The Politics of Territory
in
Early Anarchist Thought

by

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Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. All translations from French into English are mine, unless otherwise stated. Parts of this thesis have been adapted and published by the author: see Ferraz de Oliveira, António. ‘Kropotkin’s Commune and the Politics of History’ Global Intellectual History 3.2 (2018):156-177.
Abstract.

Since the days of Occupy, the once dead letter of ‘anarchism’ has gained a new lease of life in academic and popular attention. Within politics and geography, an intriguing part of this renewed appeal has centred on claims that early anarchist thought carries a rich conception of territory, one which present debates ought to recover. These claims, however, have often relied on mythological readings of the anarchist tradition, rather than on close intellectual histories of key ‘anarchist’ texts. This thesis offers an attempt at a consistent and deep reading of how arguments about territory figured in the writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Petr Kropotkin. In doing this, the thesis not only offers fresh insights into the political thought of each of these thinkers, but also sheds light on broader debates about territory in the long nineteenth century. Beyond demystifying the notion of a perennial anarchist conception of territory, the thesis therefore also contributes to the broader project of historicizing the concept of territory in nineteenth-century thought.

Introduction
In Oakland, the Occupy movement held Oscar Grant Plaza as the “Oakland Commune”. In Istanbul, no better name could be found, already in the first days, than the “Taksim Commune” for what was coming into existence there. [...] In the high mountains of Oaxaca, at the beginning of the 1980s, Indians trying to formulate what was distinctive about their form of life arrived at the notion of “communality”. For these Indians, living communally is both what sums up their traditional basis and what they oppose to capitalism, with an “ethical reconstruction of the peoples” in view. In recent years, we’ve even seen the PKK convert to the libertarian communalism of Murray Bookchin, and project themselves into a federation of communes instead of the construction of a Kurdish state.

Not only is the commune not dead, it is coming back.

The Invisible Committee, in To Our Friends, 2015.¹

The seeds of disquiet that have yielded this thesis were first sown in the days of the Occupy movement. It was in that year, when austerity and resignation were challenged insolently with discontent and dreaming, that I first encountered the language-world of ‘anarchism’. The anarchist tradition, I must say honestly, did not hold any clear meaning for me then. In the excitement of Occupy, it was unclear who the anarchists were, though they seemed to be forgotten heroes; it was unclear what they had thought, though their words and deeds were recalled with a prophetic air. If the year of Occupy marked my first loose encounters with the anarchist tradition, this was also channelled greatly by the movements’ insistence on questions of politics and place. As a young geographer, I was quickly drawn to the manifold ways in which concerns with political space seemed present. On one hand, Occupy appeared to be critically preoccupied with the practical realities of contemporary spatial politics. In this manner, the movement gathered critiques against the dwindling of public space and freedom of assembly, against the gentrification of cities and the growing financialisation of land, against the onslaughts of developmentalist planning in the global countryside, against the rise of systemic surveillance and brutal policing after 9/11, against a globalisation of ‘the 1%’. On the other hand, I was also captive to the political languages, the spatial
imaginaries mobilized around Occupy. First, there were theorists I was familiar with, invoked in appeals to Henri Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’, Gilles Deleuze’s ‘assemblages’ and ‘reterritorializations’ or Michel Foucault’s ‘Heterotopias’. Beyond these, however, was an unfamiliar conceptual world, a world of ‘autonomous zones’, of ‘networks of liberated territories’, of ‘no borders’, of ‘prefigurative spaces’, of ‘free communes’ and of ‘democratic confederations’. These, I was told, were anarchist ideas, born out in the practice of such disparate social movements as the 2000s Global Justice Movement, the 1990s Zapatistas uprising, the 1930s Spanish Civil War and the 1871 Paris Commune. Activists such as David Graeber argued that it was necessary to turn to these experiences in understanding past attempts to ‘create liberated territories outside of the existing political, legal, and economic order, on the principle that that order is irredeemably corrupt’. As poetically expressed by the Invisible Committee, the new anarchist politics sought to escape ‘the whole casuistry of territorial planning’ and ‘secede […] the existing geography’ to form networks of Communes, ‘regardless of borders’.

Yet, for all these appeals for the creation of hopeful ‘liberated territories’, as opposed to the violence, commodification and closure of state territory, it remained unclear to me what visions of territory the anarchist tradition entailed. By claiming sundry movements and thinkers expressed the same spatial imagination, anarchist texts such as those of David Graeber, the Invisible Committee and others, sacrificed intellectual detail to rhetorical appeal. Impelled by these invocations, this thesis seeks to examine some of the origins of ‘anarchist’ imaginations of territory. In this endeavour, I have chosen to study the allegedly foundational thought of three thinkers in the anarchist canon: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Petr Kropotkin. In interpreting the writings of these thinkers, I have employed the methods of intellectual history, drawing on the particular ‘contextualist’ tactics argued for by scholars such as Quentin Skinner and J.G.A. Pocock.

Put summarily, my ‘research question’ could be expressed as follows: How did arguments about territory figure in early anarchist writings? This driving question carries two significant subsidiary questions, which collectively form the basis of my contribution. The first concerns the question of the identity of anarchist thought itself.
To what extent do arguments about territory reveal continuities and discontinuities among the foundational thinkers of ‘anarchism’? The second concerns the question of territory. How do ‘anarchist’ arguments relate to broader intellectual and political controversies about the concept of territory? The thesis therefore examines the anarchist canon in terms of its internal tensions, as well as in terms of its wider significance to the history of territory in political thought.

**Research Agendas: Intellectual History, Anarchist Studies and Theories of Territory**

In addressing the question of territory in nineteenth-century anarchist thought, this thesis speaks to two growing research agendas: intellectual histories of anarchism and the history of ‘territory’ in political thought. The first agenda, set by the works of scholars such as Matthew Adams, Ruth Kinna and Federico Ferretti, seeks to historicize the contextual ways in which ‘anarchist’ thinkers produced influential texts. This approach stands in contrast to other valuable studies of the social histories of anarchist movements, such as those of Kirwin Shaffer or Constance Bantman, as well as with social analyses framed through an anarchist conceptual framework, such as those produced by James C. Scott or Simon Springer. Whilst social histories of anarchist movements recover a precious sense of the cultural milieu, organizational politics and social networks, in-depth engagement with the intellectual construction of key anarchist texts often remains limited. On the other hand, whilst social studies employing ‘anarchist’ ideas seek to show or develop their theoretical potential, they often lack enough critical awareness of the intellectual history behind their key concepts. In other words, ‘anarchist thought’ is often taken as a given, something easily appraisable rather than a messy intellectual tradition in need of careful interpretative efforts. Following the works of Kinna, Adams and others, this thesis argues that a deeper and more fruitful appreciation of anarchist thought requires retracing how key its texts and concepts were originally designed, as well as repeatedly reimagined by successive readers. These intellectual histories, moreover, are not only significant within anarchist studies but also within the broader literature of the history of political thought, where the anarchist tradition is still poorly understood.
Second, this thesis contributes to the growing research agenda on theories of territory. In the last decade, the concept of territory has attracted growing attention from sociologists, political theorists and geographers. First, analytical political theorists such as Margaret Moore, Avery Kolers and Cara Nine, have sought to argue that territory needs to be integrated into normative debates about political obligations. The importance of these debates has often been related to the urgency of questions around discharging moral duties in the context of crises of migration, ecology and regionalism. Second, sociologists such as Saskia Sassen, Benno Teschke and Charles Maier have sought to re-theorize territory in relation to the historically shifting relations between state structures, social power and spatial control. All these re-theorizations, in their own way, have been built around challenging ideal sociological narratives of ‘the territorial state’. These efforts, albeit critical in seeking better explanatory devices to social history, are limited in their appreciation of how a term such as ‘territory’ exists not only as a theoretical device but also as a politically contested concept.

This thesis seeks to address this critical gap by treating ‘territory’ as a political imagination with a plural and contested history. Inspired by the works of intellectual historians such as Stuart Elden or Annabel Brett, this thesis argues that territory ought to be understood as an intellectual construct, the contingency of which has been tied to contextual forms of knowledge and to specific political controversies. Through this approach, ‘territory’ is understood not only as a fixed legal artefact or a neutral element of social theories, but rather as a pliable element of modern political thought. In this light, and much like the political concepts of sovereignty, statehood or citizenship, territory’s meaning is approached here as a palimpsest whose multiplicity must be investigated. Without such an intellectual history, once fertile debates about territory are erased from our attention and our capacities for political imagination are silently sapped. In this spirit, the focus of this thesis on anarchist thinkers serves not simply to ask whether or not the anarchist tradition has a distinctive set of arguments about territory. It also asks to which extent these dissenters’ arguments can recast past debates about the concept of territory in a more pluralistic manner. Ultimately, then, the ambition of this study is to argue that territory is a crucial intellectual construct of modern thought and must be studied as such.
Thesis Outline

In order to reveal the diverse conceptions of territory within early anarchist thought, this thesis undertakes an examination of three key thinkers in the context of nineteenth-century intellectual history. This thesis is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, I outline the theoretical background and methodological commitments through which I have situated and analysed the intellectual history of territory in anarchist thought. The chapter addresses two questions: why study territory through intellectual history, and why engage with nineteenth-century anarchists to do so. To begin with, the chapter charts what have been the dominant treatments of territory in Anglo-American political geography since the 1970s. The approaches of influential scholars such as Jean Gottmann, Robert Sack, Peter Taylor, John Agnew and Stuart Elden are critically assessed for the purchase and limits of their theoretical frameworks. Inspired by Elden’s work, if sidestepping his Foucauldian approach, the chapter commits to studying territory through the history of political thought. Taking territory not as a ‘political technology’ but more narrowly as an ‘intellectual construct’, the chapter outlines how the thesis employs the methodological sensitivities of the Cambridge School of Intellectual History. Furthermore, the chapter clarifies why nineteenth-century anarchist thought was chosen as the focus of this study. Noting the rising profile of anarchist geographies and recent claims that anarchist thought possesses a radically distinct conception of space and territory, the chapter proposes that it is both timely and fruitful to assess how the canonical anarchists participated in written controversies about territory. If anarchists have indeed been consistent dissenters opposed to mainstream conceptions of territory, then re-articulating their thought could reveal aspects of controversies that have faded from academic attention.

The second chapter presents a broad canvas of the intellectual history of territory in nineteenth-century political thought. The purpose of this chapter is to offer some context as to the events, political debates and intellectual movements that our three anarchist thinkers could have been addressing in their own arguments about territory. Taking an illustrative and thematic approach, the chapter sketches three intellectual
‘moments’ in nineteenth-century thought on territory. First, it explores how the French Revolution precipitated two major debates on how to transform territory into a republican rather than feudalist institution. These debates concerned the administrative division of France, and the separation of public domain from private property. In recounting these debates, the chapter focuses on the thinkers such as Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès and Philippe-Antoine Merlin de Douai. Second, the chapter recounts how post-Napoleonic Romantics re-imagined territory through new arguments about nationhood. Here, attention is given to how conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre, Friedrich Schlegel and Carl von Savigny attacked revolutionary republicanism for its rationalist pretences to redraw territorial units and conventions. Europe’s territorial order, they argued, ought to be understood as the product of providential unions between kings and peoples, embodied in custom, language and religion itself. Upending this discourse, the chapter shows, a subsequent generation of Romantics subversively exploited these themes to argue that the territorial order established by the Vienna Congress was founded on despotic rather than ‘organic’ polities. These radical arguments would peak in the upheavals of the 1848 ‘Spring of Nations’. Passing onto its third ‘moment’, the chapter considers how growing technological and scientific optimism led to the burgeoning of new territorial imaginations. On one hand, through the writings of liberal Industrialists, Saint-Simonians and imperialists, technologies such as railways, steamboats and telegraphs were deployed to re-imagine territory as the product of man made networks. On the other hand, fuelled by a growing faith in scientific explanation, territory was recast as a feature of social organization itself. Thinkers such as Auguste Comte, Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer provide examples of these new territorial imaginations. Having established these key nineteenth-century debates, the thesis turns to its substantive focus on the concept of territory in the work of our three anarchist thinkers.

The third chapter engages with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s arguments about territory in his 1840s writings on property and his 1860s writings on federalism. Throughout these two periods, the chapter argues, Proudhon’s critical concern with territory resonates with French republican preoccupations. In its first half, focusing on Proudhon’s early writings, the chapter traces how he construed his critique of property by drawing on and disagreeing with July Monarchy liberals such as the Eclectic Victor Cousin and the Industrialist Charles Comte. After discussing the general arguments as well as
political and intellectual contexts of *What is Property*, the chapter examines how Proudhon challenged the idea of territory as ‘national property’ and mobilized his own readings of natural law, eclectic philosophy and historicist jurisprudence to argue that territory ought to be understood as a ‘national possession’. Through this move, Proudhon’s objective was to argue what he thought would be a consistent republican revision of new norms of property and public domain ensuring true rule of law, liberty and equality rather than a refraction of the injustices of feudal France. In its second part, focusing on Proudhon’s 1860s writings, the chapter traces how Proudhon’s inventive variations on federalism stemmed from his concern with Napoleon III’s co-optation of republican opinion through ‘the principle of nationalities’. Attacking defenders of ‘national unity’ as demagogues enabling despotism and militarism, Proudhon deployed a *sui generis* natural history of states and theory of social organismism to argue that true republicanism could only be secured within decentralized federations of small states. Only through conditions mimicking the primordial valley-states of humanity could nationalities secure their liberty, the rule of law and economic equilibrium. Provokingly, in these arguments for federalism, Proudhon argued against the French Revolution’s territorial reforms, seeing them as constituting the basis for despotism rather than republicanism.

The fourth chapter discusses how territorial arguments recurred in the writings of Mikhail Bakunin. Three key arguments are explored – Bakunin’s 1840s Romantic critique of ‘machine states’, his early 1860s alignment with the radical federalism of Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev, and his late 1860s ‘anarchist’ critique of patriotism. Throughout these three arguments, the chapter is particularly attentive to Bakunin’s continued concern with ‘nations’, ‘federations’ and ‘territorial states’. In its first part, the chapter examines Bakunin’s 1840s writings and his participation in the upheavals of 1848. Tracing the influence of German Idealism, Romanticism and French ‘radical democracy’ on his thought, the chapter shows how Bakunin deployed a Left Hegelian view of History to argue that Slavic nationhood would emancipate itself by initiating a new ‘universal’ form of politics – the federation of free nations, which would supersede the ‘mechanical’, despotic and ‘territorial’ states of Europe’s Holy Alliance. In its second part, the chapter shifts to Bakunin’s return to politics after 1861. Here, I examine Bakunin’s alignment with the ‘Russian socialism’ of Herzen and Ogarev in the context of controversies surrounding the ‘Great Reforms’ of Tsar
Alexander II. In his early 1860s writings, it is argued, Bakunin’s treatment of territory shifts through a new set of arguments about internal federalism, provincial autonomy and the right to secede. Lastly, the chapter focuses on Bakunin’s anarchist phase and considers how his readings of Proudhon in the late 1860s catalysed him into a new socialist politics and an original critique of the State and of patriotism. Here, Bakunin combined his new readings of Proudhon, Ludwig Feuerbach and Comtean positivists to argue that patriotism went through different historical phases of psychological development, and hence involved different phases in terms of the relation to territory. This intellectual construction, sketched between 1867 and 1869, was interrupted by the events of the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. This war, the chapter argues, provoked Bakunin to first mobilize his new critique of patriotism and later to recede into earlier Romantic tropes about ‘historical nations’ and mechanical states.

The fifth chapter engages with Petr Kropotkin’s political thought and his continued contrast of ‘free communes’ and territorial states. To explore this contrast, the chapter focuses on two key texts in Kropotkin’s thought, his 1885 Words of a Rebel and his 1902 Mutual Aid. Opposing common readings of Kropotkin as overly influenced by positivism, the chapter articulates the significant influence of Romantic historians in the development of his thought. Beginning with Words of a Rebel, it is argued that Kropotkin’s arguments about communes were indebted to his subversive readings of the liberal Romantic historian Augustin Thierry. Subverting Thierry’s historiography, Kropotkin argued that monarchical territorial states had historically served to suppress communal liberties rather than expand them. Modern liberty, Kropotkin argued, would only be possible through the rebirth of free federations of communes, united in a network of ‘incessant relations’. Examining a text written twenty years later, the second part of the chapter shows how Kropotkin’s famous Mutual Aid again co-opted the narratives of historians to contrast federations of communes and territorial states as two poles of social organization. Tracing his use of Henry Maine’s writings, it is argued that Kropotkin consciously subverted Maine’s narrative of the passage between primeval communism to modern States. Subverting Maine, Kropotkin argued that it was ‘communism’ that was progressive and the history of states which was stagnant. In reference to territory, Kropotkin emphasized how village communities and medieval city communes had collectively conquered the wilderness and formed vast networks of economics and solidarity. Modern states, on the other hand, were seen as
driving forward a cycle of war and feudalism, which led to growing social division. In this manner, States’ use of politico-legal norms of territorial sovereignty and private property represented the destruction, rather than the constitution, of vast organic social networks.

In its conclusion, the thesis returns to its opening promises, recounts the thesis’ key findings and addresses future avenues of research. In doing this the conclusion returns to the two ‘subplots’ underlying its research question to ask: (i) what are the continuities and discontinuities in how Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin engaged in argument about territory; and (ii) to what extent did their arguments relate to broader controversies about territory in modern political thought? In addressing each of these subsidiary questions, the conclusion also outlines the limitations of this thesis and suggests what could be addressed by future studies. In regards to anarchism, it is argued that future studies ought to further challenge canonical readings and unearth the significant diversity of intellectual sources that operated in the writings of key thinkers associated with this tradition. The richness, banality and deciduousness of anarchist thought can only be gauged through these interpretative conditions. As to studying territory through the history of political thought, it is argued that this approach enables a more plural and meaningful understanding of what controversies indented modern imaginations of politics and place. This project, it is argued, is particularly significant with regard to the long nineteenth-century and the idea that it completed a universal closure of place through the globalisation of the territorial state. In this manner, it is hoped, what is here an end, may elsewhere become a beginning.
Chapter 1. Theory and Method: Territory and the History of Political Thought

Nowadays, in contrast, we must say that the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a particular territory – and this idea of “territory” is an essential defining feature.

Max Weber, in ‘Politics as Vocation’, 1919.¹

Amazingly little has been published about the concept of territory, although much speech, ink, and blood have been spilled over territorial disputes.

Jean Gottmann, in *The Significance of Territory*, 1973.²

Territory remains one of the most frequent and fundamental terms in the vocabulary of politics, and yet, it is seldom problematized. Much like Max Weber in his famous lecture ‘Politics as Vocation’, social scientists often allude to the term’s centrality only to then leave it unexamined. This is surprising for a term defining modern states, covering almost all inhabitable areas of the planet, and often at the centre of political conflict and contest. This neglectful state of affairs, however, has not remained wholly unchallenged. In the last ten years, thanks to a handful of academic interventions, territory is becoming the focus of sustained theoretical discussions in political theory, historical sociology and political geography. Within political theory, the new attention to territory has been dominated by normative philosophers such as Margaret Moore, Cara Nine, Avery Kolers, and John Simmons. Their discussions have focused on developing moral justifications for how territory ought to mediate the distribution of political rights and duties.³ As for historical sociology, theoretical discussion has most often focused on challenging narratives around the rise and demise of ‘the territorial
state’. Scholars such as Hendrik Spruyt, Benno Teschke, Saskia Sassen and Charles Maier have all contributed significantly to these debates. In political geography, ironically, new theoretical treatments of territory have remained more limited, with the noteworthy exception of Stuart Elden’s works. This is a strange situation given territory was a defining concept in the rebirth of Anglophone political geography since the late 1970s.

To locate my intervention, this chapter begins by reviewing four dominant ways in which territory has been theorized in geography between the 1970s and the 2000s. Taking the vantage point of key scholars such as Jean Gottmann, Robert Sack, Peter Taylor, John Agnew and Stuart Elden, I argue that geographical engagements with territory have tended to focus on territory as a social institution, at the cost of understanding it as an intellectual construct. Building on from Elden’s work, I propose to understand territory as a political imagination that ought to be studied through intellectual history. Following this aim, in the second part of this chapter, I position the present study in relation to the ‘spatial turn’ in intellectual history and explain what methodological commitments I employed in the thesis. In a final part, I reflect on the present motives and limitations in exploring the concept of territory in the anarchist tradition. The discussion of motives, though tied to the resurgent interest in anarchism since Occupy, focuses on the issue of how mythological readings of anarchist thought have been prevalent within anarchist geographies. In contrast to these readings, I argue for the need to demystify the anarchist canon through careful intellectual histories of key thinkers. Through these steps, this chapter reviews the thesis’ theoretical and methodological foundations in studying ‘territory’ as an intellectual construct, and the cares taken in exploring it in ‘anarchist’ thought.

1.1. Territory in Political Geography

1.1. Four Canonical Interventions: Gottmann, Sack, Taylor and Agnew

Given political geography’s operative concern with explaining the relations between politics and place, addressing the territorial organization of the modern world has been one of its enduring themes. Since the revival of the subject in the 1970s, key thinkers such as Jean Gottmann, Robert Sack, Peter Taylor and John Agnew have offered
influential reflections on how to think through territory as an object of politics. Whilst each author’s answers were idiosyncratic, they shared a common preoccupation with revealing territorial organization as something socially dynamic rather than institutionally static. Deploying sociological, historical, economic or ethological theories, these influential geographers carried out canonical moves, which have defined disciplinary engagements with ‘territory’. Given their continued influence and traction within the discipline, it is necessary to review these accounts. In this section, I retrace these key theoretical approaches chronologically and evaluate their limitations in terms of historicism.

The first account of territory to consider is in Jean Gottmann’s work, most particularly his 1973 The Significance of Territory. One of the last great representatives of pre-war geography, Gottmann was also a foundational figure in the re-birth of political geography. In The Significance of Territory, Gottmann conceptualised territory as a ‘unit of political organization that defines at least for a time, the relationships between the community and its habitat […] and between the community and its neighbours’. Following from this definition, Gottman argued that the concept of territory had evolved as an expression of two competing tendencies in each community: to seek ‘shelter for security’ or ‘a springboard for opportunity’. Expressing these tendencies creatively throughout history, territory was to be understood as a ‘psychosomatic phenomenon of the community’ - a materialization reflecting communal psychology. This conception, as noted by Luca Muscarà, bore two key intellectual influences: Vidalian geography and Bergsonian evolutionism. Given Gottmann’s education in the humanist and holistic geography of Vidal de Blache, Albert Demangeon and André Siegfried, it is unsurprising to find him analysing territory by reference to a contingent and subjective relation of people to their milieu, their ‘habitat’. Gottmann’s reference to this subjective relation as ‘psychological’ reflects the influence of his mentor, Albert Demangeon, whom he quotes to this effect. Beyond this, Gottmann’s emphasis on two opposed ‘tendencies’ in this psychomatic relation bears the mark of Henri Bergson’s Creative Evolution, which argued that organic diversity reflected a series of contingent creative acts which mediated the ‘implication of antagonistic tendencies’. In addition to establishing these evolutionary antinomies, Bergson’s theories (like Vidalian ones) implied unity in the development of social and intellectual life. When speaking of ‘the evolution of the concept’ of territory, therefore,
Gottmann understood it as driven by shifts in social relations, which mediated perennial tendencies towards security and opportunity creatively, thus producing ever more complex forms of politico-geographical organization. For Gottmann, then, the concept of territory was an image of social ‘organization’, which in turn reflected transhistorical ‘creative’ tendencies. Tellingly, not many geographers since using Gottmann’s work on territory have noted this historicist conundrum, where conceptual innovations on ‘territory’ are framed \textit{a priori} as creative variations on two perennial psychological tendencies (i.e. to seek shelter or opportunity); and where intellectual innovations are assumed to represent psycho-social shifts in relation to ‘habitat’. In Gottmann’s account, to sum up, the ‘concept of territory’ was constricted into a transhistorical evolutionism, which saw contingent intellectual creations as expressing antinomial phases in social psychology.

Whilst Gottmann’s intervention was influential, Robert Sack’s \textit{Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History} achieved yet greater canonical status in political geography in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{14} Building on ethological studies from socio-biologists, psychologists and anthropologists, Sack sought to understand territory not merely as static sovereign space but rather as the dynamic product of ‘territoriality’, a strategic group behaviour based on ‘delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area’.\textsuperscript{15} Such behaviour, Sack claimed, was visible at all scales of social interaction – be it in a home, a neighbourhood, a Native American tribe, a factory, a network of churches, or indeed, a modern state. Whilst much of Sack’s appeal stemmed from presenting territoriality as a socially constructed organizational strategy, it is crucial to note that its logical structure was closely linked to ethological literature on territoriality. Within geography, Sack’s work ought to be read together with Ed Soja’s \textit{The Political Organization of Space} and Torsten Malmberg’s \textit{Human Territoriality}.\textsuperscript{16} Beyond geography, Sack is in proximity with anthropologists such as Rada Dyson-Hudson and Eric Alden Smith.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, although Sack did not assume a biologically founded aggressive defence of ‘territory’, he nonetheless assumed that human ‘territory’ was established to exert areal control over resource access.\textsuperscript{18} Such an assumption, rather than truly escaping ethological logic, merely transposed it into organizational language. Admittedly, this move allowed Sack to hypothesize that territoriality included ‘ten tendencies’, which through combinations could provide categories for a multi-scalar analysis of ‘hierarchies of territorial organization’.\textsuperscript{19} In spite of this,
however, Sack’s theory remained compromised by two key problems. First, it ultimately relied on an ethological referent, which saw ‘territoriality’ as a *behaviour* with ‘logically prior’ functions (e.g. enforcement of access).\(^\text{20}\) Second, Sack’s conception of ‘territory’ as the outcome of varying forms of territoriality, emptied territory of its historical specificity in European political thought. In Sack’s account, hunting grounds, private property, a room, church parishes and states were ‘territories’. Territory, in short, had become a catchall signifier for a ‘controlled area’. Nonetheless, whatever may be said of its shortcomings, Sack’s *Human Territoriality* rapidly redefined the landscape of geographical reflections on territory, serving as a springboard for innovative studies by scholars such as Anssi Paasi and Steven Herbert.\(^\text{21}\) To this day, key introductory texts on territory see a capacious framework in Sack.\(^\text{22}\)

Despite Sack’s continued popularity, through the late 1980s geographers such as Peter Taylor and John Agnew would challenge the lack of historicism in Sack’s analytical approach to territory. Drawing on the then novel literature of neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian historical sociology, Taylor and Agnew mobilized the writings of Immanuel Wallerstein and Michael Mann to argue that political geography ought to study territory through a critical attention to the historical spatialities of state formation. In this turn, Agnew and Taylor both emphasized two points: (i) that is was necessary to understand how ‘territorial states’ had emerged in early modern Europe through contingent social struggles; and (ii) that it was critical to rid the social sciences of the methodological assumption that all social processes could be explained through the prism of coherent state-territorial units. By defending these two points, interestingly, Agnew and Taylor simultaneously argued that it was key to understand the rise of the ‘territorial state’ in the past, and its gradual demise as a social container in the present.

Writing from the 1980s, Peter Taylor developed a new Marxist understanding of territory.\(^\text{23}\) Inspired by Immanuel Wallerstein, Taylor argued that geography, much like other social sciences, had been hampered by a state-centric analysis that took state units as ‘autonomous units of change’.\(^\text{24}\) In contrast to this, like Wallerstein, he argued that focusing on the world-economy enabled a better explanation of changes in social and ‘spatial structure’.\(^\text{25}\) At one level, this implied imagining the ‘world-economy’ as an integrated system stemming from Western Europe outwards and shifting different
regions into ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’ and ‘periphery’ roles. As articulated by Taylor, this would switch the analytical primacy from state-centric scales for that of systemic economic scales. In Althusserian verbiage, Taylor suggested this corresponded to shifting from a statist ‘scale of ideology’ to the world-economic ‘scale of reality’. This move, as noted by Neil Smith and Neil Brenner, would be foundational for Marxist geographies of ‘state spaces’ and ‘territorialisation’, which re-read administrative zoning in relation to political economic processes.

Whilst arguing against the ‘embedded statism’ in social studies, Taylor simultaneously argued that understanding the emergence of territorial states was crucial. Following Wallerstein, Taylor saw the ‘modern world-system’ as fuelled by the development of capitalism in Europe from the 1500s onwards. This development, Taylor argued, was concomitant with the emergence of the ‘modern state-system’. Expanding on Wallerstein’s discussion of Dutch economic hegemony and the spread of mercantilist policies, Taylor saw the modern state-system as enabling economic actors’ greater manoeuvrability due to interstate competition, shared norms and relative security. Framing it in Gottmann’s terms, Taylor wrote that ‘with an appropriate new political economy imperative (i.e. mercantilism), territorial states could become platforms for capital expansion by combining security with opportunity’. Territorial states, then, appeared in Taylor’s writings as an historical political formation, which had outcompeted other feudal organizations and enabled the gradual emergence of global capitalism. In explicit contrast with Sack’s theories, Taylor argued that the territorial state and its spatial organization could not be derived from an abstract strategy of geographical control but rather from a situated social struggle that owed its structure to a defined set of politico-economic processes. Yet, for all these claims to historicism, it should be noted that Taylor’s discussions of territorial states carried a certain latent functionalism. In his view, the ‘territorialism’ of states was interpreted as a functional form, which at different stages either complied with or failed to meet a ‘systemic’ world-economic logic. In ascribing territorial states this ideal functional character, Taylor’s approach limited the potential to appreciate the complex histories through which territory was contingently thought of and built into the practices of modern states.
Like Taylor, John Agnew also argued for the need to overcome state territory as the embedded frame of social analysis and to deploy historical sociology to emphasize the historical contingency of the territorial state.\textsuperscript{32} In Agnew’s terms, this implied escaping the ‘territorial trap’, a set of geographical assumptions reducing political spatialities (i.e. uses of space) to fixed and impermeable units of sovereignty. As he expressed it, ‘the territorial trap’ resulted from ‘the tendency to restrict spatiality to territoriality and to associate territoriality only with statehood’.\textsuperscript{33} Defending a fine-grained and pluralistic approach, Agnew sought to provide enough analytical latitude to non-statist territoriality (pace Sack) as well as to non-territorial state spatialities. To give substance to this second idea, Agnew would later develop a theory of ‘sovereignty regimes’, which included four ideal types of state spatiality.\textsuperscript{34} Here, drawing on Michael Mann’s sociological writings, Agnew conceived of state authority as socially constructed through a combination of ‘despotic power’ and ‘infrastructural power’.\textsuperscript{35} Whilst despotic power referred to the capacity to marshal an effective and legitimate apparatus of rule, infrastructural power referred to the degree to which such an apparatus commands public provision and market exchanges within a discrete territory. In Agnew’s assessment, ‘these dimensions define both the extent of state autonomy and the degree to which it is territorial in practice’.\textsuperscript{36} Using these coordinates, Agnew’s purpose was to enable an ‘empirical view’ of state spatialities, which allowed for enough specificity in describing the contingent relation between politics and place in different historical and geographical contexts.\textsuperscript{37} In other words, Agnew’s indication was that in order to escape the ‘territorial trap’, it was necessary to focus on the actual geographies of state action.

Considering the interventions by Gottmann, Sack, Taylor and Agnew, it becomes clear that post-1970 political geography employed numerous pathways to engage with territory. Whilst detailed discussion on this deserves more attention than can be given here, for present purposes it is useful to note two commonalities. First, all these approaches sought to show how ‘territory’ resulted from social practices happening at a range of different spatial scales. Territory, in other words, was not the given ground of any political community but the result of specific and contingent social practices. Second and more problematically from the perspective developed here, all these approaches took territory for granted as a part of a theoretical framework for social analysis. Gottmann saw territory as a device through which community psychology
framed a milieu, Sack saw it as a way of explaining competition amongst social groups, and Agnew and Taylor saw it as one of the many spatial strategies of modern states. In other words, none of these engagements took territory as a historical concept, a collective invention of modern thought whose contingent intellectual path needed to be carefully accounted for. This theoretical blind spot would be noted and challenged by Stuart Elden.

1.1. 2. Elden’s Challenge: Territory as Political Technology

Why have we become inured to this sense of territory as something politically fixed and conceptually static?


In the late 2000s, the political theorist and geographer Stuart Elden inaugurated a paradigmatic shift in the treatment of territory. Drawing on critical interventions, such as Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’, Elden argued that territory had to be ‘conceived as a historically and geographically specific form of political organization and political thought’. For Elden, the ‘territorial trap’ called not only for opening up understandings of geographies of state action but for specifying territory as a historically produced concept, which informed social and institutional practices. Moving beyond the ‘territorial trap’ required deeper questioning of the historical process constituting the contemporary ‘banality of territory’. For Elden, this process had to be located in the techniques and knowledges that built ideas of territory into state practices. In a perceptibly Foucauldian project, Elden proposed to understand territory as a ‘political technology’.

This Foucauldian approach, it should be emphasized, came equipped to break significantly with approaches inspired by neo-Weberian or neo-Marxist historical sociology, such as in the works of Peter Taylor and John Agnew. These approaches focus on identifying major shifts in social structures by reference to institutional outcomes produced by social struggles. One of the perceived problems of these approaches is that they tend to project their frames of reference into the past,
impoverishing their historical accounts into a staged foretelling of idealized sociological structures such as ‘the territorial state’ or ‘capitalism’. By contrast, in a Foucauldian approach, shifts in social institutions are seen as intimately tied to episodes in intellectual history. This stems from Foucault’s creative use of philosophy of science to suggest that social change should be investigated by thinking of institutional practices as *political technologies*: activities with a conscious aim, informed by specific knowledges, executed through particular techniques, and reifying certain ways of seeing the world.\(^4^4\) In Foucault’s writings, examples of such political technologies can be seen in his discussions of prisons, clinics, asylums and states, where specific knowledges inform the technical arrangements of institutions and transform their targeted objects both in expected (i.e. reification) and unexpected ways (i.e. through creative resistance). In this perspective, intellectual history is transposed into social history by examining its influence on producing institutional apparatuses – ‘practical rationalities’ become ‘political technologies’, which in turn structure the social world anew.

In applying this approach to territory, Elden initially suggested that territory could be seen as a political technology because ‘it comprises techniques for measuring land and techniques for controlling terrain’.\(^4^5\) Following Foucault’s comments in the *Security, Territory, Population* lectures, Elden suggested that territory ought to be understood by reference to legal and administrative practices.\(^4^6\) At first glance, this broad view appears singularly well devised, especially for its integrative capacities. Thinking about territory through its constitutive technologies enabled a theoretical framework that could integrate the rich insights of critical cartography, legal scholarship and administrative history. Through the cartographic works such as those by Jeremy Crampton, Christian Jacob, Josef Konvitz and others, it would become possible to trace the relation between cartographic visualization and the reification of territory as an object of government.\(^4^7\) Through the legal scholarship of Lauren Benton, Andrew Fitzmaurice or Joshua Castellino and Steve Allen, it would be possible to reflect on how shifting legal norms and practices constituted territory as an object of specific juridical qualities.\(^4^8\) Through the administrative histories of territorial division and regional planning, the work by Michael Keating, Neil Brenner or Jeffrey Herbst could be shown to enrich territory with functional expectations in terms of bureaucratic compliance, economic growth and democratic representation.\(^4^9\) Integrating arguments
on the effect of these diverse ‘technical practices’ on the political reality of territory, Elden’s Foucauldian approach was nothing short of ambitious.

However, whilst Elden’s approach carried significant ambitions in re-thinking the institution of territory, his works sought to offer illustrative examples of this approach rather than a comprehensive historical sociology of territory. This spirit can be seen in Elden’s two main monographs on the subject: *Terror and Territory* and *The Birth of Territory*. In the first, Elden discussed how the political reality of territory was being altered through the ‘War on Terror’ and the deployment of new politico-legal arguments on territorial integrity and contingent sovereignty. In the second, *The Birth of Territory*, Elden traced a multitude of instances of ‘practical rationality’ transforming the political reality of territory from the Renaissance to the early Enlightenment. Examples of these included the role of Renaissance jurists Bartolus de Sassoferrato and Baldus de Ubaldis in first relating territory and jurisdiction and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s association of territory and sovereignty, in opposition to imperial majesty. In these instances, as in others, Elden emphasized these conceptual innovations as precipitated by the practical context of legal and diplomatic contests. Yet, in spite of Elden’s insistence on the entanglement of conceptual shifts with practical contexts, many commentators expressed dissatisfaction and surprise at *The Birth of Territory*’s focus on political texts, rather than institutional practices.50

A chorus of geographers such as John Agnew, Marco Antonsich and Natalie Koch criticized *The Birth of Territory* for an excessive preoccupation with textual exegesis and for trailing the recurrence of territory as a word rather than a socialised or institutionalised political reality. In Agnew’s assessment, although Elden offered an impressive ‘history of the concept of territory’, ‘what remained unsecured’ was ‘the relevance of this textual pathway to how ‘territory’ has actually figured in political practice’.51 To a certain extent, such critiques seemed to judge that *The Birth of Territory* had fallen short of its own Foucauldian framing of territory as ‘a bundle of political technologies’.52 Whilst Elden’s work considered shifts in the concept of territory in relation to juridical, political or diplomatic contests, this did not satisfy the expectations of a focus on the insidious deployment of ‘practical rationalities’ within new institutional apparatuses. On the other hand, however, Elden’s critics also placed significant emphasis on their perception of intellectual history as an unsatisfactory
endeavour. Insight as to the meaning of territory, they seemed to imply, could not possibly come from forgotten dusty old pages. In Agnew’s review, for instance, intellectual history was charged with being a method unsuited for social scientists, as it obstructed a proper appreciation of social history and undermined theoretical creativity.

Agnew’s charges against intellectual history built on two lines of argument. First, he argued that this method often eludes questioning as to whether its chosen texts are relevant ‘registers of experience’ with regard to their social contexts or, at least, overlooks how texts ‘enter into concrete experiences and affect the behaviour of elites and populations’.53 If failing to relate textual artifices to social effects, Agnew claimed that intellectual history subsides into studying ‘old ideas [that] actually never “took off”’.54 Second, he argued that this method often leads to ‘static nominalism’ – a fetishistic attention to prior meanings of terms rather than to their ‘applicability to contemporary theoretical problems’.55 For Agnew, this tendency leads scholars to an excessive focus on disembodied discourse as opposed to the (present) ‘ontology’ of the social world.56

Although these charges may well apply to some studies, they are, to my mind, unfair to intellectual history as a general approach on at least two counts. If one agrees with Agnew’s first charge that texts needs to be related to social significance then what is being disputed is not the validity of an intellectual history approach but whether given studies have sufficient relevance in the subjects they tackle. Within this charge is an admission that intellectual history can potentially explain certain changes in past social life and political practice. Second, Agnew’s charge that intellectual history obstructs theoretical creativity is disputable along several lines. To begin with, it ascribes an aim of ‘structural’ or ‘ontological’ social explanation, which is most often not part of intellectual historians’ pursuits. The focus of intellectual historians on ‘language’ or ‘epistemology’ is most often aimed at understanding what beliefs have contingently motivated social action or institutional practice. This aim does not imply the provision of macrosocial explanations of past or present politics, economics or social dynamics. Beyond this, the claim that intellectual history obstructs theoretical creativity is also problematic in that it seems to forget that ‘theory’ exists not only as part of explanatory devices but also as part of political language. In this manner, whilst
intellectual history is not primed to improve social theory’s ‘applicability’, it does enable a more critical attitude to the historically contingent epistemic qualities of its logics. Such critical attention to the linguistic contingency of theory is, to my mind, something that would enable more rigour, creativity and political sensibility in the construction of new social theories. Without this historicist attention, I wager, it is easier to lose insight into how language relates to its objects, rather than sustaining it.

Taking stock of both Elden’s arguments and those of his critics, I seek to push this debate forward by arguing for the pursuit of intellectual histories of territory. To do so, I sidestep Elden’s Foucauldian approach to avoid treating territory as a ‘concept and practice’ embodied in social institutions. By pursuing an intellectual history outside of a Foucauldian framework, my aim is to avoid collapsing intellectual history and social explanation into one analytical framework. Instead, I focus more narrowly on how territory has featured as an intellectual construct in written political thought. Such intellectual constructs are significant not only when they enter into institutional rationalities, but also when they motivate political action more broadly. My contention is that there is value in intellectual history, not because it can substitute social history or theories of social structure, but because it can show us how contingent beliefs about place have been creatively involved in social contests and have often been critical in justifications for or challenges to existing social orders. Ideas are not all powerful, but neither are they irrelevant. Territory, as part of our political language, is no exception.

1.2. Territory in the History of Political Thought

Putting aside Elden’s work, territory has thus far not been the subject of consistent study through intellectual history. The reason to pursue such study is precisely that ‘territory’ is not only an institutional reality, or a theoretical term in historical sociology, but that it is also an idea which has been rearticulated and transformed by a range of political thinkers. Territory, like sovereignty, citizenship or statehood, is both an institutional reality and a political imagination. As an ‘imagination’ or an intellectual construct, I will show that territory is far less fixed than Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’ suggests. Indeed, as Andrew Barry has noted, ‘rather than assume that the concept of territory is necessarily coupled to ideas of the nation-state or
sovereignty, there is a need to interrogate the *variability* of the concept of territory, *and its politics*.\(^5\)

Recovering forgotten arguments about territory is valuable for two key reasons. First, such a focus allows us a more pluralistic view of the past, one which emphasizes how different events and traditions have elicited rich argumentative struggles, full of inventions, subversions and shifts in ascribing form to social and political life. Second, and connectedly, given that territory is still a major focus of argument, recovering the palimpsests of discussions that have sought to inscribe it with meaning, following their logic in detail and understanding how they were addressed to their own social contexts, can serve as a valuable inspiration to pursue present debates with greater rigour and creativity. Given how much territory remains a subject of political debates around federalism, globalisation, nationalism, regionalism or environmentalism, it seems prescient for us to gain greater appreciation for the intellectual depth and tactical inventions of past political arguments.\(^5\) Be it in the context of the European Union’s territorial cohesion policies, the controversies around federalism in India and Nigeria, the struggles for indigenous rights in Latin America or the Occupy movement’s daring imaginations, the politics of territory are today as much a focus of contest as in the last centuries.\(^6\)

### 1.2.1. Intellectual History and the Spatial Turn

Beyond these broad motives, it is worth noting that the present intellectual environment is ripe for this enterprise. On one hand, as noted in the opening of this chapter, territory is now the subject of renewed theoretical questioning in political theory, historical sociology and geography. In these debates, pursuing an intellectual history of territory is an avenue that has just been opened up by Stuart Elden’s pioneering work. On the other hand, the ‘spatial turn’ in historical studies is particularly attuned to developing intellectual histories of territory.\(^6\) Until recently, this turn has fuelled three major directions: the use of geographical information systems (GIS) for spatializing historical visions, the development of environmental history and the focus on the geographies of knowledge and culture.\(^6\) Engagements with the spatial turn from the perspective of intellectual history, however, have
remained limited, leading scholars such as David Armitage to claim that ‘space is the last frontier of intellectual history’. In this context, an intellectual history of territory befits what Armitage and others see as the need for ‘historicizing conceptions of space’.

Whilst Armitage has highlighted how underleveraged intellectual histories of spatial concepts remain, it is necessary to acknowledge what scholarship has participated in this agenda before it was one. Within geography, for instance, the works of Clarence Glacken, Denis Cosgrove and Mark Bassin stand as valuable examples. Writing in the 1960s, Glacken devoted his *Traces on the Rhodian Shore* to examining how ideas of the natural environment figured in Western thought, from the Ancient Greeks until eighteenth-century figures such as the Comte de Buffon. Cosgrove, on the other hand, produced an important study on the idea of landscape in Western thought since the fifteenth century. Bassin, in turn, accompanied by Neil Smith, Gerry Kearns and others, has focused on the history of geopolitical thought, beginning with nineteenth-century thinkers such as Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer. Neighbouring geography, the philosopher Edward Casey has offered a compelling conceptual history of ‘place’ and ‘space’ from ancient times to postmodernism. Moreover, beyond these studies on particular ‘spatial concepts’, geography has also produced a wealth of literature on the intellectual histories of geographical thought more broadly. Among these, David Livingstone’s *The Geographical Tradition*, Robert Mayhew’s *Enlightenment Geography* and Chenxi Tang’s *The Geographical Imagination of Modernity* are particularly noteworthy examples.

Furthermore, in a vein closer to Armitage, it is important to recognize what openings intellectual historians have made towards historicizing conceptions of space, and their attendant politics. Annabel Brett, for instance, has shown how early modern natural law discussions around ‘civitas’ and ‘commonwealth’ can be reviewed through relating them to questions of political space. Be it in Francisco de Vittoria or Hugo Grotius’ writings, Brett suggests, the civitas or commonwealth was ‘unthinkable’ without reference to actual cities, as well as broader metaphysical unions. Through this approach, as Brett shows, the shift between ‘civitas’ applying to medieval cities and to early modern states can be appreciated more richly. Focusing on the same historical lineage, Anthony Pagden and Andrew Fitzmaurice have produced important
discussions of how early modern colonial empires furthered politico-legal debates on natural law, ‘occupation’ and territorial rights. Fitzmaurice, in particular, has offered fascinating discussion of how early modern defences of ‘occupation’ evolved in the context of nineteenth-century colonization. As Fitzmaurice shows, in the 1870s-1890s discussions of ‘international jurists’ such as Travers Twiss, Eugène Ortolan and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, a spatialized distinction between the ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ was used to fabricate the concept of *territorium nullius*. Beyond appeals to natural law, historians of political thought such as Duncan Bell have also begun to examine how conceptions of space were key in the making of late nineteenth-century imperialism. Focusing on Victorian intellectuals, Bell has shown how debates around imperial federation were informed by new arguments about the relations between politics, technology, race and space, be it in the writings of John R. Seeley, Edward A. Freeman or James A. Froude. Beyond the nineteenth century, Or Rosenboim has examined how ideas of globalism emerged in Anglo-American thought between 1939 and 1950. Armitage’s call, in short, does not lack resonance, though much remains to be done.

Few social scientists and historians, I imagine, would be ready to argue that ‘territory’ is an irrelevant concept in modern world politics. Yet, even as territory’s character as a critical concept seems to be globally assumed, its’ specific intellectual histories remain vaguely drawn. Most often, as argued above, social scientists fall back onto macrosociological theories and assume that territory’s modern meaning evolved immanently to the ‘rise of the modern state’ after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. As many historicist scholars have argued, this is unsatisfactory as it ignores both how *territorium* was employed as a politico-legal concept in city-states in Renaissance Europe, but also how most of the modern intellectual concern with territory seems to have gained currency only from the late eighteenth century onward. As it is suggested by a Google ngram statistical test on the recurrence of the terms ‘territory’, ‘territories’ and ‘territorial’ in Anglophone publications from 1500 to 2000, a much more complicated set of stories remain to be understood (see Figure 1). Whilst sharp increases in the term’s usage appear around the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) and the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), what is more striking is that the term accrues continuous growth only after the 1750s until it peaks in the 1910s and 1940s.
Interestingly, this general trend is paralleled if the same test is operated on French-, Spanish- or German-language publications.\textsuperscript{75} Evidently, this offers next to no answers in understanding how the term was used, in which contexts and to what effects. It does nevertheless suggest a puzzle in need of explanation. ‘Territory’ seems to have been part of a growing number of discussions in the long nineteenth-century. What were these exchanges and what can they teach us about the modern meanings of territory? This thesis seeks to participate in that much broader and uncharted investigation.

Territory, I have argued until here, ought to be studied as an intellectual construct with a history. Theoretically, the motives to do this stem from the manner in which new literatures on territory have remained trapped within the limited historicism of normative and sociological accounts. Pragmatically, studying the intellectual history of territory is inspired by the need for more open and pluralistic imaginations in contemporary political debates around territorial reforms. Historically, at last, this study is encouraged by the growing attention to the historicity of spatial concepts within Anglo-American intellectual history. With these motives in place, I now turn to the specificities of method.

