (Floyd, 2007a, p. 338).

Unlike Floyd, McDonald identified securitization theory as an inherently negative concept due to the theory’s analytical narrowness. As Aradau by focusing
on the procedural part of securitization he argued that by defining the nature of an act “solely in terms of designation of threats to security” ignoring the way security is understood in particular contexts”, securitization takes an inherently negative concept as it “acquires content only through representations of danger and threat” (2007: 564).

Roe in his aim to establish prospects for the emergence of a positive security identified the basis of the negative claims as the development of the debate on the “acceptance of an essentialized (Schmittian) logic of security” (Roe, 2012: 249). The two arguments upon which he argues for a positive security are firstly the ‘lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” in liberal democracies and secondly that even though securitization is built on a conceptualization of politics based on realism the modes of extraordinary politics “also serve to reveal more non-divisive referent and cooperative practices” (Roe, 2012: 250).

These scholars apart from engaging with the theoretical aspects of this debate to work through the challenges critical issues pose for politics they evaluate securitization/desecuritization in the context of specific threats and security sectors, such as human trafficking (Aradau, 2004), migration (Aradau, 2004; McDonald, 2008), HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006), environment (Floyd, 2007a). Through these examples instead of reaching concrete conclusions the authors tried to unfold that practical challenges this debate poses for the theorization of securitization and desecuritization.
3.8 **Securitization Theory and Migration – a Critique**

In order to understand a theory in its full depth and fully identify its relevance and applicability for this specific case study the related critiques need to be acknowledged. Due to the word limitation of this project the critiques that will be discussed are the ones relevant to the specific case study. As discussed in the previous sections in the context of securitization theory migration enters the national security agenda as a threat against the national societal security. In the case of female migrant domestic workers their securitization is being developed in two levels since both their national and gender identities are perceived/articulated as constituting existential threats, given that gender is experienced as a threat against the embedded patriarchal structures and a systematic organization of life.

One of the main critiques, also known as the normative dilemma, is that researchers by talking security can “contribute to the securitisation of an area” (Huysmans, 1999, p. 18). Huysmans (2002), Floyd (2007b) and other scholars have discussed how by writing security the researcher is reproducing the reality s/he is analysing as by speaking security “him-herself executes a speech act” (Taureck, 2006, p. 57). This project aims to critically diagnose the process through which female migrant domestic labour in Greece is politicised as a security threat taking an objective step back from endorsing any specific narratives of securitization or desecuritization.

Securitization theory has also been criticised with regards to its conceptualization of identity as something fixed (Innes, 2015), a constant in relation
to which actors speak security. As already discussed in section 3.3 of this chapter McSweeney was the first to criticize the Copenhagen School on such grounds by arguing that “identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups” (McSweeney, 1999, p. 73). How people view and experience identity is fluid, subjective and closely related to the specific context within which analysis is taking place at a specific point in time. As such the environment and the view of identity themselves have to be identified for any given context. Wæver and Buzan’s addressed these critiques by explaining that in the context of securitization theory “they have attempted to demonstrate that social communities defined in terms of identity can become a reference object in some events of securitization in which the value that is being protected is not the sovereignty of state but rather the identity of community” (Panic, 2009, p. 36). With regards to this project the politicization of migration as a security threat to the societal identity of Greece can help in exploring the links between the politicization process and the high levels of racism and xenophobia. The question that this project aims to ask is not what constitutes the Greek identity itself but what the effect the identity of otherness has for the experiences of migrants.

As Stritzel argued (2007, p. 363) the second criticism is with regards to the exact mechanism between the triology of speech act, actors and audience (Balzacq, 2005) and the lack of specificity in the substance of their terms. The questions that he raises fall in the broader criticisms with regards to the underdevelopment of securitization theory and more specifically its inadequate theorization of the power relations between actors and audience, the identification of the relevant actors and
audience (Stritzel, 2007, p. 363), of discourse in the securitization process and the structure of the theory role the ‘speech act’ is playing in the construction of security (Skleparis, 2011, p. 6).

With regards to the speech acts a few scholars have raised a number of concerns. The first is about the growing role electronic media, audiovisual media, non-verbal forms of communication, material practices and images play in the communication of news stories and ideas and as a consequence despite the fact that they are not included in the theorization of the securitizing moves they are still used as integral aspects of the securitization processes (Balzacq, 2008; Bigo, 2000; 2002; 2006; Bigo and Guild, 2005; Hansen, 2000; Huysmans 2004; 2006b; Skleparis, 2011; Williams; 2003). In response to these concerns Hansen (2007) and Moller (2007) argued that “images are ambiguous in meaning, making it harder to control the meaning others take away from them. This renders the strategic use of images more difficult, while also pointing to the importance of contestation over meaning central to security politics” (McDonald, 2008, p. 570). The second criticism is the narrow definition of the context of speech acts. In McDonald’s words “the context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. The potential for security to be constructed over time through a range of incremental processes and representations is not addressed” (2008, p. 564).

For the purposes of this project it is argued that even though the visual means and images of communicating security will not be explored, the securitizing interests of the actors and their acceptance by the social sphere can still be identified through
the study of the speech acts in the plenary sessions and the documentations of the functional actor. As such even though the visual means are not rendered irrelevant, they will not effect the conclusions of this research project. Moreover given the fact that the politicization of migration in Greece as a security threat is being explored in this project within the timeline of 20 years, this timeframe provides the opportunity for the researcher to address the criticisms with regards to the context of speech acts as they will be explored as narratives over time rather than instantaneous acts. Overall for Wæver the fact that “the theory does not point to one particular type of study as the right one… optimistically, the diversity is a sign that the theory… can generate/structure different kinds of usage and even produce anomalies for itself in interesting ways” (Stritzel, 2007, p. 359).

CONCLUSION

This chapter presented this research project’s design by discussing the way the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory will be used as the basis for the development of this project’s analytical framework. Divided in two parts it started off by providing an overview of how Security Studies as a sub-discipline of the field of International Relations has contributed to the study of the politicization of migration. This part navigated through the different schools within Security Studies, the Welsh School, the Paris School, Human Security, Feminism and Critical Security Studies, and provided an overview of the theoretical grounds upon which
security has been theorised and discussed how migration has been problematized in each of this schools.

The second part of the chapter focused on Copenhagen School’s securitization theory which has been used to act as the basis for this project’s analytical framework. This part provided a more in depth presentation of the specific school by discussing the ways security has been conceptualised as a socially constructed state of being and presenting its different analytical components. This part concluded by providing a review on the ways securitization theory has been mobilized to explore the politicization of migration as part of the national security agenda of states focusing on the concepts of Schmit’s politics of exception and Huysman’s desecuritization in problematizing the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of migrants. This second part concluded by looking into the criticisms of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory that are relevant to this project and addressed them individually.

Having established the theoretical basis upon which this project was developed in order to address the research puzzle the chapters that follow consist the analytical chapters of this research project. The analysis starts with Chapter 2 that provides a presentation of the facts and figures on the feminisation of migration in Greece as part of the contemporary migration wave and the emergence of domestic labour as the occupation almost exclusively occupying the totality of the female migrant population in Greece. Keeping in mind that the developments in Greece are
part of the global developments on the feminisation of migration it starts off by situating the case of Greece in the global arena.
Chapter 2
The Feminisation of Migration and the Case of Female Migrant Domestic Labour in Greece

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will act as a background chapter aiming to situate this research project in its immediate historical and geographical context. The information provided has been used as the basis upon which this research project was designed and built. Moreover the provided data will be utilized in conjunction with the analytical chapters to answer the second research question of this project with regards to the ways the securitization processes have shaped the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour and the experiences of female migrant domestic workers in Greece. The data was collected by conducting research in national and international data sources as well as research projects and governmental and nongovernmental publications.

The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section situates Greece within the global care chains. Starting by looking into the global patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour, it identifies Greece’s role as a host country of the specific migrant group in relation to the global labour market. By situating the
case of Greece within the global developments of female migrant domestic labour, I will acknowledge the independent global factors that have affected the case of Greece, that cannot be controlled on a national level and which affect national developments. The second section offers a situational analysis of female migrant domestic labour in Greece, aiming to build the profile of the migrant domestic worker for the Greek case. The main argument of this research project is that the exploitation of female migrant domestic workers is being enabled through established migration regimes. Since the politicization of female migrant domestic labour is dependent upon the politicization of migration, the profile of the female migrant domestic worker in Greece has to be built within the context of the contemporary migrant wave. As such, I will then move to present the emergence and growth of the contemporary migration wave in Greece and identify the size and composition of the group of female migrant domestic workers as part of this wave.

1 THE FEMINISATION OF MIGRATION: A GLOBAL PHENOMENON

Domestic responsibilities and the labour activities of the private sphere are “simply indispensable for the economy outside the household to function” (ILO, 2009, p. 5). Nevertheless and regardless of their social, economic and political value, domestic tasks have historically been considered as a menial (Roberts, 1997, p. 51), low skilled, low class supporting “service” subject to no legal protection or labour rights, and as Bridget Anderson and Raffaella Sarti have argued, an occupation associated with slavery, “colonial or imperialistic policies” and class divisions
(Anderson, 2000, p. 128; Fauve-Chamoux, 2004; Sarti, 2008). Due to this social status, when afforded it has been outsourced to socially, economically or politically vulnerable and underprivileged population groups and predominantly women. Gender is an inherent dimension of this specific labour sector due to the reproductive element of domestic labour, which has always been a controlling factor in determining its composition.

The past couple of decades saw the global emergence of an expanding domestic labour sector. According to the ILO, between 1995 and 2010 the global domestic workers labour force rose from 33.2 million to 52.6 million, almost doubling in size (ILO, 2014a, p. 24). As a labour sector it has grown to account for 1.7 per cent of the global workforce and for 3.6 per cent of all wage employment (ILO, 2014c, p. 2). Maintaining the gendered attributes of the total domestic labour population, 83 percent have been documented as females and 17.2 million have been documented as children aged 5-17 years old (ILO, 2014c, p. 2). Given the fact that the ILO incorporates labour-intensive housekeeping jobs performed by male workers, such as gardening, to the data for this labour sector, and given the fact that the aim of this project is to research domestic labour it can be concluded that women are almost exclusively employed in this labour category.

The global expansion of the domestic labour sector in terms of both its composition and its size has not been geographically uniform. As seen in Table 3, there is much higher concentration of domestic workers in Asia and the Pacific as well as Latin America and the Caribbean in comparison to Eastern Europe, CIS and
It’s true that the global population distribution is uneven in these areas but this fact does not justify the observed disparities as the proportional employment participation and the monetary outsource of domestic labour are still higher in the same regions, e.g. Latin America and Caribbean female domestic workers make up 26.6 per cent of paid employees and 17.4 per cent of the total working population in comparison to Eastern Europe and CIS where the same group forms 0.5 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively (ILO, 2014a, p. 19).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developed countries</th>
<th>Domestic Workers</th>
<th>Domestic Workers as percentage in total employment</th>
<th>Domestic Workers as percentage of paid employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and CIS</td>
<td>3 555 000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific excluding China</td>
<td>595 000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>21 467 000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 077 000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19 593 000</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5 236 000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle east</td>
<td>2 107 000</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52 553 000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
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<th>Female Domestic Workers as percentage in total employment</th>
<th>Female Domestic Workers as percentage of paid employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and CIS</td>
<td>396 000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific excluding China</td>
<td>17 464 000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>9 013 000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>18 005 000</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle east</td>
<td>3 835 000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43 628 000</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male Domestic Workers</th>
<th>Male Domestic Workers as percentage in total employment</th>
<th>Male Domestic Workers as percentage of paid employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>958 000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and CIS</td>
<td>199 000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>4 003 000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>excluding China</td>
<td>3 064 000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>1 588 000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1 400 000</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle east</td>
<td>778 000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 990 000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Global and regional estimates on the number of domestic workers in 2010. Males Source: ILO (2014a, p. 19)
The political element of domestic labour (Connelo, 1987; O’Brien, 1981), as the politics of reproduction (Brenner and Laslett, 1991; Glenn, 1991; Glenn, 1992) functions as the basis of the construction of national identity and nationhood (Hastings, 1997), and presents a very strong aspect in the negotiation of the profile of domestic labour as an occupation and the identity of the domestic worker. In that sense despite the historical continuities in the underprivileged and marginalized status of domestic labour, it is expected that the patterns and trends of the domestic labour sector will be highly dependent on the political economy in which the allocation of the tasks of the private sphere is negotiated and managed.

Looking into the history of domestic labour as a paid occupation, the reliance on unpaid family labour was the common feature in poorer households, whereas the outsourcing of labour activities to economically or politically weaker national groups was observed in wealthier households. This division of labour resulted in the migration of national population groups from rural to urban areas. In developed countries, the mid-nineteenth century onwards brought a more international and inter-continental take on the outsourcing of domestic labour activities where migrants moved from poorer to richer countries and from less to more powerful ones, with which there were imperialistic ties, for the purposes of such employment (Sarti, 2008, p. 78). Contemporarily and in post-industrial society (Anderson, 2007, p. 247) “the last quarter of the twentieth century saw a burgeoning of employment opportunities for middle class women in Western Europe and America” (Lutz, 2008, p. xi) resulting in the integration of women in the public sphere. Women started to engage more actively with the formal labour market and work towards the creation
of a professional image, while disassociating themselves from the private sphere. The growing economic divide between developed and developing countries, the absence of labour opportunities for the women of developing economies, the inherent association of domestic skills with women, the intensification of global labour exchanges that has been enabled by capitalism and the abundant demand for female migrant domestic labour in developed countries, have led to the growth in the supply of female migrant domestic labour. Developing countries are not only the source of domestic labour for developed countries, but also for richer groups within their borders. Consequently rural areas of those countries are growingly suffering from a domestic labour deficit due to their national and international export of labour power.

Whereas gender as well as “the presence of international and intercontinental migrant domestic workers is not a peculiar feature of the current situation… the contemporary breadth of domestics’ international migration” (Sarti, 2008, p. 88), their varied educational and professional backgrounds and the predominant dislocations of migrant women (Parrenas, 2001, p. 23) are setting the case of contemporary domestic workers apart from the past. With global economic and political inequalities, the emerged domestic labour sector consists of a more diverse population. Some, in cases of in-border migration, still come from poorer families where others, more the case in international migration, are from middle-class backgrounds. According to available data “domestic workers include teachers, nurses, university lecturers and lawyers; others are farmers, vendors, mothers, domestic workers or rural/urban unemployed” (Anderson, 2000, p. 28). Whereas
poverty remains the main reason behind their migrating decision global inequalities, “domestic violence, labour market segregation and the unequal division of labour in the family” have grown to become contributing factors (Parrenas, 2001, p. 61).

This emerging international division of labour (Parrenas, 2001, p. 61) has raised concerns “primarily with the transnational dimension of care labour provision” which has resulted in the creation of “a series of personal links between people across the globe based on the paid or unpaid work of caring” (Hoschschild, 2001) which Hoschschild has explored under the term ‘Global Care Chains’. “Global care chains do more than demonstrate the connections between personal lives and global politics; they indicate the structures and processes that reflect and perpetuate the unequal distribution of resources global” (Yeates, 2004, p. 373). In that sense the available data on the domestic labour sector reveals the global economic and political dichotomies between and within states.

Given that domestic labour is being conducted in the apolitical, unregulated and gendered private sphere, within the current social, economic and political setting, it is outsourced to non-national labour groups as a labour sector and has emerged as part of the peripheral economy to support the reproductive labour needs of the capitalist system (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 3). Effectively, even though to a great extent monetarily outsourced, domestic work’s undervalued, underprivileged and marginalized status is being reproduced, tying it to more vulnerable population groups. In practice this status is visible through the inequalities and vulnerabilities the domestic workers experience in comparison to other labour categories even
within the global migrant community. The most current international data has revealed that more than a third of women domestic workers are not entitled to maternity protection, more than half have no limitations on their weekly hours of work under national legislation, just over half enjoy minimum wage coverage, 29.9 per cent are completely excluded from national labour legislation and 45 per cent have no entitlement to weekly rest periods or paid annual leave (ILO, 2014c, p. 2). Due to this unregulated status the available data, sourced from official national data, provides minimum estimates. ILO argues that in reality domestic workers are estimated to be close to 100 million (ILO, 2014a, p. 24), meaning that half of the domestic labour population works in the shade of the formal economy.

2 GREECE AND THE CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION WAVE

2.1 1970s: THE EMERGENCE OF GREECE AS A MIGRANT DESTINATION COUNTRY

Up until the 1950s as a newly formed state and due to social, economic and political reasons, Greece was one of the main migrant sending countries in Europe with nearly one million Greeks living abroad (Charalampopoulou, 2004, p. 81; Cavounidis, 2004, p. 35; Hatziprokopiou, 2005, p. 1). After the 1970s Greece started to experience political stability, with the collapse of the military dictatorship, the establishment of democracy, and economic growth encouraging many Greeks from Europe, Asia, Africa, the USA and Australia to repatriate on their own initiative,
bringing both capital and labour (Kiprianos, Balias and Passas, 2003, p. 151; Cavounidis, 2003, p. 223; Charalampopoulou, 2004, p. 81; Iosifides, 1997; Mousourou, 1991; Halkos and Salamouris, 2003, p. 531). The capacity of Greece to accept repatriates was seized as an opportunity by the Russian government to exercise pressure on the development of national programmes for the repatriation of approximately 400,000 Greeks living in Russia (Halkos and Salamouris, 2003, p. 519). There were also population groups of Greek ethnic origin that moved back to Greece from countries such as Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans due to political pressures, political instability, “economic decline and social reorganisation” (Halkos and Salamouris, 2003, p. 519). These groups consisted of citizens of those countries that had Greek origin. The repatriation programmes for these populations were developed by the Greek government with the cooperation of the Turkish, Cypriot, Russian and Balkan national governments, as well as the support of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Even though these repatriates don’t fit into the same category as migrants, due to their Greek ethnic origin, they add up to the total size of the new residents in Greece that had to be absorbed into social and political structures as well as the labour market. Their ethnic origin didn’t imply cultural homogeneity nor language proficiency, as the years in other countries had resulted in partial assimilation. Thus, on many occasions the distinction between migrants and repatriates was challenging practically (Halkos and Salamouris, 2003, p. 519).
Despite the repatriation of nationals, the national labour market didn’t seem to cover the labour needs of the Greek economy and “in 1972, the Federation of Greek Industry (SEV) expressed concern about Greece’s lack of workforce” (Kiprianos, Balias and Passas, 2003, p. 151). The government proceeded in giving opportunities to migrants from various countries with which there were political connections, establishing formal migration channels through issuing visas and residence permits, to seek employment in Greece. At that stage the economic migrants that had arrived to Greece were from Africa, mainly Egypt, and from Asia, mainly the Philippines and Pakistan (Kasimati, 2003, p. 33). The Greek Consulate in Cairo alone had handed 10,000 visas to Egyptian nationals who were the first migrants to legally seek employment in Greece (Koniordos, 1994). The second largest migrant group to arrive in Greece was from the Philippines and consisted of women oriented towards the private sphere and the domestic services (Iosifides and King, 1998; Anderson, 2001). Starting as a minority, this migrant group grew significantly and whereas in 1973 female migrants just about reached 1,000, in 1987 they numbered around 9,979 (Wilbers, 1990).

Data show that within a decade “the number of people with work permits had increased, from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 20,000 in the 1970s. Since then it has fluctuated between 23,000 and 34,000” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 106). By the beginning of the 1980s residence permits were issued to around 100,000 migrants of which, according to unofficial sources, 60,000 were from Africa and Asia (Kiprianos, Balias and Passas, 2003, p. 152), and, according to the Greek Ministry of Labour, “28,628 in 1980, 28,422 in 1990 and 33,912 in 1992”
(Kiprianos, Balias and Passas, 2003, p. 151) were legally employed in Greece. These numbers show that of the documented migrants approximately only 30% of them were legally employed leaving a 70% either in unemployment or in the informal economy. The observed high economic illegality implies the possibility for the existence of a substantial number of migrants with no residence permits. Unfortunately the data of the period between 1970s and 1980s is very limited and there is no information about the correlation between legal status, gender, nationality and occupation. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the existing data is the existence of a highly segmented strong informal economy in which nationality and gender played a significant role in determining the involvement of migrants in the national economy.

2.2 1980s – 1990s: The Establishment of Economic Migration in Greece

The Ministry of Public Security indicated that in 1992 there were around 500,000 foreigners in Greece, 280,000 of whom were illegal (Chletsos and Karasawoglou, 1997, p. 3). Others have estimated the number of illegal migrants to be around 590,000 (Kontis, 1996; Linardos-Rylmon, 1995), or about 5 per cent of the total population of Greece, 12.5 per cent of its active population and 15 per cent of its labour force (Chletsos and Karasawoglou, 1997, p. 3). While about half the latter are estimated to be Albanians, the actual number of Albanians in Greece is simply unknown (Lazaridis, 1996) as according to a press release by the Ministry of Public Security (21 July 1994), “during 1993 220,655 Albanian citizens, who had
illegally entered the country, were located and turned back into Albania”. This figure does not include the number of Albanians in Greece due to their illegal status and relatively high degree of spatial mobility (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 719).

The opening of the Greek borders to repatriates and the invitation of economic migrants implied the economic and political availability of the country to welcome and accommodate population groups transforming Greece into an appealing migrant destination country in the Balkans and Mediterranean. In the 1980s though “foreign immigration replaced return migration as the key element in the positive migratory balance of the country” (Charalampopoulou, 2004, p. 81; Petriniotis, 1993), and after the 1990s the country started to witness “the most massive inflow of economic migrants and refugees in its history” (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 20). Initially after the fall of the Soviet Union migrants of Russian descent saw the established institutional structures for the repatriation of Russian Greeks as migration channels and an opportunity for entry to Greece (Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 159). Parallel political developments in the Balkan countries, the fall of communism, opening of the national borders and the introduction of new policies of liberalization (Koniordos, 1994; Petrinioti, 1993b; Charalampopoulou, 2004, p. 81; Ring, 2005; Markova, 2010, p. 4), “poverty in the Third World, and the political and social upheavals in many near and Middle Eastern countries” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 105) resulted in the significant inflow of migrants from the Balkan countries as well as Africa and Middle East (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005; MIGHEALTHNET, 2009). The geographic morphology
of the Greek borders limited the ability of the state to control the inflow of migrants adding to the country’s appeal as a migrant destination (Lazaridis and Romaniszyn, 1998, p. 11).

Unfortunately, during the period 1980 – 2000, the national data on migration is very limited, mainly because research could not respond quickly enough to the pace of new developments in relation to migration. Moreover, most of the research focused on the then major migrant nationalities. Major sources of data are either national estimates or official data from the sending countries. Acknowledging the limitations of the existing data, their chronological presentation will be given with the purpose of providing an overview of the migration flows during the period that have led to the official data from the 2001 census.

Despite the fact that there is no data with relation to ethnic groups, the size of the migration wave can be estimated by data from the Greek Ministry of Public Order regarding the average annual number of foreigners with a valid residence permit between 1987 and 1989, which was 110,000 (Fakiolas and Maratou-Aliprant, 2000, p. 106), and the work permits whose number “had increased, from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 20,000 in the 1970s” and was fluctuating between 23,000 and 34,000 during the 1980s (Fakiolas and Maratou-Aliprant, 2000, p. 106). By 1991, according to the Ministry of Interior Affairs, 33,000 Bulgarian citizens had migrated to Greece as seasonal farm workers (Markova and Sarris, 1997, p. 58) and in 1991 the estimates of Albanian migrants were of around 150,000 (linardos-Rylmon, 1993, p. 17; Petrinioti, 1993a, p. 17). As for female migration, women “in
the 1980s constituted a quarter of the foreign population” (Vassilikou, 2007, p. 1) and their “participation in the labour force increased from 27 per cent in 1981, to 32 per cent in 1991” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 103). In 1992 the Greek Ministry of Public Security acknowledged the existence of 500,000 foreigners of which a bit more than half, 280,000, were illegal (Chletsos and Karasawoglou, 1997, p. 3).

In 1993, data offered a more detailed national distribution of illegal migrants in Greece. The Ministry of Public Security announced that 220,655 illegal Albanians were returned to Albania (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 719), and as estimated by the Greek Trade Union Confederation 150,000 were estimated to have remained in Greece (Lazaridis, G., and, Romaniszyn, K., 1998, p. 7). Excluding the big group of Albanians, out of 66,000 illegal migrants, Russians came second with a population of 11,770, 11,560 were Poles, 9,200 Filipinos, 8,400 Romanians, 7,000 Bulgarians, 5,200 Lebanese, 3,900 Iranian, 3,500 Iraqis, 2,650 former Yugoslavians and 2,500 Ethiopians (Markova and Sarris, 1997, p. 61). Others estimate that the number of illegal migrants was around 590,000 “or about 5% of the total population of Greece, 12.5% of its active population and 15% of its labour force” (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 719). During 1993, migrant labour was estimated to constitute 8-9% of the national labour force (Linardos-Rylmon, 1993, p. 16). Despite the involvement of migrants in the labour market, the Greek government was forced to manage a difficult situation due to the uncontrollable inflow of migrants and thus during the years 1992 to 1995 over 225,000 migrants were returned to their country on an annual basis (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002, p. 224).
For the period of 1996 - 1998, according to the Greek Ministry of Public Order, the number of foreigners with valid residence permits decreased to 80,000 per year, while the number of people with or without a valid permit was estimated to have increased from 168,000 to 254,000 annually (Petropoulos, 1994). In the above figures “only 44,883 of the 70,419 new permits in 1996 were issued to non-ethnic Greek foreigners” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 106) as the remaining were issued to ethnic Greeks. During 1997, the permits issued were 44,073 and 74,618 respectively, of which over half were issued to citizens of the former socialist countries and 39,919 of the total of 70,419 in 1996 and 43,475 of the total of 74,618 in 1997 were issued to women (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 106). According to the Ministry of Labour for the years 1996 and 1997, the number of people with work permits had decreased from 24,968 to 23,551 respectively, of which half were ethnic Greeks and citizens of other EU member states. “Therefore the number of permits to non-ethnic Greeks foreigners was about 15,000 or just over 1/3 of 1% of the registered labour force” - the lowest in the EU (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 106 - 107). With regards to the national population, by 1997 migrants constituted 5% of the total Greek population, 12.5% of its active population and 15% of the labour force (Chletsos and Karasawoglou, 1997, p. 3).

In 2000, the Albanian Department of Emigration estimated that out of the 800,000 Albanians living abroad, 500,000 were in Greece (King, 2005, p. 138 – 139). Unfortunately there is no data on the correlation between nationalities and
political and economic legality and illegality. Taking into consideration the size of just the Albanian group of migrants, the presented data as well as the figures from the Greek Ministry of Public Order on the issued residence, as shown in Table 6, reveal that the contemporary migration wave in Greece was growing in political illegality. In a research project conducted in 2000 by the Hellenic Employment Observatory, it was confirmed that this political illegality was the major source of economic illegality, as ‘44% of all migrants mentioned the difficulties they faced in finding legal work, in other words, work for which employers agreed to formal relations and social security contributions’ due to their undocumented political status and the lack of sanctions for employers (Cavounidis, 2004, p. 50 – 51).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Residence Permits</th>
<th>Migrants arrested for Deportation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>87,675</td>
<td>6,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>85,543</td>
<td>8,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>71,792</td>
<td>9,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>73,313</td>
<td>10,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70,324</td>
<td>13,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>66,548</td>
<td>21,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>65,858</td>
<td>21,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>39,780</td>
<td>15,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3,119</td>
<td>22,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,629</td>
<td>27,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>20,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Residence Permits and Deportation Numbers in the 1990s Source: Greek Ministry of Public Order (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005)

The basic characteristics of the relatively young and developing Greek economy in which the demand for migrant labour emerged were its small family-
run enterprises, the persistence of a large informal economy, the high demand for manual labour and the seasonality of the agricultural, tourist, construction and shipping sectors. As with every developing economy, apart from the increase in demand for highly skilled, knowledge intensive work, there was also a high need for low-paid, low-skilled and manual labour, a need not filled by nationals as it was rejected on the grounds that it did not meet their higher socio-economic aspirations (Charalampopoulou, 2004, p. 81).

Despite the fact that there is no detailed data on the migrant labour market according to Fakiolas (1997), all the indicators for that period show that migrant labour came to fill these gaps and thus as it grew it started to constitute a separate segment of the national labour market (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 720). Migrants had been a preferred source of labour because they were more flexible in their conditions of employment (OECD, 2005), as a study carried out in the North of Greece showed they were less expensive, “the real cost of their labour to Greek employers (was) estimated to be 40% below that of locals” (Lianos, Sarris and Katseli, 1995) and they were not subject to labour regulations. The employment of non-EU migrants is also reflected in the size of the underground economy which was estimated to form 30 - 35% of the national GDP (Baldwin-Edwards and Lios-Rothsch, 1999, p. 207).
Table 7. Evolution of Legal and Undocumented non-EU Immigrant Stock in Greece, Source: IMEPO (Migration Policy Institute) (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005, p. 3)

2.3 2001: THE YEAR OF THE CENSUS AND A CLEARER PICTURE ON MIGRATION

The 1980s marked the beginning of the current migration wave and the unwillingness of the Greek state to regularise migration. In addition, its strong efforts to contain its size through the deportation of migrants gave the impression that the inflow of migrants was an external imposition. The 2001 census was the first source of official data that gave a clearer picture not only of the size of the migration wave, but also the involvement of migrants in national structures. We have to acknowledge that due to the low regularisation of migrants the census data cannot
provide an in depth account of the actual size and composition of the migration wave, due to high illegality.

According to the census, and as expected from the data available up until 2001, the majority of migrants were mainly entering from the Balkan countries (EUROSTATL 2009, p. 1). The dominant migrant nationality was that of Albanians with a population size of 443,550 (King, 2005, p. 138 – 139) making up “two-thirds of the non-EU population and more than a half of the total immigrant numbers” (King, 2005, p. 140), followed by Bulgarians, Georgians and Romanians as the second largest groups. The remaining identified nationalities were Egyptians, Pakistanis, Ukrainians, Polish, Indians, Filipinos, Bangladeshis, Syrians and Nigerians (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002a, p. 212), making up 37% of the counted migrant population and revealing the presence of a more heterogeneous group than anticipated. In relation to the Greek population, the 796,713 migrants constituted 7% of the total population and 7.7% of the male and 6.3% of the female population (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 20). Compared to the rest of the European countries, by 2001 Greece had the greatest percentage of non-EU migrants within its migrant population, around 10 per cent, compared to 3 per cent in Italy and 1.3 per cent in Spain (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002a, p. 222).
In 1991 where there were signs that the female migrant labour market was growing, perceived as due to family reunification. One of the major developments during the 1990s, apart from the increase in the diversity of nationalities, was the change in the gender patterns of migration. The census showed that by 2001 female migration had matched male migration and it consisted of 40% of almost every migrant national group apart from Bulgarians and Georgians, where the percentage was reversed as women consisted of 60% of the subsequent national groups. Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s female migration was associated with Filipino women, by 2001 it involved every national group present in Greece and “it is remarkable that the migrants from all the major source countries that correspond to the former Soviet Union are mainly women and not men” (Cavounidis, 2003, p. 227). The same pattern is observed for countries of the former Soviet Union: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia (Cavounidis, 2002). As expected from the high proportion of female migrants within each national group, movement statistics show that 59% of the women were migrating on their own, giving employment as their major drive, compared to 41% for men (KETHI, 2006,
Among those women, 46.7% migrated as individuals and not with their families, compared to a 44.1% of men (KETHI, 2006, p. 47).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Migrant Population</th>
<th>National Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Percentage of Female Migrants in the Census (Cavounidis, 2003, p. 227)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drive</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>244,628</td>
<td>168,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>24,503</td>
<td>27,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Reunification</td>
<td>47,847</td>
<td>52,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>98,574</td>
<td>98,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>415,552</td>
<td>346,639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Migration Drives 2001 Census Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality (www.kethi.gr) (KETHI, 2006)

The geographical susceptibility of Greece to migrant inflows from neighboring countries and the economic and political restructuring of the Balkan countries cannot be identified as the only push and pull factors behind the growth of the contemporary migration wave in Greece. Despite the fact that they constitute the triggers of the migration wave, the rise in the inflow of migrants despite the decrease
in the issued residence permits and the increase of deportation rates, the changes in
the national composition of migration on the one hand and the patterns of migration
in relation to gender and drives on the other indicate that during the 1990s the main
national development was the establishment of a migrant labour market within a
peripheral economy, supporting the growth of the core national economy.

