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# Fearful loyalty: The strategic deployment of emotion by the Cuban proslavery elite, 1830–1850

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## ABSTRACT

This article presents the expression of colonial loyalty in nineteenth century Cuba as a tool mobilised by otherwise disenfranchised enslaving elites seeking to shape the island's governance. Combined with the judicious expression of fear, this paper suggests that "fearful loyalty" was deployed to influence the Spanish colonial government on the subject of slavery. Contemporary periodicals from the USA, examined here, presented Cuban loyalty as effeminate and baffling. Employing the methodology of History of Emotions to analyse private correspondence between Cuban enslavers, Captain Generals in Cuba, and the metropolitan government in Spain, this study rebuts that outsider impression. Adding depth to our understanding of Atlantic History, this article argues that fearful loyalty was a creolised emotional protocol utilised by enslavers and pro-slave trade individuals when attempting to manipulate the Crown to follow the course of action they considered most advantageous to their interests regarding slavery, censorship, and abolition.

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Providing a foreboding forecast of the consequences that would arise in Cuba should open abolitionist debate continue in Spain, the *Junta de Fomento y Agricultura* of the island offered a barefaced verdict to the metropolitan *Regencia Provisional Del Reino Relacionada con la Abolición de la Esclavitud*. A sensible capitalist, they reasoned, would sooner invest their funds in any other location than Cuba, which seemed to be approaching the same fate as Jamaica (whose productivity potential had been hamstrung by emancipation).<sup>1</sup> In light of these economic preoccupations, it would take a man of some intrepidity to establish a plantation in Cuba, the *Junta* continued, when publications in Spain spoke of nothing but abolition:

The very idea that in Madrid the discussion of such a dangerous question is tolerated (and then circulated profoundly here) [...] has been sufficient in introducing distrust and anxiety among the capitalists and plantation owners concerning the future fortune of the island, for they think, with good reason, that the time has come to save the parts they still can of their fortune, moving it to countries that offer more stability and protection.

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On the surface, such correspondence reads like an earnest and candid formal report. In fact, there was much more beneath the surface. In that same document, the *Junta* intentionally linked the issue under consideration – weak censorship – to the eventuality most dreaded by Spain. “It is worthy of the consideration of the regency’s profound penetration,” the council reasoned, that should abolitionist leaflets continue to arrive from Madrid, “there is no opinion or feeling in this island that would disagree with the common vote that [Cuba] would be irredeemably lost for the metropole.” For this *Junta*, which evocatively conjured images of the island’s inhabitants “losing their properties, endangering their lives and being left subordinate to the power of the blacks,” fear was the ideal tool for unofficially, but intentionally, lobbying the metropole for stricter censorship laws and controls on documents entering the island.<sup>2</sup> This communication typifies the emotional tone adopted by elite enslavers who wrote to the metropole in order to make explicit the issues they deemed to be sources of immense threat to the future prosperity of the island, and the survival of its White inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> These proslavery actors were deploying an emotion – fear – in the service of self-interest.

I argue that, between 1830 and 1850, when elite White enslavers lacked any official political leverage, they mobilised a stylised fearful rhetoric when writing to the metropolitan government and colonial officials in Cuba in order to motivate and influence defensive imperial action. Since these enslavers expressed their fears in such explicit connection to their stipulated need for metropolitan intervention, I have termed this emotional and affective style *fearful loyalty*.

This article will illustrate how that rhetoric – which was loyal, emotional, and gendered – was used by enslavers seeking to influence the metropolitan course for dealing with three themes. First, British interference in Cuban slavery. Second, the growing number of *emancipados* (Africans nominally freed in Cuba after the discovery of their illegal entrance into the island as enslaved people following the ratification of two anti-slave trade treaties between Spain and Britain). Third, abolitionist publications in Spain that made their way to Cuba.

I will present this style as a *creolised emotional protocol* when used by Cuban Creoles born on the island. I will also explore the tendency of the island’s Peninsular Captain Generals, as well as Peninsular Spaniards invested in the illicit slave trade, to use that same strategic emotional style. The latter two groups were not necessarily in the process of becoming creolised, but, since they, too, evidently saw the value in using fearful rhetoric as a method of influencing the colonial government to suit their interests, I approach this as a creolised style that was adopted by those who shared the same or similar goals as the Creoles.

María Dolores Pérez Murillo establishes that proslavery capitalists in Cuba were appealing to “a false sentimentalism as the moral base of slavery” when they wrote of their fear that inflammatory abolitionist tracts would be the factor that would cause the fatal rupture between colony and metropole.<sup>4</sup> Similarly, colonial attempts to goad and influence Spain with themes of loyalty and disloyalty have been studied in the context of Cuba’s possible mid-century annexation to the USA. Although the prospect of annexation was entertained by the wealthiest enslavers of the island, Gabriela Cruz-Taura has shown that there was acute awareness among this group that the greatest utility of annexation was as a tool of manipulation against the colonial government. Cruz-Taura argues that Cuban elites aimed “the annexationist dagger” towards Spain’s heart, corroborating Manuel Moreno Fraginals’ position that annexation was used by sugar barons within the context of

seeking reform, not, as Cruz-Taura paraphrases, because they were realistically considering it as an option for Cuba, but because it was the ideal threat reformists could use when seeking to obtain concessions from Spain with regard to slavery.<sup>5</sup>

This article is written in full accordance with these scholars. It adds, however, that Cuban enslavers had several more rhetorical “daggers” up their sleeves, carefully disguised as loyal, and fearful, pleadings for protection. Extending these studies surrounding colonial strategies of gaining informal, unofficial leverage over the metropole, it will explore the method of slaveowners who shrewdly touted their loyalty in a bid to shape the future of slavery according to their preferences, in a convergence of allegiance and self-interest best surmised by José A. Piqueras’ phrase: “*lealtad interesada*,” or: self-interested loyalty.<sup>6</sup> David Sartorius has illuminated the political use of loyalty for Cubans of colour who negotiated social mobility and political inclusion by expressing, and demonstrating, loyalty to Spain. Sartorius’ discussion characterises the circumstance as one in which loyalty as an “affective posture” provided an opportunity for Cubans of colour to have their voices heard within the Spanish empire.<sup>7</sup> This article extends Sartorius’ framework to postulate that the strategic approach of utilising loyalty for personal gain was put to work by the elite slaveowning Whites of the island as well.

Elite Cuban enslavers (a term that will henceforth be used to refer both to Cuban Creoles and Peninsular-born Spanish emigres who kept people enslaved on the island) found strategic advantage in emphasising Cuba’s dependent status on Spain. Moreover, by sending beseeching communications to metropolitan officials that intentionally amplified the terror afflicting White Cubans and catalogued the numerous dangers inundating the island from within and outside its borders, they sought to awaken and manipulate dread on an imperial scale: Spain’s fear of losing Cuba.

