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

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# Mixed Methods in an Evolving Research Program on Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Their Mobilizations

**Maria Koinova**
*Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK*

**Philippe Blanchard**
*Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK*

**Ben Margulies**
*Previously a post-doctoral research fellow, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK.*

## Abstract

Scholarship at the intersection of migration studies and international relations has been increasingly interested in diasporas in world politics, yet analysis integrating relevant literature in systematic ways through rigorous empirical methods has been largely missing. How can mixed-methods techniques contribute to the evolution of a relatively new research program, such as the study of diaspora mobilizations in conflict processes? How can these techniques identify data patterns that could help establish meaningful analytical categories and factor in multi-sited complexity? Based on a large-scale European Research Council migration project "Diasporas and Contested Sovereignty," this Research Note offers a pathway for future scholarship on how to systematically do so. It presents a rich theoretically informed coding procedure that systematizes the analysis of four researchers working across conflict-generated diasporas in multiple host-countries and linked to

**Corresponding Author:**
Maria Koinova, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Warwickshire CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: M.Koinova@warwick.ac.uk

conflicts in multiple countries of origin. Correspondence and cluster analyses are used to isolate profiles of diaspora entrepreneurs. Procedures used early in the project's life-cycle helped later to design a unique survey and inform a deeper comparative causal analysis, thus creating a coherent conversation among different research products.

**Keywords**
diaspora, conflict, multi-methods

## Introduction

Scholarship at the intersection of migration studies and international relations has been increasingly interested in the transnational activity of diasporas in world politics (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Shain and Barth 2003; Kapur 2005; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Orjuela 2008; Koinova 2009; Brinkerhoff 2016; Marinova 2017). Yet analysis that integrates relevant literature in systematic ways through the rigorous coding of large-scale migration data is still largely missing. This paper revolves around two major questions: How can mixed-methods techniques contribute to the evolution of a relatively new research program, such as the study of diaspora mobilizations in conflict processes? How can these techniques identify data patterns that could help establish meaningful analytical categories and factor in multi-sited complexity?

This Research Note presents a rich theoretically informed coding procedure that systematizes the analyses of four researchers working on a large-scale research project on conflict-generated diasporas in multiple European host-countries linked to conflicts in multiple countries of origin. Initially facing scattered literatures that could not adequately cover the complexity of diaspora mobilizations in breath and variability, we introduced a comprehensive coding of qualitative data followed by quantitative correspondence and cluster analyses, and isolated the profiles of diaspora entrepreneurs as an important analytical category. Such profiles allowed us to not confine the notion of diaspora to that of a group, but to highlight individual agency, which is much needed in scholarship and practice but difficult to arrive at without access to large-scale data.

This paper briefly reviews migration and international relations scholarship relevant to diaspora mobilizations and crucial to our integrative analysis. Further, we discuss how we conducted semi-structured interviews with diaspora political entrepreneurs in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands in 2012–2016. Interviews were systematically coded on the basis of 11 codebook sections, subjected to intercoder procedures, and analyzed through cluster and correspondence analyses. We conclude by reviewing the impact of these early procedures on subsequent research products—a cross-national survey and a comparative book—that advanced the research program in a coherent way.

## Diasporas in World Politics

At the outset of our investigations, several lines of research provided varying insights into diaspora activities in conflict, post-conflict, and development. A large-N World Bank study argued that if an intra-state conflict draws resources from an affluent US-based diaspora, conflict is perpetuated (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). These results turned contradictory, as a new quantitative study showed that large diasporas can significantly reduce conflict risks (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008). Case studies of Armenian, Chechen, Kosovar, Sikh, Somali, and Tamil intra-state conflicts found that conflict resolution was resisted when diasporas sponsored rebel factions (Lyons 2006; Adamson and Demetriou 2007). Diasporas can also affect the purchase and smuggle of weapons, provide sanctuary for rebels, and draft soldiers from diaspora circles (Byman et al. 2001). Other scholars have argued that diasporas can have both positive and negative influences on conflict dynamics with their remittances, philanthropy, human capital, and policy influences (Smith and Stares 2007; Orjuela 2008; Koinova 2011; Brinkerhoff 2011). It eventually became clear that research needed to better understand the conditions and context-shaping behaviors of diasporas. More researchers started calling for the use of comparative and quantitative methods.

For their part, development studies focused on diasporas more generally, and beyond the conflict-generated ones discussed here. Diasporas send much-cherished remittances back home, constituting 10–26 percent of a fragile state's GDP (World Bank 2017). Remittances maintain households during warfare and rebuild lives, housing, and infrastructure in the aftermath. Diasporas also invest in various enterprises (Smart and Hsu 2004), buy diaspora bonds (Leblang 2010), and make philanthropic contributions (Sidel 2003; Brinkerhoff 2008). Diasporas act upon political opportunities and constraints by mobilizing structures available to them locally and globally (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Smith and Stares 2007).

Diaspora entrepreneurs are important in such movements. We acknowledge the growing scholarship on them from a business perspective (Zapata-Barrero and Rezaei 2020), yet focus on its political dimensions, especially on mobilizations in conflict processes. We define diaspora entrepreneurs as "formal and informal leaders in a diaspora community, associated with migrant, religious, and other identity-based institutions, … acting autonomously as activists, businessmen, politicians, … who actively make public claims with a homeland-oriented goal. These are political and social entrepreneurs, even if some of them may have a business background. What unites them is a strong commitment to a cause related to their original homeland" (Koinova 2021: 11).

Diaspora entrepreneurs can bridge structural gaps through "brokerage" (Adamson 2013), "in-between advantage" (Brinkerhoff 2016), and their socio-spatial positionality in different global contexts (Koinova 2017). They can mobilize more or less contentiously through: (a) Different *channels*, preferring state-based or transnational ones to organize their activities and (b) different *levels of intensity* ranging from

weak, medium-strong, to strong. Discussing diaspora entrepreneurs as political actors, Brinkerhoff sheds light on diaspora individual agency from a leadership perspective, drawing evidence from the US (2016: 29–32). In contrast, this Research Note identifies how profiles of diaspora entrepreneurs are contextually embedded in Europe and maintain connections to their original homelands.

Delving deeper, we aimed at combining five relevant aspects of diaspora mobilization discussed separately by existing scholarship: (1) Diaspora group characteristics; (2) host-state migration integration regimes; (3) host-state foreign policies towards the home-state; (4) critical events in the homeland; and (5) homeland policies towards diasporas abroad. Considering these domains through common methodological procedures allowed us to extract from semi-structured interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs a variety of identity-based, contextual, and behavioral "traits" that shape their "profiles." We discuss these domains below and in more detail in the codebook.

1. For *diaspora group characteristics*, size, organization, and spatial concentration stand out. The literature struggled to ascertain diaspora *size*, as diasporas consist of migrants and refugees, their descendants, and different generations, rendering unclear who belongs within the group. Diasporas are also not counted equally in censuses. Larger diasporas are deemed more likely to mobilize than smaller ones (Cohen 1997). A diaspora's *organizational level* often depends on age and size, with old, large diasporas usually better organized than new ones. Organizationally strong (Rubenzer 2008), unified (Haney and Vanderbush 1999), and spatially concentrated diasporas are also more likely to mobilize (DeWind and Segura 2014).
2. In *host-state migration incorporation regimes*, how citizenship is acquired holds a central role. Compared to the unrestricted *jus soli* (law of the soil) principle in the US and Canada, some European limitations exist, even in the most open cases, such as the UK and France. Germany's citizenship law has been historically given on the *jus sanguinis* (law of blood) principle, although it was amended to more open methods after 2000. In Sweden and the Netherlands, citizenship is also conferred on the *jus sanguinis* principle, with possibilities for naturalization with residence over time. We also considered other institutional arrangements, such as multicultural versus assimilation policies (Banting and Kymlica 2006), isolation of migrants in host-states (Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 2001), incorporation regimes considered with migrants' collective identities, and homeland influences.
3. Regarding *host-state foreign policies towards the home-state*, the most striking characteristics of diaspora groups that are actively and successfully lobbying are those that are partially assimilated, organizationally strong, and allied with other groups (Rubenzer 2008; Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 2003). Powerful ethnic lobbies can be instrumental in the "policy capture"

of host-state foreign policies and in fostering interventions in conflicts abroad (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). Until recently scholarship on diaspora lobbying in foreign policy remained largely state-centric, yet emerging discussion has considered a *transnational dimension* (Koinova 2017; Marinova 2017). Building on their geographical "comparative advantage," rebel groups strategize on how best to engage diasporas (Lyons and Mandaville 2010), including how to contribute to a homeland cause, education, and media activism (Adamson and Demetriou 2007).

4. Regarding *critical events in the homeland*, we have identified major stimuli for diaspora mobilization. Critical junctures and transformative events are especially impactful if violent (Sökefeld 2006: 273), leading to an expansion in diaspora activism (Demmers 2007) and changes in statehood (Koinova 2018a). Regime change can also be important (Kuropas 1991). Such critical events can affect diasporas if they are durably linked to kin in the homelands, as in the 2011 Arab uprisings.
5. *Homeland policies toward diasporas abroad* can occur for a variety of reasons: As a resource for remittances, investments, purchasing bonds, philanthropy, and tourism. Sending-states seek to construct or maintain diaspora identities through schools and curricula in the mother-tongue, commemorations of national holidays, and retainment of dual citizenship (Ragazzi 2009; Waterbury 2010). Sending-states govern their diasporas directly or indirectly, fostering their self-reliance and encouraging homeland-bound contributions (Delano and Gamlen 2014).

