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Secrecy, spies and the global South: intelligence studies beyond the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance

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Most states in the world, large or small, have a substantial tradition of espionage and internal security organizations, engaging in all manner of surveillance activities. The literature on this subject is increasingly voluminous and sophisticated.¹ Yet in more than a century of writing on intelligence, the study of secret services has largely been dominated by an Anglo-American perspective. Both the empirical focus of scholarly inquiry and the conceptual framing of intelligence remain firmly rooted in the experiences of the United States and its English-speaking allies.² Although this work is sophisticated and can claim to have recovered a ‘missing dimension’ of international studies, it is largely the work of western scholars who have tended to assume that they are describing intelligence in global terms.³ The importance of intelligence studies has been bolstered by a growing perception of its salience within both public and policy spheres, but the resulting tendency of the mainstream International Relations (IR) literature to take more notice of intelligence, surveillance and secrecy has only reinforced this Anglocentrism.⁴

This striking imbalance in the literature has not gone unnoticed. As early as 1988, Adda Bozeman penned a path-breaking essay on the importance of thinking more widely about

* The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust.

¹ For recent commentaries see Lewis Herrington, ‘The debatable land: spies, secrets and persistent shadows’, *International Affairs* 94: 3, 2018, pp. 645–55; Simon Willmetts, ‘The CIA and the invention of tradition’, *Journal of Intelligence History* 14: 2, 2015, pp. 112–28.

² Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds, *Intelligence elsewhere: spies and espionage outside the Anglosphere* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), pp. 3–11; Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, ‘What is intelligence studies?’ *International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs* 18: 1, 2016, p. 10; Damien Van Puyvelde and Sean Curtis, “‘Standing on the shoulders of giants’: diversity and scholarship in intelligence studies’, *Intelligence and National Security* 31: 7, 2016, p. 1041.

³ Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds, *The missing dimension: governments and intelligence communities in the twentieth century* (London: Macmillan, 1984).

⁴ e.g. Rory Cormac, *Disrupt and deny: spies, special forces and the secret pursuit of British foreign policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Austin Carson, *Secret wars: covert conflict in international politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

intelligence cultures.⁵ In the same year, Eduardo E. Estévez offered one of the first assessments of intelligence and democratic transitions grounded in the Latin American experience of the Third Wave.⁶ In 1996, Mexico's leading intelligence expert, Sergio Aguayo Quezada, lamented this imbalance as 'not only absurd, but dangerous'.⁷ Later, regional scholars Fredy Rivera Vélez and Katalina Barreiro challenged the liberal democratic dominance of the intelligence literature through an emphasis on local political history, institutional culture and democratic development.⁸ More recently still, Philip J. Davies and Kristian Gustafson, in an important agenda-setting contribution entitled *Intelligence elsewhere*, have called for the comparative study of national intelligence outside what they term the 'Anglosphere'.⁹ Over the past decade, a notable trend among academics working in both intelligence studies and surveillance studies has been to refocus on the global South.¹⁰ These two related subdisciplines, one emphasizing realist and empirical approaches derived from contemporary history and international security, the other favouring post-modern and conceptual approaches rooted in sociology and media studies, have noted the relative lack of attention to the secret services of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.¹¹

⁵ Adda Bozeman, 'Political intelligence in non-western societies: suggestions for comparative research', in Roy Godson, ed., *Comparing foreign intelligence: the US, the USSR, the UK and the Third World* (Washington DC: Pergamon, 1988).

⁶ Eduardo E. Estévez, *Seguridad e inteligencia en el estado democrático* (Buenos Aires: Fundación Arturo Illia para Democracia y la Paz, 1988).

⁷ Sergio Aguayo Quezada, 'Intelligence services and the transition to democracy in Mexico', in John Bailey and Sergio Aguayo Quezada, eds, *Strategy and security in US–Mexican relations beyond the Cold War* (San Diego: University of California Press, 1996).

⁸ Fredy Rivera Veléz and Katalina Barreiro Santana, eds, *Inteligencia estratégica y prospectiva* (Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2011), p. 29.

⁹ Philip H. J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, 'An agenda for the comparative study of intelligence' in Davies and Gustafson, eds, *Intelligence elsewhere*, pp. 3–6.

¹⁰ Zakia Shiraz, 'Drugs and dirty wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South', *Third World Quarterly* 34: 10, 2013, pp. 1749–66.

¹¹ Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, 'Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress', *Democratization* 18: 3, 2011, p. 605; Aaron W. Navarro, *Political intelligence and the creation of modern Mexico, 1938–1954* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 2010), pp. 4–5.

Intelligence has shifted and is no longer the sole preserve of states. Regional and international organizations, including the once-promising Latin American trade bloc Mercosur, the African Union, the European Union, and perhaps most notably the United Nations, have become increasingly active in this field since the 1990s.¹² Meanwhile, private companies, especially those engaged in commodity extraction across the global South, have long maintained significant intelligence capabilities and working relationships with local secret services.¹³ The obvious question is why, given the ubiquity of intelligence entities, the conceptualization of intelligence remains narrowly derived from the experiences of the Anglo-Saxon world, sometimes referred to in practitioner parlance as the ‘UKUSA’ partners, or the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance? One answer is that the so-called ‘Old Dominions,’ including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, all prioritised information as an aspect of national strategic culture.¹⁴ Another answer, is that we suggest here, is that studying intelligence in the global South poses complex challenges.

The term ‘global South’ is increasingly deployed to explain a rather peculiar mix of countries and regions. For multilateral agencies, it refers low- and middle-income countries in Africa, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. But the term functions as more than a metaphor for economic underdevelopment. In IR, political science and development studies,

¹² Lauren Hutton, ‘Regional security and intelligence cooperation in Africa: the potential contribution of the committee on intelligence’, in Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, eds, *Towards an African peace and security regime: continental embeddedness, transnational linkages, strategic relevance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 179–94; José Manuel Ugarte, ‘Panorama de la inteligencia criminal Latinoamericana’, *URVIO Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios de Seguridad* 15, 2015, p. 44; Arile Ahram and J. Paul Goode, ‘Researching authoritarianism in the discipline of democracy’, *Social Science Quarterly* 97: 4, 2016, pp. 834–49.