Building upon Sara Ahmed’s theoretical foundation surrounding “the affective politics of fear,” which considers the deployment of fear to be an “affective economy” mobilised by established governments seeking to guarantee and conserve their power, this article will posit that disenfranchised enslavers also sought to find currency in that affective economy, seeking to exert power and influence within a framework of political subordination.<sup>8</sup> Bringing the History of Slavery into dialogue with the History of the Emotions, this article will respond to Joanna Bourke’s crucial rallying call that urges each historian to question: “what is fear *doing*?”<sup>9</sup> In accordance with Bourke, my argument will illustrate that verbalised emotions should not be regarded as bulletins that relay uncontaminated interior feeling: in this context, the narration of Cuban fear was *doing* the work of influencing the metropole.<sup>10</sup> My work is also written in accordance with Tobias Green’s appeal for historians to meticulously analyse the emotional content of archival documents in order to paint a historical scene in which fear occupies a warranted and vital position of significance, and to interrogate the ways in which that fear influenced the actions and decisions of the society under consideration.<sup>11</sup>

This article will be of use to scholars seeking to explore loyalty and fearfulness not simply as states of being, but as tools that – in this case – when declared, were of political and personal *use* to settler colonists, enslavers, and slave-traders seeking sway and coercion within a framework of loyalty to Spain. It will expand our understanding of the nineteenth century Atlantic, of imperial paranoia and covetousness, and of relations between Cuba, the USA, Spain, and Britain.

For reasons of space, valuable explorations of the emotional experiences and subjectivities of enslaved people in Cuba must remain the purview of a separate study. I will state, for the avoidance of doubt, that although this article focusses on White fear, *there was nothing inherently fearsome* about enslaved Black men (or women). Neither is it the purpose of this article to corroborate conclusively the extent to which Cuban enslavers feared the people they enslaved. By the 1830s, African cultures and Black people had suffered demonisation, derision, and reduction in Iberian culture for centuries. Black persons had been enslaved and stolen across the Atlantic Ocean to labour in Spanish Latin America since the sixteenth century.

Nefarious emotional fictions of Black devilishness were capitalised upon by malevolent proslavery/anti-abolition Cuban enslavers who sought to manoeuvre their colonial government. This was possible, and effective, because the suggestion that Black men and women (and Blackness in general) represented menacing risks in Cuba made *conceptual* sense in the minds of White Spaniards, the heirs to a centuries-long patrimony of racialised loathing. In this way, simultaneously to being reduced in the White enslaving mind to objects of labour and tools for producing the staggering wealth that benefitted Spaniards and Cubans alike, enslaved Black Africans also served as the *rhetorical* tools used by Cuban enslavers to manipulate the Crown.

Slaveowners who regarded and described enslaved people as disquieting objects rather than suffering subjects – even while those enslaved people were baptised into the Catholic Church across Latin America – sought to remove their humanity. As a result, enslaved people were more easily converted, in the vicious minds of mercenary enslavers, into chattel to be abused, raped, tortured, worked to death, or murdered for alleged involvement in conspiracy, and then replaced. Cuban enslavers were determined to profit from and protect an institution that kept them in a furious state of paranoia, and their deeply hostile emotional reactions to the people they enslaved were understood across the Atlantic in Spain. When the prominence of fear-writing is highlighted in the discourses of Cuban enslavers, the reality is reemphasised that these men largely spent their time detesting and distrusting the people they kept enslaved, but on whose labour and expertise their prosperity, and the prosperity of the metropolis, depended entirely.<sup>12</sup>

### **Atlantic contexts: Colonial exclusion and constriction**

The enslavers of Cuba had felt the impact of Spain's fluctuating political tides throughout the first three decades of the nineteenth century, benefitting from only two brief but consequential intervals of official political inclusion, influence, and representation in the Spanish Cortes during two constitutional periods. The first was 1810–1814: during these years, which spanned the national assembly of the Cortes of Cádiz during the Peninsular War and the establishment of the 1812 Constitution, deputies from Cuba spoke vehemently (and successfully) to defend the institution of slavery and to oppose speakers such as Agustín de Argüelles and José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, both of whom pushed for the abolition of the slave trade. This brief spell of political involvement ended abruptly with the return of the absolutist monarch King Ferdinand VII to the throne, and his abolishment of the 1812 Constitution.<sup>13</sup>

The next was the Liberal Triennium of 1820–1823, during which time Juan Bernardo O'Gavan, who had also represented Cuba at the Cortes of Cádiz, acted as a mouthpiece

for the Cuban enslaving elite (even when prohibited from speaking during Cortes debates). O'Gavan fought tooth and nail to oppose the proposed imposition of a penal code to enforce the full execution of the 1817 anti-slave trade treaty between Spain and Britain, and to punish with jail and economic sanctions all who shamelessly flouted it.<sup>14</sup> The restoration of absolutism in 1823 was the watershed point that marked the subsequent absence of official political and civil inclusion for Cuban elites.

In light of the recent corrosion of what had been its vast Latin American empire following the Wars of Independence, the Spanish colonial government, reeling and paranoid, determined that Cuba – the preeminent sugar producing region of the Atlantic, now importing more enslaved people than ever before, and unfurling new techniques for productivity and profit – required safeguarding legislation that was specifically tailored to a colony with an enormous enslaved presence (for which circumstances constitutional governance was deemed inappropriate).<sup>15</sup> The Spanish colonial government was not willing to undertake any action that may have risked losing Cuba, whose wealth and Atlantic significance, Lisa Surwillo proffers, may have rendered the island's geopolitical importance greater even than Spain's.<sup>16</sup> As Jesús Sanjurjo has convincingly argued, the metropolis was sharply aware of the fact that, to Spain: "Cuba was *everything*."<sup>17</sup> Cuban slaveowning elites were thereby denied formal influence over the political future of the island they inhabited, and, in 1826, as a precautionary measure against unrest and anti-colonial sentiment, the colony's exclusively Peninsular (never Creole) Captain General was awarded "*facultades omnimodas*," delegating to him the complete control over Cuban military capacities, all economic administration on the island, and unquestionable political and judiciary control.<sup>18</sup>

The political and diplomatic climate of the 1830s was one of tremendous friction, as Britain became increasingly bullish in its approach to abolitionism in the Spanish colonies, and Spain sought to maintain a vice-like grip on Cuba at all costs. A cholera epidemic in 1833 had killed a vast number of enslaved labourers in Cuba, and enslavers seeking to replenish their workforces found themselves provided with one supercilious ally and a number of overt opponents.<sup>19</sup> The death of King Ferdinand VII in 1833 was followed by the appointment of his widow María Cristina to act as Queen Regent on behalf of their daughter Isabella; the establishment of a Liberal Regime in 1834 in favour of constitutional monarchy; and the first Carlist War of succession (1833–1840).<sup>20</sup> The immediate opposition mounted by supporters of the late king's brother and pretender to the Spanish throne, Carlos, was fended off only with considerable British financial and military support. As a result, demands from Britain (which had abolished slavery in its West Indian colonies in 1833) for more rigorous policing of the 1817 Anglo-Spanish anti-slave trade treaty could no longer be avoided.<sup>21</sup>