None of these five theoretical domains could single-handedly or coherently explain diaspora mobilizations during conflict. Hence, one needs to examine the domains concurrently, consider how mobilizations occur in context, and eventually isolate profiles of diaspora entrepreneurs shaped by these contextual dimensions.

## Collecting and Coding Diaspora Interviews

Given the growing number of large migration projects involving multiple individual researchers working on a common theme,[1] this Research Note demonstrates how a specially designed coding system can help analyze interview transcripts through a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods to identify data patterns across researchers' sub-projects. In our case, the emerging patterns revealed "profiles" of diaspora entrepreneurs. We went through three phases, as indicated in Table 1.

During the *Preparation Phase* (Table 1), large-scale fieldwork was conducted among six diaspora groups in five EU countries, targeting diaspora entrepreneurs.

[1] For a detailed review of academic projects focused on diasporas, migration, conflict, and peace see Koinova (2021:7).

**Table 1.** Investigation and Coding Process.

| Preparation phase | Wave 1 of coding | Wave 2 of coding |
|---|---|---|
| February 2012–June 2014 | June 2014–May 2016 | May 2016–December 2016 |
| 1. Scattered theories inform the launching of a comparative study of diaspora mobilizations across Europe and the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus regions. | 1. A team of six coders is introduced to a first version of the questionnaire, elaborated from 10 sections and 125 codes derived from the literature. | 1. A second, distinct subsample of 40 interviews is extracted, stratified among three diaspora groups (Albanians, Armenians, and Palestinians) and a subset of three countries (Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and decomposed into units of analysis (unitized). |
| 2. A team of four interviewers conducts 300 interviews among an overall sample of six diaspora groups linked to weak and de facto states in the EU neighborhood (Albanians, Armenians, Bosnians, Kurds, Iraqis, and Palestinians) in five EU countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and UK). | 2. A first sub-sample of 24 interviews are selected at random from the 300, with interviews from the six diaspora groups and five states. | 2. Two independent pairs of coders test the enhanced codebook against a pilot sample of six unitized interviews, then 20, out of the 40. They propose and discuss more amendments to the codebook, finalized at 11 sections and 138 codes. |
| | 3. Interviews are transcribed, then used to revise the codes through grounded coding analysis. | 3. The final coding of the 40 unitized interviews is taking place. |

The groups were selected on their linkages to different types of weak and fragile states.[2] Albanians, Armenians, and Palestinians are linked to the *de facto* states of Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Palestine, polities lacking international legal sovereignty. Iraqis and Bosnians are linked to Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively, weak states with international recognition but challenged in their domestic sovereignty by deep ethno-nationalist or sectarian divisions. The Kurdish diaspora is stateless and linked to autonomist and secessionist movements in the Middle East. The five European countries were selected based on their different types of migrant incorporation regimes (UK and France traditionally considered "liberal," Germany as more

[2] See Krasner (1999) on types of state sovereignty.

"restrictive," and Sweden and the Netherlands as taking a middle ground; based on Howard 2009). The investigation considered over 300 open-ended and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observations during diaspora events.

Interviewees were selected through purposive and snowball sampling to represent active diaspora members who are involved in claim-making and organizing of others about homeland-based political and social projects. Respondents were sampled from different networks, to avoid selection bias. Some of the interviewees belonged to diaspora organizations, while others were wealthy individuals who did not need diaspora organizations to endorse them. Still, others held jobs that brought them in frequent contact with the diaspora community, such as shopkeepers, restaurant owners, and hairdressers. This open definition of diaspora entrepreneurship captured a multitude of people who made claims about their original homelands, or mobilized resources for specific projects.

In the *Wave 1 coding phase*, following Saldana's method for qualitative coding (2013), topics were grouped into ten sections: life in the homeland prior to migration, migration experience, host-country integration, citizenship, relationship to host-land foreign policy and homeland government, substantive homeland-oriented goals and claims, prospects for return, and modes of mobilization. Codes were elaborated from a random sample of interviews from the six diaspora groups (Albanian, Armenian, Bosnian, Iraqi, Kurdish, and Palestinian). Group-level comparisons revealed commonalities, including that individual interviewees (a) do not speak about specific host-land policies, but about their *individual perceptions* and how they act on them; and (b) are very aware of how supportive host-state foreign policy is regarding homeland-oriented goals, but rarely know specific details. They act on such general perceptions. This first sample of interviews was set at twenty-five, which enabled us to test the range of theoretical categories without exhausting our resources.

The *Wave 2 phase* consisted in selecting forty interviews from three diaspora groups (Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian) and three host-countries (Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden), which enabled us to cover a range of themes relevant to diaspora mobilizations, and guaranteed a degree of diversity among sociodemographic profiles. Every eighth interview was randomly selected from the existing pool of transcribed interviews. Our goal was an in-depth analysis of these forty interviews using quantitative methods to reveal certain patterns across the cases.

This selection elucidates relationships concerning the *de facto* states mentioned earlier. Our goal was to generalize cautiously about the wide range of diaspora mobilizations from these fragile states. Narrowing this probe to mobilizations in three host-states—Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden—allowed us to reduce the number of contexts in which to interpret the results. Interviews were then divided into small units, called "conversational moves,"[3] or building blocks "for conversational game structure, that reflect the goal

[3] The authors would like to thank Kenneth Benoit for his inspiration to use the unitizing process through "conversational moves."

structure of the dialogue" (Carletta et al. 1997: 22). Given the multiple themes covered in the different literatures, using the conversational moves enabled us to effectively classify and code smaller segments of text to answer a single question, stated or implied, or multiple but closely related questions dealing with a single, self-contained topic.

The codebook and coding protocols were applied progressively to the forty interviews and improved accordingly. Coders were initially instructed to assign up to two codes to each conversational unit. Intercoder discussions during a pilot phase revealed that these two codes should not be hierarchized (into master and secondary codes), as this made it more difficult to code in subsequent treatments. Eventually, a "negotiated agreement" approach was adopted, so that the two coders could "code a transcript [independently], compare codings, and then discuss their disagreements in an effort to reconcile them and arrive at a final version in which as many discrepancies as possible have been resolved" (Campbell et al. 2013: 305). The final codebook (see Appendix 1) underwent twelve drafts to refine the existing categories.

## Analyzing Interview Data

We used successively *correspondence analysis (CA)* and *cluster analysis*. We did not formulate and test hypotheses deductively, due to the scattered state of the literature. Nor did we arrive at our conclusions purely inductively, as we started with some theoretical insights from the earlier discussed scholarly domains. We evaluated the coding propositions and amended them sequentially, making the final findings more robust.

CA, our primary (quantitative) analytical method, is a type of factorial analysis focused on categorical variables (Benzecri 1992; Le Roux and Rouanet 2004; Greenacre and Blasius 2006). CA can be counterintuitive to scholars used to testing hypotheses but is helpful at establishing systematic empirical patterns (here diaspora entrepreneurs' profiles) within a relatively new research program dominated by case studies and some comparative studies, where causal relationships have not been tested yet. CA can cluster personal characteristics, mobilization pathways, and entrepreneurs' experiences, and establish specific patterns of contextual entanglement.

CA centers on individuals with attributes (e.g., "being a woman," "having migration experience of political violence," "mobilizing for one's homeland independence"). CA does not capture ties between individuals connected in a network as social network analysis does. We did not investigate such ties. The merit of CA is different: To capture how the above-mentioned attributes are tied to individuals with similar attributes, within various groups and contexts in the same social field, and to calculate the mathematical distance between cases (here diaspora individuals in Europe linked to conflict and postconflict polities in its neighborhood). CA also has the specificity of progressing inductively and acquiring robustness through *ex post* statistics.

CA has proven fruitful through its application to multifactorial phenomena, such as the social construction of tastes (Bourdieu 1984), social reproduction in education (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990), social structures and political hierarchies (Hjellbrekke et al. 2007), structure and stability of political elites (Bühlmann, David and Mach 2012), and evolution of electoral constituencies (Blanchard 2007). Ragazzi's (2009) work is an exception in having used CA to study aspects of diaspora politics, most notably how sending-states reach out to diasporas abroad.

We followed CA's three usual steps: (1) Calculate (hidden) factors that summarize optimally the information from the original dataset; (2) assess and interpret factors by means of maps that determine distance between cases and codes, and joint statistical outputs, where each factor is described through a contrast between its extremes; and (3) use the calculated factors to elaborate a classification of interviewees characterized by cross-tabulations and prototypical individuals.

Our analysis is based on the transcripts of forty interviews, stratified by diaspora group and host-country. CA is appropriate for our analysis, as statistical representativity is less important than the richness of cases, the structure of similarities between them, and how all cases give shape to the field of diaspora mobilizations. On average, each interview was divided into thirty-nine conversational moves and attributed thirty-two unique codes, chosen from a list of 138 provided in Appendix 1. Codes refer to values of variables, mostly categorical, often binary. A few exceptions are ordinal, such as age range, or public opinion about immigration, with three nominal values (*Negative*, *Divided*, or *Positive*). Due to the predominance of binary codes in the dataset, we use simple CA instead of the more popular multiple CA (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004: 2061). Only codes used as "active variables" contribute to building the model. Respondents' host-countries (*Germany*, *the Netherlands*, and *Sweden*) and diaspora groups (*Albanians*, *Armenians*, and *Palestinians*) do not: they are used as "illustrative variables." This formal homogeneity of active variables (mostly binary) keeps the analysis statistically consistent and sociologically meaningful, i.e., consistent with our ability to interpret variables from the perspective of theory.

