No credit for transition: European institutions and German unemployment
UNSPECIFIED. (2003) No credit for transition: European institutions and German unemployment. SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 50 (1). pp. 41-60. ISSN 0036-9292Full text not available from this repository.
The Stability and Growth Pact, adopted by members of the European Union, imposes tight limits on government deficits. But since the collapse of Communism, Europe has been faced with the problems of economies in transition: and reunified Germany-the leading economy of the EU-combines a prosperous western state and an eastern economy in the process of transition. In a model where unions play a key role in wage bargaining and transition imposes a substantial burden on the national budget, we analyze the implications of balancing the budget for the path of unemployment. Where high but temporary costs are financed by raising taxes on employment to satisfy the Stability and Growth Pact, then the title is a misnomer: relative to a policy of 'tax smoothing', the pact increases unemployment and slows growth. In designing fiscal rules for Europe, the benefits of tax smoothing must be weighed in the balance along with the virtues of fiscal discipline.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Journal or Publication Title:||SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY|
|Publisher:||BLACKWELL PUBL LTD|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 41-60|
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