\textbf{Figure 1. Ngram of 'Territory' in Anglophone publications from 1500 to 2000.}
1.2.2. Method: Becoming a Wary Interpreter

Territory, I have claimed, needs to be studied as a *political imagination*. To study it as such, I draw mostly on the methodological sensitivities of the ‘Cambridge School of Intellectual History’ and engage with territory as an intellectual construct that has taken shape through specific written arguments. Though I am sympathetic to a Foucauldian approach, I do not adopt it here because my aim is to avoid collapsing social and intellectual history into one framework of analysis. Following the guidance of scholars such as Quentin Skinner, Richard Whatmore and Kari Palonen, I focus more narrowly on showing how past texts can be read as situated interventions, whose arguments are best understood as ‘speech-acts’ addressed at their original social and intellectual circumstances. Understanding texts in this way implies several theoretical commitments. Drawing on the linguistic theories of John Austin, John Searle and Ludwig Wittgenstein, an understanding of texts as ‘speech acts’ implies analysing them as conscious interventions by individual actors who are constrained by and operate within at a structured epistemic context (or in Wittgenstein’s expression ‘a language game’). What is key here is that the *use of language* by particular agents should be read as consciously purposive, and that its purpose can only be gleaned effectively through careful attention to its particular speech context. This context, as Annabel Brett notes, should be thought of broadly, not only in linguistic terms but also in terms of ‘a specific political situation, a social or cultural milieu, an institutional context like a courtroom’. This broad conception of context is helpful precisely because it allows better judgments of what might have been the intended meanings of given texts.

Although this approach may seem overly concerned with understanding the motives of individual interventions, it is important to acknowledge how this refashions historicist views of epistemic context. First, because context is to be gleaned outwards from the specific thinkers and texts, it is more easily seen as *situated* rather than boundless. In this manner, there needs to be no structurally assumed doctrinal influence, no inescapable canon nor epochal *episteme*. Instead, by building outwards from the evidence available on each thinker, a better sense of intellectual milieus and networks of ideas is incrementally formed. Second, given that ‘speech-acts’ can be...
shown to be referred to by others, epistemic contexts can be seen as unevenly transformed by conflicting creative interventions. As noted by Stefan Collini:

[It] is no accident that intellectual historians so often refer to debates, controversies, arguments, exchanges and so on […] no writer or thinker creates the language they use de novo, and language is a social practice that expresses and is shaped by a collective history.

These theoretical positions, in turn, yield a set of methodological sensitivities in their interpretative tactics. As argued by Skinner, these tactics should be devised to avoid entangling our interpretations with unreasonable expectations, which would be at the cost of understanding a given text closer to its own terms. In a famous essay, for instance, Skinner warned against three sources of recurrent misinterpretation: (i) assuming a ‘doctrine’ was to be found in every thinker; (ii) assuming that any given text should be interpreted ‘in the interests of extracting a message of maximum coherence’, and (iii) projecting future concepts into past texts. Beyond these three ‘mythological’ tendencies in the reading of past texts, Skinner insisted on the importance of interpreting texts closer to their own terms instead of forcing them into reductive and teleological readings which assumed all texts as commensurable interventions on certain ‘perennial problems’ in the history of thought.

Beyond Skinner’s prescient recommendations, it is necessary to outline the more granular aspects of interpretative tactics used in this thesis. Having decided to centre my attention on three main thinkers, the first stage of my approach was to ‘map the corpus’. This stage included reading relevant intellectual biographies – to situate a thinker’s social context; and, more importantly survey the entirety of their published works – to gain a sense of recurring themes and the breadth of considered questions. With Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, for example, this included reading the key works of Pierre Haubtmann, Steven K. Vincent, and Edward Castleton as well as surveying over forty volumes of Proudhon’s collected works and correspondence. In this lengthy initial stage, I increasingly gained a sense of which texts to engage with for a deeper analysis, as well as which intellectual ‘contexts’ to be most attentive to (especially according to intellectual biographies).
In a second stage, I focused on ‘locating chosen texts’. Here I read chosen texts carefully and sought to locate core arguments, targeted audiences and operative sources. To a certain extent, this stage was influenced by a medieval hermeneutical device, the ‘accessus ad auctores’, which sought to locate a text by asking a set of core questions. As typified by Wolfgang Detel, the accessus most often focused on:

(i) Who (is the author) (quis/persona)?
(ii) What (is the subject matter of the text) (quid/materia)?
(iii) Why (was the text written) (cur/causa)?
(iv) How (was the text composed) (quomodo/modus)?
(v) When (was the text written or published) (quando/tempus)?
(vi) Where (was the text written or published) (ubi/loco)?
(vii) By what means (was the text written or published) (quibus faculatibus/facultas)?

Inspired by this heuristic device, I crafted my own schematized accessus to each chosen text, adding two ‘questions’, namely ‘what literature is most referred to, where and to what effect’; and ‘how does this text relate to the author’s prior texts’. The purpose of this exercise was not to fix an interpretative framework a priori, but rather to build a broad sense of the ‘speech context’ of a given text.

In a third stage, I devoted what critical capacities I could muster to ‘analysing arguments’. Here, inspired by Skinner and others, I focused closely on critical passages and considered how retracing their uses of language could account for how a line of reasoning delivered certain polemic objectives, often through subversive reference to other arguments. Thus, for example, with detailed attention, this phase allowed me not only to notice Petr Kropotkin’s passing references to Romantic Historians but also to become keenly aware of their sophisticated purpose in his arguments against territorial states. In sum, this phase provided the critical moment in my approach, as it yielded the core substance of my own interpretative arguments. Throughout these stages, I should emphasize, my aim was to sustain focus rather than comfortably fix an interpretative framework. Wary of sliding into one of Skinner’s ‘mythologies’, I sought to actively rely as closely as possible on textual evidence (rather than presumed doctrine), as well as build on my own doubt to stay attentive as
to the limited merits of my proposed interpretations. At several points, I had to play
off different contextual frames and argumentative transcriptions against one another
before I became satisfied with the grounds and limitations of my chosen interpretation.
Put summarily, my three-stage methodological approach followed the below scheme
(Figure 2).

\textbf{Figure 2. Schema of Methodological Process}

In addition, because my approach was centred on identifying arguments \textit{about
territory}, I had to exercise caution to avoid unduly reading this concern \textit{into} the text.
To avoid slipping into the problem of self-serving projections, I employed two tactics.
At one level, I remained attentive to the recurrence of the term and the question of
how it was signified. This followed Elden’s warnings as to the dangers of assuming a
stable or clear word-concept relation when pursuing a conceptual history of territory.
Drawing on Reinhart Koselleck’s \textit{Begriffsgeschichte}, Elden notes how a term like
‘territory’ is often used vaguely to signify land or terrain, rather than to denote any of
its modern political qualities as a ‘state space’.\textsuperscript{85} At a second level, following Skinner’s
advice, I attempted to gauge the author’s meaning by following the specific use of the
term in situated arguments. Although not exhausting reasonable doubt of what authors
might have thought the term to signify, this did give a stable sense of its usage in a
given linguistic context. As per any interpretation, my aim was to situate and mobilize,
rather than ignore or deny, the bounds of reasonable doubt as to ‘what was meant’.
Lastly, in terms of archival resources, the research drew from a series of digital archives.\textsuperscript{86} The digital archives consulted included GALLICA (BNF), the Amsterdam International Institute Social History (IISH), Archive.org, Google Books, ArchivesAutonomie.org, Anarchy Archives, HathiTrust, the Freedom Press Newspaper Archive, Osmikon.de, and the Besançon Municipal Archives. For the purposes of the thesis, using these platforms was suitable because they included access to the collected works and correspondence of Proudhon and Bakunin, as well as the majority of Kropotkin’s books, pamphlets and newspaper articles. Beyond these digital archives, it would have been fruitful to delve into the non-digitized collections held at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) in Moscow, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris, and the Besançon Municipal Archives.\textsuperscript{87} The amount of material digitally available, however, precluded the time necessary to visit these additional resources. Moreover, it should be noted that the use of digital archives made textual analysis more manoeuvrable and facilitated access to the co-textual works referenced in the selected texts. Below is a table specifying key sources accessed through digital archival research (Figure 3). Having outlined what sensitivities and processes structured my method, I now turn to why I chose to focus on the texts of three anarchist thinkers spanning the nineteenth century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Primary Materials</th>
<th>Archival Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Oeuvres Posthumes</em>, 7 Vols.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Correspondance</em>, 14 Vols.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Papiers, BNF.</td>
<td>NAF 18255-18262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Besançon.</td>
<td>MS 2802-2982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Archives Bakouwène</em>, IISH</td>
<td>CD-ROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropotkin’s books and pamphlets in English</td>
<td>Archive.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropotkin’s books and pamphlets in French</td>
<td>Gallica.bnf.fr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kropotkin’s books and pamphlets in Russian</td>
<td>Osmikon.de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kropotkin’s Letters [Perepiska]</em>, 2 Vols., 1857-1871</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Le Révolté</em>, 1887-1894.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>La Révolte</em>, 1879-1885.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Nineteenth Century</em>, 1883-1919.</td>
<td>Archive.org</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Press Newspaper Archive, 1890s-1910s.</td>
<td>Freedomnews.org.uk/archive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mother Earth</em>, 1906-1918.</td>
<td>Anarchy Archives [dwardmac.pitzer.edu]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3. Main Archival Materials Consulted.*
1.3. The Politics of Territory in Anarchist Thought

My rationale to focus on the political thought of three anarchists in the nineteenth century stemmed from a double intuition: (i) that the nineteenth century was a key period for the intellectual construction of territory; and (ii) that anarchist thinkers, as dissenters, would provide a rich vantage point on the imaginations at contest. This intuition, of course, was not without its sources. In choosing the nineteenth century, I was seeking to address the diffuse emphasis that social scientists and historians have placed on this period as the epoch in which the modern territorial state emerged and took over the world (see Chapter 2). In choosing to focus on territory in anarchist thought, I sought to tap into the resurgent interest in anarchist studies since the days of the Occupy movement. More particularly, I was motivated by two sets of literature: anarchist geographies and intellectual histories of anarchism. The first interested me for its claims about anarchist theories of territory, the second for its efforts to demystify the anarchist tradition.

1.3.1. Anarchist Geographies and the Question of Territory

The Occupy Wall Street movement was a watershed moment in this general process of awakening, which some are calling an ‘anarchist turn’ […] but perhaps, more appropriately, [it] should be thought of as a return, given that Peter Kropotkin, Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Elisée Reclus all proved the worth of anarchism over a century ago.

Simon Springer, in ‘Space, time, and the politics of immanence’, 2014.88

In the years since Occupy, a growing group of scholars has revived interest in anarchism. Be they from philosophy, sociology, anthropology, pedagogy or politics, a new generation of authors has been assembling a myriad of publications on how to draw new insights from this marginal tradition.89 Within this revival, geography has been no exception, with scholars such as Simon Springer, Anthony Ince and Federico Ferretti contributing to this literature.90 Springer, the most vocal proponent of this revival, has argued for the need to ‘return anarchist studies to the centre of geography’s
disciplinary map’, and to displace the dominance of Marxist approaches. Drawing on the authority of Elisée Reclus and Petr Kropotkin, Springer argues that an engagement with anarchist writings would attune the discipline to better analyses of spatial domination as well as to better acknowledge actually existing projects of ‘spatial emancipation’ based on radical solidarity and naturalism. Unsurprisingly, Springer’s unrepentant optimism about the prospects of anarchist geographies has been regarded by some as romantic and uncritical.

Within this growing literature, whether in the lively polemics of Simon Springer or the social geographies of Anthony Ince and others, what caught my attention was the idea of an ‘anarchist theory’ of spatiality, with references to ‘territory’ playing a central role. First, within the social geographies of Ince and others, an appeal was made to appreciate the ways in which social movements increasingly used ‘grassroots territorial agency’ in unsettling ‘dominant territorial regimes and discourses’. Reflecting on his participant observation of two ‘anarchistic’ squatted social centres in 2000s London, Ince argued that their uses of space ought to be understood as a form of prefigurative politics. In these politics, establishing autonomous clusters outside of market and authoritarian relations was argued to build a vision of a world of fluid territorializations and decentralized direct democracy. This stood in contrast to the ‘sovereign establishment of calculable space for the purposes of bureaucratic efficiency and control’. Such claims for the transformative potential of ‘grassroots territorial agency’, it should be noted, resonated greatly with the political languages of the Occupy movement, Latin American social movements and indigenous politics. This commonality has been noted by other geographers such as Sam Halvorsen, Victoria Habermehl, Nick Clare, Paul Routledge and Joe Bryan.

Beyond this appeal to understand ‘grassroots territorial agency’, anarchist geographers such as Simon Springer have made even greater claims as to the possibilities of an anarchist theory of spatiality. Anarchism, Springer has argued, is primed to develop new conceptions of space as immanent to everyday social relations and ecology. Drawing on Elisée Reclus’ ‘universal geography’ and Petr Kropotkin’s ‘mutual aid’, Springer has argued that anarchist theory can break out of enduring statist assumptions by recognizing humanity’s ‘irreducible entanglement in the web of life’ and refusing to believe that social and ecological relations function hierarchically.
theoretical shift, Springer has claimed, new paths would be opened towards a praxis supporting geographical organization based on ‘an ethic of empathy’. At the heart of such visions, what seemed at play was a dichotomy between two idealized forms of spatiality: the statist or authoritarian ‘rigid territorial bindings’ contra the anarchist or grassroots ‘decentralized system of self-governed communes of all sizes’. What was more surprising was that Springer’s commitment to this dichotomous view was explicitly justified as a continuation of the prophetic and dateless wisdom of classical anarchists such as Elisée Reclus, Petr Kropotkin, Mikhail Bakunin or Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. In referring to Proudhon and Bakunin for example, Springer claimed that they held ‘a tacit geographical framework’, whilst Kropotkin and Reclus’s ‘anarchist vision’ was said to be ‘rooted in geography’.

Such statements undoubtedly betrayed what Skinner would call a ‘mythological’ view of anarchism. In assuming a doctrinal coherence between all anarchists, a perennial character to the problems they addressed and projecting concepts onto past texts, Springer limited the purview for a conceptually deep and historically attuned engagement with the anarchist tradition. In spite of this, his insistence on how creatively classical anarchist thinkers conceived of territory begged the question as to whether this concern figured in these nineteenth-century texts, and if so, how was it argued about? To answer such questions, however, what was necessary was not an ‘anarchist spirit’, but an approach to these texts through the tools of contextualist intellectual history. This is precisely the task of this thesis.

1.3.2. Intellectual Histories and Demystifying the Anarchist Tradition

From the nineteenth century to today, anarchists have been the target of many lurid stereotypes. Dubbed as wayward idealists, nihilistic terrorists, political savages or toothless rebels, anarchists have been the focus of mythologized representations. Such a plethora of images, often promoted by its detractors, has often led to ‘anarchism’ being envisaged as a rogue and irrational tradition, unworthy of sustained scholarly scrutiny in terms of its political thought. Yet, where ‘anarchism’ has been studied with some measure of sympathy, mythological readings have also been the norm rather than the exception. In recent years, however, led by the work of scholars
such as Ruth Kinna, Matthew Adams and others, growing attention has been given to the need to examine anarchist thought more rigorously and historically.\textsuperscript{106} It is on such approaches that this research builds its critical relation with narrating the anarchist tradition.

In a flagship article, Matthew Adams has argued that the need for intellectual histories results from (i) the hitherto predominance of ‘political theory’ approaches to ‘anarchism’, and (ii) the focus on the social history of anarchist movements.\textsuperscript{107} On the first grounds, Adams argued that from Paul Eltzbacher’s 1900 \textit{Anarchism}, through George Woodcock’s influential 1962 \textit{Anarchism}, to George Crowder’s 1991 \textit{Classical Anarchism}, narrations of the anarchist tradition have relied on focusing on a handful of ‘canonical’ thinkers and presenting these as engaged in a coherent doctrine and focused on certain perennial questions.\textsuperscript{108} This canonical fixture, as Adams noted, has latched onto Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin as the triad at the heart of anarchism, with the irregular additions of Leo Tolstoy, Max Stirner and William Godwin. Given the great number of influential anarchist writers this has been unnecessarily reductive, and one might add, androcentric and Eurocentric.

Beyond the problem of this ‘rather hermetic pantheon of key thinkers’, these accounts of anarchism have tended to dehistoricize anarchist ideas, presenting them more as part of a response to a philosophical view of society and human nature than to contingent political realities and debates.\textsuperscript{109} Woodcock, for example, argued that the perennial problem of all anarchists was the ‘replacement of the authoritarian state by some form of non-governmental cooperation between free individuals’.\textsuperscript{110} In such views, as Adams has noted, ‘concepts like “freedom” become static, something that makes sense across temporal and spatial contexts and can be translated between cultures with ease’.\textsuperscript{111} In this manner, ‘political theory’ accounts of anarchism have led to an unhelpful constriction of the intellectual depth and historical contingency of texts included in the anarchist canon. To Adams and others, this constricted view continues to manifest itself today in the postanarchist accounts of Saul Newman and others.\textsuperscript{112} One answer to the problem of this (mis)interpretative fixture, as followed by Matthew Adams, Ruth Kinna, Carissa Honeywell and Dave Berry, has been to study how ‘the canon’ came to be produced and reproduced, especially in post-1945 canon-making texts such as George Woodcock’s and others.\textsuperscript{113}
Beyond the paucity of historicism in these political theory accounts, Adams also argued that the impetus for intellectual histories of anarchism has been unwittingly sapped by social histories of anarchism. Emerging in the 1970s, and driven by scholars such as David Goodway and Carl Levy, social histories of anarchism shifted focus from discussions of anarchism as a political philosophy to a historical investigation of the life of anarchist mass movements. At the core of such scholarship lay a focus on the activities of anarchist networks, their involvement with trade unions and syndicalism, with social campaigns, with ‘free’ schools and cultural movements. Early examples of such studies included John Hart’s Anarchism and The Mexican Working Class, 1830-1931, Temma Kaplan’s Anarchists of Andalusia, 1868-1903, and Jean Maitron’s Le mouvement anarchiste en France.

Initiated in the 1970s, social histories of anarchism have continued to blossom with the recent scholarship of Constance Bantman, Kirwin Shaffer and others, articulating a renewed interest through the paradigm of a ‘transnational turn’. This turn, as the name suggests, builds on examining the social histories of anarchist networks beyond the methodological confines of national context. Such social histories, it ought to be emphasized, have had immense value. Paying attention to specific political contests and social practices, this scholarship has gradually recovered an attention to the contingencies of anarchist political action. Empirically, these studies have privileged a productive attention to the pamphlets, meetings, and other ephemera produced by anarchist movements. Geographically, they expanded from familiar European or national contexts to a transnational approach, with especially productive results in the context of Latin America.

For the agenda of intellectual histories of anarchism, the predominance of social history offers substantial benefits. First, its consideration of movements breaks with the hermetic focus on a handful of prophetic thinkers. In this manner, studies of anarchist movements in Latin America offer not only a new emphasis on a working class milieu, but also on a range of understudied anarchist thinkers, such as Fábio Luz, Manuel González Prada or Enrique Creci. Second, by paying attention to transnational networks, intellectual milieus and ephemeral media, this approach enables a more contextualized texture to the production and consumption of ‘great texts’, which could otherwise be read in a more rootless fashion. As Matthew Adams
argues, such studies enable understanding of the political cultures that underpinned the writing of different anarchist texts.\textsuperscript{118}

Yet, for all these benefits, the predominance of social histories of anarchism has also somewhat sapped the impetus for intellectual history by paying little attention to the intellectual lineages of anarchist writings outside their immediate political milieu. In this manner, although social histories of anarchism have revealed a plethora of anarchist writings and their immediate motivating contexts, they have foreclosed questions as to the intellectual content and context of these texts. Such analysis is important insofar as a deeper understanding of this tradition of political thought can be produced, both in terms of canonical texts hitherto treated ahistorically and in terms of texts beyond the canon. This task is the purview of intellectual history.

Building on this background, this thesis contributes to the demystification of anarchism by engaging with the thought of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin through the question of territory. Given that I have just criticized the limitations of a canonical focus this may seem a strange choice. I make it for three reasons. First, though I focus on these thinkers, my aim is not to treat them as philosophically commensurate, as part of a perennial ideological crucible or as wholly representative of an anarchist doctrine. Indeed, my approach is wary of these mythological trappings and reads each of these thinkers in relation to whichever intellectual contexts can be empirically shown to influence them. In this manner, rather than assuming these thinkers display an ‘anarchist philosophy’, I consider them primarily in their own terms. This means that throughout the text, I maintain radical scepticism as to what extent these thinkers can be productively understood by reference to a common anarchist canon.

Second, I focus on these thinkers because although they have been the token protagonists of the anarchist canon, they have not yet been sufficiently studied through the methods of intellectual history. This is patently obvious, for instance, when it is noted that most studies of their thought have not had recourse to expansive collections of their works. Whilst canonized, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin thus remain superficially understood in anarchist literature and, more importantly, in mainstream scholarship. Following Kari Palonen’s arguments, I see the endeavour undertaken here as part of enriching mainstream accounts of the history of political thought by
engaging with a ‘history of losers’, which recasts bygone contests anew and complicates the inherited visions of history’s victors.119

Third, given I began by addressing the post-2011 ‘anarchist’ imaginations of territory, examining these three thinkers was part of the process of calling into question their mythological legacy. By taking the approach of intellectual history, I have taken aim at the distorted readings that deploy decontextualized quotes to suggest that these foundational thinkers shared the same critique of overbearing ‘territorial’ states and the same vision of socialist federalism enlivened through small-scale territorial autonomy. My aim in this is not to discredit those who have made these rhetorical appeals, but rather to show the contingency and richness of the arguments these past thinkers actually entertained. In understanding past imaginations rigorously and historically, my point is, to use Skinner’s phrase, that ‘rather than looking for directly applicable “lessons” in the history of philosophy, we shall do better to learn to do our thinking for ourselves’.120

**Conclusion**

Territory, I have argued in this chapter, ought to be studied as an intellectual construct with a contingent history. Countering the dominance of sociological theories that understand territory as part of spatial frameworks of social analysis, I have argued that territory needs to be taken seriously as a modern political concept, whose collective imagination stems from intellectual contests. To study territory in this manner, this chapter also outlined the methodological commitments embedded into this thesis. Drawing on the ‘Cambridge School of Intellectual History’, the chapter explained what interpretative tactics were employed in engaging past texts to retrace the intellectual trajectories of ‘territory’ in political thought. This approach, I have argued, is particularly valuable in its attention to how thinkers devised texts as purposive ‘speech-acts’ aimed at shifting situated epistemic contexts and their attendant politics.

Taking from this methodological disposition, I also argued that recent claims as to a perennial ‘anarchist’ view of territory ought to be faced with caution. To understand what past ‘anarchists’ thought about territory, I claimed, it is best to take a radically
skeptical view of those canonical fixtures that ascribe a coherent and transhistorical doctrine to their key thinkers. Rather than assume this mythological view, I argue it is necessary to take each thinker in terms of his original context and contingency. This approach, moreover, is valuable not only to construct a plural, deeper and open-ended understanding of the anarchist tradition but also in that it enables more productive dialogues with intellectual history at large. Thus, in examining what arguments about territory recurred in the writings of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin, this thesis stands not only to upset the mythological notion of an anarchist theory of territory, but also to enrich intellectual histories of territory in nineteenth-century political thought. To mark how these thinkers contrasted and connected with these broader rivers of thought, the next chapter offers a survey of how ‘territory’ figured in the intellectual contexts of their times.
Chapter 2. Territory in the Long Nineteenth Century

If, as Stuart Elden suggests, the ‘birth of territory’ can be narrated in lineages from the Renaissance rediscovery of Roman law to Enlightenment theories of sovereignty, then the long nineteenth century should be seen as territory’s ‘coming of age’.¹ For if ‘territory’ was first proposed as an ‘essential’ feature of sovereignty in the post-Westphalian European eighteenth-century, it was in the long nineteenth century – from the Atlantic Revolutions to the aftermath of the First World War – that territory gained its modern conceptual valence, becoming central to conceptions of statehood, nationhood, world order and social theory.² Through nineteenth-century political thought, ‘territory’ progressed from a relatively limited element of arguments on sovereignty to extensive use in arguments about public power, cultural identity and civilization. In co-constitution with this discursive shift, the nineteenth century saw a succession of state-led efforts to erode a pre-modern world of enclaves, overlapping jurisdictions, non-state authorities and unknown spaces.³ In its stead, a world of territorial states was in the making, where all terrestrial geography would be portioned into rationalized closed units of rule. This was, in James Scott’s phrase, the beginning of ‘the last [political] enclosure’, bringing all peoples and places under economic and political domination through a spatially regularised governance.⁴

This chapter offers a survey of territory’s longue durée intellectual history in the nineteenth century.⁵ Inevitably, as any survey, this paints an illustrative rather than exhaustive landscape. This chapter focuses on three ‘moments’ which redefined European political conceptions of territory. The three contexts engaged with surround the events of French Revolution, the Spring of Nations and the Industrial Revolution. In relation to these events, this chapter seeks to show how different intellectual traditions and situated texts contested and shifted the meaning of territory. In particular, the chapter focuses on three loose intellectual movements: ‘modern republicanism’, ‘romantic nationalism’ and ‘positivism’. Beyond indicating broader controversies around territory in nineteenth-century thought, this chapter’s narrative is also tied to ‘setting the intellectual scene’ against which our three writers intervened. In this manner, while later chapters trace the intellectual lineages specific to each
thinker’s arguments, this chapter aims to offer a broader sense of what political imaginations of territory were at play in nineteenth-century thought. Given this contextualizing purpose, the survey in this chapter foregrounds French, German, British and Russian intellectual contexts, the linguistic milieus in which Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin were most involved. This, undoubtedly, results in a Europeanist narrative, which says little about arguments about territory in the political thought of the Americas, India or the Far East. This limitation notwithstanding, it is hoped that the survey presented here can inspire future research concerning controversies about territory in nineteenth-century thought.

Within these limitations, the chapter proceeds in three parts, each in turn divided internally. In its first part, the chapter engages with controversies about territory unleashed by the French Revolution, namely around the administrative redistricting of France and the demarcation of territorial sovereignty and private property. At the core of these discussions was republican and rationalist preoccupation with substituting feudal arbitrariness with an equitable order. In its second part, the chapter engages with Romanticism and its re-signification of territory through new arguments about nationhood. In particular, emphasis is placed on how these imaginaries were used to both legitimate and attack the order established by the 1815 Congress of Vienna. In its third part, the chapter discusses the relations between technological and scientific improvement and new arguments about territory from the perspectives of industrial enthusiasts and positivist social theorists. Here, emphasis is given to the innovative ways in which territory came to be thought of as immanent to economic networks and social structures.

2.1. Through the Gates of Revolution: Reason and Republicanism, 1789-1825

In a daring and forgotten book, the French Marxist Paul Alliès claimed that the French Revolution marked the beginning of a political ideology that ‘fetishized’ territory. This ideology, he wrote, resulted from the revolutionary elites’ eagerness to legitimize the republic without recourse to the political language of the Ancien Régime. Such an ‘ideology’, Alliès claimed, had waxed and waned on discursive tropes surrounding
national sovereignty, unity and indivisibility, natural borders and rational order, thus positioning territory as a key field of political action. In spite of this, Alliès warned, the novelty of this ‘territorial ideology’ should be regarded suspiciously given that its rhetorical tropes and practical reforms traded heavily on projects initiated in the Absolutist period. To a certain extent, this assessment seems uncontroversial. As shown by Keith Baker and others, the political languages of the Revolution flowed from contesting discourses that emerged from within the elite of Absolutist France, be it in the case of parliamentarian discourses of constitutionalism, of republican discourses of natural rights and virtue, or Physiocratic discourses of reason and administrative reform. On the other hand, however, Alliès’s statement can be seen as misleading, as it suggests that the Revolution’s discursive returns to territory were a mere fetish of ideology - a symbolic fixation undeserving of careful attention.

Paying attention to both pre-revolutionary lineages and revolutionary debates themselves, this section argues that the French Revolution transformed the concept of territory radically. First, combining Physiocratic rationalist and classical republican languages, the Revolution re-signified territory as an object of rational representative government. Second, drawing on the language of natural rights and legal humanism, the Revolution demarcated territorial sovereignty and private property. In both instances, these transformations stemmed from the Constituent Assembly’s efforts to abolish feudalism, an agenda first enunciated in the feverish night of 4 August of 1789. Whilst the agenda of republican spatial reorganization is best captured by the process of ‘departmentalization’ and the thought of the Abbé Sieyès in 1789-1790, the agenda of property is more winding, beginning with the creation of the biens nationaux and ending with the Code Napoléon of 1804. Discussion of these controversies is particularly indebted to two seminal works: Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier’s La Formation des Départements and Rafe Blaufarb’s The Great Demarcation.
2.1.1. *La Formation des Départements*: Equality, Reason and National Representation

The kingdom is one and indivisible; its territory is divided into eighty-three departments, every department into districts, every district into cantons.

Article I, Title 2 of the French Constitution of 1789.¹⁰

On the night of 4 August 1789, a febrile Constituent Assembly initiated the French Revolution by declaring ‘the Abolition of Feudalism’. In the days following this fateful night, the Assembly would issue a series of decrees against seigniorial rights and ecclesiastic tithes. Moved by the immediate concern of saving France from financial difficulty, these decrees focused on abolishing the Ancien Régime’s corporate fiscal privileges. Amongst the August decrees, Article 10 proclaimed the end of ‘all particular privileges given to certain provinces, districts, cities, cantons and communes’ and that ‘every part of France is equal’.¹¹ Within a month of this decree, the Constituent Assembly would commission a Constitutional Committee to execute ‘the equality’ of all parts of France by proposing a new administrative division of the kingdom.¹² By February 1790, after merely six months of work and debate, the Constitutional Committee had projected a division of France into 81 almost equally sized departments, each divided into nine cantons, all with fixed boundaries and local capitals (see Figure 4). For some European observers, such as the Whig parliamentarian Edmund Burke, this rapid and geometric re-drawing of the kingdom signalled a flight of rationalist folly, where a group of imprudent politicians arbitrarily quartered time-tested provincial bodies.¹³
To understand this re-constitution of France, however, it is necessary to move beyond the striking character of its geometrical fiat and focus on what informed the works of the Constitutional Committee. At stake in the formation of the departments were two questions: how to enable a uniform administration, and how to secure the basis for representative government. This double objective reflected the concerns of two of the Committee’s leading personalities, the abbot Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès and the lawyer Jacques Guillaume Thouret. Such concerns are well represented in texts such as Sieyès’s *Observations on the Report of the Constitution’s Committee* or Thouret’s *Report on the bases of Proportional Representation*.14

The first of these questions was indebted to reformist wings of the *Ancien Régime*, who had sought to overcome the labyrinthine fiscal, judicial and administrative subdivisions of feudal France.15 Drawing continuity from projects of administrative regularisation by Physiocrats such as Guillaume-François Le Trosne, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and René Louis de Voyer de Paulmy d’Argenson, the Committee saw its mission as vital to enable a more efficient system of taxation, circulation and wealth creation.16 To achieve these aims, reforms had to tackle two twin problems: the multiplicity of administrative divisions of different purposes (i.e. the *Généralités*, the *Gouvernements*, the *Dioceses*, the *Balliages*) and the array of provincial and corporatist privileges embedded in *Ancien Régime* divisions.17 The issue of administrative uniformisation was thus not only integrating governmental functions but also countering provincial interests, the much-maligned *esprit de corps* and *esprit de clocher*.18 In this sense, the pursuit of administrative regularisation was also a pursuit of the centralization of power.

Paradoxically, however, the Constitutional Committee understood its projected re-organization of France as an effort towards centralization and decentralization.19 This seeming paradox stemmed from the Committee’s second aim: to secure the basis for representative government. As expressed by Thouret, the primary aim of the Constitutional Committee was to provide ‘a fixed and simple order for elections’ and ‘establish proportional equality in representation’ so that stability, justice and liberty could be guaranteed in France’s new political order.20 In this light, the formation of departments was understood as a means to organize primary assemblies rationally
throughout the country so that the National Assembly could claim to represent the national will.

Bypassing the representative order of *Ancien Régime* corporatism, the Committee framed its agenda as enabling equality among all citizens, national unity and a government driven by reason. This vision, akin to modern constitutions, had its roots in Sieyès’s permutations of Rousseau’s republican language.  

21 Extending Rousseau’s concerns to create polities based on civic equality and liberty, regenerated morals and the exercise of a ‘general will’, Sieyès saw the formation of the departments as a means to form a representative system that would ‘make all parts of France into one Body, and all the Peoples that divide it, one Nation’.  

22 In this light, the geometric departmentalization of France was not merely a moment of mathematical symbolism but a creative measure that saw an integration of administrative and representative units as the means to enable the emergence of a large-scale republican society. In sum, the departmentalization of France though in continuity with Absolutist preoccupations with the homogenization of space and centralization of power, incremented the concept of territory by defending its division to be only legitimate if enabling representative government and national unity through geographically rationalized constituent power.
2.1.2. The Great Demarcation: Territory and Property beyond Feudality

The territory of France, in all its extent, is free as the people who inhabit it.

Article I, of the Code Rural of 1791.23

Beyond the departmentalization of France, the ‘abolition of feudalism’ of August 1789 had a second significant consequence: the disentanglement of territorial sovereignty and private property from the domanial, seigniorial and feudal rights of Ancien Régime.
law. As argued by Rafe Blaufarb in his magisterial *The Great Demarcation*, this disentanglement sought to abolish private ownership of public power and to depurate landholding from hierarchical feudal obligations. Motivated by powerful peasant uprisings, this program drew, to some extent, from the languages of legal reform already present in the work of Humanist jurists such as Charles Loyseau (1564-1627). Loyseau’s legacy for the revolutionary legal inventions was double. First, his distinction between ‘seigneurie privée’ and ‘seigneurie publique’ enabled an agenda of separation of public power from private property. Second, his distinction of ‘seigneurie directe’ and ‘seigneurie utile’ within *seigneurie privée* formed a key background to revolutionary discussions of tenural landholding and the distinction between possession and property. Together with Robert-Joseph Pothier’s *Traité du Domaine de la Propriété* (1772), Loyseau’s *Traité sur les Seigneuries* (1608) served as a crucial tract for revolutionary jurists’ creation of modern property rights. This ‘Great Demarcation’ was crucial to modern conceptions of territory as an object of public power and land as an object of private property. Yet, this transformation was not straightforward. Indeed, as argued by Blaufarb and others, this process would outlast the Revolution running late into the nineteenth century.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1789 August decrees, the demarcation of public power and private property began by the abolition of venal offices, judicial seigneurie, various feudal tenurial rights and the lordly status to some land. These first steps aimed first to remove public offices from imbrication with private ownership and interest, and second to remove corporative tenurial privileges. The complicated process of defining a new regime of exclusive property titles out of hierarchical tenure was to follow. Under the auspices of the Constituent Assembly, a ‘Comité de Féodalité’ would first address this problem between 1789 and 1791. Led by lawyers such as Philippe-Antoine Merlin and François-Denis Tronchet, this committee would collapse the distinction between *seigneurie directe* and *seigneurie utile* into a single form of exclusive property. In effective, this movement recognized *seigneurie directe* as a superior right of property and *seigneurie utile* as a contracted right of usage. In this circumstance, those holding *seigneurie utile* were given the right of becoming proprietors by buying the *seigneurie directe* (i.e. *rachat*), thus indemnifying lords for the perpetual dues of ancient feudal contracts. Though this was a revolutionary
process, as noted by Jean-Jacques Clère, this echoed previous feudal reforms such as those advanced by the Kingdom of Sardinia in 1770.27

However, this gradualist dissolution of feudal tenure was met with strong resistance by peasants and deputies who saw them as excessively beneficial to those who had held seigneurie directe. After the King’s flight to Varennes, with the intensification of republicanism and peasant unrest, the Legislative Assembly would change this state of affairs.28 Influenced by pamphlets such as C. Michallet’s Mystère des Droits Féodaux dévoilé, the rights of seigneurie directe would be re-described as a priori coercive rather than contractual, and thus abolishable without compensation.29 Such revision amounted to a reversal of Merlin’s acceptance of seigneurie directe as implying a contractual relation and indemnifications. Under the Jacobin-led National Convention, the abolition of directe dues without compensation was consolidated in a decree to suppress all feudal dues, even if indisputably contractual. As argued by Blaufarb this constituted a radical, though not definitive, ‘second abolition of feudalism’.30 Under Napoleon, through the persistent efforts of Merlin de Douai and Jean Jacques Régis de Cambacères, a reversion to the 1790 rachat process would be pursued in the départements réunis.31 Nonetheless, irrespective of disputes over indemnification, the creation of modern private property free of feudal obligations had by then been secured. In the 1804 Code Napoléon, article 544 enshrined property as ‘the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, so long as one does not make a usage forbidden by laws or regulations’.32 This legal formulation would prove influential as well as durable.

Parallel to the emergence of ‘absolute’ property, the revolutionary politico-legal travails also produced the modern idea of public domain. This process began with the decision to place all of the clergy’s goods at the ‘disposal of the Nation’ in the autumn of 1789. This confiscation constituted a momentous revolutionary legal device: the biens nationaux. Classified as goods subject to uses for the benefit of the nation, the National Assembly decided to auction the biens nationaux to refinance the state.

Though initially designed as a process to ease France’s financial distress, the sale of the biens nationaux soon became part of the grand plan of liberating the state from any ownership of objects of private property. In the winter of 1790, between 22 November and 1 December, a series of laws, known as the ‘Code Domanial’, consolidated this
trend. Claiming the Crown’s domain as ‘a property’ of the nation, the assembly transformed it into the ‘national domain’ and specified its rights to alienate parts of it as private property whilst retaining others, such as rivers, forests, and city walls as unalienable. As noted by Marguerite Boulet-Sautel, this decree’s specific provision as to alienability broke with the legal norm of inalienability of Crown domains established since 1566 by the Edict of Moulins, a crucial device for monarchical feudal accumulation. Adding to this new principle of alienability, the 1790 Code Domanial incorporated old royal rights by emphasising the ultimate prerogative of the Nation over all properties, as well as the state’s administration of special public goods (i.e. forests, rivers, etc.).

Such a distinction was constitutive of the modern understanding of territorial sovereignty in relation to public power as reliant on three aspects: limited state ownership, state management of public domain, and the ultimate prerogatives of territorial sovereignty. In deploying these innovations, the revolutionary assemblies opened up a radical new vision of territorial sovereignty as free of proprietary relations and subject to the limits of public utility. The Ancien Régime’s inimICATION of sovereignty and feudal hierarchical tenure was forfeit. The territory of France, the revolutionaries claimed, was ‘free’ of feudal dependency, an empire of liberty.

2.1.3. Epilogue: After 1800

The French Revolution’s republican political language decisively recast the concept of territory. Departing from absolutism, the Revolution disentangled territory from feudal corporatist orders of political representation, administration and feudal tenure systems. Through discourses of national sovereignty and natural rights, revolutionary law radically re-articulated the concept of territory as a rationalized sphere of representative public power, awash with uneven feudal politico-economic dependencies and formally separate from private property. In creating the departments, the Revolution made the concept of territory the subject of debates on national representation, and thus created new arguments relating territorial order, equal constituency and political legitimacy. Beholden to new concerns of equal representation, territory became enduringly tied to debates about democratic
constituency. In demarcating territorial sovereignty and private property, the Revolution broke with the patrimonial confusion of territorial sovereignty and monarchical dominion and advanced the modern separation of public and private. Territory thus became radically detached from landed property.

These intellectual distinctions would be the fuel of vast social maelstroms. Throughout the Revolutionary wars, the deployment of departmental organization and the dissolution of feudal tenure would remain key objects of political contest and conflict. From 1801, Napoleon’s rise to power would see these processes gain in social entrenchment and geographical reach. Ending civil strife in France, Napoleon entrenched these processes by giving them a stable legal form and expanding their application. Napoleon’s support of comprehensive projects of legal codification and schemes of property registry and conversion were key instruments here. In spite of this, Napoleon’s despotic tendencies and accommodation policies also mitigated the spirit of these reforms. Most significantly, however, Napoleon was key in exporting what had been a political revolution confined to France to the breadth of Europe, impelling conquered lands and competing polities to adopt constitutional reforms.

The last of the Revolution’s meteors, Napoleon left a legacy that divided liberals, radical republicans and counter-revolutionaries alike. On one hand, Napoleon’s distortion of representative government moved liberals to imagine new constitutions, which would avoid the corruption of excessive centralization and despotism. In this camp, thinkers such as Benjamin Constant, Destutt de Tracy, Simón Bolivar and Pavel Pestel envisioned new orders through ideas of federation. On the other hand, counter-revolutionaries saw Napoleon’s sweeping redrawing of European states as the outcome of a republican folly, which threatened Europe’s ancient and ‘organic’ order. Common to these two reactions was a language concerned with social or ‘national’ unity. As we will see in the next section, in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna this recurrence to ‘nationhood’ would gain ever greater ground in European political thought, peaking with the social uprisings of the 1848 ‘Spring of Nations’, and binding itself to a new imagination of territory.
2.2. Inventing Fatherlands: Territory and Romantic Nationalism, 1815-1848

What is the German's fatherland? Now name at last that mighty land! ‘Where'er resounds the German tongue, Where'er its hymns to God are sung!’ That is the land, Brave German, that thy fatherland!

Ernst Ardnt Moritz, ‘The German Fatherland’, 1819.39

From the Volga to the Euphrates, From the Ganges to the Danube Thus lies the Russian Kingdom, and shall never pass As the spirit foresaw and Daniel prophesied.

Fyodor Tyutchev, ‘Russian Geography’, 1848.40

At the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, liberals and conservatives alike scrambled to create political languages for a new chapter of European politics.41 Whilst liberals sought to rescue constitutionalism, representative government and anti-feudal policies, conservatives sought to recover dynastic power, religious authority and feudal bonds. These factions, though opposed, were suffused in dense networks with liberals such as Benjamin Constant, Germaine de Staël or Wilhelm von Humboldt in contact with conservatives such as Joseph de Maistre, Friedrich Schlegel or Jacob Grimm.42 At play in these networks was the political language with which to negotiate reaction and reform in a new European order. One key idiom at play in this language was ‘nation’, once a signifier of republicanism now wrestled to support a new politics.

As argued by Joep Leersen and Brian Vick, the reference to nations during this period entangled several intellectual lineages, including Romantic variations on history, religion, language and custom, as well as on Enlightenment conceptions of patriotism, Rousseauist popular sovereignty and the new literatures of ethnography.43 The junction of these lineages, as argued by Vick, made for complex conceptions of nationhood, which cannot be summarized as either ‘political’ or ‘cultural’.44 Most often, however, appeals to nationhood were deployed in a Romantic register, claiming a break with Enlightenment rationalism and republicanism, deeming its view of the
universe as mechanistic, materialistic and obsessed with imposing uniformity through the ahistorical theories of social contract and natural law. In this context, eschewing the civic fiats and calculative order of a rationalist’s nation (such as Sieyès’), early nineteenth-century thinkers sought to recast nations as the product of long-laboured affinities, born out in language and custom, shaped by nature, providence and ancient collective action. In this, a historicist rethinking of national unity would recast conceptions of territory through the prism of placed ethnic identity. Henceforth, territory was no longer merely the perfected province of administration, but the necessary homeland of ‘imagined communities’.

2.2.1. Christianity or Europe: Providence, Monarchy and Nations

In the early aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, counter-revolutionaries held a privileged position in delineating the political language to undergird a new political settlement. In this context, conservatives sought not only to shore up the legitimacy of dynastic monarchies and feudal-absolutist regimes but also to establish a new understanding of European social order as grounded on spiritual and natural bases. Looking at the Napoleonic Wars in parallel to the Thirty Years’ War, conservatives of this generation saw the rationalist republicanism of the Revolution as a force of evil that had caused social crisis in Europe. Addressing this, conservatives emphasized the need to accompany discussions of dynastic restitution and ‘balance of power’ with a substantive program to ground social harmony. This program often compacted three strands of appeal: providentialism, romanticism and historicism.

In the context of providentialism, thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald provide good exemplars. Seeking to regenerate the social bonds of ‘Throne and Altar’ in Restoration France, Maistre and Bonald became influential for their attempts to base conceptions of social order on religious grounds. In their view, the Revolutionary Wars resulted from the Republic’s ‘atheistic’ rationalism, which unceremoniously discarded corporate bodies and ancient traditions, institutions that were the mark of a Christian nation. Such folly, Maistre and Bonald argued, had brought God’s wrath upon Europe in the form of mass war and suffering. Thus, though it had claimed to act lawfully and reasonably, the Revolution was accused by
Maistre of having demolished ancient unions of sovereigns and peoples and of having threatened Europe’s ‘constitution’ (i.e. composition) by ignoring its various ‘religion[s], mores, language[s], demarcations of empires, forms of government, classes of men, bases of property’. Led not only by the folly of its principles, but also by the voracious drive of personal interests, Maistre argued, the Revolution had attempted to create a world of ‘propriétaires souverains’ [sovereign owners] who destituted the common people and erased the moral role of monarchical sovereignty.

For Maistre and his followers, then, securing European peace implied reinstating Christian authority in social and political life. Unlike the ‘abstract’ experiments of the Revolution, Christian dogma appeared in their eyes as a means to tend human nature and achieve social harmony, namely by acknowledging unmoveable truths and long-laboured national communions. In this view, the defining character of territory had to be that it corresponded to a historical and ‘natural’ spiritual bond between monarch and people, not to rationalist inventions or republican associations. Territory had to be conceived through a religious recognition of providentially assembled ancient national unities and Christian monarchs. Above this, only Christianity was capable of providing universal unity. Such a spiritualist vision was far from particular to Restoration France. In Austria and Southern Germany, similar visions of a providentially ordained monarchical Europe were present in the writings of thinkers such as Karl Ludwig von Haller, Joseph Görres, Franz von Baader, Adam Müller, Friedrich Christoph Schlosser and Friedrich Schlegel. In Russia, Slavophile thinkers such as Aleksey Khomyakov, Ivan Kireyevsky, Stepan Shrevyrov and Konstantin Aksakov developed similarly providential readings of European order, though premised on re-reading order from the viewpoint of Russian Orthodoxy. Both German-speaking and Russian-speaking movements, however, were significantly informed by another intellectual tradition besides Maistre and Bonald’s ultramontane Catholicism. This tradition was German Romanticism.

As argued by Frederik Beiser, as early as the 1790s, German Romanticism had nurtured a preoccupation with creating European states that would foster an ‘organic community’ and thus both social and individual ‘development’ [Bildung]. This vision both drew on and departed from German Idealism and Humanist traditions of the likes of J. W. Goethe, Immanuel Kant, J.G. Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt.
The Romantics’ concept of society was formed in contrast to a critique of eighteenth-century states as ‘mechanical’, governing peoples as an object to be manipulated coercively through the imposition of bureaucracy, law and physical force. Led by powerful elites, such states functioned ‘materialistically’ for the accumulation of territory and power, and resulted in the alienation of communal autonomy, thus preventing the development and happiness of its people. In contrast, Romantic visions of organic society, such as advanced by Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, used the idea of cultural commonality to imagine a co-operative harmony between individuals and the state, thus progressing ‘organically’ rather than through the imposition of governmental rational schemes. In an early phase, this vision had led many German Romantics to exult the French Revolution as heralding a new political society beyond the mechanical and paternalist states of the Ancien Régime. Towards the late 1790s, however, disillusioned with the course of the French Revolution, the German Romantics reverted to a sharply critical position. No longer did the Revolution promise the emergence of organic states. Instead, it expressed the catastrophic climax of the eighteenth century’s narrow self-interest, materialism, bureaucracy and despotism.

In this new light, the Revolution appeared not as the end of ‘mechanical states’ but rather an anarchical expansion of their damaging tendencies. In these circumstances, Romantics such as Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel turned to a defence of religiosity and monarchy as guarantors of social unity and political order, enabling a durable Bildung. Writings such as Novalis’s Christendom or Europe inscribed Romantic discourse into a historicist apologia of Christianity as the key force in the development of Europe towards unity and freedom. In this vision, Novalis adumbrated the Middle Ages as a lost golden age of political and spiritual harmony. Years later, in his Vienna lectures on the Philosophy of History, Friedrich Schlegel would take this teleological vision further by describing the progressive ‘revelation’ of humanity through the succession of various periods in history: the Chinese Empire, Brahminical India, the Persian Empire, the Hebrews, the Roman Empire, the ancient Germanic tribes, the Medieval ‘Christian Government’, Protestantism and Modern Europe. Allotting different periods of social order to different geographical areas and ‘nations’, Friedrich Schlegel’s Philosophy of History marked a key point of reference for G.W.F. Hegel’s own teleological Lectures on the Philosophy of History and the notion of nations as
the key historical actors in a universal theodicy.\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, the focus on historical progression as a diachronic revelation of an ‘organic state’ also carried through to Hegel’s narrative. Where Schlegel emphasized the unity of church, kings and peoples, however, Hegel emphasized the unity of nations, the Spirit and civil states.

