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Elections and strategic positioning games

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Page, Frank H. and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Elections and strategic positioning games. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.545).

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Abstract

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and stragetic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e. the principals) compete for voters (i.e. agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates’ positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe (1994)) and apply Chwe’s result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Voting research, Social stability, Game theory, Political sociology
Series Name: Warwick economic research papers
Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication: Coventry
Official Date: August 2002
Dates:
DateEvent
August 2002Published
Number: No.545
Number of Pages: 26
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Description:

Original version, November 1999; revised September 2002

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