¹³ Oxford Business Group, *The report: Colombia 2013* (Medellín: Grupo Bancolombia, 2013), p. 147; Americas Market Intelligence, *Managing mining risk in Latin America* (Coral Gables, FL, Oct. 2018), pp. 16–17.

¹⁴ The exact nature of the UKUSA intelligence alliance remains remarkably contested, see for example: Jason Dittmer, ‘Everyday diplomacy: UKUSA intelligence cooperation and geopolitical assemblages,’ *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 105.3, 2015, pp. 604-619; Patrick Walsh and Seumas Miller, ‘Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ security intelligence collection policies and practice post Snowden,’ *Intelligence and National Security* 31.3, 2016, pp. 345-368.

the North–South dichotomy incorporates the history of colonialism, neo-colonialism, geopolitical relations, and differences in social, political and economic processes. For area specialists, the idea of the South is conceptualized as a region of distinctive intellectual production. By contrast, for intelligence and surveillance studies, the primary focus of scholarly work has been western intelligence services, largely conceptualized through the historic East–West divide of the Cold War. As intelligence and surveillance studies adjust their focus to look beyond the Anglosphere, and inevitably seek to reconceptualize intelligence, these broader approaches to understanding the global South could prove to be useful in avoiding the pitfalls of overgeneralization. This is particularly important in the context of uneven democratic development in the global South, which underscores the salience of explicit differentiation of intelligence systems between authoritarian states, hybrid regimes, and countries undergoing democratic transition and consolidation.

Intelligence in the global South is now emerging as one of the central axes of inquiry in the field. We have witnessed an increasing flow of publications and conference papers probing the activities of secret services that were unknown to academic research ten years ago.¹⁵ *Not only are we beginning to see a greater number of detailed monographs on the subterranean activities of particular countries, we are also beginning to see comparative work*, often with a regional focus that allows us to begin to think in terms of new typologies and to locate the development of these secret services within wider frameworks that draw on ideas of state formation and historical sociology.¹⁶ This comparative work is perhaps most advanced

¹⁵ Dina Rezk, ‘Egypt’s spy chiefs: servants or leaders?’ in Paul Maddrell, Mark Stout, Christopher Moran and Ioanna Iordanou, eds, *Intelligence leaders in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018); Maha Abdelrahman, ‘Policing neoliberalism in Egypt: the continuing rise of the “securocratic” state’, *Third World Quarterly* 38: 1, 2017, pp. 185–202; Jane Duncan, ‘Taking the spy machine south: communications surveillance in sub-Saharan Africa’, in Bruce Mutsvairo, ed., *The Palgrave handbook of media and communication research in Africa* (London: Palgrave, 2018), pp. 153–76; Mariano Bartolomé, *Inteligencia estratégica contemporánea: perspectivas desde la región suramericana* (Sangolquí: Universidad de las Fuerzas Armadas ESPE, 2016).

¹⁶ John Kasuku, *Intelligence reform in the post-dictatorial Democratic Republic of Congo: a critical analysis of DRC’s intelligence service* (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2016);

among Latin Americanists and points to nascent disciplinary divisions about how to move forward.¹⁷

Yet there has been only limited reflection on the fundamental reasons for this imbalance—and limited consideration of the extent to which the study of intelligence and security agencies in the global South requires different methods.¹⁸ Much of the new work on the developing regions carries the underlying assumption that we can ‘copy and paste’ the approaches that have been deployed to study the United States and its allies onto new and challenging projects about intelligence elsewhere. At times, this methodological blind spot has resulted in collections of largely descriptive essays with a state-centric focus. But perhaps most importantly, contemporary and historical analyses have sometimes relied on the recycling of previously classified ‘internal’ studies or polemical material that has emerged as the result of regional rivalries, typically over Kashmir.¹⁹

The global South is notably absent from the dominant texts on intelligence theory or intelligence research methodology.²⁰ These landmark meta-level works are important as they constitute the foremost conceptual studies for a subject that is often regarded as somewhat

Carolina Sancho Hirane, 'Democracia, política pública de inteligencia y desafíos actuales tendencias en países de Latinoamérica', *Inteligencia y seguridad: Revista de análisis y prospectiva*, 11: 1, 2012, pp. 67-102; Navarro, *Political intelligence*.

¹⁷ Gregory Weeks, ‘A preference for deference: reforming the military’s intelligence role in Argentina, Chile and Peru’, *Third World Quarterly* 29: 1, 2008, pp. 45–61; Veléz and Santana, *Inteligencia estratégica*; Nelson Arteaga, ‘Doing surveillance studies in Latin America: social sorting in contexts of violence’, *Surveillance and Society* 13: 1, 2015, pp. 78–90.

¹⁸ Methodological reflections in intelligence studies are rare; but see Andrew Hammond, ‘Through a glass, darkly: the CIA and oral history’, *History* 100: 340, 2015, pp. 311–26.

¹⁹ Prem Mahadevan, *Islamism and intelligence in South Asia: militancy, politics and security* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Vikram Sood, *The unending game: a former R&AW chief's insights into espionage* (Delhi: Penguin, 2018).

²⁰ Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin and Mark Phythian, eds, *Intelligence theory: key questions and debates* (London: Routledge, 2008); Stephen Coulthart, Michael Landon-Murray and Damien Van Puyvelde, eds, *Researching national security intelligence: multidisciplinary approaches* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019).

‘under-theorized’, at least by comparison with other areas of international studies.²¹ The recent *Routledge companion to intelligence studies* contains twelve essays about specific countries, none of which are less developed countries.²² Equally, in an Oxford University Press anthology entitled *Intelligence: the secret world of spies*, the entire ‘world’ surveyed consists of the United States until the very last section, which is rather awkwardly entitled ‘Intelligence in other lands’—and this apologetic coda consists of two essays about the United Kingdom and Russia.²³ So while we have begun to see essays, and even books, about the secret services of countries such as Mexico and Egypt, they remain outliers, not only in terms of their numbers but also because of the failure of subject leaders to explicitly consider them within the dominant analyses on research approaches or the conceptualization of intelligence.²⁴

Curiously, surveillance studies is no less Anglospheric.²⁵ While its mission has been distinctive, focusing on the theorizing of surveillance power, its excursions outside the Anglosphere have mostly been limited to post-communist authoritarian states such as Russia, China and the countries of eastern Europe, or surveillance in the context of globalization and global capital.²⁶ Much of its literature about the global South remains focused on country-specific accounts interspersed with familiar frameworks borrowed from Orwell, Bentham and Foucault. In other words, for the purposes of conceptualization, the usual western suspects

²¹ Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, international relations and “under-theorisation”’, *Intelligence and National Security* 19: 2, 2004, pp. 170–84.