Figure 1 shows twenty extracted factors with a fairly smooth decrease in explanatory power (variance). Such a vast and diverse corpus is fully multifactorial. Axes 1, 2, and 3 account for 21 percent of the explained variance, and appear to structure the experience of diaspora entrepreneurs. This relatively low variability is the rule more than the exception in CA. This reflects the fact that many aspects of the multivariate combinations of codes are not summarized by the clustering. Nevertheless, CA extracts the largest contrasts within the space of codes produced by the coded corpus.

Axis 1 contrasts those diaspora entrepreneurs who are reasonably well "segmentally assimilated" (Portes and Zhou 1993) into the host-society with those who make homeland-oriented claims based on political grievances. This does not mean that a person who is segmentally assimilated cannot potentially make homeland-oriented claims based on political grievances, but that the opposition between these two characteristics is structuring axis 1. This is the first and largest axis, yet it exhausts only




**Figure 1.** Distribution of factors extracted by means of correspondence analysis.

part of the total explained variance and may not be structuring for other axes. Axis 2 contrasts individuals shaped mostly by experiences in the original homeland with those engaged in host-state institutions or transnationally. Axis 3 (Appendix 2) contrasts individuals who are predominantly self-employed and engaged mostly in communal activities with those based in migrant-dominated areas and more actively involved in their host society. Overall, the main three axes contrast personal experiences of migration and settlement with balancing identity between home and host-country. This means that some respondents engage better than others with the host-land, and diaspora mobilizations are constrained in some cases, or more enabled in others.

## Exposing Clusters and Profiles of Diaspora Entrepreneurs

An examination of the axes reveals the main differences between diaspora entrepreneurs. However, these remain abstract from the reality of the respondents. To present respondents' specific characteristics more concretely, we further cluster them. The concept of statistical clustering is similar to other approaches to build typologies but differs insofar as it relies on precise calculations (its algorithm). Clustering aims to maximize the similarities between cases belonging to the same cluster and to minimize them between those belonging to distinct clusters.

Here cluster analysis is based on the three main axes detailed above, plus some minor ones, grouping sets of interviews with similar combinations of properties




**Figure 2.** Clustering tree. The 40 interviews on the left-hand side are aggregated progressively from left to right, from pairs with the most similar codes to most dissimilar. The horizontal axis materializes dissimilarity between interviews: The more similar two interviews, the shorter the fork that pairs them.

over the range of 138 codes. All interviews are examined in pairs, with the most similar clustered first. All remaining interviews and clusters are examined in the same way, and those most similar are clustered again. Eventually, each small branch of the "clustering tree" merges into a bigger branch. The process moves from the forty distinct interviews (left side of Figure 2), towards the whole population (right side).[4]

Labeling the clusters associates human characteristics with the statistical modeling results, and creates diaspora entrepreneur profiles based on a combination of extracted "traits," mobilization modes, and contextual embeddedness. A "constrained" diaspora

[4]We performed agglomerative hierarchical clustering, using Euclidean distances and Ward's agglomeration algorithm. This set of parameters has the advantage of delivering well-balanced clusters in terms of size, and of allowing a straightforward examination of the clustering dendrogram (tree), in order to select the best cut. This approach is generally recommended for treating the outputs of correspondence analysis applied to texts. A variety of parameters have been tested within this approach, such as inter, intra-cluster and explained inertia, Calinski-Harabasz criterion, and Davis-Bouldin index, as demonstrated in Appendix 2.

entrepreneur has relatively restricted access to host-institutions, yet still lobbies them through media, protests, and boycotts. A "contented" diaspora entrepreneur has a more positive outlook of host-country institutions, yet is more limited in mobilizing. An "enabled" diaspora entrepreneur has soft powers based on economic resources and relies highly on education to engage with their original homeland, whereas a "discontented" diaspora entrepreneur believes conditions in the host-country and its public opinion to be negative or divided and demonstrates strong transnational activism.

Cluster 1, or the constrained diaspora entrepreneur, is the largest: It contains nineteen interviews, gathering 44 percent of the codes. It occupies the lowest third of the clustering tree (Figure 2), and is over-represented in the Netherlands and among Armenians and Palestinians (Table 2). This cluster derives codes nearly exclusively from six codebook sections (perception of host-countries, access to host-institutions, participation in host-country, types of claims, activism modes, and events triggering mobilization). This is a striking result, as no statistical rule explains why characteristic codes for a cluster would be so selective regarding the code sections.

Cluster 1, the constrained diaspora entrepreneur wishes they had more access to host-institutions. They advance claims associated with religion, genocide recognition, and less frequently gender and human rights. They define themselves by their ability to mobilize, struggling to do so at times because of moderate host-country support or limited personal involvement in host-country institutions. They are not strongly linked with their homeland, as if marooned between it and their host-country, and can't access either's valuable resources.

Cluster 2, the contented diaspora entrepreneur, is the third-largest. It contains eight interviews, gathering 21 percent of the codes (middle block, Figure 2), and is slightly over-represented in Sweden and among Palestinians (Table 2). In contrast to Cluster 1, it is mostly defined by two sections of the codebook: Personal attributes and experience with migration and integration. Dominant codes are, in decreasing order of magnitude, having transited through the host-country (and/or possibly a third country), leaving home due to violence or economic reasons, being a woman, and having attended university, mainly in the homeland. These individuals have close friends among co-ethnics and host-country nationals, have a good command of both homeland and host-country languages, and want to integrate themselves in the host-country. Contented diaspora entrepreneurs share quite positive views on many aspects of integration, including knowledge of the host-country, social and institutional resources that can enable them to act and mobilize, and support from local institutions. However, they don't mention much about the kinds and modes of mobilization they favor. They are less politically active.

Cluster 3, the enabled diaspora entrepreneur, is the smallest in our dataset, grouping four interviews at the top of Figure 2, and gathering 6 percent of all codes. It is over-represented in Germany (Table 2). An enabled diaspora entrepreneur is well-settled in the host-country, mostly through the host-land mainstream. Education and other soft means of influence are crucial to their role as diaspora leaders. They talk much more than other respondents about diaspora educational activities aimed

**Table 2.** Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Their Mobilizations.

| Diaspora entrepreneur profile | Percentage of sample codes in context | Host-land related aspects to mobilizations | Homeland related aspects to mobilizations | Issues of mobilizations | Modes of mobilizations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Constrained - 44 percent of overall sample | *Host-country:* GER 26 percent NL 37 percent SWE 37 percent *Diaspora group:* ALB 5 percent ARM 47 percent PAL 47 percent | Considering themselves having limited access to host-land institutions but better access to political parties; concerns about rival lobby groups; host-land foreign policy considered adverse for pursuing homeland-oriented political goals | Events triggering mobilizations: anniversaries and warfare; limited participation in homeland institutions | Religion, genocide recognition, less frequently human and gender rights. | Lobbying, protests, boycotts |
| Contented - 21 percent of overall sample. | *Host-country:* GER 25 percent NL 25 percent SWE 50 percent *Diaspora group:* ALB 38 percent ARM 25 percent PAL 47 percent | Positive view of host-land institutions and society; some membership in host-land associations | Leaving home due to violence and/or economic reasons; some have homeland-based education | Views that the host-land needs to recognize independence of the homeland | Minimal mobilizations |
| Enabled - 6 percent of overall sample | *Host-country:* GER 75 percent NL O percent SWE 25 percent *Diaspora group:* ALB 50 percent ARM 20 percent PAL 20 percent | Well settled in the host-country usually through the mainstream of society; soft powers and education | Importance to build connections between host-land and homeland; homeland government seeking ties with diaspora abroad | Partnerships, trade, education, | Lobbying, advocacy |

*(continued)*

**Table 2.** (continued)

| Diaspora entrepreneur profile | Percentage of sample codes in context | Host-land related aspects to mobilizations | Homeland related aspects to mobilizations | Issues of mobilizations | Modes of mobilizations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Discontented - 29 percent of overall sample | *Host-country:*<br>GER 44 percent<br>NL 33 percent<br>SWE 22 percent<br>*Diaspora group:*<br>ALB 100 percent<br>ARM 0 percent<br>PAL 0 percent | Views conditions and public opinion in host-land as negative and divided, concerns about discrimination and limited job and other opportunities | Well linked to a homeland, also through political parties; more likely to wish to return; reiterate that diaspora sends remittances | Calling for host-country to refrain from discrimination, for homeland to introduce profound political reforms. | Strong transnational activism |

at the community (language classes, job-training schemes) and specific youth programs in the diaspora. They establish and maintain links between citizens of the host-country, home-country, and other locations around trade, partnerships, educational initiatives, and other activities, and are often engaged with homeland advocacy through social media. They describe tight relationships with the homeland, which seems to translate to their own successful involvement. Yet they also report disagreements with homeland institutions, a sign that they cannot reach all their objectives as diaspora leaders.

