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What Drives Counter-Extremism? The Extent of P/CVE Policies in the West and Their Structural Correlates

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ABSTRACT
Counter-extremism (P/CVE) policies have shot to global prominence rapidly, yet there are large discrepancies in their implementation both between, and inside, countries. In this paper, we construct and present a robust index of P/CVE policies in Western countries (N = 38), based on data submitted by national experts, which we then use to test three hypothesized structural correlates of the extent of P/CVE implementation: threat of terrorism (measured as the number of past attacks/victims), size of Muslim minorities (Muslim communities have been "securitised" as potential threats in the post 9/11 period), and neoliberal governance (drawing on Criminological literature that connects neoliberalism to anticipatory crime control). We find the first two structural factors to be positively and significantly correlated to the intensity of P/CVE deployment, while neoliberal governance negatively and significantly. In the discussion, we highlight the usefulness of a complementary in-depth qualitative research inspired by these findings.

KEYWORDS
Counter-extremism; index; terrorism; muslims; neoliberalism

Introduction

An array of studies have explored the heterogenous and uneven counter-terrorism policy regimes enacted after 9/11.[1] Most significantly, Mariaelisa Epifanio has developed the LeRIT (Legislative Responses to International Terrorism) dataset detailing the measures enacted by 20 liberal Western democracies between 2001 and 2008, revealing the willingness to "trade" civil liberties for increased security in the immediate years of the War on Terror.[2] But this work, and the follow-up studies which have used the same dataset to explore the "peer-effect" between nations,[3] do not include counter-extremism policies—which emerged later. These differ from counter-terrorism by adopting a soft and non-repressive approach to preventing terrorism, built around the infrastructure and methods of social crime prevention policies.[4] Our research contributes to the exploration of variation in counter-terrorism regimes by developing an index of counter-extremism policies implementation across 38 Western nations and using regression analysis to identify its structural drivers.

The past decade has seen a tremendous wave of adoption and implementation of counter-extremism policies, a new policy field, now increasingly referred to as Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE).[5] This field has evolved in the post 9/11 environment and embodies the so-called "soft" counter-terrorism approach, extending counter-terrorism so that it addresses a (much) broader field of "violent extremism,"[6] understood to exist "upstream" of terrorist attacks. To this end, P/CVE policies are based on various types of interventions—educational, social, health-care, or psychological—with the aim of positively affecting entire populations, specific social groups, and individuals in order to reorient them from potential future involvement and support of violent extremism, including terrorism. The anticipatory, pre-crime logic and the broad palette of possible actions drawn from non-security policy sectors situate counter-extremism policies between the fields

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of counter-terrorism and social crime prevention. Unheard of before 2005, the rise of P/CVE to global importance has been so rapid that the Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2016, only eleven years after the first policies of P/CVE were introduced in the Netherlands and UK. The UN is not the only international organisation to urge its members to adopt P/CVE policies; the European Union, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and ASEAN have also endorsed the CVE agenda.

However, despite their meteoric rise to global prominence, P/CVE policies have been implemented unequally, both among and inside countries. This is particularly true of Europe—the region where P/CVE policies originated in the context of policymakers' anxieties about Muslim minorities as potential terrorists,[7] and where significant social opposition to P/CVE implementation has subsequently developed. A quick glance across Western countries reveals that while some European countries, e.g. UK, the Netherlands, or Denmark, have implemented robust P/CVE infrastructure, others, e.g. France, Italy, or US, have not done so.

The distinction between P/CVE policy architectures is also 'qualitative.' Some Western countries have designed P/CVE strategies which focus on de-radicalising terrorism offenders, some on intervening with radicalizing individuals before they become offenders, others on educative and communicative measures targeting the entire population, and a few countries made substantial efforts in all of the above. Additionally, some countries (e.g., in the Balkans) have adopted ambitious P/CVE strategies and institutions but conduct few activities on the ground. A cursory look across these divergent implementation practices shows little correlation with political culture, nor constitutional protections of free expression (often invoked by civil liberties organisations in opposition to P/CVE expansion).

Finally, the process of P/CVE adoption and implementation takes place in the context of, and despite, little to no solid empirical proof about the effectiveness of such policies. The lack of robust reviews and evaluations geared toward measuring the effectiveness of P/CVE policies is highlighted by the very organizations and institutions that promote and implement these policies,[8] and there has been a steady stream of critical studies arguing that P/CVE policies mark unprecedented securitization of public policies and life,[9] and that they can be outright counter-productive.[10]

In the light of these inconsistencies, uncertainties and worries surrounding P/CVE implementation, this paper asks the following two questions: what is the current extent to which P/CVE policies are implemented in the West? And, what structural factors contribute to the intensity of P/CVE deployment? We provide the answers by, first, constructing a systematic, high quality P/CVE index measuring the extent of P/CVE implementation in thirty-eight Western countries[11] based on original data collected through an online expert survey. Second, we conduct regression analyses to determine the relationship between the P/CVE index and three structural factors derived from terrorism and criminology literatures: threat of terrorism, size of Muslim minorities, and neoliberal governance.

To our knowledge, this is the first study that systematically collects nuanced, in-depth data on P/CVE policies in the West that enables comparison across various dimensions of these policies.[12] It is also the first study that investigates potential drivers of P/CVE implementation. In doing so, we address a gap in the existing security and terrorism literature, mainstream and critical, for this literature deals predominantly with the questions of "what works" and "what is wrong," respectively, leaving aside the interrogation of the "why" and "to what extent." Our research also empirically tests the implicit assumption in most of the mainstream security and terrorism literature that P/CVE policies are adopted in response to terrorism threats or, as is the case of some of the critical literature, that it is a result of a self-perpetuating counter-extremism industry largely based on essentialised or prejudiced views of Muslims.[13] Between these polarised positions, other academic research also identifies the rise of pre-emptive risk-governance in governments and international organisations as contextually important to spread of P/CVE policies[14] —something we comment on later in the paper, when drawing upon criminological hypotheses for the expansion of prevention-oriented policies.

The paper is structured in the following way. First, we conceptualize P/CVE policies as encompassing four dimensions: strategy and institutions, prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation. Then, we describe the methods through which we collected data on P/CVE policies in different Western countries and constructed the P/CVE index that measures their extent. At the end of the section, we present the P/CVE index and highlight some descriptive statistics with respect to the use of P/CVE policies by countries in our sample. After that, we turn to the potential correlates of the P/CVE index, drawing on the terrorism and criminology literature. We propose that threat of terrorism, size of Muslim minority population and neoliberal governance are possibly associated with the extent of P/CVE policies and proceed to test this assumption with the help of a regression analysis. Finally, we discuss the findings and their implication for further research.

The P/CVE Index

Conceptualisation of P/CVE Policies

The problem of defining "extremism" and, hence, "counter-extremism" has been already well described.[15] In this paper, it is not our intention to add to the definition debate, but to devise a way how to measure practically the extent to which various countries, with various definitions of extremism (or lack thereof), implement counter-extremism policies. By "implement" we do not mean to study policy implementation *processes* or *outcomes*. The "extent of P/CVE implementation" in our use of the phrase relates simply to the question of "how much of P/CVE policies is there in a given country?" In articulating this question, we are motivated by the novelty of P/CVE policies in combination with the global push for their adoption and the inconsistencies in and criticism of their deployment. Therefore, being able to quantify how much of P/CVE is "out there" in a set of countries makes it possible to (a) see the general pattern of adoption of this new and controversial policy area, and (b) learn about why some countries deploy more of these policies than others, which speaks to the broad divide between those scholars who see P/CVE as a rational efficacy-driven response to terrorism and those who see its expansion rooted in and motivated by anxieties and paranoia over racialised Muslim minorities.