²² Robert Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, eds, *Routledge companion to intelligence studies* (London: Routledge, 2013).

²³ Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, eds, *Intelligence: the secret world of spies. An anthology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

²⁴ e.g. Richard Betts, *Enemies of intelligence: knowledge and power in American national security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

²⁵ e.g. Kirstie Ball, David Lyon and Kevin Haggerty, eds, *Routledge handbook of surveillance studies* (London: Routledge, 2012); Gary T. Marx, *Windows into the soul: surveillance and society in an age of high technology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

²⁶ David Mukarami Wood, ‘Globalization and surveillance’, in Ball et al., eds, *Routledge handbook of surveillance studies*, pp. 333–42.

are rounded up.²⁷ While surveillance studies can rightly claim to be more conceptual than its sister subject intelligence studies, it has nevertheless used quite a narrow range of theory to reflect on the surveillance practices of more developed states, while failing to build bridges with development studies or area studies.²⁸

We argue that both intelligence studies and surveillance studies could learn much from comparative politics and area studies researchers. Secret services are subjects that have long been a matter of interest to area studies researchers and ethnographers precisely because, in these fields, academics can be subjected to unwelcome attention by the security agencies of the countries they wish to study. This is perhaps best illustrated by one of the most recent handbooks on methods for research in the Middle East and North Africa, which opens rather ominously with an essay entitled ‘Encountering the Mukhabarat state’.²⁹ We therefore ask, in an era increasingly obsessed with researcher safety: is the new frontier of secret service research in the global South already being constrained before it has really begun?

While the tension between university ethical frameworks and academic research is not irreconcilable, it is heightened for scholars of intelligence and surveillance studies. This is partly because of the nature of secrecy, but also, and more importantly, it is a result of the rather narrow focus on western intelligence in which there has been only a limited need to reflect on research ethics and methods. Accordingly, breaking out of the Anglospheric bubble will require scholars to embrace a wider range of ideas and approaches. This might not necessarily require a new theoretical lexicon but will certainly require wider frameworks, together with new methods that appreciate the difficulties of examining these subjects in a landscape that can be hostile to the academic researcher.

Designing your secret service

²⁷ Karin Dean, ‘Myanmar: surveillance and the turn from authoritarianism?’ *Surveillance and Society* 15: 3–4, 2017, pp. 496–505.

²⁸ But see Katherine Wisser and Joel Blanco-Rivera, ‘Surveillance, documentation and privacy: an international comparative analysis of state intelligence records’, *Archival Science* 16: 2, 2016, pp. 125–47.

²⁹ Jillian Schwedler and Janine A. Clark, ‘Encountering the Mukhabarat state’, in Janine A. Clark and Francesco Cavatorta, eds, *Political science research in the Middle East and North Africa: methodological and ethical challenges* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 23–34.

The question of what kind of overarching concepts we might consider when researching the global South is especially slippery. Intelligence studies developed during the Cold War and imported ideas that reflect a historic East–West divide. Western liberal democratic states have therefore conceptualized their secret services as defenders of their freedoms against foreign adversaries. They have historically prioritized intelligence to support wider foreign policy initiatives or pugilistic counter-insurgency campaigns while characterizing their opponents as authoritarian ‘counterintelligence states’.³⁰ These simple typologies have always been challenged by more critical literatures that perceive all secret services as praetorian.³¹ However, they are even less sustainable in a world where, even by a stringent criterion, over 47 per cent of the world’s population is thought to reside in a country classed as a ‘full’ or ‘flawed’ democracy. A further 16.7 per cent live under ‘hybrid’ regimes that consist of countries still in the process of democratic transition or consolidation. China, the world’s biggest authoritarian state, accounts for a large share of the estimated 35.6 per cent of the global population under authoritarian rule.³²

At first glance, it seems absurd to use typologies derived from the study of the CIA and the KGB to study the secret services of the global South. But others might respond that this is exactly where their recondite agencies originate. Latin America’s secret services have been historically viewed as ‘apprentice agencies’ of the CIA and FBI—the region’s governments and state security forces at large having been willing recipients of external training to curb the threat of right-wing Falangist and Nazi elements.³³ One of the first requests for help to set up a secret service came from Brazil in 1938, quickly followed by another from Colombia.³⁴

³⁰ e.g. Robert W. Pringle, ‘Andropov’s counterintelligence state’, *Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 13: 2, 2000, pp. 193–203; Kevin O’Brien, ‘Counter-intelligence for counter-revolutionary warfare: the South African police security branch 1979–2010’, *Intelligence and National Security* 16: 3, 2010, pp. 27–59.

³¹ E. P. Thompson, ‘The secret state’, *Race and Class* 20: 3, 1979, pp. 219–42.

³² Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2018: Me too? Political participation, protest and democracy* (London, Jan. 2019), pp. 2–3, 9.

³³ Navarro, *Political intelligence*, p. 4; Dennis M. Rempe, ‘The origin of internal security in Colombia, part I: a CIA special team surveys *la Violencia*, 1959–60’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10: 3, 1999, pp. 24–61.

³⁴ Martha K. Huggins, ‘US-supported state terror: a history of police training in Latin America’, *Crime and Social Justice*, 27/28, 1987, pp. 154–5.

This effort was supported by the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), a covert counter-intelligence branch of the FBI that constituted the first foreign intelligence bureaucracy in US history. It deployed some 700 agents across the region and quickly transformed itself into an industrial-scale surveillance mission of the left, targeting a broad range of local political and labour organizations.³⁵ By contrast, Argentina's first state-level intelligence agency, the *Secretaría de Inteligencia*, was set up by General Juan Perón in 1946 with the help of former Nazi agents, some of whom served in the organization.