Subsequently, a new and more rigorous anti-slave trade law was passed in 1835. Spain's new treaty, which outlawed the trade "totally and finally," crucially involved an equipment clause (upon whose inclusion the British had insisted unequivocally.) Unlike the treaty of 1817, now vessels did not have to be carrying enslaved people at the time of inspection in order to be seized: the presence of trading paraphernalia such as shackles, handcuffs, and unusually large amounts of water were (in theory) sufficient for the ship to be condemned.<sup>22</sup>

The appointment of Miguel Tacón as Captain General of Cuba in 1834 was reassuring for enslavers who were becoming increasingly aggravated by the British, but it came with

a cost. Tacón's installation was as good as an iron-clad guarantee to enslavers in Cuba that, if lubricated with bribes, he would protect and collude with slave traders limitlessly, but he was also an authoritarian figurehead who fiercely supported the exclusion of colonial representatives from the Spanish Cortes. The constitution of 1837, it was decided, while re-establishing representative monarchy in Spain, would not apply to the Spanish colonies. Captain General Miguel Tacón had been instrumental in pushing for this decision.<sup>23</sup> Instead, it was determined that those colonies would be ruled by "special laws" which were decided upon in the Spanish Cortes, access to which elected representatives from Cuba were flatly denied. In 1837 the colonial deputies were disallowed from taking their seats in the Cortes, and colonial voices would not have official representation again until 1878.<sup>24</sup> The much-anticipated "special laws" never materialised.

Jesús Sanjurjo's excellent analysis reveals that deputies within the Liberal Regime, such as Vicente Sancho and Agustín de Argüelles, used fear as a means of justifying why Cuban society was simply too precarious to be governed by the same rules as those tailored to Spain. The island's heterogeneous population – a powder keg of enslaved multitudes that supposedly awaited only one spark to ignite, explode, and imitate the scenes of the Haitian Revolution – was the reason they used to justify their stance. Cuba, so they reasoned, "stood atop a volcano."<sup>25</sup> As I will demonstrate in due course, Cuban enslavers used that same fear to seize power for themselves in a representative monarchy which, unironically, refused Cubans representation. The very same fear would hold currency for actors on both sides of the Atlantic.

Enslaving elites, consequently, were ostensibly bereft of any official say concerning what should be the best course for protecting their own livelihoods in an increasingly turbulent and threatening Atlantic age. Politically impotent, they felt exposed to the staggeringly large free and enslaved populations of colour they themselves had willingly created, and which, for the first time in 1841, outnumbered Whites on the island.<sup>26</sup> They faced frequent incidences of organised insurrection and were greatly disquieted by neighbours they believed to be highly ominous: recently emancipated Jamaica and the new republic of Haiti.<sup>27</sup>

Among exiled Cubans and some Creole elites on the island there was considerable support for annexation to the USA, motivated by outrage concerning Cuba's stifled and submissive state beneath Spain's oppressive, mercantilist heel.<sup>28</sup> In addition, annexationists wished to guarantee the continuation of slavery whilst precluding the prospect of violent conflict between the Whites on the island and the free and enslaved populations of colour. This risk was considered to be exacerbated by the prospect that the British would successfully pressure Spain to emancipate wholesale the 260,000 enslaved persons illegally imported to Cuba following the first anti-slave trade treaty between both nations.<sup>29</sup> Yet, on the island, appreciable emphasis was placed on the worth of seeking reform within a framework of loyalty to Spain. As Christopher Schmidt-Nowara outlines, there existed strong pro-Spanish impulses among both the immensely wealthy sugar planters of the West of the island and the urban professionals and landowners of less prosperous regions. The former group was motivated by the desire to *maintain* slavery and access to the illicit slave trade while the latter, contrastingly, was driven by its *fear* of both slavery and the slave trade. Both viewed continued Spanish rule as essential to avoiding what they consistently referred to as a "race war."<sup>30</sup>

Josef Opatrný, examining the development of *Cubanidad* (a sense of “Cubanness”) using anti-slave trade intellectual José Antonio Saco as the lens through which to observe its evolution, traces an awareness of *Cubanidad* back to as early as the eighteenth century, developing tangible expression in the 1830s.<sup>31</sup> Saco’s sense of *Cubanidad* moved past what Cubans had previously seen themselves as, which was “overseas Spaniards,” leading him to become a spokesman for young intellectual Creoles on the island who, significantly, had recently begun to refer to themselves as “Cuban.”<sup>32</sup> (Saco’s sense of nationalism, it must be stressed, was entirely reliant on Spanish heritage, and was very much a *White nationalism* that excluded all persons of colour.)<sup>33</sup> Saco, nonetheless, was deeply perturbed by the prospect of annexation to the United States, concerned that the new political order and inevitable Anglo-Saxon influx to the island would have led to the dilution of Creole Cuban culture, which necessarily relied on Spanish cultural patrimony.<sup>34</sup>

While Saco was desperate for the island to achieve political representation and prosperity, ideally, for him, and for fellow Creole intellectual Domingo del Monte, patriarch of the Havana literary community, Spain would have been the nation to bestow Cuba with those benefits.<sup>35</sup> Thus, despite the undeniable sense of *Cubanidad* fermenting among Creoles, for the slaveowning class especially, Spain remained jointly, as Schmidt-Nowara expounds: “a crucial pole of identity” as well as a hub of political and economic focus.<sup>36</sup>

Of equal consequence was the belief among Creoles that any anti-colonial rebellion would have become subsumed by Haitian proportions of violence and revolt at the hands of the enslaved and free populations of colour, resulting in the total incineration of the island’s sugar cane fields, and the destruction of machinery and all forms of production. The choice that faced plantation owners considering the dilemma between protecting their wealth or claiming their independence, knowing that it would be impossible to achieve and maintain both, is exhumed by Manuel Moreno Fraginals: “Nation or Plantation.”<sup>37</sup> For the moment, then, the spectre of the overwhelming and constant threat of widespread violence (which influenced discussions concerning not only bodily and financial survival, but also the survival of Hispano-Cuban culture) drew Cuba ever-closer under Spain’s wing. In this context of threat and agitation, however, the temptation to characterise elite White Cuban men as apathetic and powerless would be misled.