While the term P/CVE includes the word "violent," we acknowledge that some countries might have policies in place that target non-violent extremism. We are interested in both, since our aim is to measure the extent to which policies that are explicitly aimed at preventing and countering any type of extremism are deployed. Thus, the word "violent" in P/CVE, in our mind, rather signifies the violent *potential* of individuals that some countries are anxious about and attempt to address. We should also add that the nature of violence in question is *political*, which distinguishes P/CVE policies from crime prevention, although the boundaries are fluid. To complicate matters even more, there is no single fixed name for counter-extremism policies as such. The US and UK governments prefer the term Countering Violent Extremism (CVE),[16] French official strategies do not shy away from the expression "countering radicalization,"[17] UN documents use the phrase Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE),[18] the OSCE champions Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (P/CVERLT),[19] and the European Commission writes about the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism.[20] These differences mark divergent political sensitivities, aspirations, or simple habits, but the policies the different labels describe are fundamentally the same.[21] Their objective is to prevent and counter the process through which individuals accept violence as a legitimate mean to achieve political objectives.[22] This is done via "non-repressive," "soft" tools, other than the classical police, military and intelligence repertoire.

In the academic literature, some scholars prefer to distinguish between PVE and CVE, pointing out that PVE offers the advantage of discussing upstream prevention outside of the security-driven framework of CVE.[23] CVE is thus perceived as closely linked to counter-terrorism and extending the "security-agenda into the realms of care, social work, and

education."[24] Other scholars either use the two terms interchangeably, (e.g., Kundnani and Hayes)[25] or regard PVE as a strategic re-labelling of CVE,[26] or even see PVE as a subset of CVE.[27] In this paper, we submerge both PVE and CVE into one conceptual framework of P/CVE, because both terms came to existence in response to the same policy problem (political violence) and are considered by scholars and policy makers alike as part and parcel of the same preventative approach to political violence, mainly terrorism. Moreover, the notion that PVE differs from CVE in terms of avoiding the perils of securitisation of policies such as education, social care, or healthcare is highly debatable, given that PVE's ultimate goal of preventing the occurrence of violent extremism is a security goal *par excellence*. To this end, both PVE and CVE rely on "non-coercive methods (usually voluntary) to intervene before violence takes place,"[28] which distinguishes them from "traditional" counter-terrorism approach based on coercive methods applied by the security apparatus. Definitional issues aside, the way forward in measuring the extent of P/CVE policies deployment is to imagine the universe of all their possible manifestations and then break down this abstract representation into specific component parts and levels, which can then be operationalised. This is no easy task, since some scholars argue that P/CVE is "a policy theme, not a single policy [...] [whose] range of relevant activities is potentially unlimited."[29] Indeed, P/CVE implementation can occur across the traditional policy sectors of education, health, prisons and probation, policing, community engagement and youth work. However, these various activities could be and have been systematised in a way (levels or dimensions) that encompasses their total theoretical breadth. One such often used classification is derived from the public health model, which divides prevention into primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.[30] Another suggestion is to classify P/CVE policies according to the macro-meso-micro levels at which they try to intervene (i.e., entire population-community/groups-individuals).[31]

In this paper, we take inspiration from the OSCE, which classifies P/CVE policies according to their function into prevention, intervention, and rehabilitation programming.[32] We follow this approach because the OSCE classification is to our knowledge the only one used in practice and recommended by a reputable international organisation with a large and diverse membership and a long-standing focus on P/CVE. However, the type of activities grouped under each of the three OSCE dimensions correspond roughly to those conceptualised in the public health model of P/CVE and the macro-meso-micro model. In the end, the choice between these models is rather a matter of taste than substance.

Following the OSCE classification terminology, we conceptualise P/CVE policies as comprising the dimensions of Prevention, Intervention and Rehabilitation. To these three dimensions we add a fourth one—Strategy and Institutions. This additional dimension expands the breadth of the index by taking into account the existence or absence of formal P/CVE strategies and P/CVE-dedicated government institutions. In our view, this dimension completes the universe of potential elements of P/CVE policy mix by complementing possible policy instruments (the other three dimensions) with policy strategy elements (see figure 3.1 in Rogge).[33] In other words, if a country has P/CVE specific strategy and institutions in place (and these are, in practice, not pre-requisites for having P/CVE policy instruments in place), it suggests higher-intensity investment into P/CVE policies implementation, thus the extent of P/CVE deployment should be judged to be higher too.,

Before we describe each dimension in more detail, it should be noted that some counter-extremism programs/instruments (i.e., index components) could be included in multiple dimensions (regardless of the classification used), for example it could be argued that counter-narrative campaigns fit both the prevention (primary prevention/macro level) and intervention (secondary prevention/meso level) dimension (e.g., if they are conducted in the language of an ethnic minority). In such cases, the final categorization is a matter of the best call given the limits imposed by data collection and the need for parsimony.

Our index is based on the logic of complementarity of all components in P/CVE dimensions, so that, in theory, a country can choose to deploy every single component in all four dimensions, reaching thus the full theoretical breadth of P/CVE policies. However, the index also expresses the *depth* of these policies, i.e., not just whether individual components exist or not, but how extensively deployed they are, if they exist (see section Method of Index Construction).

As noted above, the first dimension, Strategy and Institutions, measures whether governments have in place formal P/CVE strategies and dedicated institutions with an explicit focus on counter-extremism. Formal government strategies include action plans, conceptual notes, policies which have received parliamentary assent, and white papers. Granted, there can also be countries that have some P/CVE policies without actually grounding them in a formal (or a separate) strategy. After all, P/CVE is more akin to a policy theme, which cuts across other policies. However, the existence of a formal strategy suggests a certain level of seriousness about P/CVE as a policy field. Countries with a formal P/CVE strategy thus, in our opinion, demonstrate an increased implementation of P/CVE than those without such strategy. Similarly, countries with established P/CVE institutions, whether it is a special representative for P/CVE, a ministry department or a government centre, have advanced P/CVE implementation further than countries that do not have such dedicated institutional infrastructure. An example of a country that has both a P/CVE strategy and a dedicated counter-extremism institution is Sweden, whose government published the "Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy Against Violence-Promoting Extremism" in 2011 and established the Center for Preventing Violent Extremism in 2018.

Prevention Dimension captures all P/CVE activities that are "typically designed to build community resilience against VERLT [violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism] and social cohesion to resist the appeal of VERLT."[34] These activities "target communities not radicalized to violence,"[35] i.e. the general population or broad segments of society (e.g., communities and groups), and their aim is to prevent radicalisation to violent extremism from gaining a foothold in the first place. This is the most challenging dimension in terms of clear boundaries that would discern P/CVE from other policies such as education or health. Indeed, it is usually the case that the former is embedded in the latter. Therefore, if education or other policies have components that are explicitly articulated as contributing to the prevention and/or countering extremism or radicalisation, these components could be regarded as parts of P/CVE. For example, since 2006, one of the goals of the Framework Education Programme for the primary education level in the Czech Republic is that pupils "recognize intolerant, racist, xenophobic and extremist manifestations of human behaviour and take an active stance against all manifestations of intolerance."[36] All Czech primary schools are hence obliged to include in their curricula hours devoted to the "prevention of extremist attitudes."[37]

To this Prevention Dimension, we also count government efforts to train public servants in recognizing (and reporting) the signs of radicalisation as well as public vigilance campaigns with the same purpose. Lastly, this dimension also includes the so-called alternative and counter narrative campaigns that are trying to make extremism and extremists less attractive and/or offer an alternative model of socio-political activism.