In Asia and Africa, the origins of secret services often lie with colonial constructs or post-imperial legacies. Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence or ISI, its much-discussed military intelligence service, was arguably the product of a multi-layered imperial legacy, since it was created in 1948 by an Australian army officer, Major-General Walter Cawthorne, who had served in the Indian Army, but then changed allegiance to the new state of Pakistan.³⁶ A similar double colonial legacy was exemplified by the work of Ian Henderson. Having served in an intelligence and security capacity during the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, he was recruited by Bahrain to reform its security and remained in place there until 1998.³⁷ Some of these legacies of external training have had comical consequences. In Fiji, the domestic security service reportedly struggled to cooperate with the country's foreign intelligence service because the former had been trained by the Hong Kong Special Branch while the latter had been trained by the CIA; and so, despite both services being 'Fijian', they operated with clashing organizational cultures borrowed from elsewhere.³⁸

The origins of intelligence services in the global South vary considerably. While the legacy of external training and *shared heritage* is significant, moving beyond the Anglosphere requires an understanding of how intelligence apparatuses evolve in countries undergoing democratic transition or consolidating democratic governance from authoritarianism or the legacy of colonial rule. One of the hallmarks of intelligence in the global South, particularly

³⁵ Marc Becker, *The FBI in Latin America: the Ecuador files* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2017), p. 3.

³⁶ Hein Kiessling, *Faith, unity, discipline: the Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 14–15.

³⁷ William Roger Louis, 'Britain and the Middle East after 1945', in L. Carl Brown, ed., *Diplomacy in the Middle East: the international relations of regional and outside powers* (London: Tauris, 2004), p. 50.

³⁸ Private information.

in states undergoing democratic transition, is often the historic redirection from serving the state bureaucracy to protecting the premier and working on behalf of a particular political party.³⁹ This is perhaps best captured by the experience of Latin America, which saw widespread democratic transitions throughout the 1980s: while the region is widely regarded as the most democratic in the developing world, it continues to suffer from the pervasive problem of partisan abuse of intelligence services and a tendency for elements of the secret services to pursue their own agendas. Since 2015 alone, domestic spying scandals and cases of abuse of power have engulfed the secret services of Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Paraguay and Venezuela.⁴⁰ This raises the wider issue of the relationship between democratic governance, oversight mechanisms and organizational culture within intelligence services, which will become increasingly pertinent for transitioning countries in the global South.

Uneven democratic development in the global South presents challenges in the search for more appropriate conceptual frameworks. Ahram and Goode argue that the past decade has seen a growth in new forms of government that combine a degree of electoral contestation with media manipulation and a continued monopoly of power. Largely concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and eastern Europe, these regimes are often designated ‘semi- authoritarian’, ‘electorally authoritarian’ or ‘managed democracies’.⁴¹ Their intelligence and security regimes are certainly worthy of analysis but remain difficult to categorize.

Arguably, such classification systems can also serve to hinder endeavours to move beyond the Anglosphere. First, many of the countries placed in such categories have recently emerged from or are still experiencing internal conflict, circumstances which undoubtedly alter the nature and texture of their secret services as well as systems of accountability. Here, we require new sets of ideas that are sensitive to patronage and personal networks, particularly in conflict and post-conflict environments, as well as traditional theories of

³⁹ e.g. Barry Gilder, *Songs and secrets: South Africa from liberation to governance* (London: Hurst, 2012).

⁴⁰ Andrés Gómez de la Torre Rotta, ‘Servicios de inteligencia y democracia en América del Sur: ¿Hacia una segunda generación de reformas normativas?’ *Agenda Internacional* 16: 27, 2009, pp. 119–30.

⁴¹ Arile Ahram and J. Paul Goode, ‘Researching authoritarianism in the discipline of democracy’, *Social Science Quarterly* 97: 4, 2016, pp. 834–49.

bureaucracy and organization. Second, such classification systems neglect trends in democratic design, particularly between parliamentary and presidential systems of governance, that inevitably have impacts on the types of oversight mechanisms adopted. Finally, the emergent confusion about the reconceptualization of democratic regimes has sought to classify regimes emerging from authoritarianism by using adjectives to qualify ‘democratic’, a practice which will inevitably lead to outliers. Perhaps the most obvious example is Latin America, where bad habits within the secret services persist largely as a result of the failure to achieve effective intelligence accountability and oversight, while two-thirds of the region’s countries are nevertheless considered to be ‘fully’ or ‘flawed’ functioning democracies, boasting some of the world’s highest scores for electoral process and pluralism, and civil liberties.⁴² Colombia, the region’s most stable democracy, saw its premier intelligence agency dissolved in 2011 following reports of an open door policy between the director of intelligence and paramilitary commanders.

The study of the secret services in Latin America is one of the more developed areas of intelligence beyond the Anglosphere.⁴³ However, much of this literature has appeared through welcome scholarly innovation outside intelligence studies and as the result of two factors that have combined to hinder academic development in intelligence. First, ‘intelligence’ is a dirty word in Latin America, historically associated with the region’s dictatorships or external (and often covert) intervention. Second, Latin American states have failed to establish boundaries that demarcate what constitutes national security. During the dictatorships of the twentieth century and subsequent transitions to democracy, studies of the authoritarian intelligence systems were largely undertaken by scholars in area studies and political science, aided by truth commissions that sought accountability for human rights abuses. Democratic transitions and transitional justice saw new interest from scholars of law that were central in bringing questions of intelligence accountability, oversight and reform to the forefront of national security debates. More recently, some Latin American states have

⁴² Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2018*, p. 9.

