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On the stability of cooperation structures
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UNSPECIFIED (2003) On the stability of cooperation structures. In: ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications, QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA, AUG, 2002. Published in: ICM MILLENNIUM LECTURES ON GAMES pp. 167-183. ISBN 3-540-00615-X.
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Abstract
This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [13]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.
Item Type: | Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED) | ||||
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Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | ICM MILLENNIUM LECTURES ON GAMES | ||||
Publisher: | SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN | ||||
ISBN: | 3-540-00615-X | ||||
Editor: | Petrosyan, LA and Yeung, DWK | ||||
Official Date: | 2003 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number of Pages: | 17 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 167-183 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Title of Event: | ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications | ||||
Location of Event: | QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA | ||||
Date(s) of Event: | AUG, 2002 |
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