Parallel to the late German Romantic turn to theological history, the notion of the nation as a deep historical organic community was further entrenched by the writings of the German Historical School developed by Carl von Savigny, Karl Friedrich Eichhorn and others.\textsuperscript{56} Rejecting transhistorical rationalism and natural law, Savigny argued for a revaluation of customary law as the long laboured expression of distinctive national life (i.e. \textit{Volkgeist}). For Savigny, the organic character of customary law stemmed from its social embeddedness in language and mores. Such an embrace of customary law was particularly significant as a rejection of universal pretentions of Napoleonic civil codes and constitutions. Instead, inspired by Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, Savigny looked back nostalgically at the medieval heyday of the Holy Roman Empire, with its legal and institutional pluralism. Moved by Savigny’s vision of the nation through ancient custom, the brothers Grimm, who had studied law under him, developed collections of folk tales to support the idea of an ancient moral and linguistic Germanic community.\textsuperscript{57} In affinity with these efforts, Eichhorn’s revival of Tacitus’ description of the mores of Teutonic tribes contributed to a further sense of ancient national lineages, long resisting Romanic hegemony.\textsuperscript{58} These conceptions of nationhood, though not reliant on theodicies such as those of Maistre, Friedrich Schlegel and Aleksey Khomyakov, shared a central commonality with their arguments, by refusing that nations could be the product of a rationally organized social contract (as imagined by Sieyès). Instead, nations were to be understood as age-old collective bodies whose existence was expressed in customs and vernacular language. The development of these nations depended on whether the states ruling them were embedded or detached from the ‘national spirit’. If embedded, the states would foster development of the nation’s personality. If detached, states would break the nation by eroding the consciousness of its placed peculiarity.
Figure 4. Constant Desjardins’ Ethnographic map of the peoples of Europe. Paris 1843. (source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France – Public Domain)

2.2.2. Preparing the Spring of Nations: Liberalism and Subversive Nationhood

Romantic visions of nationhood, however, were not beholden to play a legitimating role to the Restoration and the Congress of Vienna. Indeed, the new historicist, culturalist and theodicist conceptions of nationhood were soon subverted from conservative readings and enlisted into contestations of European political order. If nations were understood as natural cultures, stateless ethnicities could be seen to need separate states. If nations were thought of as historical, narratives of their political unification could be re-written with new emphases. If nations were envisaged as instruments of progressive theodicy, oppressed peoples could be imagined as the harbingers of a new revelation. The period leading to 1848 saw the deployment of all
these subversive tactics in multiple re-readings of romantic nationhood. Illustrative examples of these tactics can be found in Adam Mickiewicz (within theodist views), Pavel J. Šafárik and Karl Bernhardi (within culturalist views), and Augustin Thierry and Joachim Lelewel (within historicist views). These thinkers, it should be emphasized, were not only theorists but also militant activists working against the post-1815 European order. In thought and militancy, these thinkers sought to subvert conservative readings of romantic nationhood and re-write the concept of territory through new national geographies. Ultimately, their visions would have their most feverish watershed in the year of 1848 in the Pan-German Frankfurt Parliament and the Pan-Slav Prague Congress.

Romantic historians such as Thierry and Lelewel seemed to echo Germaine de Staël’s cautionary words to Restoration thinkers: ‘It is important to repeat to all partisans of the rights founded on the past, that it is liberty which is ancient, and despotism which is modern’. Breaking with conservative readings of national history as founded on the superiority of monarchy and church, liberal historians sought to recast the history of nations as an epopee of popular participation. Thus, for Lelewel, the national history of Poland was not to be understood as that of a people under a dynasty, a religion or a language. Instead, Lelewel re-wrote Polish national history as one of political culture. In his writings, this nationhood was rooted in the ancient institutions of small gentry democracy, which had defended peasant communes and constituted a commonwealth against the encroachments of feudalization, religious intolerance and dynastic monarchy. For Lelewel, these institutions were ‘national’ not only due to their ancientness but also due to their success in creating a large-scale and culturally diverse political unity without mass violence. Within such a vision, Lelewel imagined that the return of Polish nationhood signified the creation of a multi-ethnic republican federative polity. In a parallel vein, Augustin Thierry recast historicist narratives of French nationhood by placing its origins in the forgotten ‘liberty’ of its eleventh-century ‘communal revolutions’. Studying these insurrections of towns against feudal lords and clergy, Thierry described the emergence of charters, elective government, civil liberties and industry as the beginnings of French nationhood. Through such visions, Thierry and Lelewel’s narrations of nationhood shifted emphasis from ethnic uniqueness and exclusivity to tales of age-old popular political community and enfranchisement.
Where Thierry and Lelewel limited their narrative to a deep history of a civic nationhood, thinkers such as Adam Mickiewicz inverted theodicist philosophies of history. Reflecting on the misfortune of his country, Mickiewicz drew on Catholic thought about providential suffering and re-imagined Poland as ‘the Christ of Nations’. As such, Mickiewicz saw Poland as suffering for humanity’s sins to redeem them, and as destined for a resurrection that would bring about a heavenly realm on Earth. This realm would unite all Slavic peoples and deploy their republican customs toward the creation of a new ‘political form’. Contrasting with Maistre’s vision of suffering as a punishment that returned nations to ancient monarchies of faithful Christianity, and contrasting with Hegel’s vision of one nation-state embodying providence, Mickiewicz imagined a new ‘political form’ uniting all Slavic peoples, rejecting the ‘territorial states’ and enabling a brotherhood of nations. This order, he emphasized, would overcome the dynastic machinations of the Congress of Vienna. Echoing this call, thinkers such as Giuseppe Mazzini and Mikhail Bakunin would go on to oppose a ‘holy alliance of nations’ to the ‘Holy Alliance’ of monarchs.

Beyond historicist and theodicist accounts, culturalist conceptions of the nation as an organic community of customs and language were also subject to subversive readings. Cast geographically and statistically, such ethnic or linguistic ‘nationalities’ became visible, as did their mismatch with territorial order. These tensions, captured in the first European ethnic maps of the nineteenth century (see Figure 5), would be exploited creatively by intellectual activists of ‘stateless nations’ such as Pavel Šafárik and Karl Bernhardi. Projected with the authority of scientific visualization, the linguistic maps produced by Bernhardi, Šafárik and others were received not only as cultural artefacts but also as political devices. This was foremost due to language ties being perceived as the ‘natural’ bounds of any national community. Thus, in the case of Bernhardi’s 1844 Sprachkarte von Deutschland, the project of creating a linguistic map of Germany was a conscious effort to contribute to national consciousness and, in Hansen’s words, to create ‘an image of a unified Germany that otherwise did not exist’. So clear was this intention, that Bernhardi’s map would be used in 1848 during the Frankfurt Parliament’s attempts to delineate a pan-German state. A second instance of politicizing cartography was Pawel Šafárik’s 1842 Slovanský zeměvid, an ethnographic map of Eastern Europe depicting an undivided area of Slavic peoples, stretching from the Adriatic to Siberia. Though Šafárik’s map was only an
annex to a study on Slavic folklore and languages, its political purpose was to ‘awaken’ Slavic peoples to their potential greatness. This appeal would be answered in 1848, with insurgents across different kingdoms imagining pan-Slavic federations and demanding the right for their nationalities’ development to be protected. In this manner, the ‘visualization’ of nationalities combined with Romantic accounts to recast the meaning of territory as either ‘abstract’ – if grounded merely on politico-legal fiction; or ‘organic’ – if representing a national body.

2.2.3. Epilogue: After 1848

In the years after the fall of Napoleon, European political discourse appealed to new idioms of nationhood to revise the legitimacy of territorial states. Pitting organic and historical nations against despotic ‘mechanical states’, conservative and liberal Romantics constructed arguments for and against the order secured at the Congress of Vienna. For conservatives, the return to organic nationhood required the restitution of ancient institutions, chief among which was Christian monarchy. Dissenting with these views, liberal and republicans across Europe mobilized idioms of nationhood to argue that dynastic divisions of territory undermined national communities. Thus, whilst both factions reified nations as ancient communities of language and custom, and both argued that past states had pursued territorial expansion at the cost of national community, a great deal of disagreement stemmed from which customs and which territorial arrangements were to restore nationhood. In 1848, fanned by the enthusiasm of the fall of France’s July Monarchy, Europe would be engulfed in a year of uprisings from Paris, to Frankfurt, Dresden, Prague, Posen, Iași, Tipperary and Venice. Throughout these varied uprisings, appeals for the political rights of nationality were key, with the Frankfurt Parliament and the Prague Congress uniting political activists in debating new constitutional orders and territorial divisions. In contrast with Sieyès and Thouret’s constitutional conceptions, however, securing national unity was not to be achieved by eliminating internal corporative bodies and securing a geometry of equality. Instead, these revolutionaries sought to combine ideas of representative government with a placed understanding of linguistic and customary nationhood. To mediate this sense of placed historical communities, 1848 revolutionaries often
appealed to the notion of federalism, seeing the preservation of local and provincial identities as the necessary building block of greater social unity.

Though etched in memory, the 1848 ‘Spring of Nations’ ended in what appeared to be absolute failure. Repressed militarily within a year by Austria, Prussia and Russia, the revolutionary promise abated even in France, where 1851 saw Napoleon III’s instauration of the Second Empire. In spite of these failures, 1848 marked the first eruption in the emergence of nationhood as a crucible of political practice and thought. In the immediate aftermath of 1848, this continuity was marked by imperial attempts to co-opt the language of nationality. Thus, for instance, Napoleon III made ‘the principle of nationalities’ a key element of his foreign policy, whilst Habsburg Austria negotiated between the scientific and political recognition of its constituent nationalities. Simultaneously, wide networks of intellectual refugees from 1848 continued narrations of nationhood against the established order. Such exiles included Giuseppe Mazzini, Karl Marx, Victor Hugo, Lajos Kossuth and Dumitru Brătianu. Their intellectual labours would feed into further storms of nationalism in the 1860s and 1870s. Whilst decades would pass before ‘the principle of nationality’ saw its most daring application in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, by 1848, early-nineteenth-century iterations on nationhood had cast their spell. Territory was bound to be thought of as either the necessary homeland of nationhood, or else its prison.

2.3. The Trials of Modernity: Technology, Social Science and Imperialism, 1850-1900

In the five decades following 1848, the human world transformed perhaps faster than ever before. As captured in David Landes’ *Unbound Prometheus*, the accelerated industrialisation and technological development of key countries in the Western hemisphere led to an unprecedented age of mass production, population growth and organizational capacity. Under the combined furies of steam engines, railways, factories, telegraphs and machine guns, space-time seemed to dissolve, whilst the ‘civilizational’ gap between societies seemed to widen. Such gargantuan material changes were accompanied with shifting intellectual languages, most notably in terms of empire, science and progress. Cast upon these tides, the concept of territory would
once more metamorphose significantly. This section traces these transformations by focusing on two themes: technological utopianism and the rise of sociological theories. These themes are discussed with the rise of imperialism as a background.⁷⁹ Tracing these developments, this section shows how the concept of territory was re-imagined as an immanent expression of the structure of societies.

### 2.3.1. Technological Utopianism: Industrialists, Saint-Simonians and Imperialism

[A]nd, because the railways and steam engines I applied to the movement of cars and boats shortened distances, facilitated the administration of a great empire and of geographical discovery; I noted that maxim of Montesquieu: *that a great empire cannot subsist for long*, a maxim today recognized as false.


Technological innovation transformed the nineteenth-century world, not least in terms of its political thought. Be it for railways, steamboats or telegraphs, the rise of capacious machines and engineering made for a spate of daring re-imaginings of world politics.⁸¹ Under such utopian views of technology, the rules binding pre-modern politics were soon seen to be forfeit. Imperialists, liberals, socialists and thinkers of all ilks dreamed discordantly of the promise of technology: war and misery would be extinguished, empires would be boundless, trade would know no barriers, the world would be as one. In such imaginations, as noted by Duncan Bell, technology transformed ‘the very perception of the political limits prescribed by nature’.⁸²

Utopias of technology were first patent in the debates between liberals and Saint-Simonians in the late 1820s.⁸³ In the context of the Restoration, French liberal intellectuals focused considerable debate on questions of constitutionalism and industrialism. Whilst concerns with constitutional liberties hailed back to pre-revolutionary thinkers such as Montesquieu, the concern with ‘industrialism’ and political economy was substantially new.⁸⁴ Thinkers such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer shifted from traditional liberal concern with how
to secure appropriate political forms to a focus on how to organize production and exchange to create and distribute more wealth. This new approach, as captured in Dunoyer’s writings, focused on how fostering ever growing ‘free markets’ would enable labour to deliver prosperity to all and overcome international belligerence and despotism. Far from merely abstract, this vision was often tied back to the material aspects of political change. Under an ‘industrial regime’, Dunoyer insisted, great states and violent borders would dissolve leading peoples ‘to group more naturally’, ‘to municipalise the world’ and to a ‘multiplication of action centres’.85 This, he hurried to emphasize, would lead to ‘destroying artificial inequalities but only to better bring out natural inequalities’, which would emerge even if ‘men associated themselves under the principle of the most perfect equality’ or ‘divided territory equally’.86 For Dunoyer, as for many contemporaries, such natural inequalities included not only distinction of individual merits, but also of race, of culture, and of geography and place.87 If respected, such natural inequalities led not only to social inequalities in industrial societies but also to the uneven geographical distribution of peoples, institutions and infrastructure. This, for Dunoyer, was the price of progress.

Though largely forgotten today, liberal Industrialists, such as Dunoyer, were a key influence in their time, particularly on Saint-Simon and his young disciples.88 As early as 1817, in the newspaper *Industrie*, Saint-Simon defended the view that ‘political economy is the unique and true foundation of politics’, something he claimed Say had identified but not seen in ‘its general considerations’.89 Departing from other liberals from 1819, Saint-Simon claimed to advance the true doctrine of the ‘industrial system’ by claiming that the government of ‘legists and metaphysicians’ had to be replaced by the ‘administration’ of the industrial class, a political alliance of producers of all kinds: merchants, bankers, farmers, artists and scientific scholars. In contrast to Dunoyer, Saint-Simon emphasized the need to ‘organize’ production rather than simply ‘freeing’ it. Without effective planning and political unity amongst the ‘industrial class’, Saint-Simon claimed that the ‘industrial system’ would not overcome the still-dominant ‘military, theological and metaphysical’ system of European politics.90 This shift in social and political order, Saint-Simon imagined, would be accompanied by a new relation to territory. As stated in his parting tract, *New Christianity*: 
[N]ow that the dimensions of our planet are known, let artists, savants and industrials make a general plan of works to render the territorial possession of humankind the most productive possible and the most agreeable to inhabit in all its relations.\textsuperscript{91}

Such words would not be ignored. Following Saint-Simon, a cohort of young engineers, businessmen and men-of-letters would take this idea to new heights, imagining and often conducting daring new projects of large-scale ‘territorial amelioration’. Reacting first to public discussions on canal and railroad construction, Saint-Simonians made their mark by the ways in which they imagined technological innovation as the source of a new social world.\textsuperscript{92} Perhaps the most famous text offering such a vision was Michel Chevalier’s \textit{Système de la mediterrannée}, written in 1832.\textsuperscript{93} In this text, the then young Chevalier imagined a European-wide railway and canal network and imagined the political effects on each European country. A railway from Venice to Taranto, he claimed, would be the ‘material emblem’ of the unity Italy so desired.\textsuperscript{94} A network of railways and canals would be the ‘most effective means’ to transform the ‘political order’ of ‘Slavic races’ and ‘awaken them from their somnolence’ through ‘a prodigious velocity’.\textsuperscript{95} Russia, above all, was to be transfigured by this ‘vivifying network’.\textsuperscript{96} Perhaps even more significantly, Chevalier argued that such transport networks would not only enable the politics of each country to shift from feudal belligerence to industrial concord but also that an international network of canals and railways would enable European peace and cooperation far better than the politics of ‘European equilibrium’ based on the balance of threat amongst great states. In Chevalier’s own words:

\begin{quote}
[I]n the eyes of men who have faith humanity marches towards \textit{universal association}, and who have vowed to conduct it towards it, railways appear under a whole new day […] railways are the most perfect symbol of \textit{universal association}.\textsuperscript{97}
\end{quote}

Thus, beyond enabling European peace and prosperity through catalysing social interaction and industrial activity, Chevalier imagined railways as a potent means towards global integration and peace, allying the ‘Orient and Occident’ across the Mediterranean and extending outwards across ‘old Asia’ and piercing the isthmus of Suez and Panama’.\textsuperscript{98} In the words of Enfantin, another key Saint-Simonian, industry
was to be ‘no longer the means of national communications, but the means of universal communion’. The hopes for the political prospect of railways could not have been grander. This enthusiasm, however, had many significant supporters (see Figure 5).

Technology would not be appealed to only by liberals and Saint-Simonians imagining a more or less contagious growth of industrial peace. Such visions were key in promoting a new territorial imagination whereby locomotion and exchange promised to erode hard borders, cease territorial conquests, integrate economies regionally and lead to a growth in municipalism and industrial self-government. These avowedly peaceful and anti-despotic visions, however, carried significant ambiguities. In Chevalier’s *Système* for instance, a radically optimistic vision of Mediterranean peace was concomitant with French Orientalism and its political ambitions towards Algeria, Syria and Egypt. Amongst the Saint-Simonians, and more broadly, technological utopianism was to be the motor of yet another grand vision – that of an unrestrained Empire.

As Duncan Bell has argued, after the 1850s, the infatuation with technology fed new imaginations of Empire. Through the power of steam, distance was seen to have lost its power of attrition for large-scale states. This, as noted by Bell, contrasted with well-known Enlightenment arguments as to ‘natural limits’ to Empire. Montesquieu, for instance, argued that the excessive expansion of empire could only lead them to befall despotism, weakness and decline. Similarly, Burke had famously noted how distance posed ‘an immutable condition’ which ‘weakened Government’ in any ‘extensive Empire’. With the emergence of steamships, railways and telegraphs, however, a growing number of thinkers began arguing that large-scale empires would now be compatible with efficient administration, political liberty and social harmony. In this context, as shown by Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith, large-scale engineering became increasingly entangled with ideas of empire building. In this context, railways were seen not just as a means to overcome fragmented societies but also as the primary means of enabling *actual* dominion. Just such a sentiment permeated a new imperialism, with colonial administrators such as Sir John MacDonald claiming that dominions would remain ‘little more than a “geographical expression”’ until ‘the railway’ would enable ‘one great united country with a large inter-provincial trade and a common interest’. This logic, moreover, was applied not only to uniting already
held dominions but also to absorbing unconquered regions. In the words of Lord Salisbury, ‘small kingdoms are marked out by the destinies of the world for destruction […] The great organizations and greater means of locomotion of the present day mark out the future to be one of great empires’. In the eyes of late nineteenth-century imperialists, technology therefore transformed territory not only in that it promised the rise of a boundless industrialism which would erode political fragmentation but in that it prefigured the possibility of boundless empires, where natural distance could no longer offer attrition to effective administration or conquest.

Figure 5. E. Martin and E. Chevaillier’s Isochronic map of communications between Paris and the rest of France. Paris 1882. (source: The University of Chicago Map Collection – Public Domain)
2.3.2. Social Theory and ‘Territorial Evolutionism’: Positivism, Ethnology and Darwinism

Beyond popularizing technological utopianism, the second half of the nineteenth century was also marked by an increasing confidence in the power of ‘science’ to understand and reform the world.¹⁰⁹ Fuelled by the momentous development of natural sciences, statistics and political economy, intellectuals increasingly embraced new idioms of enquiry and argument. Be it through the works of Pierre-Jean G. Cabanis, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Charles Lyell, Thomas Malthus, Charles Darwin, Ludwig Büchner or Karl von Baer, nineteenth-century European political thought transformed itself by importing a new insistence on empiricism, materialism, organicism and evolutionism as ‘scientific’ principles.¹¹⁰ In these circumstances, political reflection was no longer to draw on theology, natural law or metaphysics, but on the new thoroughly empiricist sciences, which, through systematic observation, could reveal the dynamic structure of minds, matter and society. In terms of conceptions of territory, this precipitated a significant shift. Increasingly, territory was reconceived as a shifting expression of social ‘organic’ structure, which at different stages of development worked through different logics. This section illustrates traces of this conception by focusing on the evolutionist theories of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and Henry Maine.

Auguste Comte

As a thinker closely tied to the Saint-Simonian generation Auguste Comte distinguished himself by his attempt to produce an integrated philosophy of science: positivism.¹¹¹ At the core of this edifice, Comte sought to construct a vision explaining the progress of intellectual and social history by reference to a theory of mental development.¹¹² At its most schematic, this theory was premised on ‘the law of the three stages’, which narrated the passage from inchoate mysticism (in the theological phase) through abstract dogmatism (in the metaphysical phase) to demonstrated knowledge (in the positive phase).¹¹³ These stages, besides complying with intellectual history, were tied by Comte to moral, political and material developments.¹¹⁴ Materially, Comte emphasized the passage from nomadic scarcity, through sedentarity subsistence to industrial wealth, and the attendant emergence of a capable intellectual class.¹¹⁵ Inspired by Lamarck, Comte emphasized the social dependence on the
material as corresponding to the ‘general subordination of the organism to the milieu’. Moreover, influenced by phrenology, he corresponded these stages to the predominant use of different parts of the human brain. Morally, he argued that societies developed from a limited tribal affection to civic patriotism and, eventually, to universal love for humanity. Politically, he argued that states evolved from theocracy to absolutism, and in time, into positivist industrial republics. In his rich texts, Comte narrated this passage through a complex history of ‘the Occident’, which evaluated the legacies and downfall of each societal order. In this Eurocentric narrative, discussions of Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the Christian Middle Ages, and the rise of Absolutism all interlocked into foreshadowing the emergence of a positivist society, which both overcame and integrated previous eras.

Throughout this complex history of social development, Comte made repeated references to territory. In the early theological period (i.e. ‘fetishism’), Comte noted the significance of the attachment to ‘territorial property’ and its identification with familial affection as leading to the institution of the ‘fatherland’. In later theological societies, such as the Roman Empire, this attachment would gain a civic character and lead to a ‘savage patriotism’ of continuous territorial conquest. In the Christian Middle Ages, feudalism enabled a free association of small fiefdoms that decentralized political power, favoured industrial development and detached spiritual community from the civic realm. This period, Comte claimed, represented a ‘sketch’ of the positivist republics to come. In contrast to the Roman Empire, the medieval period had corresponded to ‘the sociological law that everywhere restrains the natural territory of temporal dominations’. Soon, however, the territorial order of the Middle Ages would be upset by Papal and Monarchical campaigns for absolute dominion and great states. Compounded by Atlantic colonialism this had led to ‘the exorbitant extension of western states’. For Comte, however, the American Revolution had initiated a ‘peaceful decomposition’, which would bring about a ‘positivist regime’ of small self-governing industrialist republics. These republics, Comte wrote, would include ‘a population of one to three millions, on a territory equivalent to that of Belgium’. This extension, he claimed, corresponded to the ‘spontaneous reunion of rural populations around a preponderant city’ and to enabling a benevolent patriotism, ‘the most intimate and most vast of associations’.

Once ‘sketched’ in the Middle Ages,
Comte believed this decentralized order would ensure wealth, social harmony and worldwide solidarity.

Ultimately then, territory played a central role in Comte’s theory of human development. In narrating a procession of human societies organized differently, Comte emphasized not only which ideas and classes became hegemonic but also which political configurations they consolidated. Here, be it in the ‘fetishist’ attachment to soil, the theocratic obsession with conquest, or the industrialist restraint of positivist republics, the relation between society and territory was constitutive of historical development. In this context, Comte’s attacks against modern colonialism and ‘exorbitant states’ echoed his belief that these policies would lead to social retrocession. This position was well understood by his followers, who in the case of Victorian Britain, consistently argued against Empire as a project doomed to stagnate the development of conquering and conquered societies alike.

Herbert Spencer

Whilst Comte had established the promise of a scientific account of social development, his writings were often deemed to lack empirical grounding and rigorous logic. Much like the Saint-Simonians, Comte’s writings were seen by many as corrupted by the incipient mysticism of a new universal religion. Within years of his death however, through the works of Herbert Spencer, a new ‘positivist’ account of social evolution would be inaugurated. Inspired, as Comte had been, by the explosion of the natural sciences in the nineteenth century, Spencer focused most of his life on developing a ‘synthetic philosophy’ in which he sought to apply the idea of ‘evolution’ to the fields of psychology, biology ethics, and sociology. At core, Spencer’s project issued from the idea that ‘the law of organic evolution’ was indeed ‘the law of all evolution [...] in the development of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its surface, in the development of Society’. Evolution, in Spencer’s words, was ‘a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through continuous differentiations and integrations’. This definition was based on Karl von Baer’s theories of embryo development. Moreover, though mute in this definition, Spencer’s understanding of organic
evolution was also influenced by his readings of naturalists such as Lamarck and Darwin. Thus, whilst von Baer’s schema furnished Spencer’s ‘evolution’ with the idea of structure and function (i.e. a cell developing into aggregates with different specialized parts integrated), Darwin and Lamarck’s emphasis was on external factors influencing intergenerational change (i.e. environmental adaptation, inter-societal adaptation).

Within such a framework, then, Spencer believed that polities should be seen as ‘social organisms’ whose ‘truths of social development, structure, and function’ could be unveiled by careful comparative study. Following his embryological analogy, Spencer’s earlier sociological writings imagined society as a growing aggregate (from wandering families, to large tribes, to settled villages, to nations) which grew in differentiations (from merely sex, through rulership, through craft) and thus gained greater productive capacities, leading towards ‘an economic aggregation of the whole human race’. Deploying increasingly refined regulation to a growing range of specialized labour, societies grew in size, integration, wealth and stability.

Importantly for us, this organic imagination of society was accompanied by a strong spatial language. Thus, in Spencer’s First Principles he proposed that, like an organism society first developed where ‘the average of opposing [environmental] forces is the least’. Moreover, he noted that primitive societies ‘ceasing to be so nomadic, and restricted in its range by neighbouring tribes’, developed ‘after prolonged border warfare, a more settled territorial boundary’. These tribal territorial divisions, Spencer claimed, favoured the division between a ‘warrior-class’ and ‘classes devoted to the cultivation of the soil’. In time, through the subordination of weaker tribes and chiefs to stronger ones, societies would be combined, leading to:

[A] process through which petty tenures are combined into feuds, feuds into provinces, provinces into kingdoms, and finally contiguous kingdoms into a single one, [which] slowly completes itself by destroying the original lines of demarcation.

This process, he added, facilitated the ‘specializations’ of ‘separate districts’, which were defined by ‘local circumstances’, and enabled when ‘means of transit become
numerous’. Through its development, then, society mimicked embryonic growth – from a simple self-sufficient cell, society grew and aggregated others cells, which in turn led to the emergence of localized specific functions, regulating centres and internal circulation. In Spencer’s analogy, territory appeared as a multicellular social body, which at different stages concentrated more space and population, whilst shifting structure and functions.

In addition to this embryonic analogy, Spencer operationalized an analogy between animal territorial behaviour and societal development. Aggressive defence or expansion of territory appeared in his theories as a key driver of ‘super-organic’ evolution. This stemmed primarily from a primordial and animalistic urge to mark out territory against others. In Spencer’s own words, ‘in early stages we see habitual aggression and counter-aggression: now between societies and now between individuals. Neighbouring tribes fight about the limits of their territories’. This territorial drive, he noted, ‘may be compared to that of many animals, solitary and gregarious, which drive trespassers away from their lairs or habitats’. Crucially, in his thought, this aggressive drive did not disappear but rather transformed and persisted. These ‘predatory habits’ fostered the emergence of militant societies, where war and conflict lead to social aggregation as well as structures of rule.

This predatory persistence, Spencer believed, had been a transversal feature of medieval societies, where the territorial aggression between kingdoms was mirrored by the conflicts between fiefdoms, towns and even guilds. However, he argued, in the long run, reinforcing political integration ‘had the result that within the consolidated territories the amount of diffused fighting decreased’. Stemming from this consolidation, peaceful habits of industry and commerce would gradually emerge and transform social evolution. Whilst the growth of industrial activities reduced ‘diffused enmity’ and ‘predatory habits’, Spencer argued that militancy would remain in social structures and relations. In his own day, he believed, this was best shown in Great Britain’s infatuation with the project of Empire.

To sum up, Spencer’s remarkably novel vision of social evolution had achieved a thorough re-conception of territory. Seeing it as the persistent and shifting effect of social behaviour, structured by social interactions at the micro and macro level,
Spencer had unknowingly spread the seeds of theories of ‘territoriality’, be they ethological or structural-functionalist.\textsuperscript{152}

**Henry Maine**

Whilst the success of Spencer’s reimaginings of territory stemmed primarily from his uses of biological analogy, they also reflected his engagement with a growing ‘ethnological’ literature.\textsuperscript{153} Drawing from writers such as John Lubbock, Lewis H. Morgan, John F. McLennan, Fustel de Coulanges, Émile de Laveleye and Henry Maine, Spencer’s *Principles of Sociology* built on an increasingly shared language of institutional and cultural evolution.\textsuperscript{154} Chief among these thinkers, Henry Maine deserves special discussion for his influence on new social theories of territory.\textsuperscript{155}

Writing between the 1850s and 1880s, Henry Maine distinguished himself for his construction of a theory of legal and social evolution. Inspired by Savigny’s historical jurisprudence, Maine’s first influential work, *Ancient Law*, sought to account for the ancient social conditions that had accompanied the emergence and codification of Roman Law. Far from an antiquarian exercise, Maine believed this endeavour to be key in explaining the exceptional legal fictions that enabled a progressive society.\textsuperscript{156} In Rome’s early history, he claimed, society had been made up of patriarchal families, bound into political community based on ‘kinship in blood’.\textsuperscript{157} In these circumstances, ‘law’ had been little more than patriarchal commands within a system dominated by kinship status. From this primeval state, Maine argued, Roman society had slowly developed an oral religious custom whose adjudication was dominated by patriarchal aristocracy. Until this stage, Maine noted, Rome was unexceptional, sharing the same conditions of other ancient stationary societies, such as Brahminical India.\textsuperscript{158} At this stage, however, Roman society departed onto a progressive path by innovating its customs into a more systematic, pragmatic and simple form. Gradually, such innovations led to the codification of a civil law, which carved out a public sphere increasingly free of paternal authority and providing for personal rights and obligations (including, crucially, greater possibilities for property free of patriarchal power).\textsuperscript{159} Through this shift, Maine argued, Roman civilization had achieved two key developments for modern society. First, Roman society vanquished patriarchal
despotism and dissolved family dependence, leading to the emergence of individuals capable of free contract.\textsuperscript{160} Second, political community itself had ceased to stem solely from the ‘assumption of kinship’ and became based on ‘local contiguity’, or as Maine wrote in later works, ‘common territory’.\textsuperscript{161}

For what could have remained an obscure apologia of Roman socio-legal history, Maine’s \textit{Ancient Law} gained a significant audience. Be it for Émile de Laveleye’s writings on ‘primitive property’ or in Lewis Henry Morgan’s works on kinship and political society, Maine became enthroned as a major theorist of social development. To a certain extent this is unsurprising, given that Maine’s approach offered major avenues of enquiry by persuading readers that the promethean sources of progress could be found in tracing the tortuously gradual and contingent development of ancient customs and institutions. Maine’s later works would illustrate the ambitiousness of this approach even more explicitly. Comparing the histories of ancient India and feudal Europe, Maine would attempt to show why Indian societies had remained ‘stationary’ and why European modern states had developed.\textsuperscript{162}

Contrasting the village-communities of East and West, Maine began by establishing their common primitive states – family dependence, patriarchal authority, communal ownership. Having established this commonality, Maine then narrated how Western village-communities had escaped their stationary condition through a tortuous and contingent process leading to the legal institution of private property and territorial sovereignty. For Maine, this tortuous process was best demonstrated in feudalization, a process unique to Europe, he claimed, in part due to the incipient influence of Roman Law.\textsuperscript{163} Tracing the legal practices of ‘commendation’ and ‘benefice’ (two contractual forms), Maine argued that European tribal patriarchs had slowly eroded village-communities through feudal land tenure and feudal monarchy. Interestingly, in these texts, Maine revealed some ambiguity as to the source of a ‘revolution’ transforming tribal communities into territorial societies. On one hand, Roman influence seemed to precipitate a specific emphasis on landed property and territorially based political community. On the other, Maine claimed that the passage from tribal to territorial community was gradually achieved by ‘the fact of settlement’, by the institution of village-communities themselves and their attendant emphasis on common land ownership.\textsuperscript{164}
Maine’s ambiguous emphasis on the passage of societies based on kinship to societies based on territory marked a key axiom for emergent sociological scholarship. In contrast to Comte and Spencer’s sociobiological and teleological premises, however, Maine placed emphasis on the uncertain and contingent history of institutions. Beyond their influence on burgeoning sociological imaginations, Maine’s theories were also fed into the practice of Empire. Maine’s emphasis on stationary ‘tribal’ societies and the trials of a transition to modernity were highly attractive for Western imperialists seeking to play the part of benevolent civilizers. In the context of India and Africa, as Karuna Mantena has shown, Maine’s writings informed colonial policies of ‘indirect rule’, which segregated ‘tribal societies’ to ‘protect’ them. With a cruel irony, Maine’s arguments provided support to narratives presenting imperialists benignly, almost a breed of providential invaders.

2.3.3. Epilogue: After 1900

As there are no unoccupied territories—that is, territories that do not belong to any state in Asia and America, it is necessary to amplify Supan’s conclusion and say that the characteristic feature of the period under review is the final partitioning of the globe [...].

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, 1917.

Gazing at a political map of the world at the end of the nineteenth century, even Napoleon might have been surprised. In the space of a handful of decades, a world of uncertain dominion, fragmented sovereignties and unclaimed lands had become metrically parcelled out between a few powerful modern states. Combining the rationalist dreams of republicanism, the romantic fervours of nationhood and positivist utopianism, territory had come to pervade modern political thought. Its ascent to this position was tortuous and its figurations elusive, contradictory and inconstant. First re-imagined as the object of a perfected administration and democratic design, then as an ancient national homeland awaiting rediscovery, then the material result of
technology, then the immanent expression of social development, territory gained its modern conceptual variance, in a palimpsest far exceeding its pairing with sovereignty during the Enlightenment. This trajectory, which I have only sketched here, remains worthy of more detailed study.

At the turn of the century, given the apparent success of European imperialism in claiming all frontiers, the concept of territory found itself at yet another set of crossroads. Subject to idioms of imperial federation, humanitarian protectorates, cultural spheres of influence, geopolitics, or self-determination, territory would soon experience yet more controversy.168 In the aftermath of the First World War, christened twice at the Paris Peace Conference and at the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the concept of territory was once more pulled in different directions, at once the object of nationalist claims, principles of self-determination and the radical designs of soviet socialism. This story, though worth telling, belongs to another day.

For now, we remain in the nineteenth century and turn to the heart of this thesis and our ‘anarchist’ thinkers. In this chapter, besides discussing broader nineteenth-century controversies around territory in their own terms, I also positioned some of the critical contexts against which Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin would intervene. Proudhon, I will argue, discussed territory through the prism of post-revolutionary republican concerns with constitutionalism. Turning to Bakunin, I will return to Romantic contests over territory and nationhood. With Kropotkin, at last, I will revisit the context of late-century positivist social theories. Though these prisms will ground our discussion, I will also show how Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin challenged these contexts creatively. We begin with Proudhon.
Chapter 3. Proudhon’s Territories: Post-Revolutionary Republicanism, Property and Federalism

Hailed as ‘the father of anarchism’, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) remains a poorly understood thinker in Anglophone academia. Though often recalled for phrases such as ‘property is theft’, Proudhon’s writings have received limited critical engagement, making short shrift of any curiosity about this allegedly major nineteenth-century dissenter. This landscape, however, has begun to be challenged by scholars such as Edward Castleton, Anne-Sophie Chambost and Alex Prichard. Chambost’s *Proudhon et la Norme*, for instance, has cast new light on Proudhon’s conception of law and his polemics on political representation, whilst Prichard’s *Justice, Order and Anarchy* has offered a new analysis of Proudhon’s thought on war and international order. It is to these efforts to re-interpret Proudhon through careful linguistic contextualism that this chapter contributes. This is be done by addressing the question of where and how the concept of ‘territory’ figured at different moments in Proudhon’s writings.

Here, two moments are engaged with: Proudhon’s 1840s writings on property, and his 1860s writings on federalism. These writings have often been adumbrated as foundational for anarchism, yet as argued in Chapter 1, I take interpretative distance from preconceptions of Proudhon as ‘an anarchist’. Deploying attentive reference to the specific texts discussed as well as to their political and intellectual context, I ground my interpretations on explicit textual evidence and refrain from attempting to characterize Proudhon’s thought as a coherent ‘whole’ or as a precursor to any present doctrine. Whilst I locate the gravitational centre of my work in the texts analysed, I have also benefitted from a more general survey of Proudhon’s works, as well as from the contextual maps laid out by key intellectual biographies by Pierre Haubtmann, Steven K. Vincent and Anne-Sophie Chambost.
3.1. Natural Law, Industrialism and Republicanism in *What is Property?*

The people at last consecrated property… God forgive them for they did not know what they were doing. For the last fifty years they have expiated this miserable mistake […] There was a progress in the evolution of the law, there was no revolution.7

Written between September 1839 and May 1840, Proudhon’s *What is Property?: Or, an Inquiry into the Principle of Right and Government* resonated with the quandaries of the July Monarchy (1830-1848).8 A ‘liberal’ and constitutional regime, the July Monarchy was portrayed by its defenders as the historical accomplishment of French history, achieving balance between republican reforms and moderation.9 In this spirit, the July Monarchy proclaimed its commitment to constitutional liberties, the sacred right of property and national glory. Yet for all these commitments, by 1839, ‘the semi-centennial of the Revolution passed unmarked by official celebration’.10 In fact, by 1835, a series of censorship laws restricted freedom of the press, banning even the printing of the word ‘republic’ and suppressing left-wing ‘republican’ clubs such as the Society of the Rights of Man.11 Adding to this strained relationship with republican history, the July Monarchy took an uneasy position as to France’s social and economic situation. Ushered in partially by the 1827-1832 economic crisis, the regime continued to be beset by food crises and economic instability, especially between 1837-1840 and 1845-1848.12 Whilst the regime attempted reforms to industrialize the country and ease growing pauperism, its chequered results led to many critics seeing the regime as faithful only to the interests of ‘an aristocracy of wealth’.13 In these circumstances, ‘the question of property’ compounded social and political pressures. On one hand, the right of property was heralded as one of the great acquis of the French Revolution, freeing all citizens from feudal dependency. On the other hand, most property titles remained concentrated in a limited elite and participation in political life was limited by property qualifications.14 In this context, the July Monarchy’s triumphant canonizations of ‘property’ as a panacea of modern liberty and prosperity stood awkwardly in the context of continued mass poverty and disenfranchisement.
Whilst this social and political background pervaded Proudhon’s famous polemic, it is helpful to trace its context within our author’s biography. As noted by various scholars, Proudhon’s project to write on property emerged in the context of his years as a grantee of the Pension Suard.\textsuperscript{15} As a beneficiary of this academic grant, Proudhon had been pursuing studies in Paris: attending lectures at the Collège de France, reading compulsively and writing his first long essays. These essays corresponded not only to the development of Proudhon’s interests but also to literary contests. In this manner, Proudhon’s polemic on property was motivated by the 1840 Academy of Besançon contest, which invited essays on the ‘hitherto and likely economic and moral consequences of the law of equal division of goods between children in France’.\textsuperscript{16} In addition to this, as argued by Castleton, Proudhon’s interest in the question of property stemmed from his investigations on Hebrew ‘legislation’ in his 1839 essay \textit{On the Utility of the Celebration of Sunday}.\textsuperscript{17} In this tract, drawing on a radical reading of the Decalogue and the historical jurisprudence of Emmanuel de Pastoret, Proudhon placed strong emphasis on the idea that the goal of any legislation ought to be the institution of equality of conditions among men.\textsuperscript{18} ‘Property’, he claimed, though originally stemming from this intention, had degenerated into entrenching inequity.\textsuperscript{19}

Proudhon’s \textit{What is Property} would build on many of the themes initiated in \textit{On the Utility of the Celebration of Sunday}. Beyond this, it is important to emphasize the institutional context that influenced Proudhon. This can be gleaned not only from his readings, but also from the lectures he attended and the tutorship he received.\textsuperscript{20} Among these, it is significant to emphasize the critical influence of the then reigning philosophy of ‘eclecticism’ led by Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy, Philibert Damiron and others.\textsuperscript{21} This school’s influence was then pervasive in Parisian academia, with disciples such as the historians Edgar Quinet and Jules Michelet or the jurists Raymond-Théodore Troplong and Eugène Lerminier. Though this intellectual context was key to \textit{What is Property}, its specific impact remains unsatisfactorily charted. Lastly, it is relevant to emphasize Proudhon’s discomfort in this milieu. Whilst passionate in his studies, Proudhon’s correspondence depicts this society of letters as shallow and vain.\textsuperscript{22} In contrast, Proudhon imagined himself as a follower of ‘truth and the republican faith’, a ‘son of the people’ devoted to ‘the cause of the poor’.\textsuperscript{23} In writing \textit{What is Property}, Proudhon therefore combined a series of hopes. On one hand, he hoped to achieve academic success, on the other to ‘speak for’ the
poor, but perhaps most importantly, he hoped to provide a convincing argument as to why modern property was unjust and held back human progress.

In his own earliest notes on the project, Proudhon described his aim as to ‘show that in following the principles on which property is defended, these principles lead directly either to the equality of fortunes, or to absurdity; property is the law of wolves not of man’. In his final revision of this text, Proudhon pursued this initial design in four main moves. To begin with he positioned the concept of property, contrasting legal and philosophical arguments. In legal terms, Proudhon drew from the Code Napoléon and commentators such as Charles Toullier. Considering the Romanist roots of the Code, Proudhon argued property was understood as *jus utendi et abutendi re sud*, the right to use and abuse a thing. In contrast to this, Proudhon then discussed property as a ‘natural right’. Recalling this understanding as fundamental to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, Proudhon went on to discuss an understanding of property as a natural right by drawing on Thomas Reid’s critical writings on natural law. From Reid, Proudhon took the argument that man’s ‘natural right’ was the right to live, and to procure the means to do so; which implied a right of work and temporary appropriation, but not of property. With this understanding at hand, Proudhon dismissed the theories of Destutt de Tracy and Victor Cousin, which understood the right to property as an innate extension of personal liberty. In opposing civil law and natural rights philosophy, Proudhon was putting forward his key distinction – that of positive property as opposed to a natural right of possession.

Having deployed this productive distinction, Proudhon went on to dismantle two sets of recurring arguments for the defence of positive property. First, he tackled the defence that property was the result of primitive ‘occupation’. At the level of natural rights, Proudhon noted that if ‘occupation’ should be seen as part of a natural right to have the means to live, then, given this right was equal to all living men, no occupation could be seen as giving perpetual title to any individual. In geometric fashion, he argued that if ‘a hundred thousand men establish themselves in a country as large as France, and empty of inhabitants: the right of each man to territorial capital is of one hundred thousandth. If the number of possessors augments, the part of each diminishes by the ratio of that increase’. At the level of civil law, Proudhon countered classical arguments that property had resulted from securing agriculture as a means of
civilizational development. Whilst Proudhon located these arguments in the works of Charles Toullier and Robert-Joseph Pothier, they have a longer history in thinkers such as John Locke, Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf. Challenging such Enlightenment accounts, Proudhon deployed ‘historical jurists’ such as Emmanuel de Pastoret and Charles Giraud to argue that primitive agricultural societies had initially organized only the possession of land, and had done so with the intention of securing an enduring equality of conditions amongst their members. Although this primitive intention had been egalitarian, Proudhon argued it had been thwarted by the transformation of cultivated plots into familial patrimony. Though instituted to conserve ‘the equality of partitions’ across generations, inheritance had led to ‘disastrous exclusions’. In short, Proudhon’s attack on justifications of property through ‘occupation’ was double. On one hand, natural rights arguments led not to justifying perennial property but to reinforcing relative rights of possession. On the other hand, reference to the historical origins of property revealed not a providential primitive appropriation but instead that the degeneration of primitive possession resulted accidentally from an erroneous legal development.

Second, Proudhon took aim at justifications of property based on labour. Here, his chosen antagonists were the liberal Industrialists Charles Comte and Jean-Baptiste Say. Following Smithian inspirations, these thinkers argued that property found its justification in that it enabled labour to create social wealth. For Proudhon, such arguments were well summed up in Comte’s claim that ‘men that render the earth more fertile are not less useful to their equals than they would be if creating a new expanse’. Proudhon’s issue with this justification was somewhat oblique. On one hand, he accepted the idea that labour was the greatest source of wealth creation. On the other hand, Proudhon discounted all arguments that implied that landed property would be justified by this. First, he argued that given the ‘earth’ was a ‘natural gift’ susceptible to a right of use by all, no amount of labour could justify absolute appropriation of this gift. Arguments as to the scarcity of land only reinforced, rather than weakened, this argument. Second, and more daringly, Proudhon argued that the value created by applying labour to land could not be awarded to any one individual, even if he had the prescience to organize such labour. Drawing on economists’ emphasis on the multiplying force of combined labour, Proudhon argued that given all production was collective, the value produced beyond the needs of sustenance ought
to be considered social capital which no individual could hold as ‘exclusive property’. Further drawing on the idea of combined labour, Proudhon countered arguments about differentiated remuneration by emphasising that laboural diversity ought to be seen as the condition of productive combinations, rather than the reflection of unequal productive capacities. In sum, Proudhon’s critique of Industrialists entailed not only that exclusive control of land ought to be illegal, but also that disproportionate appropriations of labour value ought to be outlawed. In such a vision, property was recast not as enabling labour to gain its due, but rather as an obstacle to just distribution.

Having, to his mind, shown property to be morally and socially unjustifiable, Proudhon devoted his final chapter to outlining a ‘psychological’ history of human societies. In the style of the eclectic ‘philosophies of histories’ of Cousin and others, Proudhon’s aim was to explain which enduring moral principle could best account for social development. To do this, Proudhon began by establishing a parity between animal and human sociability, shown especially in an instinct towards sympathy and species conservation. He also argued human morality distinguished itself due to a capacity to discern individuality from the collective and to recognize ‘in others a personality equal to ours’. In addition, Proudhon noted that human sociability developed complex forms of association, combining a great diversity of talents and labour. Recognition of this fact led to sentiments of ‘equity or social proportionality’.

From these three ‘psychological’ stages of human sociability, Proudhon claimed history could be portioned into three social forms – communism, property and liberty. Given its animal sociability, human society had initially been instinctively communist – all things were forcibly shared equally and individuals sacrificed for the common good. Provocatively, Proudhon’s examples of such communities included Plato’s imaginary republic, Lycurgus’s Sparta and primitive Christian ecclesiastic communities. Rousseau’s writings, as well as the imaginings of Saint-Simonians and Babouvists, were charged with being caught in this ancient trap, in which community was synonymous with ‘oppression and servitude’. Against this ‘stupid and beatific uniformity’, a society based on property had resulted from individual consciousness rebelling and seeking personal reward. This development, Proudhon claimed, was well represented in how ancient texts, such as the Odyssey, represented cunning thieves and brutal conquerors as heroes.
From this, Proudhon claimed a society based on property had consolidated a right to exclude and enserf, thus consecrating despotism and social inequality. This social form, seen in antiquity and in feudal Europe, insinuated its continued presence in how the ‘benefits of industry, of commerce and of the bank’ were still captured by a ‘right of ruse’. However, whilst the curse of primitive communism had been imbecilic stability, he argued that individuated societies were trapped in a form of exclusionary accumulation, which led to ‘periodical explosions of the proletariat against property’ and to ‘the degradation and death of societies’. To overcome this infernal cycle, Proudhon claimed a third social form was necessary. This form, he wrote, would discard ‘property and royalty’ as outcomes of a wayward belief in ‘the sovereignty of will’, or that power should accrue to the strong. Instead, in recognizing the immorality and chaos brought by the right of might and ruse, human societies were en route to acknowledging ‘the sovereignty of reason’, which revealed the value of association and would organize equality among men and balance among nations through a just law and economic administration. This apotheotic vision would correspond to a society based on ‘liberty’, which would ensure:

[E]quality amongst men, balance amongst nations, […] that industry […] be distributed according to the geographical and climatic conditions of each country […] in such just, wise and well combined proportions, that no place will ever have an excess of, or want for, population, consumption and products.