## Reconceptualising Cuban loyalty

Following the annexation of Texas to the USA in 1845, expansionist interests in Cuba not only gained traction, but also became characterised by confident inevitability. Typifying the rhetoric that filled US newspapers, *The New York Herald* (Morning Edition) stated, swaggeringly, that it would be good sense for “the ministry of Queen Isabella [...] to sell Cuba to the United States for what they can get, before destiny takes it forcibly from them for nothing” (24 November 1849). Most often the frustration of those designs is attributed to the determination within the USA to avoid war with Spain and Britain, the latter of which, it was understood axiomatically, nursed ambitions to acquire the island for its own empire.<sup>38</sup>

Consequently, the first move towards Cuban annexation or independence, the USA resolved, needed to be seen to originate organically from within the island. Yet, in a reality most irksome and confounding to the United States, the slaveowning elites of



Cuba, supposedly desperate for liberation from their despotic metropole, still openly self-identified as inhabitants of what they proudly termed the “ever-faithful isle.” Save for a few small and easily thwarted independence movements, no overwhelming effort was made towards Cuban independence at the time.<sup>39</sup> Paul D. Naish and John C. Havard each illuminate the manner in which, in the nineteenth century USA, Latin American men, and Latin American masculinity, were used as negative proxies against which the men of the United States could favourably measure themselves, thereby buttressing their sense of cultural and racial masculine superiority.<sup>40</sup> By comparison, Latin American men were regarded with disparagement as non-White, Catholic, inferior republicans, and even overly brutal slaveowners. In addition, since the men of Cuba were not forcibly asserting their independence from Spain, they were regarded in the USA as possessing, in the words of Alice R. Wexler, “a certain softness and flaccidity,” and were tinged with woeful effeminacy.<sup>41</sup>

This perceived Cuban incapability and inertia was the subject of discussion and derision in US newspapers. Until Cuban men asserted their independence they seemed, from the United States’ perspective, to be unworthy of it. Supporters of annexation appeared to offer earnest encouragement to the nationalist impulse in Cuba: “let the oppressed people of Cuba strike for independence” *The Keowee Courier* of South Carolina championed (19 July 1850), while *The North Carolinian* urged: “the island would be received, but you must first achieve your own independence – then [the USA] will acknowledge you, and take you in as a partner” (23 October 1841). Apparent Cuban reluctance was met in the United States with impatience, occasionally redesigned as aspersion. The following meditation by *The New-York Daily Tribune* conveyed that bafflement, if not chagrin:

There is one feature of the Cuban movement that looks badly. It seems to rely on outsiders not merely for aid but for inception. The first shot is to be fired by an invading force. No flag inimical to Spain is to be raised on the island until a military expedition, securely fitted out within the borders of the United States should have debarked on her shores [...] and it seems off, if the Creoles really pant for independence, that they do not claim the honour of initiating the movement. It argues incapacity for independence, this holding back for a foreign force to *begin* the contest. (16 August 1849)

This conjectured Cuban passivity or torpidity, what the *Edgefield Advertiser of South Carolina* described as: “the usual sluggishness of Cuban zeal” and “pitiably weakness of power” (12 September 1849), contributed to the impression in the United States that the men of Cuba lacked the skill and character to meet the challenge of claiming the island as their own. “The Spanish inhabitants of [Cuba] are incompetent to govern themselves,” it was concluded with denigration in *The New York Herald* (3 August 1848). Unfortunately, that ethnocentric contemporary conception, along with any modern scholarship that paints Cuba’s loyalty to Spain long into the nineteenth century as being somehow backwards or incongruous in the Latin American context, provides too parochial an account by far, and only tells part of the story.

As far as US annexationists conceived, the island was inhabited by listless men under the control of an archaic, decrepit European nation. Cuba, they opined, required the protection of a real global power, and, by extension, real men. Louis A. Pérez Jr.’s study of metaphorical imagery surrounding the Spanish American War (1898) analyses the

gradual shift in the style of political cartoons in US publications covering the conflict. Those American artists, Pérez demonstrates, began by personifying Cuba as a helpless child, then instead as an elderly maid, and finally as a beautiful young woman, while the USA was depicted as the noble, masculine power protecting feminised Cuba from a despotic and lecherous Spain.<sup>42</sup> This idea of a childlike and feminised island, however, was not only in place much earlier than 1898, but it was also a representation that served enslavers in Cuba long before it did the covetous USA. There was therefore a marked contrast between the feeble impression that Cuba's loyalty to Spain made in the USA, and the strategic impulses that led the proslavery elites of Cuba to tout their loyalty when making appeals to the metropole as a method of influencing the future of slavery according to their preferences. The enslavers of Cuba manipulated the island's feminised persona in order to engineer their own advantages by goading the diplomatic difficulty of Spain's position.

### Gendering an island

Philippa Levine has argued that the construction of an empire can only be fully understood when the process is regarded through gendered lenses. We must appreciate, she states, that the practice of establishing imperial power and colonial dominance was influenced and shaped in every possible way by the contemporary power imbalances that existed between men and women. In answer to Levine's subsequent question on empire: "did the very fact of domination itself reflect, echo, or partake of the kinds of power relations at work in sexual difference, in the relations between men and women?" this article argues the affirmative.<sup>43</sup>

Yes, Spanish domination over Cuba embodied the pressures and obligations of masculinity, namely protection, strength, and defence. An understanding of masculinity as it related to Spain's dominance (and dominance lost) was intentionally inflamed by the enslavers of Cuba. Professing continued colonial loyalty, but making prominent how treacherous Cuba's future was, surrounded – and inhabited – by actors wishing to rip the colony out of Spain's hands, voices from Cuba utilised a tone of fearful loyalty to probe and provoke in the metropole the shattering possibility of land loss, a dreaded prospect Ann McClintock describes as being connected to sensations of emasculation and impotence in the colonial imagination.<sup>44</sup>

The beauty of the island; its need for Spain's paternal defence; and the risk to Spain's national honour should Cuba have been left to its own miserable fate, are three themes that were emphasised repeatedly by those with economic interests in the continuation of slavery and the slave trade, be they Cuban enslavers or Spaniards in the Peninsula (a point that will be expanded in due course). Appeals were consciously decorated with almost unctuous paternal solicitations, as demonstrated in the writings of Captain General Dionisio Vives to the *Secretario de Estado* [composed in quick succession]. By 31 May 1823, as the second constitutional period was coming to an end, Vives was setting the emotional tone that would be used by Cuban enslavers until the 1850s, appealing to "his majesty, whose paternal heart interests itself so deeply in the fate of this island," an island that, days later on 12 June, he portrayed as seeking the defence and intervention of "the paternal care and love of his majesty," and on 6 June as "seeking [...] his paternal protection."<sup>45</sup>

Given that both women and children were thought to require masculine protection in similar ways, Cuba was at times depicted as more child-like, and others as more feminine. This deliberate choice of gendered language informed the intentional depiction of Cuba as feminine, meek, and humble by “The Council of Your [Majesty’s] Ever-Faithful City of Havana” on 19 October 1830, when seeking to awaken in King Ferdinand VII “the paternal concern with which your grace views this favourite daughter.”<sup>46</sup> This “daughter” was depicted jointly as beautiful and threatened, paralleling the human relationship between anxious parent and vulnerable daughter, her beauty only increasing the fear of her being stolen away by a philanderer.

Describing Cuba itself using gendered language, and couching communications to Spain in emotional language traditionally associated with femininity, care was taken to emphasise the earnestly dependent and gendered relationship between colony and metropole, strategically shrouding entreaties from the island as those of a frightened daughter seeking paternal protection. A more belligerent approach would have given the impression that Cuba was a disgruntled colony eager to rebel, having the unhelpful effect of provoking the paranoia and deaf autocracy of Spain.