Within this economy and despite the increase in the inflow of migrants, jobs
maintained their low-skilled profile and were constrained to the manufacturing,
construction, tourism, commerce, transport, domestic services and to a lesser extent
utilities and banking sectors (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004; Cavounidis, 2004, p. 49). The
only major change was in relation to female migration. The presence of female
migrants from the Philippines in the 1980s and their exclusive employment in
domestic services has revealed the existence of strong national gendered divisions
of labour expected to be transferred in the established migrant peripheral economy.
Indeed the 2001 census showed that the demand for cheap domestic labour was
absorbing half of the women in each national group (Cavounidis, 2004, p. 48),
signaling the feminization of migration in Greece.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Albanian Male</th>
<th>Albanian Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>162,655 (24%)</td>
<td>8,089 (15.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>72,098 (44.3%)</td>
<td>559 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Hotels, Restaurants</td>
<td>20,339 (12.5%)</td>
<td>10,211 (19.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>18,962 (11%)</td>
<td>4,815 (9.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, Storage, Communications</td>
<td>4,029 (2.3%)</td>
<td>253 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>429 (0.2%)</td>
<td>12 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>261 (0.1%)</td>
<td>12 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Insurance Finance</td>
<td>127 (0.1%)</td>
<td>138 (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Services</td>
<td>6,050 (3.5%)</td>
<td>27,712 (53.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>162,655 (100%)</td>
<td>51,836 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Bulgarian Male</th>
<th>Bulgarian Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4,291 (47.3%)</td>
<td>3,295 (26.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2,376 (26.2%)</td>
<td>119 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Hotels, Restaurants</td>
<td>996 (11.0%)</td>
<td>2,048 (16.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>917 (10.1%)</td>
<td>531 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, Storage, Communications</td>
<td>360 (4.0%)</td>
<td>53 (0.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>29 (0.3%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>20 (0.2%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Insurance Finance</td>
<td>12 (0.1%)</td>
<td>19 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Services</td>
<td>513 (5.7%)</td>
<td>6,246 (50.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,066 (100%)</td>
<td>12,313 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Occupations of Bulgarian Migrants Census Data 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Romanian Male</th>
<th>Romanian Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,574 (28.1%)</td>
<td>1,006 (23.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3,839 (41.9%)</td>
<td>47 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Hotels, Restaurants</td>
<td>957 (10.4%)</td>
<td>1,170 (26.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,421 (15.5%)</td>
<td>439 (10.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, Storage, Communications</td>
<td>209 (2.2%)</td>
<td>45 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>11 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>42 (0.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, Insurance Finance</td>
<td>14 (0.1%)</td>
<td>13 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Services</td>
<td>400 (3.9%)</td>
<td>1,613 (37.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,154 (100%)</td>
<td>4,341 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 2.4 2000s: The Recent Developments

Census data provided a clearer picture on migration and during the 2000s research focused on analyzing the 2001 data and conducting projects to further explore aspects of the identified trends and patterns of the migration wave (KETHI, 2006). The next thorough research offering in depth data was conducted in 2011 with the next census. During the first decade of the new millennium the total number
of registered migrants had risen by around 100,000. The two major developments were the inflow of more national groups and the significant rise in female migration (EUROSTAT, 2009, p. 1). As identified by 2009’s EUROSTAT report, whereas in the early 1980s migration to Greece was mainly from the Balkan countries (EUROSTAT, 2009, p. 1), Greek borders became legally and illegally accessible to multinational economic and political migrants. As a consequence, within the EU Greece has become the country with the highest number of migrants from countries outside EU, with which it has no specific cultural, economic or political ties, turning it into a highly nationally and culturally diverse country (EUROSTAT, 2009, p. 2). The absence of responsive legalisation policies and the reluctance to regulate the migrant labour market, the establishment of the migrant labour market at the periphery of the economy, the unwillingness to recognise migrants’ national professional qualifications and their exclusion from white collar work (OECD, 2005) were the major pull factors that enabled the inflow of more nationally diverse migrant groups.
The total migrant population consists of 10% of the national population and 12% of the national working population (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 20) and according to recent estimates the total migrant population including illegal migrants is around 1,100,000 - 1,200,000 presenting a rather insignificant difference compared to the 905,224 census sum. Migrant inflows have exceeded the exponential estimations: while in October 2004 around 700,000 residence permits were given away, the 2001 census estimated they wouldn’t exceed 592,159 (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 22). Despite the rise in the issued residence permits, the data on the number of third world nationals found to be illegally present in Greece showed a continuing rise, reaching 115,630 in 2010, with an EU average of 17,000. Either due to the economic crisis or other factors in the years 2011 and 2012, the number of migrants found to be illegally present in Greece started to drop.
As the crisis is very recent, no concrete conclusions can be drawn about how it has affected the crisis or how it will affect migration flows in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>99,170</td>
<td>106,010</td>
<td>79,805</td>
<td>64,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7,545</td>
<td>9,620</td>
<td>9,035</td>
<td>7,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106,715</td>
<td>115,630</td>
<td>88,840</td>
<td>72,420</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 15. Third country nationals found to be illegally present**  
*Source: Eurostat (12.09.2013)*

The second major development was the equalization of migration between the two genders. Whereas in 2001 male migration consisted of 59% of the counted migrant population and female 41% by 2011, it was 51% and 49% respectively. In 2005 a survey by the Hellenic Statistical Authority on family budgeting data showed that domestic services constituted the second most popular migrant profession employing 20% of the whole migrant population (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 42) and that 76% of domestic workers are migrants (Kontis, Zografakis and Mitrakos, 2006, p. 64). In 2007, Albanian immigrants represented 65% of the migrant population and 43% of all foreign women, Bulgarians 6.8% of the migrant population and 15% of all foreign women, Romanians 4.6% and 5.5% of all foreign women, women from Ukraine, Georgia and Poland represented 8%, 5% and 4% of the foreign female population in Greece respectively (Vassilikou, 2007, p. 1). The comparison between the data of the nationalities of female migrants in 2001, as shown in Table 14, and the data from the 2011 census, as in Table 16, shows that contrary to the whole migrant population the nationalities of female migrants in their majority have remained the same and in the nationalities where females were the dominant gender the inflows have increased.
### Table 16. Percentage of Female Migrants Census 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Group</th>
<th>Total Migrant Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>225,298 (47%)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>6,822 (70%)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>13,405 (79%)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>11,025 (80%)</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>7,134 (69%)</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,164 (73%)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>18,157 (66%)</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>47,229 (52%)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>25,520 (55%)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>4,606 (57%)</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>360,360</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (2001)*

### 3 THE FEMINIZATION OF MIGRATION

Historically in Greece domestic labour and activities within the private sphere were under the exclusive responsibility of female family members, or in upper class households of employed national women of lower economic status (Maratou-Alipranti, 1995). With urbanization, the increase in living standards (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 104), the growth of the upper class, the rising educational status of women and the development of an agenda for economic, social and political equality between genders, the subsequent dynamic involvement of women in the economic and political activities of the public sphere (Lazaridis, 2000, p. 50, 56; Cavounidis, 2004, p. 51; Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 104).
103) the growth of the ageing population “from 3% in 1870, to 7% in 1951 (511,000 persons) and 14% in 1991” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 104), saw an increase in demand for care services (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 113).

The developments towards gender equality did not manage to break through the gendered patriarchal structures that manifested themselves in the persistence of private and public divide and the preservation of domestic labour as a female responsibility. “With an increase in living standards, reductions in flows from rural areas to urban centers and the acquisition of higher education Greek women of lower class disassociated themselves from the domestic occupation”, the “very slow adjustment of the Greek male mentality in the issue of sharing responsibilities in house chores” (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 105) and at the same time absence of the development of the welfare state, the demand for domestic services was outsourced to the migrant labour market (Cavounidis, 2004, p. 50).

Parallel to these national developments, the economic restructuring and political instability of the migrant-sending countries exercised different pressures on different social groups. Gender, marital status, age and educational qualifications are factors that played a distinctive role in each national context and determined the role of social groups in the labour market, social sphere and the political world (Cavounidis, 2003, p. 221), the employment opportunities of migrants in national labour markets and subsequently migration patterns (Cavounidis, 2003, p. 221). Due to the gender based division of paid and unpaid labour and the gendered occupational segregation of the labour market, poverty has been limiting the employment
opportunities for women, resulting in “higher levels of female vis-à-vis male unemployment” in the sending countries (Fakiolas and Maratou-Alipranti, 2000, p. 105).

With the social, economic and political conditions in the sending countries pushing women to migrate and the expansion of the migrant labour market in Greece, the country experienced a change in the size and gender composition of the inflows (Cavounidis, 2003, p. 223). The employment of female migrants as domestic workers and the involvement of Greece in the Global Care Chains as an employer came as a response to parallel, rather than just one-sided, developments. Proof of this is the change in the composition of the female migrant labour market in Greece since the start of the contemporary migration wave. Greece developed its own identity as a female migrant receiving country by initially employing Filipino women, and then progressively moving to a more diverse migrant workforce.
Due to the unregulated character of domestic work and the illegality that dominates the occupation, the documentation of this specific migrant group in Greece has to this day remained problematic. Despite the absence of thorough data that provides the full picture of the exact size and patterns of this migrant group, existing data offers an insight that can provide substantial conclusions. In spite of the invisibility of domestic workers, as seen in Table 17, the concentration of female migrants has been in the occupation of domestic labour as they consist of 57.2% of the interviewed sample. With Albanian women dominating the domestic work labour market with a 44.1%, Bulgarian women came second with a 10% followed by Ukrainian with 6.3% and Filipino and Georgian with 5.3% (Hantzaroula, 2008,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientific Occupations</th>
<th>Albania (3.8%)</th>
<th>Balkan Countries (5.8%)</th>
<th>Former USSR Countries (5.7%)</th>
<th>Remaining Countries (22.2%)</th>
<th>Total (5.5%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants/Business owners</td>
<td>10 (3.5%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (4.3%)</td>
<td>2 (7.4%)</td>
<td>15 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office staff</td>
<td>13 (4.5%)</td>
<td>1 (1.9%)</td>
<td>7 (10.0%)</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>22 (5.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic workers/cleaning staff</td>
<td>182 (63.6%)</td>
<td>24 (46.2%)</td>
<td>29 (41.4%)</td>
<td>14 (51.9%)</td>
<td>249 (57.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low skilled work</td>
<td>23 (8.0%)</td>
<td>10 (19.2%)</td>
<td>6 (8.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39 (9.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service providers retail assistants</td>
<td>47 (16.4%)</td>
<td>14 (26.9%)</td>
<td>21 (30.0%)</td>
<td>4 (14.8%)</td>
<td>86 (19.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>286 (100.0%)</td>
<td>52 (100.0%)</td>
<td>72 (100.0%)</td>
<td>27 (100.0%)</td>
<td>435 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Labour sector distribution of female migrants in Greece Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality ([www.kethi.gr](http://www.kethi.gr)) (KETHI, 2006)
Amongst domestic workers, Albanian women present higher employability levels as domestic workers compared to the remaining nationalities, with an average difference of 15%. Despite this fact and considering that Albanians consisted the highest migrant national group in Greece, proportionally within their own nationality 86% of Filipino women, 66.3% Ukranian, 64.2% Moldavian, 63.8% Polish, 59% Gregorian, 51% Albanian and 47% Bulgarian women were employed as domestic workers in Greece (Hantzaroula, 2008: 61).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 – 6 years</th>
<th>7 – 9 years</th>
<th>10 – 12 years</th>
<th>13+ years</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific Occupations</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (4.3%)</td>
<td>3 (13.0%)</td>
<td>19 (82.6%)</td>
<td>23 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Merchants/Business owners</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (40.0%)</td>
<td>4 (26.7%)</td>
<td>5 (33.3%)</td>
<td>15 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office staff</strong></td>
<td>1 (4.5%)</td>
<td>2 (9.1%)</td>
<td>8 (36.4%)</td>
<td>11 (50.0%)</td>
<td>22 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic workers/cleaning staff</strong></td>
<td>11 (4.4%)</td>
<td>38 (15.3%)</td>
<td>143 (57.7%)</td>
<td>56 (22.6%)</td>
<td>248 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low skilled work</strong></td>
<td>6 (15.4%)</td>
<td>10 (25.6%)</td>
<td>18 (46.2%)</td>
<td>5 (12.8%)</td>
<td>39 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Service providers/retail assistants</strong></td>
<td>6 (7.0%)</td>
<td>18 (20.9%)</td>
<td>40 (46.5%)</td>
<td>22 (25.6%)</td>
<td>86 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>24 (5.5%)</td>
<td>75 (17.3%)</td>
<td>216 (49.9%)</td>
<td>118 (27.3%)</td>
<td>433 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18. Education years in relation to the female migrants’ occupation. Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality (www.kethi.gr) (KETHI, 2006)

The data provides evidence of the significant role nationality has played in determining the migrant labour market and preserving its high segregation and rigidity from the country of origin to Greece. The lower cost of hiring Albanian domestic workers compared to Philipinos, Georgians and Russians, and the employment of Philipino women exclusively from upper middle class households
demonstrates this active role in the social environment, national identity and political conditions of migration as parameters in shaping the domestic work labour market in Greece (Anderson, 2010). It has also been acknowledged within research and literature that nationality has been a determinant in the migrating paths of migrants as well as their experiences along the way (KETHI, 2006, p. 85). As this project’s focus is on the experiences of female migrant domestic workers in Greece, even though the project acknowledges the role of nationality in the determination of migration paths, it will not pursue this further.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Balkan Countries</th>
<th>Former USSR Countries</th>
<th>Remaining Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alone</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 (1.9%)</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>16 (15.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With parents/other relatives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 (12.9%)</td>
<td>3 (4.3%)</td>
<td>9 (8.9%)</td>
<td>2 (6.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husband or spouse and children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239 (58.2%)</td>
<td>17 (24.6%)</td>
<td>28 (27.7%)</td>
<td>11 (35.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With their children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 (3.9%)</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>6 (5.9%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With husband or spouse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 (11.9%)</td>
<td>24 (34.8%)</td>
<td>14 (13.9%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With employers/other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (1.5%)</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>16 (15.8%)</td>
<td>7 (22.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With parents/relatives, husband/spouse and children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 (6.3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (6.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With parents/relatives, and husband/spouse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (2.4%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (4.0%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>With parents/relatives and children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (1.0%)</td>
<td>1 (1.4%)</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
<td>3 (9.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Greece, the feminization of migration and the almost exclusive employment of female migrants in the domestic labour sector was subjected to the population movement dynamics of the greater migration wave experienced by the country. From a very controlled female migrant labour market with Filipino exclusivity, the country saw the rise in the involvement of more nationalities and mainly Albanian women. Nationality played a great role in the settlement patterns of women. As part of the great inflows of migrants of the Balkan countries, female Albanians relocating with their families sought employment as a parallel income for their households. Female migrants from other countries arrived to Greece more independently and as such portrayed different patterns of employment and settlement. The analysis of this data under the concept of Global Care Chains reveals the economic and political connections as well as dichotomies between and within states. As such Greece’s profile as a domestic worker destination country initially was established on a local level and then started to expand to a more international level.

With regards to the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities following the global conditions upon which contemporary domestic labour has emerged, illegality, exploitation and poor social conditions have been demonstrated to prevail in the Greek case too. Research projects have explored the experienced vulnerabilities and exploitations in relation to the social, economic and political presence of female migrants in Greece. Within this specific national context they have been identified to stem from the exposure of female migrants to illegal networks who control the management of the migrating channels, the supply of migrant labour market in Greece and the practical support in legalization processes, on an economic level from the violation of labour rights by national employers, on a social level from the racist and xenophobic national environment and on a political level from the restrictive migration policies (Psimmenos, 1995; Iosifides, 1997; Hatziprokoopiou, 2003). Despite the recognition that nationalities experience these vulnerabilities differently most of the research has focused on the experiences of Albanian female migrant domestic workers since their nationality has dominated the contemporary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Balkan Countries</th>
<th>Former USSR Countries</th>
<th>Remaining Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All the children in Greece</strong></td>
<td>288 (89.2%)</td>
<td>25 (56.8%)</td>
<td>37 (56.9%)</td>
<td>24 (75.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All the children in the country of origin</strong></td>
<td>12 (3.7%)</td>
<td>13 (29.5%)</td>
<td>25 (38.5%)</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Some in Greece &amp; some in the country of origin</strong></td>
<td>23 (7.1%)</td>
<td>6 (13.6%)</td>
<td>3 (4.6%)</td>
<td>4 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>323 (100%)</td>
<td>44 (100%)</td>
<td>65 (100%)</td>
<td>32 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

migration wave. Within this focus Albanian migrant women were identified by the scholars researching identity (Charalampopoulou, 2004; Hantzaroula, 2008) to adopt “an ambiguous attitude that was characterized by a tendency among the women to distance themselves from the group to which they ‘legitimately’ belong and a difficulty accepting their new identity as domestic workers” (Vassilikou, 2007, p. 42). The rest of the migrant nationalities have been documented to be affected by this environment on a secondary level. Due to this focus and the small number of related research projects there is lack of comparative research on the exploitation experienced by different nationalities especially since the migrant population is becoming more and more diverse in Greece. As mentioned in the introduction further research is required to draw conclusions about the specific ways nationality is determining the experiences of female migrant domestic workers especially in the context of EU enlargement and the new national challenges Greece is facing as an EU border.

Apart from the high levels of illegality that have been identified by scholars to characterize the Greek case on a global level, according to KETHI’s research what distinguishes the Greek case on a global level is that female migrants identify their greatest vulnerabilities and inequalities to be stemming from migration policies and the governance of migration rather than the workplace itself or the social sphere.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
<td>279 (45.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties with regards to the acquisition of a residence and work permit</td>
<td>266 (43.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income for the Greek cost of living</td>
<td>202 (33.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties in finding legal work (with insurance)</td>
<td>193 (31.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with public services (e.g. rude behaviours)</td>
<td>141 (23.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t have information about my rights and existing opportunities</td>
<td>141 (23.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties in finding employment</td>
<td>108 (17.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many hours of work</td>
<td>98 (16.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulties in adjusting (language, distance from family, loneliness)</td>
<td>94 (15.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of insurance</td>
<td>81 (13.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative responses from Greeks</td>
<td>65 (10.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalization (doctors, hospitals)</td>
<td>63 (10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty in bringing family members to Greece</td>
<td>45 (7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of daycare centres</td>
<td>33 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship with the police</td>
<td>24 (3.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>18 (2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears of walking in the street</td>
<td>15 (2.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 21.** The most important problems female migrants face daily in their lives in Greece. *Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality (www.kethi.gr) (KETHI, 2006)*

Unfortunately, available data on female migration doesn’t provide any insight into the correlation between migration interests prior to arrival, migration
experiences in the country of settlement and decisions over future settlement. Nevertheless what is rather interesting is that the group of Albanian female migrants that had migrated to Greece with their families and not individually, for the sole purpose of employment display lower interest in long-term settlement in Greece compared to female migrants from countries of the former USSR. It can be argued that such information indicates that Greece’s profile as a migrant receiving country was attractive based on economic interests rather than the social and political prospects of integration. This argument is supported by the testimonies of female migrants with regards to problems they face during their time in Greece.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stay forever in Greece</th>
<th>Albania (39.3%)</th>
<th>Balkan Countries (34.8%)</th>
<th>Former USSR Countries (44.6%)</th>
<th>Remaining Countries (16.1%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return to my country</td>
<td>85 (20.7%)</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>16 (15.8%)</td>
<td>17 (54.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go to another country</td>
<td>21 (5.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
<td>2 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go back and forth to Greece</td>
<td>25 (6.1%)</td>
<td>15 (21.7%)</td>
<td>10 (9.9%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to my country only when living conditions improve</td>
<td>97 (23.7%)</td>
<td>16 (23.2%)</td>
<td>24 (23.8%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>21 (5.1%)</td>
<td>6 (8.7%)</td>
<td>4 (4.0%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>410 (100.0%)</td>
<td>69 (100.0%)</td>
<td>101 (100.0%)</td>
<td>31 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Future settlement plans of female migrants according to their country of origin Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality (www.kethi.gr) (KETHI, 2006)
Table 23. Knowledge of the Greek language for female migrants in relation to their country of origin Source: General Secretariat for Gender Equality (www.kethi.gr) (KETHI, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th></th>
<th>Balkan Countries</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Basic/N</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(72.5%)</td>
<td>(22.6%)</td>
<td>(4.9%)</td>
<td>(69.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>38</td>
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Conclusion

This chapter placed this research project in its immediate historical and geographical context by establishing the specific conditions upon which domestic labour and female migration in Greece have contemporarily emerged, and the subsequent concerns and considerations that these conditions have raised. By doing so it has demonstrated the need for further and deeper research on a macro level into female migrant domestic labour and more specifically on a micro level in the Greek case. Starting by demonstrating the historical continuity of low status domestic labour and activities of the domestic sphere, its gendered nature and its outsource to vulnerable and underprivileged social groups, it identified that the patterns and trends of the domestic labour sector are highly dependent on the political economy, and more specifically the politics of reproduction, in which the allocation of the tasks of the private sphere are negotiated and managed.
What attracts the research interest of scholars on Greece and distinguishes it as a case study is on the one hand the almost exclusive employment of female migrants in the domestic work labor sector, and on the other the high levels of political and economic illegality that characterize the female migrant experience (Anderson, 1997, p. 37 – 49; 2000, p. 49 – 56; 2001, p. 18 – 26; Hantzaroula 2008, p. 61 – 74; Parrenas 2001, p. 1129 – 1154). With no legal access to state structures these characteristics result in female migrant domestic workers experiencing extreme conditions of inequalities and vulnerabilities. The data of this chapter will be utilized in the conclusion of this project in order to answer the research questions. The next chapter is the first of the three-part analysis of the collected data.
Chapter 3
Female Migrant Domestic Workers Under National and International Law – The Institutionalisation of Securitization

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims “to unmake the fabrication of migration as an existential threat” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 572) in Greece so as to argue and explore its prospects for desecuritization, more specifically with regard to female migrant domestic workers. The previous introductory chapters began by discussing the ways female migrant domestic labour has been theorised and analysed within different disciplines, further arguing for the choice of securitization theory as the basis for the development of the analytical basis of this project. These chapters then proceeded to present the analytical framework as well as the structure of this thesis. The chapters were concluded with the presentation of the case of female migrant domestic labour in Greece through the available data as collected and analysed by international and national governmental and non-governmental bodies and subsequent research projects.
This chapter consists of the first part of the three-tiered analysis and aims to look into the regulation of female migrant domestic labour on an international level and more specifically in Greece. It explores the first dependent variable, which consists of migration policies, and the subsequent techniques of governance applied to female migrant domestic labour in Greece. The purpose is to identify the techniques of governance that “have contributed to retain large numbers of migrants to a status of “illegality”, as well as to a pendulum movement of many others to and from such a status” (Vaiou, 2006, p.5). By utilising Carl Schmitt’s notion of politics of exception, it will explore how national techniques of governance based on security legitimise the violation of female migrant domestic workers in an international legal arena that proactively safeguards the basic human rights of such an acknowledged vulnerable group.

Despite the fact that Greece is a sovereign state with complete control over the people and activities in its territory, it also has international responsibilities stemming not just from its foreign policy agenda but also from its membership in international organizations. As such, by discussing the international legislation on this economic migrant group, which has been established on a security free basis, the aim is to comparatively evaluate national reality in relation to international directions. As discussed in the introduction of this project, international legislation on female migrant domestic workers has emerged as a by-product of the realisation that, for various reasons, female migrant domestic workers fall through the cracks of national migration and labour legislation, thereby ending up unprotected. Apart from presenting the national legislation on migration and this specific migrant group,
This chapter will identify the extent to which international legislation has been incorporated in the national legislation in Greece.

This chapter is divided in two sections. Section 1 is divided into two parts and each of these presents the legislation and direction of the two main international governmental organizations, namely United Nations and the European Union. Section 2 is divided into five parts each of which presents the five policy stages on migration that took place between 1991 and 2010 in Greece. Triandafyllidou (2009, p. 160) distinguishes migration policy in two phases, in the first stage spanning the time period from 1991 to 2001 and in the second stage the time period from 2001 to 2009 (when the article was written). She identifies the phases with the legislative moves of the Greek government. Although during the period of 1991 – 2001 legal development in the form of legislation did not occur, there were presidential decrees aimed at managing migration.

Each section of this chapter is subsequently divided in four parts wherein the legislative framework, the bodies of public administration governing the implementation of the legislative framework and the rights and obligations of migrants according to the law and the bilateral agreements that were signed during each phase are outlined. Multilateral and international agreements are of importance for the purposes of this project. This is because, as discussed in the Introduction as well as Chapter 2, nationality plays an important role in determining the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour in Greece. Therefore, identifying the bilateral agreements helps in finding the correlation between the migration
experiences of specific nationalities and legal protection. The concluding remarks of this chapter will serve to frame the remaining chapters presenting the analysis.

1 **FEMALE MIGRANT DOMESTIC LABOUR AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW**

1.1 **ILO CONVENTION NO. 189 – DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS, CONVENTION CONCERNING DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS**

In the first decades of the inception of ILO, the United Nation agency on labour issues, general international labour standards were established that applied across all labour sectors and occupations. Special focus was given to labour migration as ILO’s Constitution of 1919 called for the “protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own” (ILO, 2010b, p. 5). Along with monitoring mechanisms, the basic body of work of ILO deals with the establishment of fundamental Conventions that set out the labour standards which states are called to ratify. Up until the 1990s, the fundamental Conventions covering the basic rights and freedoms for workers at a global level (ILO, 2012, p. 5) include:

1. Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)

2. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1959 (No. 105)
3. Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100) and Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)

4. Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)

5. Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26) and the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131)

6. Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95)

7. Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 158)

8. Migration for Employment Convention Revised, 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)

The need for the special distinction of domestic work as a labour type and the development of more specific directions was identified at an international level in the late 1990s. In his report on Decent Work in 1999, the ILO Director-General called for special attention and regulation of domestic work (ILO, 1999). However, it was not until the 301st ILO Session in March 2008 that “the ILO Governing Body agreed to place an item on decent work for domestic workers on the agenda” (ILO, 2010a, p. 1). In 2010, the UNHR published a report on the Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe. This identified that apart from a rise in the outsourcing of domestic responsibilities to non-family members “in Europe, the trend in recent years has been towards an increase in migrants among domestic workers, the overwhelming majority of whom are women” (UNHR, 2010, p. 4). The report examined the specific challenges faced by migrant female domestic workers in Europe due to the nature of the occupation and the existing international mechanisms
for their protection within the specific region. Reflecting upon the established international human rights legislation, the report outlined the clauses that were relevant to female migrant domestic workers. It suggested that despite the absence of international legislation catering to this specific labour group, existing legislation could still provide sufficient basis for protecting female migrant domestic labour. The related legislative frameworks (UNHR, 2010, p. 11 – 18) were identified as the following:

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

In 2011, the ILO proceeded in establishing the Domestic Workers Convention: Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 189) and the Domestic Workers Recommendation: Recommendation Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (No. 201). Through the identification of the elements distinguishing domestic workers as a more vulnerable labour group, their employment in private households, absence of clear terms of employment, unregistered labour and their exclusion from labour legislation (ILO, 2015), these
two international directions affirmed the fundamental rights of domestic workers and established minimum labour standards in the context of their specific needs. Building upon the Convention and the Recommendation, ILO produced a guide entitled *Effective Protection for Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws* (ILO, 2012). Its aim was to act as an advisory tool on national and international levels for the development of labour laws that acted “as a mean to ensure the effective protection of domestic workers” (ILO, 2012, p. ix). In this guide, it is suggested that legislation should be developed under certain thematic categories that link to the “highly particular nature of domestic work” (ILO, 2012, p. 2), as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. These thematic categories are:

1. Legal definitions and the scope of labour laws
2. Written contracts or particulars of employment
3. Fundamental principles and rights at work
4. Protection against abuse
5. Harassment and violence
6. Living conditions of domestic workers
7. Working time and remuneration
8. Protection of young workers
9. Regulation of employment agencies
10. Establishment of compliance mechanisms
The mid 2000s also saw the European Union proactively addressing gender equality by setting “ambitious targets in terms of promoting gender equality and fighting discrimination in the labour market, among others by raising women’s labour market participation, reducing pay gaps, fostering labour mobility and facilitating better balance between family and work responsibilities” (ILO, 2013, p. 4). Inherent patriarchal structures in the social, economic and political spheres found the European Union unprepared to address employment-related factors “such as the decline in the size and changing skills composition of the EU working age population (which, in a “no migration” scenario, could significantly shrink over the next few years)” (ILO, 2013, p. 4). With “the reduction of public welfare budgets, often geared toward the transfer of care responsibilities from public institutions to families; as well as the growing insertion of European women in the labour force, which is seldom accompanied by changing gender divisions of labour in the household and societies in general” (ILO, 2013, p. 4) the demand for female migrant domestic labour kept increasing significantly.

Source: International Labour Organization (www.ilo.org)

1.2 **European Union and Female Migrant Domestic Workers**

The mid 2000s also saw the European Union proactively addressing gender equality by setting “ambitious targets in terms of promoting gender equality and fighting discrimination in the labour market, among others by raising women’s labour market participation, reducing pay gaps, fostering labour mobility and facilitating better balance between family and work responsibilities” (ILO, 2013, p. 4). Inherent patriarchal structures in the social, economic and political spheres found the European Union unprepared to address employment-related factors “such as the decline in the size and changing skills composition of the EU working age population (which, in a “no migration” scenario, could significantly shrink over the next few years)” (ILO, 2013, p. 4). With “the reduction of public welfare budgets, often geared toward the transfer of care responsibilities from public institutions to families; as well as the growing insertion of European women in the labour force, which is seldom accompanied by changing gender divisions of labour in the household and societies in general” (ILO, 2013, p. 4) the demand for female migrant domestic labour kept increasing significantly.
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 (formerly the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) has been the main international legislative framework at a European level prescribing the standards with regard to human and labour rights. In 2005, the case of a Togolese girl held in servitude in Europe appeared at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), thereby revealing the existence of extreme forms of servitude at a European level. It was noted that “The girl worked 15 hours a day, with no days off, as a domestic servant, cleaning and caring for children. She slept on a mattress on the floor of the baby’s bedroom. She was not paid” (FRA, 2011, p. 3). The Court’s decision was based on the European Convention on Human Rights as it ruled that these conditions contravened the Convention’s Article 4, which prohibits slavery, servitude and forced labour. In addition, the EU Charter of Fundamental rights reaffirmed the UN and ILO Conventions and instruments on human and labour rights, and as a consequence, member states were called to ratify them (FRA, 2011, p. 11), thus legally binding the union to the international standards.

The centrality of migration to the European Union policy agenda and the acknowledgment of the vulnerability of certain migrant labour groups to exploitation are evident. With the continuing growth of the female migrant domestic worker population in 2011, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) produced a policy report distinguishing the regulatory needs of domestic workers (FRA, 2011). The specific report identified five fundamental rights areas, which are
being violated in the European Union and proceeded to underline the relevance of
the existing international legislation to addressing them:

1. Fair pay: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 23
   (2)
2. Health issues and sick leave: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
   Union, Article 35
3. Compensation for work accidents: ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary
   Provisions), 1975 (No. 143), Article 9 (1)
4. Right to rest periods: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
   Article 31 (2)
5. Lodging for live-in workers: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
   Union, Article 31 (1)
6. Unjustified dismissal: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
   Union, Article 30
7. Freedom of association and right of collective bargaining: Charter of
   Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 12
8. Remedies for labour law violations: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
   European Union, Article 47
9. Remedies for victims of serious crimes: Charter of Fundamental Rights of
   the European Union, Article 5
10. Legal assistance: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
    Article 47
11. Rights related to family life: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
    Union, Article 7
In 2013, the ILO published a report titled *Promoting Integration for Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe: A Synthesis of Belgium, France, Italy and Spain* (ILO, 2013). The organisation identified that the European agenda aimed to not only safeguard the rights of migrants but also to proactively engage in their integration against labour market indicators under the European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals as established by the European Commission (2011). At a national level, it was noted that:

> since the adoption of the ILO Convention on decent work for domestic workers, 2011 (No. 189), and its accompanying Recommendation (No. 201), there has been a renewed interest from EU Member States and national social partners to improve the working and living conditions of domestic workers and migrant domestic workers, and to promote their integration in their countries of destination.

~ ILO, 2013, p. 2

Despite the observed progress, in practice “only a few Member States, such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, have negotiated collective agreements geared specifically towards domestic workers” (ILO, 2013, p. 4).

Moving forward, the aim is to raise the engagement of more Member States as well as to integrate in legislative frameworks factors that do not just safeguard the human and labour rights of domestic workers but also provide “an opportunity for enhanced socio-economic integration” (ILO, 2013, p. 20). These factors include, amongst others:

1. Acquisition of regular migration status
2. Access to support networks
3. Information about rights
4. Acquisition of language skills

5. Recognition of diplomas and qualifications

6. Access, on an equal basis to other workers, to training, skills and qualifications

As such, for migration to become an empowering story, success “depends very much on the choices made by policy-makers in deliberately and coherently addressing the needs of migrant domestic workers from a holistic, multidisciplinary and coordinated approach” (ILO, 2013, p. 20 – 21).

As a EU and UN member, Greece has ratified most of the conventions with the exclusion of the:

1. Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928 (No. 26) and the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131)

2. Migration for Employment Convention Revised, 1949 (No. 97) and the Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)


In view of the above, it is expected that the history of the migration legal frameworks in Greece will progressively reflect the move towards the ratification of the EU and UN conventions and proactive safeguarding of the legal needs of female migrant domestic workers.
2 MIGRATION POLICIES IN GREECE

2.1 STEP 1 – THE 1975/1991 LAW REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT AND MOBILITY OF ALIENS IN GREECE, POLICE CONTROL OF PASSPORTS, DEPORTATIONS AND DISPLACEMENT

Prior to 1990s, as a newly formed and economically weak state with an unstable national and European political environment, Greece presented low interest as a destination country for migrants, and as the high emigration rates of low skilled Greek workers reveal, under those circumstances it had established itself as a migrant sending country (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004). This reality is also reflected in the country’s oversimplified migration policy established in 1929. The 4310/1929 law Regarding the Settlement and Mobility of Aliens in Greece, Police Control of Passports, Deportations and Displacement aimed at establishing the procedures and technologies of governance for the country’s borders as well as the movement of non-nationals through and within them (1929, p. 2432). The procedures for the settlement of non-nationals were outlined in a single article without detailed provisions (1929, p. 2433). Due to the lack of interest, they seemed practically irrelevant to the state needs. In terms of the political incentives and interests undergirding this policy framework, the legislation reflected the security interests and concerns over the country’s geographic sovereignty in relation to the movement of non-nationals rather than social, economic or political concerns related to migration.
The first wave of planned economic migration that took place in the 1970s was managed outside this law through the establishment of bilateral agreements demonstrating the interest of Greece in maintaining economic migration on an irregular and invitation only basis. The bilateral agreements placed the Greek consulates in the workers’ countries of origin in charge of the migration process, thereby outsourcing the administrative processes to them (2003, p. 33). As such, up to the 1990s, there was no infrastructure to manage any potential migration to Greece. Constitutionally, and despite the absence of a comprehensive legal framework, according to Article 5(2) “every person who lives in Greece is entitled to full protection of his/her life, honour and freedom, irrespective of his/her nationality, race or language, or of religious or political benefits” (Lazaridis, 2010, p. 341). However, these fundamental rights do not protect non-nationals that were present in Greece illegally. Due to the emigration profile of Greece and the controllable inflow of non-nationals, the legislative needs with regard to migration were very limited. Consequently, it was not until the start of the contemporary migration wave that the 4310/1929 law was challenged over its adequacy, relevance and responsiveness (Magliveras, 2011, p. 24).

Legal Framework

The inadequacy of the 4310/1929 law to respond to the needs of the increased migrant inflows of the late 1980s resulted in its substitution by the 1975/1991 law on Entry, Exit, Stay, Employment, Deportation of Aliens, Procedures for Recognition of Foreign Refugees and Other Provisions. This law, even though it was

The law started by establishing and defining the language to be used for legal and political purposes in relation to the identification and management of non-nationals. Three categories were identified as relevant for the early stages of the contemporary migration wave:

a) Αλλοδάποι – aliens: “alien is every person that does not have Greek nationality or the person that has no nationality (is stateless)”

b) Ημεδαποί - aborigines: “persons that inhabit in Greece and have more than one nationalities, of which one is Greek, are accounted as aborigines and have the obligations and rights of the Greek nationals”

c) Multiple nationalities: “persons, that invoke more citizenships, are obliged to declare in their respective Police Department the preferred citizenship and to show a legitimate travel document of the country, of which the citizenship they are invoking” (1975/1991, p. 3141)

Even though the Greek government was introducing a more comprehensive legislative framework for the management of the increased inflows of non-nationals, the terminology and definitions employed signal that the political premises upon which it was developed did not differ significantly from the 4310/1929 law. Despite criticism in academic and political spheres centring on its restrictive and non-enabling approach to migration (Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 160), the 1975/1991 law is characterised as Greece’s first attempt at developing a migration policy. In terms
of its content and employed discourse, the aim of this law was to manage the processes of entry and presence of aliens within Greek borders but not to provide any prospects for migration. The term migration comes up only once in Chapter 3 and Article 6 according to which border authorities had every right to refuse entry to any alien when there was substantive evidence that the purpose of entry was unauthorised migration (1975/1991, p. 3142). In this instance, even though the term migration was evoked, it was not defined.

More specifically and in relation to its content the purpose of entry of aliens to Greece was identified within four categories:

a) Travel
b) Employment
c) Family reunification
d) Study

For every category, details regarding the procedures and documentation for legal entry, stay and mobility required were provided. The common denominator in the development of these procedures and documentation was the provision of short term stay for non-nationals. The law introduced three types of permits: VISA, residence and work permits for the management of these four categories. VISAs were provided for the purposes of travel by the Greek Consulate in the alien’s country of origin for a period of three months at a maximum. If the alien wanted to renew the VISA, they could do so through the Ministry of Public Order and be granted an extension of three more months (1975/1991, p. 3142). Residence permits
and work permits were provided for the three other purposes of entry and again were issued on a yearly basis.

