Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Renegotiation of social contracts by majority rule

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Anderberg, Dan and Perroni, Carlo (2000) Renegotiation of social contracts by majority rule. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.566).

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP_Anderberg_twerp566.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (368Kb)
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner. We also find that, with voting-based renegotioation, the availability of costly ex-post information about private investment can help overcome commitment problems. These findings call into question the practice of using a representative-consumer approach when modelling dynamic policy problems in large economies.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Social contract, Social security, Distribution (Economic theory), Education -- Economic aspects, Policy sciences
Series Name: Warwick economic research papers
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Coventry
Official Date: 4 August 2000
Dates:
DateEvent
4 August 2000Published
Number: No.566
Number of Pages: 29
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Funder: Socialvetenskapliga forskningsrådet (Sweden) (SF)
Grant number: 95:0129 (SF)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us