The Library
Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization
Tools
Tools
Tools
Meirowitz, Adam, Morelli, Massimo, Ramsay, Kristopher W. and Squintani, Francesco (2019) Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization. Journal of Political Economy, 127 (1). pp. 378-418. doi:10.1086/700761
|
PDF
WRAP-dispute-resolution-institutions-strategic-militarization-Squintani-2018.pdf - Accepted Version - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (722Kb) | Preview |
|
![[img]](http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/text_plain.png) |
Plain Text
Submission (ID 472987396) .msg - Permissions Correspondence Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only Download (49Kb) |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/700761
Abstract
Engagement in a costly and destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish political choices like militarization, and potentially offset the benefits of peace-brokering institutions. We analyze a simple model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the chances of peace for a given distribution of military strength. But, once the effects on militarization are considered the presence of unmediated talks leads to a higher incidence of war. Not all conflict resolution institutions suffer from this drawback. We identify a form of third-party mediation, inspired by the work of Myerson, and show that it can effectively broker peace in disputes once they emerge, and also minimize the level of equilibrium militarization.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | K Law [Moys] > KC International Law U Military Science > U Military Science (General) |
||||||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | War -- Mathematical models, War (International law) | ||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Political Economy | ||||||||
| Publisher: | University of Chicago Press | ||||||||
| ISSN: | 0022-3808 | ||||||||
| Official Date: | February 2019 | ||||||||
| Dates: |
|
||||||||
| Date of first compliant deposit: | 10 October 2018 | ||||||||
| Date of first compliant Open Access: | 20 September 2019 | ||||||||
| Volume: | 127 | ||||||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 378-418 | ||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1086/700761 | ||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access | ||||||||
| Related URLs: |
Request changes or add full text files to a record
Repository staff actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