The Intervention Dimension consists of activities that "typically targets at-risk audiences and seeks to intervene in a person's pathway to terrorist radicalization before the line to criminality has been crossed,"[38] These activities include formal referral mechanisms that enable the public or public servants to report individuals showing signs of radicalisation, assessment procedures to determine the risk posed by such individuals, follow-up intervention programs (e.g., mentoring), or a mechanism for taking down online extremist material. In the UK, for example, except for the Northern Ireland, formal referral mechanisms for radicalisation concerns are well established in the form of special electronic forms, phone numbers, or email addresses. Upon receiving a referral, specialised police officers may use the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+) assessment tool and potentially refer the individual to the Channel programme for a range of possible interventions.

The Rehabilitation Dimension covers activities that "typically targets individuals radicalized to violence [...] at different stages of radicalization."[39] These activities include assessing prisoners for violent extremism risk, running de-radicalisation programs in prison and assisting released offenders in leaving extremism. The German Federal Government, for example, has been funding a nation-wide program focused on deradicalization of right-wing extremists in prison run by an NGO EXIT-Germany. The program is voluntary, which means that the prisoner has to approach the organisation first, but he or she is made aware of its existence. Consequently, physical meetings are arranged between the prisoner and a specialist from EXIT-Germany, who provides practical support for leaving the prisoner's extremist group or network.

Data Collection

Kundani and Hayes'[40] remark that "[a] lack of a formal legal framework for the implementation of CVE policies is compounded by a lack of publicly available information" points to two major challenges for collecting data on P/CVE policies. In other policy areas, indices such as the Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) index and the LeRIT dataset of counterterrorism legislation draw data from explicitly formulated laws and regulations as well as extensive public databases covering anything from budgets, number of employees, or service output. In the field of counter-extremism, the landscape is much more fluid and opaque.

We are aware of one attempt to construct a CVE dataset, which has been done by Caitlin Ambrozik.[41] Her Countering Violent Extremism Globally dataset includes data on eighty-four countries for the years 2010–2017. Similar to our index, the dataset divides P/CVE programming into four types: prevention, intervention, counter-messaging (we include counter-messaging within Prevention Dimension), and de-radicalisation/disengagement/reintegration. Data on the existence of P/CVE strategy was also collected. In addition, the dataset includes variables concerning the role of religion, civil society participation, government participation, P/CVE-specific versus relevant programming typology, and concern about P/CVE threat to religious freedom.

The strength of Ambrozik's dataset is its longitudinal character, the number of countries covered,[42] and the inclusion of other variables in addition to those measuring the existence of P/CVE strategies and programming. The downside of the dataset is its lack of detail and uncertain reliability. Regarding the first weakness, the five variables that together could form a picture of the extent of P/CVE implementation in a country (strategy, prevention, intervention, counter-messaging, and de-radicalisation/disengagement/reintegration) are binary (yes/no) and based on a single item. This means that we cannot disaggregate them to find out, for example, which prevention or intervention instruments or programs are present in the country, and we cannot measure the depth (extensiveness) of each type of P/CVE programming.

With respect to the second and more serious weakness, uncertain reliability, the dataset is primarily based on information provided by the annual Country Reports on Terrorism published by the U.S. Department of State. This is problematic not only because of potential bias (acknowledged by the author), but, more importantly, because there is no publicly accessible information about the rules (if there are any) guiding the collection of P/CVE data by individual U.S. embassies that, presumably, supply them to the State Department. It is unclear whether these reports list all existing elements of P/CVE policies or just highlight the most interesting developments in the particular year, which seems to be the case. For example, the section on P/CVE policies in the United Kingdom in the 2017 report has three sentences, which obviously fail to depict the scale of P/CVE deployment in the country. Although Ambrozik[43] stated that she crosschecked the information in the US State Department's annual reports with the EU's repository of member states' national P/CVE strategies, this only concerns the information about the existence (or not) of a P/CVE strategy, not the other P/CVE policy elements. At another point in her research note, Ambrozik hints at using "other data sources when possible"[44] for crosschecking the information from the State

Department. Leaving aside that this could mean the abovementioned EU's repository of member states' national strategies, we know from our own research how difficult, or practically impossible, it is to find reliable and comprehensive public data sources on P/CVE policies in countries such as Italy, Spain, or Portugal. This is something that Ambrozik recognizes when she writes that "given the limited information that states provide on domestic CVE efforts, the full scope of CVE programming for all countries is unknown."[45]

We determined that the best way to address the challenge of obtaining data with higher reliability and depth was to recruit national P/CVE experts in each country of interest to complete a well-designed online survey. National experts, either scholars or state officials, are in the best position to find and read relevant literature in their own language, inquire among their fellow countrymen, understand the national context, and, most importantly, have substantial knowledge of the subject already.

Between August and December 2020, we approached 104 potential national experts on P/CVE and received survey submissions from forty-three of them for thirty-eight countries. Most of the contacts that did not participate either did not reply to our invitation or did not feel competent enough. A few countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and France generated the bulk of these non-responses/refusals. For the list of participating experts and countries, see Appendix 1. The experts were identified with the help of relevant literature, the EU's Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) database of experts and through personal recommendation and networks. They were offered a symbolic financial remuneration in the amount of GBP 50 in the form of an Amazon voucher.

The online survey had thirty questions, most of which had several sub-questions. They asked about the current state of affairs with regards to P/CVE policies and hence the data represent a "snapshot" of P/CVE at the time of data collection (2020). Since the data collection is a part of a larger project, which includes a qualitative research track and takes interest in crime prevention policies, the complete survey had two principal parts—P/CVE and crime prevention. Three versions of the survey were offered to the experts based on their knowledge: they could have completed the full survey, the P/CVE part only, or the crime prevention part only. The entire survey is available in the online supplement. In Appendix 1, we list only experts who filled in either the full survey or the P/CVE part only, since in this paper, we are interested in P/CVE policies.

To improve the validity of the survey data, we regularly compared the answers of the experts with the content of national strategies and secondary literature on counter-extremism where available. However, national P/CVE strategies (if the country had one) often merely analysed the current situation, listed objectives and suggested general means to achieve the stated goals. Even if they offered more details on specific proposed measures, it does not necessarily mean that these measures were implemented in reality, or, conversely, that there were not more programs than those mentioned in such documents. Moreover, secondary literature is often either only focused on some aspects of counter-extremism policies, is outdated, or both. Despite these limitations for verification of the survey answers, we could detect gross divergences from our expectations based on the reading and in such case ask for clarification. This happened in the case of Spain and Portugal, for example, where the academic literature suggested limited P/CVE policies, but also high uncertainty due to little public information available, which was signalled to us by the national academic experts. With their help, we reached out to senior government officials and finalised the full picture, which revealed that the two countries have in fact very robust P/CVE policies in place.

Method of Index Construction

Due to the fluidity and opacity of P/CVE policies, data on P/CVE policies will always be less valid than data on a codified, well-established, more clearly defined and more transparent "classical" policy. This is because of the elusive nature of P/CVE policies, which lack legislative grounding, transparency and have the capacity (desired by the executives) to blur with and subsume many public policies and activities. For this reason, we base the P/CVE index on what we deem to be the most important

P/CVE Index			
Strategy and Institutions	**Prevention**	**Intervention**	**Rehabilitation**
1. Formal P/CVE strategy (0, 0.5, 1) 2. Dedicated gov. unit (0,1) 3. Official review or evaluation of P/CVE policies (0,1)	1. Education/cohesion/resilience programs for pupils and students (0,1,2,3) 2. Education/cohesion/resilience programs for particular communities/social groups (0,1,2,3) 3. Training for public servants (from 0 to variable maximum) 4. Alternative/Counter-narratives (0,1) 5. Public vigilance campaigns (0,1,2,3)	1. Referral scheme (0,1) 2. Legal duty to report (0,1) 3. Risk-assessment tool for non-offenders (0,1,2,3) 4. Interventions on non-offenders (0,1,2,3) 5. Removal of online content (0,1)	1. Risk-assessment tool for offenders (0,1,2,3) 2. De-radicalisation / disengagement in prisons (0,1,2,3) 3. Post-detention rehabilitation (0,1,2,3)

Figure 1. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the P/CVE index (possible scores for each item in brackets).

components (items) of each P/CVE dimension, which give the least space for subjective evaluation of the experts. These items (sixteen in total) are listed below. An overview of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the index is depicted in Figure 1. A codebook is attached as an online supplement with more details on the coding rules for each variable.

