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Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods
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Brill, Markus, Laslier, Jean-François and Skowron, Piotr (2018) Multiwinner approval rules as apportionment methods. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 30 (3). pp. 358-382. doi:10.1177/0951629818775518 ISSN 0951-6298.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629818775518
Abstract
We establish a link between multiwinner elections and apportionment problems by showing how approval-based multiwinner election rules can be interpreted as methods of apportionment. We consider several multiwinner rules and observe that some, but not all, of them induce apportionment methods that are well-established in the literature and in the actual practice of representation, be it proportional or non-proportional. For instance, we show that proportional approval voting induces the D’Hondt method and that Monroe’s rule induces the largest remainder method. Our approach also yields apportionment methods implementing degressive proportionality. Furthermore, we consider properties of apportionment methods and exhibit multiwinner rules that induce apportionment methods satisfying these properties.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Computer Science | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Theoretical Politics | ||||||
Publisher: | Sage | ||||||
ISSN: | 0951-6298 | ||||||
Official Date: | July 2018 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 30 | ||||||
Number: | 3 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 358-382 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1177/0951629818775518 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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