The Library
REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS
Tools
UNSPECIFIED (1993) REPUTATION EFFECTS WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC MODELS. OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 45 (1). pp. 42-57. ISSN 0030-7653.
Research output not available from this repository.
Request-a-Copy directly from author or use local Library Get it For Me service.
Abstract
We solve lor the reputational equilibrium in a class of linear quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. This equilibrium is particularly simple to describe and tractable. There is imperfect monitoring but a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates; as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | ||||
Publisher: | OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM | ||||
ISSN: | 0030-7653 | ||||
Official Date: | January 1993 | ||||
Dates: |
|
||||
Volume: | 45 | ||||
Number: | 1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 16 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 42-57 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
View Item |