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Bundling without price discrimination
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Carvajal, Andrés M., Rostek, Marzena and Weretka, Marek (2010) Bundling without price discrimination. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics. Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS), Vol.2010 (No.936).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal bundling strategies of a multiproduct monopoly in markets in which a seller cannot monitor and thereby restrict the purchases of buyers to a single bundle, while buyers have resale opportunities. In such markets, the standard mechanism through which bundling increases seller profits, based on price discrimination, is not feasible. The profit-maximizing bundling strategy is characterized, given the restrictions on pricing policies resulting from resale and a lack of monitoring. The welfare implications of optimal bundling are analyzed.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HF Commerce | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Bundling (Marketing), Price discrimination, Monopolies | ||||
Series Name: | Warwick economics research paper series (TWERPS) | ||||
Publisher: | University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
Official Date: | 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.2010 | ||||
Number: | No.936 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) |
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