Cluster 4, of the discontented diaspora entrepreneur, is the second-largest in our dataset, with nine interviews and 29 percent of all codes (Figure 2). It is overrepresented in Germany and among Albanians (9/9 respondents) (Table 2). This cluster centers on homeland relations with the diaspora. These are seen as weak when the homeland is not consistently engaged with its diaspora, but also as strong when homeland officials frequently consult diaspora leaders, appoint them to government positions, or seek their investments. Respondents indicate strong relations with homeland parties and extraterritorial electoral campaigns, as well as committed to remittances to support their families. A discontented diaspora entrepreneur views conditions and public opinion in the host-country as negative and divided, with the host-country discriminating against the diaspora and migrants more generally. Respondents stress calling upon the homeland to politically change, reform, and democratize its institutions and are discontent about the inability to temporarily or permanently return to political and economic conditions there.

Table 2 demonstrates how our methodology integrated aspects of various literatures, listing some elements of these and how they relate to specific diaspora entrepreneur profiles in context.

## From Interview Profiles to Survey Design and Comparative Causal Analysis

The early methodological work in this large-scale migration project established a common codebook informed by data in individual research projects, and later provided the foundations for a *cross-national survey* and a book featuring *comparative causal analysis*. Therefore, the above-mentioned procedures should not be seen as seeking to create causal inferences, but as using qualitative and quantitative methodologies to essentially conduct a rigorous and systematic qualitative analysis. They touched on generalizability only minimally by identifying different diaspora entrepreneur profiles depending on context, and categories that emerged from data patterns that researchers would not have been able to identify otherwise. In-depth work on generalizability followed.

The *cross-national survey* was conducted among 3,000 respondents among the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Kurdish diasporas in the UK, Sweden, and Germany. Country groups from the original pool were modified toward conflict-generated

diasporas specifically linked to the Middle East. The survey questionnaire drew heavily from the eleven codebook sections, yet it covered only aspects highlighted by the analysis as important for diaspora mobilization. For example, while there were many personal attributes in the original codebook, the survey questionnaire focused more on factors essential to the above-mentioned profiles, such as decisions to leave, experiences in transit, education status, and access to host-land institutions.

The survey respondents were "regular" diaspora members, not diaspora entrepreneurs who organize others; therefore, direct operationalization of profiles was neither intended nor possible. Yet, by using questions relevant to diaspora entrepreneurs, we were able to compare different categories of individuals within the same country-group and across groups. The sound empirical grounds enabled us to consider many factors already identified as having an impact on diaspora mobilization. Inspired by the early findings, we asked in the survey how diaspora members are being simultaneously embedded in different contexts and about the resulting political effects. Our survey explored how, for example, diaspora members are more or less integrated in their host-countries, while maintaining translocal ties with their places of origin, engaging politically in host-land and homeland elections, responding to critical events in the homeland or another country, campaigning for genocide recognition, or supporting independence movements and military interventions.

The second item that drew on this early methodological analysis is a *comparative analysis,* published in a book, "Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States" (Koinova 2021). The book developed a typology of diaspora entrepreneurs and a typological theory of how they interact with external factors—host-state foreign policies, extraterritorial outreach of homeland governments and non-state actors, and critical events—to produce different levels of contention during mobilization. Informed by 300 interviews, this work unpacked major elements originally structuring the data-driven profiles, such as personal characteristics, contextual factors, and ways of mobilization, and studied them through a comparative causal analysis using the following procedures.

First, insights about the data-driven profiles were refined by identifying and prioritizing a diaspora entrepreneur's *linkages* to different global contexts crucial to the socio-spatial theory developed in that book. The diaspora entrepreneur types of the Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved emerged. While these types broadly correspond to the contended, constrained, discontented, and enabled diaspora entrepreneurs profiles, respectively, *the types were already conceptually derived and based on a single theoretical dimension:* the relative strength/weakness of one's linkages to the host-land versus the homeland and other global locations. The Broker has strong socio-spatial linkages to both host-land and homeland (and other global locations); the Local has stronger linkages to the host-land and relatively weaker ones to the homeland (and other global locations); the Distant has relatively weaker linkages to the host-land but stronger ones to the homeland (and other global locations), and the Reserved has weak linkages to all these contexts. Hence, the types became an independent variable (IV) in the typological theory.

Furthermore, by refining insights from the original profiles, other contextual factors were singled out, such as host-land foreign policies, critical events, and other homeland-based influences. These became further IVs in the typological theory. Since the profiles also signified that diaspora entrepreneurs can act more or less contentiously, the category "contention," important theoretically, was singled out as being analytically important and a dependent variable (DV) for the typological theory. Conceptually, this category was further unpacked into three nominal values: contentious, non-contentious, and dual-pronged mobilizations. IVs and DV were then introduced in a thorough process-tracing analysis, resulting in nine causal pathways that repeated themselves across different cases of conflict-generated diasporas linked to contested states. In contrast to the profiles, which captured data-driven patterns of multi-sited embeddedness, the typological theory took the analysis further. It used causal pathways to show *when* and *how* diaspora entrepreneurs act more or less contentiously, when interacting with specific factors from their political environment, spanning different global locations.

## Concluding Remarks

This Research Note presents a novel contribution to scholarship at the intersection of migration studies and international relations in several ways. First, it presents a possible blueprint for conducting integrative analysis of dispersed theoretical streams in a relatively new research program, especially relevant for large-scale projects that must process the output of several researchers and their sub-projects simultaneously. As Horvath and Latcheva (2019) rightly observe, while migration research has used different methods—interviews, ethnographic analysis, text analyses, and surveys—very few research projects have integrated qualitative and quantitative methods as a coherent whole. Challenges emerge from migration being a transnational phenomenon, reflected in growing critiques of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2003), essentialism, and the need to consider multi-sited approaches (Beauchemin 2014; DAMR 2021; Fauser 2018).

This Research Note speaks directly to these concerns from the vantage point of one large research project. It seeks to provide a way to de-essentialize diasporas by analyzing transcripts featuring individual behaviors, and to use theoretically informed grounded coding in conjunction with quantitative methods to extract data patterns and produce meaningful analytical categories. Here diaspora entrepreneur profiles factor in multisited embeddedness, providing insights for a later generalization through cross-sectional survey research and comparative causal analysis. Other publications from this large-scale project have also benefitted from the initial systematic coding procedures. Three journal special issues have featured the importance of diaspora connectivities to different global contexts, on topics of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, sending-states' diaspora engagement, and transitional justice (Koinova 2018b, Koinova and Tsourapas 2018, Koinova and Karabegovic 2019). The early coding procedures were helpful in integrating the analysis of diaspora

mobilizations across different global contexts and in selecting which factors to potentially prioritize for the analysis. Once the sound fundamentals of a new research program are established, the analytical endeavor could then move on to new data gathering, including longitudinal data, and creating causal models that factor in how contexts condition behaviors over time (see Kupchik, Highberger and Bear 2022).

Second, we have presented an under-utilized CA method. Coupled with cluster analysis it helped to identify meaningful analytical categories. Sometimes wrongly regarded as mere exploratory and descriptive, these tools are strong in the ways they spot structuring relationships between multiple attributes, here derived from thousands of lines of interviews, and analyzed in deep detail through a rich and structured coding grid, closely informed by theory. This comprehensive set of codes is intended to make best usage of information conveyed by respondents. CA also identifies factors that could be relevant for hypothesis testing. Without such careful analytical work, further quantitative analyses could suffer from omitted variable bias, feature variables without potential causal impact, and identify wrong hypotheses to test.

On a final note, our paper could be useful for policy-makers. This paper paints a much more nuanced picture than thinking of diaspora entrepreneurs as conflict mongers or peace-makers: individual diaspora entrepreneurs are preoccupied with different aspects of homeland-oriented activism. Some are content and enabled to influence transnational politics related to their original homelands; others feel more discontent or constrained. Policy-makers need to start thinking about the variety of diaspora entrepreneurs and their specific inclinations to engage in homeland-oriented activism.

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## ORCID iD

Maria Koinova https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9280-9736

## Supplemental Material

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# Appendix 1

# CODEBOOK

## Table of contents

### Section 1: Personal Attributes

These codes address aspects of a subject's migration history and personal background (age, gender, occupation, educational history).

### Section 2: Political Activism in the Homeland

Codes involving statements concerning a respondent's political activity in their homeland, or that of their family members

### Section 3: Citizenship

Codes relating to a respondent's citizenship in the host country; naturalization in the host country; or citizenship in the country of origin

### Section 4: Migrant Integration and Citizenship – Personal experience

Codes addressing a subject's sense of integration into the host country and its society, and general feelings about integration; statements about where in the host country one has settled; responses concerning the composition of social circles and partners (whether from host-country, homeland or other origins); host-country language acquisition; and expressions of identity (host-country; homeland; hyphenated)

### Section Five: Migrant integration – Perception of Host Country Institutions

These codes involve statements about the openness of the host country's institutions to migrants, including state and non-governmental institutions; views on certain host-country foreign policies regarding their homeland; assessments of discrimination in the host country; and evaluations of host-country sentiment towards immigration

### Section Six: Host-Country Activism

This section contains codes relating to a respondent's participation in host-country institutions; participation in institutions specific to the respondent's diaspora group; and perceptions of the unity or division within the diaspora group. The section also encompasses statements about mobilizing on political issues relating to the diaspora's relationship with the host country (as opposed to affairs in the homeland – eg migrants' rights and anti-discrimination laws in the host country), or mobilization for other purposes specific to the diaspora's affairs in the host country (youth mobilization; sports clubs; community education)

## Section Seven: Access to Host-Country State and Party Institutions

These codes pertain to statements about the ability of diaspora activists to access and influence host-country institutions (parliament, the executive) and political parties; and references to the power of rival lobbying groups.