The process for entering Greece for the purpose of employment was broken down into three stages. In the first stage, the alien had to acquire a travelling document from the Greek consulate in the country of origin stating that the purpose of entry to Greece was to fill a specific employment vacancy acquired in advance by the alien before arrival in the country. Once in Greece, the alien was granted a work permit that was provided by the Ministry of Labour subsequent to an application submitted by the alien and his or her employer at the Police Department of their area, which was provided for a given time and the specific employment vacancy (1975/1991, p. 3145). The alien was also obliged to acquire a residence permit through the Ministry of Public Order. The residence permit was only provided if it was certified that the specific employment vacancy could not be covered by nationals (1975/1991, p. 3144), and in conjunction with the work permit, and thus it corresponded to the limitations of the employment vacancy (1975/1991, p. 3144). The alien was entitled to renew their residence permit for five years in total if their employment and the original purpose of entry had not changed. For the alien wishing to extend their permit beyond five years, they had to submit their application two months prior to the end of the 5th year. The alien was granted indefinite residence permit after the 15th year of their residence in Greece, and only if they had been working and had remained socially insured for 120 months (1975/1991, p.3143). The permission for family reunification and such residence permits was only provided to aliens holding indefinite work and residence permits (1975/1991, p.
The cost of the residence permits was for less than a year 5,000 drachmas and for long term yearly ones 10,000 drachmas, with the cost rising to 15,000 drachmas for two or more years (1975/1991, p. 3147).

The 1975/1991 legislative framework incorporated the conditions for the entry of non-nationals for the purposes of employment set out by the Greek state since the 1970s (Kiprianos, Balias & Passas, 2003), in which labor migration was only facilitated through the Consulate in the non-national’s country of origin. Hence, it was explicitly stated that those non-nationals aiming to enter Greece with the purpose of seeking employment without holding relevant travel documents from the Consulate of their country of origin were to be refused entry (1975/1991, p. 3142). Therefore, under the 1975/1991 law after crossing the borders, non-nationals were not able to legally seek employment whilst in Greece. Labor migration worked under an invite only regime.

Governance

The aim of the 1975/1991 legislative framework was to securitise the entry, exit, stay and employment of aliens with the purpose of minimising long term residence of non-nationals within national borders. Migration in that sense was still an unfamiliar concept for Greece and an unwanted prospect. The priorities, interests and intentions of the Greek state in relation to migration were also very evident in Article 5 in which the formation of Special Forces to actively battle illegal migration by the Ministry of Public Order was instructed. In view of these aims, the
governance of the developed procedures that controlled the movement and actions of non-nationals through and within national borders was allocated across the Ministries of Public Order, of Foreign Affairs, of National Defense, Mercantile Marine Ministry, of Economic Affairs, of Health, Welfare and Social Security and of Justice.

More specifically, VISAs were issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through processes mutually developed and decided by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Public Order (1975/1991, p. 3142). The on ground control of the maritime and land borders was conducted by the Mercantile Marine Ministry and Ministry of Public Order respectively through processes developed and decided by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Economic Affairs, Justice and Public Order (1975/1991, p. 3141 – 3142). A list of the deported and to be denied re-entry for various reasons non-nationals was maintained by the Ministry of Public Order as they were not allowed to re-enter the country (1975/1991, p. 3143)\textsuperscript{27}. The maximum number of work permits per nationality, occupation, length of stay and geographic area was to be decided in agreement with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Labour and Public Order on a yearly basis (1975/1991, p. 3145). The conditions and the procedures for the administration of the work permits were decided and agreed upon by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Order, Labour and Health, Welfare and Social Security

\textsuperscript{27} the legislative framework outlines the grounds upon which a specific non-national can be denied re-entry in Greece

➢ Bilateral Agreements

By 1991, Greece being a member of the European Union and the United Nations had signed the Schengen Agreement, which entailed a common European Union border policy, as well as subscription to the Dublin Convention on asylum seeking ratified through the 1996/1991 law (p. 3355 – 3361). Even though the Schengen Agreement was opening up national borders for EU nationals, it also exercised more pressures upon member states to control their borders with regard to the movement of non-EU nationals. It has been nationally argued that the anti-migration provisions of the 1975/1991 law were a response to the needs of the Schengen Agreement and the interest of the Greek government in fulfilling its requirements to close up its borders (Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 726).

Despite the fact that Greece has been a country of immigration as much as emigration, it never showed any interest in ratifying the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families that was opened for signing in the beginning of 1991 (Maglieras, 2011, p. 39; Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 160). This fact confirms the securitization interests behind the development of the first “migration” policy and suggests the existence of a hostile rhetoric towards non-nationals in Greece, which suggestion will be explored in the next chapter.
Parallel to the establishment of this legal framework and the identification of the biggest inflow of non-nationals being from Albania in the early 1990s, the Greek government initiated the issuance of 30,000 work permits to Albanian nationals. Greek intentions were never recognised by the Albanian government, as it was argued the number of the suggested work permits was low considering the scale of the inflows (Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 726 – 727). The Greek government failed at that stage to establish bilateral agreements that would give validity to the 1975/1991 law in view of the migrant inflows of that time.

2.2 **STEP 2 - THE 358/1997 AND 359/1997 PRESIDENTIAL DECREES**

With migrant inflows rising in Greece and the realisation that the migrant labor market sector was growing and establishing itself outside governmental reach, the 2434/1996 Law was signed to form a “16-member Committee (comprised by representatives from trade unions, self-employed farmers, professional associations, academics and independent experts)” that would draft two presidential decrees aiming to regularize illegal migration (2434/1996, p. 3340; Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 726 – 727). Moreover “under the weight of severe multilateral criticism, the Greek government… cancelled the exception concerning the citizens of bordering countries’ and opened up legalization to all non-EU citizens (Kiprianos, Balias & Passas, 2003, p. 158). The outcome was the 358/1997 and 359/1997 Presidential Decrees representing politically the first move towards a more pro-migration environment. The first Presidential Decree 358/1997 titled Conditions and
Process, for the Legal Stay and Employment of Aliens in Greece, That Are Not Members of the State-Members of the European Union, aimed to register aliens to ‘Provisional Residence Cards’ (White Card) and the second Presidential Decree 359/1997 titled Administration of Temporary Residence Card to Aliens, to a ‘Temporary Residence Card’ (Green Card).

- **358/1997 Presidential Decree - Conditions and Process, for the Legal Stay and Employment of Aliens in Greece, That Are Not Members of the State-Members of the European Union**

Unlike the 1975/1991 law, which was developed to control the increasing inflow of non-nationals, the two Presidential Decrees sought to manage the presence of non-nationals employed or seeking employment within Greek borders. The two main aims of the 358/1997 were defined in Article 1 as being the documentation of the aliens residing illegally in Greece who were either employed or were seeking employment and the commencement of the processes that would lead to their conditional legalisation (358/1997, p. 8718; Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 726 – 727). Acknowledging the absence of a similar policy up to that point, both Presidential Decrees were introduced to act as a clean slate for the migrant workers who were trapped in illegality under the conditions of the 1975/1991 law. This commitment was clearly stated in the second clause of Article 1 where it was established that the Decree applied to all aliens irrespective of whether they fulfilled the previously established conditions of entry and employment. Breaking away from the restrictive economic migration regime and developing a more laissez-faire
approach, this law allowed aliens of every nationality and occupation to avail the opportunity to take part in the regularisation processes (358/1997, p. 8718).

The Decree called all aliens to report to the nearer OAED office (Manpower Employment Organization – ΟΑΕΔ, Οργανισμός Απασχόλησης Εργατικού Δυναμικού) within the five months subsequent to 1st of January 1998 in order to apply for the Provisional Residence Card ‘white card’ and to legalise their stay and employment in Greece. Depending on the number of applications submitted, the deadline could be extended for two more months by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (358/1997, p. 8718). The documents required for this application were:

a) Official statement documenting the alien’s personal details in Greece, i.e. residence address, occupation, educational qualifications, occupation, employment sector and previous employment in Greece, age and marital status, nationality, country of origin, four photos. If the alien’s employer was a Greek national, the aliens were obliged to declare the details of their employer and the type of their employment relationship

b) Proof of ID in the form of a passport or any other travel document or official ID or in the absence of the above a certificate from their embassy with their photo certifying that the alien had applied for a passport. If the alien could not provide any of the above, a certificate of the marital status and family ties of the applicant with a photograph certified by the alien’s embassy would suffice. This provision did not apply to those applicants that for political reasons could not provide any of these documents
c) Social Insurance Booklet or a certificate of the application for such a document

d) Copy of the employment contract

e) Health certificate provided by a Greek public hospital certifying that the alien was not suffering from an infectious disease

f) Certificate of criminal record provided by the Ministry of Justice

g) Certificate of non-entry in the list of undesirable aliens provided by the subsequent branch of the Ministry of Public Order that holds the list

h) Proof of length of stay in Greece in the form of VISA or registration in any type of public record

Irrespective of the date of production, the Provisional Residence Card was valid until the 31st December 1998 (358/1997, p. 8719).

Aside from just applying to the interests of the holder, the White Card also protected the holder’s spouse and children from deportation but restricted the right for employment to the holder (Kraler & Baldwin-Edwards, 2009, p. 300). Despite the fact that regularisation process was open to all migrants meeting the above requirements, it was established that the Minister of Public Order was entitled in the interests of national security and public health to subject White Card holders to specific restrictions in relation to their stay, residence, travel and exercise of some occupations as well as to request them to frequently report to police departments during their stay. Moreover upon the mutual decisions of the Ministry of Labour and National Insurance and the Ministry of Public, the right to deny, suspend or revoke any White Card in the name of national interest could be exercised by these
ministries. If the evoked reasons were on the grounds of the disruption of public order and security and public health, the decision of the Ministry of Public Order was sufficient (358/1997, p. 8719 – 8720).

- **Rights and Obligations of Legal Aliens**

  The White Card not only gave the alien the legal status and protection from deportation, it also guaranteed access to the same labour rights and obligations as national employees according to the subsequent labour policies and legislation and equality before the national law. In practice, it meant protection in relation to salaries, terms and conditions of employment and public insurance as well as accountability towards employee financial obligations and contributions. Nevertheless the Articles of the Presidential Decree were developed under the title of Method and Means for the Documentation of Aliens Residing in Greece instead of a more migrant focused title (358/1997, p. 8720). The intentions behind the development of these two decrees will not be examined at this stage as the aim of this chapter is just to outline the regulations and policies on migration, which will be used in the analysis chapters that follow.

- **359/1997 – Administration of Temporary Residence Card to Aliens**

  The aim of the 359/1997 Presidential Decree, as stated in Article 1, was to address the problem of illegal economic migration through the establishment of the processes and the terms and conditions for the administration of the Temporary
Residence Card (Green Card). The Green Card was administered by OAED (Manpower Employment Organization – ΟΑΕΔ, Οργανισμός Απασχόλησης Εργατικού Δυναμικού) (358/1997, p. 8720). According to Article 2, the issuing of the Green Card was conditional upon the:

a) Possession of a White Card

b) Certificate of employment services from the DOY (Public Fiscal Service – ΔΟΥ, Δημόσια Οικονομική Υπηρεσία) certifying that the alien had received income for 40 days of unskilled labour for the period between 1st of January 1998 till the day of the application (358/1997, p. 8721)

The Green Card was valid for 1 to 3 years depending on:

a) The nature of the conducted work and the length of stay and employment of the alien in Greece

b) The condition and demands of the labour market

c) The interest of the national economy

If the aliens could prove that they had already been living in Greece for five years and they had sufficient financial resources to cover their living expenses, they would be granted a five-year Green Card. This provision was also enabling these aliens to apply for family reunification (358/1997, p. 8722). After its expiration, the card could be renewed one or more times for two years at a time. The only condition was that the alien had received the income of an unskilled worker for at least half the days of the original number of days as requested in the conditions of the first application (358/1997, p. 8721).
As for the White Card, the Minister of Public Order for reasons of national security could impose restrictions upon holders of the Green Card with regard to their settlement, stay, travel and the exercise of specific occupations or oblige them to report to police departments on occasions while in Greece. Upon the mutual decision of the Ministers of Labour and National Insurance and Minister of Public Order again, the validity of the Green Card could be either refused or revoked if there were more general grounds for concern in relation to the public interest. If these concerns were on the grounds of threat to the public order and security or public health, the decision of the Minister of Public Order was sufficient (358/1997, p. 8722).

• **Rights and Obligations of Legal Aliens**

It was also outlined that the Green Card holders enjoyed the same labour rights and had the same obligations with Greek employees in terms of salary, terms and conditions of employment, insurance and other financial obligations and contributions as those were outlined by related labour legislation. The Green Card holders were also subject to the transnational social insurance agreements signed by Greece. Having established the Green Card holders’ access to the same labour, political and legal rights, the services of public administration, as well as the legal representatives of private or public law and the extended public sector were obliged to accept and process any request submitted by an alien who was residing on national grounds in order for them to exercise those rights (358/1997, p. 8723).
Bilateral Agreements

Before the development of the two Presidential Decrees and given the established political practices in relation to economic migration in 1995, an agreement was signed between Bulgaria and Greece on seasonal labour, granting residence permits to Bulgarian nationals for up to three months. In 1996, an agreement on seasonal labour was signed with Albania and ratified by the Greek Parliament during August 1997 (Law 2482 of 1997). According to that agreement, the administered resident permits were valid for only 2 months after which the Albanian nationals had to leave the country as no renewal prospects were available (Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 726 – 727).

2.3 Step 3 – The 2910/2001 Law Entry and Residence of Aliens in Greek Territory. Acquisition of Greek Citizenship by Naturalization and Other Provisions

With the continuing rise in migrant inflows and the politically recognised failure of the existing exclusionary regulations, the Greek government decided to substitute the 1975/1991 Law in order to respond to the growing rise in the inflows of economic migrants. After long deliberations, the 2910/2001 Law was drafted and voted in with the aim of offering a more detailed and inclusive migration policy. Published on 2nd May 2001 and becoming valid from 2nd June 2001 (even though in principle it was developed to distance itself from the previous takes on the active presence of aliens within national borders), it maintained its interventionist and short-term characteristics with regard to labour migration. The only major
substantive difference was the introduction of provisions on citizenship acquisition, which until the early 2000 was an improbable possibility.

> **Legal Framework**

The policy starts in Article 1 with the definitions of the employed terminology to ensure accuracy in the implementation of the provisions.

a) **Αλλοδαπός** - Alien is every person that does not have Greek nationality or the person that has no nationality (is stateless)

b) **Πρόσφυγας** - Refugees are the aliens that fulfil the conditions of the 1951 Geneva Treaty in relation to the legal regime for refugees and the related 1967 New York Protocol, to which the refugee status has been recognized by the subsequent authorities (2910/2001, p. 1693)

Despite the fact that, in principle, this Law was established as a move towards more open to migration political environment, as with the 1975/1991 Law, the employed terminology maintained its previously established securitization stance. There was no legal distinction between the different interests of non-nationals in relation to their entry, stay and settlement in Greece and neither was the term migrant introduced or employed at any point. As with the 1975/1991 law, the Chapters 2 and 3 established the parameters for the legal entry and exit of non-nationals to Greece. Chapter 4 moved to outline the provisions in relation to the entry of aliens for education purposes.
Economic migration was discussed in Chapter 5 wherein the provisions with regard to the entry, employment and settlement of economic migrants were provided. The purpose of this legal framework, as with the two presidential decrees, was to establish a regulatory process that would define legal and illegal economic migration. The differences between the 2910/2001 Law and its predecessor were evident in the decision-making processes over the regularising capacity of the national economy, the recruitment processes of aliens and the governing bodies. More specifically, in the last quarter of every year, OAED (Manpower Employment Organization – ΟΑΕΔ, Οργανισμός Απασχόλησης Εργατικού Δυναμικού) was to compile a report providing information with regard to the labour needs of every prefecture that could be covered by aliens. The variables taken into consideration and used as the basis for the development of this report were the national demand for migrant labour, as this was defined on a political level, and the documented existing employment of aliens. This report was to act as a basis for the establishment of the work permit quotas agreed between the Minister of Labour and Social Protection, Minister of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

OAED was also to compile lists of aliens seeking employment in Greece. The names and details of the interested aliens were collected with the help of Foreign Employment Agencies. Employers seeking to employ aliens were to submit an application at the Prefecture (2910/2001, p. 1696 – 1697) agreeing to be legally and financially responsible for the employed alien. The Prefect had the jurisdiction to deny or issue the final work permits to aliens depending on whether aliens passed
an interview and whether they could provide documentation supporting a clean
criminal record from their home country (Art. 20). Work permits were valid for a
year and could be renewed on a yearly basis (Kiprianos, Balias & Passas, 2003, p.
159 – 160). This work permit was also the ticket for the alien to apply and acquire a
visa from the Greek consulate authority. The legal framework also established a
separate agency, namely the Immigrants and Immigration Agency with which all
legalised economic migrants had to be registered. Residence permit for aliens
holding a work permit was provided depending upon the existence of (Art. 21):

a) a work permit

b) an employment contract

c) health insurance and no health problems

d) ensured residence

e) a certificate of health provided by national doctors working at IKA (National
   Social Insurance Institute)

For periods beyond a six year residence permit renewal, the authorisation
had to go through the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and
Decentralization and after 10 years the residence permit could be renewed for the
indefinite stay of the alien (Art. 22).

The 10-year mark was also set for citizenship acquisition (Ch. 13) whereas
the right for family reunification was much shorter and was set for two years (Ch.
7). For the conferral of this, the alien needed to provide proof for their ability to
financially support the family. The supported documentation entailed:
The Prefect was again responsible for investigating the validity of the paperwork, and its general secretary was responsible for confirming with the help of the police that all family members had a clear criminal record (Art. 28). Once any of the family members reached their 14th birthday an individual residence permit was to be provided with an expiry date equivalent to that of the alien’s (Art. 29). The residence permit did not guarantee employment rights. Family members who were part of family residence permits needed to apply for a work permit through the normal procedures (Art. 31).

- **Rights and Obligations of Legal Aliens**

As with the previous legal framework, barring the temporary nature of the legal status, once such a status had been acquired, non-nationals had the same rights as nationals and access to all insurance benefits. Moreover, the children of aliens were obliged to go to school which in Greece was provided for free. For their admission, the aliens needed to present all legalisation paperwork (Art. 40).
**Governance**

Up until 2000, the responsibility for migration was allocated to the Ministry of Public Order since legal migration was not of national interest. The political decision to move towards the establishment of a migration policy was accompanied by the reallocation of the responsibility over the governance of the legalisation process from the Ministry of Public Order to a more decentralised system under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in which municipalities, prefectures and OAED (Manpower Employment Organization – ΟΑΕΔ, Οργανισμός Απασχόλησης Εργατικού Δυναμικού) played the most central role. The Ministry of Public Order was still responsible for maintaining alien criminal records and providing related information for the legalisation processes to the remaining public administration bodies. Moreover, and as expected, their jurisdiction over illegal migration and deportations was preserved. The management of migration was starting to become a holistic project in which legal and administrative decisions over the entry, stay and departure of non-nationals within the country were the outcome of collaboration between the Ministry of Public Order, Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Justice and Mercantile Marine (Art. 4).

**Bilateral Agreements**

In 1999, just before the introduction of the 2910/2001 law, Greece signed the Treaty of Amsterdam in which the European Union policies with regard to the
control of borders, asylum, rights of third country nationals and the management of migration flows were established and implemented. Additionally, in the same year, in the Tampere Council with the collaboration with migrant sending countries, a common asylum system, fair treatment of third country nationals and a legal migration framework accompanied with measures against illegal migration were agreed amongst European Union member states.

2.4 **Step 4 – The 3386/2005 Law Entry, Residence and Integration of Third Country Nationals**

By the mid-2000s, the acceptance of the presence of non-nationals in Greece and their involvement in the economy as an inherent part of Greek reality was being demonstrated at a political level through the changes in the direction of the legal frameworks on migration. The 3386/2005 Law titled Entry, Residence and Integration of Third Country Nationals raised the expectations on the role the Greek state was planning to take in proactively encouraging and legally adopting and implementing pro-migration programmes. It also signalled the realisation at a Greek political level that migration was a more complex social, economic and political phenomenon requiring specific interventionist efforts to ensure positive contributions and the addressing of disruptions to the national cohesion.
The policy framework starts in Article 1 with the definitions of the employed terminology to ensure accuracy in the implementation of the provisions.

a) Αλλοδαπός - Alien is every person that does not have Greek nationality or the person that has no nationality (is stateless)

b) Υπήκοος τρίτης χώρας – Third country national is every person that does not have Greek nationality nor any other EU country nationality under article 17 and paragraph 1 of the European Union Treaty

c) Ανιθαγενής – Stateless is every person that fulfils the conditions of the 1954 New York Treaty with regards to the stateless regime that has been ratified with the 139/1975 law

The terminology does present one major change in comparison to the previous legal frameworks as it introduces the terminology Third Country National to distinguish the aliens who did not have any political rights due to their European Union national identity. Despite the fact that the title of the 3386/2005 Law was Entry, Residence and Integration of Third Country Nationals, it still did not include any definition on who politically qualified as a migrant or as an economic migrant. On the contrary, the status of Third Country National was discursively and legally expanding social segregation as it was establishing more rigid structures of inequality even within the alien community. In addition, the non-EU nationals were now identified as aliens as well as third country nationals acquiring a doubly legally burdensome status.
The procedures for the administration of residence and work permits remained the same as with the 2910/2001 Law. Migrants were allowed to change employers and maintain their permits upon the condition of the existence of a new contract before the end of the previous one (Art. 15). Having established the right to citizenship in the 2910/2001 Law, the political sphere moved to include another legal category, one step lower to citizenship, for those third-country nationals that had resided in Greece for five years (Ch. 13). This was subject to the conditions that the alien had:

a) stable and sufficient income to support themselves and their family
b) healthy insurance for themselves and their families
c) residence that meets hygiene requirements
d) sufficient knowledge of the Greek language
e) sufficient knowledge of Greek history and Greek culture

Thus, third-country nationals were politically established as long-term residents. The rights and obligations on social, economic and political levels as well as the benefits of this status are not very clear. The significance of this status can only be identified with the effect it had on the legality of the third-country national as it guaranteed their submission to the Greek rule of law and certified their legal activities in Greece.

The major change that this specific legal framework aimed to establish, as suggested in the title of the Law, was through Chapter 12 with the social Integration of third-country nationals. The integration programme was based on six principles:
a) The prevention of any type of discrimination against third-country nationals because of their gender, race, colour, national or social origin, genetic characteristics, language, religion, political or other beliefs, fortune, disability, age or sexual orientation

b) To pursuit of the implementation of equal treatment in every aspect of economic, social and political life irrespective of racial or national origin with purpose the promotion of economic and social cohesion

c) The respect of their fundamental rights as those are safeguarded from the internal legal order upon the protection of the cultural and religious identity

d) The support, promotion and projection of their personal contribution to the wider social, economic and political activities as well as their efforts in personally improving their quality of life

e) The support of the cohesion of their families and the support of all the networks they are members of

f) The promotion of their substantial contribution as partners in the design, implementation and evaluation of the policies of social integration and the development for that purpose of strong advisory structures

These aims were to be turned into substantive action and social, political and economic inherent attitudes with the help of sub-programmes such as information centres, employment promotion agencies, Greek language lessons, civil and cultural support, social service support, public opinion awareness etc.
Governance

The decentralisation of the management of migration and the involvement of more ministries beyond the Ministry of Public Order was established by the 2910/2001 law. With an expanded migration agenda that included the social, economic and political integration of migrants by 2005, the need for an Interministerial Committee for the Observation of Migration Policy was identified and an expanded Committee was created to comprise the Minister of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization, Minister of Economy and Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defence, Minister of Employment and Social Protection, Minister of Justice, Minister of Public Order and Minister of Mercantile Marine (Art. 3). The Committee was to meet twice a year, and by monitoring the developments of legal and illegal migration, to issue directions and institutional measures that would address any emerging problems under the established governmental objectives. Prefectures were to continue to play a central role in migration policy since they remained responsible for setting economic migration quotas. In each Prefecture, the Migration Committees in charge of the quotas were being expanded to consist of seven members. Apart from this central responsibility, along with the municipalities, they were also in charge of dealing with the day-to-day management of the administrative legalization procedures, and staff had the final say on whether legalisation of migrants was granted or not. With this system, the responsibility over migration policy was distributed across the public sector, and despite the fact that the parameters were set at a governmental level, staff of public administration even at lower levels maintained great authority over the legalisation processes.
Bilateral Agreements

The 21st century marked migration as one of the central topics on the European Union agenda. In the 2001 Laeken Council, the European Union member states recognised that the 1999 Tampere goals had not materialised. In response, it was agreed that cooperation between the member states on migration had to be strengthened. In 2002 and in the Seville Council, EU programmes on repatriation and re-entry of illegal migrants were discussed along with border control. In the 2003 Thessaloniki Council, the much-discussed FRONTEX European Agency was created with a mission statement to “promote, coordinate and develop European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter applying the concept of Integrated Border Management” (www.frontex.europa.eu). In 2003, the Brussels Council established the 2005 – 2010 Hague Programme that had the following priorities:

a) facilitation of legal migration, combat of “black labour” and control of illegal migration

b) migration policy becomes a part of the foreign policy agenda of the European Union

c) migrant integration

d) common system of asylum granting for the European Union
2.5 **STEP 5 – THE 3536/2007 LAW ON SPECIAL REGULATIONS ON MIGRATION POLICY ISSUES AND OTHER ISSUES OF JURISDICTION OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DECENTRALIZATION**

- **Legal Framework**

  The 3536/2007 Law ordered the formation of a National Committee for the Social Integration of Migrants under the governance of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. The committee consisted of the Minister and general secretary of the ministry along with the President of the Greek Institute of Migration Policy, representatives of Prefectures, Municipalities and public administration as well as representatives of trade unions, labour and lawyer associations. The role of the committee was to make suggestions and propose actions on the social integration of migrants to the Interministerial Committee of the 3386/2005 Law, the conduct of social discussions and discussions with the citizens’ society for the formulation of policies promoting the migrants’ integration in all areas in accordance with the international and European legislation and directions and the enrolment and study of programs related to the migration integration policies. Although the committee’s responsibility was to oversee the migrant integration programme, it did not include any migrant or third-country national representatives.

  This legislative framework, contrary to the previous ones, focused on the establishment of the administrative part of the migrant integration programme in Greece rather than the legalisation conditions and processes of third-country
nationals at a national level. Though, it did bring one significant change to the 3386/2005 Law. Up to 2005, legalisation was bound to an employment contract and the legal relationship of the third-country national with their employer. With Article 6 of the 3536/2007 Law, third-country nationals employed in the agriculture, construction, medical and domestic labour sectors by more than one employer were not obliged to provide labour contracts. Instead as long as they provided social insurance proof of the set hours worked, they could apply for legalisation. In addition, in periods of unemployment they could buy up to 20% of their social insurance contributions in order to meet the legalisation standards.

➢ Bilateral Agreements

Parallel to these developments, at a European Union level between 2005 and 2009, the European Union intensified talks with member states over the migration agenda, especially since the European Union displayed a more united front with regard to migration. In the 2005 Brussels Council, the need to address migration as a global issue was identified and was practically translated into the proactive cooperation between the sending, transit and receiving countries. With the aim of dealing with migration as a common European project that “has a valuable role to play in strengthening the EU’s competitiveness, addressing current and future demographic challenges and filling labour shortages” (European Commission, 2007), the 2007 Brussels Council moved to establish the European Integration Fund (EIF). It was noted that “with a budget of 825 million euro for the period 2007 – 2013 the EIF supports national and EU initiatives that facilitate the integration of
non-EU immigrants into European societies” (European Commission, 2007). In 2008, the Brussels Council moved also to approve the European Agreement on Migration and Asylum Arrangements. This aimed to organise legal migration in relation to the capacity of each member-state and encourage integration, combat illegal migration and help in repatriation, strengthen border control and construct Europe as an asylum Union.

**CONCLUSION**

Chapter 3 discussed the evolution of the regulation of female migrant domestic labour on both international and specific to this case study national levels. Discussion of the regulatory efforts of the United Nations bodies and the European Union supported a key conclusion. This suggested that, at an international level, the legislative mechanisms on female migrant domestic labour came about due to the global recognition (in the late 1990s) of the conditions of extreme exploitation and vulnerability to which female migrant labour and migrant domestic labour were subject globally. The thematic categories of the vulnerabilities this specific labour group was exposed to have been identified as:

1. Labour contracts and particulars of employment
2. Fundamental principles and rights at work
3. Abuse, harassment and violence
4. Living conditions
5. Working time and remuneration
6. Protection of young workers
7. Regulation of employment agencies
8. Problems of compliance

In view of this, international directions and legislation were developed in the form of binding legal interventionist measures that states were called upon to ratify and adopt through the introduction of national legislative frameworks. These frameworks were developed on the basis of the protection of the human and labour rights of these migrant groups. The legal condition that presupposes the development of any specialised regulatory action addressing these vulnerabilities is the transparency of labour and the establishment of legality of the economic migrants. Illegal labour has been identified as the major cause of the inequalities and vulnerabilities that all migrants, and specifically migrant domestic workers, experience at a global level. Despite the fact that domestic labour as an occupation usually exists outside the boundaries of the formal economy, as established previously, it can be observed that the position of migrant domestic workers in the underground labour market stems primarily from their illegal political status.

As a newly established migrant receiving country, Greece was legislatively and institutionally unprepared to support the involvement of non-nationals in its structures. Starting from very basic short-term legalisation policies, it slowly moved to more elaborate efforts approaching the presence of aliens in Greece as a long-term phenomenon. Under the UN and EU directions on good migration policy practices, the first policy frameworks in Greece can be identified as meeting most
of the above guidelines. Despite the low legalisation quotas, this legalisation was not just enabling the legal presence and involvement of migrants in national structures but it was also tying migrants to legal and controlled entry channels, governmentally monitored recruitment, employment contracts, access to labour rights, social security and national administrative services, thereby encouraging legal migration. The interventionist role of the government in the migration process can be considered as protective of aliens, for according to the EU and UN legislation, the binding of aliens to legal entry channels and legal employment contracts discourages exploitation and abuse and encourages good migration practices at social, economic and political levels. Whereas in practice these facts provide a positive sign for migration policy in Greece in security terms the high involvement of the Ministry of Public Order in the management of migration and the bureaucratic procedures of the legalisation processes reveal a securitized policy environment that is expected to have an effect on the securitized object, i.e. migrants.

As the contemporary migration wave continued to grow and migrants were seen to settle in Greece, migration policies in 2001 took a turn towards the disassociation of some of the aspects of migration, such as entry paths to Greece and recruitment processes, from the legalisation processes and the weakening of the role of the Ministry of Public Order. By 2007, legislation had moved one step further as it allowed third-country nationals to buy social insurance contributions irrespective of the existence of a yearly contract, thereby encouraging the existence of the black labour market especially for ad-hoc occupations that could be conducted outside the formal labour market, including domestic labour.
In essence taking control of the migration wave was being translated through the establishment of legalization as a status aiming to contain the size of the migration wave in Greece. As such despite the transference of responsibilities over the management of migration to non-security ministries migration remained securitized as the legal status did not amount to any social, political and economic protection for migrants but focused in safeguarding the social security of Greece. As a consequence and despite the ratification of EU and UN directions and treaties, the more this migration wave grew and became established in Greece, the more policies moved away from the international directions.

In addition the subsequent absence of elaborate directions and administrative mechanisms resulted in the execution of legislation, the policing of immigration control “and the enforcement of immigration policies… from local police or welfare agencies” (Psimmenos & Kassimati, 2003, p. 338). The public sector was not just given the task of “evaluating the migrant’s potential in the Greek economy” and “the applicant’s ability to respond to the new legal and social framework of labour organization” (Psimmenos & Kassimati, 2003, p. 339) but also by holding the responsibility of providing the health certificates as well as insurance vouchers, were given the executive power over the migrants’ future in Greece. Because of the absence of a clear governmentally established infrastructure “a fuzzy network system (Dingwall & Strong, 1997) of personal, market and civic welfare practice” with “no clear lines and intermixes formal organisational structures with informal structures” was emerging (Psimmenos & Kassimati, 2003, p. 340).
The attribution of executive power to the social sphere with “the metamorphosis of welfare institutions into immigration control enforcement agencies” (Psimmenos & Kassimati, 2003, p. 338) and the absence of clear policy direction empowered the use of cultural norms in the management of migration. The gender and labour identities of female migrant domestic workers take specific meanings in national contexts due to their cultural significance and as such it is expected that the absence of an interventionist approach to the development of migration policy targeting their particular vulnerabilities will have a greater effect on the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour, their settlement in Greece and the experiences of this migrant group.

As for the illegal aliens, migration policies were not just establishing the procedures of their prosecution but were also defining the rights from which they were exempt. These exceptions encouraged the establishment of a grey area in which migration operated. The message that the government clearly conveyed was that it had no power to reinforce the legal protection of migrants. Although there were clauses for the prosecution of those nationals who recruited and fostered aliens thereby illegally violating the regulations within migration policies regimes, these were deficient of a legal framework that capable of protecting the constitutionally established basic human rights of even illegal aliens.

The exploration of the minutes of the plenary sessions on migration aims to gain insight into the political basis upon which the compromising of the legalisation
of migrants transpired in Greece. This is especially relevant at a time when there is
global demand for political action vis-à-vis the protection of the migrants. This
exploration also helps in the conceptualisation of migration as vessels of the
institutionalisation of securitization narratives. By reviewing the parliamentary
debates on migration, the next chapter aims to identify the politicisation narratives
upon which migration policies have been established in Greece. It will address the
hard question of whether the absence of legal provisions protecting the basic human
rights of all aliens is a matter of deliberate neglect due to a strong securitization
agenda or represents the lack of knowledge and experience on the part of the
politicians in understanding the migration phenomenon in Greece and the technical
expertise required to meet attendant challenges. It will also shed light on the cultural
dynamics that drive policy as much as Greek society.
Chapter 4
In Search of Female Migrant Domestic Workers in the Parliament: Securitization in the Making

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter began by reviewing the regulatory needs of female migrant domestic labour, as these have been identified and agreed upon at an international political level. It then discussed the historic evolution of the migration policy framework in Greece since the onset of the contemporary wave of migration in the 1990s. These migration policies effectively comprise the rule of law with reference to the management of female migrant domestic labour. However, despite the direct effect of these policies on defining the political identity of aliens, their political entitlements and responsibilities in addition to their relationship with the state, they cannot fully account for the ways in which the politicisation of migration has shaped the experiences of female migrant domestic workers in Greece. The securitization theory advanced by the Copenhagen School is premised on the performative aspect of security, which acts as a basis for understanding the principles upon which security threats are politicised. The theory also provides a lens for understanding the ways in which the inclusion of issues in the security agenda affects the social and political understanding of the securitised object.
This securitised context helps not only to gain insights into the rule of law itself but also to establish how it has shaped the practice of law on social, economic and political levels, thereby moulding the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers. As discussed in Chapter 1 the way gender identity is experienced nationally the existential threat will be experienced accordingly. In addition this experiences will reflect and provide information on the existence of patriarchal structures.

