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How transparency kills information aggregation : theory and experiment
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Fehrler, Sebastian and Hughes, Niall (Niall E.) (2015) How transparency kills information aggregation : theory and experiment. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Department of Economics. Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS) (1088). (Unpublished)
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Official URL: https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resea...
Abstract
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decisionmaking. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect
behavior differently, and test the model’s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne out - transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Alternative Title: | |||||
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Transparency in government, Voting research | ||||
Series Name: | Warwick economics research papers series (WERPS) | ||||
Publisher: | University of Warwick. Department of Economics | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
ISSN: | 0083-7350 | ||||
Official Date: | December 2015 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | 1088 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 50 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 27 January 2016 | ||||
Funder: | Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Swiss National Science Foundation] (SNSF) | ||||
Grant number: | 100017_150260/1 (SNSF) |
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