## Section Eight: Links Between Homeland Institutions and Diaspora

This section includes codes for statements about the homeland government's relations with the diaspora; homeland political parties and their activities in the diaspora; remittances; and other activism by diaspora respondents in their homeland.

## Section Nine: Events or Processes That Trigger Mobilization

These codes cover explanations about events in the homeland that caused respondents or diaspora actors to mobilize politically, such as wars, peace processes, contested elections and natural disasters.

## Section Ten: Migrant Claims for Homeland-Oriented Projects

These codes detail the various homeland-oriented causes that respondents involved themselves in, such as genocide recognition; human rights; or transitional justice; and other causes.

## Section Eleven: Modes of Diaspora Activism

This section includes codes that detail the kinds of political activism subjects engaged in during diaspora-related mobilization, divided into:

- Institutional lobbying (Lobbying at national and transnational levels);
- Grassroots activism (Boycotts, protests and strikes);
- Other activism (exchange programs, support for homeland schools and charities, engagement with homeland media; purely host-country activism);
- Non-mobilization.

## Miscellaneous

These two codes covered statements that related to travel or the administration of the interview (000), or which the coders could not assign an appropriate code to (999)

Note: Where there are codes divided into sub-codes, *only sub-codes were used during the coding process*. The main code, in these cases, mainly functions as a category. The codebook presents the instructions given to coders during the coding process. Minor editorial changes have been introduced for tone and readability between the coding and the current version of the text.

## Section One: Personal Attributes

*Codes 101a-e:* Decision to leave the homeland

Sub-codes to be used when respondents discuss why they left their homeland and moved to the host country. *Do not use* if the respondent talks about why previous generations of her or his family migrated between two places (eg, if someone's grandparents fled Turkey for Iran because of the Armenian Genocide in 1915-16).

Use one of the following sub-codes:

*Code 101a:* Decision to leave homeland: Expulsion/Ethnic cleansing

Use if respondent states that they emigrated because the homeland government, or another government, began a campaign to expel or physically destroy the respondent's ethnic group.

*Code 101b:* Decision to leave homeland: Political violence

Use if the respondent indicates that he or she left the homeland because of generalized political violence or the threat of such violence, apart from a specific campaign of ethnic cleansing.

*Code 101c:* Decision to leave homeland: Economic reasons

Use if respondent states that they emigrated to improve their economic status, or escape poverty or limited economic opportunities, or due to lack of social mobility.

*Code 101d:* Decision to leave homeland: Family reunification

Use if respondent states that they emigrate to reunite with family members who had already emigrated, or because he or she is marrying or has married a foreign national.

*Code 101e:* Decision to leave homeland: Other reasons

Use if the respondent gave a reason for leaving the homeland not stated above.

*Code 102:* Refugee status

Use if respondent mentions being awarded refugee status by host country, or by third country; mentions of being granted asylum or similar status; mentions of refugee documents.

*Code 103:* Obstacles to obtaining refugee status

Code if respondent mentions difficulty in obtaining refugee status, asylum or provisional residency (separate from citizenship).

*Code 104:* Transit via a third nation: Affirmative

Code if the respondent mentions living in a third nation between leaving the homeland and arriving and/or settling in their current host country for a significant period of time (at least six months). For example, if the respondent is a Kosovar immigrant living in Sweden, and mentions living in Germany for some years before coming to Sweden, use this code. If the respondent mentions staying in a third country, but does not say for how long, you should try to deduce if possible from the context of the interview whether the stay was for more than a few days or weeks. If this is the case, use *Code 104.*

*Code 105:* Transit within the host country: Affirmative

Use this code if the respondent mentions moving from one place of residence to another after arrival in their current host country. For example, if a respondent living in Germany says that she lived in Hamburg at first, but later moved to Frankfurt.

*Codes 106a-e:* Age

Use these sub-codes if the respondent gives his or her age, or it can be deduced from the text.

Use one of the following sub-codes:

*Code 106a:* Code if respondent age is 18-30;

*Code 106b:* Code if respondent age is 31-40;

*Code 106c:* Code if respondent age is 41-50;

*Code 106d:* Code if respondent age is 51-60;

*Code 106e:* Code if respondent age is 61 or above

*Codes 107a-b:* Sex/Gender

Use these sub-codes if respondent mentions their sex or gender identity. In some cases, this may be implicit in the text (subject mentions performing compulsory military service).

Use one of the following sub-codes:

> *Code 107a:* Code if respondent identifies as female.
>
> *Code 107b:* Code if respondent identifies as male.

*Codes 108a-b:* Education – in homeland

Use these codes if the respondent mentions being educated in his or her homeland, or if you can determine from the context of the interview whether the respondent has been educated in the homeland.

Use one of the following sub-codes:

> *Code 108a:* Code if respondent states they attended primary or secondary education in their homeland (primary school, high school, *Gymnasium,* university preparation courses, etc.). In general, use this category for the sort of education usually undertaken before age 18.
>
> *Code 108b:* Use if the respondent mentions attending university/college in the homeland.

*Code 109a-b:* Education – in host country

Use these codes if respondent mentions being educated in his or her host country, or if you can determine from the context of the interview whether the respondent has been educated in the host country.

Use one of the following sub-codes:

> *Code 109a:* Code if respondent states they attended primary or secondary education in the host country (primary school, high school, *Gymnasium,* university preparation courses, etc.). In general, use this category for the sort of education usually undertaken before age 18.
>
> *Code 109b:* Use if the respondent mentions attending university/college in the host country.

Note: A respondent may indicate education in both the home country and the host country, even in the same unit. It is possible to use both codes in one unit should this be the case.

*Codes 110a-e:* Occupation in host country

Use these codes if the respondent mentions having employment in the host country.

Use one of the following sub-codes:

*Code 110a:* Public sector employee

Use this code if the respondent is employed by a government agency, be it part of central or local government.

*Code 110b:* Private sector employee

Use this code if the respondent is an employee of a private or non-government business or entity (a private company, a charity).

*Code 110c:* Self-employed/entrepreneur

Use this code if the respondent owns his or her own business (eg a restaurant, shop) or is otherwise self-employed (as a consultant, or a freelancer).

*Code 110d:* Other paid employment

Use this code if the respondent has some other form of paid employment, whether a formal or informal job. An informal job is one, which is not officially registered with the state for tax or other purposes (for example, an unlicensed taxi driver, or a waiter paid in cash).

*Code 110*e: No paid employment

Use this code if the respondent states that he or she has no paid employment. This code includes persons who have caring responsibilities in the home; or states that he or she is on public benefits/welfare.

*Code 111:* Circular migration

Use this code if the respondent refers to himself, herself or others migrating back and forth between the homeland and the host country, or dividing their time between the two countries on a regular basis, or engaging in regular extended visits.

## Section Two: Political Activism in the Homeland

*Code 201*: Political activism in the homeland

Use this code if the respondent states that he or she was politically active in their home country, as part of an organization (like a political party) or an activity (like a protest or a strike), or if they held some sort of public office in their homeland.

*Code 202*: Family activism in the homeland

Use this code if the respondent indicates that members of their family were or are politically active in the home country, as part of an organization (like a political party) or an activity (like a protest or strike), or if they held some sort of public office in the homeland.

## Section Three: Citizenship

*Code 301:* Host land citizenship: Possession

Does the respondent possess citizenship in the host country? Note: Use only when respondent specifically mentions the legal status of citizenship, not general feelings of being or not being integrated or identifying with the host country.

*Code 302:* Host land citizenship: Non-acquisition

Did the respondent not acquire host land citizenship? Use only when respondent specifically mentions the legal status of citizenship, not general feelings of being or not being integrated or identifying with the host country.

*Code 303:* Naturalization process: Easy

Use if the respondent mentions that the process for obtaining naturalization was uncomplicated, or completed fairly quickly.

*Code 304:* Naturalization process: Difficult

Use if the respondent mentions that the process for obtaining citizenship took an extended period of time or was procedurally complicated.

*Code 305:* Fear of loss of host land citizenship

Use if respondent expresses a concern that the host country could revoke citizenship, due to political activity on his/her part, for legal or procedural reasons, or other causes.

*Code 306:* Homeland citizenship: Possession

Use if the respondent says he or she possesses citizenship in the homeland. Use only when respondent specifically mentions the legal status of citizenship, not general feelings of being or not being integrated or identifying with the home country.

*Code 307:* Homeland citizenship: Non-acquisition

Use if the respondent says he or she does not possess homeland citizenship, chose not to acquire it, or renounced it, or did not keep a dual citizenship. Use only when respondent specifically mentions the legal status of citizenship, not general feelings of being or not being integrated or identifying with the home country.

## Section Four: Migrant Integration and Activism – Personal experience

*Code 401:* Place of settlement: Prosperous area

Use when respondent mentions that he or she settled in a well-off district, neighbourhood or area. This could be urban, suburban or rural.

*Code 402:* Place of settlement: Deprived area

Use if respondent states that they settled in an impoverished or low-income area, whether inhabited by ethnic minorities or others; an area where employment is scarce; or in an area with high rates of crime.

*Code 403:* Place of settlement: Ethnic-minority area/immigrant area

Use if the respondent states that they settled in a district, neighbourhood or location dominated by members of their ethnic minority, or by ethnic minorities more generally; or if they settled in a primarily immigrant neighbourhood. Use this code regardless of the economic status of the area.

