Markevich, Andreĭ (2007) The dictator’s dilemma: to punish or to assist? Plan failures and interventions under Stalin. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.816).

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Abstract

A dictator issues an order, but the order is not carried out. The dictator does not know whether the order failed because the agent behaved opportunistically, or because his order contained some mistake. Imperfect information creates his dilemma : whether to punish the agent, or assist her or both. This paper models the dictator’s intervention when an order fails. The analysis links the dictator’s coercive policy with the softness of budget constraints. The model is verified against the history of Stalin’s dictatorship, using statistical evidence extracted from the formerly secret records of the Communist Party's "control commission".

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953, Dictatorship -- Soviet Union, Information asymmetry, Decision making, Soviet Union -- Politics and government -- 1936-1953, Soviet Union -- Economic conditions -- 1917-1945, Soviet Union -- Economic conditions -- 1945-1955
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	2007
Dates:	Date Event 2007 Published
Number:	No.816
Number of Pages:	44
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)

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