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The pizza night game : conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points

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Isoni, Andrea, Sugden, R. and Zheng, J. (2020) The pizza night game : conflict of interest and payoff inequality in tacit bargaining games with focal points. European Economic Review , 127 . 103428. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428 ISSN 0014-2921.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428

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Abstract

We report the results of a new tacit bargaining experiment that provides two key insights about the effects of payoff inequality on coordination and cooperation towards efficient outcomes. The experiment features the novel Pizza Night game, which can disentangle the effects of payoff inequality and conflict of interest. When coordination relies on focal points based on labelling properties, payoff inequality does not interfere with the successful use of those properties. When there are efficiency cues that assist coordination, payoff inequality is not an obstacle to the maximisation of efficiency. Conflict of interest is the main barrier to successful coordination.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GN Anthropology
J Political Science > JC Political theory
T Technology > TX Home economics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Pizza, Games, Tacit knowledge, Negotiation, Conflict of interests
Journal or Publication Title: European Economic Review
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0014-2921
Official Date: August 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
August 2020Published
20 May 2020Available
18 March 2020Accepted
Volume: 127
Article Number: 103428
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103428
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 19 March 2020
Date of first compliant Open Access: 8 June 2020
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
670103H2020 European Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010663
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