*Code 404:* General feelings of integration: High

Use if the respondent makes a generalized statement that he or she feels well integrated into the host country's society. Also use if the respondent states this in another, less direct way – for example, if he or she says they have built a successful career in the host country, or started a family there. Use this code if the respondent states that his family members also seem integrated (have good jobs, educational qualifications, and so on).

*Code 405:* General feelings of integration: Low

Use if the respondent makes a generalized statement that he or she feels poorly integrated into the host country's society. Also use if the respondent states this in another, less direct way – that they are not optimistic about feeling at home in the host country, that they are unwilling to start a family, or that they cannot find a stable housing situation. Also use this code if the respondent indicates that family members are not well integrated (have trouble finding employment or accessing education).

*Code 406:* Aspiration: Affirmative

Respondent indicates that he or she, his or her family, or other diaspora members feel that they *could* integrate or aspire to success in the host country in the future. Whereas 304 and 305 deal with how integrated they feel now, 306 and 307 are about whether they think they can integrate in the future.

*Code 407:* Aspiration: Negative

Respondent indicates that he or she, his or her family, or other diaspora members feel that they *could not* integrate or aspire to success in the host country in the future.

Whereas 304 and 305 deal with how integrated they feel now, 306 and 307 are about whether they think they can integrate in the future.

*Code 408*: Composition of close circle of friends: Mostly from host country

Use when respondent states that the majority of the respondent's close friends comes from the host country.

*Code 409*: Composition of close circle of friends: Mostly from homeland/ homeland ethnic group

Use when respondent states that the majority of the respondent's close friends come from the homeland, or the predominant ethnic groups/groups of the homeland (if these persons were members of that ethnic group, but born abroad – eg, "My friends are mostly Armenians from Sweden.").

*Code 410*: Composition of close circle of friends: From both homeland and host land ethnic groups, or from multiple ethnic groups

Use when respondent states that close circle of friends comes from multiple ethnic groups, with no group clearly comprising the majority of the circle.

*Code 411:* Marriage to host country national/Mixed marriage

Use this code if the respondent mentions having a spouse who is a native of the host country, or a spouse who is from a nation that is neither the host country nor the homeland. This includes former or deceased spouses.

*Code 412:* Marriage to homeland national/member of homeland ethnic group

Use this code if the respondent mentions having a spouse who is a homeland national, or from the respondent's own ethnic group. This includes former or deceased spouses.

*Code 413*: Host country language: High degree of fluency

Use if respondent indicates he/she speaks the language of the host country well, fluently, and/or as a first language, or this can be deduced from the text.

*Code 414*: Host country language: Low degree of fluency/ no language knowledge

Use if respondent indicates that he/she does not speak the language of the host country well, or at all, or this can be deduced from the text.

*Code 415*: Homeland language/languages: High degree of fluency

Statement that the respondent speaks the main, or one of the main, native or official languages of the homeland well, fluently, or as a first language. This may be his or her ethnic group's language (eg Armenian), or it may be another language used in the homeland which is perhaps the official language or a language used by the educated (eg Russian, Turkish).

*Code 416:* Homeland language/languages: Low degree of fluency/ no language knowledge

Respondent indicates poor grasp of the main, or any of the main, native or official languages of the homeland, or does not speak it at all.

*Code 417:* Identity – primarily host country

Use if respondent indicates that they primarily identify as a national of the host country.

*Code 418:* Identity – primarily homeland or with homeland citizenship

Use if respondent indicates that they primarily identify as a national of the homeland.

*Code 419:* Identity – hyphenated

Use if respondent indicates that they identify as part of both host country and homeland national communities, or specifically mention possessing a hyphenated identity (eg Swedish-Albanian)

## Section Five: Migrant Integration – Perception of Host Country Institutions

**The key thing to keep in mind here is that Section Five is about the role of the host country's institutions in the integration process. If the respondent is saying, "I feel/don't feel integrated," use codes from Section Four. If the respondent is talking about *who helped him/her* feel or not feel integrated, use Section Five**

*Code 501*: Perceptions of role of host country governmental institutions: Helpful

Use if respondent mentions the positive role of the host country's state institutions in helping the respondent, or immigrants from his or her diaspora group, integrate into the host society. Examples may include assistance in setting up community organizations; help with housing, sports programmes or youth activities.

*Code 502*: Perceptions of role of host country governmental institutions: Hindering

Use if respondent mentions the negative role of the host country's state institutions in helping the respondent, or immigrants from his or her diaspora group, integrate into the host society. Examples may include refusal to grant funds for community organization; unsuitable housing or shelter assignments.

*Code 503*: Perceptions of role of host country governmental institutions: Neutral

Respondent indicates that the host country's state institutions neither helped nor hindered integration.

*Code 504:* Does host country government support homeland independence: Affirmative

Use this code if the respondent states that the government of the host country is favourable to the independence, sovereignty or autonomy of the homeland.

*Code 505:* Does host country government support homeland independence: Negative

Use this code if the respondent states that the government of the host country is not favourable towards or opposed to the independence, sovereignty or autonomy of the homeland.

*Code 506:* Host country military engagement in homeland

Use if respondent mentions that the host country is involved in military operations in the diaspora's homeland, either in an active role [deployment of troops, aircraft, naval vessels, drones etc] or passive role [deployment of auxiliaries, monetary support]

*Code 507:* Host country engagement in development activity in the homeland

Use if respondent mentions that the host country participates in aid, development programmes or other economic activities in the respondent's homeland.

*Code 508*: Perceptions of role of host country non-governmental institutions: Helpful

Use if respondent mentions the positive role of the host country's non-governmental institutions (charities, businesses, NGOs) in helping the respondent, or immigrants from his or her diaspora group, integrate into the host society. Examples may include advice and/or funding for community organizations; assistance with housing; legal aid services; or language classes.

*Code 509*: Perceptions of role of host country non-governmental institutions: Hindering

Use if respondent mentions the negative role of the host country's non-governmental institutions (charities, businesses, NGOs) in helping the respondent, or immigrants from his or her diaspora group, integrate into the host society.

*Code 510:* Perceptions of role of host country non-governmental institutions: Neutral

Respondent states that host country non-governmental institutions (charities, businesses, NGOs) have neither helped nor hindered integration.

*Code 511:* Perceptions of social openness/absence of discrimination

Code if the respondent claims that they feel that the host society is open to immigrants; that the host society does not discriminate against immigrants or his or her specific immigrants group in employment, housing or other services; or says that it is possible to access host-country social networks.

*Code 512:* Perceptions that society is closed/presence of social discrimination

Code if the respondent states that they feel that the host society discriminates against their group, or migrant groups generally; that the host society denies them access to employment and services on ethnic/racial/origin grounds; that the host society does not permit outsiders or immigrants to access social networks; or if the respondent has experienced overt racist acts (name-calling, bullying, physical attacks).

*Code 513:* Perceptions of public/media opinion on immigration: More positive than negative

Respondent mentions that public opinion towards immigration, either by his or her specific group or in general, is *more positive than negative*. Also use this code if the respondent mentions that host land media tend to have a more positive than negative view of immigration.

*Code 514:* Perceptions of public/media opinion on immigration: More negative than positive

Respondent mentions that public opinion towards immigration, either by his or her specific group or in general, is *more negative than positive*. Also use this code if the respondent mentions that host land media tend to have a more negative than Affirmative view of immigration.

*Code 515:* Perceptions of public opinion on immigration: Equally divided

Respondent mentions that public opinion towards immigration, either by his or her specific group or in general tends to be *equally divided between positive and negative opinions*. Also use this code if the respondent mentions that host land media tend to be equally divided between positive and negative opinions of immigration.

*Code 516:* Other perceptions of host country institutions: Positive

Use if respondent makes comments about the host country's institutions that suggest they played a positive role in integration or are open to immigrants generally, but which cannot be otherwise classified.

*Code 517:* Other perceptions of host country institutions: Negative

Use if respondent makes comments about the host country's institutions that suggest they played a negative role in integration or are closed to immigrants generally, but which cannot be otherwise classified.

## Section Six: Host-Country Activism

This domain covers occasions when diaspora members mobilize on questions relating to their position in the host country, as opposed to trying to affect conditions in their homelands. It also includes measures of how active diaspora members are in associational life in their host country.

*Code 601:* Respondent membership in host country associations or public life: Affirmative

Use if respondent mentions being a member of host country associations (trade unions, political parties, charitable associations). Also use code if respondent mentions regular participation in host country elections. *Only use for discussions of membership; the respondent's political activities will be separately coded*.

*Code 602:* Respondent membership in host country associations of public life: Negative

Use if respondent mentions not being a member of host country civil society organizations, and/or is not an active participant in host country elections.

*Code 603:* Domestic political participation

Use if the respondent talks about organising political debates, encouraging voting and voter registration, or other activities designed to involve diaspora members in domestic politics or civic life more generally, without making a specific claim or trying to raise awareness of diaspora issues. This is a separate matter from *Code 601,* which is about simply being a member of a host-country political institution. Use *601* if the respondent says he or she is a member of the Labour Party; use *603* if the respondent says he or she is encouraging other Palestinians in London, for example, to register to vote.

*Code 604*: Respondent membership specifically in migrant associations: Affirmative

Respondent indicates that he/she is a member of one or more immigrant institutions. Examples may include permanent membership in immigrant political or social organization; regular attendance at a religious institution strongly associated with the diaspora (eg, the Armenian Apostolic Church); or participation in diaspora media organizations. This is distinct from *Code 601* – if the respondent says they are a member of the Liberal Democrats, use *601.* If they say they are a member of an organization of friends with Palestine, for example, use *604.*

*Code 605:* Respondent membership specifically in migrant associations: Negative

Respondent indicates that he/she is not a member of immigrant institutions, possesses little interest in them, or is dismissive towards them.

