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Evidence games : truth and commitment
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Hart, Sergiu, Kremer, Ilan and Perry, Motty (2015) Evidence games : truth and commitment. Working Paper. Coventry: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (WERPS) (1091). (Unpublished)
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Abstract
An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup where the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy. The main result is that under natural conditions on the truth structure of the evidence, the two setups yield the same equilibrium outcome.
Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Equilibrium (Economics), Pricing, Disclosure of information | ||||
Series Name: | Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (WERPS) | ||||
Publisher: | Department of Economics, University of Warwick | ||||
Place of Publication: | Coventry | ||||
ISSN: | 0083-7350 | ||||
Official Date: | December 2015 | ||||
Dates: |
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Number: | 1091 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 50 | ||||
Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Status: | Not Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
Funder: | European Research Council (ERC) | ||||
Version or Related Resource: | This paper also appears as CRETA Discussion Paper No: 6 | ||||
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