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Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
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UNSPECIFIED (1998) Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 15 (4). pp. 521-542. ISSN 0176-1714.
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Abstract
This paper introduces the "Extended Pareto" axiom on Social Welfare Functions and gives a characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it in a framework of preferences over lotteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range of preferences) implied by the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms. With the addition of 2 other axioms: "Anonymity" and a weak version of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom: "Weak IIA" it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function called "Relative Utilitarianism" that consists of normalising individual utilities between 0 and 1 and adding them.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences |
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Journal or Publication Title: | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | ||||
Publisher: | SPRINGER VERLAG | ||||
ISSN: | 0176-1714 | ||||
Official Date: | August 1998 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 15 | ||||
Number: | 4 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 22 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 521-542 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
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