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Selecting a winner with external referees
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Bloch, Francis, Dutta, Bhaskar and Dziubinski, Marcin (2023) Selecting a winner with external referees. Economic Theory, 211 . 105687. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687 ISSN 0938-2259.
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687
Abstract
We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and re- ceives outside signals (like the report of external referees). We show that there is a gap between the optimal Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism and the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanism. In the optimal BIC mechanism, the planner can leverage the outside signal to elicit information about agents' types. BIC mechanisms are lexicographic mechanisms, where the planner rst shortlists agents who receive high reports from the referees and then uses agents' reports to break ties among agents in the shortlist. We compare the \self-evaluation" mech- anism with a \peer evaluation" mechanism where agents evaluate other agents, and show that for the same signal precision, the self- evaluation mechanism outperforms the peer evaluation mechanism. We show that op- timal Ex Post Incentive Compatible (EPIC) mechanisms give the planner an intermediate value between the optimal DSIC and BIC mechanisms.
Item Type: | Journal Article | |||||||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HA Statistics H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | |||||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Decision making -- Mathematical models, Decision making -- Econometric models, Ranking and selection (Statistics), Microeconomics | |||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Economic Theory | |||||||||
Publisher: | Springer | |||||||||
ISSN: | 0938-2259 | |||||||||
Official Date: | July 2023 | |||||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 211 | |||||||||
Article Number: | 105687 | |||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687 | |||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | |||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | |||||||||
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): | This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687 | |||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | |||||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 23 June 2023 | |||||||||
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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