3.1.1. The Spectre of Republicanism: Territory in What is Property?

In What is Property Proudhon covered an ambitious range of matters. At heart, his aim was to argue that present legally sanctioned forms of property could not be justified with appeal to the egalitarian morality of natural rights. Property was not only legally defined as a right to use and abuse but was also socially shown as enabling abusive economic and political power. In opposition to a varied field of jurists and economists, Proudhon argued that ‘the right of occupation impeded property’, that ‘the right to work destroyed it’, and that the natural right to life implied a right to possess the means to live. Furthermore, he argued that the combined character of labour made wealth a
social good, and that the exclusive entitlement by the select few was therefore unacceptable.\textsuperscript{56}

Be this as it may, how was this moralist argument in any way related to territory? In *What is Property*, territory is not a frequent term – recurring only fifteen times in over two hundred pages - but it is entangled in two key conceptual games. The first of these concerns debates about natural law and appropriation; the second concerns the relationship between ‘national property’ and the spectre of republican politics. In attacking defences of property through occupation, Proudhon’s endpoint had been to claim that it was not property but ‘the means to live’ that ought to be considered a natural right. This results not in rejecting natural law arguments but in upending them – it was not property but possession that stood as an ‘unalienable right’.\textsuperscript{57} In posing this inversion, Proudhon followed former narratives of natural law and the origins of property to subvert them. Taking Robert-Joseph Pothier’s *Traité du Domaine de Propriété* and Charles Toullier’s *Du Droit Civil* as examples, Proudhon retraced how such narratives emphasized that the Earth had been a divine gift and that the development of agricultural societies had caused the institution of property and with it a civil state and law.\textsuperscript{58} Arguments for ‘property’ operated in terms of landed property. Challenging this narrative, Proudhon argued that agriculture had initially relied on ‘territorial possession’ and that ‘permanent property, as we know it today, is the work of civil law’.\textsuperscript{59} Defending this shift, Proudhon argued that a study of ancient nations showed not that ‘property’ was the foundational ‘fact’ of civil society, but rather that ‘property’ had been the outcome of a series of erroneous legal customs being applied to land (e.g. the right of inheritance, the right to alienate).\textsuperscript{60} In this light, reversing dominant legal narratives, the right of property had not been a ‘natural outcome’ of agricultural development but a cumulative legal accident that had undermined the ‘natural’ equality of possession in ancient societies. The legal right to property was not the reification of ‘natural’ possession but its denial. In Proudhon’s own words, ‘occupation is always subordinate to population; hence, legal possession can never remain fixed, it is impossible, in fact, for it to become property’.\textsuperscript{61} With this argument, Proudhon argued that on no moral ground could the ‘domain of the soil […] be prescribed’.\textsuperscript{62}
Up to this point, Proudhon’s argument could be understood by reference to questions of entitlement to land and the Christian conception of the Earth as a natural gift, whereas territory appeared elusively. Beyond this, however, Proudhon also considered the idea of private property in contrast to national property. This contrast was articulated through a critique of Charles Comte’s *Treaty of Property*, especially in a chapter ‘On the Conversion of National Territory into Private Properties’. In this chapter, Comte sought to argue that primitive private occupation had often been carried out without *usurpation*, and had been beneficial to surrounding peoples. Using his reading of Malthus, Comte argued that ‘men who fertilised the earth’ acted as if they were creating a ‘new extent’. Interestingly, this argument was premised on the idea that private property emerged out of ‘fractions of national territory’. In Comte, this insistence on ‘national territory’ was not only a statement of the thesis of primitive communism but an emphasis on enduring national spaces as ‘divisions of nature’, first enabled by geophysical borders. In his own words, ‘each people, considered in mass, has a territory that it possesses exclusively, and which forms its property […] this fact is not only recognized, but it is generally indestructible’. For Proudhon, however, such a statement was wrong-headed - a nation should not be considered as holding its territory as *property*, but merely as a possession. In making this distinction, Proudhon laid the ground for two arguments: first, that seeing territory as ‘national property’ enabled an alienation of public ‘patrimony’ and, second, that it betrayed the remains of a feudalist conception of politics.

In terms of ‘patrimonial alienation’, Proudhon’s argument drew directly from his earlier reading of a natural right of possession and the degeneration of Hebrew law. In Proudhon’s own words, this amounted to the question of whether ‘today’s generation can dispossess tomorrow’s’. As the Earth ought to be seen as a natural gift, guarded by nations in view of individuals’ natural right of possession, to alienate access to land as ‘private property’ ought to be seen as transacting a natural right – which was morally indefensible. Furthering this position, Proudhon met Comte’s argument that alienations of national territory into private property were justified because prior to these alienations, land plots produced little wealth or means of subsistence. In Comte’s view, ‘one must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of these usurpations […] if the extent of land worth today a thousand francs was worth only five cents when it was usurped, only the value of five cents was ravished’. For Proudhon, this was
reasoning in bad faith, as it was not the present productive value of land that was alienated but a perennial entitlement to access its fruits. In his own words:

[T]he soil has not only an integral and current value, it also has a value of potency and future […] in losing your title […] you alienate not only one, two, or many harvests, but you annihilate all the products that you could draw from it, you, your children and the children of your children.\textsuperscript{70}

More significantly, in critiquing Comte, Proudhon was not only addressing theoretical arguments about the origins of private property but also contemporary politics. This was astute, as Comte’s \textit{Treaty} had advanced its ‘value’ arguments for the ‘conversion of national territory into private properties’ not only to justify the ancient origins of private property but also to intervene in contemporary debates about the privatization of goods in the public domain. In this vein, Comte’s examples alternated between imagining the passage of nomadic nations into agricultural civilization (a natural law \textit{locus classicus}) with reflections on why France’s government ought to sell unused lands in the national domain. In Comte’s rationale, just as in ancient societies, this alienation would lead to multiplying the productive value of extents of land held as national property. At one level, this argumentation seemed to merely follow Physiocratic and English political economists in a concern to render all land more productive, in encouraging ‘improvement’ through private property. At a second level, however, Comte’s argument was specific to legal debates on the public domain and private property in France’s post-revolutionary monarchy. Conceived in the late 1820s, Comte’s \textit{Treaty on Propriety} was envisaged as part of a radical liberal campaign to defend the legal acquis of the Code Civil against royalist reactions, such as the efforts to reinstate the right of primogeniture and distribute indemnities to \textit{émigrés} expropriated by the Revolution.\textsuperscript{71} When writing in the early 1830s, Comte added a new set of concerns, namely those of justifying the right limits to the 1833 law of expropriation for the cause of public utility.\textsuperscript{72} In this light, Comte’s recurring reflections on ‘employing’ unused marginal lands in the national domain by privatizing them, appears in continuity with post-revolutionary concerns to consummate the emergence of private property from feudal dependency (as outlined above). It was with this political context in mind that Comte wrote of ‘spaces of land […] which have not been converted into individual properties’ and encouraged the
government to employ them in ‘the common interest’ by selling them to ‘industrious’ men.\textsuperscript{73} For Proudhon, as for other left-wing republicans of his time, such a suggestion was far from innocent. On one hand, this sale unfairly empowered those with enough capital to buy such titles. On the other hand, its proceeds did not yield clearly into public wealth. In dramatic contrast to Comte, Proudhon imagined that if such ‘sales multiply, soon the people, who would not have wanted to sell, who have not received the proceeds, will have nowhere to rest, or shelter, or harvest: they will go to die at the door of the landowner, at the edge of that property which had been their heritage’.\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, opposing Comte’s Malthusian view that privatization led to greater yields, Proudhon argued that this failed to recognize the ‘pauperizing power of property’, and that ‘wherever this right is tolerated, independently of the wealth and extent of the soil, there are always too many inhabitants’.\textsuperscript{75}

Apart from these arguments insisting on a natural right of possession, first expressed in terms of access to land, and the patrimonialist subversion of Comte’s defences of ‘the conversion of national territory into private property’, Proudhon’s discussion hinged upon a third provocative reading of territory. Taking issue with Comte’s notion that a nation’s territory was its ‘property’, Proudhon retorted that nations ought to be seen only as guardian, or possessors of territory. Expecting disbelief, he interjected:

[I]f the reader found that disputing a nation’s property of its territory stretches logic, I will confine myself to recalling that it is from the fictitious right of national property that in all epochs are drawn pretensions of suzerainty, tributes, régales, corvées, contingents of men and money, supplies of goods, etc., and consequently, tax refusals, insurrections, wars and depopulation.\textsuperscript{76}

Strikingly, in this passage Proudhon not only argued that ‘the fictive right of national property’ was the source of requisitions, conscriptions and taxes (as if these were rental exactions) but also he did so with feudal vocabulary (i.e. suzerainty, régales, corvées). Rhetorically, this implied that the Revolution’s legal innovations had in fact retained much of past feudal logics. The casualties here were double: on one hand governmental appeals to eminent domain (i.e. ‘national property’) were seen as continuing feudal traditions of sovereign power; on the other hand private property was seen as polluted with the idea of feudal prerogatives of ‘arbitrary’ exaction. This second sense was notoriously enshrined in Proudhon’s decision to translate the ‘right
of property’ as a ‘right of aubaine’. At its root, the right of aubaine was the lordly right to inherit the goods of a foreigner deceased in seigneurial lands. This right, it should be noted, was the target of multiple abolitions during the French Revolution’s ‘abolition of feudalism’, as well as the focus of a Restoration law in 1819. Proudhon used the term more widely, defining it as ‘a tangible and consumable homage, competing to the owner in virtue of his nominal and metaphysical occupation’. Although it is unclear why Proudhon fixated on this particular term to establish a correspondence between the post-Revolutionary right of property and feudal rights, it is likely that Proudhon was attracted to the term because it referred to a form of disinheritance, something he would have been aware of from his readings of Toullier.

Beyond this, in relating the ‘fictitious right of national property’ to feudal depredations and modern taxes and conscription, Proudhon was criticizing governmental abuse. In later passages, he repeated this by writing that ‘a nation is like the farmhand of a great landowner called government, to whom she pays, for the exploitation of the soil, a rent known under the name of tax’ or that conscription was ‘an act of property exerted unexpectedly by the government on families’. In describing such governmental practices as ‘acts of property’, Proudhon was not making a general anti-statist argument, but he was rather accusing the contemporary government of acting as a proprietor. In attacking tax as a form of national ‘rent’, Proudhon’s following point was that the capital thus raised was not used to better the nation’s productive capacities, but to finance debts. Similarly, in attacking conscription, Proudhon’s point was to argue that this ruined peasant families, either by depriving them of their best labour or by forcing them to go into debt to ransom this conscription. In critiquing such practices as abusive ‘acts of property’, Proudhon’s aim was to delegitimize such acts as serving the public good, and instead present them as part of a long tradition of ‘despotism, the government of bon plaisir, the reign of libidinous will’ once linked to royal sovereignty. Placing this critique of the July Monarchy under the veil of philosophy, Proudhon’s argument suggested that the liberal equivalence between eminent domain and ‘national property’ betrayed a continuity, rather than a break, with a long history of governments that destroyed social order by committing themselves to the right of property. In other words, the French Revolution had not been accomplished.
3.1.2. Appealing to History: Eminent Domain, Territory and Property in the Second Memoir

Published in July 1840, *What is Property* gained Proudhon some instant notoriety and many mixed reactions, and almost cost him the third year of his *Pension Suard*. In 1841, however, Proudhon decided to publish a rejoinder to *What is Property*, explicitly addressed to the political economist Adolphe Blanqui (who had reviewed Proudhon sympathetically) and taking the opportunity to further justify his views on property. The present interest in the Second Memoir is that it included commentary on the writings of legal historians of property, thus clarifying what was at issue in Proudhon’s early considerations of territory. Engaging with the classical works of Bossuet and Montesquieu, as well as the legal histories of Emmanuel de Pastoret, Charles Giraud, Édouard de Laboulaye, Jules Michelet and Jonas D. Meyer, Proudhon attempted to discuss how the study of ancient Greece, Rome and the European Middle Ages revealed the historically catastrophic character of ‘the right of property’. Proudhon’s aim was to emphasize that property had a long history of social ruination. In so doing, he was consciously radicalizing traditional attacks on luxury and large estates as the sources of social conflict and civilizational decadence. This theme, it should be emphasized, was central to both eighteenth-century republican writings as well as post-revolutionary liberal tracts.

Proudhon’s historical discussion was focused on three moments – the foundations of the ancient constitutions of Sparta, Athens and Rome, the rise of the Roman Republic and Empire, and the development of European feudalism. In discussing the foundational ‘constitutions’ of Lycurgus of Sparta, Solon of Athens and Numa Pompilius, Proudhon emphasized how the different legislative paths had led to ruin. Lycurgus had failed to institute a love of industry in Sparta, thus leading its citizens to pillage and slavery. Solon had enshrined a greater political influence for the citizen of greater property, thus instilling perennial conflict among citizens. It was for Numa Pompilius, however, that Proudhon reserved his harshest judgements. In the reign of Numa, in the eighth century B.C.E, the dilemma of how to dispose of conquered lands had first posed itself to the Roman Republic. Before Numa, Proudhon claimed, ‘property in Rome was national, not private’. In a foundational moment, however,
Numa had created ‘individual properties by dividing the lands Romulus had conquered’, thus leading to ‘the inequality of fortunes, the absolute abdication of the eminent domain of the republic over the citizens’ properties’. From this act, Proudhon continued, all ‘Roman revolutions’ had ensued. Founded on a land-based inequality of fortunes, Ancient Rome would develop in a voracious history of social conflict, foreign conquest and concentration of property.

Drawing mostly from Laboulaye’s account, Proudhon recounted the history of Ancient Rome as a series of struggles between patricians and plebs over property, where the success of patricians in accumulating vast amounts of landed property precipitated the loss of republican liberty and the decadence of the Empire. In particular, Proudhon focused on discussing the perversion of the ager publicus, the conquered lands under the republic’s management. First, he argued that the patrician class had monopolized the concessionary uses of parts of this ‘public domain’. As these lands were considered public, they fell not within the right of citizens to property but within a special class of rights of possession. Although this had not conferred ‘absolute’ titles on the patricians, it had enabled them to grow rich by holding large concessions of land, which were not taxed as properties. This concentration of wealth, in turn, had enabled patricians to buy citizens’ properties outside the agri publicus, thus leading most plebeians to a state of destitution and dependency. In this manner, Proudhon argued, large property had invaded small property.

This trend, Proudhon noted, had been contested politically at various turns and alternatives had been possible. Recalling the times of Tiberius Gracchus, a tribune of the people who ‘had wanted to limit the possessions of the ager publicus to 500 arpents per citizen’, Proudhon claimed that such measures would have led the concessionary possessions of these public lands to dissolve, rather than ‘engross property’, thus avoiding ‘the scourge of large domains […] [which] would desolate the empire’. As Proudhon himself noted, this point was critical for his argument:

I insist on this point which is of the highest importance, because it offers a historical perspective of that individual possession of which I have spoken so much in my first essay, and that few readers seem to have understood. The Roman Republic, by the faculty of disposing sovereignly of its territory and imposing conditions on its possessors, was closer to liberty and equality than
any nation yet. Suppose the senate had been intelligent and just, suppose during a retreat in the Mons Sacer [...] a solemn renunciation of the right to acquire by each citizen having reached his contingent of possession: and the republic, constituted on the equality of possessions and the duty of labour, would have achieved wealth without degenerating its mores. [...] [T]he conquests of the people-king would have been a propaganda of civilization, instead of a series of assassinations and banditry.96

In this new appeal to history, Proudhon renewed his argument against property by emphasising how the failure of the Roman Republic had stemmed directly from its uneven access to possession of public lands. This story, it should be noted, differed from his focus on the degeneration of patrimonial inheritance into alienable private property in the ancient Hebrew context, as discussed earlier. Here, possession and property had existed in parallel, as two legally differentiated forms of right, one specific to public lands (jus possessionis in agri publici) and another to citizen properties (dominium quiritarium). It was in the failure of an equitable use of eminent domain over public lands (‘the faculty of disposing sovereignly of its territory’) that the republic had failed to create a society ‘closer to liberty and equality’.97 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this narrative was used in parallel with the post-revolutionary history of France. Thus, referring to the confiscations and sales of the biens nationaux in 1789 and 1793, Proudhon criticized this event as having done nothing but ‘enrich nimble proletarians, who having become aristocrats, today make us pay our fathers’ plunders dearly’.98 In contrast, Proudhon imagined, the Republic would have succeeded if, instead of seizing properties, it had applied ‘the great principle of collective production’, giving ‘the State eminent domain over all capital, rendering each producer responsible, abolishing customs and transforming into public functions all kinds of professions and crafts’.99 Through this, he claimed, ‘large property’ would ‘vanish without confiscation or violence’ and ‘individual possession would be constituted without community under the inspection of the republic, and the equality of conditions would depend on nothing but the citizens’ will’.100 Later in the text, addressing the proletarians of his own time, Proudhon wrote

You want, proletarians, to bring rules upon property, which is to say you want to destroy it and bring back the right of possession. For bringing rules upon
property, in spite of owners, is to reject domanial right; it is to proscribe eminent right, to give it associates. ¹⁰¹

In Proudhon’s Second Memoir, then, reference to territory was innovated through reference to the socio-legal history of Ancient Rome and the idea of an ‘eminent domain’. In his first intervention, Proudhon had argued several key positions: that it was possession of the means to live, and not property, which ought to be sanctioned by civil law; that the right of property had developed as a legislative mistake; that the teleological aim of social history was to reach liberty and equality of conditions; and that the notion of ‘national property’ ought to be regarded with mistrust. Within the Second Memoir, most of these positions held, although new arguments were brought forward. With respect to territory, Proudhon’s recounting of Roman history as a failed republican project was key in that it made a new and more explicit claim as to how to organize ‘national possession’, rather than ‘national property’ or ‘absolute property’. By reference to the history of the agri publici as a legal realm of public land and rights of possession, Proudhon reflected on the problem of equitable possession in a new light.

Translating the distribution of these lands into an application of a national ‘eminent domain’, Proudhon could point to how this legal device of ‘territorial’ concession was practicable, as well as how easy it was to abuse if monopolized by the gentry. As if in continuity with his invectives against Comte, this argument enabled him to gesture at the peril of seeing the ‘eminent domain’ of national territory as based on a ‘property right’, allowing permanent alienations of collective patrimony and being subject to imprudent governments. If understood as the result of the continuous association of all citizens’ natural rights, an ‘eminent right’ would dissolve private property into individual possession, and avoid drifting into the arbitrary and abusive patterns of past sovereignty. Ignorant of much of the detail of revolutionary struggles over the redefinitions of ‘national’ sovereignty and the legal debates on how to disentangle ‘property’ from feudal tenurial hierarchies (see Chapter 2), Proudhon had offered in his early writings on property a provocative and new argument about how to settle post-feudal rights of ownership and some of the relations between sovereignty and territory. With this vision, he would galvanize the imagination of some of the nineteenth century’s most influential socialists.
3.2. After the Flood: Territory and Nationality in the Writings on Federalism

The first part of this chapter discussed ‘territory’ in the writings of the ‘early’ Proudhon, while the second part shifts attention to the ‘later’ Proudhon, writing from 1858 to 1865. Between these two moments, Proudhon’s intellectual career was marked by many turns. The most significant were catalysed by Proudhon’s experience of the short-lived Second Republic, between 1848 and 1851. Participating as a member of the national assembly and publishing one of the most read newspapers, Proudhon lived through every step of the Republic’s troubled engagements with the problems of universal suffrage and ‘the right to work’. This was the period of Proudhon’s famous duels with Louis Blanc, Pierre Leroux, Adolphe Thiers and other prominent French republicans. Ultimately, however, what marked Proudhon most was the presidential election of Louis-Napoléon and the subsequent coup-d’état of December 1851. For Proudhon, the rise of Napoleon III’s Second Empire marked a decisive reactionary downturn, ushered in by the republican left’s failure to prevent the co-option of democratic and socialist ideas. Marked by these experiences, Proudhon’s writing after 1851 would recurrently refer back to 1848 to renew a campaign against the Second Empire and the republicans seen as enabling it. Proudhon’s writings on federalism in the 1860s were only the most effusive episode of this long campaign.

In recent years, the question of Proudhon’s ‘federalism’ has attracted renewed scholarly interest. Given the significance of appeals to Proudhon’s ‘federalist’ views in late nineteenth-century socialism, and at times hoping to recast the European Union’s ‘federalist’ designs, authors such as Jorge Cagio y Conde have sought to reopen discussion on this aspect of Proudhon’s thought. Most interestingly, many scholars have begun to examine Proudhon’s ‘federalism’ within the intellectual context of 1860s debates on ‘nationalities’. Following this fruitful trail, this section considers how Proudhon’s emphasis on ‘federalism’ emerged within a wide range of his later published and unpublished writings.
3.2.1. Political Contexts: The Second Empire and the Question of Nationalities

The crisis is raging and is not a chimera or a panic […] Are we going to try to conjure it with new political and bellicose fantasies? [Are we going] to exhaust the last democratic and Jacobin dada: the nationalities? 108

Towards the end of the 1850s, Proudhon’s invectives against the ‘dada’ of ‘nationalities’ pervade his correspondence. 109 This recurrence was primarily spurred by the outbreak of the Italian War of 1859, where Napoleon III supported the Piedmontese kingdom against Austria. In this context, Proudhon’s recurrent references reflected his growing frustration with appeals to ‘the cause of nationalities’ amongst the French republican press; appeals, he thought, which played straight into the hands of the imperial regime. 110 By 1859, Proudhon thought the Second Empire was fragile and that a war for ‘nationality’ served to reinforce its popularity at home, delay its collapse and press Europe towards reactionary politics. 111

These positions, it should be noted, were not entirely new to Proudhon, though he had not professed them publicly. As early as 1852, writing to his friend Charles Edmond, Proudhon suggested that the Second Empire balanced two ‘tendencies’: an ‘almost liberal’ concession to the need for deep economic reform and ‘a brutal Caesarism’ supported ‘per fas et nefas, by the sabre and the flail’. 112 For Proudhon, this ‘brutal Caesarism’ was expressed not only in domestic despotism but also in territorial ambitions. Writing to Edmond in 1852, he already believed that Louis-Napoleon ‘covets the Rhine border’. 113 By 1859, Proudhon believed the Empire to have exhausted its potential to affect economic reforms and to be entangled in warmongering to shore up its autocracy. In a parallel vein, Proudhon’s lack of faith in the cause of ‘nationalities’ also dated back to the early 1850s. Reacting to the manifestos of Mazzini’s European Democratic Committee, Proudhon mixed indignancy and dismissal. 114 Writing to his friend Marc Dufraisse in 1850, Proudhon argued that it had been ‘the policy of unityism of Mazzini, of nationalism by Kossuth, of the Teutonic empire by A. Ruge and his friends, [which] have lost everything in Italy, Hungary and Germany’. 115 Yet, in 1852, though Proudhon thought these politics wrongheaded, he did not see them as worth fighting. Writing again to Duffraise, he followed his tirade by stating that he would not ‘declare war on the patriots’. 116 As if putting a nail in a coffin, he noted ‘Mazzini, Kossuth, Darasz and Ledru-Rollin, four
lost men! Let them be mourned and let them be forgotten’. 117 For Proudhon then and later, the ‘real’ revolutionary question of 1848 was social and economic, not national.

In 1859, however, Proudhon was dazed by how the French newspapers such as La Presse, L’Opinion Nationale and Le Siècle flocked to defend the ‘principle of nationalities’ in the context of the Italian War.118 Most of all, Proudhon was confounded by how many exiled republicans sought to defend this ‘principle’ whilst claiming to oppose Napoleon III. In such circumstances, Proudhon thought it his duty to intervene publicly. 119 As he expressed to Charles Beslay in March 1859:

I have taken it upon myself to express the opinion of the Republic on this circumstance […] It was not possible to wait to find an agreement with ten or twelve refugees for such a declaration. […] They are willing to fight the Empire, but they make all reservations on the question of nationalities. – As for me, I show that this pretended question of nationalities, as they understand it, is a false principle, a false given, an anachronism, that I deny and pull to pieces.120

Crafting his first intervention within his War and Peace, Proudhon intended ‘to sink to the depths those famous dadas of nationalities, natural borders, treaties of 1815’, which had led republicans to legitimize the Empire’s belligerent policy.121 Starting this campaign in 1859, Proudhon would not abandon it until his death in 1865, devoting most of his published and unpublished manuscripts to addressing this topic. To a large extent, this was enabled by the political events of that period. Following the Italian War of 1859, debates around ‘the principle of nationalities’ continued to be polarized with regard to the plebiscite annexations of Savoy and Nice, the 1861-63 Polish upheavals and the 1862 unification of the Romanian principalities. In this procession, Proudhon was continuously outraged by what he saw as a successful imperial campaign to ‘mystify’ nationalities to its advantage. This manoeuvring, Proudhon thought, was catastrophic for European peace and for socialist republican politics. Within the early context of the Italian War, Proudhon thus described the Piedmontese Count of Cavour as ‘a great deceiver, setting Europe on fire to escape [state] bankruptcy’ and Garibaldi and Mazzini as agents of agitation and intrigue.122 Beyond upsetting Europe’s peace, this campaign also soiled republican ideas. Referring to the 1860 plebiscite annexation of Savoy and Nice to France, Proudhon
expressed outrage about how universal suffrage was applied demagogically. As he noted in his letters, it was shameful that the Italian state was ‘so prompt to throw away its ancient patrimony’ and use universal suffrage to ‘abjure the fatherland!’.%123 In this manner, Proudhon judged appeals to national restoration as poorly concealed projects for the ‘unitarian constitution of vast territories, on the model of the great powers whose centralization weighs so heavily upon peoples, [this is] monarchical imitation for the benefit of democratic ambition; it is not freedom, and much less progress’.%124 Seeing these appeals to nationalities as a tool of chauvinism, unrest and autocracy, Proudhon would not only craft a battery of arguments to meet its defenders but also would go on to develop his own alternative vision, with hopes of rallying republican opinion to a progressive path. This vision was summed up in his Of the Federative Principle.

3.2.2. The Panegyric of Federalism

Without that unfortunate question of Italy, occupied by other studies, perhaps I would never have thought of raising the banner of federalism […].%125

Written in three feverish months in the winter of 1862, Of the Federative Principle and the necessity to reconstitute the revolutionary party was by Proudhon’s own judgement an uneven piece, ‘very strong in places, soporific in others’, yet carrying ‘a formidable idea’.%126 Intended initially as a short pamphlet of sixty pages, Of the Federative Principle ended up as a 240 page book which Proudhon claimed was the first to deliver ‘the philosophy of the federal system’ and a methodical resolution of ‘the problem of the Republic’.%127 The ‘true social constitution’, he argued, was ‘the Federative Republic’.%128 This grandiose ambition was somewhat accidental, as Proudhon had initially intended only to write a reply to critics of his 1862 pamphlet, Of the Federation and Unity in Italy.

Of the Federative Principle included three parts: ‘on the principle of federation’, ‘unitarian politics’ and ‘the unitarian press’. The first and most original part summed up Proudhon’s new ‘philosophy of the federal system’ by presenting his conception of the federal republic as a ‘solution’ to the perennial instability of political regimes.
The second part focused on the ‘unitarian’ politics of France in the context of the Second Empire and the Italian question. In presenting his own analysis, Proudhon targeted accounts of ‘neo-Jacobin democrats’ committed to ‘the principle of nationalities’. Finally, the third part challenged critics in the French press, placing emphasis on questioning their faithfulness to republican beliefs. Joining together these three parts, Proudhon’s aim was not only to redress his critics but, as he argued in his conclusion, to show how his new federalist system offered France the means to regenerate itself and lead a world-changing revolution, ending economic want, the spectre of war and political agitation. Federalism, Proudhon seemed to promise, was not only the policy of the hour, but the end of history.

To appreciate Proudhon’s panegyric of federalism, it is helpful to retrace his steps in explaining the ‘philosophy of the federal system’. All political regimes, Proudhon claimed, resulted from trying to balance the antinomies between two perpetual principles – authority and liberty. Authority stemmed first from a principle of patriarchy given by nature and ‘tending towards hierarchy, centralization and absorption’. Liberty, on the other hand, stemmed from personal conscience and tended at critique, division and arbitration. This second principle, Proudhon noted, was ‘superior to the nature it uses, to the fatality it dominates’. Whilst liberty and authority were perpetually recast in their opposition, Proudhon suggested their political outcomes could be reduced to four ideal-type regimes: monarchy, communism, democracy or anarchy. Monarchy and communism were argued to be ‘regimes of authority’ stemming from patriarchal and physiological forms of indivisible power. Democracy and anarchy, on the other hand, were described as ‘regimes of liberty’, which sprang from the belief that political society could be determined by conventions and contracts, thus tending to divide power formally. This characteristic ‘division or separation of powers’, Proudhon argued, enabled society ‘to take a decidedly organic form’.

Having posed these ideal-type regimes, Proudhon proposed examining ‘empirical’ examples of states to show how these ‘principles’ were ‘transacted’ in various historical contexts, creating a myriad of hybrid states and ‘political contradictions’. These ‘contradictions’, he argued, were particularly visible in the paradoxical tendency for monarchies to become liberal and democracies to become despotic.
On one hand, monarchical governments supported by a patriciate or bourgeoisie tended to become preoccupied with defining law to defend privileged interests, often in the language of individual, corporative or local liberty. On the other hand, ‘democratic’ governments, spurred by a hatred of ‘caste privilege’ by masses ‘ignorant of the conditions of power’, tended to appoint ‘absolute leaders’. Thus, in a strange turn of events, ‘the party that most needs liberty and legal order creates absolutism’. From ancient Rome to post-revolutionary France, Proudhon argued, this inversion dragged society down ‘the endless slope of revolutions’. Was this problem ‘insoluble’, he asked, was humanity condemned to this ‘wheel of Ixion’?

Proudhon’s answer was a firm no. Returning to his philosophy of history, Proudhon argued that the long-term evolution of political society was towards greater liberty. Old monarchical regimes, he argued, would be forced to make concessions to liberty as they grew beyond their original tribal realm to incorporate greater population and territory. Extension corrupted authority and set conditions for the development of liberty. Moreover, he argued that, once liberal concessions were made, they would never recede completely. In ‘diacritical eras’, such as the French Revolution or the Reformation, ‘Liberty had officially overtaken Authority’. In the long run, authority gave way to liberty, the arbitrary became precarious, the law became more precise and ‘the Republic […] approached’. In this light, ‘political contradictions’ appeared epiphenomenal to the long-term advance of liberty in society. Furthermore, Proudhon suggested, society could ‘arrive at something regular, equitable and fixed, satisfying reason and conscience’.

To achieve this, Proudhon argued that it was critical to transform political and economic law substantively. First, the foundational ‘conventions’ that made political society had to be understood not as Rousseauist fictive ‘social contracts’ but as actual federative contracts. Contracting parts had to be identified in society and given power to determine the terms of their political union, under the condition that they exchange equivalent obligations and retain more ‘sovereignty and action’ than that which they alienated. For this form of contract to be possible, besides recognizing contracting parts and enforcing contractual equivalence, it was necessary to scrupulously restrain state powers. In a well-organized society, where ‘science, industry, wealth and public health’ were in ‘continuous growth’, the ‘principal organ
of movement’ ought to be the State.\textsuperscript{145} Yet, for this to occur, Proudhon argued the state had to function as an ‘initiator’, an ‘installer’ and ‘supervisor’ of systems of public utility, but not as a perpetual monopolist.\textsuperscript{146} If hoarding too many functions, the state would become ‘a vast anonymous corporation […]’ which instead of serving citizens or communes, would dispossess and pressure them.\textsuperscript{147} Such a state, constantly ‘augmenting its prerogatives’ and ‘engrossing its budget’ would succumb to ‘autocracy and immobilism’, leading its social body, ‘the nation’, to begin its decadence. This path, he argued, could be stymied by a federative system where small sovereign groups and small states premised on the division of power would federate in such a manner as to progressively reduce rather than increase the attributes of a central authority.\textsuperscript{148}

Historically, Proudhon claimed, this ‘federative system’ had not been possible or desirable, as great authoritarian states had to overcome ‘the original incapacity of nations’.\textsuperscript{149} In his own words, ‘it was necessary to tame, to fix the wandering, undisciplined and coarse multitudes, to form into groups the isolated and hostile city-states, to found, little by little, from authority, a common law’.\textsuperscript{150} Yet at present, according to Proudhon, this work of the ages was done, or at least in Europe. Having constitutionalized all governments, and having recognized the virtues of a ‘division of power’, the time was at hand to secure economic and political decentralization. This, he claimed, was all the more evident as ‘the whole of Europe called loudly for peace and disarmament’.\textsuperscript{151} The federative system, Proudhon argued, would end perennial ‘political contradictions’ by dividing the masses who enabled populist imperialism, and by instituting a form of law defending equality of conditions rather than privilege. Moreover, the federative system would end the descent into overburdening states, such as the Second Empire, which alternated between military and fiscal depredations upon the common welfare. Lastly, under this system, he argued that the artificial nationalities produced by authoritarian and expansionist states would disappear. In their stead, Proudhon prophesied the return of primitive nationalities, each situated in a distinct hydrographical basin and fixed within ‘the natural limits’ of a federative system.\textsuperscript{152} With the annexionist and absorbing tendencies of regimes of authority at an end, stability and equilibrium under a true regime of liberty would begin. The panegyric of federalism was made. Proudhon hoped it would capture the imagination of enough of French republican and socialist opinion.
3.2.3. The ‘Natural Limits’ of Federalism: Territory in Proudhon’s Social Organicism

Proudhon’s *Of the Federative Principle* posed an ambitious re-description of European politics and the path to a new form of social republicanism. Its arguments, however, were at times outlined somewhat vaguely and seemed to assume reading of his prior works, such as *Of Justice, Theory of Taxes* and *War and Peace*. This was nowhere as apparent as when it came to Proudhon’s philosophy of history and his description of long-term political development. This was particularly evident in terms of territory. First, Proudhon contrasted the ‘natural limits’ of the federative system to the ‘annexionist’ nature of prior states. Rather than seeking aggrandizement, the federal system was seen as reliant on the formation of small autonomous states, which corresponded to ‘groups, given *a priori* by nature, whose average size does not exceed that of a population gathered on a territory of a few hundred square leagues’. Only such restrained states, on Proudhon’s account, could be ‘organs’ of progress. There were, it seems, spatial limits to an effective republicanism. Second, Proudhon insisted on the ancient ‘federalism’ of Italy and Gaul which, given their geophysical composition, had enabled a diversity of primitive nationalities to develop indigenously. These primitive nationalities, produced by geophysical or natural ‘territories’, would be reproduced in a federalist system as full liberty would allow nature’s full expression. Proudhoun thought these two organicist propositions, the social and the geographical, were perfectly compatible.

The origins of Proudhon’s social organicism go as far back as to his 1843 *Of the Creation of Order in Humanity, or Principles of Political Organization*, and his 1858 *Of Justice in the Revolution and the Church*. In 1843, inspired by Charles Fourier and Georges Cuvier, Proudhon had attempted to outline an organicist explanation of political thought and order throughout human history. Drawing on the naturalist Cuvier, Proudhon proposed to analyse society as a ‘living being’ made up of integrated ‘organs’, each with a distinct function, object and form. The development of ever more complex arrangements of social organs was revealed by political economy as the defining driver of social development. Social harmony was to be achieved when a highly developed social organism would recognize ‘the equivalence of its
Returning to this organicist analogy in *Of Justice*, Proudhon argued that society ought to be conceived of as made up of synthetic forces tied to specific groups. The particular character of each synthetic force was the source of each group having a distinctive identity. Whether a group was natural and progressive depended on whether its function matched its object. Groups exerting functions on the wrong objects led to inorganic relations and corrupted the social body. Such inorganic influences, Proudhon claimed, were particularly evident in political institutions throughout history.

Historically, Proudhon argued, governmental power had developed as an organ for the appropriation of collective force. This had begun with ancient families, where ‘the father was invested naturally with property and the command of the force resulting from the familial group’. He understood this patriarchal power as having grown as the family became a tribe, assisted by the labour of growing numbers of mercenaries and slaves. Following a ‘law of nature […] domestic authority became political authority’, Proudhon argued that anywhere a collective force grew, ‘a patriciate formed itself’. The idea of the patriarchal origins of political power was arguably taken from Louis de Bonald’s writings. Contrary to Bonald, however, Proudhon saw this transference as the beginning of social corruption, rather than of harmonious order. The patriarchal origins of political power had led to ‘an arbitrary economy and the artificial constitution of public power’. This artificial constitution was, for Proudhon, the cause of social convulsions through the ages. As he put it, with ‘collective forces appropriated, social power compressed, alienated, the government oscillated from demagogy to despotism and from despotism to demagogy, sowing ruins and multiplying catastrophes, in almost regular periods’. This disorder, Proudhon wrote, was proof of the ‘inorganism’ of past states. Yet, whilst this indicated the need for revolutionary reform, it did not imply the pointlessness of past errors. The study of the growth and decadence of past states, he argued, was valuable because ‘they have been, by their very inorganism, the revelation of a new State, and as an embryogeny of Revolution’. In other words, whilst in the past the state had developed as an ‘organ’ that drove the social organism into a disharmonious life, a long history of misdevelopment gradually revealed a better way of organizing social forces. This history not only revealed the true functions of the state but also its true form. In this manner, Proudhon suggested, the state had progressively transformed.
from being understood as the princely appanage of a glorified patriarch to ‘the reunion of many groups of different nature and object, rallied under a common law and in a common interest’. This state, he continued, was ‘a collectivity of superior order, in which each group […] concurs to develop a new force, which will be all the greater as the associated functions will be more numerous, their harmony more perfect’. In this manner, the ages ‘revealed’ that the true function of a political organism was to produce such a law that all social groups under it would find themselves in a harmony of interests. It would be only in Proudhon’s later writings, however, that the ‘form’ of this just and organic state would gain a more explicitly territorial aspect.

In the months following *Of the Federative Principle*, Proudhon worked on a manuscript provisionally titled *Theory of the Constitutional Movement in the 19th Century: Political Contradictions*. Left unfinished by his death in 1865, it was nonetheless published by his executors in 1870. In the fifth and sixth chapters of this manuscript, Proudhon attempted a new explanation of his organicist view of states and society. ‘Political society, or the *cité* […] is one and indivisible’, he began; however, ‘there are natural limits to all organisms’. Describing plants’ and animals’ natural limits in terms of height and lifespan, Proudhon suggested a ‘principle’, borne out ‘by experience as much as reason’:

> In all organisms, the force of unity is in inverse relation to mass, consequently, in all collectivity, organic power loses in intensity what it gains in extent, and reciprocally.

Applying this proposition to politics, Proudhon argued that:

> [T]he *cité* being essentially one, indivisible, inviolable, the more it would develop in its population and territory, the more its cohesional force; its governmental unity will have to loosen, under the penalty of tyranny, and ultimately rupture.

The truth of this statement, Proudhon claimed, was borne out by how ancient and modern states created colonies, which eventually became ‘emancipated’. In his own words, ‘[n]ature itself preaches us example. When the fruit is ripe, it detaches itself and creates a new organism, when the young man is of age, he leaves his father and
mother’. So too was the case of the independence of the United States, Canada, perhaps soon Australia and Algeria; so had been the case in Ancient Greece where ‘everyone founded free colonies, and inaugurated, around the Mediterranean, a civilization far superior to the one that later substituted it with imperial and praetorian unity’.

Later in his text, Proudhon reflected on whether different constitutional or governmental arrangements of large-scale states could make up for the absorption of the political societies or cités they encompassed. Unsurprisingly by now, he answered negatively. Local autonomy was not to be considered merely a counter-balance to central authority. Either it would be recognized as the original and ultimate form of political society, or it would remain merely ‘a subsidiary’ of the overgrown state. In Proudhon’s own words:

[When]ever men, followed by their women and children, assemble in a place, join their dwellings and crops, develop in their bosom diverse industries, create neighbourhood relations between them, and whether they like it or not, impose on themselves conditions of solidarity, they form a natural group, that soon becomes a cité or political organism, affirming itself in its unity, its independence, in its life or its own movement (Autokinēsis) and its autonomy.

These groups, he continued, ‘at a distance from one another, may have common interests, and it is conceivable that they […] associate […] forming a superior group’, yet it was ‘impossible’ for them to ‘abdicate themselves by a sort of immolation’ – ‘all these groups are, whatever they may think of themselves, and whatever they may do, cités, that is to say indestructible organisms’. In present days, ‘the vice of the political system’ was that ‘the provinces and cités of which the State is composed, and that, as natural groups, must all enjoy their full and entire autonomy, are instead governed and administered […] as conquered populations’.

Proudhon’s use of the word cité to refer to the ‘indestructible organism’ is worth commenting on here. Cité is a complicated term to translate. On the one hand, cité signifies merely a political community. On the other hand, this polity comes with a strong sense of a limited spatial scale, traditionally tied to the ‘city’. In Proudhon’s
Theory of the Constitutional Movement, he indicated both meanings as he began by presenting ‘cités’ and ‘political society’ as synonyms, but then implied a strong sense of spatial boundedness to this society, at times exchanging the term for city (ville) or province. Although ambiguity as to scale remains, Proudhon’s use of organicist language engaged strongly with the idea that a just political society was inherently tied to ‘natural groups’, which ought to be sovereign within small territories. Beyond this, he cautioned that ‘any organism that exceeds its just bounds, and tends to invade or annex other organisms, loses in power what it gains in expanse, and tends to dissolution’. Constitutional efforts to re-organize departments and municipalities were thus seen as impotent to overcome the need for full local autonomy. Beginning with Sieyès’ creation of the départements (see Chapter 2), Proudhon saw all efforts to devolve provincial autonomy as misguided attempts to avoid federalism by attenuating centralization. From 1789 to his day, he claimed France’s political upheavals resulted from a stubborn ‘political unitarism [… ] which consisted in retaining in governmental indivision, groups that nature has made autonomous and reason wants independent, united only by a link of federation’. In arguing for these ‘natural groups’, as argued above, Proudhon drew on post-revolutionary thinkers such as Cuvier, Fourier and Bonald to argue that society ought to be understood as an organism, whose good health depended on each organ having its functions and sphere delineated clearly.

3.2.4. ‘Political Topography’ and the Return of Nationalities: Territory in Proudhon’s Geographical Organicism

*Italy, I had wanted to say, is federal by the constitution of its territory.*

In his 1860s polemics on the ‘question of nationalities’, Proudhon often appealed to geographical arguments to counter those arguing that instituting ‘natural borders’ went hand in hand with creating states for unrepresented nationalities. Seeing in such arguments not only bad faith but also nonsense, Proudhon devoted several passages to debunking them and providing his own account of the relationship between geography and politics, past and present. Most relevant comments on this subject can be found in three pieces: *France and the Rhine, New Observations on Italian Unity* and *Poland.*
In these writings, Proudhon’s conceptual tactic was twofold. First, he argued that contemporary ‘nationalist’ appeals to ‘natural borders’ were most often focused on ‘strategic lines’, not ethnographic divisions. Second, he developed an original account of how geophysical territory related to ‘natural’ ethnic groups and primitive states. Combining these two lines of argument, Proudhon intended to divert contemporary appeals for the resurrection of old nationalities by employing them to support his federalist vision rather than one made up of great states. As he reflected in a letter to his friend Buzon, ‘dead nationalities do not resuscitate, at least not in the manner that is imagined’.186

Proudhon’s first sustained critique of the ‘principle of natural borders’ was articulated in his unfinished France and the Rhine, drafted in 1860.187 In this manuscript, he aimed to undo ‘the dangerous and unfortunately increasingly fashionable’ prejudice which led many to take ‘the principle of natural borders, combined with that of nationalities’ as a basis of ‘political topography’.188 Within this ‘prejudice’, Proudhon wrote, ‘rivers, mountain chains, [and] sea arms’ were seen as ‘separating territories’.189 In his view, however, this ‘principle’ for the delimitation of states had most often sprung from strategic considerations rather than a naturalist study. Reminiscent of the Napoleonic imaginary, he claimed, that what were often called ‘natural borders’, such as the Rhine river, were in fact being perceived not as natural limits to nationality but as transient ‘strategic lines’.190 Inverting this view, Proudhon claimed that ‘history and ethnography’ showed that what was often considered a ‘natural border’ was in fact ‘a centre and a milieu’.191 Where rivers, sea straights or mountains most often separated polities, this was testament to the artificial history of state warfare, rather than the natural histories of primitive nationality. In a chapter on the ‘natural limits of France’, Proudhon delivered this argument with clarity.192 From an ethnographic point of view, what were commonly called ‘natural borders’ were most often ‘literally imperceptible’: ‘nationalities are not distinguished clearly in the soil from one another, and only great distances and after lengthy centuries are differences marked’.193 What is more, such marked distinctions were not the result of nature but of politics, which ‘formed artificial groups’ under ‘central languages’.194

Through a naturalist gaze, however, Proudhon argued that:
By a mechanic and climatic necessity [...] populations tended to group themselves after the delimitation of the basins that they inhabit; so that their natural limits, ethnographic, linguistic, climatic, economic, would be placed at the point where plateaux divide, or take their source in streams of water.\(^\text{195}\)

Applied to ancient Gaul, Proudhon continued, this revealed twelve basins or ‘twelve hearths or groups of populations’.\(^\text{196}\) These populations, Proudhon noted, being ‘homogenous, distinct, and to a certain extent autochthonous’ could be considered as ‘destined by the nature of places, climate and language, etc. to form a State or a cité’ within ‘a defined basin’.\(^\text{197}\) This ancient geography, which created natural groups, Proudhon noted, was ‘a forceful necessity, from which the greatest States cannot subtract themselves’.\(^\text{198}\)

In another unfinished manuscript on Poland, Proudhon returned to a discussion of the question of ‘political topography’ and his ideas on the historical relationship between nationalities, states and hydrological basins.\(^\text{199}\) Here, Proudhon reinforced his positions with organicist language. As he noted, although ‘the idea of a limit or border is incompatible with the evolutionary nature of the State, from another point of view that idea imposes itself and forms the subject of an interesting question: that of the embryonary formation of the first growth and of the final destiny of the State’.\(^\text{200}\) The basin, he noted, could be seen as ‘the natural seat of the population, which forms the envelope and so to speak the shell, the armour of the State’.\(^\text{201}\) From this ‘embryonary alveolus’, primitive states developed by fusing valleys within ‘the same trunk through which their waters are confluent’.\(^\text{202}\) In this iteration, Proudhon thus suggested not only a geological origin of nationalities, but also of primitive states and their first vectors of growth. In this manner, he imagined rivers as leading to arborescent states absorbing various primitive nationalities. Although this aggregation often developed through war, it complied with natural pressures. As he summarized suggestively, ‘it is not like in America, where we see vast States separate from one another by straight lines’; instead, ‘a valley is united to another, a group to another group, a system to a system’.\(^\text{203}\)

In his last writing on this subject, *New Observations on Italian Unity*, Proudhon returned to his views on what we might call ‘political geography’. Conceived as a letter to the editor-in-chief of the *Messager de Paris* in December 1864, this short
piece summed up the Italian Question through what Proudhon saw as the ‘five principal elements’ of ‘political science’: geography, ethnography, history, political economy, law of nations’.\textsuperscript{204} This, he wrote, was in contrast to his critics, such as Émile de Girardin and others, who ignored such facts to instead ‘carve up states and boroughs, corral peoples, and make constitutions, \textit{ad libitum}’.\textsuperscript{205} Setting himself in contrast, Proudhon claimed to ‘scrupulously hold to account the configuration of territory, of rights and servitudes, of climate, of the character of inhabitants, their past, the state of their civilization and their relations with other peoples’\textsuperscript{206}. In ‘scrupulously’ considering geography, Proudhon opened summarily: ‘every agglomeration of men included in a clearly circumscribed territory, and able to live an independent life there, is predestined to autonomy. Small or great, this is what is called a power or a sovereignty, a State’.\textsuperscript{207} As in earlier writings, geophysical circumscription was claimed to ‘predestine’ primitive states, and perhaps future federal republics. Here, however, Proudhon reflected in more detail on the consequences of the unevenness of this natural influence, an unevenness premised on topographical accidents themselves. If natural conditions made for states of different size and power, how could this be argued in support of his federalist view?

