Roessler, Johannes (2024) Thought insertion and the ontology of thinking. In: López-Silva, Pablo and McClelland, Tom, (eds.) Intruders in The Mind: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Thought Insertion. Oxford University Press.

PDF WRAP-thought-insertion-ontology-thinking-Roessler-2024.pdf - Accepted Version Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (1640Kb)

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

On what I will call the No Subject view, there is a sense in which one may be aware of a thought, conceived as an event in one's stream of consciousness, without being aware of oneself thinking something. Philosophical work on the delusion of thought insertion is one of the areas in which the No Subject view has been highly influential: the view has framed what, in the philosophy of mind, has become the standard interpretation of the delusion. Here I want to present a challenge to the No Subject view, developing from reflection on the ontology of thinking. I will also consider how, if the standard interpretation fails, we are to understand thought insertion. In particular, I will suggest that we should question the widespread assumption that understanding the delusion has to be a matter of making sense of it.

Item Type:	Book Item
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Book Title:	Intruders in The Mind: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Thought Insertion
Editor:	López-Silva, Pablo and McClelland, Tom
Official Date:	2024
Dates:	Date Event 2024 Available 2023 Accepted
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Forthcoming
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit:	23 June 2023

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item