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Essays in behavioural economics
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Yeo, Jonathon (2019) Essays in behavioural economics. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3517245
Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 looks at how esteem affects knowledge transfers. Motivated by Akerlof [2015], I examine in two separate models, how esteem | via individuals' choices of values | affects teaching and learning. In teaching, there is the following trade-off: prestige can be obtained if one is able to influence others to value one's expertise, but doing so reduces one's relative achievement, hurting one's pride. This leads to non-monotonicity of teaching in students' learning potential and teachers' ability. In learning, I analyse how social pressure affects learning given an option to \escape". I show that social pressure can be used to motivate individuals to learn and possibly value an activity. However, too much pressure causes those with lower relative potential to exhibit escapism due to increasingly negative esteem. Implications of the models are discussed.
Chapter 2 studies how workers' identities are relevant to incentive theory. In particular, I conduct the first experiment exploring the relationship between identity and optimal incentives. I construct workgroups which are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in members' identities and examine their productivity at a real-effort task under tournament pay and team pay. I find that in homogeneous workgroups, productivity is higher under team pay; in heterogeneous workgroups, on the other hand, productivity is similar under both incentive schemes. Team pay induces greater helping of peers | especially in homogeneous workgroups. Tournament pay induces higher personal effort | especially in heterogeneous workgroups. I also find that incentives influence workers' identities.
Chapter 3 uses a laboratory experiment to study competitions for power | and the role of patronage in such competitions. We construct and analyze a new game | the \chicken-and-egg game" | in which chickens correspond to positions of power and eggs are the game's currency. We find that power tends to accumulate, through a \power begets power" dynamic, in the hands of \lords." Other subjects behave like their vassals in the sense that they take lords' handouts rather than compete against them. We observe substantial wealth inequality as well as power inequality. There are also striking gender differences in outcomes | particularly in rates of lordship. In a second treatment, where we eliminate patronage by knocking out the ability to transfer eggs, inequality is vastly reduced and the \power begets power" dynamic disappears.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) | ||||
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Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
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Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Information theory in economics, Respect, Education -- Economic aspects, Knowledge, Theory of, Identity (Psychology) -- Economic aspects, Incentive awards, Power (Philosophy), Competition | ||||
Official Date: | October 2019 | ||||
Dates: |
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Institution: | University of Warwick | ||||
Theses Department: | Department of Economics | ||||
Thesis Type: | PhD | ||||
Publication Status: | Unpublished | ||||
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Akerlof, Robert J. | ||||
Sponsors: | Nanyang Technological University | ||||
Format of File: | |||||
Extent: | x, 126 leaves : illustrations | ||||
Language: | eng |
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