Sarah Franklin has explored the beneficial results for claimants that used “humble” language in Cuban divorce petitions, and Camillia Cowling has written on the strategic advantage of gendered language utilised by enslaved women petitioning for their own freedom or that of their children.<sup>47</sup> Astutely playing the “motherhood card,” Cowling emphasises, enslaved women positioned themselves in a more pitiable, sympathetic stance than enslaved men, whose assertive language, which was perceived as “haughty,” often resulted in unsuccessful appeals to the syndic.<sup>48</sup> In this same way, but for very different reasons, the rhetoric of Cuban enslavers should be considered as having been tailored to convey a feminised and timorous tone. For these men it was crucial to know not only what to say, but also *how to say it*. At play, then, was a writing culture of carefully balanced and executed emotional language, a writing “etiquette,” to borrow Sandra Lauderdale Graham’s term.<sup>49</sup>

Enslavers focused upon collective metropolitan masculinity as a vulnerable point they could target. Their words can be read as subtle but barbed provocations that demonstrate the use of emasculation and shame as the rhetorical weapons of politically unarmed colonial subjects. By emphasising Cuba’s helplessness in a manner that intentionally painted the island in hues of femininity, Spanish patriarchal honour was prompted to protect Cuba in her effeminate defencelessness. Reading the political circumstance and adapting their emotional tone to meet it, the slaveowners of Cuba transformed their weakness into strength using an approach tailored perfectly to the Spanish understanding of masculine honour and *vergüenza*. Throughout Spain and its empire, for a woman to be described as possessing a sense of *vergüenza* was a compliment to her chastity and demureness. For men, contrastingly, to possess *vergüenza* was linked to honour, strength, the ability to protect one’s dependents, and to avenge the honour of the women in one’s family should the need arise.<sup>50</sup> For a man to be *given vergüenza*, however, implied a different meaning.

To give *vergüenza* to a man was to administer shame to him in an act of humiliation. In Julian Pitt-Rivers’ concise phrasing, to be given *vergüenza* is disgracing to a man because: “by implication, if he had it already he would not have to be given it.” Dispensing *vergüenza* as an imposition of dishonour denies an individual’s previous claims to

honourability.<sup>51</sup> Purposefully fearful Cuban supplications sent to Spain were a canny form of giving the Crown *vergüenza* for having allowed the island to remain vulnerable to the plans for annexation and acquisition harboured by the USA and Britain, and even the rebellious impulses of the enslaved population. Since Spain's role was to provide paternal protection to its colonies, it was Spain's dishonour and shame if Cuba was endangered.

Responding to Louis A. Pérez Jr.'s call to seek agency in pre-Revolution Cuba, this article sustains that Cuban enslavers wielded power in the position they held as the children, or women, in the Spanish imperial family, and put it to work.<sup>52</sup> That perceived effeminacy and weakness was mobilised with self-awareness by Cuban slaveowners who, aware of Spain's fear of losing Cuba, regarded that paranoia as advantageously pliable. Their communications, when read in this light, demonstrate the careful manipulation and deployment of fearful loyalty in times of requirement. Adding more depth, then, to the axiom that it was in Spain's interests to maintain slavery in Cuba so the crippling Cuban fear of enslaved rebellion would keep the White populace compliant, it also becomes apparent that proslavery Cubans made use of that very same fear as currency in a bid to influence the continuation of slavery on their own terms.

### Handling the British: Creolised emotional protocol

Nick Sharman demonstrates that from the 1830s, Spain – a second-rate imperial power following the Napoleonic Wars and the devastating corrosion of its empire, but whose remaining colonies held staggering potential for profit – was subsumed into the British empire as an “informal” colony, dominated politically and exploited economically by Britain.<sup>53</sup> The Spanish government felt the sharp sting of chagrin at foreign intrusions into matters of national sovereignty, particularly abolition. As a result of increasing British effrontery on that subject, Jesús Sanjurjo has theorised that, from the 1830s, as Anglophobia in Spain and Cuba became incensed, a “self-victimization” narrative came to characterise the discourse within the Spanish government concerning perceived British pressure and duress.

Although Sanjurjo demonstrates seamlessly that this self-victimisation sentiment was often shared and propagated in both colony and metropole, when the fissures within the Spanish empire are interrogated, it becomes apparent that, periodically, Cuban enslavers – in understanding that Spain felt enormously affronted – sought to inflame that feeling to their own ends.<sup>54</sup> While anti-slave trade proponents in the 1850s and 60s would use “national dignity” to argue that the illicit slave trade was an abomination Spain needed to suppress once and for all in order to salvage the nation's sullied reputation, during the period under consideration in this article, elite enslavers in Cuba emphasised that, conversely, bending to the dictates of British abolitionists was humiliating to Spain's national dignity.<sup>55</sup>

Enslavers capitalised upon Spain's position of degradation to Britain, seeking to arouse in the metropolitan government the impulse to reassert domination in Cuba by resisting intrusive British anti-slavery. When expressing the conviction that the British assault on the illicit slave trade was based purely on self-interest (in removing all Cuban competition for the goods produced in the British colonies of India and Jamaica), voice was also given to the perception that bowing to Britain's demands was abject and shameful for Spain, a nation usually characterised by dignity and pride, both of which were undermined by Cuban vulnerability and fear. The insatiable demand for enslaved labour rendered

persistent British diplomatic interference in Cuban slavery a source of difficulty and bitterness for Spain, and immense frustration for the slaveowners of Cuba. To police and enforce the 1817 and 1835 anti-slave trade treaties between Spain and Britain, a Mixed Commission was stationed in Havana, composed of British judges and (highly non-compliant) Cuban counterparts with a view to – in theory at least – presiding over the issue of illegal debarkations of enslaved people. Despite the corrupt and evasive techniques of those Cuban judges, it was nonetheless felt that such arrangements afforded Britain disproportionate internal sway over Cuban/Spanish affairs.<sup>56</sup>

The British proposal in 1840, which pressed Spain to pass a new treaty emancipating all enslaved people who had been illegally brought to Cuba after 1820, risked a sudden and enormous increase in the number of *emancipados* on the island, and was regarded by enslavers as a harbinger of utter catastrophe. In addition, the popular conviction that David Turnbull – fervent abolitionist and British Consul in Havana (1840–1842) – was involved in plotting the conspiracy of *La Escalera* (1843–1844) was interpreted by slaveowners in Cuba and investors in Spain as an indication of the sordid depths to which Britain would sink in order to seize the island from Spain's clutches, either for the sport of ridding themselves of a competitor in the global sugar market, or to acquire a new Caribbean colony.<sup>57</sup> Yet, Spain's weak political position at this point in the century made it impossible to appease Cuban demands by expelling Turnbull, much less the British as a whole, a reality that struck Cuban enslavers as Spain's diplomatic impotence. This perspective was given visual representation in the presence of the British hulk *Romney* moored in the waters of Havana (1837–1845); an unwanted and mammoth British appendage in Spanish territory, and a phallic representation of Britain's power over Spain. The appearance of things was damning for Spain, evidently powerless to keep Britain out of its affairs, and its island.<sup>58</sup> Cuban enslavers were increasingly convinced, and irked, that Britain was overpowering their inert and weakening metropole.

