Markevich, Andreĭ (2007) How much control is enough? Monitoring and enforcement under Stalin. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.829).

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Abstract

Given wide scope for asymmetric information in huge hierarchies agents have a large capacity for opportunistic behaviour. Hidden actions increase transactions costs and cause the demand for monitoring and enforcement. Once the latter are costly, this raises questions about their scope, logistics and type. Using historical records, this paper examines the Stalin’s answers to them. We find that Stalin maximised efficiency of the Soviet system of control but had to mitigate with the problems of the loyalty of inspectors themselves and the necessity to lessen the risk of a “chaos of orders” arising from parallel centres of power.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953, Information asymmetry, Hierarchies -- Soviet Union, Transaction costs, Soviet Union -- Politics and government -- 1936-1953
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	7 December 2007
Dates:	Date Event 7 December 2007 Published
Number:	No.829
Number of Pages:	38
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)
Funder:	Fifth Framework Programme (European Commission) (FP5)

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