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Individually-rational collective choice
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Carvajal, Andrés M. (2004) Individually-rational collective choice. Discussion Paper. Egham: Royal Holloway College, Department of Economics. Discussion paper (Royal Holloway College) (No.29).
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Abstract
In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set.
The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual
preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be
refuted.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Group decision making, Conflict management, Consumer economics | ||||
Series Name: | Discussion paper (Royal Holloway College) | ||||
Publisher: | Royal Holloway College, Department of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Egham | ||||
Official Date: | October 2004 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | No.29 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 31 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Funder: | Brown University, Banco de Re | ||||
Grant number: | 222622 (Briw) |
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