In a bid to rouse Spanish energies out of their submissive stupor, the language of Claudio Martínez de Pinillos – Cuban-born Count of Villanueva – when writing to Captain General Leopoldo O'Donnell on 20 April 1844, was strikingly explicit. He bluntly described the British as having “arrogated” control over slavery in Cuba, and depicted Havana's port as a shameful scene: “where the British flag flutters, like a sign of domination.”<sup>59</sup>

Martínez de Pinillos, a member of the elite enslaving class, had been Intendant of the Cuban Treasury (with authority over the island's economic administration) since 1825, and would remain in that position nearly without interruption until 1851. He held liberal and pragmatic economic views, and, assuming the mantle of his mentor, Francisco de Arango y Parreño, he orchestrated Cuba's journey to achieve a level of economic development and technical modernisation that placed it firmly among some of the most technologically advanced regions on the planet at the time.<sup>60</sup> In 1832 Martínez de Pinillos also became president of the *Junta de Fomento* (Development Board) of the island, upon which merchants and plantation owners were represented equally.<sup>61</sup>

As Manuel Barcia explains, since the wicked trinity of plantations, enslavement, and technology were central to Martínez de Pinillos' longstanding economic objectives, which were jointly to “aid the development of his ‘nation’ and his ‘group’,” he regarded the continued illicit slave trade to Cuba as the vital lifeblood of the island's high productivity rates. As far as Martínez de Pinillos was concerned, the cheap labour of enslaved

people was essential to the continued output of Cuba's *ingenios* (sugar plantations), and British abolitionism could not be permitted to disturb that arrangement.<sup>62</sup>

This process of the intense anti-British views of elite merchants and enslavers being voiced directly by Martínez de Pinillos to the Captain General, who then corresponded with the colonial centre on the subject of legislation in Cuba, exhibits – as Tâmis Parron, Rafael Marquese, and Márcia Berbel demonstrate – evidence of Cuban enslavers (their rejection from the Spanish Cortes notwithstanding) creating methods of having their views conveyed nonetheless, finding “channels of representation in a non-representative system.”<sup>63</sup>

The behaviour of the British was unabashedly condemned, but, in equal measure, Spanish acquiescence did not escape scrutiny. In the *Diario de la Habana*, 10 September 1842, Spain's inaction, while delicately painted as gracious diplomacy, was framed both as the root cause of continued British interference in Cuba, and the factor most likely to cause the island to be lost for the Spanish empire:

[Spain's] system of contemplations and graciousness does not restrain the arrogant nation which has resolved to destroy our precious island: on the contrary, the weaker we are, the more their demands increase: and this muted, slow, but secure method, [Britain] prefers to the noisiness of war, which has its own inconveniences; which would cause a great scandal; which could attract us the sympathies and assistance of other nations; which could compromise British commerce and interests [...] the risk of war [is] better than the loss of the overseas possessions [...] and this loss is inevitable, [and would be] accompanied by disgrace, if the Machiavellian aspirations of Great Britain are not rejected outright.<sup>64</sup>

Although writing with tact and respect, slaveholding elites such as Claudio Martínez de Pinillos nonetheless sought to induce decisive Spanish action. Writing to the *Ministro de Hacienda* on 29 April 1844, Martínez de Pinillos' words, in parallel, appealed to Spanish pride and threatened Spanish shame:

The Spanish government continued promising to her subjects in those dominions the traffic of *negros*, in accordance with their situation and special interests, without it occurring to any other government to interrupt her in those pleasures, according to the laws of good neighbourliness, until it pleased England to attack the African commerce [...] causing grave harm and danger to our commerce in both worlds [...] This island [belongs] to a powerful and independent nation [...] respected for its glorious pomp and wise institutions [...] naturally, it is surprising that Spain would want to constrict [Cuba] by admitting the inquiry of the English cabinet concerning the origin and point of departure of her slaves.<sup>65</sup>

David Lambert's exploration of White West Indian creolisation in the Barbadian context is an excellent lens through which to examine the language of Cuban enslavers.<sup>66</sup> This creolised identity, Lambert expands, lent to communications between elite Barbadians and the British Crown as being characterised by a “vacillation between *loyalty* and *opposition*.” Regarding themselves as a “Little England,” and hence, inherently English, Barbadian elites simultaneously resented imperial interference in affairs on the island.<sup>67</sup> These conflicted interests led to the creation among White Barbadians of what John H. Elliot regards as the: “dilemma of discovering themselves to be at once the same, and yet not the same, as the country of their origin.”<sup>68</sup> At play in Barbados, just as in Cuba, was the dynamic captured by Ann Stoler's observation of imperialism: the specific political and social challenges faced by White settler colonists and impermanent European residents rendered

their interests and priorities in conflict not only with those of the people they colonised (or enslaved) but also with those of the metropolitan government.<sup>69</sup>

Lambert proffers that West Indian petitions could be regarded as *lacking* evidence of creolisation, representing instead “colonial subservience to metropolitan norms” since such enormous emphasis was placed on deference in their stringent generic conventions and rhetorical style. This article argues conversely in the Cuban case.<sup>70</sup> Evidence of creolisation can indeed be found in communications to Spanish colonial powers. The language of these documents must be appreciated as *more* than deferential; it was also intentionally gendered and emotional, and those features were critical to its effectiveness. This article, reading those communications against the grain, posits that the conscious performance of deference – of fearful loyalty – was the bargaining tool elites used to sway metropolitan policy as best served their interests as capitalists and enslavers at a time when they were unable to do so by any other means. It is what I term a creolised emotional protocol.

In this regard, the Captain Generals provide an interesting point of focus. As Peninsular Spaniards appointed to the role with a specific view to maintaining peace in the colony and loyalty to Spain, their words shouldn’t be regarded as evidence of creolisation *per se*. Yet, their position – at times *supplicated to* by Cuban slaveowners, and others *supplicating to the Crown themselves* – suggests that they bought into this stylised rhetoric when it was advantageous for them to do so, fluidly utilising creolised emotional protocol when seeking to sway the metropole on the issue under consideration. Exemplifying this, impending threats brought about by British obtrusiveness were presented by Captain General Miguel Tacón on 31 August 1836, as a question that implicated “the integrity of the monarchy, and [Spanish] national honour.”<sup>71</sup> The relationship was also made very clearly by Captain General Gerónimo Valdés on 28 April 1842, between “this island [and] the national dignity.”<sup>72</sup>

Compellingly, this creolised emotional protocol didn’t only serve enslavers writing *from* the island, but also those with investments in Cuban slavery who were writing *about* the island. A prompt sent to the King Regent Baldomero Espartero on 29 June 1842, by the Provincial Council of Santander, fulfilled the role of Arlie Hochschild’s theorised “Rule Reminders”: hints and indications given by a subject’s peers that their emotional performance has erred, falling short of prescribed social expectations.<sup>73</sup> Offense in reaction to British attempts to dominate Spain, it was urged, should be felt “not only as one elevated to such a distinguished position, if not also as a Spaniard, as a son of this most magnanimous and nobly elevated nation which has never suffered humiliations caused by foreign arrogance.” If Espartero truly embodied the correct Spanish character, the cue continued, he: “would also participate in the general indignation caused by English haughtiness.”<sup>74</sup> This particular council’s heavy investment in the illegal slave trade reveals the motive behind its attempt to force the Spanish hand on the subject of British anti-slavery.<sup>75</sup>

Again, these metropolitan Spaniards would not usually enter into a study of creolisation. Their considerable financial stake in Cuban slavery and the illicit slave trade to the island, however, seemingly gave them cause to deploy a creolised emotional protocol, utilising themes of danger, shame, and fear to influence the Crown towards their desired outcome. In both Cuba and Spain slave traders and enslavers considered emotion to be a relevant, persuasive element of their communications, which bore striking similarities on both sides of the Atlantic.