This chapter serves as the second part in the examination of the securitization process of female migrant domestic labour in Greece. Through the examination of the minutes of the plenary sessions in the parliamentary archives, the aim is to trace the emergence of securitising narratives at a political level and to discuss their development, consolidation and transformation over time. The main argument of the Copenhagen School is that migration has been securitised not only on legitimate political grounds pertaining to the practical and regulatory challenges attendant upon the involvement of aliens in national structures but also in terms of other unrelated threats. This implies that as the securitising narratives have been developed on nationalistic grounds, xenophobia and racism may be considered as integral to the premise.

The identification and analysis of the securitization moves in the plenary sessions are structured upon Ceyhan and Tsoukala’s (2002, p. 24) proposed thematic categorisation, namely the socioeconomic axis, the securitarian axis, the identitarian
axis and the political axis. Hence, structuring this chapter according to the themes rather than the chronology helps in addressing the aim of this project, which is to unpack the politicisation of migration as a discursively constructed project. Nonetheless, the chronological evolution of this politicisation is still represented indirectly through the thematically categorised narratives since the construction of these is based on observed continuities and shifts in arguments.

During the data collection for this chapter, two interesting preliminary observations emerged from the review of the parliamentary plenary sessions, which seemed to anticipate what was about to be unpacked about the politicisation of migration and female migrant domestic labour. Firstly, in the archival index of the plenary sessions discussions on migration issues, classifications were made under the term ‘Αλλοδαποί – Aliens’, and there was no mention of ‘Μετανάστες – Migrants’ or ‘Μεταναστευτική Πολιτική – Migration Policy’. Secondly, there was no evidence at policy level of the distinction between different alien groups and their diversified legislative needs. Within the international political arena, female migration has been distinguished as an area needing specialised regulation. Therefore, the absence of such recognition even at indexical level denotes the political invisibility of this particular alien group. These preliminary observations suggested that the presence of non-nationals in Greece was primarily, and in all likelihood, exclusively managed in security terms as the phenomenon was indexed in the archives under alien identity rather than under economic or political terms.
1 1991 AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIGRATION PROBLEM IN GREECE

The unpredictable and significant increase in size of the inflow of migrants in Greece and their widespread engagement in economic activities caught the government as well as the political sphere off guard. Prior to the 1990s, the political basis for containing economic migration was the country’s economic interests. As such, and as presented in the Introduction and Chapter 3, a selective and restrictive approach to migrant employment on an invitation-only and non-permanent basis for neighbouring aliens in cultural proximity was established. In serving national interests, this position aimed to safeguard the economic development of Greece while simultaneously preserving its societal security. Subsequently, in practice and in terms of governance mechanisms, the legislative framework was translated into a tight border control policy and the development of bilateral agreements between the Greek state and the migrant sending countries. By developing such a highly controlling stance on migration with a strong focus on culture the real political motives were to secure the national economic interests without compromising the societal security. The centrality of societal security in the national agenda reveals a strong commitment to the reproduction of a national identity and as such stronger exclusionary implications for female migrants in general.

With this specific agenda on migration and under an exclusionary migration regime the unpredictably large inflow of migrants resulted in the development of the 1975/1991 law on Entry, Exit, Stay, Employment, Deportation of Aliens, Procedures
for Recognition of Foreign Refugees and Other Provisions\textsuperscript{28} under the government of New Democracy (ND).\textsuperscript{29} Under this migration policy, the arrival of uninvited non-nationals in the country and their involvement in the national structures was compromising the national agenda on the protection of the societal security and as such inherently unwanted and by default illegal. Under the specific agenda the inability of Greece on the one hand to secure its borders and on the other to minimise the presence of non-nationals in Greece had significant ramifications. In effect, this led to an increase in the population of illegal non-nationals slowly establishing themselves as migrants outside the formal national structures. As this phenomenon was unfolding the ways in it was articulated, problematised and evaluated in the Parliamentary Plenary Sessions was reflective of whether there was a move from the original stance and the national interests and intentions with reference to migration as well as to the vested interests of the political parties at that moment in time.

The plenary sessions under consideration demonstrated the presence of two basic opening narratives upon which opinions, concerns and criticisms were introduced. The first narrative was sympathetic towards migrants and drew upon the long Greek history of emigration and the sensitivity this experience of the Greek nation had generated with regard to migrants and migration.\textsuperscript{30}

\emph{In such discussions it is necessary to remind, that our Country is a migrant country with an extensive experience, positive and negative, not only in clear migration issues of citizens that were pushed from...}

\textsuperscript{29} New Democracy (ND) government April 1990 – October 1993, Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis
\textsuperscript{30} Stratis Korakas, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1489
the hardships that they were meeting in our Country to seek elsewhere their luck, but also due to political reasons.\textsuperscript{31}

The Greek workers in their totality are overly sensitive about this problem. In our country more or less there is no household without an emigrant. This is why Greeks are sensitive towards these problems.\textsuperscript{32}

Although the narrative evidenced positive sentiments towards migrants and migration, it could be understood as also evoking a defensive environment based on strong societal discourse of Greek cultural values. Consequently, even though the political objectives of such a narrative were welcoming and respectful towards migrants environment, they were also reproducing and cultivating cultural values inherent to the national identity worthy of being secured for the future wellbeing of the country. Judging from the rather conservative national approach to the potential of migration especially in its early stages, it is worth questioning the political merit of this narrative in the politicisation of migration and the subsequent effects it has on female migrants and female migrant domestic workers more specifically. One of the questions that stems from the approach taken by this study in relation to what has been discussed above is whether the Greek case represents a failure to translate good intentions into practice or a case of deliberate migrant exclusion especially for the group of female migrant domestic workers. In an environment inimical to migration, the use of cultural values and national discourse to persuade the critics

\textsuperscript{31} Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1488, similar opening narratives can be found in the majority of the discussions on migration especially in the 1990s

\textsuperscript{32} Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1487
otherwise seems to have yielded an effect opposite to that which had been intended. The reality of high illegality reflected concerns of an exclusionary approach led by nationalistic concerns with regard to national cohesion and Greek sovereignty.

The second narrative comprised presentation of the known data on migration and the documented size and scope of the phenomenon in Greece. The influx of migrants was characterised as vast, uncontrollable and illegal. The consequences on Greece were not just territorial. Rather, in the words of the New Democracy MP Aristidis Kalantzakos, the phenomenon was presented as “one of the biggest and most serious problems of Greek society”. Such characterisations created a chaotic narrative of a threat against the state’s sovereignty on national and international levels, a threat penetrating the state mechanism resulting to the loss of domestic control. The aim behind this narrative was to raise awareness within the parliament as to the existence of a more complex phenomenon and to urge towards its politicisation as a threat imperilling both the country’s foreign policy and domestic policy agenda.

The next sections discuss the different narratives, the interests behind their development as well as subsequent calls for action identified within the

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33 Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1493
34 Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1487
parliamentary plenary sessions with reference to national economic, social and political dimensions.  

1.1 FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CULTIVATION OF RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA

In the review of the parliamentary sessions, what was most striking was that the majority of the questions were addressed to the Ministers of Public Order and Foreign Affairs respectively. Although population movements have featured in the histories of the states, uncontrolled movements tend to be experienced as threat. As discussed in Chapter 1, migration initially began to feature in Security Studies as part of the territorial security agenda, reflecting national concerns in relation to the power of the state to maintain control over the inflow of migrants and consequently their geographical sovereignty (Heisbourg, 1991; Loescher, 1992; Widgren, 1990). Wæver’s argument on migration being a threat to societal security rather than to territory denotes the belief that the protection of borders, in addition to foreign policy, serves the interests of societal security. In that sense, territorial security still remains an aspect of the migration problem but as a means rather than an end in itself. For Greece, territorial security concerns were constructed as being problems of greater significance in comparison to the rest of the European and Mediterranean countries on the basis of two key arguments:

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35 Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1491
1. ‘the country’s geographical position’\(^{36}\) being EU’s physical border with Asia and Africa

2. the country’s status as the most politically and economically stable country in the Balkans\(^{37}\)

What distinguishes the Greek case within that mode of analysis is that the sudden and exponential rise of the uncontrolled and unplanned inflows was not deemed to be a concern on its own.\(^{38}\) In the Greek context, the political interests motivating the management of the Greek borders and the inflow of non-nationals cantered on the foreign policy agenda of the country. The majority of the migrants arriving in the late 1980s and early 1990s, about half of the migrant population,\(^{39}\) were Albanian nationals leaving their country due to the political developments in the Balkan region. At that point, the tense relations between Albania’s president, Sali Berisha,\(^{40}\) due to the human rights ‘violations against the Greek community in North Epirus’\(^{41}\) and territorial interests over Greece,\(^{42}\) were associated with decision


\(^{37}\) Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1495

\(^{38}\) Oresits Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1499

\(^{39}\) ibid, p. 1499, the other half were mainly from Iraq, Philippines and Poland

\(^{40}\) Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1487

\(^{41}\) Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1491; Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1487

\(^{42}\) Dimitris Kostopoulos, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1498; Aristidis Kalantzakos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\)
making about the management of migrant inflows. This tension originated in “old ethnic and territorial disputes which have been a source of conflict between the two countries since the Balkan Wars” (Lazaridis & Poyago-Theotoky, 1999, p. 718). Due to the high concentration of Albanians, the politicisation of the contemporary migration wave towards Greece reflected the friction between Albania and Greece as well as the more general political instability in the Balkan region. As a consequence, migration came to be associated with Albanians and the anti-Albanian sentiment, thus fast becoming one of the most complicated national problems with multiple components requiring carefully coordinated legislative and administrative management.

For the communist parties the association of migration with the foreign policy agenda of Greece in the Balkan area was not just a strategic choice for the protection of the national sovereignty. There were criticisms that migration had evolved into a national negotiating tool for both sides to exercise pressure upon Albania and vice versa, thus enhancing the hostile political environment in the region and the instability.\textsuperscript{43} The view advanced by Koumpouris is a good example of the hostile reaction to Albanian migration to Greece:

\textit{The problem has developed into a vicious circle. Without any doubt the Berisha regime is a regime of black marketers supported by Americans taking advantage of Greek nationalists to which it answers recycling the system itself... Trials from your side? Cages for illegal migrants from our side. Tsamouria from your side?}

\textsuperscript{43} Oresits Kolozof, op. cit., p. 1499
Lampropoulos’ contention was equally forceful, touching upon the complicity of the Albanian state in the migration wave and its negative impact on Greeks:

*The governments of those countries encouraged illegal migration to help their people survive. Albania survived by the salaries their migrants were earning in Greece even though they don’t admit it. Berisa opened the prisons and all criminals came here. As a result criminality increased sharply and as a result no Greek was feeling safe in their country.*

Despite deep concerns and tensions on this issue, the Albanian government seemed to be uncooperative in establishing bilateral agreements for its migrants in Greece, arguing that the numbers of acceptable Albanian migrants proposed by the Greek side were very low. This lack of cooperation provided substantial political ground for Greece to experience rising insecurity with regard to its political sovereignty in the Balkan area and to question the motivation of the Albanian government in not staunching the tide of migration. The outcome under the current regime was the inability to create legal entry paths for the majority of migrants, especially those from Albania and the Balkan area, thereby leading to greater fossilisation of the securitization narrative.

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44 Dimos Koumpouris, op. cit., p. 1487  
46 Giorgos Adamopoulos, op. cit., p. 1495
Despite changes in the continuation of migration, size of the migrant population and the push and pull factors, this negative line of argumentation maintained a central role in all discussions on migration. The failure to re-evaluate the particularities of the migration phenomenon in Greece during the course of the two decades resulted in misrepresentation of the phenomenon, consequently limiting the prospects for the development of responsive migration policies. Given the development of the phenomenon, it can be argued that maintaining this particular line of argumentation linking migration to the national cohesion of Greece and its territorial sovereignty, especially in the Balkan area, was in essence a tactical move to justify the nationalistic sentiments behind foregrounding the issue on the national security agenda. Given these facts, it is not surprising that the political sphere remained reluctant in introducing a migration policy. As a consequence, the commencement of the new millennium saw the MPs requesting the enhancement of the borders through advanced and new technologies, increase in the border control officers’ weaponry and consequently practical securitization of the borders.

2 THE SOCIOECONOMIC AXIS: AND THE NARRATIVE OF “MIGRANTS STEALING THE JOBS FROM GREEKS”

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49 ibid
Despite the government’s very clear direction on economic migration the data presented to the parliament\(^{51}\) revealed exponential rise in the employment of aliens in small, medium and large-scale businesses.\(^{52}\) After the introduction of the 1975/1991 law, the narrative with regard to the rise in the inflow of aliens was expanded to include the increase in illegal employment and the establishment of the underground migrant labour market. The economic aspect of migration, i.e. the dynamic entry of migrants into the national labour market outside the bilateral agreements,\(^{53}\) in the first stages of the contemporary migration wave was perceived and constructed as a by-product of the state’s primary failure to secure its borders and create legal migration paths for Albanian nationals. As such, economic migration was considered subject to the interests of the foreign policy agenda rather than as an independent phenomenon based on the needs of the national labour market. There was a call for:

> Security of public order, security of the country and harmonization of the foreign policy that aims to secure our interests and rights as well as the establishment of good relationships, mutual respect and cooperation with neighbouring countries. These goals require cooperation between ministries of Labour, Foreign Affairs, Public Order and Interior.\(^{54}\)

During this period, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), amongst all parties, was seen to dominate the parliamentary Plenary Sessions with questions on

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\(^{51}\) as those have also been presented in Chapter 1  
\(^{52}\) Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1487  
\(^{53}\) Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1494; Parthena Fountoukidou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5636  
\(^{54}\) Giorgos Adamopoulos, op. cit., p. 1493, 1495
aliens and introduction of a narrative that related to the economic aspect of migration rather than to the political aspect. The ideological foundation of KKE could be identified as the driving force behind this domination. This was because the emerging economic aspect of the illegal alien inflows to Greece could be contextualised within the Marxist rhetoric on capitalism, global inequalities and global economic divides.\textsuperscript{55} Acting as a basis of the problematisation of migration in Greece, most of the questions revolved around the economic activities of aliens and their illegal employment in the Greek private sector. These questions framed the problem of illegal alien labour as a responsibility of the national private sector resulting in the criminalization of the labour demand rather than supply. For KKE, within the context of this phenomenon, the law was being broken in Greece at three levels:

1. the employment of illegal aliens outside the official processes that were established with the 1975/1991 law
2. the toleration of the abuse of labour rights evidenced in the employment of aliens with low salaries and no insurance
3. the illegal dismissal of national workers due to the higher costs of their employment and the reduction in the demand for low-skilled national labour.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{55} Dimitris Kostopoulos, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1496
\textsuperscript{56} Stratis Korakas, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1499
KKE framed the problem in economic terms, and despite the fact that it was exposing the presence of these illegal aliens in Greece, its aim was to incriminate the Greek private sector for exploiting their presence. For KKE, the threat creating the need for securitization was the non-conformity of the Greek private sector with the national laws and the failure of the Labour Inspection Committee to act on documented complaints. Illegal aliens were not identified as the threat of this problem since they were portrayed as victims of the capitalist system. Irrespective of this, there was absence of counter-argumentation for the development of legislation and motions that would protect the exploited alien workers even after their identification. Under the existing legislation, any report of illegal employment of aliens resulted in their criminalisation not just in terms of being illegally employed in Greece but also in the context of being illegally resident. By constructing the problem as a purely economic phenomenon and by failing to acknowledge its political merits, this specific narrative missed offering a discursive ground that could act in opposition to the main securitization narrative. In addition despite the fact that it acknowledged the existence of a strong underground economy and the illegal employment of aliens in the business sector it did not address nor explore the employment of aliens in occupations that fall outside the legal labour market and leave aliens more susceptible to exploitation and abuse.

As the questions were seen as criticisms of the existing regime rather than opportunities for debate and discussion, the responsibility to respond to such

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57 Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 68, Greek Parliament Archives, 23rd February 1994, p. 2817
criticisms was seen to fall to the government. Despite the fact that the 1975/1991 law was introduced and passed under the New Democracy (ND) government of Konstantinos Mitsotakis, the pressure of implementing it was transferred to the the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) government, led by Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, which won the elections in early 1994. The words of the PASOK Minister of Labour Evangelos Giannopoulos, for example “we inherited this problem too”58 indicated the stance of the incumbent government in response to criticism on the migration situation. Such responses were not just aimed at protecting PASOK within the parliament but also revealed the lack of the governmental political intentions to redefine the pre-existing politicisation of migration. The answers also show that the aim of the questions was not to question the objectives behind the development of the legislation but its execution and implementation. On the record, the Minister of Labour is noted to question “what more measures can we take apart from not giving the aliens the right to work?”.59

As the opposition parties mainly raised questions as to policy implementation rather than their objectives, the government was seen to defend not only the policy frameworks but also the work of the ministries and public administrative bodies engaged with the implementation of migration policies.60 The evaluation of their work was based on evidence of the successful policing of

58 Evangelos Giannopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), MP Plenary Session 68, Greek Parliament Archives, 23rd February 1994, p. 2813
59 Evangelos Giannopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), MP Plenary Session 68, Greek Parliament Archives, 23rd February 1994, p. 2817
60 Mavrouis Voridis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 10th November 2008, p. 1540
economic migration through the number of cases that the Labour Inspection Committee investigated and prosecuted under the 1975/91 law.\textsuperscript{61}

The government’s attempt to justify its lack of control over illegal alien labour in order to secure its political sovereignty gave rise to the idea of migration as an uncontrollable phenomenon. Although political parties differed in their views of governmental efficiency vis-à-vis policy implementation, they were in agreement as to the consequences of the involvement of aliens outside the legal structures for Greece and the urgent need to address these.

The consequences were identified in both economic and social terms, both as by-products of illegal labour and an underground black migrant labour market. The economic aspect encompassed economic losses in the national economy due to tax and insurance contributions evasion.\textsuperscript{62} Politically this illegal phenomenon was constructed to constitute a threat towards the national economy. As Voridis, LAOS MP, observed:

\begin{quote}
Employers taking advantage of the weaknesses of national control mechanisms and employing illegal migrants with multiple consequences for the labour market, social insurance and social cohesion. How many checks have been conducted during 2007 and 2008 regarding black labour market. What are the measures that the ministry is going to take to tackle black labour market? \textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{61} Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1500 – 1501

\textsuperscript{62} Giorgos Adamopoulos, op. cit., p. 1491

\textsuperscript{63} Mavrouis Voridis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 10\textsuperscript{th} November 2008, p. 1540
The key social aspect approximated to the perspective held by the communist party, which contended that the availability of cheaper, in comparison to national, low skilled alien labour was increasing national unemployment. Secondly, within a highly securitised and policed national environment, the supply of black labour seemed to require coordination from an underground illegal system. Illegal networks were seen to seek and establish control at both national and international levels by operating migration and alien employment channels under criminal and not just illegal regimes. As Adamopoulos argued:

*Do not pretend that insurance funds were saved and that aliens contributed towards development. They contributed to unfair competition, black exploitation, black market, increase of criminality. Crimes of extraordinary violence our country learnt due to aliens and contributed to the growth of the organized crime. Slave trade is blooming as UN also testifies. And this means that some countries do not respond to the needs of our time. They are not dealing with the phenomenon of our time.*

This “nationwide occurrence” was primarily addressed as a valid threat not only to the social cohesion of Greece, in terms of the nation’s identity, but also in the corruption of the Greek culture with the introduction of such practices. Within this narrative, the national social complicity with a culture of xenophobia and racism was being excused and in other times legitimised within the parliament as it was viewed as a defensive mechanism rejecting this corruption. For instance, Zois suggested that:

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64 Giorgos Adamopoulos, op. cit., p. 1493
65 Parthena Fountoukidou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th March 2001, p. 5637
66 Ioannis Katsaros, Communist Party of Greece (KKE), MP Plenary Session 68, Greek Parliament Archives, 23rd February 1994, p. 2813
67 Aristidis Kalantzakos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1489; Giorgos Adamopoulos, op. cit., p. 1493
all these are seen by the Greek citizen. And exactly because he is not allowed to feel safe certain that the government of the country that is holding the wheel, reacts with instincts lets his fears take over, loses his trust and sees with suspicion every effort for humane response and restoration of migrants with regards to their human rights.  

Given the basic narrative upon which the politicisation of migration was constructed, with regard to the uncontrolled and illegal inflow of Albanians, it is not surprising that the above concerns were problematised as effects of the above phenomenon rather than the absence of a legalisation regulatory infrastructure. Over time, the political sphere slowly started to understand that migrant labour was establishing itself as integral to the national economy and as such proceeded to establish controlled regularisation. Even in 2008 and twenty years since the start of the migration wave, the nationalistic sentiments against economic migration persisted and maintained their dominance in the plenary sessions due to arguments on the continuing rise in national unemployment and illegal migrant labour. In line with this and in a departure from the communist party perspective, the economic migrants were not identified as the victims of this reality. The question that was never raised on a parliamentary level was whether the rise of the illegal migrant labour market emerged due to the national demand for low skilled labour or due to the national abuse of a more willing cheaper and versatile labour force providing easier profit. In addition it didn’t explore whether the presence of aliens under the illegal status was creating new types of employment outside the formal labour market. The

69 Mavrouis Voridis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 10th November 2008, p. 1540; Sofia Kalantzakou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 10th November 2008, p. 1540
evidence presented linking the rise in the national unemployment and the rise in the illegal employment of aliens, at least in certain sectors, supports the second argument. Even if a combination of the two were the case, there was a visible lack of narratives for the development of stricter and tighter employment regulations and governance infrastructure.

3 THE SECURITY AXIS

3.1 MIGRATION AND THE RISE IN CRIMINALITY

In the first years of the contemporary migration wave, the primary preoccupation on a political level was with the illegal economic activities of non-nationals and the appearance of criminal networks after 1997. Later on, a new dominant narrative emerged, associating the observed rise in criminality in Greece with the aliens themselves. This narrative was introduced by the members of parliament as an incipient aftereffect of the inflow of aliens within Greece. The recognition of the relationship between the establishment of illegal networks and exclusionary migration policies started to recede and the narrative about the presence of illegal networks portrayed as a part of the way of life and culture of illegal aliens began to dominate. Aliens were perceived as criminal nationals moving to Greece with criminal motives. Kontogiannopoulos noted that:

many of them, taking advantage of the abnormal situations in their countries, surely they didn’t come with the greatest intentions in our country. They were aiming for the easy and many times illegal profit. Besides the state machine was found unprepared and it wasn’t in a place to secure to the newly arrived conditions of housing, social
insurance, reasonable income, education, prospects for a social integration.\textsuperscript{70}

The data and evidence presented by members of parliament focused on violent acts wherein aliens were perpetrators and the nationals were victims. The heinous incidents were presented as a new phenomenon for Greece as acts of violence reported were more extreme than those by Greece in its modern years.

The examples cited were economic crimes, such as the 1) “complaint of the PanHellenic Pharmaceutical Association regarding the illegal trade of drugs to neighbouring countries by aliens using national insurance documents of deceased nationals to gain access to drugs and especially Albania”\textsuperscript{,71} 2) incidents where “a young female was raped in front of her husband and father by aliens”,\textsuperscript{72} 3) aliens “robbing, murdering, raping in the middle of the day”,\textsuperscript{73} 4) “kidnapping, increase in drugs, murders of police officers”,\textsuperscript{74} 5) unsafe streets in which nationals could not “walk around at night due to the increased number of aliens, illegal migrants that live in really bad unhygienic conditions, living in squares, forests and nurseries”\textsuperscript{75} and 6) a new phenomenon in which children were seen to beg “at the traffic lights (e.g. 2000 children in traffic lights 80% Albanians and 20% gypsies).\textsuperscript{76} Rural and

\textsuperscript{70} Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5638
\textsuperscript{71} Iordanis Tamtzis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 77, Greek Parliament Archives, 29\textsuperscript{th} January 2002, p. 3444
\textsuperscript{72} Georgios Karasmanis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 9, Greek Parliament Archives, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 418
\textsuperscript{73} Georgios Karasmanis, ibid, p. 418
\textsuperscript{74} Gerasimos Giakoumatos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 127, Greek Parliament Archives, 11\textsuperscript{th} May 1998, p. 8037
\textsuperscript{75} Eleni Anousaki, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 24, Greek Parliament Archives, 10\textsuperscript{th} November 1997, p. 1378
\textsuperscript{76} Georgios Karasmanis, op. cit., p. 418
habitually less dense areas were reported to be afflicted by the more serious acts of violence due to limited policing resources.\textsuperscript{77}

The absence of responsive migration policies continued to be identified as an issue even within this narrative. In the narrative prior to 1997, there was evidence of the political understanding that illegal networks were growing due to the failure of the state to take control and deter the inflow of aliens. After 1997, members of parliament pointed out that criminality was rising due to the deficiency of the state in developing a migration policy that would control the quality of the migrating population. As Panagiotopoulos, New Democracy MP, asserted:

\textit{none is claiming that every unfortunate migrant, that has arrived to Greece illegally to seek better housing, a decent salary to live with his family is rogue. The confusion has been created due to the lack of a policy and has lead for the fair and unfair to be placed in the same sack.}\textsuperscript{78}

At a parliamentary level, some alien nationalities were associated with alien criminality more than others. According to the accounts provided in the plenary sessions, the problem was more pertinent to Albanian nationals and Albania mafia as they were seen to be dominating the development and growth of illegal networks.

\textit{Strong statements such as “the law of kalaznikof and of the Albanian mafia is reigning”,\textsuperscript{79} being built up on the pre-established securitization narrative on}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{77} Dimitrios Pipergias, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 19\textsuperscript{th} November 1998, p. 1396
\item\textsuperscript{78} Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5646
\item\textsuperscript{79} Georgios Karasmanis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 9, Greek Parliament Archives, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 418
\end{itemize}
Albanians’ were aimed at alerting the political sphere to the notion that migration in Greece was still part of the foreign policy agenda linked to threats from a specific neighbouring state. For instance, Tsiplakis, New Democracy MP, argued that

*what we are experiencing since 1993 is a situation of hostageship to say the least from gangs many times consisting of hungry migrants that are lured in northern Greece and also in Athens and other places in Greece. We are experiencing a negative environment of negative situations consisting of punishable behaviours that insult the legal goods of the Greek state, citizens should be protected. What we should have as a result since we are experiencing this problem is the limitation, the end of this specific problem.*

The experiences of nationals were described in terms of insecurity, with similar perceptions holding sway in the perspectives of MPs with good grounds given the portrayed situation. In the words of Georgios Karasmanis, New Democracy MP, “no Greek feels secure mister Minister. What is happening in Greece with the aliens is not happening in any other place of the world. Take brave measures, brave decisions, before we mourn more victims”.

One of the few voices within the government trying to challenge the established narratives on migration was Georgios Romaios, the Minister of Public Order in 1998, who sought to make a political distinction between illegal migration and alien criminality. His argument evident in a key statement made in the parliament in 1998 suggested that only a small percentage of migrants had been legalised and that the criminals had to be identified and deported’. This was

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81 Georgios Karasmanis, op.cit., p. 418

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suggesting a need for the redirection of the politicisation narratives as his statement linked illegality and criminality with the quota capacity of migration policies and capacity of public administration to manage the illegal stay of aliens. Under such narrative, the best course of action was to revisit migration regulations and the restructuring of public administrative bodies that governed the execution of migration policies.

A minority of voices took this challenging narrative one step further. They argued for the need to transfer the responsibility over the identified problems to the national political failure, with the aim of accepting migration as part of the country’s present and future and establishing a responsive legalisation process. Through presenting data showing “that Albanian criminality is proportionate to the Albanian population in same size as the Greek one”, they attempted to highlight that the political sphere

shouldn’t transfer the weaknesses of our society and the state to the foreigners. Of course the illegal migrant will be penalized for crossing illegally... of course it’s the migrants fault that doesn’t demand work stamps. But isn’t the employer or IKA responsible too? We should try to figure out the phenomenon of transference of criminality to the foreigners. 83

Even though both narratives were grounded in facts, they were never accepted on full merit. The government and the political sphere only accepted them as one side of the same phenomenon. As a result, the assumption that all aliens had a criminal side was still factored into discussions over migration, thereby obstructing the

83 Theodoros Pagkalos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 22nd July 1999, p. 401
introduction of more open migration policies. It was observed that “if the government is intending to legalize the migrants then it should develop measures so that they are under constant supervision and they are equipped with identifications and work permits so that the farmers know who are legal and who are illegal and criminals”.84

This reality led to a vicious circle pivoting on difficulty in reaching a common ground for the legalisation of migrants and the development of inclusive and open to migration policies resulting in the deeper establishment of the illegal networks. The victimisation of migrants slowly started to transform into a securitization narrative that focused on the observed criminal activity of migrants against nationals. Lampropoulos, New Democracy (ND) MP questioned “what are you planning to do now? Legalize all that are here illegally and were sent by Berisa from the prisons”.85

3.2 VIOLENCE OF POLICE OFFICERS TOWARDS MIGRANTS

As expected, this rise in criminality was addressed through the mobilisation of the police force. The use of police force per se was justifiable as aliens were subject to the rule of criminal law as nationals. Within parliament, concerns were raised on the development of double standards in the application of laws to which nationals and non-nationals were subject. It was observed that the use of police force

85 Ioannis Lampropoulos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th March 2001, p. 5645
in encounters with aliens was increasingly resulting in lethal “accidents”\textsuperscript{86}. One of the cases that dominated discussion in the parliamentary sessions was related to a 30 year old Albanian migrant murdered by a police officer in Thessaloniki “for no particular reason”\textsuperscript{87}. Police violence as well as hostility from civil servants towards non-nationals at border control stations was a documented and condemned fact in the plenary sessions. The questions asked on a parliamentary level aimed to challenge the government on the directions governmental administrative bodies were given in the implementation of the legislation. This was especially “with regards to the use of force”\textsuperscript{88} as a management tool through the development and establishment of “procedures of accountability for police officers”\textsuperscript{89}.

These worrying incidents were politicised as arising from the existence of a social environment of racism and chauvinism. On behalf of the government, the Minister of Public Order confirmed the observations regarding the cultivation of racism and its association with police force violence but did not hold the government, policies and the rule of law, its administration, the public service and the civil servants responsible for this\textsuperscript{90}. Instead it was communicated that the media played a central role for the political sphere\textsuperscript{91} in the development of strong and negative “perceptions” that influenced police practices, thereby triggering the

\textsuperscript{86} Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 43, Greek Parliament Archives, 28\textsuperscript{th} November 2001, p. 1877
\textsuperscript{87} Charalampos Aggourakis, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 9, Greek Parliament Archives, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 418
\textsuperscript{88} Charalampos Aggourakis, ibid, p. 418
\textsuperscript{89} Orestis Kolozof, op. cit., p. 1877; Charalampos Aggourakis, op. cit., p. 419
\textsuperscript{90} Georgios Romaios, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Minister of Public Order, Parliament Plenary Session 9, Greek Parliament Archives, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 419
\textsuperscript{91} Charalampos Aggourakis, op. cit., p. 419
“creation of more victims”. 92 The picture painted by the media, according to the plenary sessions, was of a national population that at times had to resort to violence in order to protect its wellbeing from the criminally driven aliens. Racism and xenophobia were constructed as factually justified defensive responses rather than ideologically cultivated racist and xenophobic sentiments. As such, despite the fact that police violence against aliens was not supported, ordered nor justified politically, such aggression was viewed as a natural response to extremely violent situations. Justifying police violence, Romaios observed that “the mentioned incident was an accident as per the coroner’s report. There is no racism within the police. And by no means are there orders as you are letting it be understood. It was an accident as it occurred during a chase of someone that got away”. 93

The political responsibility for this problem was conflated with the failure of the government to contain illegal migration and distinguish it from legal migration either through more effective organisation of public administration or the revision of migration policies. Romaios held that:

we have all drawn the conclusion that we can’t hold all Albanians as criminals and hence hold all of them responsible for criminality in Greece... We can’t tell if the one that got away was an economic migrant or one of those that got away from the Albanian prisons... It's a difficult problem we must protect the safety of our civilians. 94

The narrative institutionalising violence and abuse towards migrants had more adverse effects in the form of compromising the ethical and moral basis of the

92 Charalampos Aggourakis, op. cit., p. 418
93 Georgios Romaios, op. cit., p. 418
94 Georgios Romaios, op. cit., p. 418
state, thereby gendering an environment of tolerance towards misconduct and abuse of power. A significant number of MPs presented evidence of corruption within the police force, the public sector,\textsuperscript{95} “in administration”\textsuperscript{96} and the higher ranks of the Ministry of Public Order, thereby abusing their authority and roles in order to issue residence and work permits to aliens that did not fulfil the criteria. In this respect, Georgios Sourlas, New Democracy (ND) MP, noted that:

\begin{quote}
permits were given to aliens that had been arrested and previously deported by the police force without taking into consideration these past activities... permits were given to aliens that were persecute by Interpol... All these permits were given during a time were a rise in the criminality has been observed... All the 2500 permits that were given by the predecessor of Filippos Petsalnikos, Romaios, were given illegally... permits to pimps, gangsters and criminals under the knowledge of the leadership of the ministry of Public Order and the political leadership of the Ministry of Public Order.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Making reference to other forms of corruption, Fountoukidou added that

\begin{quote}
cases of bribery on the bus before their deportation have been reported. To whom are you depending... when you are not accepting the corrupted Public Administration so that you can confront these phenomena and can then talk about an organized entry of migrants in Greece?\textsuperscript{98}
\end{quote}

The misuse of authority applied to the reverse outcome as well, for deportations occurred “on a daily basis even when economic migrants have all their

\textsuperscript{95} Christos Markogiannakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 19, Greek Parliament Archives, 26\textsuperscript{th} May 2000, p. 419
\textsuperscript{96} Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5646
\textsuperscript{97} Georgios Sourlas, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 34, Greek Parliament Archives, 1\textsuperscript{st} December 1998, p. 1859
\textsuperscript{98} Parthena Fountoukidou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5636
Deportations were described as “selective and with no legal base… based on personal conflicts, interests and abuse of power from national employees”. Given the high percentage of bribery cases and despite the absence of facts within the plenary sessions, it is worth questioning whether a system of bribery was well established within public administration to the extent where the system persecuted aliens with legal papers who were unwilling to pay bribes, by deporting them as a matter of norm. It appeared that what had started as a narrative of identitarian security was transforming into normalisation of abuse, violence and exploitation.

The development of the administrative structure that managed the regularisation processes took place within a system of public administration lacking accountability and meritocracy. It was in these debates that the existence of female migrant domestic labour was acknowledged and was specifically linked to specific concerns with regards to corruption. The then Minister of Public Order Mr. Romaios could not discredit the allegations for corruption as endemic to Greek bureaucracy was a widely accepted reality. Instead the only defence he could offer for his administration was that corruption was a common practice across the political and social spheres. He further argued that MPs from all parties, officials as well as religious leaders were part of the problem since they had been using their political power to ask for permits for aliens employed by them and used as domestic workers.

