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Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization

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Meirowitz, Adam, Morelli, Massimo, Ramsay, Kristopher W. and Squintani, Francesco (2019) Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization. Journal of Political Economy, 127 (1). pp. 378-418. doi:10.1086/700761 ISSN 0022-3808.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/700761

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Abstract

Engagement in a costly and destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish political choices like militarization, and potentially offset the benefits of peace-brokering institutions. We analyze a simple model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the chances of peace for a given distribution of military strength. But, once the effects on militarization are considered the presence of unmediated talks leads to a higher incidence of war. Not all conflict resolution institutions suffer from this drawback. We identify a form of third-party mediation, inspired by the work of Myerson, and show that it can effectively broker peace in disputes once they emerge, and also minimize the level of equilibrium militarization.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: K Law [Moys] > KC International Law
U Military Science > U Military Science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): War -- Mathematical models, War (International law)
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Political Economy
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISSN: 0022-3808
Official Date: February 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
February 2019Published
20 September 2018Available
20 September 2018Accepted
Volume: 127
Number: 1
Page Range: pp. 378-418
DOI: 10.1086/700761
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 10 October 2018
Date of first compliant Open Access: 20 September 2019
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