To this problem, Proudhon gave two replies: the first by giving a further geophysical explanation for polities to tend towards liberty or authority, and the second, by deploying historical narrative to explain how state development interfered with these natural conditions. Adding to his argument about the political predestination of a ‘clearly circumscribed territory’, Proudhon proposed that:

\begin{quote}
[t]he more there is independence between different fractions of a country, isle, peninsula, continent, etc. the more for this reason there will be, by the nature of things, liberty amongst \textit{cités} and their inhabitants; and that liberty, [which is,] so to speak, indigenous, spontaneous, will disappear only by foreign cause, war or force.\textsuperscript{208}
\end{quote}

On the contrary, where ‘different parts of territory are in dependence of one another and will command each other mutually, the more [there is] tendency towards autocracy’.\textsuperscript{209} It was by this principle that some areas of the world were seen as having originated ‘great unitarian monarchies’, whilst others generated ‘republics or federations’.\textsuperscript{210} The first appeared in the interior plateaux of continents, whereas the
latter were most often coastal. Liberty, Proudhon wrote, ‘is a gift of the sea’. Thus, ‘civilization’, which was greatest as a product of liberty, was to be found in the Mediterranean shorelines, not in European, Egyptian or Persian interior plateaux. Such an assertion, Proudhon claimed, was clear in contrasting the achievements of ancient Greek states and ‘the Orient’. In sum, then, it was not only the geophysical size of basin that ‘predestined’ it for life as an autonomous state, but also its ‘independence’ and access to the sea, that predisposed it for liberty and small-scale statehood. At this point, however, Proudhon introduced an additional historical argument. Once great states formed in interior plateaux, their expansionist tendency would soon ‘absorb, into its sphere of attraction, a multitude of small states that nature would have wanted free’. Such had been the case in the formation of ancient Assyria, Egypt and Persia, Proudhon claimed.

Shifting his discussion from antiquity to the Middle Ages, Proudhon contrasted the regions of France and Italy to further his geographical argument. Following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, ‘ancient Gaul, fallen under the sword of Caesar and forced to undergo Roman centralization, kept the form that conquest had imprinted upon it’. This, Proudhon argued, could be ‘understood, to a certain measure’ due to the geographical dependency between ‘the great arteries’ of the Saone and Seine and the need for ‘great cities of the centre’ to have an ‘outlet’. Italy, on the other hand, ‘returned to its natural constitution’, rather than retain ‘the false unity conquest had imposed upon it’. Italy’s ‘natural constitution’, as he saw it, was that of a ‘long peninsula, divided in its length by a continued chain of mountains, from which are extended, on both sides, until the sea, a multitude of valleys, separated by so many crests and perfectly independent’. This was, Proudhon claimed, the ‘most original and decidedly federalist [constitution] in the world’. With the fall of Rome, he claimed that the return to this natural constitution had enabled Italy, ‘as a geared machine’, to host for a thousand years all that had given the Middle Ages its ‘thought, life and liberty’. ‘At the example and inspiration of Italy’, he continued, ‘other confederations had been formed: the Teutonic Hansa, the United Provinces, between the Scheldt, the Meuse and the Rhine, Switzerland, at last, which can be seen as a truncated federation from which the sea withdrew little by little’.

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In these reflections, then, Proudhon added some historical reflections to note how a continued geographical influence eased or hampered a return to a federalist constitution. Going further, he also pointed at how political history could artificially overcome or reproduce ‘natural constitutions’. Just as great plateaux states once absorbed neighbouring smaller states and imposed upon them ‘the form of conquest’, so too did some states had mimicked the tendencies of federalist ‘natural constitutions’ – such as in the case of Switzerland or the Hansa League. Thus, whilst noting a long history marked by ‘artificial absorptions’ of great states, Proudhon also noted that the ‘tendency towards autocracy’ in continental plateaux ‘would only be vanquished definitively by an artificial division of the country, imitating the natural division of freer States’.222

This implies that there was a wrinkle in Proudhon’s geographical organicist argument, since he claimed the influence of geophysical conditions was unchangeable. Geography, he thought, was a ‘fatality […] which we must resign ourselves to live with’.223 Some of his critics saw in such an assertion a mark of illiberal fatalism.224 Proudhon countered that although geography ought to be considered ‘a fatality’, it also ought to be understood as ‘the condition of liberty’.225 As he saw it, ‘the soil is to the nation what the body is to the individual, an integral part of the being […] which we are compelled to care for as for our spirit […] under penalty of destroying the body, the soul and liberty itself’.226 Proudhon’s insistence here is significant, since it clarifies some of his attachment to naturalist arguments. An awareness of ‘natural constitutions’, such as in those of geophysical territory, was not to be read as a simple materialist determinism but rather as a search for which material conditions underwrote the possibility for real liberty, an act of the spirit, to establish itself securely. Proudhon’s reference to geography, then, although employing the language of organicism, remained anchored to the motives of his broader philosophy of history, where liberty progressively affirmed itself in social norms.227 In this sense, it becomes clear why, in closing his last geographical arguments, Proudhon noted that ‘the best, most sound, and most natural of borders is the one that guarantees the populations it separates the most complete liberty, the most absolute self-government’.228
Conclusion

In politics, develop the federative idea and give a theory of Constitutions; - some comments on what is called nationalities, natural borders, etc. It is a kind of application of natural history to politics.²²⁹

Writing to his lifelong friend Bergmann in 1864, Proudhon summarized his recent and planned efforts as ‘a kind of application of natural history to politics’. Having discussed his organicist thought, with its analogies to embryos, organs, natural limits and geographical conditions, we can examine how Proudhon followed this intention. Part of what makes Proudhon’s thought interesting on this point is how these organicist analogies were articulated in tandem with his uptake of a ‘philosophy of history’, as understood by Victor Cousin and his followers. The harmony of an organism was thus tied to its ‘psychology’ and to how this consciousness developed throughout history to gradually shape itself into the image and instrument of a regime of liberty. Where Proudhon departed from Cousin and his followers was that he doggedly searched for more materialist or ‘naturalist’ explanations to what in Cousinian thought was a purer form of idealism or spiritualism. In this, it could be said, Proudhon was playing Feuerbach to Cousin’s Hegel. This indicates not only at the complexity of Proudhon’s thought, but also at some of its key continuities, especially in relation to Eclecticism.²³⁰ Such an awareness can only spur us on to further explorations.

This chapter examined two moments in Proudhon’s vast writings, which have often been adumbrated as critical foundations to the anarchist tradition: the critique of property and the (re-)invention of federalism.²³¹ My aim here has been to treat both moments with sufficient rigour to show what intellectual hinterlands they emerged from, while also reflecting on how these moments tackled arguments of territory.

Examining the 1840 critique of property, the chapter emphasized how Proudhon’s text expressed a challenge to the political context of the July Monarchy and its liberal defenders. Subverting contemporary views on Eclectic philosophy, theories of jurisprudence and political economy, Proudhon assembled a highly original attack on the arguments for property. Significantly, like his adversaries, Proudhon took ‘property’ as both a codified legal norm and a political institution. Unlike his adversaries, he attacked ‘property’ as an institution of feudalist depredation, of
economic and political despotism, rather than of liberty. In doing so, and in opposing property to possession and title to usage, Proudhon was giving new mileage to post-1789 republican concerns. Chief among these was the question of how to separate private ownership from public power, property from sovereignty and estate from territory. Inverting liberal appeals to territory as ‘national property’, he claimed territory ought to be treated as a form of national patrimony, an inalienable inheritance to which all citizens ought to have equal individual access. Proudhon’s thought was fuelled by a radical reading of the Decalogue, historical jurisprudence and natural law. In terms of territory, I have suggested that the most significant sources in Proudhon’s What is Property were Charles Comte’s Treaty on Property and the historicist jurisprudence of Pastoret, Giraud and Laboulaye.

The second part of the chapter moved twenty years forward to explore Proudhon’s ‘federalist’ writings, from 1859 to the time of his passing in 1865. To situate the political context of these writings, discussion began by commenting on Proudhon’s intense opposition to the French Second Empire. Haunted by the fact that this regime had been ushered in ‘democratically’, Proudhon saw the Empire as a dangerous avatar of demagogy and belligerence, a Caesarism that risked cannibalizing all republican institutions. In this context, Proudhon became increasingly agitated when, after the 1859 Italian War, he saw most of the French republican press unwittingly insist on the cause of nationalities. For Proudhon, such an insistence was politically fatal as it legitimized Napoléon III’s intervention and encouraged Europe on a slide towards general warfare and new despotic regimes. Furiously employing his pen as best he could, Proudhon contested this ‘democratic betrayal’ and argued for a renewal of republican ideas through the federative principle. In his last tour de force, Proudhon sought to argue that republicanism could only assure economic and political liberties through a regime of federated and highly autonomous small states. Such a system was desirable because it could not be easily hijacked by despotic and belligerent populism. More than a guarantee, Proudhon thought a federative system corresponded well to a philosophy of history in which liberty was progressively actualized. This actualisation, Proudhon sought to argue, was not a utopian goal, imposed by abstract morality, but the product of a form of ‘natural history’ in politics. Thus, in speaking for federalism, Proudhon employed arguments that described its ‘natural limits’ as marks of its higher organism.
I contend that this line of reflection opened a substantive new set of arguments on territory. First, in arguing society to be a collective being with intrinsic social limits, Proudhon employed an analogy to Cuvier’s biological theories. Transposing from Cuvier, Proudhon argued society ought to be seen as an organism whose organs were ‘natural groups’ with distinct functions, and were in need of harmonized relations. Drawing on Bonald’s idea of the patriarchal origins of monarchy, he claimed that great states had been an all-absorbing force leading to expansionism and ‘indivision’, thus restraining social potential. In contrast to this ‘inorganic’ history, Proudhon claimed that ‘political organisms’ ought to embrace the division of powers, political and industrial, by operating through small autonomous republics, cités of provincial proportions. Second, Proudhon developed a set of arguments on federalist natural limits by explicit reference to the influence of geography upon history. This, he intended to contrast with chauvinistic nationalists, such as Mazzini, who traced national limits to the artificial apogees of past empires.

Applying a hydrological theory to political history, Proudhon claimed that states first emerged as ‘embryos’ placed upon valleys with small homogenous populations, what he thought of as natural nationalities. From this theory, Proudhon sketched an argument where geophysical ‘constitution’ precipitated either a ‘multitude of independent republics’ or a great autocratic state, rooted in ‘dependent’ plateaux. Although, in an earlier period, great states had outgrown their geographical cradles and absorbed smaller states, Proudhon imagined a future where great states, now bodies of artifice, would imitate the ‘natural constitution’ of federalism, thus administratively instituting the federative systems indigenous to topographies such as Italy’s or Greece’s. On the other hand, Proudhon also deployed the assumption that a more liberal system would release these natural forces to act freely, where they were now eroded and congested. It was from this intellectual stream, that Proudhon posed the idea of France returning to the twelve confederated nationalities of ancient Gaul, each sitting on its natural basin. This, he believed, would establish republicanism much more solidly than Sieyès’s rationalist départementalisation. As such, for Proudhon, the egalitarian character of republican territory was to be not only a function of equitable law but also an expression of nature itself.
Chapter 4. Bakunin’s Territories: Nations, States and Free Federations

If Proudhon was the unwitting prophet of anarchism, Bakunin was its improbable gospeller. Bakunin, a Left Hegelian and radical democrat, would turn to ‘anarchism’ only in the late 1860s, but would then become key in establishing it as a political tradition, in particular through his involvement with the International Workers Association and other socialist circles. Taking great succour from his reading of Proudhon, Bakunin’s anarchism was nevertheless distinctively original, drawing from substantively different bases. An appreciation of this difference, a testament to Bakunin’s adventurous intellectual journey prior to the late 1860s, is critical. Most significantly, this journey was marked by his early study of German Idealism and his engagement with debates about Slavic nationhood in 1848. In the early 1860s, aligned with the ‘Russian Socialism’ of Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev, Bakunin integrated a new defence of federalism. These two moments were crucial in incubating Bakunin’s anarchist turn and resonated in his later writings. For these reasons, even when studying Bakunin’s ‘anarchist’ thought, it is necessary to refer to it globally and contextually.¹

Focusing on territory, this chapter reflects on two key moments: Bakunin’s early Romantic critique of ‘mechanical’ states and his later ‘materialist’ critiques of patriotism. In exploring these two moments, the chapter sheds light on what underpinned Bakunin’s call for an ‘abolition of territorial states’. In referring to Bakunin’s intellectual paths, this chapter is greatly indebted to the rich works of Jean-Christophe Angaut and René Berthier, as well as Arthur Lehning and Aileen Kelly.² Angaut’s Liberté et Histoire chez Bakounine, for instance, was key in making me aware of the continued resonance of German Idealism in Bakunin’s thought, whereas Kelly’s Mikhail Bakunin was helpful in leading me to pay attention to Bakunin’s Russian relations. Berthier’s L’Autre Bakounine and Lehning’s extensive commentary in Archives Bakounine were further useful in giving me a keener sense of Bakunin’s tireless participation in dissident political networks, and its relation to his writings.
Before embarking on this chapter, however, it is necessary to take note of the interpretative challenges at hand. In contrast to Proudhon’s encyclopaedic treatises and abundant unpublished reflections, Bakunin’s corpus consists mostly of short militant pieces. Given this fragmentary character, his writings often occlude their intellectual sources and underpinning reasoning. Such circumstances have led some of the secondary literature to speculative interpretations, where Bakunin’s intellectual inspirations are inferred from his expressions and biography. To a certain extent, this speculative leap is hard to avoid. Here, faithful to the methodological sensitivities expressed in Chapter 1, I have attempted to interpret Bakunin’s writings in a rigorous manner, tying myself to the Ariadne’s thread of textual evidence and being as explicit as possible in articulating my own interpretations.

4.1. The Storm before the Storm: German Idealism and Romantic Nationhood in the early Bakunin

Born in 1814 to a noble family in Tver, Russia, Bakunin’s education was marked by an immersion in the Romantic and Idealist literature of the day. Having served in the military until 1835, Bakunin broke with this secure path to devote himself fully to the study of philosophy and history. Discovering the works of Fichte and Hegel through his involvement with the young ‘Stankevich Circle’, Bakunin was initiated into the worldview that historical development could be understood as the progress of liberty and reason, or the ‘realization of the Spirit’ in the world. As part of this circle, however, Bakunin was not only introduced to liberal teleology but also to the question of national identity. As argued by Alexandre Bourmeyster and others, the introduction of Schlegel and Hegel’s philosophies of history provoked intense debate amongst Russian literati about Russia’s identity. Divided into ‘Westernizers’ and ‘Slavophiles’, this debate polarized around the question of whether Russia required liberal reforms to become a ‘historical nation’, or whether a return to Russian popular customs was the means to resurrect its organic personality. As noted in Chapter 2, this debate followed the trends of post-revolutionary Romanticism and its attempts to use spiritual, naturalist and culturalist arguments to expound a new understanding of European order. Beginning in the 1830s, this complex ‘debate’ would endure and
metamorphize until the late 1860s. Involved in the early stages of this controversy, Bakunin was intimate with key characters of both sides, including the Slavophiles Aleksey Khomyakov and Konstantin Aksakov as well as Hegelian Westernizers such as Alexander Herzen. His involvement in this debate is significant, as it would have left Bakunin with a keen concern for Russia’s identity in a teleological ‘philosophy of history’. Was Russia to bring a new form of liberty into World History?

Arriving in Berlin in 1840 to pursue his studies in philosophy and history, Bakunin soon diverted his attention from scholarship to the febrile political scene of Western Europe in the 1840s. Energized by Young Hegelians such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer and Arnold Ruge, Bakunin developed a radical dissatisfaction with the conservatism of Restoration Europe. In 1842, in a defining article entitled ‘The Reaction in Germany’, Bakunin employed Hegelian logic to argue that the time for radical renewal was at hand. The destructive force of ‘negation’ in the world-Spirit was growing to sweep aside the ‘positive’, established form of European politics. Appealing to this teleological dialectic, Bakunin claimed that henceforth all Europeans had to choose between two parties: the conservative Reaction or democratic Revolution. This divide, Bakunin warned, was not merely theoretical and as such required the ‘democratic party’ to transform its ‘negative’ or critical force into creating ‘a new practical world, a world not accomplished in any manner by the formal application and diffusion of ready-made theories, but only by an original act of the autonomous practical Spirit’. A new world was ‘developing secretly’ like ‘a mole burrowing under the Earth’, the ‘State’ was ‘prey to internal contradictions’ due to its lack of spiritual conviction, and ‘even in Russia, that endless empire covered in snow […] so unknown and waiting perhaps for a great future […] sombre clouds gathered announcing storms’.

Choosing this radical turn to ‘a philosophy of action’ in 1842, Bakunin spent the following years travelling between Switzerland, Paris and Brussels, meeting many of the ‘revolutionary’ republicans, democrats and socialists of the day. It would be in these years that, along with meeting Wilhelm Weitling, Georg Herwegh, Pierre Leroux, Karl Marx and Adam Mickiewicz, he would meet Proudhon. Although this meeting was depicted tenderly in Herzen’s Memoirs, Bakunin’s writings of this period do not indicate a significant impact on his own thinking. In lieu of republican
socialism, Bakunin’s energies set on the cause of Polish emancipation, allegedly after meeting the historian and activist Joachim Lelewel in Brussels in 1844. By 1847, addressing the Polish émigrés in Paris, Bakunin professed this support in a public speech. Here, Bakunin would explicitly sketch some of the enduring themes of his ‘revolutionary’ Slavism. To begin with, he argued that the Russian people were not willing participants in the oppression of Poland. Instead, Bakunin claimed that the people were ‘but the inanimate cogs in that monstrous machine of oppression and conquest, which we call the Russian Empire’. As an ‘enslaved people’, the Russian people were coerced to the indignity of being the ‘passive executors of a foreign thought’ and to ‘chain the world, to subjugate peoples’. In these circumstances, ‘the emancipation of Poland’ would be Russia’s ‘salvation’. Following the example of the Decembrist protests of 1825 and of the Polish insurgency of 1831, Bakunin argued that a revolutionary alliance between Polish and Russian peoples was the key to the liberal future of both nations. The ‘formidable mass of peasants’, tired of despotic abuses and misery, was ready to ‘throw itself with passion into the first revolutionary movement’. As he summarized:

[W]hilst we have remained disunited, we have paralysed one another; together we will be all-powerful towards the good […] the reconciliation of Russia and Poland is […] the deliverance of all Slav peoples wailing under foreign rule, and at last the fall, the definitive fall of despotism in Europe.

In making this public commitment to Polish emancipation, Bakunin established several Romantic leitmotifs which he would hold for much of his life. First, following his education in German Idealism, Bakunin was convinced that the Russian people were destined to enter ‘world History’ by embodying a new form of liberty, which would both bear out their individuality and a universal value for humanity. Second, he drew on the Romantic leitmotif that despotic ‘mechanical states’ were foreign and inimical to organic, awoken nationality. Third, drawing on the idea that the European political order had become interdependent, Bakunin saw a revolutionary alliance of subjugated peoples as necessary to a Hegelian-type historical development. Lastly, Bakunin identified the destiny of Russian nationality as indelibly tied to a broader Slavic ‘awakening’. This last element, expressed perhaps under the influence of Adam
Mickiewicz or Pawel Šafářík’s Pan-Slavic visions was to become increasingly marked after the revolutions of 1848, and Bakunin’s participation in the Prague Congress.19

4.1.1. The New World of 1848: ‘Mechanical’ States or the Fraternity of Nations

Expelled from Paris in 1847 for his speech in favour of Polish emancipation, Bakunin rushed back as soon as he heard news of the 1848 February Revolution.20 As he wrote in an article in the republican left-wing newspaper La Réforme on March 13th, the February revolution was the sign of ‘the birth of a new world’.21 Yet, he warned, ‘the revolution will perish if royalty does not disappear completely from the surface of Europe’.22 As he saw it, ‘the revolutionary movement will stop only when Europe, the whole of Europe, without the exception of even Russia, becomes a democratic-confederated republic’.23 Towards this purpose, he advised his French readers that it was necessary to support ‘the liberty of nations’ sincerely.24 In this context, territorial questions were particularly sensitive. As Bakunin noted, whilst other nations were ‘attracted’ towards France by virtue of its emancipatory principles, they could be put off ‘by interest […] especially among those closest to us ethnographically’.25 In his own words, ‘territorial circumscriptions are one of the most cherished elements of nationalities’. Wary of ‘fratricidal wars’, Bakunin advised the French not to ambition conquest and to recall ‘the monstrous rearrangements operated on our neighbours during our last wars’.26 For all this advice to the French, however, Bakunin directed his attention to Russia. It was from there that ‘the first thunders of Reaction were to be expected’.27 These ‘thunders’, he wrote, had to be ‘turned against the very one that launched them’.28 The Revolution, he believed, ‘will also save Russia’.29

It was in this mood that in April 1848 Bakunin left Paris to travel to central Europe. As Angaut notes, his first destination had been the Polish provinces under Prussian occupation, but having been arrested in Berlin, he ended up in Wroclaw in a congress with Polish émigrés discussing the failed Poznan insurrection.30 It was here that Bakunin would have heard about the upcoming Prague Slav Congress, organized by František Palacký and others to discuss the future of Slavic peoples in the Austrian Empire and beyond.31 This congress, as mentioned in Chapter 2, was held in direct contrast to the Frankfurt Parliament, which hoped to unify Germany.32 Joining the
Prague Slav Congress in early June 1848, Bakunin would flee the city after the Austrian empire came to lay siege to it in mid-June, under the command of field marshal Windischgrätz. Although the Prague Congress was short-lived, its symbol would galvanize Bakunin’s political writing until his arrest in Saxony in late 1849.

Four texts remain from this febrile period. The first of these, ‘Fundamental Principles of the New Slav Politics’, was a collective draft for a radical program, written during the Congress itself. The second, *Appeal to the Slavs by a Russian Patriot*, was a pamphlet written in Germany in the winter of 1848. In this ‘appeal’, Bakunin drew on the symbol of the Slav Congress and called his Slav ‘brothers’ to unity against European despotism. Third, ‘The Situation in Russia’, was an article series written in early 1849 for the *Dresdner Zeitung*. The aim of this text was to convince German revolutionaries that the Russian imperial might was fragile due to internal social disarray. Lastly, in the months after his arrest, Bakunin penned a letter to his lawyer, entitled ‘My Defence’, where he sought to explain his opposition to the ‘despotic’ Russian and Austrian empires and to argue that Prussia could only be saved by adopting the cause of German national unity.

Whilst a detailed account of each of these texts does not belong here, it serves our purposes to reflect on one of its common themes: namely, the antagonism between ‘a new Slavic politics’ and ‘states functioning as machines’. This contrast was first rehearsed in the ‘Fundamental Principles of a New Slav Politics’, where Bakunin claimed that after having long been ‘tried and formed by long misfortunes’, the Slav races at last felt ‘called to realise what the other peoples of Europe had prepared by their past developments and what was today regarded as ‘the ultimate goal of humanity’.

The age-old trials under which Slavs had suffered, Bakunin argued, were ‘foreign oppression’ which resulted in ‘demoralization and disorganization’ for both the oppressed, and for the oppressor. This oppression was the result of a politics that employed ‘diplomacy and conquest […] to establish artificially and mechanically a central might to the detriment of the liberty of individuals and nations’.

Rejecting this past, the text declared that ‘the new politics of the Slav race would be a politics of States, but a politics of nations, a politics of free and independent peoples’. In a more practical tone, it was claimed that this politics would form under a ‘Slav federation’ based on the independence of each constituent people, on fraternal
solidarity, free of fratricidal wars or ‘a German thought’. In these few phrases, a scheme with strong Hegelian resonances was drawn: the Slavs, hitherto absent from History, were now to embody a new development of universal liberty. This liberty, expressed in opposition to despotic ‘mechanical’ and ‘artificial’ States, held a new political form, that of an inter-national federation. Interestingly, the genuine solidarity underlying this new form was placed in contrast with the centralizing and statist tendencies of ‘German thought’.

In *Appeal to the Slavs*, Bakunin added more depth to this contrast. Writing in the aftermath of the Austrian suppression of the 1848 uprisings in Vienna and Prague, Bakunin opened his pamphlet by stating that the ‘hour of resolution’ had come and that all Slavs had to choose one of ‘two camps dividing the world’: revolution or counter-revolution. Anyone claiming a middle path was either deceiving or deceived. The side of reaction, he specified, was that of ‘old German politics […] the politics of old chancelleries of State, monarchical rights, aristocrats and privileged people of all kinds, the politics of camarillas […] and war machines’. The reaction, he admonished, sought to employ the ‘arts of diplomacy’ to beguile peoples and ‘divide, to rule’, as it had in Poland. For the camp of revolution, then, the vital question was to unite the forces of ‘democrats of ALL countries’, Germans, Magyars, Slavs and others, a policy which he recognized was as imperative as it was difficult.

Although Bakunin recognized the ‘absurd pretentions of the Frankfurt Parliament’ to retain Slav provinces in a new Germany and the ‘ardent’ enmity of the Magyar ruling party to Austrian Slavs, he argued that Slavs ought to regards these as echoes of the ‘old politics’ and answer them with a revolutionary solidarity with the liberation of all European peoples. Contrary to the mood of most Austrian Slav politics, then, Bakunin appealed to the Slavs to rush to the rescue of the failing Hungarian Revolution. The pamphlet ended by calling for an alliance toward the dissolution of Austria, which would in future enable a federation of all Slav peoples, from Prague, to the North and Turkey.

In calling for inter-national revolutionary solidarity, Bakunin’s *Appeal to the Slavs* also built a singular focus on questions of territory. In one of the most memorable passages of this text, Bakunin claimed that ‘at the Revolution’s first sign of life’ it had been understood that ‘the well-being of nations could not be ensured while there still
Liberty to the oppressed, to the Poles, the Italians, to all! No more wars of conquest, but only the last, supreme, war of the Revolution for the emancipation of all peoples! Away with the narrow limits imposed by force in the congress of despots, according to alleged historical, geographical, commercial and strategic necessities! There must be no other borders than those that respond to both nature and justice, according to the sense of democracy, and which the peoples themselves will trace in their sovereignty on the basis of their national sympathies.

With this awakening cry, he wrote, the ‘lethargy of so many living-dead peoples’ was ended and ‘the Revolution, in its omnipotence, declared dissolved the States of despots’. In the wake of this dissolution, Bakunin imagined, Northern and Eastern Europe would be ‘regenerated’ and form a ‘universal federation of European republics’. Setting a contrast between the divisionary politics of ‘the reaction’ and the universal politics of ‘the Revolution’, Bakunin accused ‘old politics’ of relying on hypocritical diplomacy, such as in the Congress of Vienna, to create borders best suited to the collective hegemony of despotism. The ‘new politics’, on the other hand, he claimed would abandon domineering designs and create territorial divisions on the basis of democratic ‘national sympathies’. Although the national sympathies appeared here mostly on ethnic terms, it is significant that Bakunin thought these to be ‘according to a sense of democracy’. This relied on a sense of ethnic nations formed freely by collective action. As stated later in the text, supporting Austria was problematic because it meant ‘aiding despotism to weaken by division and hatred each of its peoples from diverse races [...] to prevent them, I say, from becoming closer and freely forming a nation’. Such a view corresponded broadly with the tone of the early German liberalism of Bakunin’s education in which a ‘nation’ was ‘organic’ through its creative participation in a common culture. In this sense, the national awakenings of the Revolution for Bakunin were to make the people into ‘living and vivifying masses’ rather than ‘machines at the service of despotism’.

So far as 1840s texts are concerned, it is in Bakunin’s ‘My Defence’, a letter written to his German lawyer in hopes of avoiding deportation to Russia, that the contrast
between ‘mechanical states’ and ‘organic nations’ is made most informatively. In explaining his participation in ‘the first European revolution’, Bakunin sought to justify his ‘hatred of despotism’ in greater detail.52 Best represented in Russia and Austria, he wrote, this despotism was ‘the political code of the eighteenth century’, which operated on the basis of ‘the divine right of reigning dynasties, the desire to swell territories [and] the expansion by all means of powerful States functioning as machines’.53 This system, he added, had little regard for ‘morality and the rights of man’ and ‘held no concern for the people who were sold and treated as inanimate objects’.54 In the case of Russia after the reforms of Peter the Great, this ‘code’ had created a ‘State organized towards conquest’, which turned it towards ‘perpetual expansion, only those tireless efforts to extend its borders always further’.55 This expansionist force, he insisted, was not a sign of a ‘nation joyously conquering’ but of an ‘abstract principle that weighs on the Russian nation forcing it to serve it as its tool and champion’.56 In this manner, unlike ‘the barbarians who destroyed Roman civilization to bring to the world a new form of life and even new elements of liberty’, Russian conquests had been the product of a mechanical state which ‘enslaved’ its own people ‘in order to extinguish from the rest of the world the light of liberty and life’.57 Russia’s territorial extension, then, was not a testimony to its national vitality but the inverse. The more the Empire gained in extension, the more it became foreign to its own people.

Whilst Russia had exercised this ‘mechanical’ code by coercing the numerous Russian people into an instrument of incessant conquest, Austria had had to employ a different strategy. Ruling over a diverse people, the Austrian monarchy had organized ‘by the means of its own governments [to] demoralize peoples, divide them, empty them of energy and to lull them into slavery’.58 More specifically, Bakunin pointed to the Austrian use of ‘the obscurantism of priests’ and diplomacy, especially during the partitions of the Napoleonic wars and after the Congress of Vienna.59 In the interests of its hegemony, he wrote, Austria was opposed to the ‘aspirations of German peoples to liberty and unity’.60 Turning to Prussia, Bakunin wrote that it was ‘obliged to choose’ between ‘two camps: Germany and liberty […] or Russia and Austria’.61 If joining the camp of despotism, Prussia would have to ‘once again deal with Russia and Austria and proceed with the latter to a partial division of Germany, in exchange for which satisfaction would have to be given to Russia in Turkey, Galicia and the
Great Duchy of Poznan’. If joining the German nation, it would enable it ‘to create the organic unity of Germany, as only the people harbour in themselves the blood, the sap and the life’ in contrast with German princes who were ‘only capable of realising a purely mechanical union’. This ‘organic unity’, he promptly added, would only be so if remaining ‘within truly German limits, and not going beyond, not delivering itself to the romantic extension that sings the patriotic hymn of teutomaniacs! The prejudices and passions engendered by a petty patriotism do not make any sense today’. The ‘teutomaniac hymn’ Bakunin was referring to here was most likely Ardnt’s famous ‘The German Fatherland’ poem (see Chapter 2).

In rehearsing once more the contrast between mechanical states and organic nations in his 1840s writings, Bakunin was using a widespread metaphorical device in German post-Napoleonic culture. Within German Idealism and Romanticism, this metaphor was deployed by the likes of Herder, Schiller, Fichte and Hegel, though with very diverse uses. As noted by David Lidenfeld, in many quarters ‘the words machine and mechanical came to serve as embodiments for all that was evil in government: rigidity, coldness, and impersonality’. In spite of the currency of this metaphor, it is difficult to identify the sources of Bakunin’s specific use, since he gave little indication of any sources in either his publications or personal texts. Frustrating as this is for the intellectual historian, it is nevertheless evident that Bakunin articulated a clear contrast between mechanical states and organic nations. Mechanical states were described as expansionist, based on ‘abstract principle’, treating people ‘as instruments’, and using diplomacy to divide and rule, at times through territorial partition. The avatars of these states were Austria and Russia, the two lynchpins of post-Napoleonic order. In opposition to this, Bakunin imagined democratic republics, where territorial circumscription would not be the product of rapacious empires but the result of a living community, a ‘nation’ with a self-conscious ‘individuality’ and universal humanism. For such democratic republics, territory would be the natural product of popular sympathies and would not excite conflict with its equally liberal national republics.
4.2. Return to Revolution: Bakunin’s turn to Socialism, 1860s-1870s

4.2.1. Bakunin, the Kolokol and the ‘Great Reforms’, 1861-1863

Arrested in Saxony in 1849, Bakunin would not escape deportation to Russia.Transported in brutal conditions, Bakunin would be imprisoned in the dungeons of the notorious Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg. Languishing in prisons for seven years, Bakunin’s sentence was commuted into perpetual banishment to Siberia in 1857. In 1861, galvanized by news of Garibaldi’s ‘Expedition of the Thousand’, Bakunin would daringly escape Russia and return to Western Europe via the Pacific. Arriving in London, Bakunin would dive headfirst back into his revolutionary militancy, aligning himself with the Russian émigrés Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev. As he wrote to them when announcing his escape, his intention was to ‘serve among you the Slavo-Polish section […] my watchword will be the destruction of Austria […] for beyond this appears in all its beauty the free Slav Federation’. 67

By 1861, Herzen and Ogarev were noteworthy critics of the Russian Empire, publishing two newspapers with high levels of circulation (in spite of being officially banned). These two newspapers, Polyarnaya Zvezda [The Polar Star] and Kolokol [The Bell] were their instruments in advocating liberal reforms and peasant emancipation. 68 At the core of this advocacy, Herzen and Ogarev defended a vision which, in Hegelian fashion, argued that Russia would give birth to a new development in History by using its traditional peasant communes to create socialism. 69 In one of the key places articulating this vision – an 1851 open letter to the French historian Jules Michelet – Herzen complemented this ‘Russian socialism’ by arguing that ‘centralization is alien to the Slav spirit’ and that only through ‘the idea of Slavonic federation’ would ‘the Slav world at last enter upon its genuine historical existence’. 70 In this same letter, Herzen recalled Bakunin’s 1847 speech to the Paris Polish émigrés and decried his imprisonment, vowing to avenge it. Herzen and Bakunin had been friends since their 1830s participation in the Russian Hegelian ‘Stankevich Circle’.

Coinciding with Bakunin’s arrival in London, Herzen and Ogarev’s propaganda efforts found themselves at a critical crossroads. In 1861, the beginning of Tsar Alexander II’s ‘Great Reforms’ forced them to voice either recognition or reprobation. These ‘Great Reforms’ marked a turning point for Russian politics as the Empire
recognized serfs as free citizens (instead of property) and attempted to create a new form of decentralized government through local *zemstvo* assemblies. It was at this moment, when Herzen and Ogarev found themselves navigating between caution and optimism, between backing liberal reformers or radical critics (not to mention warding off conservative opponents), that Bakunin joined them. Bakunin’s earliest 1860s writings need to be read with this context in mind.

The first text to consider is Bakunin’s open letter on his return to politics, entitled ‘To the Russians, Poles and all my Slav friends’. This was published in *Kolokol* on 15 February 1862, one month after his arrival in London. The second text was a pamphlet, *The Cause of the People: Romanov, Pugacev or Pestel?*, published independently in July 1862. In ‘To the Russians, Poles and all my Slav Friends’, Bakunin opened by tying the present moment directly to 1848. As he saw it, ‘a new spirit’ seemed to breathe new life into ‘slumbering nations’, ‘those chosen by the new civilization: the Italians, Greeks, Romanians, Magyars and the great Slav nation’ would emerge out of the ruins of the Austrian, Turkish and Russian empires. The Russian people free at last from ‘the monstrous alliance of Tartar barbarity and German political science’ was about to enter a ‘historical life’. This life, however, would not be the product of Tsar Alexander’s reformist efforts. ‘All these constitutional attempts’, Bakunin thought, would ‘be a fiasco’, given that they relied on the rotten world of Russia’s officialdom. The course to take, he wrote, was to prepare a ‘real force, a national party’, under the program of Herzen and Ogarev’s *Kolokol*. This agenda, he wrote, began with giving all land rights to traditional peasant communes, so as to enable the ‘historical vocation of the Slavs’.

Beyond this, Bakunin argued that to ensure political liberalization, it was necessary to allow ‘Autonomy’ in Russia’s society. In contrast to dictatorial decrees or elitist parliamentary decisions, this could only be achieved by re-organizing society:

[B]y the law of nature, from below to above, by the free confederation of independent societies, starting with the commune – that social and political unit, the cornerstone of the Russian world - and going until a provincial administration, general for the entirety of the State, and – if you wish, federative for all Slavs.
This call for an internal federation – through communes, to provinces, to States – was novel in Bakunin’s writings, but it was not of his own making. Indeed, almost the same language can be found in Ogarev’s 1862 Essay on the Russian Situation: Letters to an Englishman, where he asks for ‘the self-government of the communes, their federation into provinces, following nationalities and local advantages, and a federative union of provinces’. Tellingly, Ogarev’s key model here was the federal system of the United States of America. Interestingly, however, the expression ‘from below to above’ [de bas en haut] seems to be Bakunin’s flourish. Be this as it may, it is highly significant that Bakunin’s first claims for a commune-based ‘bottom-up’ federation had its origins in Herzen and Ogarev’s radical liberalism or ‘Russian socialism’, and its specific debates surrounding Russia’s decentralization reforms in the 1860s. As Bakunin signalled in his texts, the principal adversaries in this debate were conservative ‘panslavists’, such as Mikhail Pogodin or Mikhail Katkov.

Beyond embracing the Kolokol’s agenda, Bakunin’s 1862 writings included one further noteworthy line of argument, namely on the question of the ‘minor’ nationalities of Lithuania, Belarus, Livonia, Courland and Ukraine. Countering the views of conservative panslavists, Bakunin argued once more against territorial arguments premised on ‘historical, strategic and economic limits’. In his view, there ought to be on this subject only ‘one supreme law […] the will of peoples themselves’. He continued, ‘every nation, every race be it great or small’ ought to have:

[T]he possibility and the right to act according to its will […] If they want to be autonomous members of Russian, Polish or panslavist confederations, let them be so. If they want at last to separate and live as a fully independent State, let them separate.

In a trait characteristic of Bakunin’s radical liberalism, he saw no reasonable arguments against a right of secession, though he assigned this particularly to nations, rather than to provinces. This suggests continuity with his particular sense of romantic nationhood. Any nation, as a living being endowed with a personality or identity and requiring liberty to act humanistically, had to be able to self-determine. As Bakunin summed it up, ‘in good or bad will, all violent annexations and detentions
must be renounced. We only have one thing left to do: to recognize spontaneously the independence and liberty of Slav populations and others surrounding us’. 88

Whilst Bakunin’s 1860s alignment with Herzen and Ogarev was key in introducing new themes to his thought (not least in relation to the question of territory), this alliance was soon strained significantly. As their correspondence attests, Bakunin and Herzen’s friendship was marred by recurrent conflict, with Bakunin deriding Herzen for his moderation and Herzen scolding Bakunin’s restless radicalism. This was aggravated by the difficult path that the Russian Free Press sought to navigate between the various supporters and critics of Tsar Alexander’s ‘Great Reforms’. By 1863, against Herzen’s recommendations, Bakunin decided to journey to join preparations for an insurgency in Russia’s Congress Poland. Having broken out prematurely, this Polish uprising was brutally repressed. For the Tsarist government, it led to a conservative retrenchment, cracking down on critics and limiting the liberalizing enthusiasms of reform efforts. For the Kolokol, this marked a sharp fall in their fortunes. 89 Having being sympathetic to Polish emancipation, Herzen, Ogarev and Bakunin were accused of having plotted to cause chaos in the country. In reaction to this, the Kolokol’s Russian readership fell sharply, ending a golden age in influencing the public debate. Bakunin, rather than returning to London, travelled through Sweden, Belgium and then on to Italy.

4.2.2. Becoming Anarchist: Proudhon, the Internationale and Socialist Federalism, 1864-1870

The years of 1864 to 1867 were marked in Bakunin’s life by his near disappearance from published life. Yet while he became silent in writing, Bakunin was incessantly involved in the revolutionary democratic scene of 1860s Italy and Switzerland. Increasingly disappointed with the prospects of a Polish and Russian insurgency after 1863, Bakunin also became increasingly skeptical of the Italian, Hungarian and German ‘democrats’ conspiring on behalf of their national liberations. In an 1864 letter to Herzen and Ogarev, for instance, he gave a satirical depiction of ‘our friend Karl Vogt’ and the Hungarian general György Klapka for their incessant ‘Napoleono-piedmonto-magyar manoeuvres, hoping to rally to them […] the revolutionary
projects of Germans’. It was at this time of disappointment with European revolutionary democrats and the prospects of Slav emancipation that Bakunin turned to western socialism, principally in the writings of Proudhon and the budding International Workers Association (IWA).

The question of Bakunin’s study of Proudhon is a difficult question, which deserves more careful attention than it has received in studies on Bakunin. The first archival evidence of Bakunin’s reading of Proudhon is dated October 1864, where he refers in passing to Proudhon’s *Of Justice in the Revolution and the Church*. This appeared in the first of various programs Bakunin would write to organize secret revolutionary societies. In the most significant of these, the 1866 *Principles and Organization of the International Revolutionary Society*, Bakunin showed clear marks of his reception of Proudhon’s writings. Echoing Proudhon, he argued against transcendental conceptions of the State and opposed ‘the principle of authority and the Reason of State’ with ‘the principle of association’, embodied especially in worker associations, which ‘sooner or later will overcome all national borders [and] form an immense economic federation’. These explicit concerns with a ‘positivist’ or ‘antitheological’ view of the State and with economically-led federalism are singularly new in Bakunin’s thought at this point. In spite of these new themes, he also repeated past ones, such as the ‘abolition of historical rights, the right of conquest and the right of diplomacy’, and the federation of ‘autonomous’ communes, provinces and nations. This program, as Jean-Christophe Angaut has suggested, might well be seen as Bakunin’s ‘first anarchism’.

Despite the continuities with his past politics, the mid-1860s were also a time of rupture in Bakunin’s thought. This rupture was well captured in a long letter Bakunin wrote to his comrades Herzen and Ogarev in July 1866. In this letter, to which he attached a copy of the aforementioned *Principles*, Bakunin explained to his friends that he had for three years been ‘more active than ever’ in organizing an international socialist society. In this endeavour, he told them, he had ‘been obliged to fight extensively against the so-called national ideas and passions, against the detestable theory of bourgeois patriotism that Mazzini and Garibaldi excited’. Secondly, reflecting on Russian politics, he broke with Herzen and Ogarev’s ‘mystical faith and
theoretical passion’ for the Slav peasant commune. This commune, Bakunin now argued, had for:

[T]en centuries’ yielded ‘the most abominable slavery […] the abasement of woman […] the despotism of patriarchs and customs, the subjection of the individual to the community [mir] […] killing in germ any initiative […] or sentiment of independence. With this new depiction, Bakunin argued, there was no hope in radical reforms from these quarters. Peasant communes, he now argued, were in ‘a process of disaggregation’ under the weight of the Russian ‘mechanical’ state. Chastising his friends for their reformist hopes, he argued that the Russian state, given its reliance on a predatory bureaucracy and militarism, had no prospects of ‘transforming into a democratic organization’. There was, Bakunin wrote, no wisdom in reconciling oneself to ‘the most vile and formidable engendered by our century – official democratism and red bureaucracy’ or a ‘socialism of State’. This phrasing is telling as it sums up Bakunin’s new concern for the co-option of democratic and ‘social’ ideas in the context of the reforms led by Napoleon III, Tsar Alexander II and the Prussian chancellor Bismarck. Much like Proudhon at the end of his life, Bakunin was concerned with the ‘democratic betrayals’ of socialist and republican spheres. Contrary to those ‘parties’ who were ‘unitary at all costs, preferring always public order to liberty’, Bakunin declared himself ‘an anarchist, and preferring liberty to public order […] or federalist from head to toes’. Following this shift in his politics, Bakunin would enter what was his most active period of writing between 1867 and 1870. Here, three events were the main catalysts. First was Bakunin’s participation in the second congress of the League for Peace and Freedom. This organization, led by his friend Karl Vogt, brought together republicans and liberals from all quarters to debate the worrying trend towards militarism and to argue for the creation of ‘the United States of Europe’. The league enlisted the support of intellectuals and activists such as Victor Hugo, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Jules Favre, John Stuart Mill and the Reclus brothers. In this company, Bakunin distinguished himself through a series of speeches in which he challenged the congress to subscribe to a socialist program. Drawing on Proudhon’s authority, as ‘the great and true master of us all’, Bakunin argued against the faith of ‘unitarian’
democrats and of ‘authoritarian socialism’ in ‘that formidable centralization of the State, which has rendered possible [...] military dictatorship’. Contending with Gustave Chaudey throughout December 1868, Bakunin attempted to convince the League to support the policies adopted by the Brussels Congress of the International Association of Workers, namely support for instituting collective property. Bakunin’s contest with Chaudey was also noteworthy in that Chaudey had been a close friend to Proudhon and stood as one of the chief executors of his works.

Yet Bakunin’s efforts failed to gain much ground and he left the Congress of the League, together with a group of socialist supporters. This group, including activists such as Elisée Reclus, Nikolai Zhukovsky, Giuseppe Fanelli, and Walery Mroczkowski created the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy and adhered to the International Workers Association in bloc. In these years of incessant socialist militancy, Bakunin wrote a series of key texts. The first of these was an unfinished manuscript entitled Federalism, Socialism, Antitheologism, where he outlined his beliefs by reference to each of these terms. This was addressed to the League of Peace and Freedom Central Committee. The second set of texts stems from Bakunin’s articles in the socialist newspapers L’Égalité and Le Progrès from December 1868 to June 1869. Although many themes pervade these texts, this chapter will focus on one specific intellectual campaign in them: the critique of patriotism.

4.2.3. The Critique of Patriotism: Romanticism, Positivism and Socialism, 1868-1870

The theme of patriotism had an early presence in Bakunin’s writings, recurring both in his 1848 texts and in his early 1860s texts. Across these writings, Bakunin’s reference to patriotism was grounded in contrasting political devotion to the people (i.e. ‘nation’) with loyalty to ‘mechanical’ States and despotic dynasties. Moreover, Bakunin attacked the dangers of a megalomaniac ‘national’ patriotism, such as that shown in ‘the hymns of teutomaniacs’. In his own words, ‘the prejudice and passions engendered by a narrow patriotism have today no sense’, as this threatened the revolutionary fraternity of national awakenings. In a sense, this was the kernel of Bakunin’s Romantic attitude to patriotism. Yet by the mid 1860s, much like Proudhon,
Bakunin came to see defences of ‘patriotism’ as co-opted by reactionary politics. Although targeting this subject was thus justified, Bakunin’s texts from 1868 to 1870, beginning with *Federalism, Socialism, Antitheologism*, would tentatively deploy a novel line of argument, namely that of a socialist positivism, enabled by readings of Proudhon, Auguste Comte, Ludwig Feuerbach and others.

In the opening of *Federalism, Socialism, Antitheologism*, Bakunin was unequivocal:

[T]he so-called principle of nationality, as posited today by the governments of France, Russia and Prussia, and even by many German, Polish, Italian and Hungarian patriots, *is only a derivative*, opposed by the reaction to the spirit of revolution [...] denying implicitly the liberty of province and the real autonomy of communes [...] and sacrificing systematically the interests [of the popular masses] to [...] the ambitions of States.106

As he further adumbrated:

[A] patriotism which tends towards unity outside of liberty is a bad patriotism, always nefarious to the real and popular interests of the country it pretends to exalt and serve, a friend, often without wishing it, of the reaction – enemy of the revolution, which is to say the emancipation of nations and men.107

To avoid this reactionary co-option, Bakunin argued it was necessary to recognize nationality not as a ‘right’ but as a ‘fact’, whose protection was justified only by principles of liberty. This line of argument, it is important to emphasize, was addressed primarily not to European despots, but to republicans and democrats whom, Bakunin (like Proudhon) saw as falling into co-option. Lured through the ‘principle of nationalities’, the once dissenting republicans and democrats of Europe found themselves bolstering public support for the aggrandizement projects of Napoleon III, the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck and the Count Cavour.

Building on his readings of Proudhon, Bakunin contrasted ‘political republicans’ and ‘socialist republicans’ to demarcate between the co-opted and true dissenters. A political republican, he claimed, placed an egoism for their fatherland above all things, himself, all individuals, all nations in the world and humanity itself. This egoism led
to a desire for the fatherland to prevail against all nations, thus leading to conquest and Caesarism. A socialist republican, on the other hand, ‘detests the greatness, power and military glory of the State – to which he prefers liberty and wellbeing. Federalist at home, he wants an international confederation, [...] overcoming the artificial and baneful bounds of States’. 108 A political republican, such as Mazzini, he claimed ‘is rigid, and often through patriotism – as a priest through religion – cruel’. 109 A socialist republican, such as Proudhon, was ‘natural, moderately patriotic, but always very human’. 110 As he summed it up, ‘between the socialist republican and the political republican there is an abyss: one, as a semi-religious creation, belongs to the past, the other, positivist or atheist, belongs to the future’. 111 By denoting political republicans as semi-religious and socialist republicans as atheist or naturalist, Bakunin was explicitly mobilizing Proudhon’s critiques of ‘transcendentalist’ conceptions of the state, as developed after his Of Justice.