*Code 606:* Perception of diaspora community: United

The respondent describes the migrant community's groups, institutions or collective bodies as unified, or as not being internally divided by conflicts (of whatever kind), well-organised, well-funded and able to act effectively together.

*Code 607:* Perception of diaspora community: Divided

Use if respondent describes migrant associations or the migrant community in general as being divided or disunited, due to factional, partisan, ethnic, religious or other difference.

*Code 608*: Mobilization for migrant legal rights and status

Use if respondent discusses the diaspora mobilising to defend the legal status of migrants in the host country, or to improve that status. This can include activities to oppose deportation or return of migrants; organising to demand more secure legal status in the host country for migrants; providing legal advice on immigration; or for other matters related to immigration laws and the legal status of non-citizen residents. Also use if the respondent is mobilizing for migrant rights more generally, without specifying a host country or referring to migrants in multiple host countries.

*Code 609:* Anti-discrimination measures or initiatives

Use code if the respondent talks about the diaspora calling for stronger laws prohibiting discrimination against minorities in the host country (regardless of their migration status), or better enforcement of these laws, or if the diaspora is involved in broader campaigns against racism and discrimination.

*Code 610:* Women's rights and participation

Use if the respondent describes diaspora activities related to encouraging women's equality and/or equal participation in the host-country's society, including the creation of specific women's or feminist groups, or efforts to encourage women to seek further education and/or employment.

*Code 611:* Public awareness

Use this code if the respondent mentions activities designed to increase awareness about the homeland and its people in a general sense, but which does not advance any specific political claim. (Do not use for activities related to genocide commemoration, which is dealt with by Code 1001).

*Code 612:* Community education

Use if respondent talks about diaspora educational activities aimed at the diaspora community itself (language classes, job-training schemes).

*Code 613:* Cultural activities

Use if the respondent mentions that the diaspora participates in cultural activities (dance troupes, theatre).

*Code 614:* Youth and sports

Use if the respondent says that the diaspora has specific youth programmes or sports clubs.

*Code 615:* Charitable activities

Use if the respondent talks about the diaspora's charitable activities in the host country, including material (not legal) relief for other migrants.

*Code 616:* Activities with other diaspora groups in the host country

Use if the respondent describes the diaspora cooperating with other diaspora groups or immigrant groups for activities in the host country. For example, use this if a Kurdish person in the Netherlands talks about holding a football match with an Albanian team. Do not use if the diaspora groups are cooperating for political activities relating to their homelands. Note: this is covered by Code 1101, because it is part of the dependent variable.

*Code 617:* Other activities

Use this code when the respondent mentions mobilizing on any other issue relating to the diaspora's place in the host country that is not listed above (as opposed to conditions in the homeland).

## Section Seven: Access to Host-Country State and Party Institutions

Note: Respondents may also talk about mobilizing at the European level. For this project, mobilization across national boundaries is part of the dependent variable (levels of mobilization), which is measured in Section Eleven. So if the respondents mention EU institutions, use Code 1101.)

*Code 701:* Respondent/diaspora access to host-country parliament: Broad

Use if respondent states that the host-country's parliament and its members are accessible to diaspora activists (open to meetings; willing to work on legislation, motions, question to ministers; MPs will attend diaspora events). If the state under discussion has a two-house legislature, code for mentions of *either* chamber.

*Code 702:* Respondent/diaspora access to host-country parliament: Restricted

Use if respondent states that the host country's parliament and its members are not accessible to diaspora activists. If the state under discussion has a two-house legislature, code for mentions of *either* chamber.

*Code 703:* Respondent/diaspora access to executive/ministers: Broad

Use if respondent states that the host country's executive (the cabinet, individual ministers, or ministries/departments of government) are accessible to diaspora activists (open to meetings; willing to work together on legislation, aid programmes; ministers willing to attend diaspora events).

*Code 704:* Respondent/diaspora access to executive/ministers: Restricted

Use if respondent states that the host country's executive is not accessible to diaspora activism.

*Code 705:* Respondent/diaspora access to political parties: Broad

Use if respondent mentions of a political party's willingness to engage diaspora activism/lobbying, or the willingness of political parties in general to do so (hold meetings, work on legislation, attend events).

*Code 706:* Respondent/diaspora access to political parties: Restricted

Use if respondent discusses political party's lack of interest or refusal to engage diaspora activism/lobbying, or of such lack of interest or refusal on the part of political parties in general.

*Code 707:* General access to host country institutions/host country sympathy: Broad

Use if respondent makes general statements about being able to access or influence the government, media and other public institutions of the host country, or express a

belief that the host country is sympathetic to the diaspora's political causes in a generic sense.

*Code 708:* General access to host country institutions/host country sympathy: Restricted

Use if respondent makes general statements about being unable to access or influence the government, media and other public institutions of the host country, or express a belief that the host country is unsympathetic towards the diaspora's political causes in a generic sense.

*Code 709:* Rival lobbying groups: Strong

Use where respondent states that a rival lobbying group operates in the host country, and uses its influence to block the goals of diaspora activists [eg Turkish lobbies vs. Armenian, Israeli lobbies vs. Palestinian].

*Code 710:* Rival lobbying groups: Weak

Use where respondent states that rival lobbying group operates in the host country, but is unable to use its influence to block the goals of diaspora activists.

## Section Eight: Links Between Homeland Institutions and Diaspora

Note: This domain is about homeland relations with the diaspora, not homeland relations with the government of the host country. If the host country opposes the independence of, say, Palestine, that's dealt with under Code 405, not Code 802.

*Code 801:* Homeland government engagement with diaspora: Strong

Use where respondent mentions that the homeland's government is engaged with the diaspora and its affairs. This can include mentions that homeland government officials have frequent meetings with diaspora leaders, or consult them often; that the homeland government seeks formal ties to diaspora organizations; appoints people from the diaspora to government bodies; or actively seeks investment from the diaspora.

*Code 802:* Homeland government engagement with diaspora: Weak

Use where respondent mentions that homeland is not consistently and intensively engaged with diaspora and its affairs, does not reach out to diaspora figures, or does not seek investment in the diaspora.

*Code 803:* Homeland government engagement with diaspora: Conflictual

Use where respondent mentions state that the homeland government and diaspora groups/activists clash or disagree over homeland policy, foreign policy, tactics, strategy or values.

(*Do not use* for mentions of the homeland government having a conflictual relationship with the *host country's government*, or for disputes over independence and/or diplomatic recognition. This code is for when the homeland government doesn't get along with its own expatriates, not another government).

*Code 804:* Homeland political party activity in diaspora: Strong

Use where respondent states that homeland political parties maintain organizations/branches in the diaspora, or if they engage in electoral campaigns in the diaspora, and seek votes from overseas voters. Also use if political parties appoint officers or candidates from the diaspora; seek funding or support from the diaspora; or are influential in the diaspora.

*Code 805:* Homeland political party activity in diaspora: Weak

Use where respondent states that homeland political parties do not consistently or intensively organize in diaspora; campaign in the diaspora; or are otherwise active in the diaspora.

*Code 806:* Sending remittances: Strong

Respondent mentions that the diaspora consistently sends remittances to the homeland, and/or sends large remittances to the homeland, or that these remittances are important to the homeland's economy or society.

*Code 807:* Sending remittances: Weak

Respondent mentions that the diaspora does not consistently send remittances to the homeland, or that these remittances are not very large or important to the home country.

*Code 808:* Links with homeland NGOs or charities

Use when respondents mention having links with civil society groups, NGOs or charities in the homeland, or activities they conduct. Also use if they mention any of these homeland-based groups seeking out links in the diaspora.

*Code 809:* Other relations with homeland

Use this code when the respondent mentions any other relationships with institutions in the homeland not falling under another category, whether formal or informal.

## Section Nine: Events or Processes That Trigger Mobilization

*Code 901:* Contested or stolen elections

Respondent mentions diasporas mobilizing because of a competitive election in the home state, or because of an election in the home state where the incumbent government has rigged, falsified or annulled the elections, or otherwise degenerated the electoral process, and in doing so has prompted diaspora mobilization.

*Code 902:* Regime change

Incidences when diasporas mobilize because of the sudden fall of a homeland government or regime due to domestic insurrection, uprising or coup d'etat not related to an electoral process.

*Code 903:* War

Mentions of diaspora mobilization because the homeland has been invaded by another state; has entered into a military conflict with another state, or is involved in a civil war.

*Code 904:* Peace processes: Support

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization relating to calls in favour of peace talks; support for ongoing peace negotiations; the ratification of peace treaties or settlements; and the implementation of peace deals.

*Code 905:* Peace processes: Oppose

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization to oppose proposed or ongoing peace talks; the ratification of peace settlements or treaties; or the implementation of peace deals.

*Code 906:* Transitional justice: Support

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization in support of post-war judicial proceedings, or quasi-judicial proceedings (such as truth and reconciliation commissions) designed to address criminal acts committed during a previous conflict. Examples might include mobilization to support the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Court.

*Code 907:* Transitional justice: Oppose

Use this code if respondent mentions of mobilization to oppose post-war judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings designed to address criminal acts committed during a previous conflict.