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100 Konstantinos Mitsotakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th March 2001, p. 5643
in their households. Political authorities were widely noted to be taking advantage of the situation\textsuperscript{101} as much as civilians and civil servants. Corruption was so rife that at times the political rights given to aliens were outside the provisions of migration policies. For example, and as presented in the parliament, despite the absence of naturalisation prospects, citizenship was given “to the Ukranian Olena Foursevits the domestic assistant for the grandmother of the photographer Tsoukia… Russian criminals Soloni and Tatarengko, Ukranian Segkei Kotovits wanted by Interpol since 1997”\textsuperscript{102}. Taking into consideration the lack of acknowledgement of female migrant domestic labour as a migrant occupation with distinctive characteristics and links to the rest of the narratives on migration the specific quotes reveal the full awareness of the existence of domestic labour as an illegal female migrant occupation. Given the pressing socioeconomic narratives on the problems arising from illegal migrant labour the absence of this labour group in that axis must be approached as a deliberate exclusion rather than a coincidental omission.

The illegal regularisation of aliens was identified to be serving both economic and political interests. Through the presentation of 22 documented instances wherein citizenship was granted close to election times\textsuperscript{103} the government was accused of naturalising criminal aliens in order to increase its voting power\textsuperscript{104}. The scrutiny of the police force with regard to violence and administrative

\textsuperscript{101} Theodoros Pagkalos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 1999, p. 401
\textsuperscript{102} Viron Polidoras, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 19, Greek Parliament Archives, 26\textsuperscript{th} May 2000, p. 417
\textsuperscript{103} Viron Polidoras, ibid, p. 417
\textsuperscript{104} Viron Polidoras, ibid, p. 417
malpractices was questioned since, in the words of the New Democracy MP Georgios Sourlas, “the covering processes of protection of criminals happens through networks within the police force” under the directions of the political sphere.\(^{105}\)

In view of these facts, a major contributor to alien criminality was identified as the existing corrupt national system. It is not surprising that underground criminal networks were able to exploit the national system by proceeding in the production and sale of forged cards which were openly advertised in magazines and newspapers.\(^{106}\) The political sphere was recognising that migration as a phenomenon was serving micro-political and economic interests at the expense of aliens, national cohesion and national macro-economic, social and political interests.\(^{107}\) In line with this, the sense of insecurity experienced by Greek citizens was politically mobilised through the deliberate bad management of the phenomenon.\(^{108}\)

This status quo was responsible for diminishing the credibility of migration policies and regularisation processes, thus exposing aliens to further abuse. The insecurities around the regularisation processes were not just related to the narratives of fear upon which migration was politicised but also stemmed from practical irregularities. Irrespective of this, in the plenary sessions, these facts were

\(^{105}\) Georgios Sourlas, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 34, Greek Parliament Archives, 1\(^{st}\) December 1998, p. 1859
\(^{106}\) Georgios Karatzaferis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) President, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5655
\(^{107}\) Epaminondas Zafeiropoulos, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 22\(^{nd}\) July 1999, p. 401
\(^{108}\) Evripidis Stilianidis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 19, Greek Parliament Archives, 26\(^{th}\) May 2000, p. 420
approached as separate problems, and as such no narrative was introduced to politicise alien criminality in relation to migration policies and the failures of the regionalisation of these migration policies through the techniques of governance.

3.3 THE VICTIMISATION OF MIGRANTS

The “acts of violence towards illegal migrants… adopted… by governmental bodies”\textsuperscript{109} were increasingly becoming a daily occurrence faced by both nationals and migrants, thereby legitimising a politically tolerated culture violating the migrants’ basic human rights. The violations were not limited to aliens’ exchanges and conduct with the state as abuses were also observed in the social and economic private exchanges of aliens with nationals. Despite the fact that police violence was politicised as being related to a media cultivated environment of racism and xenophobia, the social and economic exploitation and abuse of aliens were constructed as a trickle-down effect of the management of migration by “the authorities”\textsuperscript{110} and the developed political narratives on migration.

What had started as an opportunistic labour exchange between nationals and migrants breaching national employment legislation in the 1990s by 2000 was developing into a strong black labour market depending on its own criminal networks.

\textsuperscript{109} Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1498

\textsuperscript{110} Stratis Korakas, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1499
The difference between illegal employment of aliens and illegal employment of nationals is that the illegal migrant knows that against every report he will end up involved and for this reason they don’t report. He is more susceptible than the Greek employer. The Greek employer that will be the receiver of bad employment practices, that will violate his rights, has the opportunity to refer to the authorities and defend himself. Possibly he might have consequences, agony whether he will lose his job, but he won’t have as dramatic consequences as a report from an alien. It is common secret that the vast majority of illegally employees are aliens. And their advantages are that their uninsured, lower salaries from the lower levels of basic salaries, those that are being set by collective agreements and in this sense they are breaking the Greek economy.111

The problematic implementation of migration policies and the subsequent administrative malpractices were transforming a politically illegal phenomenon into a criminal one with social and economic expressions. The breaches of the employment regulations consisted not only of unequal treatment in relation to working hours and pay rates but also of considerable abuse. Migrants were being identified on a parliamentary level as “victims of multiple abuses”,112 thereby experiencing conditions similar to those of slavery.

The 1926 League of Nations definition on slavery, which stands as “the agreed upon definition of slavery in international law” and defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised” (Allain, 2008, p. 239). Members of parliament reported a series of incidents in the plenary sessions that provided evidence to support claims of slavery. In these incidents employers were reported to keep

111 Mavrouis Voridis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 10th November 2008, p. 1540 – 1541
112 Stratis Korakas, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1499
migrants captive by withholding their passports, subjecting them to sexual harassment and threatening them with reporting to the police for deportation in order to avoid salary payments.\textsuperscript{113} In the words of Dimos Koumpouris, KKE MP:

\textit{the greatest drama is experienced by the alien workers that are resembling modern slaves, since from the current regime the only ones gaining are the various businessmen, that are reminding slave traders of previous century, that are taking advantage with the most brutal way of their employees in the hardest and unhygienic jobs}.\textsuperscript{114}

It is very clear that there was unanimous discomfort in the political sphere over the emerging patterns in the treatment of legal and illegal migrants and the defining role they played in establishing a hostile environment. It was also clear that there was a political awareness of the gender aspects of alien exploitation and abuse. This awareness though didn’t lead to the elaborate politicisation of these incidents as parts of the gender dimensions of the involvement of female aliens in the national structures.

The arguments used to establish such discussions were based on:

1. the emigrating history of Greece and the expectations Greece had as a sending country from the migrant receiving countries. “Migrant receiving countries, like our own, hold the responsibility over the hospitality of these people”\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} Stratis Korakas, ibid, p. 1499 and Georgios Romaíos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Minister of Public Order, Parliament Plenary Session 142, Greek Parliament Archives, 29\textsuperscript{th} May 1998, p. 9895

\textsuperscript{114} Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1487

\textsuperscript{115} Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1488, similar statements from Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1491
2. ethical concerns under the Greek legislative framework and constitution: “It wasn’t right for them to be illegally employed and used by modern slavers”,116 “like human beings and not slaves”,117 “importance of safeguarding human rights of these people present in our country [and] implementing the existing legislation available for Greek citizens”118

3. the international legislation binding Greece to respect migrants’ human rights: “These humans have rights, that are recognized by the international community. International treaties”.119

The continuing violations of the migrants’ human rights served to drive political advocacy for the development of more adequate migration policies. By law, the police was identified as the administrative branch of the government with a “mission to defend human and personal rights”.120 The rise of the legally unjustified violence of police officers towards aliens was revealing in that the police force lacked the capacity to fulfil this role. The identification of the responsibility of Greece as a host country to resolve this matter revealed a huge difference between rhetoric and practice, which stemmed from a lack of politicising capacity under the current narratives and approaches to agenda setting on migration.

116 Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1491
118 Orestis Kolozof, op. cit., p. 1488
120 Evaggelos Malesios, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Vice Minister of Public Order, Parliament Plenary Session 43, Greek Parliament Archives, 28th November 2001, p. 1877
The essence of human rights is the establishment of a uniform legislative and administrative infrastructure that protects the basic human rights of all human beings, irrespective of their identity, political or legal status. The plenary sessions showed weakness at a political level in distinguishing between provisions over basic human rights and access to additional political, social and economic rights stemming from the economic involvement of aliens in Greece. There were fears that the establishment of a policy framework safeguarding basic human rights irrespective of the identity and the political status of migrants would compromise state sovereignty, threaten the social security of Greece and would legalise the “lack of respect of the rights of Greeks on an EU level”.\(^{121}\) The words of Andreas Lentakis’, (Political Spring (PS) MP), during his speech on the abusive attitudes towards migrants exemplify the above approach:

> why should we accept illegal migration in the name of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism is the security of the rights of the habitats of this country because problems can be created. And indeed problems are created… Acceptance of illegal migrants was equal to violations of the international law.\(^{122}\)

National security was deemed incompatible with an elaborate human rights framework. Hence, as it was framed to conflict with a strong human rights agenda, the protection of the migrants’ human rights could only be conceptualised within the national security agenda. A by-product of this belief was the development of a nationalistic narrative of denial through which it was argued that there was “no need

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\(^{121}\) Kiriakos Spiriounis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5647

\(^{122}\) Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) December 1994, p. 1491
to develop human rights discourse outside the Greek mentality as universal human values were developed in Greece”\textsuperscript{123} and as such were inherent to Greek law and Greek culture. Such a narrative abstracted the parliament from filtering national legislations from international standards and legitimised human rights’ violations as a valid response to situations of national urgency and empowered nationalistic sentiments.

As a solution of this problem, voices within the opposition and the communist parties exhorted the government to legally distinguish the uncontrolled inflow of aliens to Greece and the employment of illegal aliens by Greek citizens as different phenomena. Irrespective of the fact that the violence towards migrants was becoming a uniform phenomenon, within parliament, the agenda and discussions on the abuses were grounded in the construction of different migrant categories, illegal, political and economic migrants. As such, these did not reflect observed practices. Dimitris Kostopoulos, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP argued that “our humanity has been damaged by the way police is treating Albanians. And the statement of the Minister of Public order announced that our foreign policy is taking into consideration the failure to see the matter of foreign workers independently”.\textsuperscript{124} It was contended “the government should develop a migration policy that will defend the peaceful coexistence, that will resolve the issues of the rights of economic

\textsuperscript{123} Kiriakos Spirounis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5647

\textsuperscript{124} Dimitris Kostopoulos, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1496
migrants and won’t exercise violence”.\textsuperscript{125} Stella Alfieri, SYNASPIMOS (MP), added that:

\begin{quote}
the legalization of the stay of migrants is the necessary condition for the provision of equal rights and obligations in the labour sector, social benefits, in the social life of this country. Such a humanitarian and legal solution for the migrants we believe would contribute in the improvement of the relationship between Greeks and migrants.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

This distinction aimed to establish a divide in the national responsibilities over these categories and abuses experienced by migrants,\textsuperscript{127} which would help to secure political and administrative control and transition from the discourse of nationalistic fear normalising a culture of tolerance of violence against migrants.

The plenary sessions on migration policies can be categorised under two themes:

1. The management of economic migrants
2. The management of illegal migration

Even though it is unlikely that differentiated treatment was meted out to different kinds of migrants, the debates on illegal and economic migrants will be explored separately.

\section{3.4 The Management of Economic Migration}

The regularisation and legalisation of the non-nationals engaging in economic activities in Greece was established on an urgent basis. Firstly, it would

\textsuperscript{125} Stiliani Aliferi, SYNASPIMOS (MP), Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 1999, p. 399
\textsuperscript{126} Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5640
\textsuperscript{127} Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1491
protect them from social, economic and political exclusions, exploitation and abuses. According to Christos Protopapas, PASOK Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Insurance, there needed to be efforts exerted towards stopping what was an “unacceptable situation with people moving outside the social boundaries” and creating “the conditions for a Greece, an EU member state that can hug all its citizens, normalize the labour market, stop illegality and exploitation”.\(^\text{128}\) Secondly such a move would protect the economic and political sovereignty of Greece by controlling the size of economic migration and the conditions of the involvement of aliens in the social, economic and political structures.\(^\text{129}\)

Despite the testimonies and the provided data of the positive financial contribution of the migrant labour market, showing that “the contribution of migrants in the economy has led to a rise of 1.5\%”,\(^\text{130}\) the political sphere did not intend to base economic migrant legalisation on their years of residence in Greece but on nationally established quota. By default and since the protection of the aliens’ human rights was defined through their legalisation, the observed humanitarian argumentation, which aimed to securitise the exploitation stemming from illegality, did not aim to protect all aliens present in Greece. This was because the government did not offer legal provisions securing the human rights of already employed economic migrants who lacked a legal status.

\(^\text{128}\) Christos Protopapas, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Insurance, Parliament Plenary Session 123, Greek Parliament Archives, 18\(^{\text{th}}\) May 1998, p. 8333
\(^\text{129}\) Parthena Fountoukidou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{\text{th}}\) March 2001, p. 5636
\(^\text{130}\) Charalampos Aggourakis, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 65, Greek Parliament Archives, 19\(^{\text{th}}\) January 1998, p. 4369
Prior to the establishment of legalisation procedures, the status of all aliens present in Greece was, by default, illegal. The biggest contradiction of these processes was their dependence on the aliens’ long term past employment. This practically meant that aliens had to remain part of the illegal labour market in order to be able to acquire the work and residence permits. Within this context, it was to be expected that even though the penalisation of nationals engaging with the underground migrant labour market\textsuperscript{131} constituted an intrinsic element of migration policies, it could not manage to tackle the illegal employment of aliens. In addition whereas the legal labour market could be policed through the established agencies the migrant labour types falling outside the formal economy were out of those agencies’ reach as they were lacking jurisdiction and technical provisions. Since official labour positions were not open to illegal economic migrants it was easier for aliens to acquire work and residence permits through occupations that did not require legal documentation, such as domestic labour, making them more popular for aliens and in some occasions their only financial means. The indirect normalisation and encouragement of the existence of the underground economy was recognised within parliament as being encouraged through migration policies. As pointed out by Zois, the question amounted to “how serious [was] a state that sends such a message, that in Greece the most important thing is to consolidate your illegality and you can be sure that one day the time will come that you will be vindicated”\textsuperscript{132} Despite these

\textsuperscript{131} Dimos Koumpouris, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1488
\textsuperscript{132} Christos Zois, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5651
conclusions the parliament failed to recognise its contribution in the creation of certain migrant labour types under the specific approach to the phenomenon and explore whether certain weaker migrant groups were more susceptible to exploitation and abuse within this operational regime.

The basic aim upon which the politicisation of migration was developed in Greece was that of the urgency to respond to the uncontrolled inflow of aliens. What speakers in parliament defined as legalisation processes aiming “to protect the aliens from the exploitation that was taking place until now so that they can claim their rights with regards the labour conditions as well as their pay”\(^{133}\) were in essence “documentation and legalization processes”.\(^{134}\) Christos Protopapas’, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Insurance statement: “their stay needs to be connected with the type of labour and only if they are completely necessary they should stay. Their labour mobility should be monitored until they receive Greek citizenship and this should be done under straightforward restriction” (emphasis added)\(^{135}\) represents the political approach to migration.

Due to the dual role of the regularisation policies and the reluctance at the political level to redefine the teleological purpose of legislative frameworks, the

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\(^{133}\) Georgios Romaios, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Minister of Public Order, Parliament Plenary Session 142, Greek Parliament Archives, 29\(^{th}\) May 1998, p. 9895


\(^{135}\) Parthena Fountoukidou, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5637
abuse and exploitation of most of aliens continued even after the establishment of these policies. This was highlighted by Kontogiannopoulos who noted that:

*Mr Minister you saw what picture is being created to MPs. That the aim is clear, send them away and this is why we aren’t making the Green Card process easier. This is the impression that has been created to the Greek society lately from your statements. And this picture, this atmosphere is completely unacceptable.*\(^{136}\)

Partial regularisation was established as part of the existing regime within which citizens saw the regularisation of aliens as a personal choice and not as such a clear break with the law. Kontogiannopoulos PASOK MP took this observation further by adding that nationals chose to keep migrants illegal as they were cheaper. In his own words: “you know why hundreds of thousands of migrants couldn’t go to apply? Because their employers denied to give them the stamps since they are employing them illegally. That’s how they want them”\(^{137}\).

With the continuing rise of an inflow of a more nationally diverse alien population and the lack of interest in the increase of the number of residence and work permits, the size of the illegal economic migrant population kept growing. It was observed that “today the situation in our country is out of control with regards this population…. Some think that their number has exceeded 1 million. The vast majority are illegal in our country according to the laws of this country”\(^{138}\).

\(^{136}\) Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5638

\(^{137}\) Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5638

\(^{138}\) Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\(^{th}\) March 2001, p. 5639
What the political sphere was failing to acknowledge was its own limitation to identify the changing consistency of the national economy and to distinguish between the different aspects of the migration problem, the different emerging types of migrant labour and their particulate regulatory needs. It was not that “the state machine was found unprepared”. Rather, it was that the state machine failed to acknowledge the conflict between the national security interests as those were conceptualised by the political elites, national foreign policy, national economy and humanitarian concerns. The plenary sessions lacked the development of a narrative that could argue for the development of administrative mechanisms for proactively safeguarding and promoting the basic human rights of migrants and, at the same time, maintaining a clear tightly controlled agenda on migration distinguishing between migrant rights, illegal and economic migration. Unfortunately, the desecuritization narratives were not elaborate enough to unmask the ways which migration was slowly constructed as a security drama. The pleas that called for “a democratic government formed a policy of human respects, a policy that forms the conditions of a democratic system of government with absolute respect to the human element” recognising the failure of the political sphere “to protect certain functions that should have pre-existing”. The effect this failure had in catalysing the phenomena of xenophobia and racism remained sporadic and failed to become further entrenched.

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3.5 THE MANAGEMENT OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Due to the circumstantial aspect of migration and the ineffective legalisation, the aliens who could not manage to submit their documentation were all politicised as illegal, irrespective of their migration journey and history in Greece. Despite the fact that their criminalisation was an outcome of the exclusionary migration policies and the state defined status of illegality as discussed in the above sections, they were still stripped of governmental provisions safeguarding their basic human rights. The discourse of aliens as a drain upon national resources and a threat on multiple levels for Greece discursively burdened this specific percentage of the alien population. As a consequence, the illegal aliens seemed to exist in a grey area circumscribed by social, political and legal protective provisions.

With the continuing rise in the inflow of a more nationally diverse alien population, the discourse of the politicisation of migration was infused with fear towards a multi-ethnic society becoming more rigid. The political intentions for all illegal migrants were very clear, and as such the population of criminal aliens and aliens that needed to be deported kept growing. In one plenary session, Orestis Kolozof, KKE MP questioned existing practices: “Legalization of half of them. What about the rest? Will they keep producing illegally in this country? No matter how may ships we rent to transport these illegals that we will be collecting we won’t be able to empty our country from the illegals”.141 The effect of the grey area in the management of illegal migration was reflected in the failure of the political sphere

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to accept responsibility for the transition period between arrest and deportation. The development of an infrastructure was defined as financially burdening the state. This negligence resulted in the emergence of a series of additional problems largely stemming from overcrowding in the detention facilities. Within plenary sessions, these problems were filtered through a securitization narrative so that they were presented as constituting a threat to national security rather than the security and wellbeing of the aliens. It can be argued that in general the conditions under which the management of illegal aliens took place in Greece simulated those existing within a military approach and legal conditions experienced by war hostages and not just criminals.

Two problems were identified within the plenary sessions as preoccupying the parliament with regard to deportations. The first was the reappearance of previously eradicated contagious diseases due to the poor health of illegal aliens and the unhygienic detention conditions. There was a strong argument in favour of the development of solutions for the protection of the basic human rights of criminal aliens, including their right to health. However, the main political preoccupation was with the protection of the national population and police officers as their work duties and poor infrastructure support was exposing them to threats due to their contact with aliens. Paraskevi Christofilopoulou, PASOK MP observed that:

\[\textit{the social sensitivity towards these people, economic migrants legal and not, one shows with actions not words. And the actions of this}\]

\[\footnotesize{142}\text{ Spiridon-Adonis Georgiadis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) MP, Parliamentary Plenary Session 44, Greek Parliament Archives, 4th December 2007, p. 2063}\]

\[\footnotesize{143}\text{ Stiliani Aliferi, Coalition of Left (SYNASPISMOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 24th October 1997, p. 735; Parliament Plenary Session 162, Greek Parliament Archives, 26th June 1998, p. 11862;}\]
The reasoning was very clear. The argument undergirding the call for the development of responses to the emerging health threats was premised upon the rising and uncontrolled inflow of illegal aliens rather than the poor detention facilities or the absence of care provisions for illegal migrants. Despite the fact that their criminal identity was nationally constructed, it could be clearly identified as the basis of the absence of interest \textsuperscript{145} to provide protection, solutions and governmental funds.

The second problem was linked to the deportation procedures and infrastructure. As underlined in the previous and current chapters, the responsibilities of the management of migration were mainly allocated to the Ministry of Public Order and more specifically to the police force. Bearing in mind the size of migrant inflows and the large number of illegal aliens, the concerns of the Police Officers’ Union over their numerical capacity in terms of the officers’ increasing responsibilities \textsuperscript{146} were unsurprising. Rather than seeking the

\textsuperscript{144} Paraskevi Christofilopoulou, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) MP, Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 28\textsuperscript{th} November 2005, 1696
\textsuperscript{145} Georgios Romaios, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Minister of Public Order, Parliament Plenary Session 15, Greek Parliament Archives, 24\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 735
\textsuperscript{146} Georgios Karasmanis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Sessions 9, 16\textsuperscript{th} October 1997, p. 418; Dimitrios Pipergias, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 25, Greek Parliament Archives, 19\textsuperscript{th} November 1998, p. 1396
restructuring of the administrative branches and encouraging the reconceptualization of the management of illegal migration, MPs used the information to support their arguments within the securitization process.

The political resistance to acknowledging illegal migration as a national responsibility was portrayed in the parliament to be expressive of the response of the social sphere. The plurality of the problems surrounding the contemporary migration wave and lack of resolution had cultivated an accumulative hostile social environment. In this environment, it was believed that Greece was already paying a high price with migration, and as such any additional provisions would multiply the national burden in social, economic and political terms. Deportation centres were socially approached in the same terms as prisons, and as such local authorities were opposed to the establishment of deportation centres close to residential areas for social and economic reasons.\textsuperscript{147} In the words of the MP Theodoros Pagkalos, when discussing the construction of a detention facility around the Malakasa region, “the community is against that decision as they believe it will downgrade the area. The community was not asked”.\textsuperscript{148} On a parliamentary level, the securitization of migration was identified as a bottom up process.

\textsuperscript{147} Anastasios Papaligouras, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliamentary Plenary Session 82, Greek Parliament Archives, 5\textsuperscript{th} February 2002, p. 3642
\textsuperscript{148} Theodoros Pagkalos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Greek Parliament Archive, 20\textsuperscript{th} January 2003, p. 2099
The settlement of economic migrants in Greece did not just relate to their economic and political activities but also comprised their involvement in Greek society. Given the absence of interest in the establishment of Greece as a migrant host country up to mid-2000s and the introduction of the 3386/2005 Law, there were no provisions for the political management of the social aspect of migration. Despite the political resistance to legalisation by 2000, the aliens had already settled in Greece with their families and were part of social life. Mixed marriages, enrolment of first and second-generation alien children in schools and the appearance of more religions were few of the social changes Greece, as a host country, had to be responsive to. The basic dilemma facing Greece was a question over whether to resist the social and political empowerment of migrants in order to protect its nationalistic culture as well as to risk the regularisation of racism and xenophobia or to bridge the nationalistic interests with the acceptance of ethnic diversity so as to achieve social cohesion.

For a certain number of MPs, due to the growth in size and cultural diversity of the migrant population, “declarations regarding ethnic purity and monoethnic composition” of Greece were not modern and were developing into causes of misunderstandings and more problems. For these voices, the more pragmatic aim

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for Greece was “to become a multicultural society”.\textsuperscript{150} Despite the legitimacy of these concerns, and the positive starting point in practice cultural diversity was politicised as a challenging project mainly due to the history of Greece as a recently established mono-ethnic nation-state. As Pathemelis argued:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Greece has been a single nationality state. 98\% of the citizens have the same ethno-racial origin and lately we tend to address it like a future multi-ethnic state. I cannot conceive how from one day to the next we, from a mono-ethnic state, can become a multi-ethnic state. Why should this happen?}\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

By 2004, the political sphere was identified in plenary sessions to still be allegedly divided since there was “no clear direction in migration policy. No set goal agreed on a political level” about the burning question of “Integration? Or not?”.\textsuperscript{152} The governmental policies as well as the politicisation of the problems emerging from the social engagement of aliens in Greece testified to the opposite. This was because they were clearly constructing a political environment in which the country was identified as “suspicious and reserved” towards the national presence of aliens, their prospects for integration and acquisition of citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{153}

Drifting away from the themes of foreign policy, economic or social concerns, the narrative that was observed as underscoring all debates on integration

\textsuperscript{150} Sotiris Chatzigakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5653
\textsuperscript{151} Stilianos – Aggelos Pathemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5635
\textsuperscript{152} Fotios Kouvelis, Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology (SYNASPISMOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 52, Greek Parliament Archives, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 2004, p. 2149
\textsuperscript{153} Fotios Kouvelis, Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology (SYNASPISMOS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 52, Greek Parliament Archives, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 2004, p. 2154
was a clear identitarian narrative. This was based on concerns about the effect of the equal involvement of migrants in Greek structures on the national cohesion of Greece and the national identity of Greek society. The MPs constructed Greece as a small and politically weak country, in comparison to its European and regional neighbours, and therefore easily affected by any type of integration or legalisation of aliens. The inflow of aliens came at a time when national birth rates were dropping and the mean population age was increasing. As a consequence “the high birth rate of aliens in Greece or the economic migrants generally”\textsuperscript{154} was identified to have more pressing implications.

The imminent threat and the presence of a variety of other nationalities and cultures were identified as exposing Greece to the extinction of its national identity and culture. Despite its strong nationalistic heritage, it was believed that the evolution of Greece into a multicultural society would compromise its culture and dilute the Greek ethnic identity. The narratives already presented and discussed touching upon the pressing issues around aliens and migration, as those were perceived by the political sphere, contributed to the construction of a migrant profile with specific characteristics.

1. In territorial terms and with the high percentage of Albanian nationals, aliens were seen as carrying a strong national identity aiming to take over the Greek one

\textsuperscript{154} Christos Meimarakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 95, Greek Parliament Archives, 3\textsuperscript{rd} April 2003, p. 3746 – 3747
2. in socioeconomic terms aliens were believed to be stealing national jobs resulting in the increase of national unemployment rates and contribute to the growth of an underground labour market

3. in securitarian terms aliens were observed to be contributing to the rise of criminality due to their corrupted ethical basis.

These characteristics were portraying a very negative cultural profile comprising of ideas, customs and social behaviours contrary to the Greek ideals. Consequentially the narrative supported by the majority of the MPs was that their political responsibility and obligation was to safeguard and preserve the national and cultural identity of Greece. Due to these concerns, and as discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2 and 3, prior to 1990, economic migration was based on an invite only basis of national groups with similar culture. The aim of this was to control the length of stay, size, nationality of aliens and their reproductive rights in Greece. The composition of the contemporary migration wave was identified to violate all three aims, thereby giving rise to specific securitization narratives relating to debates on integration. The central question that emerged was: “Shouldn’t we take all measures to protect the clarity of Greek people?”.

The narrative on the dominance of Albanian migrants and the effects of the presence of a nationality with expansive towards Greece interests expanded to

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include more considerations. The following extracts represent a range of perspectives on these:

*Are we going to import minorities? Skopians are reminding us of the existence of a minority in our country. If they import some then we will end up with a second pole minority apart from the Muslim. None overlooks that the third pole already exists, that being the Albanian minority. Albanian leadership makes efforts supporting the issue of Tsamides with the aim to create the big Albania.*

*The first problem is the security of borders. Second problem is how many foreigners do we need and if we need some then the third problem is from where we will get them. There are of Greek origin and we could integrate ones of Greek origin from former ESSD. We will get them from countries that don’t have at the back of their heads to create a minority in Greece whether we are referring to Skopians or Bulgarians or Albanians or Turks. We will get them from countries such as India.*

*With this bill essentially you are legalizing all migrants that are in our country irrespectively of their number, nationality or whom they are. What percentage from these migrants belongs to specific ethnicities that have created a problem in our country... Mrs Maragkopoulou stresses that it is nationally dangerous for our country a single ethnicity to exceed in percentage the 20% of the totality of migrants, owing to the danger of creating minority problems.*

*Fertility of Kosovo. If they weren’t fertile then they wouldn’t be able to do what they are doing now. We haven’t realized that in our north we have a new Turkey, another Turkey. A country that is connected closely with its political decisions with Turkey. With one Albania, with the second Albania of Kosovo, with the third Albania of Tetovo, with the fourth Albania of Presevo. We are moving towards a transformation that is related with the demographic problem of the area. We have a minority that is recognized by the Lozanne Treaty.*

159 Ioannis Kefalogiannis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th March 2001, p. 5649
A decade into the migration wave, different nationalities were identified to raise further concerns adding to the “geographical and political pressures”. The political sphere was requesting “the discouragement of the entry of members of fanatic groups and politically religious extremist groups”\textsuperscript{161} to avoid the future development of “an Islamic party in the parliament”\textsuperscript{162} or parties of other ethnicities and cultures in order to safeguard and maintain “the ethnical and cultural physiognomy”\textsuperscript{163} of Greece.

Despite the fact that these debates did not focus on female migrants, in essence they were aiming to secure the right of social reproduction and the norms behind gender relations. The use of phrases such as ‘high alien birth rates’ and ‘fertility of Kosovo’ identified as the core of this specific dilemma the social reproductive capacities of aliens. Given that social reproduction is highly gendered the core of these debates had a gendered character despite the lack of direct use of gender language and references to female aliens. The centrality of the identitarian concerns in the national agenda denotes the existence of strong patriarchal structures translating into gendered national behaviours, moral and cultural codes of conduct to organize and control social reproduction. As such female aliens constituted a bigger threat than male aliens and would by default experience greater

\textsuperscript{161} Sotiris Chatzigakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5653
\textsuperscript{162} Georgios Karatzaferis, Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) President, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5655
\textsuperscript{163} Sotiris Chatzigakis, New Democracy (ND) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5653
marginalization and exclusions in the social, economic and political aspects of their migration experience than male aliens.

The pro-integration narratives that appeared in the plenary sessions were mostly constructed in relation to the European and international standards and directions on the matter. To balance the strong stance on illegal migration and the tight border control agenda, the European Union has adopted a very proactive integration agenda for legal migrants based on the United Nation standards on the protection and promotion of migrant rights in the form of binding agreements. The association of the pro-integration narratives with the European Union directions can be identified to stem from:

1. the practical pressures Greece was experiencing as a member state to follow the European Union agreements
2. the absence of another narrative that could counterbalance the dominant securitization agenda on migration.

A minority of voices, mainly from the communist parties, were trying to establish an independent narrative defining integration as an intrinsic national responsibility of the state towards the legal economic migrants with negligible influence. Despite the pro-migrant argumentative basis of these developments, “so that they are not taken advantage by modern slavers”, the resistance for prospects

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164 Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6th December 1994, p. 1491
of naturalization\textsuperscript{165} and the unchanged interests with regards to the length of stay of migrants, questioned the effectiveness of their implementation. Within these dominant and conflicting arguments, integration as a term was distanced from its European meaning and its principles describing conditions of assimilation, thereby weakening the prospects for the materialisation of such directions.

For the MPs sceptical of integration, the country’s EU membership and the strong EU integration agenda were portrayed to compromise the country’s sovereignty since they did not secure its interests. The geographic position, relations with neighbouring countries and strong national culture were few of the factors discursively identified to differentiate the Greek case from those of the other European member states. As Paphthemelis noted:

\begin{quote}
\textit{in the European Union there is a similar demographic problem with our own. There, there is no security problem. Those countries are big. Germany has 82 million population. The fact that it has 3 million Turkish and 1 million others including Greeks, does not worry the German government. It feels strong since it's a big country.} \textsuperscript{166}
\end{quote}

It was noted that “Germans are not as afraid as French. The latter are 61 million and have 5 million Muslims”\textsuperscript{167} and because of that “France introduced legislations to deal with heretics proselytizing”.\textsuperscript{168}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{165} Giorgos Adamopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) Vice-Minister of Labor, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1495 December 1994, p. 1499
\textsuperscript{166} Stilianos – Aggelos Paphthemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5635
\textsuperscript{167} Stilianos – Aggelos Paphthemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5635 – 5636
\textsuperscript{168} Stilianos – Aggelos Paphthemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5636
\end{flushright}
Despite the limited pro-integration voices, integration was finally incorporated in the national agenda in 2005 and was regulated through the 3386/2005 law. It was established in the form of practical measures and access to health insurance, social insurance and education and programmes aiming to ease the social integration of aliens through language lessons and housing programs.\textsuperscript{169}

Given the strong securitization agenda, this move was characterised politically as a positive and brave step in the history of Greece as a migrant hosting country. The hope was that it would signal a new era in the politicisation of migration. In legal terms, it can be argued that migration policies consisted of a fair and integrative system for legal migrants. Nevertheless, integration, as much a social as political and legal process, was being challenged for its success in Greece. Pantelaki, KKE MP observed that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{KKE argued that the terms, conditions and the process open the way to abuse, discrimination and expediencies. They don’t create the right conditions for the migrants that live and work in our country for decades.}\textsuperscript{170}
\end{quote}

The 3386/2005 law had to be evaluated at a political level for its success as an institutional framework to deal with migration and the potential integration of migrants posed a “complicated social problem and not as a police problem”.\textsuperscript{171} The politicisation of the future of Greece as a host of a more nationally diverse population was slowly changing direction. From an identitarian perspective, the

\textsuperscript{169} Orestis Kolozof, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1488; Andreas Lentakis, Political Spring (PS) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 38, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} December 1994, p. 1491

\textsuperscript{170} Elpida Pantelaki, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 52, Greek Parliament Archives, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 2004, 2149

\textsuperscript{171} Eleni Kourkoula, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 131, Greek Parliament Archives, 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2001, p. 5644
debate was slowly being negotiated by MPs via questions on the pressing practical problems emerging from the engagement of aliens in the social sphere. In practice, integration had to be politicised as a way to smooth the co-habitation between nationals and aliens through the materialisation of conscious efforts towards their social empowerment.

As discussed in Chapter 3, integration at a European Union level was conceptualised through the legal incorporation of a series of factors as an intrinsic aspect of national migration policies. These specific factors did not consist just of the political establishment of the aliens’ legal status and the protection of their basic human rights but also aimed to offer “an opportunity for enhanced socio-economic integration” (ILO, 2013, p. 20). This was to be achieved through:

1. access to support networks
2. information about rights
3. acquisition of language skills
4. education and training

Migration becomes an empowering story as aliens are provided with the means to personally develop themselves in the host country.

By the mid-2000s, the absence of such provisions in Greece meant the development of a number of social problems for over a decade. Given the unplanned and illegal nature of the contemporary migration wave, the most identifiable point of social friction at a parliamentary level with implications for aliens and nationals
was the low quality or dearth of language knowledge and skills of aliens. Language was identified as a problem on three levels:

1. daily economic, social and legal exchanges
2. emergence of isolated minorities within Greek society
3. inability of aliens to follow, understand and respond accordingly to legalization processes and developments on migration policies

Due to the concentration of aliens in low-skilled labour sectors, where productivity and profit were not conditioned on the existence of language skills, and the absence of expectations for the political empowerment of aliens, interest in these problems at parliamentary level was developed around national social, rather than economic or political, observed disruptions.

