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Bargaining and the timing of investment
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UNSPECIFIED (1997) Bargaining and the timing of investment. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 38 (3). pp. 527-546. ISSN 0020-6598.
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Abstract
The joint determination of the timing of investment and wage bargaining is modelled. Two cases are considered: (a) There is an alternating-offer bargaining game over binding wage contracts and production is possible only when agreement is reached. (b) There are no binding contracts so revenue is divided in period-by-period bargaining post-investment. Investment can occur earlier in case (b) than in case (a) and the equilibrium in case (b) can Pareto-dominate the equilibrium with binding contracts. These conclusions depend on players' discount factors.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | ||||
Publisher: | UNIV PENN | ||||
ISSN: | 0020-6598 | ||||
Official Date: | August 1997 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 38 | ||||
Number: | 3 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 20 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 527-546 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
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