*Code 908:* Anniversaries

Use this code if respondent refers to mobilization on the occasion of an anniversary of historical, political and/or commemorative significance to the national community (Armenian Genocide memorial day; Independence days).

*Code 909:* Policy controversies

Respondent refers to diaspora activity concerning the proposal, passage or implementation of laws or other policy instruments in the homeland (laws relating to the rights of women, tax laws, etc).

*Code 910:* Disaster relief

Respondent mentions that the diaspora is engaged in activities to support victims of a disaster – whether natural or man-made – in the homeland.

*Code 911:* Other issues

Use this code if the respondent mentions another issue that motivated or triggered their activism, but which is not listed above.

## Section Ten: Migrant Claims for Homeland-Oriented Projects

These codes all relate to activism on behalf of the homeland, either to change the policies of the homeland government, or the foreign policies of the host land government towards the host country. Do not use for activities intended to influence the domestic policies of the host country (which are covered by Section Six), or which are meant to raise public awareness without making any specific claims (code 608).

*Code 1001*: Genocide recognition (by any government)

Respondent mentions that the diaspora group lobbies on the issue of recognition of past genocides in the homeland, or which have afflicted the diaspora group in the past. Note: Use the respondent's definition of what event or events constituted "genocide."

*Code 1002*: Independence

Respondent mentions that the diaspora group lobbies in favour of independence for the homeland, whether in a legal sense or an effective sense (if the homeland is legally independent but a foreign power has troops on its soil); or for recognition of that independence by the host country government. (Note: This code describes the diaspora's calls for independence. If the respondent is talking about whether the government is in favour or opposed, use Codes 504 or 505).

*Code 1003*: Political and institutional reform in the homeland

Use when respondent mentions diaspora activism in the host country calling on the homeland to enact political reforms that change, reform, clean up or democratise its institutions (the constitution, legislature, elections, courts, etc.). This code refers specifically to changes in homeland institutions, not to the rights of individual homeland citizens (for which there are other codes).

This code can refer to calls that the host country government pressure the homeland to do these things, or direct appeals to the homeland government from the host country.

*Code 1004*: Human rights

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization in the host country calling for the homeland to better protect internationally recognized human rights and civil liberties, without reference to a specific subgroup of citizens (freedom of speech; freedom from arbitrary arrest; freedom of movement).

This code can refer to calls that the host country government pressure the homeland to do these things, or direct appeals to the homeland government from the host country

*Code 1005*: Women's rights, women's empowerment and gender equality

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization in the host country calling for it to encourage or pressure the homeland to better protect women's rights, encourage

gender and sex equality in public policy and national life, or to empower women legally, economically, politically and socially.

This code can refer to calls that the host country government pressure the homeland to do these things, or direct appeals to the homeland government from the host country.

*Code 1006*: Ethnic, linguistic or religious discrimination

Use when respondent mentions diaspora mobilization in the host country calling for the homeland to protect the rights of specific ethnic groups, national groups, linguistic groups or religious groups, through social, legal, political or economic reform. These will usually – but not always – be minority populations in the homeland.

This code can refer to calls that the host country government pressure the homeland to do these things, or direct appeals to the homeland government from the host country.

*Code 1007:* Religious mobilization

Use when respondent mentions that religious organizations are mobilising the diaspora to pursue goals relating to the homeland, or for the advancement of religious groups, bodies, principles or goals in the homeland . You may use *1007* in conjunction with another code if a respondent mentions a religious organization mobilizing in a general sense on homeland issues, or on issues that mix religious and other claims (for example, when Hamas, an Islamic organization, or its allies advocate Palestinian independence).

*Code 1008*: Diaspora mobilization to obtain host-country aid and development funding

Use if respondent discusses diaspora mobilization to obtain aid or international development funds for causes in the homeland. Do not use if the diaspora is providing the funds itself – this will be covered by *Code 1106.*

*Code 1009*: Obstacles to return

Use this code if the respondent refers to mobilizing because they wish to return, either temporarily or permanently, to their homeland but are unable to do so due to political conditions there.

*Code 1010*: Property interests and restitution

Use this code if the respondent mentions diaspora mobilization to reclaim property from the homeland, seek damages from the homeland government for some loss, or seek the restitution of a business or enterprise.

*Code 1011*: Preservation

Use this code when the respondent mentions the diaspora calling for the preservation of places in the homeland that possess cultural or historical value, or to protect the homeland's natural environment.

*Code 1012:* Other issues

Use this code when the respondent mentions that the diaspora has mobilized on any issues not mentioned above.

## Section Eleven: Modes of Diaspora Activism

### Institutional lobbying

*Code 1101:* Lobbying host-country institutions and media

Use this code when the respondent discusses, for the purposes of advancing a homeland-oriented claim:

- Meeting with host-country political figures in the executive or legislative branches;
- Actively circulating petitions in the host country;
- Engaging with host-country media on political issues.

*Code 1102* – Lobbying transnational institutions and building transnational coalitions

Use this sub-code when respondents discuss lobbying international, transnational or intergovernmental bodies, for the purposes of advancing a homeland-oriented claim, including:

- Activism at the European institutional level;
- Activism directed towards international organizations such as the UN;
- Building coalitions with activists or groups in other countries for the purpose of lobbying at transnational level, or lobbying multiple national governments. These partners may be members of the diaspora in different countries, or members of other diasporas, or non-diaspora actors.

### Grassroots activism

*Code 1103* – Boycotts

Use when activists discuss boycotts, divestment or sanctions, either aimed at:

- A third-country government (by host country or other third parties) against a third country that is somehow perceived hostile to the homeland or its interests. The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign (BDS) would be an example of this.
- Boycotts of or sanctions against the homeland's own government. This is distinct from asking for a boycott of a third party - an example might be South African exiles who called for sanctions against the apartheid regime.

*Code 1104* – Protests and strikes

Use when activists discuss engaging in physical protests, demonstrations, vigils or performance art (eg flashmobs) relating to political claims towards the homeland. Also use when activists discuss striking, in the sense of withholding labour, for the purpose of advancing homeland claims. Do not use for non-physical protests (eg Facebook pages, online petitions), or for protests relating only to host-country issues.

*Code 1104a* – Transnational protests and strikes

Use when activists discuss organizing, or engaging in, protests in multiple countries (as opposed to transnational organizing for lobbying), or forming coalitions with people in other countries to mount such protests. These partners may be members of the diaspora in different countries, or members of other diasporas, or non-diaspora actors.

If the respondent says there were protests in the host country *and* third countries, use *1104a* rather than *1104.*

**Other activism**

*Code 1105* – International exchange with homeland

Use when activists discuss activities designed to encourage links between the peoples or economies of the homeland and the host country:

- Organizing partnerships between host country organizations and similar organizations in the homeland (partnership agreements, town twinning/sister cities);
- Sponsoring travel for host-country nationals in the home country (eg Operation Birthright in the Jewish diaspora), or otherwise trying to forge links between host-country nationals and the homeland;
- Encouraging trade with the homeland

*Code 1106* – Other homeland activism

Use when activists discuss other modes or causes for activism

- Diaspora mobilization to support social services or charities;
- Diaspora mobilization to support schools;
- Diaspora engagement with homeland media

*Code 1107* – Activism on the Internet or social media

Use when the respondent discusses advocating for the homeland on self-published Internet media – blogs, Facebook, Twitter, et cetera. This is distinct from writing for mass media, which are formal institutions.

*Code 1108* – Activism on host-country issues

Use when diaspora individuals make claims for their own wellbeing in the host state without regard to their original homeland.

Use this code even if the diaspora individuals are mobilizing transnationally; the key thing is that they are not mobilizing for homeland claims. For example, use *Code 1101* if Albanians lobby the EU to recognize Kosovo, but *Code 1108* if they lobby for EU funding of diaspora studies programmes in Swedish universities.

*Code 1109* – No diaspora mobilization.

## *Miscellaneous*

*Code 000:* Discussions about meetings, introductions, travel

Use if the unit primarily deals with discussions between the interviewer and respondent about setting up meetings, introducing one actor to a third person, or other manners mainly related to the administration of the project, as opposed to substantive discussions about integration or activism.

*Code 999:* Substantive discussions that do not fit other codes

Apply if the unit deals with a discussion or statement about migration, activism, institutions, foreign policy or other substantive issues, but does not fit under any other code. *Avoid using this code if possible: If you can make an argument that one code fits best, or at least somewhat better than other possible codes, use that code and explain your decision in the comments.*

## Appendix 2

### Outputs from a Variety of Tested Parameters

A variety of parameters have been tested within the hierarchical clustering approach using Euclidean distances and Ward's agglomeration algorithm, described in footnote 5 above. Statistical indicators such as those below were used to tailor the outputs. However, our methodological decisions were not only based on statistical indicators, but also on the meaningfulness of the solutions, that is, our ability to interpret the clusters in view of the theory, which is not reflected in statistics.

**Quality indicators**

| Criteria | 3 clusters | 4 clusters | 5 clusters | 6 clusters | 7 clusters | 8 clusters |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intra-cluster inertia | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
| Inter-cluster inertia | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 |
| Explained inertia (%) | 10.6 | 15.1 | 19.5 | 23.7 | 27.8 | 31.4 |
| Calinski-Harabasz (pseudo F) criterion | 149.1 | 148.4 | 151.8 | 156.1 | 160.6 | 164.0 |
| Davies-Bouldin's index | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 |

**Graphics**