The area of concern that had political significance for the MPs was the challenge caused by the attendance of alien children in Greek schools to the children and educators. At a basic level, the “language difficulties of alien students” were disrupting the teaching and learning pace of national students and becoming the basis for their social exclusion. Despite the significance of these facts, members of parliament did not engage in debate over their politicisation. There were expectations that the alien students would adapt, national students would welcome them and teaching staff would identify concerns and support both national and alien students.

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172 Vassiliki Arapi-Kontogianni, Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI), MP, Parliament Plenary Session 60, Greek Parliament Archives, 18th January 1999, p. 3461
A case with regard to alien students in schools that dominated the media, gained strong publicity and was highly politicized revealed that the attention to the challenges migration posed for the education system did not stem from a practical standpoint. The education system in Greece is developed upon strong nationalistic values incorporated in the learning programmes as these play a vital role in the national cultural reproduction processes. In Greek schools, the top finalist student is awarded the privilege of carrying the Greek flag in the school parades taking place on national holidays. In the early 2000s, a case was highlighted by the media wherein a migrant student after achieving the highest marks of his class was refused to carry the flag due to his ethnic origin. The decision was made on the premise expressed at a political level through the words of MPs that:

the flag is the holiest symbol of every nation and the citizens should even give their lives in order to defend it. Flag cannot become a prize, an award or something equivalent. Internationally, in EU, USA with few exceptions the prerequisite is that for taking up the flag you have to be a citizen. Albanian students have their own motherland and their own flag and if given the choice they would choose to carry the Albanian flag.\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{The flag is not a prize nor a trophy nor anything similar. A flag... symbolizes the idea of the existence of unity of the greatness of a nation. For this flag, the one holding it should be prepared to sacrifice themselves if need be.} \textsuperscript{174}

\textit{Our flag symbolizes these values. This is the emblem of our nation, this is the emblem of our society. It is the values of democracy, solidarity, tolerance, the cohesion of a society with a basis these

\textsuperscript{173} Stilianos Paphathmelis, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) MP, Plenary Session 23, Greek Parliament Archives, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 2001, 1023
\textsuperscript{174} Stilianos Paphathmelis, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) MP, Plenary Session 23, Greek Parliament Archives, 2\textsuperscript{nd} November 2001, 1023
specific values, embedded in the totality of the constitutions of our country from the era of the national revolution.¹⁷⁵

There was no doubt, according to the political voices, that “Albanian and alien students that excel in Greek schools winning over language difficulties, are worthy of praise and an example to Greek students”.¹⁷⁶ However, excelling in school and the nationalistic curriculum of Greek history and language did not equate access to the education system in equals terms. The official political stance, given the politicisation of the incident, was for “the related decisions to be recalled and from now on it has to be appointed that only Greek citizens or nationals are entitled to carry the flag”.¹⁷⁷

In view of this, language was neither just a practical barrier nor a factor in the evaluation of the social integration progress. Instead, indirectly, it was securitised as a valuable component of the cultural heritage of Greece attached to the population’s ethnic origin. The specific case embodied the political role of the education system and highlighted the resulting marginalisation of first and second-generation migrant students through the school learning programmes on the basis of their ethnic origin. It also revealed that the nationalistic element constituted an inherent part of Greek culture and was innate within the administrative structures of the state, thereby making the prospects of integration and especially naturalization

¹⁷⁶ Stilianos Papathemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) MP, Plenary Session 23, Greek Parliament Archives, 2nd November 2001, 1023
¹⁷⁷ Stilianos Papathemelis, PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) MP, Plenary Session 23, Greek Parliament Archives, 2nd November 2001, 1023
seemingly impossible. Politically, the education system was politicised to act as the first step to the alien’s “integration in Greek society”, as expressed by a PASOK MP. As such even though the right to education was legally safeguarded for alien children, it did intensify their experienced marginalisation. The argument of the communist party that the terms, conditions and the processes of migration policies “open[ed] the way to abuse, discrimination and expediencies” was validated. Deeper and more conscious efforts to break through the cultural barriers had to be made if the political sphere wanted to provide the opportunity for integration.

The association between marginalisation and culture and the power of the social sphere in driving the political decisions with regard to integration interests had been established as a given fact at a parliamentary level. This political reality became visible through debates in the late 1990s via a questionnaire developed by the Ministry of Education to collect feedback from the national population on the policies with regards to repatriated and migrant students in schools. Some of the questionnaire questions brought into the plenary sessions as examples were:

- Would you consider it right for your child to spend their free time in the company of children from other countries (Albanians, Polish, North Epirus, Pontiac Greek etc.)?

179 Elpida Pantelaki, Communist Party of Greece (KKE) MP, Parliament Plenary Session 52, Greek Parliament Archives, 2nd November 2004, 2149
- Do you agree that foreign migrants (Albanian, Polish, Romanian, North Epirus, Pontiac Greeks) are marginalised because their culture detests order and discipline?

- Do you think that foreign migrants (Albanian, Polish, Romanian, North Epirus, Pontiac Greeks etc.) want their integration in the society but they are afraid that the rest might think of them as traitors?

Despite the explorative character of the project, the questions were subjective as they were visibly established on a series of assumptions:

1. the interpretation of racist and xenophobic responses as ethical expressions
2. negative cultural assumptions with regards to the civility of aliens in Greece
3. the conceptualisation of integration as a by default politically and socially problematic notion.

Given these politically accepted assumptions, the basis of the scrutinisation of the questionnaire was not that it encouraged the reproduction of racist and xenophobic social responses towards aliens. The main concern was the “degradation of the dignity of Pontius Greeks”180 since the questionnaire was merging the phenomenon on migration with the phenomenon of repatriation. In response the Vice-minister of Education and Religion of that time Ioannis Anthopoulos reassured the MPs that:

*no one had the intention to minimize the national consciousness of our repatriates. Neither to identify them with aliens that come from other EU or greater area countries. I have to admit that in some questionnaires, that remained at a trial stage, these types of unacceptable phrases did exist. In the document that was circulated*

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the relevant corrections and restorations have been made in order for such impressions to not be created nor provoked. These statements are in the form of questions to explore the situation for research purposes.\textsuperscript{181}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

Chapter 4 aimed to explore the emergence, communication and development of the narratives that politicised migration as a security threat through reviewing the parliamentary archives and more specifically the minutes of the parliamentary plenary sessions with a focus on female migrant domestic workers. The analysis showed that the case of female migrant domestic workers was not directly politicized on a parliamentary level but was mentioned in discussions on political corruption in relation to migration. Members of the administration as well as politicians and prominent figures of the church were accused of securing citizenship rights for their employed female migrant domestic workers bypassing legal channels. This fact reveals on one hand direct contact of the political sphere with female migrant domestic workers and subsequently awareness and knowledge about the specific challenges this group was experiencing. The experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrants were also indirectly acknowledged in the politicization of the victimization of migrants with the discussion of experienced sexual harassment as a form of exploitation. The sexualized character of exploitation specifically of female migrants exposes the existence of a very mascunalized context

\textsuperscript{181} Ioannis Anthopoulos, PanHellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) Deputy Minister of Religion and Education, Parliament Plenary Session 80, Greek Parliament Archives, 9\textsuperscript{th} February 1998, p. 5207
where gender is being used as a form of social, economic and political control.

Despite the absence of a further direct engagement with female migrant domestic workers and female migrants the plenary session narratives on migration reveal the existence of gendered dimensions and strong embedded patriarchal structures.

Within the parliament, the change in the status of Greece from a major sending to receiving country was identified with the uncontrolled inflow of illegal Albanians penetrating the Greek borders in the early 1990s. This inflow came at a time when there had been ethnic and territorial disputes between the two countries. As such, this phenomenon was not politicised as migration but rather as Albanians penetrating the Greek borders challenging the territorial and law enforcement sovereignty of Greece. By the mid-1990s, this phenomenon acquired an economic character for the parliament as these Albanian aliens started to be employed in the national underground labour market. These developments signalled the birth of the contemporary migration wave despite the reluctance of the parliament to elaborately acknowledge it as such. After 1997 and the issuance of the two presidential decrees, the analysis of the narratives through which these developments were politicised revealed that the narratives were addressing a socioeconomic phenomenon rather than a threat to the territorial sovereignty of Greece.

Two basic narratives dominated the parliamentary debates. The first one was related to the rise of the illegal involvement of aliens in the national economy and the establishment of an underground labour market at the expense of the sovereignty of labour regulations, the national welfare system and the competitiveness of
national labour. The second was on the contribution of the settlement of aliens under a status of illegality to the rise in criminality and the subsequent effects leading to the disruption of social cohesion and compromise of the political and legal sovereignty of the country. Overall, the main concern was that the arrival and social and economic presence of aliens in Greece under the direction of their own criminal networks constituted a threat to the national cultural heritage. This was due to the approximation of the illegal and criminal ways of life as inherent characteristics of the alien national identities. Throughout the different narratives the underlining common theme that kept emerging was that the arrival and socioeconomic presence of aliens in Greece constituted a significant threat to the national cultural heritage and the Greek civilised way of life. There was failure to connect these characteristics with the absence of a migration policy and legal migration channels to Greece.

The social sphere was presented, through available data, to be expressing the same concerns about the imminent corruption of the national cultural heritage in its conduct with aliens even through the use of violence. Despite the unease of the political sphere about the establishment of a racist and xenophobic social environment, the birth of these cultural norms was constructed as a legitimate social defensive mechanism. Through real life cases the mobilisation of excessive force and the use of violence towards aliens were identified to be adopted by public servants and law enforcement agents in their professional conduct with all legal and illegal aliens. Contrary to the parliamentary response in the justification of the social expressions of racism and xenophobia, the political expectation for the public servants was the adoption of an impartial and professional code of conduct in their
exchanges with all alien groups irrespectively of identity and political status. Officially responsibility for the cultivated environment of racism and xenophobia within the police force and public service was allocated to the media. On a secondary level MPs recognised that on one hand, the failure of developing a reliable legalisation processes for legal aliens and on the other, the failure of addressing corruption within the police force, public sector, administration and political sphere were acting as obstacles in the implementation of the specific expectations. What MPs failed to recognize was that the cultivation of a racist and xenophobic culture would have translated into adopted behavioural norms transcending the boundaries between the social and professional lives of public servants and police officers.

A decade into the contemporary migration wave and in the early 2000s, there was a turn towards the indirect recognition of the existence of pull factors, mainly in the form of demand for unskilled labour outside state planning, behind the growth and establishment of alien labour in Greece. This recognition came through the discussion of the conditions of slavery under which alien labour was observed to be established in Greece irrespective of the legal status of aliens. These conditions of slavery were identified on a parliamentary level as:

1. labour contracts and particulars of employment
2. fundamental principles and rights at work
3. abuse, harassment and violence
4. living conditions
5. working time and remuneration
6. absence of legal employment channels
7. problems of compliance

8. lack of access to legal and political rights
With this turn the premise that illegality and criminality were inherent characteristics of the alien national identities started to be challenged. It was recognised that there was political responsibility behind these conditions due to the absence of a migration policy and subsequent legal migration channels.

On a social level the absence of an elaborate and inclusive migration policy was identified to have resulted in the marginalisation of aliens and the emergence of isolated minorities within Greek society. In the plenary sessions, there was lack of recognition of the social implications of these developments at a national level. The absence of schemes was problematised as burdening the alien community. This was because the lack of language skills not only resulted in their social marginalisation but also acted as a barrier to their daily economic, social and legal exchanges and in following and responding to legalisation regulations and developments in migration policies. The biggest difficulties were documented to be experienced by alien children, a proportion of which was born in Greece, but due to their national identity experienced discrimination and exclusion within schools.

The debates in the plenary sessions focused on the need to establish more concrete legalisation plans in order to protect the rights of the legally employed aliens. The legalisation of economic migrants and the offer of longer-term options were established to serve national interest on two levels. Firstly, it would protect the aliens from social, economic and political exclusions and inequalities, and secondly
it would protect the economic and political sovereignty of Greece by controlling the size of economic migration and the conditions of the involvement of aliens in the social, economic and political structures.

Despite the move away from the construction of aliens as inherently illegal and criminal in nature this need was met with great resistance as the majority of the MPs expressed fears that the establishment of a policy framework safeguarding basic human rights and encouraging their integration irrespective of the identity and the political status of migrants would compromise state sovereignty and threaten the societal security of Greece. A lack of politicising capacity can be identified under the current narratives and approaches to agenda setting on migration and the conceptualisation of the role of migration policies. There was no ethical compromise for the Greek political sphere in the absence of political protection of illegal aliens’ human rights. The political justification on which this resistance was based by majority of the MPs was that their political responsibility and obligation was to safeguard and preserve the national and cultural identity of Greece, which was conceptualised as a mono-ethnic country. The concepts of naturalisation and polyethnicity through integration programmes and the provision of citizenship for aliens were identified as threats to the societal security and as such faced great resistance in their institutionalization.

As discussed before in the previous sections of this chapter there was no direct politicization of female aliens and female migrant domestic workers but the above narratives, arguments and conclusions have a gender dimension and
implications for female aliens. On a policy level state membership and citizenship protect and reserve the right for social reproduction securing the ethnic constitution of the country. With direct references to mixed marriages, the high fertility of aliens and the growth in the number of alien children in schools the political sphere openly expressed its concerns, interests and intentions with regards to the social dimensions of this agenda item. Due to the social dimensions of the presence of aliens in host countries the political securitization of national identity is not sufficient. The formulation of acceptable codes of conduct, morality and behaviours securitize the social dimensions of the presence of aliens in the host country. Within this context gender identities, gender roles and gender relations are given meaning that reflect the specific political agenda. The acceptance of the cultivation of strong nationalistic social sentiments against migrants expressed as behaviours and establishing themselves as a racist and xenophobic culture must be framed as aspects of this process. The higher the interest in preserving the societal security the stronger the intensity of the political exclusion of female aliens will be exercised.

For the case of female aliens their employment as domestic workers in the politically significant private sphere subjects them to the national care regimes which explains the absence of their case from the plenary sessions on two levels. On the first level, due to the sociological value of the gender identities within the household and the sociological element in the performativity of reproductive activities, the gender and national identities of female migrant domestic workers threaten to disrupt the existing norms. Consequentially their legalization and political empowerment would risk compromising the legitimacy of these norms.
Socially their identification as a threat would be expected to demonstrate through their marginalization and construction as immoral and pervasive. On a second level, the embeddedness of patriarchal structures and their role in the reproduction of patriarchy in employment relations, through the definition of the boundaries between the private/public divide, has a direct effect on the access female migrant domestic workers have, to legalization prospects. A highly masculinized environment would maintain a strong private/public divide pushing the occupation in the periphery of the economy.

By reviewing the articles on migration in the printed press, the next chapter aims to explore the role printed media has played as a functional actor in the politicisation of migration as a societal security threat. Through the parliamentary plenary sessions, the media have been identified as instigators and reproducers of racist and xenophobic responses to migration, thereby encouraging the development of a hostile environment towards aliens even in the form of violence. Hence, in the next chapter, one of the key aims is to explore the validity of this established political claim.
Chapter 5
Migration and Female Migrant Domestic Workers in the Printed Press – The Acceptance of Securitization

INTRODUCTION

While inquiring into the existence of diversification with regards to female migrants and, more specifically, female migrant domestic workers, the previous chapter explored the politicisation of migration in Greece from the onset of the contemporary migration wave in the 1990s as a securitization process. It did so by researching the parliamentary plenary sessions and the political level at which securitization moves are accepted or rejected and acted upon in the form of policies, with the purpose of identifying the securitizing narratives. It analysed these narratives under the framework proposed by Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p. 24) thematic categories, namely the socioeconomic axis, the securitarian axis, the identitarian axis, and the political axis. This helped to reveal the varied interests behind the politicisation of migration, female migration and female migrant domestic labour and to evaluate their legitimacy in the politicisation of the securitised object. In addition to identifying the securitization narratives with the purpose of understanding the interests behind the politicisation of migration as a security threat, the chapter also addressed the second aim of this research project.
This aim sought to inquire into the ways the inclusion of migration, female migration and female migrant domestic labour on the security agenda has affected the social and political understanding of the securitised object.

Since within the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, security is framed as an on-going socially and politically constructed project, the securitization process has to be explored in both the social and the political spheres. Having covered the political level in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter addresses the third part of the thesis, the aim of which was to examine the politicisation of female migrant domestic labour in Greece as an identitarian security threat and to explore the role printed media has played as a functional actor in the communication of the securitization process to the social sphere. It identifies the ways migration, female migration and female migrant domestic labour are being experienced socially in Greece. The main concerns that stem from these experiences, the developed social interests with regard to the politicisation of the contemporary migration wave, the social reception of migration policies and the institutionalisation of securitization narratives in the implementation of these policies are also identified. Having established the exploration of the possibility of the desecuritization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece as the main goal of this research project, the securitising narratives and the interests underlying these in the social sphere will be evaluated in relation to their merit.

For the purposes of this chapter, articles on migration, female migration and female migrant domestic labour from the three top selling newspapers, Kathimerini
- Καθημερινή, Το Βήμα, Ta Nea - Ta Nέa and the most visited online news agency website, www.in.gr, in Greece were reviewed, as popularity of the chosen printed media sources reflects the social trust reposed in specific media sources. The choice of conducting research with regard to the social sphere on media outlets rather than on interviews related to migrants, migrant networks, national population and non-governmental organizations working with migrants and female migrant domestic workers in Greece was based on the following factors:

1. nationals are exposed to migration through daily life contact, political discourse and media news stories. As such, the press is one of the sources wherein the social sphere receives the information with regard to the social, economic and political developments. Since the media environment shapes the media content, it has power to direct social responses to national developments

2. the press acts as a communicator between the political and social spheres a fact that can help the researcher identify the extent to which securitization has been a bottom up or top down process

3. in the plenary sessions, the media have been extensively identified as a securitising actor holding power over the social sphere and acting as an agent influencing and directing social national responses to migration. Herein, most racist, xenophobic and violent incidents have been politicised as cultivated by media.

The search terms used to identify the relevant articles were migrants - 'μετανάστες', aliens - 'αλλοδαποί', female migration – 'γυναικεία μετανάστευση', domestic workers - 'οικιακές βοηθοί', and illegal migrants - 'λαθρομετανάστες'. As in
Chapter 4, the analysis of these articles has been conducted through the utilisation of Ceyhan and Tsoukalas’s (2002, p. 24) thematic categories, namely the socioeconomic axis, the securitarian axis, the identitarian axis and the political axis. As within security regimes, female migrants are expected to experience double marginalisation due to both their gender and migrant identities (Lister, 1997; Lister, 1997; Lister, 1998; Lister, 2003; Lister, Williams, Anttonen & Bussemaker et al, 2007; Sassen, 2006) the case of female migrants and female migrant domestic workers will be discussed separately in the final part of this chapter.

1 **THE SOCIOECONOMIC AXIS**

1.1 **ECONOMIC MIGRATION**

The substantial in size inflow of aliens in the 1990s was experienced by nationals in the form of the rise in the availability of cheap and low-skilled labour. The labour relationships acted as the main, and maybe only, point of contact between aliens and nationals in Greece especially in the first stages of the contemporary migration wave. At a political level, as discussed in Chapter 4, migration was constructed as a socioeconomic threat due to the rise of national unemployment levels and the emergence of a black labour market. Given the information presented, the expectation is that the content on migration in the printed press would reflect:

1. national discomfort on the rise of unemployment
2. evidence of complications from the illegal employment of aliens
In contending with a new phenomenon, in the early years of 1990s, the printed media can be identified to have spent a lot of their resources in collecting information at a social, political as well as research level in order for the reported information to reflect the existing reality. The initial articles, triggered from social observations and political narratives, focused on communicating the known facts on the size and nature of the migration phenomenon based on data presented in national and international research projects. The involvement of aliens in the economy was reported to be contained in specific segments of the national labour market and in jobs that on one hand could be performed outside the legal labour market and on the other were unpopular to the national population. Articles such as *Foreigners in the Tough Jobs: How Many are They and Where are Aliens Employed in Greece* (To Vima, 1996d), discussed how migrants were employed in low-skilled, ad-hoc “jobs Greek nationals don’t want” while others such as *Many Profits with Low Wages: Revealing Research of Three Professors/What Have Aliens Offered to Development and the Economy* (To Vima, 1997b) presented data that the alien labour market was offering “40%-50% lower salaries of illegal migrants in comparison to national population” making it comparatively more competitive.

The printed articles affirmed the political urgency arising from the establishment of migrant labour on the sidelines of the national economy. Unlike the securitization grounds upon which the politicisation of these concerns was constructed in the plenary sessions, the media focused on the social significance of the illegality of this phenomenon and the ways this illegality was shaping the experiences of migrants within it. Due to the fact that the beginning of the migration
wave was marked with the exclusive inflow of Albanian nationals, the printed press described the emergence of *The Illegal Society* (Psicharis, 1996) where “thousands of second class citizens live smuggled and work illegally, the ones we call ‘Albanians’”. The aim of these articles was to raise awareness as to the need for the reconceptualisation of the social relationships between nationals and aliens.

On the contrary, due to the lack of experience with regard to migration, the printed press seemed reluctant to question governmental decisions over migration policies based on their own conclusions. In these articles reporting the objectives of the newly introduced migration policies, the press took up the role of the communicator between the political and the social sphere. Having disassociated migrant labour with national unemployment, they adopted the politically established reverse securitization narratives in those articles reporting the political decisions of the development to adopt strict migration policies.

*The legalization of all the aliens that illegally work in Greece is not of course possible. In a society that sees unemployment (of the nationals only unfortunately) to increase, the problem of aliens must be dealt courageously: each case of illegal presence has to be reexamined and when deemed right and necessary should be legalized.*

~ Rouggeri, 1997

A toned down version of the securitised narratives recorded in the plenary sessions was communicated overall through the press as the policies were presented to have an economic rather than a foreign policy character. The aim of the restrictive policies was constructed as the combatting of the “explosive dimensions of illegal economic migration” (Rouggeri, 1997). The main criteria in their development were
“the needs of the labour market… the fight of the black labour market and the overexploitation of aliens” (To Vima, 1996c). The reported aim, through the words of the then Minister of labour, Mr Papaioannou, was not to criminalise aliens and “lead the country into a racist logic of the mass expulsion of aliens” (To Vima, 1996c) but to regularise and control their presence. Responsibility over the phenomenon was allocated to nationals too and, for that reason, the communication of the criminalisation of the illegal employment of aliens was as strong (Papadis, 1997b).

A decade into the contemporary migration wave, the economic involvement of migrants in Greece continued to be reported as a positive phenomenon. Articles presented the existence of data proving that the productivity of migrants was higher in comparison to the national population “in some areas as they are trying to reach the living conditions of locals” (Karakousis, 2001). Headlines such as *Boost from Migrants to the Greek Economy* (Kospini, 2001), based on national “OECD data”, constructed the observed hard working culture of migrants as, to a great extent, the driving force behind Greece’s economic development in the past couple of decades. Despite the national regularisation efforts, the Greek labor market remained segmented and migrant labour maintained its place in the black market (Damoulianou, 2004). The economic development of the migrants under the status of political and economic illegality did not entail their acceptance of the status quo. Strikes and protests by a variety of alien nationals were openly reported in the news sections under a pro-migrant stand (Lialios, 2002d). In the media the regularisation of migrants and the facilitation of their economic, social and political integration
was constructed as strengthening this positive social and economic contribution of migrants (Drettakis, 2002).

Unlike the first stages of the phenomenon when illegality was attributed to the sudden and politically unplanned inflow of aliens in the beginning of the new millennium, illegality was now constructed as a byproduct of the political failure to develop responsive migration policies. The criticisms towards the political sphere were at both policy making and implementation levels. More specifically, the printed media invited (Kathimerini, 2002b; Lialios, 2002b) reflection over the following issues:

1. the existence of a clear and elaborate political plan to manage the phenomenon
2. whether there was political acknowledgement of the full scope of the economic benefits of alien labour and as such policy strategy towards national ownership of the phenomenon
3. the reluctance of the political sphere to invest in an infrastructure for the management of the phenomenon
4. the capacity of the existing centrally controlled public system of administration to respond to the promised aims of these policies.

Within this context, the articles framed economic migration as a threat to the state due to the lack of adequate state planning and political governance competence. As a functional actor, the media in Greece can be identified to play more than just an indirect political role in the development of the national social, economic and
political agenda. Through the articles, they aimed to actively engage in the national
development by adopting the strong role of the political opposition against not just
the government but the whole of the political sphere\textsuperscript{182}. Commentaries and criticisms
of migration policies were as such incorporated in the preexisting concerns on the
governing capacity of the modern political figures in Greece. More specifically, the
legalisation of migrant labour and the subsequent access of aliens to the benefits and
pension rights without the development of new administrative structures and any
long term sufficient plan were communicated as threatening the Greek state by
enhancing the preexisting problems of the social insurance funds (To Vima, 2007g).

The social sphere was reported to be sharing the narratives communicated by
the printed press, thereby challenging the capacity of the state mechanisms to
implement the policies. The reported social discomfort of the legalisation of aliens
was depicted in strong headlines such as ‘Invasion’ of Migrants in Municipalities,
thereby being documented as stemming from an “administrative and economic
burden” (Kathimerini, 2001a) rather than as a racist and xenophobic reaction to the
changing status of Greece from a migrant sending to a migrant receiving country.
For nationals, these developments were experienced first-hand as with the majority
of the national population employed as civil servants, the assignment of the
legalisation processes to the existing public sector services was resulting in the
multiplication of their responsibilities. Through their experiences, regularisation
policies were characterised as an “emergency solution” turning “the need into

\textsuperscript{182} Further research can be conducted on this observation by examining the association of
media outlets as well as journalists with specific political parties and political figures with
the purpose of identifying the role of media outlets in party politics in Greece.
diligence” (Kathimerini, 2001a). Due to the acknowledgement of the de facto market need for the cheap and ad-hoc alien labour by the printed media as well as the social sphere, there was absence of articles strongly criticising Greek employers for employing aliens illegally. For the printed press, the financial benefits of utilising alien labour were very clear and, as such responsibility, fell to the government to acknowledge the nature and scope of the contemporary migration wave and to develop responsive migration policies.

1.2 Health Security

The main source of concern identified in the media regarding alien contact with the national population was related to national health security. In the early 2000s, various news stories were reporting the re-appearance of certain contagious (Karanatsi, 2001) and “forgotten” (Fintanidou, 2003) diseases amongst the alien population. The phenomenon was not identified as being widespread across the whole population. Rather it was concentrated in specific areas such as poorly established migrant detention facilities (Choulakis, 2001) and amongst specific national groups of aliens arriving from countries with specific disease breakouts (Foura, 2002). Irrespective of this, the articles adopted a strong securitization rhetoric alerting the public as to the health risks public officers were exposed to on the job and the ramifications of the failure to control these outbreaks for the national population. Police officers were identified as a high-risk employee group since they were the ones in daily contact with illegal aliens. It was argued that:
The health of forty police officers is at risk, who, for the past couple of weeks, are in charge of guarding 164 illegal migrants that are being detained in the premises of the old airport in Chania. And this is because the health test results, that illegal migrants were subjected to, showed that at least 70 of them are carriers of tuberculosis, one of them is hospitalized at Chania hospital and one has pneumonia

~ Choulakis, 2001

Given the existence of advanced medical knowledge with regard to those diseases, it would be expected that the relevant ministries would extend reassurance mitigating such concerns in these articles. On the contrary, the information in the articles created a narrative on the relationship between migrants and health aiming to alert the social sphere about new health risks.

Unlike news stories that were based on events, such as the one in Chania, most of the articles were of informative nature. A number of articles with headlines *Emergency Alarm for Contagious Diseases* (Karanatsi, 2001), *Eastern Europe and Africa Danger for Greece* (Foura, 2002), *AIDS, The Neglected Threat and its Intensity in Greece* (Kathimerini, 2002a), *Danger from ‘Forgotten’ Diseases: Causes Aliens and the Loosening of the Measures of Protection to HIV* (Fintanidou, 2003) were published. One of the basic characteristics of the articles was the focus on diseases associated with social stigma strengthening the narratives on the social marginalization of female migrants. These were based on information provided by scientific groups, such as Doctors without Borders and national data on the type of diseases and the number of documented cases. Getting past the headlines and reading the articles themselves, it was found that there was lack of substantive data to draw conclusions as to the size of the health outbreaks and on the geographic or social
correlations between infected nationals and their contact with migrants. The proportional numbers of infected migrants were low in comparison with the total migrant population and articles that discussed the health dangers conflated the outbreak levels with migration, even if the data cited could not support such a relationship. As Foura (2002) observed “epidemiologically, if one sees it under a global eye, the problem of HIV in Greece does not present important peculiarities, other than those arising from the geographical position of the country: We are the health portal of Europe” and as such on an epidemiological level did not constitute a state of urgency.

Due to the urgency communicated via the printed press, a strong political response to these outbreaks would have been expected through the development of policies or practices securitising health outbreaks by offering health screening to migrants. However, the media reported that the governmental stance prioritised, instead, the securitization of the national healthcare system from illegal migrants with the introduction of fines for those failing to comply with the directions. The result was a situation in which the nationals would “deny medical treatment to economic migrants in Public Hospitals” (Kathimerini, 2001f). It appeared that the securitization rhetoric aiming to protect the welfare state from the aliens was weakening the national health security. The aim of the articles was identifiable with the establishment of a securitization rhetoric based on sentiment rather than facts (Karanatsi, 2001). This was evident from the strong message on the contribution of migration to the rise in diseases, the lack of data to support such claims and the failure of the printed press to offer constructive criticism to the government. Despite
the informative nature of the articles they did construct an image of the unclean migrant.

2 THE SECURITARIAN AXIS

As mentioned in the introduction, in the context of the parliamentary discussions on the correlation between migration and the rise of criminality in Greece, there appeared to be expectations of substantive evidence supporting these observed facts. The research indeed revealed that a substantial percentage of newspaper articles on migration presented and discussed criminal incidents that involved migrants. The main preliminary observation with regard to the content of these articles was that the reported noticeable increase in criminal activity was mainly related to illegal and criminal activities of nationals that stemmed from the exploitation of the unregulated character of the contemporary migration wave.

2.1 MIGRANTS, RISE IN CRIMINALITY AND THE SOCIAL SPHERE

Migration within the context of the contemporary migration wave started to receive media attention in the mid 1990s parallel to the issuance timeline of the 358/1997 and 359/1997 Presidential Decrees. The initial articles focused on the issues that were identified at the political level to undergird the phenomenon and more specifically on the observation of the correlation between illegal migration and subsequent rise in criminal activities. During the initial years, the content of the news stories was seen to reflect the parliamentary securitization narratives as those were
discussed in the first part of Chapter 4. More specifically, in the news stories, Athens was described as an emergent warzone with some neighbourhoods turning into ghettos inhabited by underage gangs of illegal migrants. Strong headlines such as *The Criminals of 2000: The Gangs, the Ghettos, the New Technologies and Illegal Migration at the Brink of the New Millennium* (To Vima, 1996e) aimed to raise social awareness on the problems attendant with the inflow of illegal aliens into Greece. The information upon which the initial articles were based, such as the one cited above, originated from reports of the Ministry of Public Order and statements of governmental officials. Due to the lack of independent accounts and research, articles reproduced the provided information through abstract quotes such as in the following case, in which the consequence of population movements was considered to be the:

\[\text{rise of violence and} \text{ criminality, mainly in big cities, intensity of antisocial aggression incidents, hooliganism and vandalism due to the marginalization of people, increase in drug trafficking, the intensity of racism phenomena (violence against alien community members or groups or different nationalities), the rise in juvenile criminality (juvenile gangs etc.)}\]

~ To Vima, 1996e

The printed press demonstrated a lack of in-depth knowledge and experience in its manifest reluctance to elaborate or evaluate the presented information and to take it at face value. Consequently, the articles published took the form of news stories rather than opinion pieces.

By the late 1990s and a decade into the migration wave, the printed press was seen to develop a more independent stance on the phenomenon. As discussed in Chapter 4, at a parliamentary level, migrant criminal activity was politicised as a
characteristic of a specific nationality, namely the Albanians. Instead of adopting these narratives and reproducing the political approaches, the printed press took the role of the opposition through sharing data aimed at establishing criticism and deconstructing the narratives that opposed their sourced evidence in hand. For example the article titled *Do Not Shoot the Albanians…: Three Myths and One Truth for How Much Aliens Influence the Increase of Criminality* (To Vima, 1997a) provided data that:

a. revealed that the percentage of alien criminal activities was proportional to their size lower than the national figures. It was reported that “the contribution of aliens to the 320,302 crimes that are being documented each year in Greece doesn’t exceed 7-8%, ‘foreigners are only 3% of the offenders, and the majority are violators of the migrant legislation’” (Mandrou, 1997b)

b. the observed rise in certain criminal offenses during the mid-1990s were evidenced to be a “privilege” of Greek convicts that had escaped prison. In general the reality did not prove that the qualitative evolution of crime in Greece was a consequence of the activities of aliens. Articles such as *The Turnover of “Albanophobia”: The Residents of Attica Spend 3 billion Drachmas Annually for Installing Alarm Systems at their Homes*, (Kroustalli, 1998) discussed how the reverse narrative was identified as a political and social construct already infiltrating Greek society and affecting the way of living.

c. the third myth was with regard to deportations. Contrary to the parliamentary debates wherein deportations were identified to directly be
contributing to crime, the printed press identified indirect correlations.

The articles argued that the allocation of the deportation responsibilities to the police had on one hand added to its workload thereby practically restricting its effectiveness and on the other acted as another source of police force corruption.

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<td>Gun violations</td>
<td>122</td>
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Table 24. Data on migrant offenses *Source: To Vima* (1997a)

The presentation of available data communicated that the only crimes whose growth could be identifiably linked to aliens comprised the drug trade and prostitution. Unlike the political sphere, which correlated the existing data at hand on the basis of their face value, the printed press approached these observed developments through an inquiring stance. Filtering the data through the news stories and information that caught the attention of journalists and civilians, the articles presented a very different reality. It was observed that the illegality within which migration was conducted was reportedly giving room to Italian organized
criminal groups and mafia to use illegal aliens as drug smugglers. Similarly the growth of the sex trade and prostitution was seen as development paralleling the growth of the migration wave, which stemmed from the exploitation of illegal and unprotected aliens by Greek criminal networks (To Vima, 1997a; 1997c). Traces of anti-migration and securitization rhetoric could be discerned in the article headlines and in the ways these facts were presented to the public. Titles such as *This is the Greek Mafia: Revealing Information for the Intrusion of Organized Criminal Groups in Greece and for their Ties with Power Centres and the Police* (To Vima, 1997c) suggested that the emergence and growth of Greek mafia groups was an outcome of the corrupt culture that had infiltrated Greek borders through the arrival of aliens.