⁴³ e.g. J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Eduardo E. Estevez, ‘Comparing intelligence democratization in Latin America: Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador’, *Intelligence and National Security* 29: 4, 2014, pp. 552–80.

adopted a more relaxed approach to their internal histories through declassification, which has seen the emergence of growing literature on secret agencies.⁴⁴

Historically, there has been much general research about governments that depend on repression, but specific studies on secret agencies in the global South remain limited. In the past ten years, we have seen a small but steadily growing literature on regime resilience, coercive institutions and the machinery of state security.⁴⁵ The conventional wisdom on authoritarian regimes is that leaders ‘pack’ their secret services with people who are loyal. These might be officers who fought with them during the coup that brought them to power, or else tribal or sect members. Within fragmented countries, autocrats often draw on their own ethnic groups and appoint relatives to head the key agencies. In return, these in-groups are rewarded for their readiness to deliver coercion on behalf of the regime and for linking their own security with the survival of the leader. But it has long been argued that ‘packing’ can be a losing strategy, increasing the potential for coups and other regime problems; so there are plenty of examples of heterogeneity. Perhaps one of the most important features of intelligence under authoritarian regimes is that intelligence services are not always ‘designed’, but often develop in a more ad hoc manner that is principally responsive to the shifting priorities and fears of those at the helm of the state, rather than as the expression of a particular strategic vision.⁴⁶

Recent research on Asia, focusing on the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, suggests just such a theory. While accepting that most autocrats prioritize protection against assassination, coups, revolts and external attacks, Sheena Greitens suggests that there are distinct types of approaches. She argues that a range of typologies can be identified around related ideas of social exclusivity and organizational fragmentation. As we have seen, some security apparatuses reflect the broad makeup of the country, while others are composed of a particular ethnic group or tribe, often led by one of the premier’s relatives. Moreover, some states have multiple and competing security organizations with confused missions and little

⁴⁴ Navarro, *Political intelligence*.

⁴⁵ K. A. Harkness, ‘The ethnic army and the state: explaining coup traps and the difficulties of democratization in Africa’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60: 4, 2014, pp. 588–616; P. G. Roessler, ‘The enemy within: personal rule, coups, and civil war in Africa’, *World Politics* 63: 2, 2011, pp. 300–346.

⁴⁶ Hazem Kandil, *Soldiers, spies and statesmen: Egypt’s road to revolt* (London: Verso, 2012).

coordination, while others are highly centralized. In her final chapter, Greitens extends her ideas to explain Chile under Pinochet, the East German Stasi and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, suggesting that leaders are notably sensitive to these choices and develop a bespoke institutional design for their intelligence and security apparatus that accords with the main challenges they face.⁴⁷

Accordingly, it appears that leaders who are worried about insider threats within their own circle, typically senior military leaders, protect themselves by deploying agencies that are highly fragmented and are led by family members. Saudi Arabia is an example: here, the National Guard's main function seems to be to protect the royal family against the armed forces. This competition, Greitens argues, keeps each agency off balance and is more likely to make them all invest in the status quo. However, the cost, she further argues, is that they are less well equipped to deal with internal popular revolt or external threats. Conversely, unitary and inclusive organs that are closer to state bureaucracies than parties and leaders are better at addressing wider threats but pose the possibility of offering a coup platform. She also argues that organizational design is a factor in determining the level of state violence against civilians.⁴⁸

New evidence on the role of security agencies in Kenya seems to confirm these findings about ethnicity. For autocrats facing elections, officers in the internal security apparatus play a crucial role by engaging in coercion on behalf of the incumbent. Yet reliance on these officers introduces a principal-agent problem: officers can [quietly depart from the leader's demands](#). To solve this problem, leaders strategically post officers to different locations based on an area's importance to the election and the expected loyalty of an officer. Mai Hassan, using a dataset of 8,000 local security appointments within Kenya in the 1990s, found that the president's co-ethnic officers were sent to, and the opposition's co-ethnic officers were kept away from, swing areas. This demonstrates one way in which authoritarian state institutions can persist despite the introduction of multi-party elections and can prevent full democratization.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and their secret police: coercive institutions and state violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also Lisa Blaydes, *State of repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018).

⁴⁸ Greitens, *Dictators and their secret police*.

⁴⁹ Mai Hassan, 'The strategic shuffle: ethnic geography, the internal security apparatus, and elections in Kenya', *American Journal of Political Science* 61: 2, 2017, pp. 382–95.

The obvious alternative to researching structure is examining ideas. How does ideology influence state terror? As we have seen, most research on state repression has focused on power structures to explain the nature of repression. Yet we know little about the internal characteristics of the security forces that effect repression. Adam Scharpf argues that particular levels of ideological belief within the security apparatus result in different levels of repression, regardless of orders from higher authority. Do officers whose ideas converge with those of the leader repress more enthusiastically? Scharpf has analysed these issues using both qualitative and quantitative data in the context of Argentina's Dirty War during the late 1970s. He argues that loyal nationalist officers in the infantry and artillery committed more violence than liberal cavalry officers who disliked the junta's terror programme. In short, Scharpf shows that ideology matters and may offer an alternative avenue to Greiten's structural approach to measuring reliability.⁵⁰

A further opportunity for deploying ideational frameworks is provided by the exploration of conspiracy theory. Even at their most absurd, popular conspiracy theories are revealing about how normal people understand the state, and how the hidden hand of the state is experienced by individuals and communities at the everyday level. In terms of subjectivities, conspiracy theory can illuminate what people believe is happening.⁵¹ In other words, frameworks based on conspiracy theory offer us insights into popular imaginaries about the secret state, or their views of malignant western interventions, rather than descriptions of verifiable events. We might even see the intense cynicism they reflect towards governments, both local and western, as an expression of resistance to the post-colonial nation-state. Aasim Akhtar and Ali Ahmed have argued that we might consider the possibility that the exponents of conspiracy theory, 'far from being uninformed, in fact understand a good deal more about their own societies than the liberal commentariat is prepared to acknowledge'.⁵²

⁵⁰ Adam Scharpf, 'Ideology and state terror: how officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina's "Dirty War"', *Journal of Peace Research* 55: 2, 2018, pp. 206–221.

⁵¹ Matthew Gray, *Conspiracy theories in the Arab world: sources and politics* (London: Routledge, 2010); Daniel Pipes, *The hidden hand: Middle East fears of conspiracy* (London: Palgrave, 1996).

⁵² Aasim Sajjad Akhtar and Ali Nobil Ahmad, 'Conspiracy and statecraft in postcolonial states: theories and realities of the hidden hand in Pakistan's war on terror', *Third World Quarterly* 36: 1, 2015, pp. 94–110. See also Brenda Nyhan and Thomas Zeitzoff, 'Conspiracy

The more elaborate range of conceptual frameworks now in evidence is helpful—not least because they offer researchers more choice as they negotiate between what is intellectually desirable and what is possible in terms of research design and fieldwork. Traditionally, within intelligence studies, case-studies often choose their researchers rather than the other way around, because of difficult issues of data access. But we suggest that more attention to the work of area studies specialists again widens the range of possible resources; and so it is to these issues that we now turn.