Drawing on his reading of Proudhon’s critiques, Bakunin argued that the State was an absorbing and demoralizing force, because it relied on subjecting human liberty to transcendental ideas of greatness. Present in all states, he argued such transcendental spirits facilitated constant war, where ‘internal’ liberty was sacrificed to the higher purpose of power and ‘external’ liberty was a non-sequitur. As Bakunin wrote, in such perpetual wars, the ideal of the State ‘ruptures the universal solidarity of all men on earth, and associates a part only in order to destroy, conquer and subject the rest’. 112 Perversely, Bakunin noted, ‘this flagrant negation of humanity, which constitutes the very essence of the state, is from the point of view of the State, the supreme duty and the greatest virtue: it is called patriotism and constitutes all the transcendent morality of the State’. 113 Revealing their theological character, such States relied on the idea that ‘the immolation of human liberty’ was necessary as a moralising force, a sacrifice redeeming men of their wickedness. 114 To liberate men from this infernal and immoral subjection to ‘political theology’, Bakunin argued that one had to conclude:

[T]he absolute necessity of the destruction of States, or if you will, of their radical and complete transformation [...] with an absolute liberty for all parts to unite or not unite [...] renouncing all repressive power, and falling into the subaltern role assigned to it by Proudhon. 115
In this great political transformation, Bakunin argued, it was necessary to promote ‘an analogous movement in philosophical ideas’, namely by overthrowing religious and metaphysical reasoning with ‘Positive philosophy or universal science’. Such philosophy, Bakunin misleadingly suggested, was to be found in the works of Proudhon and Auguste Comte. The purpose of this intellectual revolution was to show how the development of ‘the human world’ stemmed from a natural evolution, whereby certain geophysical and physiological conditions rooted a series of psychological phases from ‘animality to humanity’. In recognizing the material origins and conditions of human consciousness, Bakunin argued, societies would at last understand how to constitute themselves towards autonomy and well-being.

Whilst in *Federalism, Socialism, Anti-theology*, Bakunin identified Auguste Comte’s ‘positive philosophy’ as a means to overcome humanity’s indentured service to theological institutions, it was only a year later, in a series of articles in the socialist newspaper *Le Progrès*, that he attempted to explain how positivism could provide an emancipatory re-telling of patriotism. Here, after reiterating that present-day patriotism ought to be understood as a cult of State, a ‘political theology’, Bakunin proposed exploring the deeper origins and complexion of this ‘passion’. This exploration would focus on ‘the physiological element’ at the heart of patriotism.

In Bakunin’s own words:

> Natural patriotism is a purely bestial fact, found at all levels of animal life […] in this sense it is a war of destruction, the first expression of a great and fatal combat for life […] [where] each species [nourishes itself] from the flesh and blood of individuals of foreign species.

Driven by hunger to fight against all, each animal group in turn relied on the ‘instinct of reproduction’ as ‘the only link of solidarity’, which formed the basis of a ‘multitude of little animal fatherlands, hostile and destructive to one another’. The first development of this bestial patriotism, Bakunin claimed, occurred under the influence of sedentarization, where ‘solidarity with the soil or dwelling’ was added to solidarity with the herd. This, he claimed, led to the increasing development of habits, as if a ‘second nature’ was embodied in ‘particular ways of living’. At this point, he wrote, natural patriotism could be defined as ‘an instinctive, mechanical and uncritical attachment to hereditary or traditional habits of existence taken collectively’.
For humans, however, such hereditary habits would develop not only at the level of physical behaviours, but also at the level of ‘more or less abstractive traditions, intellectual and moral, a host of ideas and false or true representations’. It was through the slow development of human capacity for these ‘abstractions’ that religious belief would emerge and with it a new form of patriotism attached to the development of political states. These states, using the development of human ‘abstractive’ traditions would ‘modify, distort [dénaturer] and diminish’ the ‘very local collective habit and very narrow, very restricted sentiment’ of ‘natural patriotism’. In Europe, Bakunin claimed, as shown even in its most civilized countries such as Italy, the hostilities between local, naturally isolated patriotisms of the countryside and ‘bourgeois’ patriotisms for great states were still visible. On the other hand, the continuous drive to war amongst great European states ought to be seen as continuing the belligerent primordial instincts of ‘physiological patriotism’. In this positivist teleology of ‘patriotism’, the role of socialism was therefore to ‘put an end to these brutal manifestations of human animality’, overcome ‘abstract’ state patriotism, and establish ‘universal solidarity among men’ and an economic order free of depredation.

In this dizzying drift on a ‘positivist’ view of patriotism, what is most interesting is not to seek a coherent theory but to appreciate the intellectual sources Bakunin was here putting at play. First, we know Bakunin began with Proudhon’s account of modern States as pervaded by a form of transcendent patriotism, which sacrificed popular welfare to the ideals of political greatness. This was to be overcome by an egalitarian economic revolution and the institution of socialist republican federations. Second, drawing on the ‘positive philosophy’ of Auguste Comte and his followers, Bakunin applied a ‘physiological’ argument to explain the material circumstances that had led to the psychological drives of patriotism (i.e. a belligerent collective egoism). Interestingly, here, Bakunin made most use of positivist arguments made after Comte, namely by insisting on a hunger-driven war of species or ‘struggle for life’, as well as an insistence on hereditary habits and local milieus. This refracted a familiarity with Charles Darwin and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s works. Although it is hard to ascertain which sources Bakunin was drawing from, it is known that he was in contact with the Russian positivist Grigory Vyrubov and had read some articles in the newly launched journal *La Philosophie Positive*. Lastly, Bakunin also made significant use of his reading of Ludwig Feuerbach’s texts, with which he likely engaged in 1867. Here,
Bakunin would find a key set of arguments on how the material circumstances of early humankind would foster psychological drives at the source of religious imagination. When speaking of the passage from animality to humanity through ‘abstractive traditions’, Bakunin showed Feuerbach’s influence on him by insisting on abstraction as stemming from ‘reflection’ and leading to systematic sacrifices of real life.129

Compounding these influences, Bakunin’s originality was to attempt to apply anti-theological arguments and physiological-psychological positivist arguments to discussions of European patriotism in the 1860s. Having added the veneer of scientific materialism to his teleological belief in the historical development of History, Bakunin had also shifted from advocating for national liberations into defending an international social revolution. Bakunin’s critique of mechanical states expanded into a critique of the ‘political theology’ of bourgeois patriotism and its baneful taste for state aggrandizement. It was in this manner that by 1869, advocating for the International Association of Workers, Bakunin claimed that its aim ought to be:

[T]he abolition of all territorial states, all political fatherlands, and on their ruins, the establishment of a great international federation of all productive groups, national and local.130

4.2.4. The ‘Death of Socialism’: Bakunin and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1873

Whilst Bakunin’s critique of patriotism had been first designed as an instrument against the co-option of republican democrats by reactionary European powers, it was soon mobilized in other political contests. First, in the context of the Internationale, Bakunin would oppose the ‘popular state’ [Volkstaat] of Ferdinand Lasalle, August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, three key German social democrats. In this program, Bakunin came to think, lay a great danger for socialism to be diverted by parliamentary compromises, national vanities and bureaucratic dictatorships. This opposition was first sketched in 1869 in Bakunin’s articles in the socialist newspaper L’Égalité. The contest over the Internationale’s socialism, however, was soon upstaged by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in the summer of 1870. Caught by surprise,
Bakunin rushed into an outpouring of militant writing. From this tempestuous period, emerged Bakunin’s three major texts, the 1870 *Letters to a Frenchman on the Current Crisis*, the 1871 *The Knouto-Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution*, and the 1873 *Statism and Anarchy: The Struggle of the Two Parties in the International Workingmen’s Association*. Through these three works, Bakunin interpreted the Franco-Prussian War as a critical juncture at which the near future of European politics would be determined.

Written feverishly between August and September 1870, the *Letters* assembled Bakunin’s agitated response to the imminent victory of Prussia’s forces. As he noted to his friend Ogarev, the purpose of his *Letters* was to argue that ‘if the social revolution in France does not directly come out of the present war, [then] socialism will be killed off in all of Europe and will not be resurrected for a long time’.¹³¹ In his pamphlet, Bakunin insisted on this idea by arguing that the present defeat of the French armies presented two facts: the moral bankruptcy of the Bonapartist administrative machine and the threat of a ‘moral and intellectual degradation [déchéance] of the entire nation’ under Germany’s hegemony.¹³² The only means to save France, Bakunin argued, was to ‘break the governmental machine’ which had poisoned France and give ‘absolute independence and spontaneity’ to the provinces and communes.¹³³ Bakunin believed that this would lead to a national uprising and social revolution. The greatest obstacle to this course of action, it was argued, were the forces of French bourgeois patriotism, whose loyalty was to the state machine.¹³⁴ To overcome it, Bakunin argued that it was necessary for city workers and peasants to abandon their mutual distrust and become allies. For this alliance to succeed, it was key to appeal to the energy of the peasantry’s primitive patriotism. In Bakunin’s own words, ‘the peasant is fundamentally [foncièremment] patriotic, national, because he has the cult of the land, a true passion for the land, and he will fight to the death foreign invaders who come to drive him from his field’.¹³⁵

In a final flight of rhetoric, Bakunin closed his *Letters* by writing that:

> France as a state is lost. She can no longer save herself by regular and administrative means. It is for natural France, the France of the people, to now enter the stage of history, to save its liberty and that of the whole of Europe, by an immense uprising, spontaneous, fully popular, outside of all official
organization, of all governmental centralization. And France, thus sweeping the armies of the King of Prussia from its territory, will in the same blow liberate all the peoples of Europe and accomplish the social emancipation of the proletariat.\textsuperscript{136}

Two months after publishing this call to arms, Bakunin grew pessimistic. Having tried to participate in revolutionary unrest in Lyon, Bakunin returned to Italy in late October 1870. From here, he turned to the pen, working on what he described to Ogarev as ‘a pathological sketch of present-day Europe and France, which will serve as a lesson to the political men of the near future’.\textsuperscript{137} By June 1871, this would be published as \textit{The Knouto-Germanic Empire and the Social Revolution}. Here, Bakunin devoted the first hundred pages to arguing that the French defeat resulted from its bourgeoisie’s insistence on reconstituting the State and dodging social upheaval. Drawing on Proudhon’s writings on the fall of the Second Republic, Bakunin argued that the Third Republic was committing the same mistakes that had led to the rise of Napoléon III.\textsuperscript{138} In a second move, Bakunin focused on the ‘position’ of the new German Empire in European politics. Prussia, he argued, formerly the weakest of the ‘great powers’, was now hegemonic and threatened Europe’s liberty. This threat, Bakunin noted, was first to ‘small States, who have the misfortune of having Germanic or formerly-Germanic populations, such as the Flemish for example’.\textsuperscript{139} In these circumstances, Bakunin considered how the new German Empire would mediate between its expansionist goals, its alliance with the Russian Empire and the intense Russophobia of German people.

In a third move, Bakunin sought to explain why the German people had come to support the creation of a German Empire. Here, Bakunin embarked on a historical excursus to argue how the German bourgeoisie had traded the noble goals of German liberalism for the dream of serving an omnipotent State. Delving back into the Middle Ages, Bakunin argued that German countries had mostly remained faithful to the ‘monotony of public order’ rather than join in the great civil wars and revolts, which had been the source of all developments in liberty. This intellectual and political quiescence, he argued, had been marked especially during the eleventh to the thirteenth century revolts of medieval communes and during the fifteenth and sixteenth century turmoil of the Renaissance and the Reformation. In particular,
Bakunin chastised the suppression of the Hussite and Taborite heresies, and Martin Luther’s betrayal of the peasant uprisings of 1525. From this point onwards, he claimed, Germany had become the ‘true centre of reaction in Europe’, preaching servitude through an ever refined administrative science, a ‘religion of terrestrial absolutism, where the sovereign takes the place of God, the bureaucrats are the priests, and the people, naturally, the victim always sacrificed at the altar of State’. In summing up this historiography, Bakunin stated that given the history of its bourgeoisie, Germany ‘could be considered predestined to realise the ideal of voluntary slavery’.

Even upon the news of the Paris Commune, Bakunin’s dire assessment of European politics was not reversed. Writing to Ogarev in April 1871, he saw the uprising as heralding the certainty that ‘there will be no other existence for France than in the social revolution’, though it was equally ‘certain that they will be vanquished’. The Commune was a heroic uprising, but also ‘a desperate movement’, which would be massacred under the bourgeoisie’s ‘pretended patriotism’. By June 1872, Bakunin’s pessimism grew further as he became subject to the attack of fellow revolutionaries. Using their leading positions in the General Council of the IWA, Marx and Engels published an open letter claiming that Bakunin and his friends had been conspiring to divide the Internationale. By September 1872, the Hague Congress would consolidate this schism by expelling Bakunin and James Guillaume from the Internationale. Whilst fuelled significantly by personal animosities, this schism also brought to the fore a substantive difference on whether the Internationale should opt to encourage worker associations to form political parties and use electoral means to capture the State, or whether it should reject this path and focus on organizing worker associations for general strikes and revolutionary disruption of State organization. Disappointed, tired, and suffering from ill health and indigence, Bakunin decided to retire from militant life by 1873.

Coinciding with this departure, however, Bakunin wrote a last long intervention, *Statism and Anarchy: The Struggle of the Two Parties in the International Workingmen’s Association*. Here, addressing himself to Russian revolutionary youths, Bakunin rehearsed anew his argument that the supremacy of the German Empire heralded a wave of reactionary bourgeois ‘state patriotism’. In spite of this, he argued
hope for social revolution remained in the popular classes of Spain, Italy and Slavic countries. Slavs, Bakunin argued, were particularly disposed to this revolution, as, in contrast to the Germans who ‘seek their life and liberty in the state, […] to the Slavs the state is a coffin’. Through revolution, he believed, Slavs would turn this historical weakness into a strength and lead the birth of a new ‘universal ideal’ – that of ‘the total liberation of the labouring masses and their free social organization from below upwards, without governmental interference, through voluntary economic associations formed in disregard of all the old state boundaries and all national differences’. Criticizing the naivety of the expansionist design of Slavic nationalists, however, Bakunin reiterated that ‘the more extensive a state, the more complex its structure and the more alien it is to the people’. In a final admonition, Bakunin addressed pan-Germanism and argued again that the once humanist aspirations of German liberalism had been slowly perverted from 1815 to 1870, becoming nothing more than a bourgeois desire for an all-powerful German state. This perversion, he wrote, was evident in how Fichte’s patriotic *Addresses to the German Nation* were now read in a ‘crude and grotesque’ manner that erased all its humanism only to exaggerate its promise of political greatness. Such was the present enthusiasm for creating a powerful state, Bakunin argued, that even German socialists such as Lasalle, Marx, Bebel and Liebknecht had become enthralled by the rise of the German Empire, pretending misguidedly that they could democratize it. As Bakunin concluded, the desire prevailing ‘in the consciousness or instinct of every German’ was to ‘expand far and wide the boundaries of the German Empire’. In his last writings, therefore, catalysed by the crisis of the Franco-Prussian War, Bakunin gradually returned to tropes from his earlier Idealist and Romantic period, assigning the problem of despotic territorial expansionism not only to the effects of ‘theological’ patriotism but also to the character of nations and their alleged historical missions.

**Conclusion**

Whilst primarily a militant rather than an intellectual, Bakunin played a significant influence on the formation of anti-authoritarian socialism (or ‘anarchism’) in the 1860s and 1870s. For these reasons alone, his writings merit the rigorous attention of
historians of political thought. Regarding territory, Bakunin’s influence was key to anarchist thought in that it offered the tradition’s radical slogans for the abolition of borders, territorial states and ‘political fatherlands’, as well as support for ‘free federations of autonomous communes’.

As this chapter has argued, however, in examining Bakunin’s intellectual history, it is highly significant that such lines of argument were often adopted and radicalized from a variety of origins. To summarize Bakunin’s thought on questions of territory, this chapter has tackled three key moments.

First, the chapter examined Bakunin’s early radical writings, from 1842 to 1850. Here, it was argued that Bakunin mobilized the influence of German Idealism and Romanticism, as well as a loose alignment with French revolutionary democracy, to argue against territorially greedy ‘mechanical states’ and for the creation of a ‘free federation of European republics’, where each nation would be liberated to develop its own identity organically. Second, the chapter examined Bakunin’s return to revolutionary activism in the early 1860s. It showed how, in response to debates on how to pursue decentralization in the context of Tsar Alexander II’s ‘Great Reforms’, Bakunin aligned himself with the Russian socialists Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev. With them, Bakunin began to appeal not only for a federation of nations, but also for an internal federation of ‘autonomous’ provinces and communes. Such ‘free federation’ would moreover include giving all land titles to peasant communes and would be organized ‘from below upwards’. In an original addition to these arguments, Bakunin insisted that the greatest mark of freedom in this federal system, ought to be the right to secede, irrespective of whether the nation or province seceding was major or minor. Concerning territory, this first phase of Bakunin’s thought is noteworthy for its radicalization of liberal and romantic arguments that posed nationhood against despotic ‘territorial states’. Bakunin’s radicalization of these liberal arguments was in his insistence for the right of secession as part of national self-determination. This emphasis, expressed in 1861, was ahead of its time.

Third, the chapter discussed Bakunin’s turn to ‘anarchism’ or socialist federalism in the late 1860s. In this period, it was argued, Bakunin’s discovery of Proudhon’s texts led him to a new critique of ‘the principle of nationalities’ and the theological and centralizing character of modern states. Following Proudhon, the chapter argued that
he also extended his ‘federalism’ as the instrument of a socio-economic revolution led by worker associations. Concerned foremost with the co-option of European democrats through the question of national unifications, Bakunin also developed an original critique of patriotism. Drawing on his readings of Proudhon, Feuerbach, Comte and other positivists, he argued that present-day patriotism was founded on a ‘theological’ reflection that transferred animalistic instincts of belligerent collective egoism to the State. In this light, he argued that the ‘bourgeois’ passion for State aggrandizement was unenlightened and brutal and ought to be replaced by a socialist recognition of ‘real’, ‘natural’ and free humane relations. In this phase of Bakunin’s thought, ‘territorial states’ appeared not only as the result of eighteenth-century ‘mechanical’ politics but as a long-term result of the physio-psychological development of humanity.

Whilst much distinguishes these three moments, some aspects provide striking continuity. The first of these is that Bakunin maintained a constant antagonism to the territorially expansive, artificial and undemocratic ‘mechanical states’. In contrast to this, Bakunin’s several iterations of alternative geo-political arrangements continuously turned on ideas of federation and the realization of popular liberty. In this manner, it is no surprise that in his last writings, *The Knouto-Germanic Empire* and *Statism and Anarchy*, Bakunin recycled ‘territorial’ metaphors from different periods of his intellectual journey. In the end, his restless hopes had always been for the abolition of expansive despotic states, and always for a radically new political form to bring about a new era of liberty and fraternity. The aggrandizing ambitions of ‘territorial states’ had always been the symptom of ‘old politics’, foregone to the march of liberty in History.
Chapter 5. Kropotkin’s Territories: Communes, History and Positivism

Unlike Proudhon and Bakunin, Petr Kropotkin is the first thinker in this thesis who can be unproblematically called an anarchist. Having joined the Internationale in 1872, Kropotkin would become a foremost spokesperson of anarchism from 1876 to the First World War. Given this long period of militancy and his popular publications, it is perhaps unsurprising that Kropotkin’s views have became canonical to anarchism. Yet, as Ruth Kinna and Matthew Adams have argued, it is important to be attentive to the history of this canonization. In the English-speaking world, for instance, Kropotkin’s continued popularity has often entrenched excessive concern with his 1902 *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. This focus has been problematic, especially in that it has facilitated misrepresentations of Kropotkin as a natural scientist who extended biogeographical theories onto his political thought. Within the new anarchist geographies, this representational legacy has led Simon Springer to claim that Kropotkin’s ‘theory of mutual aid’ was intended to show ‘a form of organizing drawn from time immemorial’, which perennially fostered ‘deep affinity and empathy’ between ‘human beings […] nonhuman animals and the wider biosphere’. Such representations, this chapter argues, lose Kropotkin’s keen historicist and political sensitivities to a mythological overstatement of his evolutionist arguments as primarily naturalist or Darwinian.

Beyond a focus on evolutionist narratives, Kropotkin’s thought has also been repeatedly read through his concern for ‘communes’. In relation to the mythologies of *Mutual Aid*, this has recently been articulated by Springer’s claim that ‘any given commons is a geographical manifestation of mutual aid’. Moreover, beyond *Mutual Aid*, several scholars have noted how Kropotkin’s many writings often returned to extensive discussion of past and present urban and rural ‘communes’, as well as the imagination of ‘free communes’ as alternatives to modern territorial states. Indeed, from Kropotkin’s 1885 *Words of a Rebel* onwards, the focus on communes pervaded publications such as *The Conquest of Bread* (1892), *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1898), *Mutual Aid* (1902) and *The Great Revolution, 1789-1793* (1909).
Understanding Kropotkin’s conceptions of ‘free communes’, therefore, appears as a key puzzle for reviewing his political thought.

To unpack Kropotkin’s engagement with ‘communes’, however, is a complex subject, with many intellectual hinterlands to be considered. First, as noted by Kristin Ross, Kropotkin’s engagement with ‘free communes’ echoed his fascination with the events of the Paris Commune of 1871. Moreover, as argued by Caroline Cahm, Kropotkin’s engagement with ‘free communes’ after 1871 also reflected his participation in the ‘Bakuninist’ Internationale milieu, where thinkers such as César de Paepe, Paul Brousse and James Guillaume stressed pursuing social revolution through autonomous communes instead of the ‘Popular state’ [Volkstaat] advocated by Wilhelm Liebknecht and the German social democrats. However, as shown by Martin Miller’s study of Kropotkin’s formative years, his concern with communes predated this post-1871 socialist context by at least a decade. Coming of age during the 1860s ‘Great Reforms’ in Russia, Kropotkin’s early concern for communes was stoked by debates between Russian liberals, Slavophiles, Nihilists and socialists such as Herzen, Ogarev and Bakunin. These debates, as discussed in Chapter 4, concerned not only questions of decentralization through new local government institutions such as the obshchina [peasant commune] and the zemstvo [local council], but also broader challenges to Russia’s character as an imperial state based on autocracy and territorial expansionism. This intellectual background, though interesting and understudied, is not the focus of this chapter. Instead, this chapter turns to a third and hitherto neglected background of Kropotkin’s concern for ‘free communes’: Romantic medieval historiography.

Among the subjects that animated Kropotkin’s political imagination, history was undoubtedbly key. Indeed, as noted by Martin Miller, history was Kropotkin’s first passion. Feverishly interested, at fifteen years old, Kropotkin sought special entry to the Russian imperial library to read not only historians’ works but also primary sources. His period of predilection, he wrote, was the European early Middle Ages, especially in the depictions of Augustin Thierry and other Romantic Historians. Forty years later, in his Memoirs, Kropotkin recalled this period fondly, and reflected on how, in reading ancient sources, ‘a new social organism and a world of complex relations revealed itself to me’, freed from the ‘prejudice of modern politics’. As can be surmised from these ‘memories’, Kropotkin’s interest in history was not only
enduring but also constitutive of his political imaginations until late in his life. This chapter offers a beginning to appreciating Kropotkin’s keen use of historical thought in his writings. In tracing this lineage, this chapter shows how Kropotkin’s contrast of ‘free communes’ and territorial states drew substantively from thinkers such as Augustin Thierry. Furthermore, by exploring Kropotkin’s debt to Romantic Historians, this chapter contributes to upset dominant readings of his political thought as stemming from a naïve faith in scientific naturalism and Darwinian evolutionism.

5.1. The Spirit of History: Augustin Thierry and Revolutionary Communes

*Words of a Rebel* constituted Kropotkin’s first monograph defending ‘anarchist communism’. Edited whilst Kropotkin was imprisoned in Clairvaux, this book assembled over thirty editorials published in the socialist journal *Le Révolté* between 1879-1882. Fifteen years later, in his *Memoirs*, Kropotkin deemed this period as having constituted ‘the foundations of nearly all that I have written on later’. Written in a propagandist style and aimed chiefly at French workers, *Words of a Rebel* engaged with European political affairs of the day. Reviewing the social turmoil in Russia, Spain, Ireland, France and beyond, Kropotkin foretold the collapse of European states. States, he wrote, were in an irreversible decomposition and decline, undermined by increasing public debt, hypocritical politics, unceasing wars and brutal internal exploitation. Shared across borders, this nefarious order produced a similar ‘spirit of revolt’, a discontent that Kropotkin argued could be channelled through the ideas of ‘anarchist communism’. Social revolution was imminent, he claimed, and a new historical phase was ‘already developing new modes of grouping’ based on ‘the autonomy of provinces, of communes and worker groups’. This phase, Kropotkin noted, had been announced by the 1871 Paris Commune and the 1873 Spanish Cantonalist Rebellion.

To a certain extent, this vision echoed those of Bakunin and other socialists. Claiming a ‘free’ federative order based on municipalities and workers’ associations had become an adagio of Internationale ‘non-authoritarian’ socialists. Announcements of the Paris Commune as the harbinger of a new ‘historical phase’ of
social revolution were equally widespread. Yet, Kropotkin innovated on these leitmotifs substantially by framing the ‘emancipation of communes’ not only as a progressive ‘modern’ policy but also as a historical return of sorts. In *Words of a Rebel*, prior to a chapter assessing the ‘failures’ of the Paris Commune, Kropotkin devoted an entire chapter to a parallel analysis of early medieval communes and anarchist Communes. In this move, the analysis of medieval communes reinforced the prospect for ‘a modern commune’: ancient flaws indicated future fixes. This argumentative tactic was used to head off critiques that ‘free communes’ were anachronistic, as well as to displace historicist defences of States as having secured national unity and liberty. The key inspiration behind this argument, the next sections show, was Kropotkin’s reading of Augustin Thierry’s Romantic historiography.22

5.1.1. Thierry’s *Letters and Communal Revolutions: Forbearing Liberty and National Unity*

Writing during the post-revolutionary Bourbon Restoration, Augustin Thierry belonged to a generation of Romantic historians whose works distinguished themselves through their efforts to create a narrative of European civilizational progress, of ‘national’ histories and of the superiority of liberal monarchy as a form of government (see Chapter 2).23 As part of this generation, Thierry had from the 1820s sought to provide a ‘truly national history’, focusing on ‘the people’ and the ‘search for public liberty’.24 In this search for ancient French popular liberty, Thierry’s key points of reference were the ‘communal revolutions’ of the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries. These ‘revolutions’, he claimed, marked ‘the greatest social movement after the establishment of Christianity and until the French Revolution’.25

By Thierry’s own admission, this focus was not wholly new and aligned itself with the works of other historians such as François Guizot and Sismonde de Sismondi.26 Writing in contest against the reactionary wings of the Bourbon Restoration, Thierry’s *Letters on the History of France* stood out as one of the most sophisticated and daring pieces of liberal provocation of the period.27 Emphasising the successes of popular insurrection against feudalism, Thierry explicitly drew links between the medieval communist rebellions and modern revolutions.28 For Thierry, medieval communes
had the ‘energy and freedom’ of republicanism, had established elected government, escaped serfdom, enshrined their rights through charters and had ‘a taste for work and a confused feeling of social equality’. These successes, he emphasized in 1827, were greatest in those communes where insurrection had ‘cost greater pain and sacrifice’. In contrast, however, these gains were most secure where the king intervened to guarantee communal charters. As in Sismondi’s *History of the Italian Republics*, Thierry noted that ‘free communes’ often lost their liberty by collapsing under internal divisions, which resulted in weak municipal governments, popular riots and, ultimately, kingly intervention and the end of municipal liberties. So marked was this narrative in Thierry’s work that Marx himself deemed him the father of “class struggle” in French historiography.

However, Thierry was not a revolutionary socialist but a supporter of a Liberal Monarchy. In this context, in his prosaic narrations of the reigns of Louis the Fat and Philippe Augustus, Thierry presented their awards of medieval charters in analogy to post-Napoleonic constitutions and stressed the role of kings in checking the excessive turmoil of communal republicanism. From this perspective, the communes had forfeited their liberties to Absolutism because they had failed to sustain social unity, representative government and a balanced alliance to the Crown. Beyond these failures, Thierry argued that the fall of the free communes had been inevitable due to their isolation in a world of rural serfdom and papal and royal powers. ‘An oasis in the desert’, the ancient liberty of the ‘free communes’ had been doomed to perish.

Pushing this idea further, Thierry would claim in later works that the isolated liberty of the free communes had only been overcome through the Crown’s adoption of the communes’ legal thought to the greater realm of a united France. It was to this unifying effort, he claimed, that the future abolition of serfdom was due. Where the bourgeois communal revolutions had provided industry and political liberty, the French monarchical state had produced unity, extension and stability. In this vein of argument, Thierry praised Louis XI ‘the Spider’ (1461-1483), whose reign had been ‘a daily combat for the cause of unity of power and social levelling, a combat sustained in the manner of savages by cunning and cruelty’. Though ruthless and murderous, Louis the Spider had advanced the cause of French liberty by expanding the basis for national unity. Key within this vision was not only the notion that the monarchy
subdued ‘anarchical’ social conflict, but also that the modern extension of freedom was enabled by the Monarchy’s pursuit of a large-scale territorial state. Within this teleological explanation, the Crown’s ‘territorial revolutions’, however violent, were justified as harbingers of large-scale liberty.

Thierry’s shift in emphasis from the lamentable passing of insurrectionary free communes to the celebration of their transmutation into the monarchical state was not incidental. Transformed by the 1830 ‘Glorious Revolution’ of the July Monarchy, his historiography shifted from liberal dissent to liberal apotheosis. As Jacques Neefs has argued, the July Monarchy was seen by Thierry as the ‘true’ moment of French history where the ‘labour of centuries’ revealed its true aim in the establishment of a democratic system, which reconciled the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. The spirit of the medieval communal revolutions, he believed, had found its destiny. Yet, Thierry’s optimism would soon be shattered by the February Revolution of 1848 and the end of France’s constitutional monarchy. History, it seemed, had betrayed him.

5.1.2. The Past’s New Future: Subverting Thierry’s Historiography in Kropotkin’s Words of a Rebel

In the heart of feudal society, a great libertarian movement was taking place.

Writing after the Paris Commune, Kropotkin re-purposed Thierry’s historiography of medieval communal rebellions as a vindication of the spirit of 1871 rather than that of 1830, of communist republicanism instead of liberal monarchy. Exploiting Thierry’s Letters, Kropotkin redeployed its key themes to argue for the progressive character of popular insurrection and popular self-government. Though claiming the industrious, artistic and scientific yield of medieval republics, Kropotkin saw the emergence of a legal class, of representative government and of monarchical alliances as the root for the communes’ downfall and the rise of Absolutist states. Far from securing liberty and national unity, these cornerstones of statecraft had damned popular wellbeing for centuries. Within this vision, the emergence of a monarchical territorial state implied not a fortuitous condition for the spatial extent of modern liberty, but an obstacle to it.
Following Thierry’s narrative whilst inverting its political inflection, Kropotkin opened his chapter on ‘the Commune’ by disputing the claim that great states had been necessary to create ‘national unity’. This was a claim he attributed not to Thierry, but to Émile de Laveleye, a Belgian jurist with whom he corresponded. Emphasising the coercive and authoritarian basis of the unity achieved by monarchical states, Kropotkin described it as the ‘slow work of agglomeration, of centralization, that […] continuous invasions favoured greatly’. In contrast, he argued that ‘the communes of tomorrow’ would enable societies to become ‘truly one, truly indivisible’, through a fortuitous combination of modern ideas and material circumstances. In making this case, Kropotkin proceeded by first presenting the faults that had prevented past communes from achieving social unity and then explaining how future communes would circumvent these problems. This argumentative structure served to reinforce the sense of the modernity of socialist ‘free communes’ and a socialist libertarian revisionist reading of medieval communes, which retold their failures in affinity with critiques of modern liberalism.

The first failures of medieval communes that Kropotkin identified were those of internal class divisions and struggles. In his own words, ‘the interior history of medieval Communes is that of the relentless fighting between rich and poor’. This incessant struggle, he claimed, had paved the way for kingly intervention and led the city populace to desert the communal cause. The source of these divisions, Kropotkin intimated, lay in a regime of ‘private wealth’ and ‘individualism’ – ‘the boulevards of a new serfdom’. Moreover, these social divisions were sustained not only economically but also politically. According to Kropotkin, in the first days of the revolution, each section of the city had jurisdictional, economical and administrative autonomy and each person could participate in deliberating public affairs in the forum. However, with growing wealth disparity, ‘municipal representation, government by proxy, […] by the rich, took hold in the commune’. This government, having established its own finance, mercenary military and professional civil servants, became a petty state, soon to have its competence taken over and mimicked by the monarchical state. Class divisions became underwritten by the seizing of public authority by the wealthy bourgeoisie and their feudal allies. This, Kropotkin claimed, was strongly symbolized by the manner in which the rediscovery of Roman Law had
come to legitimate theories of imperial power and property.\textsuperscript{54} Thus, the foundational communalism and corporatism of these towns had been corrupted by a growing social disunity and led to downfall. Crucially, the burghers’ mistake had been to allow the reduction of liberty to privilege. This was clear not only in their reproduction of internal disparity but also in their relative indifference to a vast countryside under serfdom.\textsuperscript{55}

In contrast to these failings, Kropotkin argued, the commune of tomorrow would replace a regime of liberty as privilege for one of liberty through universal solidarity.\textsuperscript{56} This shift was possible due to a combination of new ideas and material circumstances. On one hand, in contrast to the isolated and fragile industrious towns of the past, modern industrial society was intimately interconnected, with gigantic cities and a ‘gravitational […] multitude of centers [in] incessant relations’.\textsuperscript{57} The growing intensity and extent of transport, trade, communication and consumption made universal solidarity immanent to social life itself. This utopian view of modern economical and technological relations is in great resonance with Saint-Simonian and Industrialist imaginations as discussed in Chapter 2.\textsuperscript{58}

These material circumstances, however, were not sufficient; an ‘idea’, a ‘spirit’, a new politics was necessary.\textsuperscript{59} For Kropotkin, this spirit belonged to the ideas of ‘anarchist communism’, which were alleged to have been bred by the experiences of the Internationale and the Paris Commune. Armed with these ideas, the communes of tomorrow would eliminate stately authority and private property and enable the free federation of associations of all kinds, thus dissolve the social divisions in welfare and foster boundless and deep solidarity. Through these politics, Kropotkin argued, the communes of tomorrow would go beyond former municipal circumscriptions, beyond the city walls, and:

\textit{[T]angle, cross and superimpose themselves, forming in this way a network much more compact, [more] “one and indivisible” than the statist groupings that are only juxtaposed, like the beams in a fasces [sic].}\textsuperscript{60}

The communes of tomorrow would form unions of fact, cohesive through their social equality and solidaristic liberty. Thus, though echoing ancient communalist self-government, modern communes would be more than isolated places; they would
become a dense network of ‘synonyms for groupings of equals’. Departing radically from Thierry, Kropotkin discarded the idea that large territorial states constituted the arena for modern liberties. Instead, the young anarchist saw a world of networked autonomous communes as the vehicle for expanding social unity and liberty to unprecedented levels.

To summarize, in *Words of a Rebel*, Kropotkin subverted Thierry’s medieval historiography to defend anarchist communism, instead of liberal monarchy. In terms of territory, this move was accompanied by Kropotkin shifting what had been a liberal defence of large-scale modern states into a socialist call for a network of free communes and economic associations. Rather than having providentially created a vast expanse for modern liberty, monarchical states were construed as having obstructed it for centuries. Beyond territory, Kropotkin also subverted Thierry’s liberal historiography by subverting his treatment of themes of communal class struggle, industriousness and liberty. Departing from Thierry, Kropotkin saw the best of communal liberty in its insurrectionary democratism rather than its representative government. Although Kropotkin’s debt to these historians was substantive, it was also rhetorical. His rhetorical debt to Thierry centred on reading the past as a precedent of his desired politics, where a mixture of romanticization and critique served to bolster a political vision of historical destiny. Like Thierry, Kropotkin sought to narrate a trans-historical ‘spirit of liberty’, though his liberty was understood as premised on the ferment of revolt, rather than the harmonies of moderation. Whilst narrating history in these providential and progressive tones, Kropotkin was keenly aware that his use of historiography was conditioned for the politics of the present, not an eternal ideology. This is significant in that it implied an acknowledgement of political action as necessary to the movement of history. In contrast to this, Kropotkin’s later evolutionist narratives seem at first sight to depart radically from Romantic premises of a history shifting through contingent political struggle.
5.2. A Form for Evolution: Henry Sumner Maine and Progressive Communism

A decade after *Words of a Rebel*, Kropotkin published what has come to be his most popular book: *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*. Aimed primarily at an Anglophone audience, this book assembled a series of articles written for the journal *The Nineteenth Century* between 1890 and 1896. Spurred by Thomas Henry Huxley’s Darwinist articles in the same journal, Kropotkin’s articles aimed to emphasize the progressive character of ‘mutual aid’, rather than competition, in human and animal life. Given *Mutual Aid*’s framing as a controversy against Huxley, this work has often been interpreted solely within the register of Victorian ‘social’ Darwinism. This interpretation has been significant in facilitating readings of Kropotkin as a victim of an anti-political ‘scientism’.

Such readings, as shown by Kropotkin scholars such as Kinna and Adams can be debunked by appreciating Kropotkin’s political motivations in writing *Mutual Aid*. As emphasized by these authors, Kropotkin’s concern with showing the millennial labours of animal cooperation was primarily informed by his concern with the growth of individualism and Malthusianism in anarchist politics. Moreover, as argued by Adams and Jun, facile readings of *Mutual Aid* as affected by a ‘Panglossian confidence in the course of social development’ fail to appreciate its emphasis on the possibility of regression and ruin. For Adam and Jun, such emphasis stands as evidence of Kropotkin’s careful reading of Herbert Spencer’s views on evolution, which in turn reflected a Whiggish belief in the contingency of progress (see Chapter 2). Yet, even if these readings are illuminating as to Kropotkin’s politically conscious use of ‘scientific’ arguments; they elide his politically conscious use of historians’ writings. I argue that such a lack of awareness leads even educated readers such as Adams and Jun to reductively deem Kropotkin’s historical narrative ‘unsophisticated’.

Adams and Jun’s misreading of Kropotkin’s historicism stems from reading his evolutionist narrative through the sole prism of Herbert Spencer’s work. Although a key influence on Kropotkin, an overemphasis on Spencer neglects attention to Kropotkin’s treatment of other non-Darwinian Victorian evolutionists. As argued by John Burrow and others, Victorian evolutionist theories stemmed not only from...
Charles Darwin but also from the work of legal historians such as Henry Sumner Maine and anthropologists such as Edward Tylor. Paying attention to authors such as Maine and Tylor warrants scepticism towards claims that evolutionist theory lacked sophisticated historicism. Indeed, even Spencer’s *Principles of Sociology* acknowledged this heritage, with extensive discussion of Maine and others.

Contrary to previous readings, I argue that Kropotkin’s evolutionist narrative in *Mutual Aid* showed keen awareness, rather than a lack of sophistication, of historicism. This becomes apparent when analysing Kropotkin’s discussions of what he called ‘a whole new science devoted to the embryology of human institutions […] developed in the hands of Bachofen, MacLennan, Morgan, Edwin Tylor, Maine, Post, Kovalevsky, Lubbock and many others’. Whilst drawing on this broad and heterogeneous literature of anthropologists, ethnologists and sociologists, Kropotkin anchored his argument around the ‘epoch-making’ works of Henry Maine (see Chapter 2). At first glance, as noted by Adams, this seems a strange lineage given Maine’s active role as a conservative supporter of British imperialism and as a critic of mass democracy. Intellectual lineages, however, are not necessarily political affinities. As with liberal Romantic historians, Kropotkin was keenly aware of the politics of his sources and was deft at inverting their ideological inflections. Thus, whilst deploying Maine’s stadial history of institutional evolution, Kropotkin subverted Maine’s contrast between ‘ancient’ communism and the emergence of the ‘modern institutions’ of territorial sovereignty and private property. Much as he had done with Thierry, Kropotkin would shift a historiography originally designed to justify large-scale modern states into an apologia of small self-governing communes as the truly progressive political form.

### 5.2.1. Henry Maine’s Historical Jurisprudence: Escaping Primitive Communism

Writing between the 1850s and the 1880s, Henry Maine became influential for his theories of ‘historical jurisprudence’. Opposing the dominance of natural law and the positivist school of jurisprudence established by John Austin, Maine’s work sought to understand law as a historical product of organic social change. This effort was in resonance with the approach initiated by Savigny (see Chapter 2). In contrast to
Austin’s attempts to distil jurisprudence into a self-contained analytical language, Maine drew on the scholarship of philologists, historians and ethnographers to build an account of the evolution of legal codes in relation to paradigmatic shifts in social order. Though extending his historical discussions over the whole range of human history, Maine’s work was chiefly concerned with establishing the pathway from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ society. In narrating this pathway, Maine built a dichotomy whereby ‘traditional’ societies were thought of as static, communist, patriarchal and primitive, whereas ‘modern’ societies were thought of as progressive, prosperous, individuated and organized around legislating states. For Maine, the turning points of this ‘passage’ were to be found in three moments: the rise of the Roman Empire, the feudalization in Western Europe, and the colonization of India, Ireland and the Americas by the English. Whilst the first moment was deployed to warrant against decline, the second served to explain the deep sources of European exceptionality, and the third to inform imperial modernizations of present ‘ancient’ societies. In all circumstances, Maine argued, the critical ‘transmutation’ was the liberation of the individual from the strictures of ‘natural communism’, most notably through the emergence of private landed property. Without this, Maine wrote, the conception of land as ‘exchange commodity’ would never have arisen and, hence, ‘some famous chapters of Political economy would not have been written’. Without this, he claimed, large societies under powerful sovereign authority would not have emerged.

Though based on a dichotomy, Maine’s writings narrated these social ‘revolutions’ as slow and gradual affairs that passed through a series of transitional innovations and long remained limited in their reach over social life. Put summarily, Maine’s narrative of institutional evolution followed four stages: primeval communism centred on a patriarchal kinship, village communism centred on common landed ownership, feudalization centred on lordly power, and modern states centred on individual rights and civil law. In Maine’s famous dictum, this was the passage from ‘status to contract’, whereby communistic dependence gave way to individual agreement under civil obligation. In this narrative, the first significant transformations towards ‘modernity’ concerned the breakdown of ‘communism’ in the village community and the rise of personal wealth and authority by ‘chiefs’.
In Maine’s account, this emancipatory movement began when nomadic ‘undivided’ families settled and ‘common territory’ gradually substituted kinship as a basis of social unity. This shift, he claimed, provoked two successive developments: the subdivision of the tribe into smaller family cells and the ‘transmutation of the Patriarch into Chief’. The subdivision of the tribe into smaller patriarchal units led to smallholder land possession that continued to subdivide and favoured the disentanglement of individual rights from collective ones. The ‘transmutation of Patriarchs into Chiefs’ resulted from the basis of authority shifting from kinship to moveable wealth and landed rights. As warriors and cattle owners, primitive chiefs accumulated power by progressively taking common lands into personal title (‘benefice’) and by assigning land-use rights in exchange for rent and vassalage (‘commendation’). In these developments, Maine claimed, chiefs laid the basis for suzerainty and feudalization, which developed the institutions of domain and tenancy, and in time territorial sovereignty and ‘absolute’ private property.

Compounding the gradual depredations of primitive communism, powerful chiefs and their entourage would have appropriated authority over communal custom by stabilizing it into text and monopolizing its arbitration. Here lay the second set of significant transformations towards ‘modern states’. Having seized sanction and authority over communal custom, exceptional empires would shift from interfering in local adjudication to imposing active legislative creations. This process, administered centrally on a great number of people and socially disembedded from the communities it applied to, would progressively render the law consistent and equitable. In Maine’s view, the only societies that went through this process were Ancient Rome and the European states whose formation had been thoroughly informed by Roman Law. This view elevated the principles embedded in Roman Law as the breakthrough ingredient that enabled feudal European societies to become modern states, Britain chief among them. For Maine, such Eurocentric exceptionalism was operative for a defence of the imperial civilising mission.

Maine saw ‘modern society’ as resulting from the erosion of primitive communism through the emergence of manorial property relations and centralized legislative states. In this narrative, ambitious chieftains played the central role in pushing social progress. This path, he conceded, was paved by the ruination of local authority and
significant human suffering.\textsuperscript{92} For Maine, this devastation was justified in that it enabled a break away from ‘stationary’ village communes and their poverty, arbitrariness and stifling family dependence. Recognizing the brutality of this ‘civilizational’ pilgrimage served not to highlight its significance but also its precarity and complexity.\textsuperscript{93} This view of progress, anchored Maine’s conservative conviction that the centennial achievements of history must be guarded at all costs, most of all from the idealist designs of revolutionary democracy and a return to communism. If democracy won the day, Maine warned, great states such as Britain would be weakened and befallen by the ‘unavoidable’ and ‘terrible evils’ of ‘loss of territory, loss of authority, […] [and], loss of self-respect’.\textsuperscript{94} Subverting Maine’s historiography, Kropotkin would argue that it was the fall of great territorial states, and not their rise, which was progressive and desirable.

5.2.2. Re-writing Transitions: Village Communes, Medieval Cities and Progressive Communism in 
*Mutual Aid*

History has not been an uninterrupted tradition. At several points, its evolution has stopped in one region to restart elsewhere. […] But each time this evolution has started, first by the phase of the primitive tribe, to pass later through the village commune, then through the free city, and afterwards die in the phase of the State.\textsuperscript{95}

Kropotkin likely first became acquainted with Henry Maine’s writings through the works of the Belgian jurist Émile de Laveleye.\textsuperscript{96} Laveleye’s *Primitive Property* had stirred up Kropotkin’s interest and imagination for its claim that all societies had originally exercised communal land ownership.\textsuperscript{97} Laveleye spoke critically of the ‘primitive’ Russian commune as too patriarchal, preferring instead to defend Swiss communalism as the ideal for a socialist reform.\textsuperscript{98} In the late 1880s, in reading the sociologist Maxim Kovalevsky’s *Modern Custom and Ancient Law in Russia*, Kropotkin once more encountered a stimulating study which combined a usage of Maine’s historical theories with a politically framed engagement with pre-modern and post-’emancipation’ Russian peasant communes.\textsuperscript{99} Beyond Laveleye and Kovalevsky’s works, Kropotkin also encountered Maine’s work in Herbert Spencer’s
Principles of Sociology (see Chapter 2). Spencer’s influential work was likely influential to Kropotkin, especially as it offered a liberal challenge to some of Maine’s conservative apologia of patriarchy, feudalization and powerful states. In writing *Mutual Aid* through the 1890s, Kropotkin would be inspired by these works and borrow Maine’s scheme of institutional evolution to discuss social transformations from ‘savagery’ to the rise of modern states.

In transposing Maine’s scheme, however, Kropotkin shifted its narrative of progress. Though following the transitions between ‘primitive’ tribes, village communities, feudalism and modern states, Kropotkin emphasized not the gradual detachment of individual property rights and kingly power but the achievements of communistic social forms. To be sure, Kropotkin identified the collapse of each ‘phase’ on the same grounds as Maine: the tribal phase ended with settlement and family divisions, the village-community state undermined by the wealth-accumulation of warrior chiefs and their appropriation of common law. However, in contrast to Maine, he described these developments as ‘parasitic growths’ and ‘hindrances to progress’. Instead, he argued, progress was achieved through popular revolts, which renewed and developed communistic institutions.

Beginning with village communities, Kropotkin argued that their communistic social order was created to ‘oppose the dominative tendencies of minorities of wizards, priests and professional or distinguished warriors’. The achievements of village communities, he claimed, were colossal. It was to village communities and their collective labour, he argued, that humanity owed the conquest of the wilderness, the development of agriculture and industry, and the first constructions of vast networks of roads, canals, towers and markets. These achievements, Kropotkin constantly repeated, had been secured through the broadening of solidarity beyond kinship, the common ownership of land, a customary ‘law’ based on compensation rather than revenge, the establishment of village confederations and, most of all, through the institution of folkmotes to check conflict and inequality. As popular assemblies in which everyone could participate, folkmotes held unrestricted ‘jurisdiction’ to settle disputes and organize labour and tenure. Through exhaustive consensus and without sanction, these folkmotes settled disputes through a shared moral authority.
However, the achievements of the village communities would be halted by their ill-advised support for a specialized warrior class.\textsuperscript{107} Prone to feuds and war, ‘armed brotherhoods’ enriched themselves by appropriating ‘droves of cattle, iron […] and slaves’ and indebting villages by offering the use of these agricultural ‘implements’\textsuperscript{108}.

