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Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining

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Isoni, Andrea, Poulsen, Anders, Sugden, Robert and Tsutsui, Kei (2019) Focal points and payoff information in tacit bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 114 . pp. 193-214. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008 ISSN 0899-8256.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008

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Abstract

Schelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining games by creating focal points. Tests of this hypothesis have found that conflicts of interest between players inhibit focal-point reasoning. We investigate experimentally whether this effect is reduced if players have imperfect information about each other's payoffs. When players know only their own payoffs, they fail to ignore this information even though it cannot assist coordination; the effects of payoff-irrelevant cues on coordination success are small. When no exact information about payoffs is provided, payoff-irrelevant cues are more helpful, but not as much as when conflict is absent.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Game theory
Journal or Publication Title: Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0899-8256
Official Date: March 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2019Published
31 January 2019Available
28 January 2019Accepted
Volume: 114
Page Range: pp. 193-214
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.008
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 30 January 2019
Date of first compliant Open Access: 1 February 2019
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
F/00 204/AV Leverhulme Trusthttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000275
670103H2020 European Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010663
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