New research strategies in the field

Unsurprisingly, the call for more comparison in the study of intelligence and security agencies has been especially strong among political scientists. The additional advantage of some comparative approaches is that they can address the empirical roadblock in the way of gaining access to rich data. Comparative studies, particularly those focused on organizational design, can make use of a range of public sources that are open and in some cases can be accessed remotely. Moreover, quite simply, an article that compares six countries requires fewer data for each case than a single in-depth case-study. Yet understandably this approach evokes a degree of uneasiness among area studies specialists.⁵³ Indeed, there has always been a tension between inductive and particularist area studies tendencies, on the one hand, and the more generalizing and deductive tendencies that predominate in political science and sociology on the other.⁵⁴

A recent example of broad generalization is the work of Marco Cepik and Gustavo Möller, who have used network analysis to analyse national intelligence systems in the five BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—some of the largest developing economies in the world. This allowed them to consider how power was distributed within each national system, together with the implications of this for the system's overall organizational stability. Deploying empirical data for the five cases drawn from public documents, government legislation and press reports, they were able to move beyond the traditional organizational charts and 'wiring diagrams'. Using graphs and adjacency matrixes,

and *misperception: belief in the Middle East and North Africa*', *Journal of Politics* 80: 4, 2018, pp. 1400–1414.

⁵³ Robert Bates, 'Area studies and the discipline: a useful controversy?' *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30: 2, 1997, p. 163.

⁵⁴ Ariel Ahram, 'The rise and fall of Iraq in the social sciences', *Social Science Quarterly* 97: 4, 2016, pp. 850–861.

they were able to measure mutual relations between the nodes of the network.⁵⁵ Yet even more than the work of Greitens, this sort of theory-testing by mapping nodes and indexes from public documents is likely to discomfort the dedicated area studies researcher.

Many area studies researchers see these political science approaches as evidence of a three-headed hydra that is devouring their core subject, as approaches that emphasize theory-testing comparison seem to conspire with research risk-avoidance in UK universities and restrictive security practices by the state in the global South. Mark Duffield has voiced his concern about the sequential move away from ethnographic fieldwork that involves a growing remoteness from the world and what he calls ‘the compensatory emergence of remote methodologies and the simulation of digital alternatives’.⁵⁶ With the expansion of neo-liberal marketization, [together with the rapid growth of the Internet and e-commerce in regions](#) such as Africa and Latin America, more research is likely to be done remotely. But arguably, a range of other options remain.

One answer to the problem that has been pioneered by area studies experts is diasporic research. Quite simply, the most oppressive states have unintentionally created their own risk-free database through migration. Having driven a proportion of their population beyond their own borders, they have enabled excellent and even statistically significant work to be done in neighbouring countries without the researcher ever setting foot in the target country. Oddly, this sort of research mirrors intelligence-gathering from refugees during the Cold War, which saw pop-up interview centres for those coming out of the Eastern bloc.⁵⁷ In this way research about the experience of surveillance can be completed at little physical risk to either researcher or subjects. Moreover, this diaspora contains not only ordinary citizens but also former senior members of many regimes. Their memoirs remind us that cosmopolitan

⁵⁵ Marco Cepik and Gustavo Möller, ‘National intelligence systems as networks: power distribution and organizational risk in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa’, *Brazilian Political Science Review* 11: 1, 2017, pp. 1–26.

⁵⁶ Mark Duffield, ‘From immersion to simulation: remote methodologies and the decline of area studies’, *Review of African Political Economy* 41: 1, 2014, pp. 75–94.

⁵⁷ Paul Maddrell, *Spying on science: western intelligence in divided Germany 1945–1961* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

cities teem with ex-ministers and indeed senior members of former intelligence and security services.⁵⁸

Another alternative to in-country research is the possibility of research by Skype, Facebook Messenger and other kinds of voice-over-internet communication. These channels make it much easier to contact and interview subjects at a distance without venturing into the field; but they potentially put the subject at a greater degree of risk. The standard research advice is to allow the subject to determine how far to take the conversation, but this assumes that the subject is as familiar as the interviewer with the intricacies of communications security, which may not be the case. The security agencies routinely monitor emails and social media, often using state-of-the-art systems such as ‘Finspy’ bought from companies in Britain and Germany. In short, remote research is not entirely risk-free and may simply export some risks in the direction of the subject.⁵⁹

What about in-country research itself? Clearly, each regime has different sensitivities, and can be anxious about things that seem innocuous to outsiders—or, indeed, the reverse. It is helpful to know what kinds of projects a government will tolerate. Conversations with experienced researchers are helpful, as are lists of projects funded by foundations, which are quite a good way of gauging what topics have proved to be acceptable in the past. Affiliations can also be helpful, since bureaucrats tend to trust well-known research centres. Quite often, the desk fee to gain admission as a visiting fellow is quite low compared to the advantage and prestige that this can confer, and so can be a wise investment. However confident one feels about the attitude of the security services, it is wise to expect attention, typically when passing through airports. For these reasons, the storage of research data presents significant issues. Password protection for all devices is critical, as is the latest encryption software, but even then storage may not be secure. There are particular complexities associated with getting the data ‘home’ safely. On the one hand, using email or WeTransfer gives some reassurance against confiscation at the airport, but makes anonymization more important.

⁵⁸ See e.g. Mansur Rafizadeh, *Witness: from the Shah to the secret arms deal: an insider's account of US involvement in Iran* (New York: Morrow, 1987).

⁵⁹ See Daniel Grinberg, ‘Chilling developments: digital access, surveillance, and the authoritarian dilemma in Ethiopia’, *Surveillance and Society* 15: 3–4, 2017, pp. 432–8.