Accumulating moveable wealth and its attendant power, these chieftains, Kropotkin claimed, only secured their hegemony by gradually assuming privileged arbitrage of customary law within folkmote disputes. Thus, he noted, the rise of chieftains grew from co-opting a communist desire for peace. This appropriation of authority, Kropotkin noted, would be consolidated definitively through the ‘double influence of the Church and the students of Roman Law’\textsuperscript{109}.

Simultaneously to this corruption of village communities, however, Kropotkin argued that a new form of communism had emerged and renewed the march of progress. In his own words, in the tenth century, ‘with a unanimity which seems almost incomprehensible, and for a long time was not understood by historians, the urban agglomerations, down to the smallest burgs, began to shake off the yoke of their worldly and clerical lords’.\textsuperscript{110} Once again, Kropotkin was referring to his favourite ‘period’ of history: the early Middle Ages ‘emancipation of the communes’. This addition, it should be noted, departed substantially from Maine’s stadial history of institutional evolution. Within Maine’s narrative, the progressive stage following village communities was the growth of feudalization and the rise of monarchy. Kropotkin, however, focused on the medieval city commune, instead of feudal kingdoms. In this focus, he once again mobilized his radical readings of Romantic historians such as Augustin Thierry, Sismonde de Sismondi and others.

City-communes, Kropotkin wrote, were a natural growth of village confederacies as well as the result of a new principle of social order, forged into maturity by popular revolts against ‘petty rulers’.\textsuperscript{111} Developing beyond the ‘territorial bond’, medieval city-communes, he argued, had created an ‘occupation bond’ and a new key institution - the guild.\textsuperscript{112} For Kropotkin, it was to the rapid expansions of guild groupings that medieval societies owed its greatest accomplishments. In his own words, guilds had ‘bequeathed to the following generations all the arts, all the industries, of which our present civilization […] is only a further development’.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, he argued, guilds were distinctive for socializing a new conception of ‘brotherhood and sisterhood’,
which united people across territorial communities. This social bond, he claimed, bore
an undivided solidarity reminiscent of tribal bonds, but also embraced ideas of equality
and open membership. This imagination of fraternity, it should be reminded, stood
in silent contrast to Maine’s ‘transmutations’ of tribal patriarchy into feudal vassalage.
Thus whilst Maine had imagined the development of patriarchy into chiefdom as
leading to the rise of territorial states, Kropotkin argued that medieval guilds had
enabled a new development on the federative networks and communal self-jurisdiction
incipient in village communities. Surpassing village communities, the city communes
had developed greater levels of internal ‘democratism’ as well as many ‘extra-
territorial’ groupings.

The glorious days of the medieval city commune, however, would not last. Weakened
by internal divisions, medieval republics would collapse under the rise of centralized
and militaristic kingly states in the sixteenth century. Continuing a narrative he had
inaugurated in Words of a Rebel, Kropotkin argued that the rise of monarchical states
was enabled by the opportunistic manner through which kings exploited the intestine
class wars of medieval societies. In Mutual Aid, Kropotkin added to this depiction by
arguing that the monarchical State had benefited from the rediscovery of Roman Law
to seize adjudication and suppress the self-government and liberties of communes and
guilds. Under the monarchical state, he argued, traditional popular assemblies
[folkmotes] were abolished, guilds placed under state control, local initiative
dismissed, suspicious societies persecuted and common lands confiscated. Breaking
‘what was formerly an organic whole’, Kropotkin wrote, the state concentrated
authority and functions, thus eroding communal responsibility and enabling ‘the
development of an unbridled, narrow-minded individualism’.

Led by the folly of despotic minorities, Kropotkin argued this ‘stage’ of social
development caused severe decimations to popular welfare. Under great states,
populations had been held in misery by periodic wars, famines and plundering taxes.
Contrary to Maine’s narrative, these were not necessary costs for the twilight of
civilization, but the marks of an era of lost potential and decline. Unlike Maine, then,
Kropotkin did not see the advent of modern European states as initiating an era of
large-scale civic equity, national greatness and moral progress, which ought to be
protected and expanded. Instead, Kropotkin imagined modern territorial states to have
extinguished once lively networks of ‘free’ cities and guilds and led to four centuries of creeping decadence.

Yet, he argued, history would still find a way forward. As he stated in a public lecture summing up the political narrative of *Mutual Aid*, the ‘historical role’ of the ‘State’ had been to bring about an unprecedented *territorial concentration* and a *concentration of many functions of life in society*. This concentration, he argued, had existed ‘to fetter the development of local and individual initiative, to grind down the liberties that existed, to stop their new hatching’. To escape the lethargic stage in which the modern state had plunged it, societies had only to find a new progressive form of communism and federalism. In his own words:

> [T]he current of mutual aid […] did not die […] it seeks its way to find a new expression, which would not be the State, nor the mediaeval city, nor the village community of the barbarians, nor the savage clan, but would proceed from all of them, and yet be superior to them in its wider and more deeply humane conceptions.

**Conclusion**

True progress lies in the direction of decentralization, both *territorial* and *functional*, in the development of the spirit of local and personal initiative, and of free federation from the simple to the compound, in lieu of the present hierarchy from the centre to the periphery.

In his entry on ‘Anarchism’ in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Kropotkin summarized the anarchist opposition to ‘ancient and modern’ state organization by claiming that ‘progress’ rested on *territorial* and *functional* decentralization, and the development of a ‘free federation’ from the ‘simple’ to the ‘compound’. What did he mean? At first look, this language echoed Herbert Spencer’s positivist writings on society evolving from ‘simple’ to ‘compound’ structures with differentiated functions (see Chapter 2). Yet, as this chapter has shown, even though Kropotkin subscribed to this positivist and evolutionist language, his conceptions of
territorial states as opposed to ‘free communes’ had significant origins in his early creative reading of Romantic historiography on the ancient liberty of medieval communes.

By examining *Words of a Rebel* and *Mutual Aid*, this chapter has argued that Kropotkin’s contrast between ‘free communes’ and modern territorial states mobilized critical subversions of Augustin Thierry’s Romantic historiography and Henry Maine’s institutional evolutionism. Contrary to former assessments, this chapter shows that his thought did not suffer from a lack of historicist sophistication. Kropotkin was an avid and keen reader of Romantic historians and ethnologists, and his critical reading of these literatures was key to his political imagination of territory. At first glance, Kropotkin’s contrast of lively ‘federal’ economic networks and barren state scapes seems to echo a vision of territory similar to those of Saint-Simonians (see Chapter 2). Yet, upon closer examination, Kropotkin’s treatment of medieval city-communes and village communities indicates a different set of territorial imaginations at work.

In his 1880s *Words of a Rebel*, this chapter has argued, Kropotkin’s parallel discussion of the Paris Commune and medieval communes was no accident. Inspired by Thierry’s historiography of ‘communal rebellions’, Kropotkin drew his own tale of an ancient liberty, which modern times had yet to renew. However, in contrast to Thierry, Kropotkin’s argument was that the spirit of ancient liberty was aligned with libertarian socialism rather than liberal constitutionalism. In this manner, Kropotkin not only co-opted Thierry’s emphases on the communes’ exemplary industriousness and civilization, but also inverted Thierry’s assessments on their downfall. Whilst he followed Thierry in depicting social disunity and geographical isolation as part of the downfall of free communes, Kropotkin blamed the emergence of representative government and urban elites rather than popular unrest. Critically, concerning territory, Kropotkin broke with Thierry’s assessment that the centennial labours of ruthless monarchical states were necessary to create the conditions for large-scale liberty. Instead, he argued, the rise of large territorial states represented a long-term obstacle to the return of liberty across cities and the countryside.

Twenty years later, within the evolutionist narrative of *Mutual Aid*, Kropotkin would return to this inversion of Romantic historiography. This return, however, took place
through a framework of social evolution inspired by the works of Spencer and the ethnological literatures of Maine, Kovalevsky, Laveleye and others. As this chapter has argued, in *Mutual Aid*, one of Kropotkin’s key moves was to adopt Maine’s account of institutional evolution and subvert its political inflections. Maine had developed his stadial account of social development as a narration of the precarious emergence of progressive states from the perennial fetters of primitive communism. Kropotkin, in contrast, mobilized a similar stadial history to argue that social progress had always stemmed from communistic social tendencies. In this account, Maine’s patriarchs, chieftains and kings were responsible for social regression. Critically, where Maine had emphasized feudalization as a turning point in the path to progressive great states, Kropotkin chose to focus on medieval communes instead. Revealing the enduring influence of Romantic historiography on his thought, Kropotkin claimed that tenth-to-thirteenth century city-republics had spearheaded the highest forms of social progress. Among these, Kropotkin singled out the communes’ creation of an ‘extra-territorial bond’, a form of sociability that would overcome narrow localism. It was to this ‘bond’ and its institutions, Kropotkin claimed, that present and future liberty and prosperity was due. In this view once more, the territorial state appeared not as enabling a vast extension of liberty, but as constricting it.

To summarize, then, this chapter has argued that Kropotkin’s conceptions of territory were tied to his contrast between ‘free communes’ and territorial states. For Kropotkin, this contrast echoed not only former socialist visions, but also the influence of Romantic historiography. In particular, Kropotkin drew from liberal historians such as Augustin Thierry, and the depiction of medieval ‘free’ communes as the sites of a golden age before the rise of great territorial states. In Kropotkin’s later writings on ‘social evolution’, this Romantic contrast continued to operate, although articulated through the language of gradualist and stadial social development.
Conclusion

Inspired by the echoes of Occupy and contemporary academic debates, this thesis has investigated how early anarchist thinkers engaged in arguments about territory. In examining the writings of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Petr Kropotkin, the thesis sought two outcomes: to show how ‘territory’ can be traced as an intellectual construct in political thought, subject to contextual controversy and authorial re-imaginations, and to establish the extent to which these early anarchists’ texts made a distinctive set of arguments about territory. As outlined in the introduction, this path was premised on two subplots: one concerning the identity of anarchist thought, and another concerning intellectual controversies around ‘territory’. Bringing this thesis to a close, this chapter is divided into three parts. The first provides a summary of the study’s key findings. The second evaluates these findings in terms of the research agendas of intellectual history within anarchist studies and theories of territory. The final section considers the limitations of the present study and charts avenues for future research.

The Politics of Territory in Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin’s Writings

After the year of Occupy, through voices such as David Graeber’s and Marina Sitrin’s, appeals were made to the fertility of an anarchist outlook on territory. In these visions, it was suggested that the anarchist tradition held a rich imaginary contrasting the ‘closed’ territory of modern states with the ‘open’ territories of ‘free’ communities. In the case of anarchist geographies, such as that advocated by Simon Springer, these visions were claimed to spring directly from the thought of early anarchists such as Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin. Yet, as I have argued in Chapter 1, such claims ultimately rely on mythological readings of the anarchist tradition and thus offer a deceivingly simple conception of their understandings of territory. In this thesis,
deploying the methods of intellectual history, I have sought to show how each of these thinkers engaged in arguments about territory within the context of broader intellectual and political controversies. In so doing, my aim has not only been to emphasize the diversity and richness of thought often elided by mythological readings of ‘anarchism’, but also to highlight how the conceptions of territory in Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin indicate a broader tapestry of intellectual constructions around this key concept in modern politics.

To highlight the relation between the ideas on territory developed by these ‘anarchists’ and the contexts in which they intervened, Chapter 2 surveyed major controversies about territory in nineteenth-century European thought. Mobilizing debates from modern republicanism, romantic nationhood, industrialism and positivism, the chapter sought to explore the contested re-imaginations of territory. This was done specifically in relation to territory’s modern associations with arguments about democracy, property, nationhood, economic networks and sociology. By sketching this broad landscape, the chapter offered not only a grand vista of territory’s conceptual history in this period, but also set out the contexts in which Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin participated. In broad terms, it could be argued that Proudhon’s writings responded primarily to French republican preoccupations, whilst Bakunin’s thought surged within the subversions of romantic nationhood, and Kropotkin’s propaganda exploited the themes of industrialist thought and positivism. Yet, as the thesis has shown through Chapters 3, 4 and 5, whilst this framing offers productive points of gravity to each thinker’s concerns, a careful reading of each of their corpora highlights more complex intellectual constructions, which ultimately combine themes from each of these three backgrounds.

In Proudhon’s writings, whilst engagements with territory emerged from republican preoccupations with property rights and constituency, his arguments re-deployed Romantic historical jurisprudence and naturalism to his own creative ends. Bakunin, in turn, though first engaging territory from a Romantic vision of nationhood as opposed to ‘mechanical states’, eventually integrated Comtean arguments to offer a positivist view of territorial attachment as a physio-psychological phenomenon. As for Kropotkin, though his arguments were often framed by a Spencerian positivist worldview, Romantic historiography was at the heart of his contrast between territorial
states and free communes. The composite character of these arguments thus reveals not only the originality of these thinkers, but also how much remains to be done in understanding the richness of conceptions of territory in nineteenth-century thought. Beyond this general implication, however, the thesis has yielded a number of new insights into the intricacies of each of these thinkers’ thought that are worth reiterating here.

In Chapter 3, I examined how arguments about territory figured in Proudhon’s thought. Engaging with Proudhon’s early writings, I followed Proudhon’s reference to the Industrialist Charles Comte and to historical jurists such as Charles Giraud, and showed how Proudhon considered the issue of territory by questioning its conception as ‘national property’. Whilst he rejected Charles Comte’s claim that the privatization of commons was an irrelevant form of economic dispossession, Proudhon’s tactic against historical jurists was to argue that the ‘privatization’ of the public lands [*ager publicus*] was at the root of Roman ruin. In writing about property, then, Proudhon not only deployed natural law to claim that every individual had the ‘right to live’ but also to argue that only by enshrining territory as a ‘national possession’ could republics avoid sliding into feudalism or despotism. As for Proudhon’s later ‘federalist’ writings, I showed how he mobilized both social and geographical organicism to argue that territorial forms were part of an age-old ‘natural history’ of states. On one hand, this showed how Proudhon built on geographical ideas to argue that whether states were destined to tend towards autocracy or liberty was a result of hydrological dependence. In this vision, the less streams irrigated an area, the more this area was predisposed to autocratic states. On the other hand, I traced how Proudhon built on the language of social organism to argue that the greatest development of liberty relied on polities remaining within limited expanses. These organicist arguments, I claimed, mirrored Proudhon’s creative readings of Georges Cuvier, Charles Fourier, Louis de Bonald, and Victor Cousin. Interestingly for the question of the anarchist tradition, I have noted that Proudhon neither defended ‘free communes’ nor did he radically disavow statehood itself. Instead, like the socialist republican he was, Proudhon’s arguments were primarily focused on the question of how to establish just republican states.
In Chapter 4, I tackled the writings of Bakunin and highlighted how his arguments against territorial aggrandizement through diplomacy, bureaucracy and conquest had their first origins in the political culture of German and Eastern European romanticism. Beyond noting his absorption of Hegelian notions of nations as historical actors, I also traced Bakunin’s use of the mechanical metaphor in contrasting dynastic states and ‘a new form of politics’, based on a fraternity of nations and a ‘universal federation of free republics’. Whilst in the ‘old politics’, territorial partitions resulted from despotic manipulations and the coercive balance of forces, in the ‘new politics’, Bakunin believed, territorial units would result from popular affinity. This vision, though critical, is difficult to attribute to any one particular source, given Bakunin’s limited writings. Shifting from 1848 to his early 1860s writings, I argued that Bakunin’s new emphasis that ‘free federations’ relied on the internal federation of ‘autonomous communes’ was drawn directly from the political language with which Nikolai Ogarev and Alexander Herzen responded to debates about Russia’s Great Reforms. Within the question of ‘anarchist thought’, this is significant, as it means that Bakunin’s first calls for bottom-up federations stemmed from Herzen and Ogarev’s ‘Russian Socialism’ rather than a self-identified ‘anarchist’ tradition. Moreover, these arguments were not premised on claims that the state must be abolished. As I argued, Bakunin’s first calls for abolishing the state only emerged during the late 1860s, provoked by his radical reading of Proudhon’s *Of Justice*. From 1867 onwards, adding Comte’s positivist philosophy to his equations, Bakunin saw the State as theological and argued that antitheologism required it to be abolished and substituted by international socialist federations. In this positivist turn, as I showed, Bakunin argued that ‘state patriotism’ was an abstractive reflection of early animalistic collective egoism, and that its disastrous drive for territorial conquest could only be superseded by defending a humanist solidarity grounded in ‘real’ relations between communities.

Lastly, in Chapter 5, I investigated Kropotkin’s contrast between territorial states and ‘free communes’. In contrast to established renderings, I showed how Kropotkin built this contrast by subversively redeploying the Romantic historiography of liberals such as Augustin Thierry. Mimicking Thierry, Kropotkin’s retelling of early medieval ‘free communes’ was mobilized to argue about modern politics. Yet, as the chapter showed, whilst Thierry emphasized that the communes’ isolation had been overcome by the creation of vast territorial states, Kropotkin argued that the continued reign of
territorial states had hampered the growth of social networks enabled by technological and economic development. Following this, and echoing the political language of former socialists, Kropotkin argued for federations of free communes to substitute states. In the second part of Chapter 5, I argued that Kropotkin’s *Mutual Aid* continued this subversion of romantic historiography. In examining *Mutual Aid*, I traced how Kropotkin consciously co-opted Henry Maine’s historiography of the slow emergence of modern states against primitive communism. As I showed, Kropotkin used Maine’s narrative of social development only to subvert it by arguing that communism was the enduring source of social progress, whereas the rise of modern states signalled regression or stasis. In retracing Kropotkin’s moves, Chapter 5 also emphasized how *Mutual Aid* returned to earlier accounts of medieval communes to argue that the ruinous ‘territorial concentration’ of modern states would be overcome by returning autonomy to each small territorial grouping, which through modern technologies and economics would form ‘extraterritorial’ solidarities and a constellation of free federations.

Through these engagements with Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin’s writings, the thesis has excavated the intricacies of how foundational ‘anarchist’ arguments about territory came about. In doing so, I have challenged rather than accommodated mythological readings concerning the perennial consistency of anarchist visions. Countering depictions of ‘anarchist thought’ as sharing foundational critiques of statism and hopes for a free federalism, the thesis showed how each of these three canonical thinkers differed substantially on the question of territory. Moreover, it was argued that these differences reflected broader intellectual contexts and their arguments about territory. Thus, the thesis not only demystified claims as to the uniqueness of anarchist conceptions of territory but also indicated a multiplicity of nineteenth-century controversies that participated in shaping territory’s modern meaning. In the next two sections, I review the thesis’s specific contributions to the research agendas of intellectual history within anarchist studies, as well as within theories of territory.
Contributions I: Anarchist Studies and Intellectual Histories of Anarchism

In an important special issue of Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies in 2013, some of the most renowned scholars in anarchist studies reflected on the issues posed by the canonical constructions that have permeated the field.³ As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis follows Matthew Adams’s call for research that radically questions the canon by re-engaging its texts through the methods of intellectual history.⁴ In so doing, I have taken a consciously skeptical attitude to those readings of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin that presume their arguments cohere into the same transhistorical doctrine. Inspired by the new historicist studies of Ruth Kinna, Matthew Adams, Federico Ferretti, Jean-Christophe Angaut, René Berthier, Edward Castleton, Anne-Sophie Chambost, Alex Prichard, and others, the thesis has engaged with each thinker on their own terms, exploring the breadth of their writings to gain a better sense of their contingent motivations, intellectual lineages and argumentative intricacies.⁵

Though its findings are only one step in a longer investigation, this thesis contributes to a better understanding of each of these thinkers outside the mythological fixtures that have dominated accounts of the anarchist tradition. Countering mythological readings, this thesis did not assume proximity between the views of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin and instead emphasized that their intellectual relations need to be studiously reconsidered. It is more than a little significant that none of these three thinkers shared an intellectual background or co-operated directly. With all the irony of history, Bakunin’s turn to anarchism coincided with Proudhon’s death, and Kropotkin’s involvement with the Internationale occurred after Bakunin’s passing. Moreover, these thinkers referred little to each other’s texts, or at least not explicitly so, rendering their intellectual relations challenging to uncover. The most significant exception to this is in Bakunin’s late 1860s writings where reference to Proudhon is made more explicitly, though he often fails to specify to which texts.

One of the key contributions of this thesis, then, has been to show that even when these thinkers made related rhetorical attacks on modern states and appeals for new federalisms, they often came to these positions through substantially different intellectual paths. Thus, though at times they shared some terms and arguments, the
intellectual hinterlands with which they came to these endowed them with quite different meanings. In this section, I reflect on this by contrasting how Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin treated arguments surrounding federalism, free communes, natural order and anti-statism. These four themes are particularly important to contrast, as together they have formed the basis of mythological readings of ‘anarchism’ as holding a perennial view of how to ‘free’ territory.\textsuperscript{6}

The first contrast to understand relates to how these three thinkers came to call for federations. For Proudhon, the motif appeared in the 1860s. He decided to appeal to the idea of federalism to challenge Napoleonic manoeuvres around ‘the principle of nationalities’. At heart, Proudhon’s appeal to federalism was tied to wrangling over the hearts and minds of dissident socialists and republicans to argue that an Imperial constitution was incompatible with true republicanism. For Bakunin, on the other hand, the motif of federation was manifest as early as the 1840s. Its 1848 recurrences indicated an alignment with the radical democratic rhetoric of the French Left Republicans such as Ledru-Rollin, and with the political languages of Romanticism. In this rhetoric, arguing for federations was part of calling for an alliance of Europe’s oppressed nations to dismantle the monarchical rule of Austria, Russia and Prussia. Later, in 1861, Bakunin’s appeals for bottom-up federations echoed the program for administrative reforms that Herzen and Ogarev promoted for Russia. The idea at the heart of this appeal was to liberalize the Russian State by devolving autonomy to provinces and communes. Indeed, it was not by chance that in these appeals, the United States of America was gestured to as a positive example. It was only after 1867, under the influence of his readings of Proudhon, Comte and the political culture of the Internationale, that Bakunin’s appeal to federation would be tied to ‘the abolition of the state’ and the empowerment of worker associations. For Kropotkin, by contrast, the theme of federation reflected his alignment with the Internationale’s 1870s political language, as well as an echo of those Romantic historians that spoke of the early federations of village communities and medieval towns. To summarize, though Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin all called for federations, the intellectual lineages and contexts behind this differed significantly. This should make us skeptical of the idea of a coherent anarchist vision of ‘free federalism’.
A similar substantive distance can be seen between each thinker’s reflections on communes. In Proudhon’s thought the ‘commune’ figured quite marginally, and was mostly referred to only as the smallest administrative unit in France, with no reference to a special political character. This is in spite of Proudhon’s defence of small socialist republics. In Bakunin’s writings, though this motif was infrequent, it did gain significance after 1861 based on his relations with Herzen and Ogarev. Initially, Bakunin endorsed their idea that the Russian peasant commune ought to be given autonomy, and become the basic unit of a reformed Russian state. By 1866, however, Bakunin broke with this position and argued that this traditional commune was a primitive *milieu*, whose customary patriarchy and servility had no prospect of ‘transforming into a democratic organization’. Traditional village communes, he thus implied, were not the source of a socialist future. Meanwhile, Bakunin continued to argue that liberty and autonomy ought to be devolved to provinces and communes in Western modern states. However, this stood more as part of an argument about socialist federation than about the specific potential of transforming local communities. With Kropotkin, by contrast, the ‘commune’ was a practically inescapable focus of conceptual effort. To a certain extent, this echoed a mythological appeal to the memory of the Paris Commune and to previous utopic visions of socialist communes. On the other hand, as I have argued, Kropotkin’s idealisation of communes had its roots in the Romantic medieval historiography of Augustin Thierry and others. Moreover, Kropotkin’s later arguments about ‘communes’ as implying ‘communism’ had important roots in the writings of Émile de Laveleye, Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer. In this manner, it is clear that Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin did not share a conception of ‘free communes’, even if they were all familiar with Romantic and positivist accounts of medieval and rural communes. Moreover, Proudhon and Bakunin were explicitly hostile to the idea of communism as it was allegedly embodied in traditional peasant communes. Anarchist idealisation of communes, therefore, began only with Kropotkin’s creative co-option of romantic medieval historiography after the Paris Commune of 1871.

Furthermore, although Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin all appealed to naturalist arguments, they did not share the same position on the role of nature in politics. For Proudhon, naturalist arguments stemmed from an organicist view of social groups as having inherent limits and needing certain institutional organs to operate
harmoniously, and a view of physical geography as a determining factor in shaping primitive states. These arguments, as we have seen, had significant origins in Proudhon’s reading of Georges Cuvier, Charles Fourier and others. In Bakunin’s case, naturalist arguments figured differently over time. In his 1840s writings, appeals to nature were linked to a romantic contrast between mechanical states and living democracies produced by popular sympathies. As with other thinkers influenced by German idealism and romanticism, the first naturalist arguments in Bakunin were therefore tied to notions of lived cultural affinity as determining a new politics. In his later writings, however, Bakunin’s naturalist arguments would appeal to Comtean positivism and seek to argue about political history by reference to physiological explanations of psychological/political phases from animalistic attachment to herd and locality, through religious attachment to the greatness of the state, to conscious human universal solidarity. With Kropotkin, in marked contrast to Proudhon and Bakunin, naturalist arguments were integrated into a defence of communism as a perennial progressive tendency in institutional and ethical evolution. In sum, Proudhon’s naturalism drew from the French organicism of Cuvier, Fourier and others, and argued that a good relation between state and society depended on limiting state extension and fixing its institutional functions. Bakunin’s naturalism stemmed from German idealism and imagined the development of human self-consciousness in terms of popular affinity and political forms. Kropotkin’s naturalism stemmed from Spencerian positivism and argued that human institutional and ethical evolution ought to be understood as the progressive development of communist tendencies. The notion that Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin shared the same naturalist worldview is thus misleading, as it hides how naturalist arguments flowed from different sources and worked towards different ends in each thinker’s works.

Compounding these differing arguments about federalism, communes and the politics of nature, Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin’s critiques of the state also diverged significantly. Beginning with Proudhon, the critique of the state was not premised on abolishing it, so much as transforming it. Proudhon’s enduring cause was to argue for what constitutional changes were still necessary to make modern states into true republics. Spurred by the rise of Napoleon III, Proudhon’s later writings attacked the imperial reforms as creating an unduly centralized and militarized state. This criticism was tied to Proudhon’s broader Eclectic philosophy of history against communism,
populism and despotism, and was applied to his natural history of states. Significantly, however, Proudhon’s critique was not of statehood in and of itself, but only of illiberal states. In Bakunin’s case, the critique of the state grew foremost out of a Romantic emphasis on the need to overcome the despotic and mechanical states typical of the eighteenth century and invent a new political form, corresponding to a new historical phase of liberty. In Bakunin’s later writings, through his radical readings of Proudhon and Comte, he came to associate statehood with a theological stage in human development and began to argue, with rhetorical bombast, for the abolition of the state. It is significant, nonetheless, that Bakunin also explained these calls for abolition as calls for a radical transformation displacing the state to a subaltern role and empowering popular associations. For Kropotkin, on the other hand, the critique of the state was primarily mobilized by revising Romantic historiography to argue that modern states ought to be replaced by free communes. At the core of this argument was the idea that modern states were the product of sixteenth-century monarchical despotism, and that eleventh-century ‘free’ medieval communes provided a fertile model for socialist politics. This consolidated the notion that anarchists did not want to transform the state so much as replace it – a position which neither Proudhon nor Bakunin seemed to hold. In short, then, even the allegedly defining anti-statism of anarchism ought to be seen as a canonical device that obscures rather than clarifies the thought of each of these socialist thinkers. Through a contextualist reading of their thought, Proudhon’s critiques of the state are shown as aligned with post-revolutionary liberal French debates, whereas Bakunin’s reflect Romantic and Comtean attacks on ‘mechanical’ states, and Kropotkin’s echoed the attacks against autocracy in Romantic medievalist historiography and Spencerian positivism. In sum, to appropriately appreciate how each of these thinkers critiqued the state, it is necessary to investigate their intellectual constructions in their specificity, rather than assume them as sharing in an a priori wholesale rejection of ‘statism’.

With these differences in mind, it ought to be apparent that arguing that these three thinkers shared an anarchist theory of territory, where coercive capitalist states were substituted by free federations of natural communes, can only serve to occlude the depth of their thought. Such mythological appeals to coherence might well prove expedient at times, but they distort a tradition rather than rediscover it. At a general level, it is true that Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin argued against over-centralized
states and territorial conquest, and argued for a new politics of socialist federalism. It is also true that they argued that over-centralized states were ‘artificial’, whereas socialist federalism would be more ‘human’ and ‘natural’. However, tempting as it may be to see this resonance as uniquely ‘anarchist’, it is significant that any such views can be found amongst a number of liberals, socialists and even certain conservatives in the nineteenth century. Saint-Simonians, Slavophiles and Industrialists, for instance, all argued that the modern state was overburdening, that territorial conquest was undesirable and that more natural and human political forms could be established through federations. Thus, the identity of ‘anarchist’ arguments on territory has to be more specific than allegiance to these broad themes. In this thesis, I have sought to argue that a productive way to find this specificity is to explore the intellectual context and depth of individual thinkers placed within the anarchist canon.

Contributions II: Theories of Territory and Intellectual History

Beyond the literature on anarchist studies, the thesis also contributes to the growing debates around how to re-theorize territory and productively pursue the agenda marked by a spatial turn in intellectual history. Inspired by Elden’s work on the history of territory as ‘a concept and practice’ from the fourteenth to early eighteenth century, this thesis radicalized the argument that territory ought to be studied as a modern intellectual construct. Like Elden, the theoretical thrust of these efforts is to argue that territory’s meaning ought not to be considered as given or neutral, as it is in sociological theories that conceive it as social or state space, or in normative debates where territorial rights are discussed abstractly and ahistorically. Territory, like sovereignty, citizenship and statehood, is part of a contested patchwork of intellectual lineages; it is an imagination with many histories. To highlight these histories, however, the thesis did not follow Elden’s Foucauldian commitment to understand conceptions of territory as tied to governmental practices. Instead, the thesis engaged with territory within the confines of political thought and intellectual history. This shift in focus was aimed to enable a greater degree of freedom in showing why social scientists ought not to take territory’s modern meaning as a given. Territory is not just land, nor a controlled area, or even ‘state space’. Territory is a plural imagination that
has been constantly re-invented through shifting archipelagos of argument. To appreciate the imaginative character of this construction, it is necessary to avoid the sociological impulse to assume that a fixed understanding of territory defined different historical stages. In this manner, rather than assume that territory gained its modern meaning as a result of the Peace of Westphalia or seventeenth-century mercantilist states, this thesis has argued that it is necessary to navigate the intellectual games with which territory was re-invented throughout the long nineteenth century, be it through republicanism, nationhood, industrialism or positivism. Today’s theoretical and political debates about territory ought to be more familiar with this intellectual heritage.

Theoretical debates about territory, such as those occurring in political geography, historical sociology and political science, would benefit from an examination of this nineteenth-century intellectual history of territory. This is because a critical awareness of the origins of sociological and normative theories of territory would contribute to richer and more creative conceptual articulations. Sociological arguments about ‘territoriality’ and the ‘rise of the territorial state’, in particular, would benefit from critical attention to the politics that accompanied the formulation of these theoretical devices in the writings of Herbert Spencer, Max Weber or Karl Marx. As this thesis has shown, sociological views of territory have a rich and plural intellectual context in nineteenth-century thought, which reveals not only different traditions in ‘describing’ social relations but also a multiplicity of authorial inflections concerning the politics ascribed to these social theories. For better historical sociologies, in short, it is necessary to pay attention to the contingent politics of foundational sociological conceptions of territory.

Beyond the theoretical realm, contemporary political debates around territory, such as those occurring in the context of European Union policies, Nigerian and Indian federalism, Latin American indigenous rights, or Kurdish experiments in democratic confederalism, can also draw productively from engaging with the past intellectual politics of territory. The first pay-off to this engagement is in gaining a deeper insight as to the intellectual justifications and critiques levelled at past institutional arrangements of territory. Critical awareness of these past political contests provides two key benefits. First, it may offer a better sense of the genealogy of certain
assumptions and disagreements about the politics of territory. Second, and more importantly, it provides a vivid reminder of a greater plurality of conceptual games and feeds into more creative and open discussions about how to innovate political arrangements of territory.

Pluralism, the thesis has argued, is a key element of the value of an intellectual history of territory. Although engaging thinkers associated with an ideological tradition, the thesis sought to emphasize synchronic contests that defined debates and consolidated competing imaginations of territory. In this manner, the thesis sought not only to show the variability of the concept of territory but also its intricate politics. The aim in recovering this pluralism, moreover, is not merely to reconstruct forgotten identities, but rather to show how past differences were an operative part of vibrant and fertile discussions which made much of the political imagination we still live under. Following this vision, the thesis hypothesized that understanding how ‘territory’ figured in nineteenth-century anarchist thought could offer a valuable vantage point in reviewing broader controversies around territory. How, then, have its readings of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin served this broader aim?

Building on the thesis’s investigations, this section discusses how each of these thinkers’ thought on territory has indicated broader conceptual innovations of debates around post-revolutionary republicanism, Romantic nationhood and ‘scientific’ social theory. Most importantly, this section emphasizes how Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin’s writings offer exemplary instances of how different intellectual strands were creatively combined. Through Proudhon, this section reviews how questions of territory and republican constitutionalism were innovated by his combinations of Eclectic idealism, Romantic historical jurisprudence and Industrialist political economy. Through Bakunin’s thought, in turn, it is argued that debates around territory and nationhood have yet to be further understood through the interplay of the many registers of Romantic nationhood and, especially after the 1850s, the rise of positivist accounts of ethnography, nationhood and patriotism. Last, engaging with Kropotkin, this section argues that his writings on territory are useful to show how late nineteenth-century positivist and evolutionist social theories contained conceptions of territory which were in significant dialogue with former Romantic historiographies of ancient communalism and the rise of the modern state.
Dealing with Proudhon’s early writings on property, Chapter 3 showed how his arguments were in dialogue with various strands of post-revolutionary French thought and their distinctive iterations on territory. Proudhon, as the thesis showed, was directly tackling post-revolutionary revisions of natural law arguments from three quarters: Eclectic philosophy, French historical jurisprudence and Industrialist political economy. Eclectic philosophy, through the works of Victor Cousin, Théodore Jouffroy and others, encouraged an entire generation to read political history as part of a millennial history of liberty, where psychological communism and geographical determinism were progressively eroded. In this view, the legal institutions of territory, such as property and sovereignty, mirrored psychological stages in the march to liberty. Beyond this Eclectic turn, French historical jurists such as the understudied Emmanuel de Pastoret and Jonas D. Meyer, or the more familiar Charles Giraud and Édouard Laboulaye argued that the relation between social order and legislation ought to be studied through the depths of history. These jurists constructed a history of legislation, landed property and social conflict as a fable convenu to judge and defend post-revolutionary distinctions of private property, eminent domain and territorial sovereignty. In the case of Industrialists such as Jean-Baptiste Say, Charles Dunoyer and Charles Comte, a third post-revolutionary line of argument was developed. Here, the writings of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and Thomas Malthus were mobilized to argue that concerns with natural law ought to be substituted by a discovery of the laws of nature and economic utility. Moving beyond the revolutionary emphasis on internal administrative reforms, the Industrialists marked themselves apart from the Physiocrats by advocating for the abolition of economic boundaries between states. At its most febrile, this line of argument would be taken up by Saint-Simonians to launch the socialist idea that the expansion of economic interconnectedness would transform states into industrial regulators (see Chapter 2). Whilst Eclectics, historical jurists, and Industrialists deployed substantively different arguments, their engagements shared in the post-revolutionary concern with overcoming the feudal entanglement of property and sovereignty, and thus ending perennial drives to social conflict and territorial conquest.

Beyond these post-revolutionary concerns with the relations between natural law, property and territorial conquest, however, it is significant to emphasize that Eclectics, historical jurists and Industrialists also drew on broader European debates involving
territory. In the case of the Eclectics, the geo-philosophical components of German Idealism were key in developing naturalist arguments about politics. Be it through their readings of Herder or Hegel, this school of thinkers gave new currency to the idea that geography influenced national character and political development. French historical jurists, in turn, through their dialogue with the German historical jurisprudence of Carl von Savigny and Karl Friedrich von Eichhorn, increasingly linked ancient legal texts to ethnology. Territory, in this scholarship, was increasingly seen as an ethnic institution, whose social character was registered in legal texts. In later years, this view would be developed through the works of Henry Maine, Henry Morgan, Émile de Laveleye and many other scholars of legal anthropology. As for Industrialists, such as Say, Comte and Dunoyer, it is significant that many of their new arguments about territory were in dialogue with Malthus’s theory of population and Adam Smith’s defence of labour value as opposed to the Physiocrats’ emphasis on territorial rentability. For nineteenth-century controversies about territory, the Industrialists’ emphasis on Malthus’s theory resonated through imperialist arguments about colonial migration, whilst their emphasis on labour value and free trade [libre-échange] echoed through Saint-Simonianism and Manchester liberalism. All these currents of thought, though familiar to intellectual historians of the nineteenth-century, have yet to be investigated in detail for their conceptual innovations on territory.

Furthermore, Proudhon’s later federalist arguments indicate yet other fields redefining territory. His geographical organicism, for instance, indicates the presence of other thinkers that related geophysical seats to political prospects. The chief lineage that Proudhon drew on was Eclectic philosophy of history, yet these arguments are also in resonance with German Humanist geographers such as Alexander von Humboldt and Carl Ritter.¹⁴ In arguing for the organic unity of physical and human geography, Humboldt and Ritter established the correspondence of politics and geophysical terrain, which would be critical to the invention of ‘geopolitics’ by Friedrich Ratzel and Halford Mackinder.¹⁵ That Proudhon combined geographical organicism with socio-biological language, as when speaking of the ‘embryogeny’ and ‘natural limits’ of states, is in further resonance with the manner in which later nineteenth-century thinkers such as Herbert Spencer or Friedrich Ratzel employed organicist analogies in describing social development and territorial organization. Given that Spencer, Ratzel and Mackinder were all thinkers who were active after Proudhon’s death, this poses a
deeply interesting question as to which other thinkers before Friedrich Ratzel may have been developing such arguments. This is a puzzle for future research.

With Bakunin’s works, another myriad of ‘territorial’ controversies comes into view. First among these are Central and Eastern European debates about nationhood, ethnicity and patriotism. As part of the upheavals of 1848, Bakunin’s writings are in dialogue with competing imaginations of ‘the awakening of nations’ and its territorial aspects. On one hand, Bakunin’s interventions indicate the significance of a broad Romantic attack on ‘mechanical’ states, interested in territorial accumulation instead of ‘national’ welfare. This vision, far from singular to him, was shared by conservative romantics, liberal nationalists and revolutionary democrats alike. For conservative romantics such as the Russian Slavophiles, the critique of the mechanical states led to arguments that the Russian Empire was justifiable in terms of its dynastic bond to the protection of the spiritual unity of the Russian people with their land. In the Austrian Empire, on the other hand, conservative reformers such as František Palacký combined a defence of the cultural revival of non-German ‘nations’ with a defence of historical territorial entities such as Bohemia, which compounded local patriotism [Landespatriotismus] and loyalty to the Empire [Staatspatriotismus]. In yet another variation, many German liberal nationalists at the Frankfurt Parliament, such as Johann Gustav Droysen, combined the driving claim that liberal politics demanded culturally and linguistically homogenous national states, with claims to annex non-German majority territories based on historical rights or strategic considerations. What is interesting here, and ought to be studied further, is how debates about territory were not only disputes about border delineations, but about the very arguments for territorial identity.

Moreover, through Bakunin’s 1860s writings, a new moment in the entanglement of question of territory and nationhood is indicated. Bakunin’s critique of patriotism, as the thesis has argued, was part of a political assault on the perceived betrayal of European democrats as well as on the growing chauvinism of conservative nationalists such as Mikhail Katkov and Ivan Aksakov. Bakunin’s grouping of these diverse political groups under the label of a territorially expansive ‘state patriotism’ invites investigation of how conceptions of territory shifted between the nationalist cultures of the 1840s and the late 1860s. Within Russian thought, this attention could trace the
shift between ambivalence about the conquest in early Slavophiles such as Konstantin Aksakov to the expansionist eagerness of Nikolay Danilevsky and Konstantin Leontiev. Beyond Russia, Bakunin’s emphasis on the shifting politics of nationhood also resonates with the growing identification of nationalism with territorial expansionism, be it in the context of British, French or German imperial thought. In this context, Bakunin’s use of a Comtean critique of patriotism is further indicative of the critical role of Comtean positivism in challenging the imperial turn in national thought. Interestingly, the prevalence of a Comtean critique of imperial patriotism also indicates the growing confidence of ‘scientific’ arguments in political debate about society and territory. Whilst recent studies such as Duncan Bell’s The Idea of Greater Britain or Maria Fitzpatrick’s edited volume Liberal Imperialism in Europe have called attention to this late nineteenth-century turn in European political thought, much remains to be done in terms of exploring how this shift transformed conceptions of territory. A key part of any such effort will be to show how ethnic cartographies, as were used in the aftermath of the First World War, often played a limited role in how nineteenth-century nationhood debates considered territory.

Kropotkin’s arguments, on the other hand, offer a new vantage point regarding the birth of social theories of territory. Through Kropotkin’s engagements with Herbert Spencer, we identified the growth of sociological theories, which understood territory as something immanently produced by animal and human social behaviour (i.e. territoriality). With Herbert Spencer, moreover, Kropotkin developed arguments which used biological analogies to explain social development (pace Thomas H. Huxley), as well as using legal anthropological literature to explain institutional evolution as the result of shifting relations between social custom and economic activity (pace Henry Maine and Émile de Laveleye). In combining socio-biological theories of territory with anthropological ones, Kropotkin was not engaging in a singularly original evolutionist argument. Instead, such a combination was conjugated in many variations by many Western intellectuals, such as Charles Letourneau, Lester F. Ward or Friedrich Ratzel.

Yet, contrary to the popular overemphasis on Darwinism, it is important to trace what Kropotkin called ‘a whole science devoted to the embryology of human institutions’. Kropotkin’s reference, as we have seen, was to the ethnological writings of Henry
Maine, Maxim Kovalevsky and many others. Within this literature, in partial reflection of its ties to historical jurisprudence, arguments about ancient institutions were tied to stadial accounts of social and spatial organization. Through discussion of hunting grounds, village communities and communal land ownership, territory was seen as a social institution immanent to land use activities and customary rights. Beyond significantly shaping the language of modern social sciences, these theories of territoriality were translated into justifying colonial practices of indirect rule, through which European empires claimed to protect ‘primitive’ societies. Given that these new conceptions of territory often carried a stadial view of the passage between tribal territory and modern territory, new social theories of territory also encouraged governmental interventions to ‘modernize’ peasant societies through land privatization schemes and reforms to familial relations and customary rules. Intellectuals such as Kovalevsky, for example, justified their sociological studies of the Russian commune by tying them to their ambitions for liberal and economic reform in late Imperial Russia. In addition to these practical impacts, it is also significant that these new views of territory as immanent to social forms included marked engagements with debates around social ethics. Much like Kropotkin, later socialist thinkers would emphasize the need for communal institutions to save the modern world from the individualist miseries and tyrannies of the modern states.

Where these new sociological conceptions of territory embodied a markedly new approach, it is important not to overemphasize their positivist or scientific character. As argued in this thesis through the case of Kropotkin’s thought, positivist theories had deep roots and resonance with much of the Romantic historiography of the early nineteenth century. In this manner, Kropotkin’s readings of Maine, Laveleye or Kovalevsky were intimately tied to his earlier readings of Augustin Thierry, François Guizot, Sismonde de Sismondi and less familiar historians such as Ivan D. Belyaev and Mikola Kostomarov. In this union, once more, Kropotkin was far from exceptional. Indeed, Victorian thinkers such as Henry Maine or Edward A. Freeman are notable for their non-Darwinian evolutionist historiography, but also for their significant intellectual debts to Romantic historians such as Augustin Thierry and Carl von Savigny. In this manner, as John Burrow has argued, it is important to remember that the emergence of positivist social sciences was entangled with a complex cultural heritage, including deep ties to Romantic thinkers. With regard to anthropological
and sociological theories of territory, I have argued, this affinity was critical in terms of narratives of the emergence of the modern state and the erosion of ancient communalism. For many, this narrative was often seen as a tale of the regretful but necessary path to create large-scale conditions for progressive society. For others, however, as Kropotkin’s writings show, this historiographical narrative was used to argue for the return of the virtues of networks of communalist villages and cities. Far from being isolated in such a vision, Kropotkin’s writings here too resonated with other political thinkers, such as those Comtean positivists who idealized small-scale positivist republics modelled on medieval city-states (see Chapter 2).

With these first mappings in place, it is clear that much is still to be gained by considering the question of territory in nineteenth-century political thought. The three thinkers examined in this thesis have served as lookouts in a field that needs further exploration. In embracing this journey, I have argued, we may gain a better understanding of how this modern concept was forged through past contests and embedded into present politics.

Towards an Intellectual History of Territory: Limitations and Further Research

This thesis inevitably offers only a partial reading of nineteenth-century anarchist thought, given that it has only considered three thinkers and focused on specific aspects of their work. As noted in Chapter 1, a multitude of lesser known nineteenth-century anarchists could have been investigated, thinkers such as Elisée Reclus, Gustav Landauer or Manuel González Prada. Elisée Reclus, for example, would have been an interesting addition. As a renowned geographer, a student of Carl Ritter, participant in the Paris Commune and lifelong friend to Kropotkin, Elisée Reclus’s work certainly contains interesting reflections on territory. Although all these thinkers have a wealth of writings worth studying, the thesis chose to focus on Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin precisely to challenge the frequent mythological appeals to these thinkers. The point here was not so much to challenge the narrowness of the anarchist canon, but to question some of its foundational assumptions.
Yet, even in analysing its three thinkers, the thesis has had limitations. First, given that I am not fluent in Russian or German, access to materials in these languages had to be mediated through translation. This limitation was offset by the fact that my fluency in French made it possible for me to work directly with many core texts that remain unavailable in English. Second, I was not able to visit the physical archives relating to Proudhon and Kropotkin in the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) and the Besançon Municipal Archives (MS). This limitation, as discussed in Chapter 1, was offset by the wealth of digital archives concerning these three thinkers and their contexts. Third, and most significantly, the sheer amount of material in each thinker’s corpus made it necessary to choose certain moments to analyse, leaving other aspects treated in summary fashion but largely undiscussed. In the case of Proudhon, this constraint was felt significantly as his expansive corpus presented many moments inviting further study. Future work could develop further insights into Proudhon’s *General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century, Of Justice and Political Contradictions*. A further investigation of *Political Contradictions*, for example, could trace Proudhon’s reading of Édouard de Laboulaye’s *The State and Its Limits*. Concerning Kropotkin, future research could examine his Encyclopaedia articles and *The Great French Revolution* to explore his critical use of the works of historians such as Ivan D. Belyaev, Mykola Kostomarov and others. Beyond this thesis, therefore, it is undoubtedly the case that many aspects of these understudied thinkers remain worthy of further inquiry.

Furthermore, the thesis also carried limitations in recovering the intellectual politics around territory in the long nineteenth century. The aim of the thesis was not to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the theoretical case for treating territory as a *political imagination* rather than a political institution. This theoretical aim meant that the thesis was not focused on tracing the connections between intellectual politics and institutional outcomes. Unlike the works of Elden, Fitzmaurice or Koskenniemi, this thesis did not show what debates preceded defining shifts in the legal, diplomatic or state practices concerning territory. Instead, I sought to treat territory as an intellectual construct in nineteenth-century political thought. In doing so, my aim was to indicate the plurality of conceptual innovations with which territory was re-imagined into its modern polysemy. The relevance of this exercise, as argued in Chapter 1, was to use history to regain critical attention to the politically-weighted
conceptions that populate contemporary social theory and political contests about territory. Nineteenth-century thinkers re-invented the concept of territory not only in view of technical changes in governance, but also with a view to change the aspirations of politics themselves. In the cases of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin, as we have seen, this was clear in how defences of federalism, communes and naturalism were not only part of specific campaigns against imperial policies, but also part of enticing an imagination of a world where territorial order itself embodied socialist aspirations to autonomy, solidarity and equality.

