Luvisotto, Giulia (2021) An aretaic account of responsibility for beliefs. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

PDF WRAP_Theses_Luvisotto_2021.pdf - Submitted Version Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only until 28 January 2024. Contact author directly, specifying your specific needs. - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (3571Kb)

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

This thesis argues that the practices of attributability for beliefs constitutes the core of the phenomenon of ‘responsibility for beliefs’, against a strong tendency in the debate to focus exclusively on the practices of accountability for beliefs. The overarching aim of this thesis then is to offer an alternative account to the dominant theory of responsibility for beliefs, the accountability view, which is modelled on the practices of accountability for actions and is thus unsuitable to explain the practices of attributability for beliefs. In particular, being control- and norm-based, the accountability view neglects cases in which we are criticisable (and commendable) in responsibility involving ways for our beliefs even when no breach of (or extraordinary compliance with) norms can be detected. I develop the aretaic model as an alternative virtue-centred account. On the aretaic model, someone is responsible for a belief insofar as it expresses their evaluative orientation, which is their sensitivity to both practical and theoretical reasons, oriented by their values. To explain the normativity of aretaic appraisals, I articulate the notion of evaluative orientation in aretaic terms: someone is open to commendation if their belief expresses a virtue, to criticism if it expresses a vice and to either commendation or criticism if it displays a value that is neither a virtue nor a vice. I develop several implications of my view: I resist the reduction of doxastic responsibility onto epistemic responsibility, I reject the distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘epistemic’ virtues and vices, and I deny the cogency of the control requirement. Finally, where the accountability view is unable to make sense of the practices of attributability, I suggest that the aretaic model can offer a satisfactory explanation of both the practices of attributability and accountability for beliefs.

Item Type:	Thesis (PhD)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Belief and doubt, Virtues, Responsibility -- Philosophy, Ethics
Official Date:	August 2021
Dates:	Date Event August 2021 UNSPECIFIED
Institution:	University of Warwick
Theses Department:	Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type:	PhD
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor:	Roessler, Johannes
Format of File:	pdf
Extent:	[6], 160 leaves
Language:	eng

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item