This, in turn, closes off some research methods, such as discourse analysis, since recording is ill-advised.⁶⁰

Just because a regime is security-minded does not mean it is hostile to intelligence studies. For example, Hein Kiessling wrote a history of Pakistan's ISI while living in Quetta and then Islamabad for 13 years, an extended stay which allowed him to establish his bona fides over time with a range of senior officers who understood the army-dominated ISI. Clearly, several officers felt the ISI organization had been misunderstood, even demonized, and wished to tell their story to a serious academic. Kiessling's work rather resembles the kind of high-level access journalism conducted by people such as Bob Woodward in Washington.⁶¹

Remarkably, Kiessling interviewed most of the important former ISI chiefs, including General Ziauddin Butt who was court-martialled by former President Pervez Musharraf. There were also long interviews with distinguished former army chiefs such as Generals Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat. He even obtained access to the papers of Colonel Syed Raza Ali, the central figure in the Special Operations Bureau, which trained the *mujahideen* for Afghanistan. Kiessling's study is a testimony to what can be achieved using 'anecdotal' and ethnographic interviews.⁶²

Nevertheless, while the possibilities of what can be achieved using sophisticated area studies approaches to fieldwork and long immersion in local cultures should be acknowledged, so should the limits to this type of work. Probably a minority of countries across the global South would encourage this sort of long-term patient investigation of their foreign and security services by visiting academics. These can be quickly identified through research on the status of their national archives and available collections. As a result, research is likely to be patchy. It is perhaps no accident that we have numerous studies of the secret service and security in Ghana, one of the more benign democracies in Africa.⁶³ Here, the long-serving

⁶⁰ Michael Gentile, 'Meeting the "organs": the tacit dilemma of field research in authoritarian states', *Area* 45: 4, 2013, pp. 426–32.

⁶¹ Noah Goldstein, 'An international assessment of journalist privileges and source confidentiality', *New England Journal of International and Comparative Law* 14: 1, 2007, p. 103.

⁶² Kiessling, *Faith, unity, discipline*.

⁶³ Smith Oduro-Marfo, 'Eyes on you while your eyes are on God: state surveillance of religion in Ghana under the Provisional National Defence Council regime', *Surveillance and Society* 16: 4, 2018, pp. 399–409.

former head of security Kofi Bentum Quantson has not only written his own account of events but has also appeared on television to talk about creative writing. Not every country is so welcoming.⁶⁴

Intelligence and ethics

Over the past two decades, the academic intelligence studies literature has consciously and successfully developed its research frameworks in areas such as epistemology and ontology. Yet neither of these two substantial bodies of writing addresses the subject of the ethics of *researching* intelligence, which is particularly peculiar as intelligence scholars have tended to write extensively on intelligence *practitioner* ethics.⁶⁵ This gap is more remarkable when we compare the situation with that pertaining in cognate areas such as terrorism studies, which has reflected on its researcher ethics extensively.⁶⁶ Moreover, unlike anthropology, intelligence studies has little literature on the matter of academics assisting secret services with training and research. It is perhaps worth pausing to ask why this is.

Intelligence studies has been perceived as ethically risk-free territory for academics. This is because historically it has been an area of study mostly practised by westerners in the West. For political scientists, copious quantities of material have been released under Freedom of Information Act provisions, and the profusion of public inquiries and accountability committees, with their voluminous reports, supplement abundant press material since 9/11. Interviews with retired officials have proved easy to secure, and many intelligence services have their own academic outreach programmes. In the West, while intelligence researchers are discreetly watched, no academic has been sent to jail for investigating the secret state. No former official has been prosecuted for talking to academics, and no book on intelligence by an academic has been subject to an injunction. In short, for academics, this realm seems no riskier than studying local government in Norwich.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Kofi Bentum Quantson, *Security in the hand of God (My amazing testimony)* (Accra: Quantson, 2016).

⁶⁵ Ross Bellaby, *The ethics of intelligence: a new framework* (London: Routledge, 2014); David Omand and Mark Phythian, *Principled spying: the ethics of secret intelligence* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁶⁶ Adam Dolnik, ed., *Conducting terrorism field research: a guide* (London: Routledge, 2013).

⁶⁷ Mariah Blake, 'The reporter who came in from the cold', *Columbia Journalism Review*, 30 Aug. 2006.

Intelligence studies research is also perceived as ethically inert because much of it is rooted in the past. Before 2000, this relatively new subdiscipline was largely populated by historians, and while it is becoming more interdisciplinary, with growing interest from geography, education and communication studies, it still has a strong historical focus. Those working from historical archives have been provided with a convenient firewall, since the material they are mining has been deliberately declassified by officials and placed in archives for public inspection. Departmental record officers do their best to dry clean the archives before they are released, and then researchers work in earnest to uncover bits of dirty laundry that have been missed. The whole enterprise has the feeling of a Victorian parlour game.⁶⁸ This has created a worrying ethical bubble. Visiting academics sometimes have little perception of the risks entailed in research. Moreover, these risks are unpredictable. In 2018 Matthew Hedges, a PhD student from Durham University undertaking mundane security research in the United Arab Emirates, was arrested, charged with espionage and initially sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.⁶⁹ This was not an isolated incident. In early 2016 Giulio Regeni, a Cambridge University PhD candidate undertaking research in Egypt on trade unions, was killed, almost certainly by the internal security forces.⁷⁰ Even historians can be at risk. In 2017 Xiyue Wang, a doctoral student in history at Princeton University, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in Tajikistan on charges of spying after having already spent a year in prison. He was not conducting interviews but focusing on archival research on the Qajar dynasty, which ruled from 1785 to 1925.⁷¹ None of these three postgraduate students was researching intelligence. Nevertheless, their cases highlight the dangers of conducting any research that involves scrutiny of politically sensitive topics.

Although intelligence studies now has its main professional home within the International Studies Association, in terms of its approaches it is perhaps spiritually closer to history and area studies in that it privileges hard-won empirical data. Rather like ethnographers, these

⁶⁸ Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson and Len Scott, eds, *Exploring intelligence archives: enquiries into the secret state* (London: Routledge, 2008).

⁶⁹ Harriet Agerholm, 'Matthew Hedges: jailed British academic in UAE having panic attacks as health deteriorates', *Independent*, 23 Nov. 2018.

⁷⁰ Mateja Peter and Francesco Strazzari, 'Securitisation of research: fieldwork under new restrictions in Darfur and Mali', *Third World Quarterly* 38: 7, 2017, pp. 1531–50.