Strategy and Institutions Dimension

This dimension is made up of three items: (1) the existence of a formal P/CVE strategy, (2) the existence of a dedicated government unit working solely on P/CVE, (3) the undertaking of an official review or evaluation of the P/CVE policies in the country.

The items were scored 0 if found non-existing and 1 if found existing. The first item was scored .5 if there was a counter-terrorism strategy, which had a designated part devoted to "soft" prevention.

Prevention Dimension

This dimension consists of five items: (1) government run or funded[46] explicitly P/CVE grounded education/cohesion/resilience programs for pupils and students, (2) education/cohesion/resilience programs targeting particular communities/social groups for extremism/radicalisation prevention, (3) training for public servants on the recognition and/or referral of radicalisation cases, (4) alternative or counter-narrative campaigns aimed at discrediting extremist narratives, (5) public vigilance campaigns.

Items (1) and (2) were scored 0 if found non-existing. They were scored 1, 2, or 3 if found existing to a very little extent, some extent, or a great extent, respectively. These and all other similar items in this and other dimensions were then normalized to 0–1 scale. Item (3) was scored 0 if found non-existing. If training of public servants existed, the item was scored as a sum of the extent (1,2 or 3) of each group of public servants (e.g., police-2 + healthcare-3 + education-2 = 7). The result was then normalized to a scale from 0 to 1 using the maximum score of a country in this category (i.e., the score is relative to the country with the largest extent of training programs). Item (4) was scored 0 if found non-existing and 1 if it existed. Item (5) was scored 0 if found non-existing and 1, 2 or 3 if it existed with minimal, medium or significant intensity, respectively.

Intervention Dimension

This dimension is made up of five items: (1) the existence of a referral scheme for individuals suspected of radicalisation, (2) a legal duty upon public servants to report individuals demonstrating radicalisation, (3) radicalisation risk assessment processes and typologies for suspected radicalising individuals (not institutionalised), (4) intervention programs to de-radicalise such individuals, (5) a government unit tasked with removal of online extremist content.

Items (1), (2), and (5) were scored 0 if found non-existing and 1 if existed. Items (3) and (4) were scored 0 if found non-existing and 1, 2, or 3 if found existing to a very little extent, some extent, or a great extent, respectively.

Rehabilitation Dimension

This dimension consists of three items: (1) radicalisation risk assessment for offenders in prison, (2) de-radicalisation/disengagement programs in prison, (3) post-detention rehabilitation programs.

Items (1), (2), and (3) were scored 0 if found non-existing and 1, 2, or 3 if found existing to a very little extent, some extent, or a great extent, respectively.

Using the sixteen items above, we constructed the P/CVE index for the thirty-eight countries studied. The index was constructed by averaging the scores of items in each dimension to create a single score for each dimension (on 0–1 scale) and then averaging the resulting four dimension scores again. The final index is therefore weighted by dimensions. This means that in comparison to an alternative index constructed by simply averaging the sixteen items, this index gives a slight bonus to countries that are active in P/CVE policies across all four dimensions (because the dimensions are not made up by even number of items). However, switching to this alternative index yields almost identical results in terms of both the final country ranking and the subsequent analyses of potential structural correlates. Finally, for a more convenient reading of the index, its final score was multiplied by one hundred, so that its scale ranges between 0 and 100, where 100 signifies the largest potential extent of P/CVE implementation.

Results

We first turn to the four dimensions that make up our conceptualisation of P/CVE policies. Figures 2 to 5 show the scores in these dimensions for the countries in the sample. Although all four dimensions are moderately to strongly correlated with each other, one can see that there is not necessarily a sequential logic to their implementation. For example, Italy and Poland show zero score on the first strategic and institutional dimensions, yet they have in place a number of P/CVE measures in other dimensions. In another example, Austria and Romania report zero intervention policies, yet they implement some P/CVE measures in the fourth, rehabilitation dimension.

The prevention dimension is clearly the most popular among the countries in the sample—all but one country (New Zealand) reported activities in this dimension. All but three countries (92 percent) have some strategic or institutional element of P/CVE policies. The number of countries that implement at least some measures in the remaining two dimensions is lower, but still high—82 percent have some activities in the intervention dimension and 68 percent in the rehabilitation dimension of P/CVE policies.

Regarding individual items (measures, programs) that make up the four dimensions, the most widely implemented is the training of civil servants (mainly the police) (92 percent of the countries in the sample), followed by programs targeting particular communities/social groups (71 percent) and pupils/students (68 percent), and referral mechanisms (61 percent). The least implemented measures include the imposition of a legal duty on civil servants to report individuals demonstrating radicalisation (8 percent or three countries) and assessing not institutionalised individuals for the risk of radicalisation (39 percent).

The final P/CVE index is displayed in Figure 6 and visualised for the European countries in the form of a map in Figure 7. Two geographical clusters of countries stand out in terms of extent of their P/CVE policies—Western and Northern Europe—joined by exceptions in their respective regions,



Figure 2. Country scores in the Strategy and Institutions Dimension of the P/CVE index.



Figure 3. Country scores in the Prevention Dimension of the P/CVE index.



Figure 4. Country scores in the Intervention Dimension of the P/CVE index.



Figure 5. Country scores in the Rehabilitation Dimension of the P/CVE index.



Figure 6. P/CVE index (2020).



Figure 7. Map of Europe showing the extent of P/CVE policies (based on the P/CVE index). Legend: 1. United Kingdom, 2. Ireland, 3. Portugal, 4. Spain, 5. France, 6. Belgium, 7. The Netherlands, 8. Germany, 9. Denmark, 10. Norway, 11. Switzerland, 12. Italy, 13. Sweden, 14. Poland, 15. Czechia, 16. Austria, 17. Slovakia, 18. Slovenia, 19. Croatia, 20. Bosnia and Hercegovina, 21. Albania, 22. Greece, 23. North Macedonia, 24. Serbia (for technical reasons Kosovo is not depicted on the map), 25. Bulgaria, 26. Hungary, 27. Romania, 28. Finland, 29. Estonia, 30. Lithuania, 31. Luxembourg

Spain and Australia. Ireland stands markedly out as a Western European country with almost no P/CVE policies, joined by many Eastern and Central European countries (with the Czech Republic as a noticeable exception in Central Europe).

Correlates of P/CVE Policies

Having constructed the P/CVE index, we can now investigate whether certain structural factors explain the degree to which P/CVE policies are implemented in Western countries. To our knowledge, there are no studies on the drivers of counter-extremism policies, or robust comparative studies of P/CVE implementation between countries, on which we could build our hypotheses. Earlier, we proposed that P/CVE policies lie between the policy areas of counter-terrorism and social crime prevention. With the former they share the objective of stopping terrorism, although they broadened the scope to include other forms of political extremism. With the latter they share the anticipatory, risk-based, pre-crime, and multi-agency preventative and interventionist logic based on non-repressive methods.[47] For this reason, we draw on studies from terrorism as well as criminology literature to identify potential correlates of P/CVE policies.

In the terrorism literature, a few studies that examine the drivers of counter-terrorism legislation (which does not include P/CVE) point to a number of potential factors: diffusion from international organizations or great powers,[48] actual or perceived threat of terrorism[49]—which was also operationalized as the size of Muslim population,[50] available resources,[51] participation in international conflicts,[52] perceived political benefits[53] path dependency of previous legislation, attempts to squash domestic dissent),[54] and political ideology.[55] In addition, the critical strand of terrorism studies has long argued that counter-extremism policies have decisively racist, specifically anti-Muslim undertones, which implies the association between the extent of these policies and Western governments' anxieties about the size of their Muslim populations.[56]

The impracticality of collecting longitudinal data on P/CVE policies due to their unlegislated nature and a very short history in most countries means that the resulting cross-sectional analytical approach prevent us from using some of the correlates suggested in the terrorism literature above, such as the changing political ideology of national governments. In addition, other correlates, such as perceived political benefits, would be difficult to measure even if longitudinal data on P/CVE policies were available. In the end, we chose two following factors potentially associated with the extent of P/CVE implementation as they seem to be prominently highlighted in terrorism and critical terrorism studies, respectively, and also feasibly measured and employed in a cross-sectional design: perceived threat of terrorism and size of Muslim minorities.

The third potential correlate to be investigated in this study is drawn from the long-established hypothesis in the criminology literature on the association between social crime prevention and neoliberal regime of governance.[57] We transfer and test this thesis for P/CVE policies, which are largely built around social crime prevention infrastructure and methods.

We discuss the rationale for choosing these three factors in more details below.

Threat of Terrorism

The core rationale of P/CVE policies is to prevent radicalization to violent extremism that can lead to terrorism. P/CVE policies are understood as a soft component of counter-terrorism, or at least this is how they originated. A number of studies on the drivers of counter-terrorism legislation posit that it is the perceived threat of terrorism that propels counter-terrorism response. However, only a few of these studies proceed to test this assumption empirically. For example, Bloomberg et al.[58] demonstrated the impact of 9/11 on counter-terrorism legislation in the US. On the international level and more relevant to this study, Epifanio[59] and Neumayer

et al.[60] using the same dataset of twenty countries found a positive correlation between the past number of terrorist attacks and the extent of counter-terrorism legislation. Neumayer et al.[61] also argued, on the basis of a spatial dependency test, that countries enact this legislation in an effort to catch up with those countries facing similar level of threat in order not to become a substitute target after one of these countries introduces a higher level of defensive counter-terrorism measures (thus creating negative externalities for the other potential alternative target countries). However, this line of research is premised on the examination of the effect of external terrorism threat on legislated counter-measures, while P/CVE policies are geared towards domestic population (thus not creating the same type of negative security externalities) and are almost entirely of non-legislated nature. Still, we expect that perceived risk of terrorism influences the determination to implement P/CVE policies. First, because the domestic and the international dimension of terrorism has become much more blurred and, second, because high perceived threat of terrorism, even international one, opens opportunities for policy entrepreneurship in the related area of countering radicalisation and extremism.

Size of Muslim Minorities

Although terrorism and some forms of soft counter-terrorism activities have existed for a long time, P/CVE policies have developed in the context of the War on Terror that was itself launched in response to 9/11 attacks committed by what has become labelled as Islamist terrorists/extremists.[62] Despite the repeated statements of US and allied European policy-makers that War on Terror is not War on Islam, anxieties about Islam and Muslims have dominated the post-9/11 security environment. When the military response in the form of invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq failed to reduce the threat of terrorism and was followed by large scale terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the P/CVE vocabulary entered the scene.[63] The soft P/CVE approach to counter-terrorism was given a high priority in effort to win over hearts and minds of Muslim communities in the West, especially in Europe, which started to be seen as a security risk in the light of the fact that attacks in the West involved "homegrown" Islamist extremists. Terrorism anxieties about Muslim minorities gave rise to the reinvigorated debate about their alleged failure to integrate into the majority society, isolation and building of a parallel society, all of which has been conceptualized as a vulnerability to radicalisation.[64] It should be noted that these kinds of anxieties are most pronounced in those European countries with a relatively new Muslim minority population, as opposed to those societies where Muslims have lived in large numbers for centuries, which applies primarily to the Balkans.[65] In the backdrop of a massive literature on the securitization of Muslim, minorities in the West[66] and the linkage made by large swaths of Western societies between Muslim minorities and terrorism based on perceived threat,[67] we expect that the size of Muslim minorities is associated with the extent of P/CVE policies. This is not only because Muslims might be perceived as a direct terrorist risk,[68] but because the soft nature of the P/CVE approach enables culturally anxious governments to tackle a whole range of cultural issues beyond terrorism and security.

Neoliberal Governance

Ultimately, P/CVE policies aim at preventing crime—violent extremism and terrorism. The criminology literature is thus well suited for exploring their development. P/CVE bears striking resemblance to crime prevention practices[69] which in our opinion conceivably enabled the policy transfer of multi-agency prevention practices from policing to the broader remit of P/CVE. Given the shared focus on preventing (violent) crimes and the fact that P/CVE policies are built around crime prevention infrastructure and methods we took inspiration for the link

between neoliberal governance and the extent of P/CVE policies from criminologists, who trace the move to crime prevention and community safety policies to the rise of neoliberal doctrine of governance or, simply, neoliberalism.[70] These authors identify drivers for contemporary crime prevention, or pre-crime,[71] policies in the "New Managerialism"/"New Public Order" ideology in circulation at the time of their inception, including the replacement (or de-prioritisation) of rehabilitative, social justice oriented penal policies with an anticipatory, risk-based, more cost effective regime.

Although the link between economic structure and violence was also studied outside of criminology in relation to terrorism and quantitatively,[72] these studies have not explicitly investigated neoliberalism as a variable. In the critical literature, Skoczylis and Andrews[73] argue that counter-extremism policies are "profoundly neoliberal" as they "promote the neoliberal status quo and neoliberal ideology" and, at the same time, are "designed to manage the negative effects of neoliberal policies on society." However, their study is qualitative and does not suggest how to operationalise neoliberalism. To do so, one faces a great challenge in that neoliberalism is notoriously hard to define. It can be thought of as a "loosely demarcated set of political beliefs" that centre on the idea that "the state ought to be minimal or at least drastically reduced in strength and size"[74] and the need to "limit regulation, remove constraints on the flow of goods and money, privatize state functions, and dismantle structures associated with collective bargaining."[75]

In the criminology literature, the neoliberal turn is characterized in terms of a retreat from the rehabilitative ideal of the early welfare state with its roots in fixing social inequality in favour of a social-control oriented understanding of crime. This chimed well with the neoliberal discourse depicting crime as a natural and self-interested behaviour in the absence of social control. In the US and the UK, the gap left by the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from the rehabilitative and welfarist model of crime control was thus filled by the partnership-oriented, risk-based and anticipatory crime prevention orientation. The same orientation underscores P/CVE policies. Therefore, we expect that the more neoliberal countries feature more extensive P/CVE policies.

Method and Measures

Threat of Terrorism

We measure the threat of terrorism as a number of terrorist attacks and victims killed in these attacks in a given country in the period of 1970 to 1999, 2000 to 2018, and 1970 to 2018. This division helps to investigate a potential difference in effect between periods of low and high concerns with Islamist terrorism. If in a given period a particular country splintered into several independent states, the successor states "gained" statistics from the original country (e.g., Yugoslavia). The same applies to countries that merged into a single country (e.g., Germany). The data comes from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) based at the University of Maryland (US).

Size of Muslim Minorities

The size of Muslim minorities in each country was determined by accessing national census statistics, or, in their absence, other publicly available data from international organizations, scholarly articles and international public survey companies. The variable is measured as a percentage of the total population. The list of Muslim minorities' size per country can be found in Appendix 2.

Neoliberal governance

We use multiple measures as proxies to "neoliberalism." Two existing indices are predominantly used in the literature—the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) by the Heritage Foundation and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) by the Fraser Institute. The latest publicly available data is from 2020 for the IEF and 2018 for the EFW. The IEF covers all 38 countries of the P/CVE index and ranges between 59.9 to 84.1 (SD = 6.2). It is comprised of four dimensions: rule of law, government size, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. The EFW covers thirty-seven countries (it does not include Kosovo) and ranges from 6.71 to 8.53 (SD = .4). It consists of five dimensions: size of government, legal system and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation. Higher scores on these indices and their dimensions indicate more "economic freedom," i.e. more neoliberal governance.

As additional proxies to neoliberalism, we employ measures of social and healthcare expenditure and government size. Since there is no single publicly available database on social expenditure that would cover all countries of the P/CVE index, we utilise two datasets—one on social protection spending collected by EUROSTAT and the other on public social expenditure compiled by OECD. We do not merge them because they use slightly different methodologies.

Public social expenditure data (OECD) is also in the form of a percentage of GDP. It is composed similarly to the EUROSTAT data, but it excludes contributions through private schemes. The values range between 13.4 and 31 (SD = 4.8) and the data covers twenty-eight countries in the year 2019.

Social protection spending data (EUROSTAT) is expressed as a percentage of GDP. It represents "all interventions from public or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risks or needs" such as sickness/health, disability, old age, survivors, family/children, unemployment, housing and social exclusion. It covers thirty-two countries in the year 2018 and its values range between 13.5 and 33.7 (SD = 5.8).

Healthcare expenditure data was collected as domestic general government healthcare expenditure in order to exclude private spending. The data comes from the World Bank database for the year 2018. It covers thirty-seven countries (Kosovo is not included) and ranges from 2.8 to 9.3 (SD = 1.8).

Size of government was measured as general final government consumption expressed as a percentage of GDP. The data comes from the World Bank for the year 2019, except for New Zealand whose data is from 2018. It covers all thirty-eight countries of the P/CVE index and ranges from 11.5 to 25.9 (SD = 3.5).

In order to investigate whether the threat of terrorism, size of Muslim minorities, and neoliberal governance correlate with the extent of P/CVE implementation, we employ robust regression analyses with P/CVE as a dependent variable, controlling for some structural country features, namely GDP per capita (in thousands $, 2019), population size (in hundred thousand inhabitants) and land area (in hundred thousand sq. km). Robust regression is a preferable method when there are outliers in the sample and the goal is to ascertain relationship between variables rather than accurately estimate the slope of this relationship, while it is uncertain whether this relationship is parametric,[76] which is the case of this study.

Results

Table 1 shows a robust regression of P/CVE index on number of terrorist attacks for three different periods. The relationship is positive and statistically significant for all three models. The number of attacks in both pre- and post-2000 periods positively correlates with the extent of P/CVE implementation and the models predict between 22 percent and 30 percent of the variance in the P/CVE index.

Table 1. Robust regression of the P/CVE index on the number of terrorist attacks, controlling for GDP per capita, population size and land area

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Attacks 1970–2018	.013***(.002)		
Attacks 2000–2018		.051***(.017)	
Attack 1970–1999			.017***(.002)
GDP per capita	.131(.192)	.125(.198)	.132(.191)
Population	−.015**(.007)	−.008(.009)	−.016**(.007)
Land area	.26*(.147)	.175(.153)	.275*(.146)
Constant	30.37***(6.04)	31.15***(6.16)	30.41***(6.03)
Observations	38	38	38
R-squared	.289	.218	.297

Robust standard errors are in parentheses
**** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1*



Figure 8. A scatter plot with fitted regression line of the P/CVE index and log number of terrorist attacks in 2000–2018.

Figure 8 serves as an illustration of the general pattern of the association between the number of terrorist attacks and P/CVE policies. It shows the number of attacks in the period of 2000–2018 (which has the largest effect size from the three time periods) logarithmically transformed so that the figure is comprehensible despite the presence of large outliers.

When it comes to the relationship between P/CVE policies and the threat of terrorism measured as number of people killed in terrorist attacks, Table 2 suggests positive and significant association, except for the post-2000 period, which shows significant but negative correlation. The post-2000 negative result is likely caused by the 9/11 outlier that even robust regression cannot fully mitigate. When excluded, the correlation becomes positive (p = .002) with a coefficient .018.

Table 2. Robust regression of the P/CVE index on the number of victims of terrorist attacks, controlling for GDP per capita, population size and land area

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Victims 1970–2018	.015**(.007)		
Victims 2000–2018		−.051**(.02)	
Victims 1970–1999			.02***(.004)
GDP per capita	.129(.202)–	.116(.19)	.131(.195)
Population	.013(.015)	−.018(.013)	−.001(.008)
Land area	.108(.191)	.142(.191)	.131(.172)
Constant	34.07***(6.49)	29.35***(6.41)	31.67***(6.22)
Observations	38	38	38
R-squared	.145	.197	.222

Robust standard errors are in parentheses
**** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1*

Table 3. Robust regression of the P/CVE index on the size of Muslim minorities in (1) all countries and (2) countries where Muslims make up less than 15 percent of population, controlling for GDP per capita, population size and land area

	(1)	(2)
Muslim minorities	.225(.21)	6.716***(1.609)
GDP per capita	.189(.23)	−.18(.141)
Population	.007(.011)	.005(.007)
Land area	.052(.191)	.186(.165)
Constant	30.01***(8.62)	26.04***(7.69)
Observations	38	33
R-squared	.089	.419

Robust standard errors are in parentheses
**** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1*

Moving on to the association between P/CVE policies and the size of Muslim minorities, Table 3 shows a positive but statistically not significant relationship in Model 1, which includes all countries. However, we did not expect, based on the literature reviewed earlier, that P/CVE policies in Muslim majority countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo) and those with centuries old "well-integrated" Muslim communities (North Macedonia and Bulgaria) in the Balkans would be driven by Muslim-centred anxieties. Thus, we excluded these Balkan countries in Model 2. The result is a model with a good fit (explaining about 42 percent of the variance in P/CVE policies) with a positive and statistically significant correlation.

We illustrate the relationship between P/CVE policies and the size of Muslim minorities (Model 2, Table 3) in Figure 9.

The relationship between P/CVE policies and neoliberal governance is displayed in Table 4. Both IEF and EFW indices of economic freedom show positive correlation but neither reaches statistical significance. For additional verification we conducted regression analyses (not reported in the table) with the focus on certain dimensions of IEF and EFW, which we deemed particularly close to the concept of neoliberalism. Thus, using only the regulation dimension of both economic freedom indices as an independent variable (de-regulation is an important feature of neoliberal economies), and also controlling GDP per capita, population and land size, we found positive but again statistically not significant correlations. Zooming on the government size dimension of IEF and EFW (neoliberal governments ought to be small), we found negative and statistically significant ($p = .034$) relationship in the IEF measure (meaning smaller governments being negatively associated with P/CVE) and negative but statistically marginally significant ($p = .065$) relationship in the EFW measure.



Figure 9. A scatter plot with fitted regression line of the P/CVE index and size of Muslim minorities (smaller than 15 percent of population).

Table 4. Robust regression of the P/CVE index on the economic freedom indices (IEF and EFW), social and healthcare expenditures, and government consumption, controlling for GDP per capita, population size and land area

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IEF	.481(.995)					
EFW		1.329(10.528)				
Public Social Spending (% GDP)			2.453**(.991)			
Social Protection Spending (% GDP)				2.366**(.829)		
Government Health Exp. (% GDP)					9.543***(2.157)	
Government Consumption (% GDP)						3.314***(1.039)
GDP per capita	.048(.257)	.132(.245)	.006(.223)	−.071(.13)	−.072(.154)	.035(.165)
Population	.008(.011)	.007(.011)	.001(.009)	.029(.026)	−.002(.007)	.011(.009)
Land area	.01(.209)	.045(.201)	.23(.21)	.802(3.321)	.016(.193)	.032(.188)
Constant	2.97(62.48)	23.75(93.56)	−11.15(26.07)	−17.09(16.22)	−13.3(12.84)	−24.7(20.8)
Observations	38	37	28	32	37	38
R-squared	.065	.065	.206	.466	.395	.262

Robust standard errors are in parentheses
**** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1*

Table 4 confirms the pattern of these last results regarding government size dimension in IEF and EFW indices, as it shows positive and statistically significant correlation between government consumption (which is another proxy to the size of government) and P/CVE policies. The table also shows that social and healthcare expenditures are positively and significantly associated with the extent of P/CVE policies.

For a better visualisation of the distribution of values and the (reversed) association between neoliberal governance and the extent of P/CVE, Figure 10 shows the relationship between the levels of public social spending and the extent of P/CVE policies.



Figure 10. A scatter plot with fitted regression line of the P/CVE index and public social spending (% GDP).

Discussion

In this paper, we attempted to answer two questions: to what extent do Western countries implement counter-extremism (P/CVE) policies? And, what are the structural correlates of the extent of their implementation?

To answer the first question, we constructed a unique dataset of an index of P/CVE policies in 2020. The index, which measures P/CVE implementation across four dimensions, empirically confirms substantial variations in P/CVE deployment among and inside the Western countries. Although we find most P/CVE activities in the prevention dimension and least in the rehabilitation dimension, there is not necessarily a sequential logic, such that the existence of P/CVE strategies and institutions would condition the implementation of preventative measures, which would open the door for counter-extremism interventions, which would then lead to rehabilitation programs and measures.

The country scores in the index dimensions also reveal that some countries have strategies and institutions in place for countering extremism but do very little outside of it, while others are considerably active without necessarily devoting special strategies or institutions to counter-extremism.

That imposing a legal duty on civil servants to report individuals showing signs of radicalisation, and formally assessing the risk posed by individuals suspected of radicalisation, are the two least implemented P/CVE measures should be highlighted, as it might suggest a certain hesitation regarding embarking on the thin ice of pre-crime interventions in individuals on a mass and automated scale.

Looking at the final overall index, one can already see that some countries such as UK or Spain, which have historically experienced high threat of terrorism, score highest in the P/CVE index. However, we can also see that countries such as Italy, the U.S. or France, which also experienced well-known campaigns of political violence, score much lower on the index. Both groups of countries have also substantial Muslim minorities and include what are commonly assumed to be more neoliberal

and more welfare-based states. However, to make more accurate judgements about the potential structural correlates of the extent of P/CVE implementation, the second aim of this paper, we turned to statistical analysis made possible by the construction of the P/CVE index.

Here, the results suggest that P/CVE policies are to a large degree driven by past terrorist attacks as well as the number of lives these attacks claimed. Judging from the effect sizes, the post-2000 period seems more critical when it comes to the effect of both the number of attacks and victims. Still, although P/CVE policies are only two decades old at best, mostly much younger than that, it seems that a longer history of terrorist attacks, one preceding the "Islamist extremism" period, is also relevant for the development of modern counter-extremism. It is possible that a high number of attacks in the past opened up certain opportunity structures, both discursive and in terms of policy practice, which in turn then facilitated the adoption of P/CVE policies when they arrived on the world stage.

The results also show that countries with substantial Muslim minorities of recent immigrant origin tend to have more developed P/CVE policies. This is in spite of the fact that the correlation between the size of Muslim minorities and the number of terrorist attacks/victims is not statistically significant in all three time periods and both for the entire sample and when excluding the Balkan countries. Therefore, the relationship between the size of Muslim minorities and the extent of P/CVE policies might be a consequence of socially and politically constructing Muslim communities as a risk or a threat. There is ample of literature that argues how Muslim minorities became securitized after 9/11,[77] how Western societies tend to perceive Muslims as threatening,[78] and how the official discourse portrays Muslims as both risky and at risk in terms of radicalisation.[79] It is also no secret that the first P/CVE programs targeted specifically and exclusively Muslim communities and were birthed by and in the context of the War on Terror.[80]

Our results also problematize the notion in the criminology literature that the new methods of crime prevention and crime control are linked to the advancement of the neoliberal doctrine of governance. Although P/CVE and crime prevention policies share the same anticipatory, risk-oriented and society-wide responsibilising foundation, we did not find evidence of the association between P/CVE and neoliberalism. On the contrary, the results indicate the opposite pattern. Bigger governments that spend more on social and healthcare protection tend to have more extensive P/CVE policies. In our opinion, this positive correlation is not due to endogeneity, where more extensive P/CVE policies naturally increase the public spending variables. In our model, public social spending and social protection expenditures include social benefits for elderly, disabled, sick, or low-income people and do not cover P/CVE expenditures. While healthcare expenditures and government consumption can incorporate P/CVE expenditures, these would amount to an extremely small fraction of the total, since many P/CVE activities are implemented on top of the already existing (paid) duties of civil servants and those that are not are unlikely to drive the statistical result.

One way how to interpret the negative correlation between neoliberalism and the extent of P/CVE policies is that resources available to governments enable more extensive P/CVE programming. Here, resources could be understood not just in terms of government budgets but also of the extent of the existing public service infrastructure—i.e., the potential of the state to "reach down" to each individual and to mobilize this infrastructure towards implementing the whole-society approach that P/CVE requires. Another explanation might suggest that centre-left governments that have traditionally propped-up the welfare state gravitated more heavily toward adopting P/CVE policies out of fear of being criticized for being weak vis-à-vis terrorism while also seeking to avoid repressing civil society with harder counter-terrorism measures.

Finally, the results indicate that other structural factors we used as control variables, namely GDP per capita, population size and land area, do not play an important role in determining the extent of P/CVE policies. These variables (except for some models in Table 1) do not appear to have statistically significant effect in the regression analyses, in contrast to the finding by Epifanio[81] Neumayer et al.[82] (using the same dataset) that higher GDP per capita is associated with less counter-terrorism legislation.

Although our dataset covers only "Western" and democratic countries, there is no reason to believe that the way we conceptualised and operationalised the P/CVE Index is not applicable to other "non-Western" or undemocratic countries too. The range of P/CVE policy elements is the same in the West and outside of it, however defined, because P/CVE originated in the West and its global dissemination is driven by the West.[83] The drivers of P/CVE policy implementation in the West, as identified in this study, can be in principle generalised to other countries too (bearing in mind the caveat concerning Muslim majority societies or societies with long-established Muslim minorities perceived as well-integrated by the majority). On the one hand, perceived threat, both objective and prejudice-based, as well as the robustness of the state's public sector infrastructure, should play facilitating role in deploying P/CVE policies beyond the West. On the other hand, the role of policy transfer in driving P/CVE deployment is likely higher in case of developing countries given the mainstreaming of P/CVE into developmental and other external policies of the large international organisations and Western countries. Of course, other studies would have to confirm empirically the degree to which our results could be generalised outside of the Western context.

A number of limitations and caveats need to be mentioned. First, our data is cross-sectional and does not enable the sort of analysis of P/CVE dynamics that a longitudinal dataset could make possible. Sadly, the collection of longitudinal data for P/CVE would be extremely challenging due to the unlegislated, non-transparent, and scarcely documented (in sufficient details) nature of these policies. However, we believe that our cross-sectional analysis still reveals important general patterns of the facilitating role of structural factors behind the implementation of P/CVE policies.

Second, we mostly relied on one expert per country regarding data collection, which obviously introduces a certain margin of error into the dataset. This was partially caused by limited resources that we had at our disposal, but also by the fact that in many countries there are only a few experts with a broad overview of all P/CVE policy elements, and only some of them were willing to invest their time into filling in a long online survey. We tried to mitigate this limitation by doing our utmost to increase the number of experts per those countries, which seemed to have more "opaque" P/CVE policies (e.g., Spain or Portugal). We also systematically collected other primary and secondary material on P/CVE policies in the countries in our sample, some of which are also subjects of our qualitative case study inquiry in the framework of a larger project this study is situated in, which helped us to verify much of the data collected through the expert survey.

Third, the length of the expert online survey precluded the possibility to include questions on other potentially interesting variables than those designed to measure the breadth and depth of P/CVE deployment. For example, it would be interesting to measure the extent to which P/CVE policies in each country draw on counter-terrorism institutional structures and logic, the extent to which P/CVE policies rely on the concept of radicalization, and the extent to which P/CVE policies distinguish between extremism and violent extremism.

Fourth, we use the words *drivers* or *facilitators* despite the fact that cross-sectional design does not allow for causal arguments. However, it is very unlikely that P/CVE policies would drive social and healthcare expenditures, size of Muslim minorities or the number of terrorist attacks (at least in the pre-2000 period).

Fifth, due to the cross-sectional design of the study our country sample size is relatively small (although it covers almost the entire population of "Western countries"). This could have implications in terms of small statistical power (i.e., making it difficult to find statistically significant results). However, the fact that we actually found statistically significant correlations despite the small sample size (and possible measurement errors) increases our confidence in these results. The statistical non-relation between P/CVE and neoliberal governance is likely not due to type 2 error (i.e., false negative) but real, since we found statistically significant results indicating that bigger/more socially spending governments correlate with more extensive P/CVE deployment.

Sixth, we investigated only those factors could have been practically operationalised for a study like this. A multiple regression analysis using all three structural factors shows that such a model can explain roughly half of the variance in the P/CVE index. Some unexplained variance can be attributed to error caused by the challenges related to data collection of such an elusive policy area as P/CVE. However, a significant category of factors that likely drive P/CVE implementation is less structural but rather grounded in the idiosyncrasies of domestic politics or national history that are difficult to investigate quantitatively. An important role in the dissemination of P/CVE policies is also likely played by international organizations such as the EU or UN, which actively encourage countries to adopt these policies. This is particularly visible in case of the Balkan countries hopeful to become full members of the EU.

These additional factors behind P/CVE adoption can be fruitfully examined with the help of comparative case study design or other qualitative methods. Future research could, for example, systematically compare outliers identified in our study in order to explain why some countries despite experiencing significant number of terrorist attacks (e.g., Greece or Ireland) or having large Muslim minorities (e.g., Austria or Italy) have not embarked on an ambitious program of P/CVE implementation.

Another interesting direction for further research is to uncover the positive association between social protection/size of government and P/CVE policies. This connection should be especially puzzling for criminologists. Either crime prevention and P/CVE have much less in common than we assume or crime prevention (and P/CVE) has less significant roots in the demise of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberal doctrine of governance than is proposed in the existing Criminological literature.

Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between counter-terrorism legislation and the extent of P/CVE policies. Existing datasets of counter-terrorism legislation[84] could be updated so that such comparison is based on the same timeframe. It might be the case that countries with extensive counter-terrorism legislation also scale up their P/CVE policies (United Kingdom would be probably the ideal example of such relationship). However, there seems to be countries with a relatively lower level of counter-terrorism legislation but extensive P/CVE (Scandinavian countries) as well as those with an opposite configuration (e.g., United States). A research focus on a potential link between the extent of counter-terrorism and P/CVE policies could reveal whether the former enables or drives the latter or whether the two are alternative (substitute) policies.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to map the extent to which P/CVE policies are implemented in the West and investigate potential correlates in order to explore the question of what drives the unequal adoption of modern counter-extremism. To this end, we constructed the first P/CVE index based on systematic data collection through expert surveys for 38 countries. We used this index to conduct regression analyses to test whether P/CVE deployment correlates with the number of terrorist attacks/victims, size of Muslim minorities and neoliberal governance. Our findings suggest that the extent of P/CVE implementation is likely driven by both real (experience of terrorism) and socially constructed (size of Muslim minorities) threats. The neoliberal connection was not supported by our analysis. On the contrary, we found that P/CVE implementation is positively related to the size of government and its social and healthcare expenditures. These findings open space for further research as more in-depth data and diverse methodology is needed to pinpoint additional drivers of P/CVE policies and explain outliers identified in our study.

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82. Neumayer, Plümper, and Epifanio, "The 'Peer-Effect' in Counterterrorist Policies."
83. Kundnani and Hayes, *The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies.*
84. Epifanio, "Legislative Response to International Terrorism."

Appendices

Appendix 1 List of Participating Experts and Country Codes

Country Code	Country	Experts
AL	Albania	Redion Qirjazi
AU	Australia	Adrian Cherney
AT	Austria	Daniela Pisoiu
BE	Belgium	Nadia Fadil
BA	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Holger Engelmann
BG	Bulgaria	Rositsa Dzhekova
CA	Canada	Lorne L. Dawson
HR	Croatia	Krunoslav Borovec
CY	Cyprus	Afxentis Afxentiou
CZ	Czech R.	Miroslav Mareš
DK	Denmark	Lasse Lindekilde
EE	Estonia	Helina Maasing
FI	Finland	Leena Malkki
FR	France	Anina Schwarzenbach, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet
DE	Germany	Daniel Koehler
GR	Greece	Dimitris Skleparis
HU	Hungary	Gábor Héra
IE	Ireland	Orla Lynch, James Fitzgerald
IT	Italy	anonymized
XK	Kosovo	Ervjola Selenica
LT	Lithuania	Asta Maskaliunaite
LU	Luxembourg	anonymized
MT	Malta	anonymized
NL	Netherlands	Martijn de Koning
NZ	New Zealand	John Battersby
MK	North Macedonia	Rade Rajkovcevski
NO	Norway	Tore Bjørgo
PL	Poland	Jacek Purski
PT	Portugal	Raquel da Silva, Joao Paulo Ventura
RO	Romania	anonymized
RS	Serbia	Željko Nikač
SK	Slovakia	Natália Pindrochová
SI	Slovenia	Branko Lobnikar, Rajko Kozmelj
ES	Spain	Laura Fernández de Mosteyrín, Juan Fernando Rojo Esteban
SE	Sweden	Robin Andersson Malmros
CH	Switzerland	Fabien Merz
UK	United Kingdom	Paul Thomas
US	United States	Michael Jensen

Appendix 2 List of Countries in the Sample of the Study and their size of Muslim Minorities (% of population)

Country	Size of Muslim Minorities
Kosovo	96
Albania	79.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	51
North Macedonia	43.6
Bulgaria	15
France	8.8
Sweden	8.1
Austria	8
Germany	6
Belgium	6
Norway	5.7
Netherlands	5.7
Switzerland	5.3
United Kingdom	5.1
Spain	4.45
Denmark	4.4
Canada	3.2
Serbia	3.2
Greece	3
Finland	2.7
Australia	2.6
Luxembourg	2.6
Malta	2.5
Slovenia	2.4
Italy	2.3
Croatia	1.5
Ireland	1.5
New Zealand	1.3
United States	1.1
Cyprus	0.6
Romania	0.4
Portugal	0.3
Hungary	0.2
Poland	0.1
Estonia	0.1
Lithuania	0.1
Slovakia	0.1
Czech Republic	0.1