During the 2000s articles and news stories on migration and criminality continued to present a reality that supported the three myths cited above. There were reports of alien criminal activity that related to:

a. their illegality as a by-product of the migration policies:

*The Tricks of Turkish Traffickers: Problems of Illegal Migration and the Growth in the Number of Boats* (Kalliagkopoulos and Tsioutsia, 2001), ‘Pakistani and Iraqi forgers were selling fake papers for big amounts of money’ (Kathimerini, 2004d)

b. the growth of national criminal networks in Greece:

(Antoniou, 2002), ‘Greeks in drug trade arrested along with their alien supplier’ (Kathimerini, 2004c), They Were Selling Kalashnikov from Albania: Dozens of Guns were Found in the Houses of Two Greeks in Thesprotia and Corfu (To Vima, 2007d)

c. and to independent criminal activity:
    They Had “Ravaged” Apartments, ’94 break-ins by 3 aliens’ (To Vima, 2007e)

By the second decade of the migration wave, despite the documentation of these facts and the observed initial reluctance to adopt a strong anti-migration rhetoric, the securitization rhetoric started becoming established in the way news was communicated. Even though the involvement of migrants in criminal activities was indirect, and in most of the cases they were the victims, articles presented national criminality to the public as a by-product of the provocative, social and politically and economically problematic presence of aliens in Greece. One example of this development was an article on a national news story wherein a 17-year-old killed his friend with a gun. The article was titled Kids with… Pistols: The “Criminal Maturity” of the 17-Year-Old Who Executed his Friend in Elliniko Stunned Law Enforcement, (Vitoulakas, D., Nedos, V., and Tsoli, 2005), and it provided the information on the incident through a discussion about the rapid rise in violence amongst Greek teenagers. Despite the fact that the article aimed to report a national problem, it moved to argue, without the existence of any supporting facts, that the majority of minor criminals in Greece were aliens, thereby imputing them to be the source of the phenomenon. As such, national expressions of violence were
constructed as both a developed defensive mechanism and corruption of the national culture due to its dilution with discordant nationalities.

The research of media archives showed only one article during the examined period that challenged the negative implications of migration, and more specifically, this correlation between migration and criminality and migration and unemployment. The article saw this direct correlation as the product of a constructed right wing political narrative. Despite the fact that it recognised an aspect of truth in the right-wing claims it called upon the political left to trace and understand the real interests behind its development (Ligeros, 2002) with the aim of desecuritising migration and re-centring the focus on the real problems the phenomenon posed for Greece as well as stopping the reproduction of the problems stemming from narrow interests.

A news story that revealed the establishment of securitization interests as inherent aspects of national social, political and economic structures and their manifestation through a strong environment of racism and xenophobia was the report on the rape case of a 16-year-old alien girl by four Greek male classmates (Kathimerini, 2006a). The official response of the school’s administration was to punish the four male students and the alien female student with five days of expulsion on the basis that her behaviour was provocative and encouraged the incident. Not only were the four students not punished further but in an article entitled In Search of the Greek’s Lost Honour (Karaiskaki, 2006), it was reported that the Bulgarian female student and her mother were pushed away from the local
community and had to relocate on the basis of their ethically questionable lifestyle. The examples of incidents documenting unprovoked violent and criminal behaviour of nationals towards aliens are significant in number. In all, the press can be identified as adopting a relentlessly critical stance, - e.g. *Outrage for the Assault Against Pakistani*, (To Vima, 2007k) condemning national behaviour as well as their political and legal legitimisation. However, what these articles lacked was an inquiring stance towards the roots of the legitimisation of these behaviours in the form of cultural assumptions and trickled down securitization narratives and national interests.

### 2.2 Migrants, Rise in Criminality and Corruption

A significant percentage of articles on the correlation between rise in criminal activities and migration were concerned with the illegal activities observed beyond the social sphere and within state administration and public service. At a parliamentary level, the problem of corruption related to migration was discussed as part of the observed abuse of power for personal gain by politicians in the management of migration. As such, there was no evidence of corruption within public service noted within plenary sessions. Despite this fact, an indirect question raised was related to the effect of the political abuse of power in relation to migration upon state administrative bodies and public services managing the implementation of migration policies.
Within the printed press, corruption was identified in all administrative branches managing migration and was described as constituting a significant problem for both aliens and the national sphere. Articles with titles such as *The “Bomb” of Illegal Migrants: Top Secret meeting to Tackle Corruption in the Greek Consulates* (To Vima, 2000a), *The “Merchants” of the Green Card: Networks are Exploiting Aliens to Secure them the Much Wanted Legalization Paper Against Huge Fee* (Mpitsika, 1998b), *Were Producing Thousands of Fake Permits for Migrants: Network of Counterfeiter Municipality Employees was Uncovered in Varda Elias* (To Vima, 2007), *Forged Citizenship Documents* (To Vima, 2007c), *Blind... Dates with Legalization* (Kathimerini, 2001b) provided sufficient evidence to support the establishment of a socially and politically visible culture of corruption. These developments were constructed in the article as internal governmental problems rather than criminal activities. Despite recognition of their severity and the identified aim to invoke negative feelings towards such behaviours and incidents, there was neither explicit scrutiny nor discussion of the deep implications for Greece, aliens and migration in Greece as a phenomenon. In practice, with no visible interest at a political level to address corruption and the subsequent absence of disciplinary mechanisms, the implied and yet not explicitly scrutinized consequences of the growth of corruption within state bureaucracy can be identified comprising:

1. undermining of migration policies and legalization processes
2. emergence of a strong underground network of governmental document forgery
3. more rigid condition of aliens to illegality
4. intensification of distrust between aliens and the state
5. emerging culture of complicity weakening the ethical responsibility of the social sphere towards aliens and migration
6. political enabling of abuse towards aliens

A harsher language was being adopted in the presentation of police corruption cases that exceeded the concerns expressed during the plenary sessions as to the use of excessive violence in the management of aliens. The reported abuse of authority was mostly related to on duty and off duty monetary crimes either in the form of bribes or thefts. Examples of such reports included “Lieutenant Police Officer Attempted to Free an Alien from Paraguay for 400 euros” (Kathimerini, 2005d), For 120 euros... Three Police Officers Assaulted an Alien While they ‘Were not on Duty’ (Mpoukalas, 2003), a police officer was “arrested for extracting 50 euros from an alien in order to return their driving license” but luckily ‘the incident was reported by the alien” (Kathimerini, 2008), Police Officer Robbed Migrant... for 600 Euro “While the Police Officer was Performing Body Check” (Souliotis, 2008).

It was not until 2007 that a more serious case of abuse of police power was brought into the spotlight. Police Officers Sell Video with Tortures (Kathimerini, 2007b) of even a Helpless Prisoner – Drug user (To Vima, 2007h) to media and upload similar content on the Internet. Through the exposure of these illegal activities, the specific crime was reported to be shedding light on a deeper problem with regard to unjustified and unauthorised on duty physical violence towards aliens.
and police practices. The persistence of these abusive cases reported in the media during the 1990s and 2000s indicated the legitimisation and establishment of a police culture abusive towards aliens violating their basic human rights. One specific article titled “Thieves Police Officers”!: How are the Cases of Corrupt Police Officers Developing After the Spotlight (Lampropoulos, 2001) identified that the cause behind this reality had been the absence of strong anti-corruption and internal affairs inspection mechanisms. Contrary to the argumentation in the plenary sessions, both the social and political spheres were portrayed in this article to be aware of this reality but unwilling to exercise pressure as to its eradication.

These cases of corruption within the public sector were constructed as pieces of one puzzle and not isolated and contained incidents. By 2000, the printed press, through articles such as Strip Show for Lawyers, Judges and Police Officers: Pink Frauds with Businessmen and Members of the Russian Mafia (Lampropoulos, 2005), was communicating the establishment of a complex network of alien exploitation and abuse comprising underground illegal groups, professionals, public sector and politicians operating as a state within a state. The discourse employed by the printed press aimed to raise awareness on the actors enabling the operation of migration as an underground illegal phenomenon and to challenge both the criminalisation of aliens and the open anti-migration sentiment in Greece. The responsibility for this reality was attributed to the social sphere and the opportunistic responses of civilians. However, the political sphere was strongly criticised for enabling through the absence of interventionist legislation, a culture of tolerance as to the marginalisation, exploitation and abuse of migrants and their reproduction as
a third class society. The tone of the article *The Immoral “Police Officer” and the Alien Prostitute*, (Kathimerini, 2007c) where the case of “a border officer posing as a police officer offering protection to the alien prostitute in exchange for her services” was presented as an anecdote to reaffirm the central point the printed press was striving to get across. This was the idea that there was an in-depth social and political awareness about the problems around migration and an equivalently strong culture of complicity for personal gain.

3 **THE IDENTITARIAN AXIS**

Witnessing and experiencing the presence of migrants in Greece on a daily basis through their involvement in the labour market and interactions with public administration, a deep interest in the way the alien population altered the consistency of the national population emerged at a social level. Available data from the 2001 Census and a number of ministries were utilised for the publication of analytical articles focused on such information. The articles were rather descriptive and analytical, while maintaining a neutral stance. The printed press reported that according to the 2001 census, the mean of the migrant population was “of younger age” not because of the rise in the inflow of younger aliens but due to the “increase of the population due to the pregnancies of alien mothers” (Drettakis, 2002). The long-term settlement of migrants was associated with current national population developments in which the national birth rate was decreasing, and the size of the aging population was increasing (Kallergis, 2002a). Through these articles,
migration was being negotiated not just as an economic phenomenon but also as a social one. Attention was drawn to the new emerging point of contact between nationals and aliens, namely the education system. The media reported that just in the Prefecture of Athens in 2002, alien students were reported to consist 22% of the student population (Kathimerini, 2002f). By 2007, there was a slight increase and alien students comprised one quarter of the total student population (To Vima, 2007j). Despite the absence of a constructed narrative behind the reports of these developments, the association of the consistency of the migrant population with the social developments did indirectly raise questions with regard to the societal national security of Greece.

3.1 **SOCIAL RESPONSES TO MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION**

Based on the definition of racism by UN given in the beginning of this thesis, the systematic social, political and economic marginalisation of aliens in Greece and their emergence as an exploited, underprivileged, unprotected and without rights group denotes the existence of an environment of racism and xenophobia in Greece. The recognition of the existence of this environment was more obvious in the printed press rather than at a political level or in the academic work on migration. It was not just the crime related articles on migration that led towards such indirect and fact based conclusions but also articles openly acknowledging genuine concern as to the xenophobic and racist culture that had developed in Greece after the 1990s and had penetrated the Greek state system. Strong words such as hate and phobias were used to describe the feelings and standpoints of nationals towards aliens and documented
incidents gave the impression that the anti-migration culture was socially invoked rather than politically constructed. Through the presentation of some of the incidents reported in the printed press, the basis upon which this culture was constructed as legitimate will be traced and underlined.

Despite the issuance of the two Presidential Decrees in the late 1990s that aimed to document illegal migrants and provide them access to the national structures in 2001 something “amazing happened in the village of Loutra in Militini”.

_With the decision of the “local assembly” 150 economic migrants from Albania were evicted! The decision came as an “answer” to a recent beating of bar customers in the area from four Albanians (who later on were tried for their offense, convicted and deported from the country)... The “law” that the “local assembly” voted did not encounter any obstacles in its implementation: the Albanians, legal most of them, were evicted – along with their families and children - with the police, judicial and political authorities inactive. The laws of the state were completely ignored, the local “common law” at Loutra triumphed!_

~ Aggelopoulos, 2001

There was considerable publicity of the incident and outcry in the media as to the disregard of the national law, the national legal system and migration policies by the local government. In essence, what the printed press highlighted was the decision of the government to not take any steps to intervene at a local level, or to reverse the decision of the local authorities or to protect its political authority over the direction of migration policy. Instead it was presented as only verbally condemning the incident. The voices of the local MPs were communicated as characterising the attitudes of the local community as “inexcusable” but also as justified due to the
“indignation of these people” (Aggelopoulos, 2001). It can be concluded from the articles on the news story that with these statements MPs were indirectly, on the one hand, delegitimising their own decisions on the direction of migration policies and on the other officially associating themselves with the xenophobic and racist social responses to migration.

A series of similar news stories reveal that this was not an isolated incident manifesting in specific geographic areas as the articles were reporting the emergence of an exclusionary attitude towards aliens and migrants’ national social culture based on racist and xenophobic principles. The marginalisation of aliens and migrants was experienced in daily activities and was contributing to their emergence as a second-class society with limited social rights and freedoms. The social arbitrariness was in most, if not all, cases facilitated through official decisions from the local municipalities and, as such, indirectly enabled by the political sphere and the government. The effect this emerging culture had for the lives of migrants at a practical level is well represented in the news story on the experiences of migrants in the municipality of Thermi in Northern Greece. Thermi is a suburb of Thessaloniki, which is the second capital of Greece, close to the agricultural fields, farms and factories of the area. The highest levels of demand for low skilled labour within the whole prefecture had turned the municipality into an alien employment centre. In the early hours of every morning, illegal alien workers would line up at the outskirts of the municipality to seek employment on a daily basis. Potential employers would pass by and “shop” from the streets for alien undeclared, non-binding, ad-hoc labour. This phenomenon had created discomfort in the local
community not with regard to the development of an underground labour market but with the concentration of alien workers in the area and the use of public resources, such as public transport by them in their daily commute for job hunting. The outcome was that in the early 2000s, the Municipality of Thermi took official action and banned alien workers from using public transport (Karaiskaki, 2003).

In a similar manner, there was the case of the second-generation alien student who was banned from carrying the Greek flag (discussed in the previous chapter), which became a central news story and was covered in relation to these broader developments on the emerging culture of racism and xenophobia against migrants. According to the printed press, even though the exclusionary practices within the education system were based on local in-school decisions, they represented the opinions of the local communities and were openly supported and defended by members and elites of local authorities. The Prefect of Thessaloniki, Mr. Psomiadis, was reported to stand behind the decisions of the educators and parents for migrants to not hold the flag (Kathimerini, 2009), reiterating that the decision was based on the threat of the “desecration of the national symbol” (Karaiskaki, 2003) and the dilution of the national identity openly acknowledging the existence of narrative/belief against the possibility of naturalisation. In the words of the Prefect, the case was “that you don’t become Greek you are born Greek” (Tsichlias, 2003). Regardless of the scepticism on the matter identified in the previous chapter as expressed in the plenary sessions, the printed press reported that parliament was against the emerging exclusionary practices and unequal treatment of migrant students within the education system and was determined to stand firm against the
emerging racist and xenophobic culture of “Albanian Eaters” (Efthimiou, 2004). This nationwide culture was identified to be affecting, to a lesser or greater extent, the total alien student population of more than 100,000 alien students, thereby consigning their educational enrolment to unequal treatment and exclusions (To Vima, 2005).

The mutuality in the experiences of alien students within the education system and on a social level that supported the narrative of alien students as comprising a societal threat was appearing to be infused within the Greek culture. In reporting the incident of the eviction of the Bulgarian teenage student, who was raped by four of her classmates and her mother from the community of Amarynthos, (discussed in the previous section of this chapter), in contrast to the Loutra case, the printed press did not identify any criminal justification for the actions of the local community. The action was communicated to have been taken on xenophobic and racist grounds as the community aimed to protect itself from alien identity and the cultural characteristics it embodied. The assumptions upon which the alien identity was defined as a threat were based upon promiscuous and provocative gendered codes of conduct. Greece was portrayed as a traditional and conservative country with a family based system of social and political reproduction, and as such the specific alien behaviours were seen to oppose the basic principles upon which Greek culture was established. Unlike men, and as discussed in the Introduction, alien “women are often targeted as one of the racialized, sexualized threats to nation-states”, “security” and to “a nationalist self” (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 2). The victimisation of the four male students on sexual grounds without the presentation of substantive evidence
and the justification of their violent actions on the grounds of provocation was exposed the existence of such a narrative. Its absence within the parliament and the plenary sessions reveals that it emerged from inherent social and cultural gendered assumptions rather than politically constructed narratives.

The clear gendered concerns with regard to the differentiated experiences of female aliens highlighted by such incidents were not identified or problematised by the printed press. Instead the news stories were approached from a cultural perspective focusing on the expressions of xenophobia and racism. The main argument of these articles, such as *Greeks and Xenophobia: The Fight Against Xenophobia is Inherent with the Fight Against Every Arbitrariness of Authority*, was that the exposure of aliens to inequalities, vulnerabilities and exploitations was connected to racism and xenophobia. Even though racism and xenophobia were identified to not “do justice to Greek hospitality” (Mandrou, 1997a), the printed press presented a case that questioned the national social responses to migration and aliens, thereby opposing the widely used parliamentary narrative on the long national experience of emigration and the understanding of what it feels to be a migrant in another country.

The only voices offering a form of justification for the developed culture and the victimisation of nationals were those of academics expressing their views through written opinion pieces. The Professor of Political Economy at the Economic University of Athens Theodoros Lianos argued in his article *Are We Racists? Of Course not: They are not Racist the Statements of Many Citizens that they Feel*
Insecurity that the violent and exclusionary attitudes towards migrants were justified defensive acts. The rapidly developing disruptive effects of migration on social, economic and political levels and the inadequacy of the state to respond efficiently due to the uncontrolled inflow of aliens were prompting these reflexive social responses for the protection of the nation and state (Lianos, 2003). In the article entitled The Hospitable Zeus Does not Live Here Anymore: the Decalogue of the Good Racist, the author argued that:

\[\text{the main contribution of Albanians in Greek society is not crime, nor Kalashnikovs, nor the domestic workers. Is the increase in xenophobia, as the suddenly “active citizens” show that they are worried about their security and reach to the point of threatening to take up guns.}\]

~ Mpzaninou, 1998

This narrative using a securitization discourse aimed to normalise the emergent unconstitutional culture and prove not only that the inclusion and integration of aliens was an impossible goal, for instance in How Should the Issue of Migration be Addressed: The Social Inclusion and Integration are Outside the Logic even of the “Contemporary Right” (Apostolaki, 2005) but also that it was a target in conflict of the national interests.

Apart from this minority, there was an overall direct call for the securitization of this culture as the printed press was expressing strong concerns for the observed normalisation of criminal behaviour as a means of social protection against aliens and their culture. The “deeply rooted perception that the migrant has to remain a foreigner, marginalised, unintegrated” (Michalopoulou, 2002) for the survival of the Greek nation and state was practically binding his settlement in Greece to an illegal
way of life. Within this environment, it can be considered as an expected outcome that the feelings between nationals and aliens were portrayed in the press as mutual. *Why We Hate Them* *Greeks - Albanians* *Why they Hate Us: They Reject Every Single Greek Thing and we Consider them Poor Relatives that have Criminality in their Blood* (Kroustalli, 2004). Constructed and identified as the basic cause behind a significant percentage of national social problems, it is worth considering whether aliens had rightfully developed a potential culture of non-compliance against Greece and Greeks since their experiences were reactions to an unwelcoming, exploitative and highly abusive social and political environment even prior to their arrival in Greece. The reports in the printed press of the almost exclusive management of the underground economy by nationals and the victimisation of aliens in their involvement within it, discussed in the previous part of this chapter, is proof of the relationship between this narrative and migrant illegality and criminality.

The established link between aliens, migration, illegality and criminality progressively resulted in the shift of the basis of the narrative whilst maintaining the same end call for action. Despite the widely presented evidence with regard to the nature of this link, the support towards “national cleansing” slowly started to be based on the grounds that all aliens consisted of “an ultra-category that is responsible for all the problems (criminality, unemployment, even the situation in social insurance funds)” Greece was and is facing as a country (Michalopoulou, 2002). The strong nationalistic aspect of the Greek culture reproduced “over and over again the syndrome of the chosen people that are being blatantly wronged by the circumstances” (Michalopoulou, 2002), in this case, migration and aliens were
blinding the social and political spheres from recognising the fallacies behind the self-destructive character of the national approaches to migration and at the same time burdening migration and aliens with pre-existing national social, economic and political problems. This specific narrative was reported to be shared by national elites with the example of the then head of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Archbishop, who supported the idea that migrants consisted the source of a variety of national problems and were diluting the responsible and problem free identity and culture of the Greek nation (Kalokairinos, 2002).

The anti-migration sentiment in Greece was documented at international level in *The New Landscape of Racism in Europe* (Kathimerini, 2001e), *The Expansion and the Element Xenophobia* (Kallergis, 2002) on a global level and the *Globalization of Xenophobia* (Kathimerini, 2001h). Contrary to the data provided in Chapter 2 with regard to EU and global research on migration wherein Greece exceeded regional and global averages on racism and negative responses to migration, the articles gave the impression of a shared reality presenting *Stories of Racism from Around the World* (Mpersi, 2001). Articles used examples of violent incidents in UK and other countries where migrants were being taken advantage of, were victims of discrimination and were living in conditions of extreme poverty (Stilou, 2001). Migration was portrayed as a necessary economic reality that justifiably catalysed demographic and racist considerations not just in Greece but also globally (Kathimerini, 2001i).
According to the printed press, in Europe migration was welcomed for economic reasons but in a continent with dropping birth rates, despite its economic needs, an uncontrollable inflow would threaten its identity (Mpersi, 2002). Due to the growth of uncontrollable inflows, it had to be contained and illegal migration had to be combatted through regulation, police measures, deportations and other means of control (Kathimerini, 2002e). Migration consisted one of the most central policy areas within the European Union and within its developed common migration policy, Greece as an EU border was pressurised and aided to control its borders through the development of a responsive infrastructure (Galati, 2001b). The European Union was identified to align with the national perceptions with regard to the threats stemming from migration. Due to the prioritisation of national securitization interests and the targeted pressures upon Greece arising from the EU agenda due to the country’s geographical location, e.g Europe Discussed Package of Measures Against Illegal Migrants (Kallergis, 2002c), the aspects of the common EU policies that aimed to establish, safeguard and promote the basic human rights of both legal and illegal migrants (e.g Insurance Equality for Migrants within E.U) (Kallergis, 2001) were of a secondary interest.

Similarly this xenophobic and racist culture was not against the involvement of aliens in the national economy as such but against long-term economic migration and its establishment as a phenomenon in Greece. Greeks were clear in their intentions, they had “asked for workers”, but they did not expect that they would have people arriving instead (Charamis, 2006). In a survey conducted by the Polytechnic of Greece and presented in the article “Yes” to Foreigners, “No” to
their Vote: The Conclusions of a Panhellenic Research of The Polytechnic of Crete (Mpitsika, 2003) Greeks were identified as becoming more tolerant towards aliens, but they still had problems in accepting them as equal fellow citizens with equal rights. The idea of normalisation and of the political and social integration of second-generation migrant children was unacceptable. A decade and a half into the migration wave and two migration policies later, Greeks were becoming Harsher against Migrants: Survey Shows that Greeks Today Fear More the Consequences of the Temporary Settlement of Aliens in our Country (Mpitsika, 2005). The article reported that at the time according to the survey, Greeks had strengthened their opinions that social issues were the cause of xenophobia (49% vs. 42.63% in 2003) as language and religious differences were not the major cause of xenophobic behaviour. The absence, at a research level, of investigation of the relationship between xenophobia, racism and social problems around migration reflected national unwillingness to desecuritise migration since the problematisation of migration by the printed press revealed the existence of an alternative route that could lead to the relief of aliens as well as nationals from deeper social and economic complications. In an extensive article on The Foreign Migrants, the Minorities and Us, the author warned that the emergence, reproduction and growth of the social and political problems surrounding migration and aliens stemmed from the denial “to accept that our phobia towards migrants has turned into a syndrome” (Mpoukalas, 2001), an intrinsic pathology acting as an obstacle in the establishment of responsive migration policies.
There was a minority of cases\textsuperscript{183}, in which administrative authorities recognising the existence of this culture proactively acted in favour of the protection of the social and political rights of migrants as these had been established by the Greek constitution and migration policies. The President of Democracy in Greece concerned with the expressions of violence and hate towards migrants argued that “\textit{Racism Does not Have a Place in the Healthy Greek Society}”, Intervention of the President of Democracy (Mpistika, 2006). For these voices, the absence of proactive and targeted interventionist policies, despite the active discouragement of these phenomena by the political sphere, was communicated as having significantly harmful ramifications for aliens as this status quo was leading to the “unconstitutional political deprivation of ‘the capacity of aliens to find their right’” (Dimitrakos, 2006) within existing governmental structures.

4 \textbf{Female Migrant Domestic Workers}

Unlike at the parliamentary level, from the early stages of the contemporary migration wave, the printed press had identified the appearance of the phenomenon of the feminisation of migration in Greece and the growing independent arrival of female alien women for employment. What drew attention was the observed array of specific concerns emerging from the identifiably particular dynamics around this economic migrant group. Picking up on the almost exclusive employment of female

\textsuperscript{183} see \textit{A Municipality President With an Award Against Xenophobia: Nick Petasis from Kato Chorio Ierapetras Became a Shield for Albanian Workers that were Beaten by Young Men Simply Because they are Aliens} (Mpitsika, 1998a)
migrants in the domestic labour sector and the characteristics of domestic labour\textsuperscript{184}, the articles provided information on the domestic characteristics and constitution of this migrant labour sector, experiences of the involved aliens, emerging national problems and concerns and evaluation of the established migration policies in addressing them.

Starting from the beginning of the migratory journey of female migrants, their migrating channels to Greece were reported to be highly and almost exclusively associated with smuggling and trafficking (To Vima, 1996). With a growing reputation as an attractive migrant destination country with high demand for unskilled jobs, women were lured into Greece with the promise of work as waitresses or domestic workers by centrally organised networks. The purpose of these networks was financial exploitation through their employment either in the sex industry or for those that had survived the human trafficking networks (Damoulianou, 2003) in the domestic labour sector. Women were trafficked from the Balkans, Eastern European Region, Africa and Middle East (Antoniou, 2004a) and were either channelled into domestic work or were imprisoned, tortured and sold into prostitution (Antoniou, 2004b). The reported information revealed there was a uniform process of recruitment in the country of origin but at a domestic level in Greece, gender, nationality and age were acknowledged through the presentation of the developments in the articles to play the primary role as the driving forces behind the segregation of the migrant labour market and the demand, supply and constitution of female economic migration (To Vima, 1996d). These facts provided

\textsuperscript{184} see Chapter 2
evidence that contemporary migration wave in Greece was filtered through cultural norms and perceptions of identities determining the experiences of both aliens and nationals.

Just before and in the beginning of 1990\textsuperscript{185} the demand for female migrant domestic labour was originated exclusively from Athens from upper class families and was covered by Filipino women through bilateral agreements. The rise in the supply of cheaper female migrant labour opened up the opportunity to lower income households across the country to afford such services, thereby signaling the nationwide expansion of the migrant domestic labour sector with the majority of the demand concentrating in urban areas (Kalaitzoglou, 2001). The main characteristic of female migrant domestic labour was identified as its illegal status since Greece was reported to be the “champion” of black labour for this sector amongst the rest of the European countries (Kallergis, 2004). Marginalised in an occupation conducted in the private sphere and as such in the shadows of the state structures, with low wages and no insurance, as a result, female migrants were socially marginalised since their economic value and political invisibility affected their social experiences (Damoulianou, 2003).

The printed press reported that by the early 2000s, the marginalised involvement of aliens in specific sectors of the national economy was parallel to an observed change in the social value of these jobs. With the example of domestic labour, it was reported that the terms domestic help and domestic worker were being

\textsuperscript{185} see Chapter 2
replaced by the word ‘Φιλιπινέζες’/Filipinos testifying that the labour marginalisation of female aliens was a social as much as an economic phenomenon related to the nationalistic concerns with regard to migration (Pappas, 2003). Many articles tried to deconstruct these conceptualizations and distance female migrants from the cultural constructions by presenting facts and testimonies of migrant women about their educational qualifications, professional experience and prestigious jobs prior to their migratory journeys. The aim was to demonstrate that the economic, political and social value of these women was nationally decided and established based on the alien and gender identities rather than the facts at hand (Karanatsi, 2002). Given the cultural weight of the developments, the almost exclusive employment of female migrants in the domestic labour occupation was an outcome not only of the rise in the supply of cheap and flexible migrant labour but also of the unwillingness of nationals to socially degrade themselves through their association with migrant exclusive occupations and the subsequent third class social identity (Terzis, 2002).

4.1 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE FEMINISATION OF MIGRATION AND FEMALE MIGRANT DOMESTIC LABOUR IN GREECE

Through the articles on the capacity of the migration policies to manage the sub-phenomenon of the feminisation of migration and the domestic labour sector, it can be concluded that there was absence of relevant provisions and lack of political interest to realize this. The employment of Filipino domestic workers through bilateral agreements prior to 1990s reveals that the absence of political
intervention was based neither on the lack of knowledge on the emergence of the feminization of migration nor on the establishment of the gendered migrant labour sectors. Additionally, the extensive coverage of the gender and labour specific differentiated experiences and problems faced by female migrants and nationals testifies against the absence of information and knowledge on the urgency of the politicisation of these specific developments. These conclusions are supported by news stories that reported that after the acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the presidential decrees and the existing employment regulations by the political sphere the Greek government intended “to employ a prestigious global consulting company for the development of a study for domestic worker legislation” (Pipili, 1998) prior to the establishment of the first migration policy. Despite these intentions, the 2001 migration policy lacked such a focus and was criticised as being problematic by Human Rights Watch especially with regard to the labour rights of the group of female migrant domestic workers. Through the articles, the printed press acknowledged and challenged the political sphere for the unresponsiveness of the migration policies but did not show any capacity in gendering its political critique.

What distinguished the migratory experience of female domestic workers form the experiences of the rest of aliens was identified as the inapplicability of the migration policies and the legalisation procedures to this alien group (Mpitsika, 1998b; Papadis, 1998). As the potential legalisation of aliens was based on their economic involvement in the national labour market, working in the unregulated private sphere meant that such legalisation processes were beyond the reach of the female migrants. Within an anti-migration environment, the sectors existing outside
the formal economy did not constitute a matter of urgency in their regulation since they did not disrupt the state system. The housing of female migrant domestic workers in their place of work was reported to constitute a major technical difficulty in furnishing the necessary documentation required in the residence and work permit applications. To quote one migrant:

“I don’t have any proof that I have been here for a year”, says the 37 year old Galina from Ukraine, domestic worker. “I live in the house that I work, which means I don’t pay rent nor utility bills. They tell me to buy 250 stamps for the year 2000 from OGA, which are cheap. We already gave 50,000 drachmas for the administrative fee, where am I going to find the additional 100,000 for the stamps?”

~ Kathimerini, 2001b

Domestic workers were identified as victims of the legalisation processes, which also failed to protect them from the illegal networks, corruption and the subsequent added costs of bribes (Mpitsika, 1998b). In one interview, a Filipino female migrant worker shared that she got arrested as an illegal migrant not because she did not have the relevant documentation but because of a bureaucratic mistake the employee had made while processing her application (Kathimerini, 2007a).

One significant aspect that the printed press highlighted and is noteworthy is that the bureaucracy in employing female migrant domestic workers was defined by unclear and protracted procedures even for the employers. This fact acted as a disadvantage for those who wanted to employ them legally (Kathimerini, 2002c). With no focus on legalisation, extensive articles appeared in the newspapers that encouraged the employment of domestic workers with the purpose of housekeeping, Hire… a Housekeeper or a Housewife (To Vima, 1998d), childcare, Nurseries: The Cheap, the Expensive….: the Options, the Costs and the Points that Parents Must
Watch for in Childcare of Pre-school Children (Tsakiri, 1998) and care for the elderly, Useful Suggestions for the Elderly: Where can you Consult for Accommodation and Care (Tsakiri, 1999) and provided information to help nationals navigate the administrative system.

In the mid-2000s, the high demand for low paid domestic workers kept rising (Kathimerini, 2004b) under an over exploitative regime. The allegedly more migrant friendly migration 2005 policy did not seem to crack the already established regime and female migrant domestic workers especially continued to emerge as victims of legalisation processes. Monetarily, the basic problem of the policies was that even though they secured the national interests in relation to tax and social insurance contributions, they did not secure the economic interests of migrants by failing to regulate the employment contract and provide any long term political and economic security. For the female migrants who had arrived to Greece with the purpose of employment, the monetary return of domestic labour was not high enough to cover legalisation expenses. As a female Russian migrant domestic worker reported to state in an interview she grew “tired of earning money just for the legalization process with nothing in return” thereby deciding to stop trying even at the risk of deportation (Kathimerini, 2007a).

The economic losses from the illegality of female migrant domestic labour, due to the subsequent absence of social insurance and tax contributions for the Greek state were reported as being significant since they constituted 69% of the total migrant labour losses. In total due to the rigidity of the “institution of the
underground economy”, Greece had the highest economic losses amongst the rest of EU states as they reached 35% of the national GDP (Stampoglis, 2006). The identified winners in this labour exchange and the ones reportedly also holding the power over the legalisation process were the employers as the decision for the registration of their female migrant domestic workers would result in a direct increase in their wages (Papadis, 1998). The criminal networks managed and run by Greeks with the help of aliens (Kathimerini, 2004e; Kathimerini, 2005c; Kathimerini, 2006c; To Vima, 2008c; To Vima, 2009) were presented as the ones facilitating and exploiting the absence of the state in the governance of the phenomenon. They were observed to do this without having direct control on the employment relationships.

Under the existing migration policies and the aim to maintain economic migration in support of the national economic and nationalistic interests, the government had no interest in safeguarding the migrants’ labour rights, as this was perceived to be an act of political empowerment. The widely acknowledged economic loss was clearly a secondary concern and could not be used as a basis for the development of a pro-migration narrative. Due to these facts, the economic competitiveness of this labour sector was not an automated response to the alien identity of these workers but rather a combination of the regulation of economic migration on the basis of a self-serving securitization rhetoric as well as its applicability to the peculiarities of the migrant domestic labour sector due to its gendered dimensions.
In a Human Rights Watch report which was presented by the news agency In.gr migration policies in Greece and specifically the 2001 migration bill were criticised for failing to safeguard the aliens’ basic human rights. It was implied that this was done by not introducing any provisions for the prohibition of discrimination, the violation of the right of family reunification, education and medical care for legal economic migrants and the recognition of the fundamental basic human rights of undocumented migrants, their protection from slavery, smuggling, human trafficking and forced employment in prostitution (In.gr, 2001). Despite the observed progress in the inclusion of relevant provisions in the following migration policies, in practice the experiences of the specific migrant group, as much as of migrants in general, were reported to not have changed. From the information and testimonies provided in the printed press, the clear drawn conclusion is that the de jure establishment of the aliens’ rights did not guarantee access to the same due to the absence of elaborate state mechanisms supporting their existence and lack of penalties for nationals infringing these. The absence of state mechanisms raised doubts on the political commitment to and real interest in including and protecting economic migrants in Greece.