⁷¹ Erin Cunningham and Carol Morello, 'Iran sentences Princeton graduate student to 10 years for espionage', *Washington Post*, 16 July 2017.

academics feel that primary research is important, not simply to avoid over-reliance on theory, but also to verify data in a field where deception is frequently part of the business. This is particularly important in conflict and crisis situations, where meanings are deeply contested. Yet university ethics guidance is changing, and the sort of research needed to tell the story of secret services in the global South is becoming more difficult to undertake. The postgraduate student environment is notably hazardous. Some students who are [studying in western countries](#) from semi-authoritarian countries may opt to undertake dissertations on issues related to their own security state—internet surveillance is an especially popular topic—but with no clear sense of what the consequences of this may be for them when they return home. Events in Turkey have produced a veritable diaspora of research students, all eager to write about the activities of security agencies but with little guidance on what this might mean for their future career or life trajectories, or for relatives still in their home country—an issue thrown into relief by the episode of the UK’s Iraq ‘dodgy dossier’.⁷² Yet in terms of research, access to private archives or members of the diaspora network or indigenous students are all valued in the effort to move intelligence studies forward. Without this assistance, how are the stories of the Mukhabarat in Syria, Jordan or Egypt to be told? And there is a new nemesis western scholars studying security in the global South have to face. Not only do they have to worry about local security agencies in the field, they also have to look out for their own governments when they return. Recent UK and US legislation presents problems for security researchers visiting any region where non-state armed groups operate (and they are ubiquitous).⁷³ Are returning researchers likely to find their laptops and flash drives scrutinized? Will European security agencies share these data with the United States? The evidence suggests that some authorities view particular institutions with which they themselves have a research relationship as having a ‘licence’ to carry out this work, while they remain suspicious of others. [As Peter and Strazzari have pointed out](#), there are

⁷² Ibrahim Al-Marashi, ‘The “dodgy dossier”: the academic implications of the British government’s plagiarism incident’, *Review of Middle East Studies* 40: 1, 2006, pp. 33–44.

⁷³ Home Office, *Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations* (London, April 2019), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-or-organisations--2>; US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and State Sponsors of Terrorism, *Foreign terrorist organizations* (Washington DC, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 19 Sept. 2019.)

multiple ambiguities and hypocrisies here.⁷⁴ Western security agencies are hungry for data, yet suspicious of those who produce it. Universities are eager for ‘impact’ and Global Challenges Research Fund grant income, but risk-averse when faced with fieldwork proposals.⁷⁵

Yet beguiling opportunities beckon in the context of security sector reform. Over the past two decades, efforts to improve both the efficiency and the ethical standards of secret services in less developed countries have resulted in a considerable demand for security expertise. Some of this has been met by private intelligence companies and some of it has been met by universities. The gradual conflation of intelligence and information in a world of ‘big data’ has only intensified this nexus. On the one hand, this can provide opportunities for ‘embedded research’, since access to problematic areas can be achieved while training local security forces. Moreover, results are more likely to be authentic if researchers work with security agencies, effectively as participant observers. On the other hand, the scope for controversy is considerable—as was highlighted during the debates surrounding the US Army’s Human Terrain System Project. Scholarly reactions among anthropologists and ethnographers amounted to an outright disciplinary rejection of such practices. Intelligence studies scholars currently enjoy numerous examples of such embedded projects, often in the context of training or security sector reform, but they have yet to engage in this difficult debate.⁷⁶

Conclusion

Researching the secret services in the global South is both useful and important. It is also long overdue, and could constitute the next ‘missing dimension’ of intelligence and surveillance studies. However, in some countries it presents practical and ethical challenges that have been largely ignored by intelligence scholars, who have hitherto lived in an Anglospheric bubble where little consideration has been given to the development of intelligence ethics for researchers. The biggest dangers here are perhaps misunderstandings.

⁷⁴ Peter and Strazzari, ‘Securitisation of research’.

⁷⁵ Robert Dover, ‘Impactful scholarship in intelligence: a public policy challenge’, *British Journal of Politics* 13: 3, 2018, pp. 374–91.

⁷⁶ Maximilian Forte, ‘The Human Terrain System and anthropology: a review of ongoing public debates’, *American Anthropologist* 113: 1, 2011, pp. 149–53. See also Liam Gearon, ‘Education, security and intelligence studies’, *British Journal of Educational Studies* 63: 3, 2015, pp. 263–79.

The ‘spooky’ security services are not necessarily a source of risk, since after all, like journalism and academia, their members represent a particular kind of information professional, and some are keen to tell their story and conduct academic outreach. But any research project engaging with this requires a thoughtful strategy to be in place.⁷⁷ Any such strategy must include a careful consideration of research ethics, an area that demands attention. Most importantly, we must avoid the Orientalizing practice of defining particular areas and/or services as ‘dangerous’, compounding the current problems of the securitization of research and the homogenizing labels imposed upon diverse regions by university ethics committees.⁷⁸

The successful study of secret services across the global South is clearly possible. Indeed, the important call made by Davies and Gustafson to examine ‘intelligence elsewhere’ is increasingly being answered.⁷⁹ Oddly, the best work is probably being produced by comparative politics experts or area studies scholars, less so by those working in intelligence or surveillance studies. Indeed, it is not clear how far these four groups of scholars are reading each other’s literature or material in other languages. But, as David Art has argued, the study of these subjects cannot always be held to conventional methodological standards, and scholars may have to ‘think more like detectives’. He also suggests that researchers must be willing to adopt a patient historical stance; and so maybe we must accept that the story of intelligence in the global South may be unravelled only slowly and over time.⁸⁰ Perhaps the original intellectual home of intelligence studies, located in history, will come full circle?

⁷⁷ Gentile, ‘Meeting the “organs”’.

⁷⁸ Adam Morton and Pinar Bilgin, ‘Historicising representations of “failed states”: beyond the Cold War annexation of the social sciences?’, *Third World Quarterly* 23: 1, 2002, pp. 55–80.

⁷⁹ See e.g. Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: inside an authoritarian regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Ilana Feldman, *Police encounters: security and surveillance in Gaza under Egyptian rule* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015).

⁸⁰ David Art, ‘Archivists and adventurers: research strategies for authoritarian regimes of the past and present’, *Social Science Quarterly* 97: 4, 2016, pp. 974–90.