These three thinkers, however, can serve only as a timid example of a wilder plurality of nineteenth-century reinventions of territory. In this manner, although this thesis is now at an end, its project may well be at the beginning of a greater journey. As seen in Chapter 2, a cursory mapping of European nineteenth-century thought indicates how much work is yet to be done in detail. Using a similar interpretative approach as this thesis has applied to Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin’s texts, future research could tackle how other groups of thinkers contributed to territory’s intellectual palimpsests. In pursuing further research on this subject, an important question will stand as to how to select thinkers and organize the narrative of the intellectual history of territory.

In this study, given I was motivated by the echoes of Occupy, I focused on the ideological tradition of ‘anarchism’ and challenged assumptions of its perennial coherence on the subject of territory. In exploring the rich intellectual fields through which each thinker argued about territory, the thesis was thus showing the lack of accuracy and fertility in assuming all anarchist thought boils down to the same contrast between coercive territorial states and free federations of communes. This approach, though useful in undermining the notion of an ideologically coherent view of territory, came at the cost of centreing the narrative in cross-ideological debates around territory, either synchronically or diachronically.31 Future research narrating the intellectual history of territory could thus be organized differently by examining the various sides of a controversy (as in Chapter 2) or by examining how a certain view of territory shifted throughout different moments (e.g. how naturalist views of territory developed from early German Romantics, through late Victorian evolutionists and into early Geopolitical thought).
The first of these alternative approaches would have the value of relating controversies to particular political moments and placing competing views in their contemporary dialogues. In exploring the post-revolutionary moment in France, for example, this approach could better emphasize how conceptions of territory were marked by the contests and exchanges of thinkers such as Destutt de Tracy, Louis de Bonald, Charles Comte, Augustin Thierry and Victor Cousin. The chief benefit of this approach is that it would show how apparently distinct sets of arguments about territory were conceived in connection with common political and intellectual controversies.

The second approach, taking a diachronic narrative, could explore how a particular imagination of territory was constructed across different historical contexts. This approach could be used in a study on how Malthus’s arguments on territory in his theory of population were re-invented by a variety of later thinkers such as Charles Comte, Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Travers Twiss. The benefit of this approach would be to emphasize how a particular view of territory developed in manifold ways, adding new assumptions and political ambitions to earlier arguments. In our hypothetical case of a study of Malthusianism and territory, this could show how different thinkers deployed Malthus’s arguments in connection to discrediting natural law defences of common property (i.e. Comte), in relation to arguing for colonial expansion (i.e. Twiss), in relation to imagining a socialist future (i.e. Chernyshevsky). As is clear, then, the possibilities for intellectual histories of territory are many. My hope is that my limited interventions can inspire others to participate in what is an ambitious and broad research agenda.

In the years to come, my own aim is to develop this agenda by working towards an intellectual history of territory in the long nineteenth century. Drawing inspiration from David Armitage’s recent experiments with longue durée intellectual history and ‘serial contextualism’, my objective will be to use the vantage point of momentous events to explore a succession of controversies about the concept of territory. This project draws significant inspiration from writing Chapter 2, and wanting to discuss controversies about territory in further detail, as well as with less Eurocentrism. Provisionally, the controversies I intend to analyse would include not only French debates during the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Reforms, the Restoration and the July Monarchy but also Latin American debates about republicanism and
federalism between the 1820s and the 1860s and debates around the birth of the Soviet Union. In pursuing this long-term project, my aim is to contribute to a greater critical awareness of territory as a historically constructed concept whose variations have pervaded not only political action, but also the sociological imaginations of Geography, International Relations and Political Science. To gain awareness of this malleability and its forgotten moulders, I believe, is critical for a deeper understanding and creativity in dealing with enduring theories of territory. In this manner, by recognizing tradition as something made, full of flawed authors and contingent purposes, my hope is to fuel newer and deeper gestures in rethinking the politics of territory. As I was often reminded by friends from Occupy, the first task of politics is imagination. Yet, even imagination has a history, a history that we must learn to make.
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Introduction

1 Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Semiotext(e), 2015), 198-199.
2 For some academic instances of these uses see David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2012); Occupy: A People Yet To Come, ed. by Andrew Conio and others (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015); Angharad E. Beckett, Paul Bagguley, and Tom Campbell, ‘Foucault, social movements and heterotopic horizons: rupturing the order of things’, Social Movement Studies, 16.2 (2017), 169-181; and Jamie Matthews, ‘Occupation as refrain: territory and beyond in Occupy London’, Social Movement Studies, 17.2 (2018), 127-143.
4 Graeber, The Democracy Project, 259. My emphasis.
5 Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, 177, 185.


**Chapter 1. Theory and Method: Territory and the History of Political Thought**

Max Weber, *Vocation Lectures*, ed. by David Owen, and trans. by Tracy Strong (London: Hackett, 2004), 33. It ought to be noted that in the original German text, the word rendered here as ‘territory’ is ‘Gebiet’, which could also be translated as ‘area’. This translational difference is significant if analysing Weber’s thought, but only a caveat in tracing how Anglo-American scholarship has used this passage.


7 Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, ix.

8 Ibid, 14.


15 Sack, Human Territoriality, 19.
18 For the classic defence of sociobiological territoriality, see Robert Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry Into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations (New York: Atheneum, 1966). Note that Ardrey’s work was tied to the Neo-Malthusian generation of Paul R. Ehrlich and Garrett Hardin.
22 Delaney, Territory, 1-33, 70-101.
28 Taylor, Political Geography, 164, 169.
29 Taylor, ‘Beyond containers’.
30 Note Taylor’s comments on Sack’s theory as ‘trans-historical’ and ‘highly abstract’ – Taylor, Political Geography, 156.


Agnew, ‘Sovereignty Regimes’. The four ‘ideal type’ regimes suggested by Agnew are classic, imperial, integrationist, and globalist.


38 Elden, ‘Thinking territory historically’, 760.


41 Ibid, 802.


45 Elden, ‘How should we’, 14. See also Elden, ‘Governmentality, calculation, territory’.


47 For cartographic literature see for instance Jason Hansen, *Mapping the Germans: Statistical Science, Cartography, and the Visualization of the German Nation, 1848-


51 Agnew, ‘By words alone’, 316.

52 Elden, The Birth of Territory, 17.

Agnew, ‘By words alone’, 312. This view was supported with reference to Daniel Wickberg, ‘Intellectual history vs. the social history of intellectuals’ Rethinking History, 5 (2001), 383–395. With respect to ‘territory’, Agnew stated that exploring its history before the 16th century ‘rise of the modern state’ amounted to little more than an etymological exercise. A preposterous claim if we recall what Elden has shown about the linking of jurisdiction and territory in the legal practice of 14th century Italian glossators.


59 These are not original points – see Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics: Regarding Method. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Chapter 4.


64 Armitage, ‘The international turn’, 252.


Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, Property and Empire*, Chapters 7 and 9. See also Koskenniemi, *The gentle civilizer of nations*.


Note that in German, the word ‘Gebiet’ were also part of this test.


Pocock, *Political Thought*, x.


Skinner, *Visions*, 57-58, 88. The expression ‘perennial problems’ is originally R.G. Collingwood’s.

The corpuses of each thinker were relatively easy to access given their extensive digitization through GALLICA, Archive.org, the International Institute for Social History (IISH), Archives-Autonomies.org. With minor exceptions, texts were read in the original language or translations sanctioned by authors.

Wolfgang Detel, *Geist und Verstehen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011), 84.


Among these archives, the non-digitized collection I most wished to have consulted was the GARF Kropotkin Fund (GARF-1129), as well as non-digitized materials in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France and in the Municipal Archives of Besançon.


105 Jun, Anarchism and political modernity, Chapter 5; and Paul McLaughlin, Anarchism and authority: A philosophical introduction to classical anarchism (London: Routledge, 2016). As argued by Skinner, readings which resort to emphasising the lack of ‘rationality’ of past thinkers, are most often failing to engage with texts in terms of their own contextual logic - see Skinner, Visions, 31-42.


107 Adams, ‘Possibilities’. See also Kinna, Kropotkin, Part I.


110 Woodcock, Anarchism, 27-8. Woodcock, it ought to be noted, drew directly from Arthur Lovejoy’s approach to the history of ideas, believing it adequate to argue that different anarchists offered ‘unit-ideas’ to the central perennial problems. This approach was one of Quentin Skinner’s main targets in attacking ‘mythological’ readings of political thought.

111 Adams, ‘Possibilities’, 42.


113 On Anglo-American contexts see Honeywell, A British Anarchist Tradition; Adams, Kropotkin, Read; Kinna, Kropotkin, Part I; on the French context, and especially Daniel Guérin, see David Berry, A history of the French anarchist movement, 1917-1945 (Oakland: AK Press, 2009).

Chapter 2. Territory in the Long Nineteenth Century, 1789-1919

1 Elden, *The Birth of Territory*.

2 Anecdotally, this surge can be gleaned from the word frequency of ‘territory’ in key digital archival databases such as France’s GALLICA and the Anglo-American GALE. GALLICA indicates the recurrence of the term 4587 times in the eighteenth century, whereas in the nineteenth century frequency increases to almost 50,000 documents. GALE indicates a similar pattern and marks out the 1790s and 1830s-1890s as decades of rapid increase. This test was conducted in June 2017 and is only intended as indicative. This can also be gleaned from the aforementioned Google ngram tests.

3 For a good discussion of this pre-modern politico-legal geography see Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*.


8 Baker, ‘Political languages of the French Revolution’. Identifying these lineages is not to suggest unproblematic continuity but merely to situate the intellectual currency at play.


C.f. Vardi, *The Physiocrats*, 180; and Sieyès, *Observations*, 1-2. Critiques of the *esprit de corps* related to feudal classes such as the nobility or the clergy, whereas attacks on the *esprit de clocher* related to critiques of local parochialism.

On this ambivalence see Ozouf-Marignier, *La Formation des Départements*, Chapter 4. For primary material indicating this, see ‘Seance du mardi 3 Novembre 1789’ in *Archives Parlementaires*, 9: 652-670.
22 Sieyès, Instructions, 44-45.
23 ‘Article I, Code Rural, Decrees of 5-12 June 1791’, as in Garaud, La Révolution Française, 1.
24 Blaufard, The Great Demarcation, 4-10.
28 Blaufard, The Great Demarcation, 84-89.
30 Blaufard, The Great Demarcation, 82-95.

36 Whilst the Code Civil des Français, or ‘Code Napoleon’ of 1804 stood as the most visible testament to this era, other works consolidated the legal legacy of the Napoleonic period – see in particular Philippe-Antoine Merlin, *Répertoire Universel et Raisonné de Jurisprudence*, 18 vols (Paris: Garnery, 1812-1825).


42 Vick, *Congress of Vienna*, 268, 274.


44 Vick, *Defining Germany*, 172-173.


Maistre, Équilibre Européen, 71.


Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism, 223-238.


See for instance Frederik Beiser, The German Historicism Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 5. For a broader reflection on historical thought in

57 Kelley, *Fortunes of History*, 129.


64 See Seegel, Mapping Europe’s Borderlands, 186-187.


68 See Vick, Defining Germany, 22-23, for a commentary on this in relation to Georg F. Kolb’s entry on ‘natural borders’ [naturliche grenzen] in the Staats-Lexicon of 1841. The shift from a physical understanding to a linguistic understanding of ‘natural borders’ is key here, as it broke with older French arguments on statehood and physical geography.

69 Hansen, Mapping the Germans, 53. See Karl Bernhardi, Sprachkarte von Deutschland (Kassel: J.J. Bohné, 1844).


72 This aim did not fail. See for instance the reaction of the young ‘Ukrainian’ historian Mykola Kostomarov – Trencsényi, and others, Negotiating Modernity, 188.


74 See Sperber, The European Revolutions.


Dunoyer, *L’Industrie*, Chapter II (on race) and Chapter X (on industrial social inequality).


Chevalier, *Politique Industrielle*, 143.


Chevalier, *Politique Industrielle*, 145


As cited in Marsden and Smith, *Engineering Empire*, 172.


In his own words, ‘the moral order of every human association relies necessarily on its intellectual organization, which in turn relies on its material constitution’ – Comte, *Système*, 2:283.


Comte, *Système*, 3; xlix.

Comte, *Système*, 3:498; 536-7. It ought to be noted that Comte’s emphasis on the Papal quest for universal majesty was inspired by the writings of Joseph de Maistre on the Papacy.

Comte, *Système*, 4, 299; 3: 575


Comte, *Système*, 4, 305.


On Herbert Spencer’s thought see John Offer, *Herbert Spencer and Social Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Mark Francis, *Herbert Spencer and the


133 Spencer, First Principles, 148. Whilst this claim was made explicit in 1863, texts as early as 1851 already contained strong analogies between biological development and societal progress – see Spencer, Social Statics, 426-7, 468, 496-7. Spencer’s reflection leading to his concept of evolution was developed in a series of articles in the late 1850s – namely ‘The Development Hypothesis’, ‘A Theory of Population’ and ‘Progress: Its Law and Cause’. See Burrow, Evolution and Society, 188; c.f. Spencer, Autobiography, 1: 447-9; 537. Note that Spencer’s reading of biological evolutionism also bore the imprint of Malthus’ theory of population.

134 Spencer, First Principles, 216. Note that this original definition was rephrased in later editions – Burrow, Evolution and Society, 194.

135 Spencer had first encountered von Baer’s writings through reading William Carpenter’s Principles of Physiology in 1851 – see Spencer, Autobiography, 1:444. Spencer was also profoundly impressed by Milne-Edwards’ idea of a ‘physiological division of labour’ – an economic analogy to capture the functional specialization of different organs – see Spencer, Autobiography, 1:435.

136 Spencer had come across Lamarck’s theories through his reading of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology in 1840 - see Spencer, Autobiography, 1:200, 648. For commentary see Peter Bowler, ‘Herbert Spencer and Lamarckism’, in Francis and Taylor, Legacies, 203-221.

137 Spencer, The Study of Sociology, 53; c.f. Spencer, First Principles, 190, 466-7. It should be no surprise to learn of Spencer’s influence on the structural-functionalist theories of Alfred Radcliffe-Brown and other British anthropologists - see Burrow, Evolution and Society, 190-1; and Chris Renwick, ‘Herbert Spencer, biology, and the
social sciences in Britain’ in Francis and Taylor, Legacies, 126. For more on Spencer’s conception of social evolution see ‘What is Social Evolution’ in Spencer, Various Fragments; and ‘Super Organic Evolution’ in Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. 1.

138 Spencer, First Principles, 161-162, see also 157-161.
144 Spencer, Principles of Ethics, 2:47
145 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 1:646; c.f. 2:267. Prosaically, Spencer’s pet image to describe this ‘territoriality’ was that of stray dogs in Constantinople.
146 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 2:267. In Spencer’s own words, ‘after the pastoral stage, these motives continue with a difference’.
147 Spencer, Principles of Ethics, 1:86; c.f. 245, 388; First Principles, 511.
149 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 1:740
150 Spencer, Principles of Ethics, 1:20.
152 A detailed study of Spencer’s sociology of territory is the subject of a future article.
153 The ethnological ‘data’ used in Spencer’s Principles of Sociology was compiled and published in Herbert Spencer, James Collier, David Duncan, and Richard Scheppig, Descriptive Sociology; Or, Groups of Sociological Facts (New York: D. Appleton and Co, 1873). This volume was followed by thirteen others, five of which were completed after Spencer’s passing. For commentary see Jonathan Turner, ‘Herbert Spencer’s sociological legacy’ in Francis and Taylor, Legacies, 62-65; and Robert L. Carneiro, ‘Herbert Spencer as an Anthropologist’, in Offer, Critical Assessments, 2:571-581.


Maine’s ‘comparative method’ was inspired in particular by the historian Edward A. Freeman. Maine and Freeman were also connected by discussions of race – see Koditschek, *Historical Imagination*, 226-249.

For these alternative lineages of legal argument against tribal territorial sovereignty see Fitzmaurice, *Sovereignty, property and empire*, Chapter 9; and Koskenniemi, *The gentle civilizer of nations*, Chapter 2.

Chapter 3. Proudhon’s Territories: Post-Revolutionary Republicanism, Property and Federalism


published primary materials note also the (partially digitized) archival funds at the French National Library (BNF) [Fonds NAF 14265-14275 and NAF 182555-18262] and at the Municipal Archives of Besançon [Fonds general: MS 2802-2982].


10 Pinkney, *Decisive Years*, 3.


14 Coincidentally, at the time of Proudhon’s writing, the left-wing parliamentarian François Arago led a campaign challenging François Guizot and Adolphe Thiers to extend the suffrage to all men enrolled in the National Guard. Proudhon commented against this – Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 163.


16 Castleton, ‘Comment’, 68.


18 On Pastoret and the Decalogue see ‘De la Célébration du Dimanche’, in Proudhon, *Œuvres complètes*, 2:124-125; on this ‘goal’, 149. Emmanuel de Pastoret (1755-1849) was a very original French jurist who’s *Histoire de la Législation*, 11 vols (Paris: Didot, 1817-1837) provided a history of law from the Ancient Assyrians to post-Napoleonic Europe. This ambitious work of legal ‘history’ is particularly interesting
in that it falls outside of the lineage of historical jurists under the influence of Savigny and Hugo. Pastoret remains understudied.

Proudhon, ‘De la Célébration’, 144-149.

For summaries Proudhon’s reading notebooks from this period see Haubtmann, 1809-1849, 191-195, 238-255, 1080-1116.


For an anecdotal impression see ‘Letter to M. Perennes, March 1839’ in Proudhon, Correspondance, 1:100-102; for his most scathing remarks see ‘Letter to Tissot, July 1842’, in Proudhon, Correspondance, 2:61.


Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 34-35.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 37. It is interesting to note that whereas Xifaras sees this Romanist correspondence as misplaced, Garnsey defends it as astute – c.f. Xifaras, ‘Il y a t’il’, 242, and Garnsey, Thinking about Property, 177, 198. Both authors agree that this influential formulation stemmed from the writings of Bartolus of Saxoferrato, a Renaissance jurist familiar to readers of The Birth of Territory.

Proudhon’s access to Reid’s writing was enabled by Théodore Jouffroy’s translation of the Scottish philosopher – a translation that was key to the Eclectic school at large.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 48-9.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 52-57.

Proudhon uses the expression ‘cause efficiente’ to relate defences of occupation as the origin of private property. I do not use this term here for the purposes of clarity – the term has its origin in Aristotelian logics on causality. This use likely mimics the language of eclectic philosopher such as Victor Cousin or Jules Simon.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 57; 67.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 63-64. For a sense of this long history see Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property, Empire; and Garnsey, Thinking of Property.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 63-64.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 66.

This argument may seem close to a Rousseauist picture but it differs substantially by placing emphasis on the origin of property as stemming from an unwilling error of collective reason, rather than a willing ruse by certain individuals.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 90. For the original quote see Charles Comte, Traité de la Propriété, 2 vols (Paris: Chamerot, 1834), 1:149-150.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 75-6.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 97.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 176-177, 220.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 178.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 180.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 187.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 189. Original emphasis.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 202.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 203-4.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 203.
Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 204.

This emphasis was most likely taken from Michelet’s translation of Giambattista Vico’s New Science. See Jules Michelet, Principes de la Philosophie de l’Histoire (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1827), 265-267. For Proudhon’s notes on this book see Cahier 2 in-4, NAF 18256.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 205, 210, 212.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 210

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 193.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 221-222.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 221-222.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 219-224.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 35

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 35

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 60. Cf, 69.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 59-64. Note that Proudhon’s also read Grotius, Rousseau and Portalis on this subject.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 64, 63.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 66, 67.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 71

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 71

Published in 1835, Comte’s treaty was noteworthy for a variety of reasons. First, in continuity with his earlier works, Comte saw ‘natural law’ not as a juridical tradition but as a universally observable causal relation in the development of human societies. Deploying the authority of political economy, Comte claimed that observation of the ‘social laws’ which caused prosperity ought to provide a corrective to legal practices locked in regressive traditions. Second, Comte’s Treaty served as a defence of liberal politics in the context of post-revolutionary Restoration. Fearing royalist regressions, Comte sought to distinguish how property could be legitimized as free labour whilst illegitimate if based on usurpation; moreover, Comte sought to argue how to administer ‘common property’ in line with public interest. For further notes see Hart, Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, 191-265.

Comte, Propriété, 149.

Comte, Propriété, 143.

Comte, Propriété, 86.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 85.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 86.


Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 87

Note also the importance of the 1827 Code Forestier and the late 1820s ‘push’ to end the engagements of the national domain – on the Code Forestier see Comte, Propriété, 216, 250-2, 277; on engagements see Blaufard, The Great Demarcation, 167-8.


As quoted in Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 85-6. For the original see Comte, Propriété, 155.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 87. My emphasis.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 161.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 85.

Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 123.


Proudhon, ‘Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?’, 167; 142. My emphasis.


These accounts, it ought to be remembered, had little historicist accuracy. This however does not undermine their political function in Proudhon’s account.

In describing the auction of public lands in Ancient Rome, Proudhon also made an explicit parallel with Napoleonic France, claiming that it had been always generals, not common soldiers, who had gained property through conquest.


On the short-lived Second Republic see Maurice Agulhon, 1848 ou l’apprentissage de la République, (Paris: Seuil, 2002); and Christopher Guyver, The Second French


109 Between 1859 and his death in 1865, Proudhon devoted over forty letters to discussing it – see Proudhon, Correspondance, vols 9-14.

110 On the French Republican left in this period see Philippe Darriulat, Les Patriotes. La gauche républicaine et la nation (1830-1870) (Paris: Seuil, 2014); and Hazareesingh, From subject to citizen.

111 Proudhon, Correspondance, 9:21, 51-2; 63-68, 384.


115 Proudhon, Correspondance, 4:118.

116 Proudhon, Correspondance, 4:118.

117 Proudhon, Correspondance, 4:256.

118 Proudhon, Correspondance, 9:35, 84; 10:337; 11:298; 12:181, 325, 334; see also Proudhon the very targeted comments against these newspapers in Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif et de la nécessité de reconstituer le parti de la Révolution’ in Œuvres complètes, 8:161-189.

119 Proudhon, Correspondance, 9:11.

120 Proudhon, Correspondance, 9:12.


Proudhon, *Correspondance*, 9:328; 10:81


Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif’, 42.

Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif’, 43.


On Proudhon’s reading of Rousseau see Aaron Noland, ‘Proudhon and Rousseau’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 28.1 (1967), 33-54. Proudhon’s attack on the ‘social contract’ here was that it was assumed tacitly and that it deferred all social sovereignty to the state.


In making this theory of a federal constitution Proudhon drew especially from Gustave Chaudey’s various articles on the Swiss Constitution of 1848 and critical of the Second Empire’s autocracy – see *Le Républicain Neuchâtelois*, 19 and 31 August, and 1 September, 1852. For a cursory view of Chaudey’s critique of imperial centralization see Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen*, 240-242.

Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif’, 60.

Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif’, 60.


Proudhon, ‘Du Principe Fédératif’, 60.


On Proudhon’s complex readings of Fourier see Castleton, ‘Critique des Idées Fouriériestes’.


Proudhon, ‘De la Création’, 488


Proudhon, ‘De la Justice’, 111-146.


Proudhon, ‘De la Justice’, 100.


See Proudhon, Correspondance, 14:237.


Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 109. Here I do not translate ‘cité’ as I cannot find an English translation to appropriately capture its meaning; the next paragraph reflects on this.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 112. Proudhon’s emphasis.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 112-113.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 113.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 114. From this passage it is clear that it’s preposterous to argue Proudhon was strongly anticolonial. Moreover, this passage relates Proudhon’s contact with British arguments about colonial emancipation from the 1860s. Proudhon received these through his Édouard Laboulaye’s critical commentary on John Stuart Mill’s in Édouard Laboulaye, L’État et ses Limites, Paris: Charpentier, 1863. On these English debates see Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain, 31-32. Proudhon’s reading of Laboulaye’s L’État et ses Limites is the subject of a future article.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 139-144.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 128.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 128.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 131-132.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 150.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 135-139. C.f. PF, 120.

Proudhon, Contradictions Politiques, 168.


On this subject see Castleton, ‘Une Anthropologie Téléologique’.

Of these three pieces only New Observations on Italian Unity was completed within Proudhon’s lifetime. Its text was a letter to the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Messager de Paris in December 1864. France and the Rhine was written mostly in 1861 and published posthumously in 1867; and Poland was never published, though its drafts can be found at Besançon Municipal Archive, MS 2832-2837. The draft of
chapter 3 of *Poland* has been transcribed online see Ferretti and Castleton, ‘Fédéralisme, identités nationales’.


Proudhon, *France et Rhin*, 57.


Proudhon, *France et Rhin*, 204.


MS 2834, F.39-65. This unpublished manuscript remains a critically unexplored part of the Proudhonian corpus. Edward Castleton’s forthcoming *Agrégation* thesis focuses on this task.

MS 2834, F.39-65. My emphasis.

MS 2834, F.39-65.

MS 2834, F.39-65.

MS 2834, F.39-65.


Proudhon, *Nouvelles Observations*, 232. This section of Proudhon’s discussion seems highly redolent of Victor Cousin’s comments about the role of geography in history in his 1828 lectures, which Proudhon read and annotated abundantly in 1840. Lacking the space to discuss the origins of Proudhon’s geographical thought, this task is left to a future occasion.


Proudhon, *Nouvelles Observations*, 235


For some beginnings on this, see Vermeren, ‘Le remords de l’éclectisme’.


4. Bakunin’s Territories: Nations, States and Free Federations


3 See Victoria Frede, ‘Stankevic and Hegel’s arrival in Russia’, *Studies in East European Thought*, 65 (2013), 159-174; and Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought*, Chapter 7. Bakunin specific interest in Fichte and Hegel is shown by a number of translations and comments he carried out in this early stage.


6 For a thorough analysis of this article and its background see Angaut, *Bakounine: Jeune Hégelien*. See also McLaughlin, *Bakunin*.

7 Mikhail Bakunin, ‘La Réaction en Allemagne: Fragment par un Français’, in Angaut, *Bakounine: Jeune Hégelien*, 1-15. Intellectually, Bakunin claimed the ‘reactionary party’ was supported by conservatism in politics, Savigny’s historical jurisprudence, Schelling’s late positive philosophy and the French ‘Juste-Milieu’ thinkers such as Francois Guizot or Victor Cousin. The ‘democratic party’, in turn, was identified with the humanist philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Young Hegelians such as Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer [13].


16 On the Decemberists see O’Meara, *The Decembrist Pavel Pestel*; and Grandhaye, *La république des décembristes*. The Decembrist protests of 1825 were led by a group of reformist army officers, such as Pavel Pestel, which sought to liberalize the Russian Empire. These protests, perceived as a build-up to a coup, were brutally suppressed by the Tsarist regime and ended in the public execution and exile of many reformist officers. The memory of this failed uprising would continue to inspire reformists and revolutionary hopes in Russia until the late nineteenth-century. On the Polish November Uprising of 1831 see Skurnowicz, *Romantic Nationalism*, 64-93. The November Uprising was a nine-month armed rebellion, which attempted to reinstate an independent Polish state. Led by personalities such as Joachim Lelewel, Adam
Czartoryski and Józef Chłopicki, this uprising drew on the enthusiasm of the 1830s liberal revolutions in France and Belgium and also gestured at the memory of the Decembrist Uprising to argue that its fight was that of all peoples against despotism.
19 On Mickiewicz and Šafárik see chapter 2.
20 For fuller accounts of Bakunin during the 1848 Revolutions see Angaut, *Bakounine et la Liberté des Peuples* and Angaut, ‘Revolution and the Slav Question’.
21 Michel Bakounine, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’, *La Réforme*, 13 March 1848. This is available through gallica.bnf.fr. Note also that it was in this article that Bakunin first used his famed inversion that ‘the practical men of the ancient regime have become today utopians, and the utopias of yesterday are now the only thing possible, reasonable, practical’. He would use this same inversion after 1868 in his socialist writings.
22 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
23 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’. Original emphasis.
24 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
25 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
26 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
27 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
28 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
29 Bakunin, ‘Nos amis et nos ennemis a l’étranger’.
31 Orton, *The Prague Slav Congress of 1848*; and Žáček, ‘Manifesto to the European nations’.
32 On the political thought of the Frankfurt parliament see Vick, *Defining Germany* and
33 I draw here from the French versions of these texts, collected in *Archives Bakounine* and reproduced and edited in Angaut, *La Liberté des Peuples*.
34 This pamphlet was published in German – Mikhail Bakunin, *Aufruf an die Slaven. Von einem russischen Patrioten* (Koethen 1848); and was translated and re-published in French in the left republican newspaper *La Réforme* – see *La Réforme*, 1, 4 and 7 January 1849. Note that the *Archives Bakounine* include eleven drafts of this text, with informative variations. For some commentary see Lawrence D. Orton, ‘The Echo of Bakunin's Appeal to the Slavs (1848)’, *Canadian-American Slavic Studies*, 10.4 (1976), 489-502.
44 For the contrasting and more prevalent view on the Slav Question within the Austria Empire see Alex Körner, ‘National Movements against Nation State’ in Moggach and Stedman-Jones, *The 1848 Revolutions*, 345-382.


Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, in Angaut, La Liberté des Peuples, 43.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 44.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 44.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 52.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 49.


Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 68.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 68.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 61.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 63.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 63.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 60.

Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 65.


The sole exception to this is one mention, in ‘Ma Défense’, of Friedrich Christoph Schlosser’s eight volume History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth Century Till the Overthrow of the French Empire, a vast tract which there is no archival evidence of him reading. Initially written in 1823 and re-edited between 1836 and 1843, Schlosser’s tract offered a liberal narrative of the ‘awakening’ of the German nation amongst the tumult of the French revolutionary wars and away from the sleepy obscurantism of medieval Germany. Although no good archival evidence suggests Bakunin would have read this tract, it is tempting to read into substantive resonances between these texts. Bakunin, like Schlosser, was scathing to ‘the art of diplomacy’, the nefarious influence of Jesuits, the rapacious lack of scruples of eighteenth-century states, and the servile and slumbering character of German people until the literature of German Idealism. In spite of these resonances, it is still likely the case that Bakunin did not read Schlosser. Bakunin’s passing reference to Schlosser would also re-emerge in his 1870s writings.


70 Herzen, Selected Works, 478, 475.

71 On these reforms see Thomas S. Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

72 Kelly, The Discovery of Chance, 389-499.

73 These have been helpfully reproduced in Mikhail Bakunin, Michel Bakounine: Textes sur la Question Slave et sur l’Europe du Nord (1862-1864), ed. by Réné Berthier (Paris: Editions des Sorbiers, 2010). See also Nikolai Ogarev, Essai sur la Situation Russe: Lettres à un Anglais (Londres: Trübner, 1862).

74 Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Aux Russes, Polonais et tous Amis Slaves’ [1861], in Berthier, Textes sur la Question Slave, 106-107.


81 Ogarev, Essai sur la Situation Russe, 148.

82 Ogarev, Essai sur la Situation Russe, 148.


84 Bakunin, ‘Aux Russes’, 122.


86 Bakunin, ‘Aux Russes’, 123.


89 See Kelly, The Discovery of Chance, 452-473.

90 Bakunin, Correspondance, 198.

91 For some sketches of Bakunin’s influence in the IWA see Castleton, ‘The origins of ‘collectivism’’; Nunzio Pernicone, Italian Anarchism, 1864-1892 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Chapter 1; Caroline Cahm, Kropotkin: And the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism, 1872-1886 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

92 Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Principes et Organization de la Société Internationale Révolutionnaire’ [1866], in Berthier, *L’Autre Bakounine*, 3:272-294. For one of the most likely passages for Bakunin to have been drawing from see Proudhon, ‘De La Justice’, in *Œuvres complètes*, 22: 99-134.

93 Angaut, *Le Catéchisme révolutionnaire*.


95 Bakunin, *Correspondance*, 214.

96 Bakunin, *Correspondance*, 223.

97 Bakunin, *Correspondance*, 223-224.


100 Bakunin, *Correspondance*, 220. My emphasis.

101 ‘La Question Slave’, *Libertà e Giustizia. Foglio settimale democratico-sociale*, 31 August 1867, in Berthier, *L’Autre Bakounine*, 3, 255-260. *Libertà e Giustizia* was a short lived socialist newspaper in southern Italy, where Bakunin, according to Berthier, also published some translations of Proudhon’s texts. Finding a full archive of this newspaper would be precious!


104 For a lengthier account of this event see Guillaume, *L’Internationale*, 1:71-79.

105 Bakunin, ‘Ma Défense’, 65.


110 Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 43-44.

111 Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 44.

112 Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 150.

113 Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 153. This morality, he argued, drawing on Proudhon’s *De la Justice*, corresponded to what, after Machiavelli, governing classes had called ‘the reason of State’. See Proudhon, ‘De la Justice’, 30-32. Note nevertheless that Bakunin’s attacks on ‘machiavellism’ were already uttered in his late 1840s writings, as part of attacking the ‘diplomatic conspiracies’ of Russia and Austria.


115 Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 156, 170. Original emphasis. For commentary on how Bakunin’s ‘political theology’ was taken up in Carl Schmitt’s famous writings see Jean-Christophe Angaut, ‘Carl Schmitt, lecteur de Bakounine,’ *Astérion*, 6 (2009).

The misleading aspect in this is that Bakunin assumed more commonality than there was between Proudhon and Comte’s understandings of ‘positive philosophy’. When Proudhon used this term, he was not in fact referring to Comte, though some debates remain on the relations between Proudhon and Comte.


Mikhail Bakunin, ‘Aux Compagnons de l’Association International des Travailleurs du Locle et de la Chaux-de-Fonds: Quatrième Lettre’, Le Progrès, 1 May 1869. The issues of this newspaper are available through GALLICA.


Beyond this we can also assume that his friendship with Karl Vogt may have furnished him with opinions on this subject. It is also possible that Bakunin would have been inspired by the ‘positivist’ arguments of Russian ‘nihilists’ such as Nikolai Chernyshevsky. More research on this point is welcome.

This is suggested by a couple of articles he published under the title of ‘The Essence of Religion’ in Libertà e Giustizia, 3 and 4 november, 1 december 1867 – see Berthier, L’Autre Bakounine, 3, 262-271.


‘Letter to Ogarev, 31 August 1870’ in Bakunin, Correspondance, 336.

Bakunin, ‘Lettres à un Français sur la crise actuelle’ in Oeuvres, 2:82.


Bakunin identified these forces particularly with the government for national defence and the leadership of Léon Gambetta.


‘Letter to Ogarev, 19 November 1870’ in Bakunin, Correspondance, 343.

Bakunin referenced Proudhon’s Idée Générale de la Révolution au Dix-Neuvième Siècle, as well as his collected newspaper articles in Idées Révolutionnaires.


‘Letter to Ogarev, April 5th 1871’ in Bakunin, Correspondance, 348. For Bakunin’s earliest public statements on the Commune see ‘Trois Conférences aux ouvriers du val de Saint-Imer’ in Oeuvres, 5:301-360.

‘Letter to Ogarev, April 5th 1871’ in Bakunin, Correspondance, 348.

rebuttal, as well as those of other libelled socialists in Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne, 15 June 1872. The initial accusations by the General Council would be followed by an extensive ‘report’ on all accusations – see Karl Marx, L’Alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste et l’Association Internationale des Travailleurs: Rapport et documents publiés par ordre du Congrès International de la Haye (Londres: A. Darson, 1873).


146 See his public letter in Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne, 12 October 1873.

147 Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, 45.

148 Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, 46-47.

149 Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, 56.

150 Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, 194.


Chapter 5. Kropotkin’s Territories: Communes, History and Positivism

1 If Proudhon can be seen as the unwitting prophet of ‘anarchism’ through Bakunin’s fragmentary gospels, then we could imagine Kropotkin as the tradition’s Saint Paul: a great revisionist who consolidated doctrine.

3 Kinna, Kropotkin, Part I; and Adams, Kropotkin, Read, 10-47.
4 Kinna, Kropotkin, Part I.
10 Miller, Kropotkin, Chapters 3 to 7. The original defining debates around peasant communes had begun between ‘Westernizers and Slavophiles’- see Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, 287-494, 531-558, 580-663. Kropotkin’s view of the obshchina was likely most marked by the writings of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Alexander Herzen and the slavophile historian Ivan Dimitri Belyaev - see Nikolai Chernyshevsky, ‘Criticism of the Philosophic Prejudices against Communal Landholding’ in Selected Philosophical Essays (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), Herzen, ‘The Russian People and Socialism’; and Ivan Dmitrievich Belyaev, Rasskazy iz Russkov Istorii [Tales from Russian History], 4 vols (Moskva: Moscow University Press, 1861-1872). A detailed discussion of these intellectual lineages in Kropotkin belongs to a future article.
11 On the ‘Great Reforms’ and their troubled implementation see Pearson, Russia Officialdom in Crisis, Chapters 1-3; Starr, Decentralization in Russia, Chapters 4 and 5; and The Zemstvo in Russia: an experiment in local self-government, ed. by Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Chapters 3 to 5.
12 Miller, Kropotkin, 36-38.
13 Miller, Kropotkin, 36-38.
14 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 1:116-117. See also Perepiska Petra I Aleksandra Kropotkinykh [Letters between Peter and Alexander Kropotkin], ed. by Nikolai K. Lebedev, 2 vols (Moscow: Academia, 1932-1933), 1:60-61, 150, 169. In his correspondence, Kropotkin comments on his thoughts on historians and on his ongoing translations of Francois Guizot and Augustin Thierry.
Minorités Révolutionnaires’, 3:20, 1881; ‘Les droits politiques’ 3:26, 1882; ‘Théorie et pratique’ 4:1, 1882; ‘La Loi et l’Autorité’ 4.6, 1882; ‘La Loi et l’Autorité II’ 4.7, 1882; ‘La Loi et l’Autorité III’ 4.12, 1882; ‘La Loi et l’Autorité IV’ 4.13, 1882; ‘Le Gouvernement pendant la Révolution’ 4.14, 1882; ‘Le Gouvernement pendant la Révolution II’ 4.15, 1882; ‘Le Gouvernement pendant la Révolution III’ 4.17, 1882; ‘Le Gouvernement pendant la Révolution IV’ 4.20, 1882; ‘Le Gouvernement pendant la Révolution V’ 4.22, 1882. Digital copies are available at archivesautonomies.org. All articles were republished as chapters in Paroles d’un Revolé with only very minor changes, except for the chapter on ‘Representative Government’ which had three new sections and the chapter on War which appears to have been wholly new. Note that in Paroles d’un Révolté, the chapter sequence did not follow the original chronology but a thematic arrangement.


16 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 2:234.
18 Kropotkin, Paroles, 10.
20 C.f. James Guillaume, Idées sur l’organisation sociale (Chaux-de-Fonds: Courvoisier, 1876), 23, 47-52; and Bakunin, ‘Fédéralisme, Socialisme et Antithéologisme’, 20, 156, 223-224.
21 Cahm, Kropotkin, 30-48.
22 Although this chapter focuses on Kropotkin’s use of Augustin Thierry, must wider evidence exists of Kropotkin’s engagement with a range of Romantic historians – including François Guizot, Sismonde de Sismondi, François Mignet, Edgar Quinet, Jules Michelet; Thomas B. Macaulay and Henry T. Buckle, and also Timofey Granovsky, Sergey Solovyov, Mykola Kostomarov and Ivan Belyaev. For some of this evidence see Lebedev, Peripiska, 1:53, 59-63, 76-78, 110-111, 120, 145, 150-152.
23 For general discussions see Crossley, French Historians and Romanticism; and Kelley, The Fortunes of History.
25 Thierry, Lettres, 1.
For illuminating comments see Gauchet, ‘Augustin Thierry’s *Lettres*’. Note that Thierry’s *Lettres* were published over several years in different journals and edited several times as a book – see Nephi Smithson, *Augustin Thierry* for the details of the editions.


33 Thierry had begun his intellectual career as a secretary to Saint-Simon – a fact Kropotkin was always keen to remind his readers of (e.g. Petr Kropotkin, *Modern Science and Anarchism* (Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1908), 23). This early relationship with Saint-Simon was influential for Thierry, yet it did not define his political identity as a Saint-Simonian or even a socialist.

34 Thierry, *Lettres*, 465. Kropotkin would use the same metaphor in *Mutual Aid*.

35 Thierry, *Tiers État*, 33-35. Kropotkin subverted this narrative in his chapter on representative government – Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 202-211. Note that the idea of narrating ‘representative government’ as the accomplishment of centuries was also central to Guizot’s *Histoire Générale de la Civilization en Europe*.


37 Thierry, *Tiers État*, 74.


39 Thierry, *Lettres*, 27. The expression ‘territorial revolutions’ is Thierry’s.


42 Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 105-119, 176-185, 205.


44 Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 106-108. It is worth noting that Kropotkin consistently understood ‘national’ as ‘popular’, an intentional slippage he had inherited from Chernyshevsky and other Russian revolutionaries. On this point see Miller, *Kropotkin*, 75.

45 For some of this correspondence see GARF, fond 1129, opis 2, 1505. Laveleye interested Kropotkin chiefly for his *Primitive Property*, a work he would return to in *Mutual Aid* (see below). Note that in its original printing, this work was stimulated in response to one of Laveleye’s articles on the Internationale in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* – see Kropotkin, ‘L’Enterrement de l’Internationale par M.Laveleye’, *Le Révolté*, 2.4, (1880) 1-2; c.f. Laveleye, ‘Grandeur et Décadence de l’Internationale’, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 38.3 (1880), 290-332.


Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 109. On the roots of Kropotkin’s critiques of individualism see Kinna, *Kropotkin*, 56-77. As Kinna shows, Kropotkin was stoked by his interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche’s and Max Stirner’s influence on anarchists. This was crucial to Kropotkin’s investment in elaborating an anarcho-communist ethics.


Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 204.


Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 110-111, 205-207. Kropotkin was here subverting the narrative of Thierry’s *Essai sur l’Histoire de la Formation et des Prorès du Tiers État*.


Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 111.


See also Crossley, *French Historians and Romanticism*, 105-138.

Kropotkin, *Paroles*, 3. Like Thierry and Guizot, Kropotkin brought a significant influence of ‘ideas’ into social struggle.


For a good introduction to the political context of *Mutual Aid* see Kinna, ‘Kropotkin’s Theory of Mutual Aid’ and Kinna, ‘Kropotkin and Huxley’. *Mutual Aid* should be read together with the pamphlet *The State and Its Historical Role*, which schematizes the former’s political historiography. An even more schematic sketch of *Mutual Aid*’s ‘philosophy of history’ can be found in Kropotkin’s drafts – see GARF, fond 1129, opis 1, 555.


This reductionist vision, prevalent in postanarchist literature, has been debunked elsewhere - see Adams and Jun, ‘Political Theory and History’.

296
See Kinna, ‘Kropotkin’s Theory of Mutual Aid’ and Adams and Jun ‘Political Theory and History’.


Adams and Jun, ‘Political Theory and History’, 255.

On Spencer’s influence on Kropotkin’s see Adams, ‘Formulating Anarchist Sociology’. For some of Kropotkin’s considerations on Spencer see Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism, Chapter V. On Spencer’s intellectual history see Offer, Herbert Spencer and Social Theory; and Taylor, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer.

Burrow, Evolution and Society; and Burrow, ‘Historicism and Social Evolution’. See also Stefan Collini, Donald Winch, and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in nineteenth-century intellectual history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), Chapters VII, IX, XI.


Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, 79. On this ‘science’ involving linguists, ethnographers, economic historians and lawyers see Tuori, Lawyers and Savages; and Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society.

Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, 122. On Maine see Mantena, Alibis of Empire, esp. Chapters 2 to 4; and Burrow, Evolution and Society, 137-178.

Adams, ‘Revolutionary Change and the End of History’, 110. See also Mantena, Alibis of Empire, 51. Note Maine’s explicit attack on Russian readings of ancient communism as democratic: Maine, Early History of Institutions, 83.

Maine, Early History, 342-400. See also Mantena, Alibis of Empire, 121-127.

See Maine, Ancient Law, ix-lxix.

See Maine, Village Communities, Lectures I and IV. Maine, Early History of Institutions, 80-83, 289; and Maine, Ancient Law, lxiv.

Maine, Early History, 77, 86-87, 115, 120, 126-127.

Maine, Early History, 86-87. Maine’s mention of political economy followed Ricardian theory.

Maine, Early History, 86-87.

Maine, Early History, 72.

Maine, Ancient Law, xi.

Maine, Early History, 70-75.

Maine, Early History, 117; 120.

Maine, Early History, 86, 152-156.

Maine, Early History, 130-131, 166-167.

Maine, Early History, 275, 338.

Maine, Early History, 385-394.

Maine, Early History, 393. For some comments on Maine’s view of the bases of modern law see Alex Diamond, ‘Fictions, Equity and Legislation’.

Maine, Early History, 386, 394.


On this point see Burrow, Evolution and Society, 156, 159-160.


Laveleye, De la Propriété, xxvi, 2-6. See Petr Kropotkin, ‘L’Enterrement de l’Internationale par M.Laveleye’, Le Révolté, 2.4 (1880), 1-2. Laveleye was not only

97 This Mainian claim displaced theories of Natural Law and Social Contract, which positioned private property at the foundations of society. In this line, Maine’s criticism of Hobbesian Social Contract theories can be seen as refracted in Kropotkin’s own work – see Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, xv, 77-79, 137. Kropotkin’s polemics against Hobbes and Huxley’s Hobbesian Social Darwinism was thus crucially informed by Maine.

98 Laveleye, *De la Propriété*, 426. Note also that Laveleye compared the Slavic communes of his time to medieval French communes – see Laveleye, *De la Propriété*, 395.


101 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 114, 117.


103 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, xvii.

104 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 121; c.f. 126, 129-130.


108 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 156. It is interesting to note that Kropotkin avoids the patriarchalist language of Maine in favour of a fraternist one.


110 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 162.

111 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 162.


115 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 149, 179.


117 Kropotkin, *L’État*, 6. Original emphasis. This language of society as suffering from ‘functional concentration’, it should be noted, is in strong resonance with Spencer’s view of social development as inspired by embryological analogies.

118 Kropotkin, *L’État*, 44.

119 Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 222.


**Conclusion**

1 Graeber, *The Democracy Project*; and Sitrin and Azzellini, *Occupying Language*.

3 Kinna and Evren, ‘Blasting the Canon’.
4 Adams, ‘The possibilities of anarchist history’. See also Adams and Jun, ‘Political theory and history’.
5 See Kinna, Kropotkin; Adams, Kropotkin, Read; Ferretti, Anarchy and Geography; Ferretti, and Castleton, ‘Fédéralisme, identités’; Castleton, ‘Une Anthropologie télologique’; Chambost, Proudhon et la norme; Prichard, Justice, order and anarchy; Angaut, Bakounine jeune hégélien; Berthier, l’Autre Bakounine.
6 See for instance Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 3-4.
7 Bakunin, Correspondance, 220.
9 On the descriptive and ascriptive tension in political visions see Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics, 42-55.
10 On these contemporary debates see for Schmitt and Van Well, Territorial governance across Europe; Halvorsen, ‘Decolonising Territory’, Sitrit and Azzellini, Occupying language; Amoretti and Bermeo, Federalism and territorial cleavages, Tillin, Remapping India, and Öcalan, Democratic Confederalism.
11 On the Eclectics, see Spitzer, The French Generation of 1820; and Vermeren, Victor Cousin.
12 For some notes on this juridical school see Kelley, The Fortunes of History.
13 For some notes see Welch, Liberty and Utility; and Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution.
14 See Tang, The Geographical Imagination of Modernity. See also Bond, ‘Hegel’s geographic thought’.
15 See Kearns, Geopolitics and Empire; and Bassin, ‘Ratzel’s political geography’.
16 On this subject see Trenesényi and others, Political Thought in East Central Europe.
17 See Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy.
18 See Körner, ‘National Movements against Nation States’.
19 Vick, Defining Germany.
21 Claeyts, Imperial Sceptics.
22 Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain; Fitzpatrick, Liberal Imperialism.
23 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, 79.
24 See Tuori, Lawyers and Savages;
25 See Mantena, Alibis of Empire. See also Hickford, Lords of the Land.
27 Maine, as discussed above, drew inspiration from Savigny. Freeman, whom we have not discussed, drew on Thierry’s racial historiography in relation to the history of the Norman Conquest.
28 Burrow, Evolution and Society.
29 Claeyts, Imperial Sceptics.
31 On the diachronic and synchronic narrations of intellectual history see Armitage, ‘What's the Big Idea?’, and Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, Chapters 5 and 6.
32 On these relations see Welch, Liberty and Utility; Spitzer, The French generation of 1820; and Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution.