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In the spring of 1989, when student protests took place in Tiananmen Square, I was a sixteen-year-old student attending a polytechnic vocational high school on the outskirts of Taipei. A few classmates and I went with a teacher, on the evening of June 3, to the city center to join a vigil at the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall, an event to support the students in Beijing. Attended by over ten thousand people—the majority university and high school students like us—the vigil was planned as a night of joint singing with our Beijing counterparts over a telephone line. On the list were songs such as “Roar! The Yellow River,” “Descendants of Dragon,” and “Wound of History,” the lyrics of which were imbued with constructed memories of Chinese history, ones supposedly resonant on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The joint singing was scheduled to begin at 10 pm, but when the hour came, the telephone failed to connect. The line was only restored a few minutes past eleven o’clock, and news came that the army had entered the vicinity of Tiananmen Square. The telephone line to Beijing did not bring a crescendo of emotional connection between the two Chinas, but instead served as a frantic live broadcast of the bloodshed taking place. The anticipated chorus from Beijing was replaced by the sound of the machineguns of the People’s Liberation Army firing on protesters and citizens.¹

What happened that night around Tiananmen is well documented: it is estimated that between several hundred and several thousand people were massacred. But looking back at 1989, for the Taiwanese, is a complicated process. Only later did I realize that, while we were concerned about what happened in China, very little about Taiwan, where we lived, was taught to us in school. Taiwan’s history textbooks, instead, mostly narrated China’s alleged five thousand years of glorious history. As students, we were told to believe that one day we would go back to rule over the whole of mainland China. A democratic culture, and the identity of being Taiwanese—as opposed to being Chinese—were, nonetheless, fast-growing in those years.

Three decades after the Tiananmen massacre, Taiwan has been hailed as a beacon of democracy in Asia, categorized in the “Democracy Index 2021” as a “full democracy,” ranked number eight, ahead of the United Kingdom (18), France (22) and the United States (26). In sharp contrast, China is under the category of “authoritarian,” ranked 148 of 167 countries listed in the Index. What has not been fulfilled in China has been achieved in Taiwan. Focusing on democracy movements in Taiwan, this chapter attempts to probe why Taiwan succeeded where China failed.

In the years following the Tiananmen massacre, researchers in the West questioned China’s democratic future. Samuel P. Huntington took an absolutist view, arguing that democracy has “little resonance” in Confucian China. Other political scientists took a more nuanced approach to chart alternative futures for China. Taking Western democracies as a model, explicitly or implicitly, political scientists often argued that economic development would eventually lead to China’s political transformation. Analysis became more complicated when focus was drawn to the role of civil society, with some scholars questioning if China has ever had such a thing, and others doubting the usefulness of this category in understanding


3 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2021*.


China’s historical conditions.\textsuperscript{6} Taiwan’s success as a country with a Chinese culture throws into question assertions of fundamental difference, like Huntington’s. This chapter foregrounds the role of intellectuals in establishing Taiwan’s civil society and safeguarding its democratic transformation. The intellectuals of Taiwan were “new concerned intellectuals” who reimagined state-society relations by first reinventing their own role within them.

Knowledge traditions of both China and the West were drawn by Taiwanese intellectuals to reconceptualize Taiwan’s politics. Their imagination of Western democracy centering on the Chinese term \textit{minzu} (literally “government by the people,” 民主), was crucial in bringing about a transformation. Involved in a great deal of reading, writing, publication, and organization of societies as their brand of political activism, intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century propelled a democracy movement on the island. The pen, or writing brush, as the traditional Chinese saying goes, is a weapon that possesses a transformational power that must not be underestimated.

In this chapter, I contextualize 1989 as a moment of change--when Taiwan was turning toward an embrace of liberal democracy that China did not take up--and of continuity, when intellectuals and their textual culture played an important ongoing role in public discourse about just what democracy means. Taiwan’s very embrace of liberal democratic politics is itself strong refutation to the notion that Chinese values and Western democratic ideas are inherently incompatible. In what follows, I first consider the history of intellectuals’ influence in China, before turning to intellectuals in Taiwan since the Second World War, and intellectual activism in Taiwan after Martial Law. Along the way, I focus on the self-immolation of journalist Cheng Nan-jung (1947-1989, 鄭南榕), who lit a fire under Taiwan’s politics in 1989 and in so doing exemplifies the most radical of the new concerned intellectuals. Other protests were launched by new concerned intellectuals who possessed comparably radical ideas to Cheng, but who had less diehard temperaments. They negotiated with the political power holders--Chiang junior and his

Nationalist Party--and mobilized a Cold War international environment to their advantage. By focusing on intellectuals, this article is not arguing that knowledge elites were the sole agents of Taiwan’s democratic transformation. Rather, it draws attention to the specific Chinese historical context in which intellectuals were given a unique role that empowered them to take political action that shaped state and society.

**Intellectual activism**

After Western imperial invasions shook a declining imperial China to its core, traditional intellectuals experienced what historian Hao Chang has called a crisis in search of a new China. This crisis is best symbolized by the abolition of the Civil Service Examination in 1905, which formally ended a tradition more than one and a half millennia long in which intellectuals were made to serve the imperial state, a state with Confucianism upheld as its formal ideology. Reform and revolution were called upon to save China and chart a course in a world where Western civilization had great gravitational pull. The intellectuals needed to first reinvent their intellectual traditions, however. It was out of this context that new concerned intellectuals first emerged.

The introduction of Western knowledge in these years can be traced to the Christian missionary schools and Chinese overseas students of the second half of the nineteenth century. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the influx of Western ideas gathered such momentum that a torrent of change resulted in politics, economy, society, and values. Intellectual transformation in this context was, literally, text based. Written Chinese characters changed from classical to colloquial forms, making written text closer to spoken Mandarin. This measure was intended to imitate the colloquialization of Latin, which allegedly democratized European languages and cultures and freed up energy for modernization. Western Romantic and Enlightenment texts were translated into Chinese and eagerly consumed by the reading public.

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In this conscious and intentional process, Western knowledge metamorphosed to become the new heritage and reference point for China’s rejuvenated intellectuals, just as much as their traditional bases of knowledge had been. Where once traditional Chinese intellectuals were educated and socialized using Confucian-based texts, Taoist writings, and Buddhist and Legalist classics, intellectuals now referred—without resistance and internal contradiction—to a hybrid body of knowledge from two worlds; an information pool which was neither Chinese, nor Western, but both. The writings of Yu Kwang-chung (1928–2017, 余光中)—who reimagined traditional China in the newly invented genre of modern Chinese poetry—are an illustration, as was his desire to be buried at Poets’ Corner in Westminster Abbey.  

The term “intellectual” is a compromise that this article uses to catch the English meaning of the term, its Chinese translation zhishifenzi (知識分子), and an old Chinese term dushuren (讀書人)—literally “book-reading people.” Only a cocktail of meanings containing all three can capture the identity of the new concerned intellectuals. “Book-reading people,” defined against the illiterate or semi-literate common people, were associated with the Civil Service Examination through which, after the mid-sixth century, the governing elite of dynastic China was selected. The term referred to students who prepared for the examination, and also the failed candidates who became clerks, teachers, street scripters, litigation masters, and other literary professionals. Above all, “book-reading people” were the system’s graduates who assumed the role of scholar-officials running the country.  

In its colloquial, modern use, the term refers broadly to the university-educated population that includes public intellectuals, academics, schoolteachers, university students and other professionals. This new meaning of “book reading people” is not dissimilar to Edward Said’s that defines intellectuals as urban professionals. Crucially, however, the self- and social expectations of the West and East differed. The new Sinophone intellectuals inherited from the Chinese tradition the idea that they had a right and duty to speak truth to power that made them the new concerned intellectuals.  


The new concerned intellectuals’ unique position to act as the conscience of the nation (lianxin, 良心) reflects ideal Confucian moral politics, especially in its Neo-Confucian form from the late imperial era between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moralistic education equipped them for, and entitled them to, a seat at the political table to speak to the rulers on behalf of the people. This relationship between being intellectuals and serving the state—and thus society—was well-expressed in the Confucian Analects: “The official, having discharged all his duties, should devote his leisure to learning; the student, having completed his learning, should apply himself to be an official.” Learning and officialdom were closely intertwined, and the ideal intellectuals would crave neither fame, nor wealth. As scholar-official Fan Zhongyan (989-1052, 范仲淹) of the Song dynasty (960-1279) most famously put it, the intellectual always held the social duty to “be the first to bear the world’s hardship, and the last to enjoy its comfort.”

The social contract of the intellectual as society’s conscience was accepted as a norm by commoners and emperors alike, although the latter kept their absolute divine power. Scholars such as those of the Donglin school of the late Ming (1368-1644) dynasty were known for their dissidence against what they saw as corrupt politics. Their leader Gu Xiancheng (1550-1612, 顧憲成) put the following couplets on the door of their academy, showing how they regarded their duty of being concerned intellectuals: “Sounds of the wind, rain and reading into the ears; Matters of family, nation, and the world concerned the heart.”

In times of crisis, like the late Ming, the late Qing (1644-1911), and the Republican era (1911-1949), intellectuals were expected to act. The words of Donglin scholars, together with Fan’s and the quote from The Analects, were widely circulated and recited by the intellectual community in the early twentieth century as a reminder of its role in charting a path for the crisis-ridden world. Referencing the Confucian textual tradition reflected the new concerned intellectuals’ inheritance of their unique social position. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom explains how

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the expectation of taking the world on their shoulders, and their self-image as political actors, informed student protests of the twentieth century.  

Journal publication was a major means through which the new intellectuals formed societies for gathering the like-minded and exchanging ideas during the Republican era. *New Youth (Xin Qingnian, 新青年)*, one of the earliest and best-known journals, took a radical position and was at the forefront of introducing Western knowledge to China. Its editor Chen Duxiu (1879-1942) was responsible for coining the term Mr. Democracy (*Dexiansheng*, 德先生) that together with Mr. Science (*Saixiansheng*, 賽先生) became the two principal Western ideas that the new intellectuals privileged. 

Chen, a typical new concerned intellectual, was educated in the Confucian classics, passing the county level of the Civil Service Examination a decade prior to its abolition. At eighteen years of age, and much like his peers, he attended a new-style school learning French and shipbuilding, headed to Japan for further Western-style learning, and eventually converted to communism. Chen emerged as a key leader of a New Culture Movement aimed at inventing a new intellectualism for a new China. By actively shaping a new tradition that combined the knowledge systems of both worlds, these intellectuals intended to kick-start a transformation of the country. Despite their ideological differences, curricula in schools and universities in both Taiwan and China were written by the new intellectuals of this era, making the campus an institution of the new intellectualism.

Challenging the undemocratic state

The new concerned intellectuals of postwar Taiwan inherited this new tradition. Together with other agents of political transformation, such as the local social elite, they played what they saw as their prescribed role in forcing the state to adopt their Western-inspired democratic agenda. Their democratic inspirations were pivotal to Taiwan’s political transformation, especially regarding fostering an effective opposition party and a civil society through which they forced the power holders on the island country to democratize politics, while Cold War international pressures helped their cause.

17 *New Youth* 6, no. 1 (January 1918): 10-11.
The effective opposition was born out of an ethnic identity of being Taiwanese that can be traced back to the Japanese period (1895-1945). In resisting Japan’s colonization, which climaxed in the 1920s when Japan tried to “Japanize” Taiwanese people under their rule, a Taiwanese identity came into being. In reality, the early Taiwanese were mostly descended from immigrants from China’s Fujian province, who had settled on the island since the seventeenth century. The Qing imperial state came to set up a prefecture in 1874, and then a province in 1885, formally colonizing the island.¹⁹ A decade later, Taiwan was ceded to Japan after the Qing lost the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).

When Japan was defeated in 1945 in the Second World War, Taiwan returned to China, which had become a Republic in 1911. The insensitive rule, arrogant attitudes, corruption, and harsh policies of the Republic of China’s officials on assuming control over Taiwan caused anger and protest, culminating in riots and widespread violence on February 28, 1947 or, as it became known, the “228 Incident.” Two years later, Taiwan witnessed the entire government of the Republic of China descending on the island in the form of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party, which lost the civil war and its control over mainland China to the Communists. Chiang brutally ruled Taiwan over the following two decades, partly in fear of communist infiltration.²⁰

Challenges to Chiang’s tight political control came first from mainland intellectuals who followed the government to the island and brought with them the new intellectual tradition. In the late 1950s, in his journal Free China, Lei Chen (1897-1979, 雷震) voiced concerns about the absence of political freedom arguing that an “opposition party is the key for solving all problems.”²¹ On May 4, 1960, Lei formed the Chinese Democratic Party to challenge Chiang’s one-party system. Chiang put Lei and his cofounders under house arrest, ending this first intellectual activist upsurge.²²

A decade later another attempt to challenge to the Nationalist Party’s authoritarianism came from Pen Ming-min (1923-, 彭明敏), a Taiwanese Political Science professor from

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²¹ Zhiyou Zhongguo (自由中國, Free China) 18, no. 4 (1957), 111.
²² Lei Chen, Lei Chen huiyilu zhi xindang yundong haipishu (雷震回憶錄之新黨運動黑皮書, Memoir of Lei Chen and the black book of the new party movement) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 2003).
National Taiwan University. Pen criticized Chiang’s unrealistic policy of attempting to recover the mainland and, like Lei, advocated political freedom. Taiwanese intellectuals like Pen distrusted Chiang as much as they had distrusted the Japanese, and believed democracy could only be fulfilled by building a national Taiwanese state. In 1964, Pen and a few likeminded Taiwanese intellectuals published the “Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation.” For this, Pen ended up in exile in the United States.23

Journal publications in Taiwan were, as during the Republican period in mainland China, the means for concerned intellectuals to take collective action, spreading their ideas and garnering support. Lei’s Free China followed this tradition. In 1971, Chang Chun-hung (1938-, 張俊宏) founded a journal advocating Taiwanese identity and democratization. He called it Daxue (大學), which is both the Chinese word for “university” and the title of the Confucian classic, The Great Learning. Daxue’s English title is The Intellectual.24 The symbolism in the title spelt out the dual East and West traditions of the new intellectuals with the university campus as their institution. Chang, and the exiled Pen, both belonged to this new group of concerned intellectuals who saw themselves as being Taiwanese, as opposed to being Chinese. An umbrella organization, World United Formosans for Independence, was formed in 1970 in Tokyo, uniting their radical comrades, including those living in the Americas, Europe, and Japan.25

The growth of this radical Taiwanese identity took place in a Cold War international environment in which Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China on the island of Taiwan was becoming isolated. Chiang’s Taiwan had played a key role as a buffer zone containing communism in the 1950s and 1960s. Since Taiwan’s strategic position was valued, it was Chiang’s “China” that took a permanent seat in the all-important Security Council of the United Nations. This arrangement became untenable, however, after the Sino-Soviet split of the mid-1960s. Seeing the importance of joining forces with communist China in its rivalry with Soviet Russia, the United States stopped blocking communist China from joining the UN. In 1971, Taiwan left the UN, before it was expelled. President Nixon then visited China in 1972.

24 See the journal’s online editions: http://theintellectual.net/zh/ (accessed 12 September 2021).
25 The organization is still in existence and has an online presence, see http://www.wufi.org.tw/ (Accessed 16 September 2021).
Taiwan’s international standing was dealt another blow when President Carter announced the normalization of China-US relations in 1978. However, the US maintained its commitment to the island’s defense and economy through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), propping up the island country’s precarious existence as an autonomous state.

Taiwan’s existential crisis was not faced by Chiang Kai-shek, who died in 1975, but by his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1910-1988, 蔣經國). Chiang junior became prime minister in the year Nixon visited China, and then became president in the year Carter announced the normalization of US-China relations. The harsh international environment, and the fact that Taiwan belonged to the Western camp of the Cold War, albeit on the margins, helped the cause of democracy. The more Taiwan was marginalized by the new US-China relationship, the more it needed to appear to be following democratic norms to gain the formal and informal commitment of the US to its defense against communist China. Chiang junior’s tolerant approach to political dissidence was born of these circumstances. Under his leadership, Taiwan’s politics transitioned “from hard to soft authoritarianism.”

Domestic political conditions helped, too. The Nationalist Party had a formal commitment to electoral politics going back to the founding of the republic when the first general elections were held in 1912. During the ensuing two decades of the warlord era, and the decade of Japanese invasion, the electoral system was put on hold. But in 1946, after the end of the Second World War, general elections again took place. Throughout its exile on Taiwan, the Nationalist Party was committed to electoral politics, even though the process was not free from manipulation. Shelley Rigger describes this as the Nationalist Party’s “mobilizational authoritarianism.”

The flawed electoral system was, nevertheless, used by opponents to break the Nationalists’ political monopoly, especially for positions in the Legislative Yuan--Taiwan’s parliament. Taiwanese business elites Huang Hsin-chieh (1928-1999, 黃信介) and Kang Ning-hsiang (1938-, 康寧祥) entered the Legislative Yuan in the early 1970s, where they urged

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Chiang junior to open up Taiwan’s politics. Chiang invited them for private conversation in which they educated him about Taiwanese identity.  

The major challenge to the Nationalists’ political monopoly came from Taiwanese intellectual activists. They launched many-pronged assaults on the Nationalist Party through demonstrations in the streets and the formation of political societies, an opposition party, and the publication of politically charged journals and books. The most well-known event of this period was a demonstration held in the southern city of Kaosiung in 1979 that came to be known as the “Formosa Incident,” organized by Formosa Magazine, the major organ of the Taiwanese new concerned intellectuals in the late 1970s. The demonstration ended with the arrest of its major leaders: the ensuing trial and reports by media in the West put pressure on Chiang junior’s government to handle the matter with care. The arrested leaders, mostly intellectuals, and the attorneys who defended them, would become the leading political figures of the 1990s and 2000s.  

The Taiwanese intellectuals’ political activism culminated in the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986, though doing so was illegal under Taiwan’s martial law, which dated from 1949. Chiang junior did not stop the party’s creation, however, and in fact lifted martial law the next year, the year before his death. By the late 1980s, Taiwan was noticeably transformed, and so were its intellectuals. In the late 1950s, figures like Lei and Peng voiced their dissatisfaction with politics under the senior Chiang knowing they could face jail and even death. They did so following the age-old tradition of intellectual self-sacrifice in the speaking of truth to power. The launch of Lei’s Chinese Democratic Party on May 4, 1960—in reference to the May Fourth Movement when the first major student demonstrations broke out in 1919 in protest against the Treaty of Versailles—and the 1979 march in Kaosiung on International Human Rights Day show the political symbolisms at work. The “May Fourth Spirit” of the New Cultural Movement formed the ultimate symbol of the new concerned intellectuals who brought about social change through their combination of writing and activism. Taiwanese intellectuals’ gradual abandonment of this symbol in favor of Human Rights was a deliberate act of rejecting “Chineseness” in an attempt to emphasize Taiwanese identity.

For the history of this period see Fupian Chen (陳佳宏), Taiwan duli yungdong shi (台灣獨立運動史, A history of Taiwan’s independence movement) (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2006), ch. 4.

Ibid., ch. 5.
In their political activism, both the mainlanders and Taiwanese nevertheless tapped into intellectual traditions of both West and East. That their transformation was intertwined with the state followed the same pattern of early twentieth-century China, except that they were not crippled by warlords and Japanese invasion, and thus had a better chance of success. In the 1970s, the influence of mainland intellectuals like Lei diminished, while Taiwanese identity like Pen’s intensified. By taking an independent democratic Taiwan as their responsibility, the new concerned intellectuals of 1980s Taiwan developed a well-articulated identity as the descendants of immigrants who first came to Taiwan in the seventeenth century, and experienced Japan’s, and then the Nationalist Party’s, colonization. Their independent Taiwanese democratic identity was, in these years, imagined, advocated, and made.

*Over my dead body*

When martial law was lifted in 1987, Taiwan’s society was far from fully free. The Nationalist Party’s entanglement with institutions and instruments of state would take a further three decades to sort out.31 Such was the context in which, in 1989, journalist Nan-jung Cheng (known as Nylon)—who embodied a newly articulated Taiwanese identity—took the extreme action of self-immolation for the cause of democracy. Cheng’s martyrdom would be translated into multiple forms of political activism including a publication, his widow’s election success, a museum, and a foundation for championing democracy.

Crucially, in lifting martial law, Chiang junior did not abolish its legal instrument, the “Temporary Provisions against the Communist Rebellion” (1948-1991), which legitimized the state intrusion in people’s everyday lives that created legal chaos and confusion in the post martial law era. The Taiwan Garrison Command, or TGC, (1945-1992) that controlled publications and censorship, for instance, was one institution buttressed by these Temporary Provisions. The right to form political parties and to free publications guaranteed by the constitution were—in theory—allowed, but the TGC still had the statutory duty to censor publications and make arrests. Moreover, civil officials retained the habit of reacting to most issues as they had under martial law. Society, likewise, did not yet fully comprehend the

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meaning of lifting the martial law.\textsuperscript{32} The intellectuals needed to break these constraints in order for their political activism to recast the state as a democratic institution. Cheng’s drastic action—self-immolation—shook society and was the intellectuals’ call to arms.

In his youth, Cheng attended an academically prestigious high school, then the National Taiwan University to study philosophy. As Taiwan faced international isolation, university campuses in the 1980s became more than ever incubators of concerned Taiwanese intellectuals who, in the parlance of the time, “worried about the nation and the people (\textit{youguo youmi}, 憂國憂民).” Although Cheng’s father came from mainland China during the Second World War, he grew up in his mother’s Taiwanese community and Cheng identified as Taiwanese. His sense of dual heritage was not uncommon, and it informed his belief in advocating not just for Taiwanese independence but also for the reconciliation of all groups—mainlanders, Taiwanese, and the indigenous Austronesian people who had lived on the island before the Chinese—together into a new social whole.\textsuperscript{33}

As a young concerned intellectual, Cheng was influenced by the mainland philosopher Yin Haiguang (1919-1969, 殷海光), who was put under house arrest for his part in Lei’s Chinese Democratic Party in 1960. Each time he visited Yin, Cheng walked past the surveillance personnel stationed outside Yin’s house. For Cheng’s safety, Yin eventually turned him away. The intellectual relationship between Cheng and Yin represents a connection between the earlier period and the 1980s, in which mainlander and Taiwanese intellectuals started to go their separate ways, with the identity of being Taiwanese gradually foregrounded in the island’s politics.

Cheng’s intellectual activism saw him devote the mid-1980s to the publication of the political journal \textit{The Freedom Era Weekly} (\textit{shidai zhouka}, 時代周刊), which exposed government corruption and advocated democratic Taiwanese identity. The journal became a commercial success, meeting a need among the population to challenge the status quo. Not content with this alone, Cheng involved himself in other forms of political resistance, organizing

\textsuperscript{32} For an introduction to this period see Murray A. Rubinstein, \textit{Taiwan: A New History} (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007).

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Taiwan jianguo lieshi Cheng Nan-jun jinian ji} (台灣建國烈士鄭南榕紀念集, \\textit{Commemorative essays of the martyr of Taiwan Cheng Nan-jun}) (Taipei: Freedom Era Weekly, 1989), 16.
a demonstration in 1986 which added to the social pressures that forced the lifting of martial law the following year.

Commemorating the February 28, 1947 incident was Cheng’s next activism. The fact that that day happened to be his birthday and that, in 1986 when he was jailed for provocative journal articles his prisoner number was “2280,” added to the pathos. Responding partly to this private symbolism, Cheng took advantage of the incident’s fortieth anniversary to form the “Association for Advocating the 228 Peace Day.” By giving talks and staging commemorations across Taiwan’s major cities, likeminded intellectuals drew attention to the suppressed side of Taiwan’s history, accentuating the incident in the narrative of Taiwanese identity. They recast the history of Chiang’s Nationalist Party retreating to Taiwan as a colonization even more brutal than the Japanese occupation which preceded it.

The lifting of martial law in 1987 and the death of Chiang junior the following year only heightened Cheng’s desire to challenge the regime. On December 1, 1988, Human Rights Day, Cheng’s Freedom Era Weekly published “The Draft of the Constitution of the Taiwan Republic,” openly advocating independence. This went too far for the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, which still imagined itself to be the legitimate government of mainland China. A month later, on January 21, 1989, Cheng received a court summons charging him with treason, to which he responded, in English, “over my dead body.”

Over the following seventy-one days, Cheng’s wife, Yeh Chu-lan (1949-), together with friends and relatives, attempted in vain to talk Cheng out of his determined resistance, while Cheng barricaded himself inside his office in anticipation of arrest. The day of reckoning came on April 7, when police broke into the office building, fortified by iron gates. Locked inside with three barrels of petrol and a lighter, Cheng set himself on fire.

Yeh and fellow activists were prepared. Cheng’s charred body was draped with a flag emblazoned with the phrase “New Nation Movement.” A photo shows Yeh and Cheng’s comrades standing next to the body with poignant and anguished expressions. Photos like this along with others of Cheng and his family were published in a memorial booklet containing ten articles spelling out Cheng’s life goal of an independent democratic Taiwan. Cheng’s comrades knew well that the articles and photos would powerfully reinforce Taiwanese identity in the

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34 Ibid., 15-23, 73-75.
35 Ibid., 9, 41.
minds of readers. [Figure 6.1 here. Yeh and comrades with Cheng’s charred body beneath the flag. Courtesy Hsieh San-tai, 謝三泰)]

Years later, Yeh described how, when the news of Cheng’s self-immolation came, she calmly changed out of the business suit that she wore as an executive in an advertising company and put on comfortable clothes and a pair of trainers, ready for “fighting battles.” Her anger was aimed directly at the political system that made her husband sacrifice his life. She told their daughter that her “father abandoned us for his great love of Taiwan,” a quintessential discourse of self-sacrifice for the state that can be traced back to dynastic China through the May Fourth generation. Yeh expressed that she possessed inside her a great amount of qi, a word that means both “energy” and “anger.”

For two days before the funeral on May 19, Cheng’s charred body was open for public viewing. The phrase “New Nation Movement” on the flag that covered the remains framed the meaning of Cheng’s death, allowing no other interpretation. In a gesture of defiance, and leaving police and intelligence officers stunned, the funeral procession moved along the roads around the Presidential Office Building at the center of Taipei’s political district. Some forty thousand people attended. Since the dead and their families have special rights and power in Chinese culture, agents of the state did not dare to intervene.

When the funeral procession stopped in front of the Presidential Office Building, Chan I-hua (1957-1989), who had worked in Cheng’s publishing company and was active in the independence and labor movements, also set himself on fire. On his burning body, Chan flew a banner: “Born Taiwanese, died a soul of Taiwan,” directly referencing the romantic attitude of the New Nation Movement. A booklet commemorating Chan was published soon after, defining his action as that of a national martyr echoing and amplifying Cheng’s clarion call.[Figure 6.2 here. Front cover of The Freedom Era Weekly (21 May 1989) showing Chan’s self-immolation. (Courtesy Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation)] Word of the two self-immolations spread in the media, while discontent spread across Taiwan. The Nationalist government attempted with no

37 Ibid.
38 Taiwan Jianguo lieshi Chan I-hua jinian zhuanshu (台灣建國烈士詹益樺紀念專書, Commemorative essays of the martyr of Taiwan Chan I-hua).
avail to recast the deaths as the macabre performance of political thugs. In response, and to show their solidarity with the independence movement, many members of the public set up shrines.³⁹

By coincidence, an election for the Legislative Yuan was due that year. Yeh stood and won a seat on the strength of being Cheng’s widow, starting her career as a politician, and working within the system--rather than without as her husband had done--to make Taiwan a democratic country. Shelley Rigger argues that the elections of 1989 were “the watershed elections” in Taiwan’s road to full democracy. The DPP, the opposition party established two years earlier and for which Yeh stood, gained an unshakable foothold in Taiwanese politics thereafter.⁴⁰

Knowing full well the meaning and textual power of his martyrdom, Cheng’s diary referenced his planned self-immolation by quoting the eighth-century poet Du Fu (712-770, 杜甫): “Somewhere, ages and ages hence, honored you will be; Albeit after your lonesome death in time.” For his Western reference, Cheng cited Socrates: “When the philosopher is executed, mountains and rivers all cry with tears.”⁴¹ As Socrates sacrificed himself for the good of Athens, so Cheng died for Taiwan’s democratic independence. Interweaving the meaning of his self-immolation with the words of a Chinese poet and of a philosopher of the West, Cheng’s Taiwanese identity was formed in the intertextual space of two worlds.

Such dramatic events accelerated the cause of democratic Taiwan. Just eleven years later in the 2000 general election, and for the first time in its history, the DPP came to power as a ruling party. It then won another general election four years later before losing to the Nationalist Party in 2008. In the general election of 2016 it came to power again, and held onto its position in 2020.

The Taiwanese intellectuals’ nationalistic-democratic identity represented by the DPP, together with the Chinese identity of the mainlanders in Taiwan as represented by the Nationalist Party, was crucial in the formation of the two-party system of the island nation--markedly unlike a Western-style left/right split. Cheng’s martyrdom has been formally recognized as contributing to the construction of this identity. Since 1997, the 228 Incident that Cheng sought to write into

⁴⁰ Rigger, Politics in Taiwan, ch. 6.
⁴¹ Taiwan jianguo lieshi Cheng Nan-jun, 4, 24. The words of Socrates are a creative translation. The Chinese original read: 千秋萬歲名, 寂寞身後事……哲學家被處死之時, 山河都將流.
Taiwanese history has been commemorated with an annual national holiday. The site of Cheng’s self-immolation was renamed “Freedom Lane” in 2012. April 7 was named Free Speech Day in 2016. As Taiwanese new concerned intellectuals, Cheng and his comrades invoked the intellectual traditions of both East and West in forging their Taiwanese identity.

Taiwan’s civil society

In addition to state recognition of his martyrdom, on the tenth anniversary of his self-immolation, Cheng’s comrades turned the site of Cheng’s act into a museum and advocacy organization--the Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation--established to promote free speech in the form of lectures, conferences, arts festivals, school visits, and essay competitions. This marks another path of institutionalization for the new concerned intellectuals’ democracy movement that, along with their strong presence in the education system since the early twentieth century, charted a new path for state and society. Similarly, two retired mathematics professors from the National Taiwan University established the Humanistic Education Foundation in 1989, a body that would play a major role in the abolition of corporal punishment that had been an integral part of school life in Taiwan. The foundation challenged the authoritarian education system associated with the autocratic government, preparing the ground for a growing democratic culture.42

Non-governmental organizations like the Humanistic Education Foundation or Nylon Cheng Liberty Foundation blossomed in 1990s Taiwan, totaling around one hundred such organizations by the start of the twenty-first century.43 The majority were set up and run by new concerned intellectuals. The Taiwan Association for Human Rights, to give another example, was founded on Human Rights Day in 1984, at the same time as Cheng’s activism and with a similar goal of making an independent democratic Taiwan. The Association was particularly important in securing and safeguarding the right to protest and to freedom of speech that were fundamental to Taiwan’s emerging democratic culture. Human rights discourse was used by the new concerned intellectuals to express their Taiwanese identity and to put pressure on the government to live up to international standards.44

43 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (蕭新煌), “Taiwan de fei zhengfu zhuishi, minzhu zhuaxing yu minzhu zhili (臺灣的非政府組織、民主轉型與民主治理) Non-Governmental Organizations, Democratic Transformation and Democratic Governance in Taiwan,” Taiwan Minzhu Jikan (臺灣民主季刊) 1, no. 1 (March 2004): 65-84.
44 For the Association’s work and history see its website: https://www.tahr.org.tw/ (accessed 16 September 2021).
Taiwan’s Labor Party, *Laodong dang* (勞動黨) was also founded in 1989. The party had split from another left-wing organization with a similar-sounding English name, the Labor Party Taiwan, *Gong dang* (工黨), founded two years earlier. Neither have had much electoral success. In a Taiwan where the identity of being Taiwanese versus being Chinese dominated the political scene, their visibility remained low. The older labor party, however, had better publicity in 1989 thanks to its choice of candidate to stand for that year’s Legislative Yuan election in the southern city Kaohsiung: representing the party was a woman called Hsu Hsiao-dan (1958-), who gained fame for her nude performance in a live experimental theatre production the year before. During the 1989 election campaign, Hsu dressed in revealing thin satin while canvassing the streets, causing a sensation and drawing attention to her cause. For her use of her body to challenge the male world of politics, Hsu was nicknamed “Taiwan’s Ilona Staller,” after the Italian porn star politician. Hsu lost the election by a narrow margin, but her challenge to conservatism and authoritarian politics lives on as another mark of Taiwan’s democratization. Like the newly widowed Yeh, Hsu challenged Taiwan’s patriarchal order of authoritarian governance.

The year 1989 also saw the opening of the first Eslite Bookstore, which played a part in transforming the reading experience of Taiwanese, and that chimed well with the democratizing agenda of the concerned intellectuals. Eslite bookstores had cafes that the book-reading population frequented, and lecture series called “Eslite Forum” that were hosted by renowned public intellectuals and artists, making intellectual consumption commercially viable and forming a middle-class culture. This new urban reading culture added another layer of engagement to Taiwan’s thriving civil activities.

The burgeoning political arena of 1989 was further augmented by a large-scale street protest. One consequence of a fast-growing economy of the 1980s was an exponential rise in home prices. The fruits of economic growth were not enjoyed by the majority, but rather a large portion concentrated in the hands of investors and bosses whose surplus capital went into the housing market, causing prices to soar. Stagnant, low wages meant that many people paid a high proportion of their income for housing in the capital, Taipei. On August 26, 1989 an estimated 40,000-50,000 protesters occupied the most expensive districts in Taipei’s city center, sleeping
on the street overnight in response to a call for protest by schoolteacher Li Xinchang (1952-). These activists named their cause “Snail without a Shell.”\(^{45}\)

The occupation became a movement, and the movement a permanent organization called “The United Association of the Houseless.” It joined forces with a new organization of concerned intellectuals, the Taipei Society (\textit{Chengshe}, literally, “purifying society”) founded a few months earlier. The Taipei Society was formed by the most prestigious academics on the island, most with degrees from Western universities, to create a non-governmental and non-profit thinktank. Their scholarly devotion to the public good was quintessential of the new concerned intellectuals. Faculties of the Graduate Institute of Building and Planning at National Taiwan University also adopted the housing campaign as their major concern, adding weight to the cause. The expanded campaign then enjoyed support from political parties, large and small, but in truth had limited success in changing Taiwan’s housing policy, which remained largely a marketized system favoring the haves over the have-nots.\(^{46}\)

Civil society had a limited capacity to challenge capitalist economy partly because Taiwan was on the capitalist side of the Cold War divide and partly because the economic system worked in making the island country materially prosperous. The founder of the “Snail without a Shell” movement, Li Xinchang, turned his organizational talent to entrepreneurialism, opening a chain of restaurants before joining the haves and abandoning the movement altogether.

Taiwan’s civil society established in these years was, nonetheless, crucial for its democracy movement. Each civil organization addressed a specific group of issues, often joining forces in campaigning, using each other’s platforms as the Taipei Society and the housing issue shows. The notorious 1997 kidnapping and murder of a young woman, Pai Shiao-yen, underlines this, bringing together as it did civil organizations to launch a joint demonstration and campaigns. Organizations like the Humanistic Education Foundation, the Taipei Society, and many women’s organizations such as the Peng Wan-Ru Foundation joined to march in the streets and lobby legislators, forcing the government to tackle the issue of women’s safety. These civil organizations were the “grassroots democracy” of Taiwan.\(^{47}\)

\(^{45}\) Lu, Bing-Yi (呂秉怡), “1989-2014 都市住宅運動 (Urban housing movement)”

\(^{46}\) For the Taipei Society see: https://www.taipeisociety.org/ (accessed 16 September, 2021).

Despite a rejection of Chinese identity among the most extreme independence activists, Taiwan’s Chinese culture played a key role in the democratic developments, specifically, the concerned intellectuals’ traditional social and political position as “book-reading people,” which empowered them to speak out and act to fulfil both their own and their society’s expectations. Their creative adaptation of Western democratic principles and civil society practices recast the state’s role in people’s lives. Rather than being fully absorbed by the state as the traditional intellectual was, the new concerned intellectuals in Taiwan served the state and society by being both outsiders to the system, as its critics, and insiders participating in the creation of a democratic government.

Being a new concerned intellectual in Taiwan in the twenty-first century, however, has become less about a lifelong commitment, or a vocation, as it was in the traditional Confucian world. The concept of the new concerned intellectual as developed in Taiwan has started to merge, in the 2010s, with the concept of “citizenship” in the Western tradition.48 The intellectual is no longer a person but rather a persona, concerned with public affairs and bound by a duty and right to speak out and to take political action.

Conclusions: Taiwan as a method

Much has changed in the way that the history of Taiwan is taught since I was a student in 1989. A much greater emphasis has been put on Taiwan’s own past rather than on China, which is now seen as a county that shares the same Chinese culture as Taiwan, rather than as a homeland to which we would one day return. Most of today’s Taiwanese students would feel no resonance with songs like “Descendants of Dragon,” or the others we sang on the night of the Tiananmen massacre. The transformation of Taiwan in these years serves as an example of democracy taking root in a local environment and, given the shared Chinese culture, as a method to assess China’s democratic movement. China did not lack new concerned intellectuals willing to challenge state monopoly to create a democratic culture. The protests begun by the young intellectuals of Beijing in the spring of 1989 were joined by academics, public intellectuals, journalists, and other professionals, who shared the same May Fourth spirit as their Taiwanese counterparts. Ordinary workers of Beijing also joined the movement through strikes, feeding the students, and physically blocking the People’s Liberation Army entering the city. Many lost their

lives in doing so. The new concerned intellectuals in communist China, just like Taiwan, played
their part in demanding democratic change. China differed from Taiwan in two major ways,
however: first, in its political-economic conditions, and second, in the concerned intellectuals’
ability to check the communist party’s political monopoly.

While 1980s Taiwan was ready for an opposition party and the growth of civil society to
check and balance the state, China continued its hard authoritarian politics. The Communist
party-state grew ever stronger in the first three decades of its existence, becoming arguably the
most intrusive state China has ever seen. The deeply intertwined bureaucracies of state and party
reached ever deeper into society, down to the village level, bringing individuals and families into
the orbit and scrutiny of dual political control. This top-down state-led socialist revolution was
not omnipotent--it had to negotiate with local forces and its own socialist discourse. But it was
omnipresent, leaving little space for meaningful opposition or civil society. Under such
conditions, intellectuals as a knowledge elite could do little to kick start a democratic
transformation from below in the same way the Taiwanese intellectuals could.

Even though they shared the same history prior to 1949--and even the same party-state
structure until as late as the 1970s--China’s political tolerance differed significantly from
Taiwan’s.\(^49\) Taiwanese commitment to democratic elections might have been flawed, but
opposition groups did join the system and enter the state, albeit in minuscule numbers in the
early 1970s. They questioned Chiang junior and his policies as system insiders, making him
aware of their Taiwanese identity at the same time. Chiang’s Nationalist Party was localized in
the 1970s by absorbing Taiwanese social elites into its fold for power-sharing, rather than
staying aloof as a party for mainlanders.\(^50\) The Chinese Communist Party, in contrast, tightly
held its monopoly on political power as it committed to implementing the socialist revolution.
China did practice village elections, but these were not an open contest as elections in Taiwan in
the 1970s were fast becoming. Instead, the village elections in China were a process of
confirming the local leaders who had a track record of party loyalty.\(^51\) The same went for the

\(^{49}\) For the similarities between Taiwan and China in the 1950s and 1960s, see Julia Strauss, *State Formation in
\(^{50}\) Chung-li Wu and Shih-chan Dai, “From Regime Transition to Liberal Democracy: The Case of Taiwan,” in
*Democracy in Eastern Asia: Issues, Problems and Challenges in a Region of Diversity*, ed. Edmund S. K. Fung and
Steven Drakeley (London: Routledge, 2015), 60-79.
\(^{51}\) For a study on village elections see Robert A. Pastor and Qingshan Tan, “The Meaning of China’s Village
central government’s elections in the Politburo and National People’s Congress, that was confirmation of the results of power struggles among the political elite taking place behind the scenes.

The political-economic conditions of these decades also worked against China’s democratization. Following the end of the Civil War in 1949, Taiwan went through a period of political stability allowing society to develop. China instead experienced the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). The anti-intellectualism of these movements did not destroy the self- and social expectations of the new concerned intellectuals, but they did set China on a path of renewed authoritarianism.

As the people’s trust in the government was destroyed in those years, when Deng came to power in 1978, faith in the party-state needed to be rebuilt. Deng’s economic reform compounded the tendency for authoritarian rule as his reintroduction of market economy faced opposition within the party and in society. The direction that Deng would take China became clear to the rest of the world only in hindsight. When Deng started his reforms, from the perspectives of both the street and the campus, or even within the party-state bureaucracy itself, 1980s China looked chaotic and directionless. It preached socialist revolution while at the same time privatizing many state-owned industries. Deng’s developmentalism shocked the nation on both the ideological and economic fronts. The 1989 Tiananmen democracy movements, as a major outburst of young intellectuals’ political activism, and the subsequent massacre, happened in these unfavorable conditions of the Deng era. The political and ideological turbulence whipped up by the demonstrations that year further intensified the party’s need for political monopoly.

The two Chinas started life in the same year, 1949, with similar historical baggage, the same tradition of new concerned intellectuals, and the same political structures of Leninist party-state, despite their different political ideologies. Seven decades on, they are still each other’s nemesis. Democracy became the difference that divided the two. Taiwan’s route to democratic politics had its own unique trajectory and political-economic contingency, with the new concerned intellectuals playing a major role in its making. Taiwan proves that Western democratic ideas are more than compatible with Chinese culture. As the new concerned intellectuals of Taiwan set out to revolutionize themselves and their state and society, they created a democratic culture and, with it, their cultural homeland.