The experiences of female migrants as victims of human rights violations were widely reported by the printed press, thereby confirming the conclusions of the Human Rights Watch report. The abuse, exploitation and violation of the basic human rights of this specific migrant group were presented as stemming from the strong presence of the illegal criminal networks operating in Greece, national corruption and abusive employers. Unlike the holistic approach on the topic by the
Human Rights Watch report, the focus was on the problems emerging from the absence of legalisation and the subsequent connection of migration to criminality. This approach did not take into account the absence of additional provisions that would secure their human rights, thereby offering female migrant domestic workers the opportunity for integration and involvement in the economic, political and social spheres on equal terms with the national population. The documented type of exploitation experienced by women involved in the sex industry is clear. The women employed as domestic workers were subjected to similar violence and exploitation. Under the threat of their and their family’s deportation, female migrant domestic workers were raped (To Vima, 1998c), were refused time off for health reasons (Laskaraki, 2000), were denied phone communication with friends and family (Kathimerini, 2005b), denied labour rights with regard to hours and days of work (Kathimerini, 2004a) and denied salary payment (To Vima, 2008b). The common national front towards female migrants and their purposeful social marginalisation had created an environment of social complicity through which the violation of their human rights was normalised. An instance of this is exemplified in the following:

*Owner of bar was selling an alien woman he had posing as a waitress. In the court 25 villagers testified in favour of the owner even though they were aware of the fact. The only person testifying in favour of the alien woman was the police officer from Thessaloniki, the girl was deported and the Greek was convicted,*

~ Kathimerini, 2005e

With strong and elaborate titles such as *The Trade of Alien Women in Greece has Taken Dimensions of a ‘Heavy Industry’* - 600.000.000 Euros the Profits
of Prostitution: The Corruption in Public Services and the Organized Crime (Tsarouchas, 2002) and Strip Show for Lawyers, Judges and Police Officers: Pink Frauds with Businessmen and Members of the Russian Mafia (Lampropoulos, 2005), the printed press tried to draw the attention to the national economic interests and returns from the exploitation of alien women, the span of the involved agents facilitating and gaining from it, the size of the phenomenon and the rigidity of its establishment. Due to the criminal nature of the activities, apart from civil servants in various administrative bodies, lawyers (Kathimerini, 2005a) were the largest private sector to be reported as being heavily involved in the facilitation of the criminal exploitative activities. The legal facilitation of this phenomenon was not only in relation to advice provided about the criminal justice system but also advice for the exploitation of the migration policies. For the alien women whose presence in Greece was a product of this trade, women involved in the sex trade and to a secondary level in the domestic work labour sector, legalisation processes acted against their interests. Within this “Heavy Industry” male nationals exercising their civil rights fake married alien women to legalise them and to help them get Greek citizenship with the purpose of legally exploiting them in their illegitimate businesses and the underground migrant labour market (Kathimerini, 2004g).

There was enough evidence in the printed press to link the participation of female aliens in criminal activities with their trade and exploitation, thereby raising questions over the extent of personal responsibility and choice in their involvement. Such connection was neither explored nor articulated, and instead the news stories about female aliens engaging in criminal activities were reported within the narrative
of the association between migration and the observed rise in criminality. By 2000, the printed press can be seen to gender the agenda on migrant criminal activity as the feminisation of migration was reported to result in the feminisation of not just migrant criminality but also of national criminality in general. The headlines, *The “Weak” Gender Kills, Steals, Blackmails and Takes Part with Increasing Frequency throughout the Range of the Criminal code - The Women are Holding... a Knife: “Female” Criminality has Increased by 60% the Past Five Years* (Antonopoulos, 2000), drifted away from the image of the female alien as the victim and depicted them as empowered criminal perpetrators contributing to the experienced changes in the scope and nature of criminality in Greece. The majority of the reported cases were of petty thefts almost exclusively conducted by female migrant domestic workers. These female migrant domestic workers were documented not to act on their own and on their own initiative but to work with big gangs and illegal networks that were exploiting their access to households. The articles reporting more serious crimes, such as killings (In.gr, 2007, To Vima, 2008a), either discussed these as isolated incidents constituting a minor percentage of migrant and national criminal activity or constructed the involvement of this migrant group on impressions rather than on substantive evidence (Chekimoglou, 2008). The percentage of female criminality was small against the national levels and as such in reality the feeling of national urgency with regard to female migrant domestic worker criminal activity was based on the violation of the security of the private space of the household rather than the nature or the frequency of the incidents.
This practical threat was part of greater expressed insecurities stemming from the involvement of alien women in the private sphere and their engagement with the labour activities that sustain the daily maintenance of a household (Lan, 2003) and activities enhanced with sociological value and charged with sociological power in their performativity (Anderson, 2000, p. 21). Despite the absence of an explicit gendered agenda with regard to the national attitudes towards female aliens, as discussed in the fifth part of this Chapter, there were explicit reports of a gendered national insecurity agenda about the group of female migrant domestic workers. This agenda was in the form of concerns about the threats the entrustment of the activities and responsibilities of the culturally significant private sphere posed to Greece on both micro and macro social and political levels.

At a micro level, the presence of alien cultures and the subsequent ethically differentiated approaches to social codes of conduct and reproductive relationships, such as marriage, exposed the national male population to financial frauds and unacceptable social behaviours. With a clear securitization discourse alien, the female domestic workers were labelled as a “Colourful Fear” in the news and in the printed press (Tziantzi, 2003). Older men were reported to be “falling preys of alien women” who in some cases aimed to marry them with the purpose of financially profiting from the marriage (Tziantzi, 2003) or in other cases developed affairs with married men in order to extort money from them (Kathimerini, 2003).

Even when there were no financial or criminal incentives behind the establishment of interpersonal relationships, and despite the fact that with the
settlement of aliens in Greece international marriages can be viewed as an expected rational social consequence, there was extreme social discomfort vis-a-vis these developments along the identitarian axis. By 2004, it was reported that one in ten marriages in the municipality of Athens were documented to be between aliens and nationals with the majority being between Greek men and alien women. The tone of the articles communicating this information was milder as they were of informative nature aiming to discuss a social rather than a criminal phenomenon. The social responses of discomfort and national insecurities comprised separate news stories without endorsement of anti-migration sentiments. Prominent figures from the public sphere were reported to openly express their concerns with regard to the disruptive role mixed marriages and the effect that the involvement of female migrant domestic workers in the private sphere had on the social reproduction of national identity and culture. The then Archbishop Christodoulos was reported to openly accuse female migrant domestic workers in a public statement of erasing the Greek-Orthodox education and culture that was transmitted to the new generation through the Greek family principles and ideals. The aim of these public statements was not just to inform and attempt to create an environment of societal caution but also to create an environment of insecurity and thereby to urge the need to establish measures securing the national identitarian interests of Greece. In the absence of the state, the Archbishop called upon the church to create day care centres and take up a role in developing affordable welfare policy schemes in replacement of the utilisation of female migrant domestic workers (ln.gr, 2001b).
CONCLUSION

Chapter 5 is the third part of the four-part analysis carried out within this research project and constitutes the final chapter providing an analysis of the researched data. By tracing the ways in which printed media has portrayed migrants, the experiences of the social sphere and the social responses to migration and the role of the political sphere in the politicisation of the contemporary migration wave, the aim was to identify the role that the printed media has played as a functional actor in the politicisation of migration as a societal security threat. As with Chapter 4, the analysis in this chapter was structured around the proposed thematic categorization of Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002, p.24). One of the preliminary observations was that media articles seemed to aim to offer a more pragmatic approach to the problematisation of the contemporary migration wave as they communicated the national presence of aliens as a social, political and economic experience. As such, reported news stories were based on comprehensively collected information.

Overall the printed press concluded through data and evidence that the sudden inflow of aliens was a positive phenomenon for Greece due to the national economic gains. Aliens were reported to offer significantly cheaper labour power which, restricted to the specific segments of the national labour market that were unattractive to the national population, raised the national development rate without
compromising the competitiveness of the national labour force or affecting unemployment levels. Illegality was identified by the printed press as the characteristic of alien labour that kept its costs at low levels. Despite the economic gains, the social, political and financial disadvantages as well as the marginalisation of aliens stemming from this status were extensively reported with the purpose of raising social and political awareness.

With that knowledge, the printed press played the role of the advocate for aliens in Greece. The problems surrounding the migration phenomenon that were addressed in the articles, health risks, rise in criminality, rise in corruption and disruption of social cohesion as well as abuse of aliens, aimed to:

1. break through the social biases on migration and misconceptions of the characteristics of the phenomenon
2. publicise the multiple economic, political and social abuses experienced by aliens
3. address the lack of political ownership of the phenomenon and a clear migration agenda
4. question the relevance and responsiveness of the migration policies and legalisation policies
5. exercise criticism on the inefficiency and declining state of the public sector and the burdened welfare system.

The absence of adequate means for the legal employment and settlement of aliens was interpreted as a deliberate decision towards the preservation of Greece as
a monoethnic state. In practical terms, the printed press sided with nationals in their lack of interest in legalising their employed aliens under the existing status quo. Regardless, it did not justify the widely established socially hostile national environment. Underlining the accountability of both the social and political spheres with regard to the impact of the political and social responses to the migration wave on migrants and at a secondary level for nationals, the articles concluded that the main responsibility for the status quo was held by the political sphere. As a result, and despite the existence of migration policies, the social sphere was presented as holding governing power over the presence and future of migrants in Greece.

The differentiation in nature and manifestation of social and political lack of interest and empathy for migrants and the migration phenomenon were recognised as stemming from the same strong existential fears. The economic marginalisation of migrants and their association with nationally low social value labour segments and jobs, their political invisibility and their official establishment as third class citizens and their social exclusion even to the point of criminalisation of their social presence in Greece, have been interpreted as expressions of an underlying nationalistic culture defining the establishment and development of Greece as a modern newly formed nation-state.

A significant percentage of the articles on migrants and migration exclusively addressed the specific challenges and differentiated experiences of female migrants and female migrant domestic workers in Greece. There was clear understanding in the printed press that female migrants were more susceptible to inequalities and
vulnerabilities than the rest of the alien population. Their gender differentiated their economic, social and political experiences. In general, from their journey, their entry to their settlement in Greece, female aliens’ lives were controlled by criminal networks and employers. More specifically, and in political terms, in addition to the absence of responsive and relevant regulatory provisions, a more generally inadequate policy regime affected the whole migrant population, legalisation processes and the significance of gender in the provision of the citizenship status, thereby leaving alien women susceptible to exploitation by the criminal networks.

In economic terms their gender identity determined their employment prospects constraining them to gendered occupations such as sex work and domestic labour under extreme conditions of exploitation. In social terms, female migrants were marginalised through their occupations as they were associated with low-skilled jobs lacking social value. There was realisation by the printed press that the engagement of female aliens within these occupations had an effect on the social value of the occupations. This led it to conclude that the existence of national racist and xenophobic cultural constructs towards female aliens specifically disconnected from their conditions in Greece. Their exact gendered identity directing them to gender-specific occupations was the source of national insecurity about their power over the national reproductive relationships. Female migrants were openly constructed and treated as a stronger threat in comparison to the more general national population. The high vulnerability and abuse experienced by them was a direct outcome of this conclusion.
This chapter constituted the final part of the analysis wherein the collected data was presented and discussed. The following chapter aims to look at the conclusions of the three analytical chapters in order to explore what the different components reveal in the context of the greater securitization process. Divided in two parts, it will answer the two research questions documented in the introduction of this thesis.
Chapter 6
The Securitization of Female Migrant Domestic Workers in Greece

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter provides the third part of the four-part analysis of this research project and it discussed the role of the printed press as the functional actor in the politicization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece as a security threat. Under the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory securitization was developed as a framework to explore security as a state of being, constructed through identifiable social and political processes. Despite the fact that the power over the securitization process is held by political actors the success of the securitization moves is dependent on their social acceptance and their institutionalization. As such securitization has to be explored as a holistic multilevel project rather than a linear process. Each of the three chapters was developed to explore each of the three different components of this single project – the politicization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece as a security threat.

As a researcher and awareness raiser for trafficked and smuggled women exposed to the reality of vulnerabilities migrant women in general and female migrant domestic workers in particular are exposed to this research project exceeded
the personal expectations. As discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 2 the case of Greece has stood out on a European level due to the country’s high numbers of migrant illegality intensifying the group’s experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities. In the first instance through the framing of migration policies as exclusionary measures this research project provides further knowledge on the specific ways migration policies have enabled the institutionalization of the violation of female migrant domestic workers’ human rights in this specific national context. It also explores the potential policy directions that will have to be taken for female migrant domestic labour to emerge as a legal occupation in Greece able to protect their interests and rights. There were significant added gains from the utilization of securitization theory as the basis of this research project. In the first instance it helped in linking the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers to the migration policies. In addition it also helped to decode those political and social processes that reproduce and lead to the institutionalization of the status of vulnerability and exploitation that migrants and female migrant domestic workers in particular are exposed to.

This chapter is the conclusion of this research project and also acts as the final part of the analysis. The aim is to unmake the securitization process by bringing together the findings of each of the analytical chapters and discussing the dynamics of the different components in the development of the securitization project. Through this discussion the research questions, as were set in the Introduction, will be answered. The chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part by cross-
referencing the information provided in chapters three, four and five it answers the first and second research questions:

- How has the current wave of female migrant domestic workers been politicized in Greece as a security threat in the context of the greater national securitization agenda?
- How have the securitization processes shaped the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour and created the conditions for the abuse and exploitation experienced by female migrant domestic workers in Greece?

This will be done by:

1. exploring the experienced inequalities and vulnerabilities of female migrant domestic workers as by-products of the securitization process
2. identifying the role gender and occupation play in each component of the securitization process
3. evaluating if and how the securitization process has determined the patterns and trends of female migrant domestic labour
4. identifying the power relations between the securitizing actors, functional actors and social sphere with the aim to explore the extent to which securitization is a bottom up or a top bottom process

The second part will explore the question of what is next through the utilization of the concept of desecuritization:

- Given the analysis can we argue and aim for the desecuritization of female migrant domestic labour in Greece?

This will be done so by exploring the possibility and offering suggestions on the relocation of the question of migration outside the existential narratives and
based on the ethical basis of governance based on the findings of this research project.

1 The Securitization of Female Migrant Domestic Labour in Greece

This thesis started with the presentation of the case of Konstantina Kouneva a Bulgarian legal female migrant working for a cleaning company in Greece who was attacked with sulphuric acid by unknown men as she was leaving work late at night. As discussed in Chapter 1 Kuneva’s case was identified by the Greek printed press to be bringing forward multiple social, economic and political questions with regards to the experiences of migrants in Greece and more specifically female migrant domestic workers. The areas of concern were:

1. the strong role non-national illegal networks and mafia are playing in controlling all the aspects of the migrants’ migrating experience in Greece
2. the establishment of undocumented labour as a peripheric strong labour market dominated by migrants
3. the establishment of a culture that devalues migrants’ lives
4. the absence of fairness and thoroughness in the legal system even for the cases of legal migrants
5. the gendered aspects of the attack given the means used
6. the existence of deeply embedded patriarchal structures that perceive the involvement of females in the labour market as a threat
7. the abuse of labour regulation even in legal employment
8. and the lack of solidarity from national trade unions for the case of Konstantina Kuneva mainly due to her gender identity and secondarily her national.

According to the printed media the case brings forward an alarming realization that for the case of Greece the legal status, in principle a nationally defined status under whose conditions migrants don’t consist a threat against the host country, doesn’t guarantee on its own merit the protection of the migrants’ human rights and equality with the national population. It also challenges the identification of the high percentages of illegality as the main source of the experienced marginalization, extreme vulnerabilities and inequalities for the group of female migrant domestic workers. Rather these aspects reconceptualize it as an effect on one hand of the Greek securitization agenda and on the other the existence of deeply embedded patriarchal structures.

As the analysis in Chapter 5 has demonstrated the case of Kuneva speaks and sums up the contemporary challenges female migrants and female migrant domestic workers experience in Greece. Through the documentation of the diversified experiences of female migrants and female migrant domestic workers the common underlining theme that emerges from the printed press is the existence of fear of the cultural power female migrants hold against the Greek identity and the Greek way of life. Even though the printed press can be identified to play the role of the advocate for female migrants through the employed language and the arguments the existence of deeply embedded patriarchal structures is brought forward that acts as an obstacle for the development of an alternative approach to female migration in
Greece. Even though the aim of the articles is to raise social and political awareness for the need of specialized legislative clauses within migration policies that would address the differentiated needs of the specific groups they fail to identify them as manifestations of the existence of national gender norms. The articles do confirm that for the case of Greece female migrants are experienced as a threat through both their national and gender identities.

The Introduction discussed extensively that within contemporary research and literature in the case of Greece the more intense exposure to abuse and exploitation has been associated with the high percentages of illegality due to the regulatory difficulties the specific occupation is posing for this alien group. Looking back at the analytical chapters of this research project it becomes very clear that the extreme conditions of vulnerability and inequality experienced by female migrants in Greece do not just stem due to lack of legalization policies but from the strong nationalistic social and political environment that identifies migrant marginalization and invisibility, and maintenance of a strong public – private divide as national interests. The utilization of securitization theory has enabled to unfold the link between the securitization of migration in Greece as a threat to a nationalist self with the experiences of female migrant domestic workers.

More specifically chapters 3 and 4 showed that there was no direct politicization for the phenomenon of the feminization of migration neither separately nor within the more general migration agenda. Despite the extensive documentation of an array of social, economic and political problems by the printed press the lack
of engagement of the political sphere absence with all of the mentioned aspects brings forward arguments for the case of purposeful neglect. In conjunction with these observations the analysis brought forward the following facts about the case of Greece:

1. the politicization of migration as a societal threat (as discussed in Chapter 4)
2. the political unwillingness for the development of processes for the acquisition of citizenship and the links of such debates to the national politics of reproduction (as discussed in Chapter 4 and section 5)
3. the invisibility of the criminal cases against and from female migrants that took over the press within the political sphere and the focus on male alien criminality
4. the fact that in Greece all economic migrants are exposed to the same regulatory difficulties but in the case of women they are experienced more intensively leading to greater exploitation and abuse (as discussed across Chapter 5 and more specifically in section 5)
5. the existence of research data from governmentally funded projects confirming the conclusions from the press on the specific problems female migrant domestic workers face in Greece and their exclusion from the political agenda (data presented in table 21 of Chapter 2 and section 3 of this thesis)
6. the social construction of female migrants as cultural and ethnic threats in gender terms (as discussed in Chapter 5 and section 5.1)
7. the identification of the legalization processes as means of political empowerment by the political sphere (as discussed in Chapter 5 and section 5.1).

These observations and facts lead to the conclusion that the exclusion of the feminisation of migration from the national political agenda was a purposeful neglect to protect the national interests. In addition the analysis demonstrated that the cultural significance of the gender identity of this migrant group and the fears over the disruptive effects the presence of female migrants would have for the politics of reproduction within the context of the specific gendered occupation where openly identified and addressed by the printed press as the basis behind the extreme conditions of vulnerability. Despite the fact that there was a call for the development of regulatory clauses that would facilitate the legalization of female migrant domestic workers they were not addressed in terms of the public – private divide and the existence of embedded patriarchal structures neither by the printed press nor the political sphere. The specific conclusions call for further research on national policy agenda on the care and welfare regimes and explore undocumented female migrant domestic labour as a convenient national political response to the reluctance of addressing gender norms and reorganizing the public – private divide.

This project also demonstrated that female migrant domestic workers are exposed to these inequalities and vulnerabilities in addition to the ones experienced by the whole alien population since their first point of contact in the receiving country is their national identity. As such despite the absence of the feminisation of migration from the political agenda the processes of the existing politicization of
migration would still have an effect on female migrants. More specifically and as discussed in Chapter 4, section 1, the foundation of the politicization of the contemporary migration wave in Greece traces back to the early 1990s and is identified with the national security agenda on the expansionist aspirations of Albania towards Greece and the political instability of the Balkan area. Despite the changes in the foreign relationships between Albania and Greece and the slowly established stability in the Balkan region, since the start of the contemporary migration wave, throughout Chapter 4 it was made clear that the reductionist narrative associating migration with the inflow of Albanians maintained its centrality up until the end of the examined period. Throughout Chapter 5 it also became very clear that the identification of the migrant population with Albanians and the linkage of this specific nationality with the disruptions associated with migration, despite the efforts of the printed press to break through these stereotypes, was also very strong. The transition of the political insecurities into cultural ideologies reveals the acceptance of the securitization narratives by the social sphere.

The data in Chapter 2, section 3, provides evidence of the significant role nationality has played in determining the migrant labour market and preserving its high segregation through the discussions of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have to be framed as byproducts of the securitization narratives. It was discussed that within the same labour market Albanian domestic workers were paid far less in comparison to Filipino, Georgian and Russian domestic workers and were employed by lower class households. The data source framed these inequalities as products of their nationality
and differentiated conditions of migration of female migrants (Anderson, 2010) without elaborating on the processes behind them. The negotiation of different nationalities of aliens and the role they played in the politicization of migration as a valuable or a harmful phenomenon for Greece are correlated with these specific data sets.

In the same section of Chapter 2 and in table 16, data showed that the feminization of migration was a phenomenon that developed parallel to the contemporary migration wave and within it each nationality was experiencing these developments differently. Amongst the nationalities working as female migrant workers, Filipino women consisted a 6,882 of the total female migrant population and a 70% within their own nationality, Ukranian women 13,405 and a 79% within their own nationality, Russian women 11,025 and an 80% within their own nationality etc. Even though Albanian women consisted the majority of the female migrant population with a size of 225,298 women, within their own nationality female migrant Albanians were almost half and about 47%. The Albanian nationals were the least affected by the feminization of migration for the case of Greece. Due to these facts even though the contemporary migration wave was bound to have an effect in the politicization of the feminization of migration politically it should have been politicized on its own merit. As also discussed in Chapter 2 Section 3 there is the need for further research on the experiences and characteristics of the remaining nationalities rather than Albanians as well as comparative analysis between different identities.
Moreover tables 18, 19 and 20 showed that despite the fact that Albanians were the nationality of women relocating with their whole families, mainly because of the specific conditions of their parallel migratory developments, and consequently posing a bigger reproductive threat in Greece, they didn’t have the highest nor high enough percentage in their intentions to permanently relocate and settle in Greece. Given the above data even though Albanian female migrants posed a lesser of a societal threat in Greece their significantly lower salaries in comparison to other nationalities testify that they experienced greater social marginalization even though they posed a less of a threat. This data even though widely available on a social and political level, demonstrated through the printed press articles discussed in Chapter 5, was never used within the parliament for the politicization of the migration wave and the development of responsive migration policies. Instead the politicization depended on national perceptions and nationalistic fears resulting in certain developments to slip in between the seams.

Overall the analytical chapters brought forward the existence of three distinctive realities as far as both migration and female migrant domestic labour are concerned. The first is the regulatory one and the ways female migrants’ political presence was established through specific rights and responsibilities. The second is the political sphere and the ways migration was being negotiated and constructed for the purposes of its politicization. The third is the everyday experienced reality as explored through research and data. Reviewing the conclusions drawn at the end of each of the analytical chapters there is evidence to support that there are direct links between the realities of the political sphere and the daily social experiences of both
migrants and nationals, mainly because both were filtered through the same social constructs on migration.

These links within securitization theory confirm the acceptance of the securitization narratives on migration and explains the experiences of migrants as direct byproducts. The printed press through the articles also adds to the specific conclusion as it identified that the political sphere through the politicization of migration enabled the social sphere to hold governing power over the presence, involvement and settlement of migrants in Greece. Both the parliamentary debates, through the politicization of police and social violence against migrants as a natural defensive mechanism, and the articles of the printed press, on the absence of state intervention in the unconstitutional persecution and social marginalization of aliens, presented the operation of a highly xenophobic and racist state operating within the state enabled by the political sphere. Unlike the identification of regulatory progress through the reorientation of the political agenda on migration by the existing research and literature on Greece, as this was discussed in the Introduction of this project and in section 3.2, the analytical chapters of this project provide evidence that challenge these claims. Even though there was an introduction of an agenda on migrant integration and inclusion these were never institutionalized nor appeared in the social accounts on migration developments.

On the contrary, there is absence of a direct link between the securitization of female migration and female migrant domestic labour on a political level and the social sphere due to the absence of their politicization. As discussed in Chapter 4 the
securitization of female migrants was indirect under narratives on social reproduction and the importance of safeguarding the ethnic clarity of Greece and there was absence of debates of female migrant domestic labour. For securitization theory, the status of security is being achieved through the employment of speech acts by agents holding political power. As discussed in Chapter 1 Section 3.3, on securitization theory and gender, depending on how gender identity is experienced the existential threats will be experienced accordingly and will highly differentiate. Consequentially the absence of speech acts does not mean the absence of securitization or absence of effects due to securitization of migration but the silencing of both female migrants in general and female migrant domestic workers in particular on a political level. The knowledge on the differentiated experiences of female migrant domestic workers from the securitization of migration that emerges through the analysis of the printed press articles reveals the existence of gendered power inequalities and as such the embeddedness of patriarchal structures. The feminist critique that security studies is a gender blind sub-field can be comprehended through this analysis since it seems to lack a theoretical basis upon which the absence of speech acts or the silencing of a topic takes the form of a securitization move in itself.

Despite the mutuality in the interests and attitudes towards migration from the political and the social sphere the securitization process in Greece must be identified as a top-down rather than a bottom-up process because of:

1. the interventionist power of the political sphere to determine national developments
2. the purposeful empowerment of the social sphere as a means of protecting
the national cohesion and the politically defined national interests.

Within the politicization of migration on a parliamentary level, as discussed in
Chapter 4 and section 3, the political sphere made the case for media playing a strong
role as a functional actor in the securitization process contributing to the racist and
xenophobic responses to migration. The data collected and discussed in Chapter 5
reveals that as far as the printed press is concerned it maintained a rather supportive
position trying to deconstruct the politically and socially constructed
narratives distorting the real facts and problems on migration and female migrant
domestic labour.

Within this context the question with regards to the quest for the
desecuritization of migration given the conclusions drawn in this project seems more
than just relevant as a way to move forward in reconceptualizing the politicization
of migration in Greece. As discussed in Chapter 1 in terms of political practice
desecuritization is “a critical strategy” (Huysmans, 1998: 570 – 571) and “involves
precisely this process; a moving of issues off the ‘security’ agenda and back into the
realm of public political discourse and ‘normal’ political dispute and accommodation” (Williams, 2003: 523). As a process by reconceptualising the
“normative question of how political government should be organised” (Huysmans,
1998: 574) they aim to move away from questions of efficiency to an “ethico-
political judgement of a particular form of organising the political. One does not
primarily oppose securitising migration because it is an ineffective way of dealing
with the question of migration but because one cannot ethically justify the specific
organisation of the political community articulated through security practices” (Huysmans, 1998: 574).

In each stage of the politicization of migration on a parliamentary level there were signs for efforts towards the desecuritization of migration but from a minority of voices as the opposition mainly mobilised arguments with regards to efficiency and monetary gains from migration. The ethical considerations around the management of migration were skewed by worries that an inclusive and ethical approach to policy development for aliens would compromise the social, economic and political survival and wellbeing of the national population. In turn, and according to the data collected in this project, the printed press in their majority aimed to break through these politically and socially constructed fears resisting the ethical reorientation of the Greek society and state as it demonstrated through facts that it was based on false premises. The alarming effects of the securitization of migration and the subsequent establishment of aliens as third class citizens were touched upon by the political sphere and were more clearly argued by the printed press through the discussion of the growth of social and political corruption as a by-product of the chosen approach to migration. The corruption and ethical deterioration of Greece did not stem from the presence of aliens and the exposure of nationals to different cultural norms but instead it stemmed from the national ethical compromise and the political legitimation and institutionalisation of abusive and criminally exploitative practices towards aliens.
2 Post-Script and the Future of the Politicization of Migration in Greece

The changes in the developments around the case of Konstantina Kouneva, which took place a few months before the start of this research project, by the time this project was completed testify to the continuous need for further research on the contemporary migration wave in Greece. While writing the Introduction of this research project the available at that stage information reported that in July 2013 the Piraeus First Instance Court ruled in favour of Kuneva. More specifically in the decision it was stated that despite the failure to identify the attackers and the inconclusiveness of the police investigation Kuneva’s former employer Ikomet was found morally liable for her attack. The basis of the ruling was:

1. the experienced hostility within the workplace stemming from Kuneva’s trade union activity
2. her late night working hours which had been one of the safety concerns Kuneva had been brought to the attention of her employers the months prior to her attack (Mindova, 2013).

As the writing of this thesis was being concluded and in March 2016, the decision was overturned in the Greek Court of Appeal (Karamagkali, 2016; Protothema, 2016). The judge, as explained by Kounėva in an article, stated that ‘everything that was happening from members of the employers, this war against me, was irrelevant with my attack, it was they say a coincidence’ (Karamagkali, 2016). Kouneva stated after this decision that she would take up the case to the high court as ‘this decision matters to all employees that are subjected to the service of their employers,
blackmail, even to violent acts’ and added that the logic behind the decision of the Court of Appeals “is a bad evaluation of the situation and the case. They mustn’t have yet realized what this decision means for all of us. They haven’t examined all facts. The file is huge and it took the judge one year to make this decision. I don’t know how much time he dedicated to examine the file” (Karamagkali, 2016).

The change of the decision by the Court of Appeals and the justification behind it reveal that the burning questions this research project posed while it was being formulated are still of relevance for the case of female migrant domestic workers and migrants more generally in Greece. The change in the decision came after a series of national and international developments that had a strong effect on the social, economic and political conditions of the country and signalled the end of the contemporary migration wave and the beginning of a different stage in the history of Greece as a migrant receiving country. The first major change was the Greek economic crisis which, even though developed gradually, hit the country at a point of no return in late 2009 and has been resulting in the introduction of strong austerity measures since then. In addition, the country experienced a change in its status as a migrant receiving country to migrant and refugee receiving country. Since 2007, and with a break between the years 2011 and 2015, Greece started to experience the penetration of its borders by refugees from Middle East and Africa. Despite the fact that this phenomenon started before the end research period of this project, up until 2009 refugee inflows were not politicized in Greece partly because Italy appeared to be the main refugee receiving country by sea. In 2015 there was a shift in refugee inflows and Greece became the major receiving country in the
Mediterranean area mainly through its borders with Turkey. In July 2015 FRONTEX, the European Union’s border agency, announced that ‘the number of migrants entering the EU hit another record… with mostly Syrians and Afghans entering Greece from Turkey’ (Associated Press, 2015). Just in July 107,500 migrants were detected to enter EU borders in comparison to 280,000 for the whole of 2014 (Associated Press, 2015) and 615,492 in the third quarter of 2015 and 978,338 in the fourth with a total of 1.82 million of which 872,938 entered Greece (FRONTEX, 2016).

Since 2009 due to these developments Greece has become, and remained for the biggest part, the center of international news stories attracting negative publicity for its inability to fulfill its financial responsibilities, to control the inflow of refugees to Greece and subsequently to Europe and political capacity to respond to contemporary challenges especially as a member state of the European Union. Despite the differences between the national and international pressures posed by these developments one thing has become certain, that Greece has entered its most difficult period of extreme insecurities since its establishment as a modern state. The large number of refugee inflows would have been classified as a matter of emergency for any state irrespectively of its economic, social and political circumstances. The parallel economic problems Greece has been facing and the subsequent challenges they pose for its international presence as a European member state have been creating an environment of wider insecurities within which the refugee crisis was to be negotiated socially, economically and politically. Given the data and research findings of this research project it is expected that the refugee crisis
would intensify the securitization of migration and would also be politicized itself as an extension of the existing national agenda on migration. Without drawing definite conclusions since there was no opportunity to conduct research on these questions just by the reports from the printed press the reality seems to contradict these preliminary conclusions.

Throughout this thesis it was established that two parties, PASOK and ND, have been holding the political majority in Greece since the establishment of the country as a modern state. The economic collapse of Greece saw the collapse of the sovereignty of the PASOK and ND in Greece as the public was viewed to lose its faith, in the words of Alexis Tsipras leader of the far-left Syriza party and current Prime Minister, to the parties and ‘government which for 2.5 years pillaged society’ (Pop, 2014). Feeding on the strong nationalistic culture, whose existence in Greece has become very clear from the analytical chapters of this project, in January 2015 Alexis Tsipras won the elections with an anti-austerity, anti-euro and anti-EU campaign based on narratives diverting blame from the domestic sphere towards external agents and factors and especially the country’s creditors.

Parallel to these national developments the refugee crisis emerged on a global level as a humanitarian crisis with a focus on the tragic experiences and realities of the millions of Syrian refugees fleeing from great jobs and a good quality of life in their country to escape war. With the pressures of terrorism, social, economic and political stability and fears for the rise of the far right parties (ECFR, 2016; Shinkman, 2015) some of the European Union member states established
quotas on the number of refugees they would give asylum and integrate in their societies and some others closed their borders completely (France-Press, 2015; Kingsley, Weaver and Kassam, 2015). These political responses to the development and in opposition with the public opinion were exercising pressures to the political leadership of the European Union and its member states challenging its stability. Despite the fact that the European member states hold the sovereign power over the ratification of the union’s agreements and treaties on a national level those decisions have a strong effect on the members’ diplomatic relationships and power within the union.

Greece geographically consisting one of the European Union’s border most susceptible to migrant inflows has always been holding a central role in the union’s migration policy discussions and policy developments. With a weakened political position within the European Union due to the economic crisis the increasing and uncontrolled inflow of refugees was intensifying the European political discontent towards Greece to the point that the interests of having Greece within the Schengen area were questioned as the country was becoming a security liability for the European Union member states (The Guardian, 2015; BBC, 2016; EurActiv.com, 2016). On a national level and through the legitimation of the anti-EU sentiments with the election of Alexis Tsipras and the far-left Syriza party the Prime Minister was reported on a national and international level to open up the country’s borders to refugees, welcome them to Greece and exercise criticism on the inhumane approaches to the refugee problem adopted by the remaining EU member states (News247.gr, 2015; Newsit.gr, 2016; Skai.gr, 2016). The political aim of these
efforts was with the use of destabilizing narratives to try and exercise pressure against the European Union in the hope of winning in the discussions with regards to the austerity measures and financial expectations from Greece.

Within that context and contrary to the expectations for social and political discontent against the inflow of refugees, given the findings of this research project, the politicization of the refugee crisis in Greece as a threat was established on different grounds than the contemporary migration wave. The threat was framed as the European Union and its lack of availability in offering financial and political support to Greece to implement a humanitarian policy. The inability of the Greek state to respond to the demands of the political decision and move to accept the refugees was projected to external actors and agents. On a social level Greeks seemed to agree with the humanitarian concerns and criticisms expressed by the Prime Minister and volunteered their time and resources in the service of the refugees through organization provided by a variety of NGOs. Nominated by an international group of academics for the Nobel peace prize Greek islanders became first page news for their humanitarianism and availability to serve those in need irrespectively of their different national identity and culture (Boffey, 2016).

These preliminary observations cannot provide a full account and an in depth analysis for the effects the politicization of the refugee crisis had on migration, female migration and the experiences of non-nationals in Greece. These observations do provide though substantial evidence for the start of a new chapter as much as in the status of Greece as a migrant and refugee country as in the
politicization of the phenomenon. The recent character of the changes makes it impossible to fully comprehend how these developments will unfold in the near future as the political and social spheres get challenged with more practical questions with regards to the settlement and integration of these refugees in Greece. Given the country’s history and identity as a migrant receiving country it is very difficult to conceive that the refugee crisis in conjunction with the economic crisis can lead to the desecuritization of migration. The question worth exploring in a future project drawing on the conclusions of this thesis is what effects does a discursive desecuritization of migration ignited by political interests outside the migration agenda and used as a means for the achievement of irrelevant political objectives have for migrants and migration. As the economic crisis deepens in Greece and the dust settles the political sphere will have to face very difficult questions and take harsh practical decisions as priorities with regards to spending and distribution of economic resources takes place in Greece.
APPENDIX

PRINTED PRESS ARTICLES


Apostolaki, M., (2005), ‘Πώς Πρέπει να Αντιμετωπισθεί το Θέμα της Μετανάστευσης: Η Κοινωνική Ένταξη και η Ενσωμάτωση Είναι Έξοδο από τη Λογική Ακόμη και της «Σύγχρονης Δεξιάς»’, To Vima, [online], 10th July, Available:


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