Those with interests in the illicit slave trade gave voice explicitly to the perception that granting Britain whatever it requested was “degrading” for Spain.<sup>76</sup> Tolerating British interference, so the suggestion went, was abject and shameful for a nation usually characterised by grandeur and self-respect. The same Provincial Council of Santander sought to induce Spanish decisive action by making crystal clear the dangers associated with leaving British hubris unchallenged, magnifying Spain’s indignity in an attempt to provoke forceful resistance:

If [...] the traffic of *negros* [...] is repugnant to humanity [...] is it not more repugnant that a foreigner should dictate laws to independent nations [...] English [...] authority over the ports of the island of Cuba, which they besiege with their floats and steamboats; whose ostentatious display of force inspires in [Cuba’s] inhabitants distrust and terror; which attacks individual security with their threatening cannons [...] insults Spanish decency with her arrogance [...] stirs up the fire of discord among the African race [and] preaches insurrection and places the assassin’s dagger in the hands of the slaves.<sup>77</sup>

For these remarks to have their full effect, mention was also made of the widespread panic suffered in Cuba due to the island’s impending ruin at the hands of British aggressors and the individuals in Cuba who facilitated them. Letters were sent – tellingly – by the Commercial Boards of Barcelona, Cádiz, Catalonia, Seville, Valencia, Coruña, and Aragon, stressing the terrible toll this fear was wreaking upon the island’s White population.<sup>78</sup>

While the Commercial Council of Barcelona offered outpourings of empathy for “the anxiety and distress in which those who have property in that country live,” the Commercial Council of Cádiz demonstrated heartache upon repeatedly receiving: “alarming information of the lamentable state of distress and fear in which the inhabitants of the island of Cuba find themselves.”<sup>79</sup> As the Council of Cádiz expounded, damningly, this unease was caused wholly by lack of faith in the officials sent by Spain to run the colony, notably: Captain General Gerónimo Valdés. Valdés’ “misguided and ill-fated administration,” it was alleged, supported “the pernicious project of the Abolitionist Society of England,” which was attempting to orchestrate “the emancipation of that important territory.”<sup>80</sup> The Commercial Council of Catalonia predicted that, should nothing be done to defend Cuba against that eventuality, Spanish national honour would be “compromised.”<sup>81</sup>

These allegations are less surprising when two factors are highlighted. First, that Valdés was the only Captain General acknowledged even by the British government as having tried in earnest to halt the illicit slave trade to Cuba. Second, that the Spanish councils lamenting Cuban fearfulness, and reviling Valdés’ supposedly reckless designs, all represented areas of Spain that were heavily invested in the illicit slave trade.

Considering those realities, the solution proffered by the Commercial Council of Cádiz resounds as the pitiless (but disguised) agenda of a self-interested group of capitalists determined to continue profiting from their trade in human flesh. Valdés, under whose administration Cubans suffer “fear that, today, keeps them in dismay,” should be replaced by the return of Miguel Tacón, who would undoubtedly restore “order and peace to that unhappy population, inspiring in [Cuba’s] inhabitants total confidence.”<sup>82</sup> Uncoincidentally, Tacón’s time as Captain General (1834–1838) had coincided with the decade during which the most enslaved people were illegally taken to Cuba, with 181,600 arriving between 1831 and 1840. During this time, Tacón allowed Peninsular slave traders to illegally import enslaved people to Cuba, personally benefitting from the bribes he enjoyed in return for turning a blind eye.<sup>83</sup>



Enslavers in Cuba, meanwhile, by insinuating that Cuban fear was cause for imperial shame, sought to coerce Spain to fill the role expected from their metropole, which owed them defence in return for their (ostensibly) “ever-faithful” status. Cuba’s *Junta de Fomento* depicted the British as entitled and haughty on 27 February 1841: “not contented [only] with having [...] a war ship, dismasted close to the bay, manned by *negros emancipados*, dressed in the uniform of the Royal Navy of G[reat] B[ritain],” but also reportedly conducting house visits “with publicity and ostentatiousness” in search of illegally imported enslaved people.<sup>84</sup> The danger, the *Junta* made explicit, was that these actions implied to enslaved people in the local area that their own enslavement may have been illegitimate, and that they would receive forceful British support if they rose up against the Whites of the island.

Similarly, when Francisco de Arango y Parreño, one of Cuba’s foremost intellectuals and a spokesman for the planter elite, was approached to draft a new slave code, he used the opportunity to instead stress to Spain the importance of safeguarding against foreign threats to the island. On 30 August 1830, Arango y Parreño described Haiti, Mexico, and especially Britain as the actors “stoking the bonfire which consumed the French on the island of Santo Domingo,” stressing to Spain the risks of imperial complacency should the volatile enslaved population of Cuba be mobilised by a foreign power keen to appropriate the island.<sup>85</sup>

The utility of fear as a bargaining tool is demonstrated in these letters. Cuban enslavers, affronted by British interference, used fear to underscore their reasoning as to why the British needed to be expelled. Evoking fear and the threat of rebellion was a tool for coercing Spain to take action. “The love of humanity does not authorise [nations] to introduce themselves in foreign kingdoms under the pretext of correcting crimes or rectifying grievances,” Martínez de Pinillos advised, particularly when the promise of violent results was beyond a shadow of a doubt. “These are not now vain theories” he added, “it is the constant and confirmed experience in repeated examples [...] it makes obvious the immense dangers of giving freedom to the slaves when their number is excessive and superior to that of free men.”<sup>86</sup>

The frequency and consistency of fear being mentioned is solid basis for the inference that it was considered an effective tool for pushing forward a point. Nominated by the *Junta de Fomento* to compose a report on the British proposal to emancipate every individual that had been illegally imported to Cuba as an enslaved person after 30 October 1820, enslavers the Marquis de Arcos Ignacio Francisco de Borja de Peñalver y Peñalver, Evaristo Carillo, Narciso García y Mora, and Tomás de Juara expressed their feelings with similar fatalism to Martínez de Pinillos. Their report was a succinct but rich treatise on dread, danger, and fear, but not an aimless one. When contemplating the likelihood of violence should the British have continued to meddle in Cuban slavery – spearheaded in their attempts by David Turnbull, to whom they referred as an “imprudent fanatic” – the writers asked, not entirely hypothetically, how the Whites of Cuba could possibly be expected to face the strength of the enslaved population “if a nation as powerful as it is imprudent [Britain] were to give them protection and attempt to bring about their expected liberty?” The following passage typifies their tone:

We dominate by custom, by prestige; but, difficult though it is to confess it, we do not dominate by force, and force is the only element that can sustain slavery. The slave makes

continuous efforts to test the resistance and strength of his chains, and these chains today are imaginary. We have slept in this danger, and it's now necessary to awaken [...] this concerns our lives and plantations, the honour of our wives and daughters, it concerns questions of extermination, because, as the abolitionist [Alexis de] Tocqueville expresses it: 'wherever the blacks are stronger, they destroy the whites.'<sup>87</sup>

Proffering, on 29 April 1844, one possible response for the Spanish government to provide to the British Foreign Office, Martínez de Pinillos spoke plainly, perhaps betraying his own growing frustration: "they bring the dogmas which were established by abolitionist societies of England [...] they could be told '*property is everything the law declares it to be*'."<sup>88</sup>

Shaming the Crown into taking decisive protective action, and repetitively emphasizing the island's precarious state, these Cuban enslavers and Peninsular Spaniards with investments in the illicit slave trade sought to awaken Spain's imperial fear of losing the island entirely.

### Kindling imperial fear

Fear, as defined by historian of the emotions Lauric Henneon, should be considered a relationship between a subject and an object: the subject either fears someone, something, or the prospect of someone committing an act considered harmful by the subject.<sup>89</sup> Henneon's schema for measuring the intensity of fear begins, initially, with a pre-existing threat. In Cuba, this threat was provided by the presence (or, indeed, omnipresence) of rebellious, hostile enslaved and free people of colour skilled in warfare.<sup>90</sup> The memory of a danger that has already taken place, and the repetition of which is dreaded, intensifies that fear. The final two points for measuring the potency of fear are a sense of geographical vulnerability, and the extent to which subjects would feel able to defend themselves, or respond affirmatively to threat, should it arise. From the metropolitan perspective, the painfully recent dissipation of its Latin American empire, Cuba's isolated position – close neighbour to Haiti but an ocean away from military reinforcements – and the island's overwhelmingly non-White majority, were factors that lent themselves to metropolitan trepidation.<sup>91</sup> In addition to this fear, the loss of imperial land also had gendered implications.

Ann McClintock draws attention to the gendered conception of land itself. The imperial arrival represents male domination over an accommodating, inviting female, an intentional act of male penetration. The world becomes feminised in McClintock's theorisation, its interior open and available for male entry and exploration. It is only logical, then, as McClintock continues, that the corrosive paranoia caused by feared *loss* of colonial power over those feminised lands – or of their destruction by indigenous peoples – wrought acute and pathological havoc on the masculinity of the imperial power. McClintock's theorisation deals with the initial stages of "discovery," or encounter, and the foundational assertions of masculine domination over threatening "cannibal" indigenous populations and unknown lands. The constant arrival of enslaved Africans to Cuba, described by enslavers as savage, mysterious, and barbarous, kept the island in a constant state of uncertainty and instability akin to a very early, and precarious, colonial settlement, giving McClintock's work relevance to this article as it relates to Cuba and Spain. It was that potent male paranoia and fear of losing

domination the slaveowners of Cuba sought to awaken, appealing directly to that anxious metropolitan masculinity. McClintock explains:

Suspended between an imperial megalomania, with its fantasy of unstoppable rapine – and a contradictory fear of engulfment [...] is [a] crisis in male imperial identity [...] between a fantasy of conquest and a dread of engulfment, between rape and emasculation [...] The gendering of America as simultaneously naked and passive *and* riotously violent and cannibalistic [...] In this familiar trope, the fear of being engulfed by the unknown is projected onto colonized peoples [in this case, enslaved people and *emancipados*] as *their* determination to devour the intruder whole [...] unsavoury [imperial] rages, their massacres and rapes, their atrocious rituals of militarized masculinity sprang [...] from the implacable rage of paranoia.<sup>92</sup>

Pouring salt into the open wound of that threatened boundary loss, the enslavers of Cuba were perfectly poised to make their point: for Spain to retain Cuba the continuation and protection of slavery on the island was critical, but, they stressed, the institution needed to operate according to *Cuban* demands. Enslaved human beings therefore became emotionally and rhetorically useful to the people who kept them enslaved, as well as being financially crucial. The diabolical cycle flowed as follows. Enslavers wishing to affirm the vitality of sugar production, not only for Cuba's profitability, but also for Cuba's very existence, evoked the adage: "*sin azúcar no hay país*" (without sugar there is no country).<sup>93</sup> Yet, the production of this sugar necessitated the innumerable lives and deaths of enslaved labourers. For this reason, a second truism was spouted with mercenary callousness: "*azúcar se hace con sangre*" (sugar is made with blood).<sup>94</sup> The sustenance of Cuba, these men professed, relied on their unrestricted access to African bodies. Questioning how and why on earth this African Holocaust was deemed tolerable requires looking back over centuries of malevolent Iberian race-making.<sup>95</sup>

By the early nineteenth century, White Iberian conceptions of both Blackness and Whiteness had been under a centuries-long process of malign configuration. With their basis in Aristotelian principles and justifications surrounding who could (or should) be rightfully enslaved, since the fourth century, Iberian writers, poets, painters, and Church figures had been shaping conceptions of Blackness centred around demonisation, attributing devilish characteristics to groups designated varyingly as Moors, Africans, or Ethiopians, even while strong trade links existed between Iberia and North Africa.<sup>96</sup> It was the process of the Crusades and the ultimate Christian Reconquest (*Reconquista*) of the Iberian Peninsula, which had been *al-Andalus* under Muslim rule since the eighth century, however, that acted as the catalyst in solidifying fatal fictions of White Iberian supremacy. Though previously it had by no means been an Eden of differing religions and ethnicities peacefully coexisting, the longstanding diversity of the Iberian population since the Middle Ages, at this point, was disassembled and violently replaced by a paradigm of White Catholic supremacy.<sup>97</sup>

After the final step in the Reconquest – seizing Granada in 1492 – the process of forging the Catholic Spanish nation-state, crucially, demanded the forced expatriation or conversion of Jews, and the initial conversion followed by the ultimate expulsion of what had been Spain's Muslim population (1609–14) by King Phillip III. This process of nation-building and consolidation solidified, as Jerome C. Branch terms it, a "racialized Spanish nationalism."<sup>98</sup> This process was legitimised wholly by the Catholic Church, generating the nationalistic push to stratify the Spanish population according to each person's "*limpieza de sangre*" (blood purity), by which each individual would prove

their social standing by attesting to a family line completely bereft of any trace of non-Christian blood. (Conversely, evidence of Jewish or Muslim ancestry would compromise that *limpieza*, and the aspiration to achieve high social status).<sup>99</sup> This violent process of racial “othering” and racialised selfhood further served the malevolent and capitalistic impulse of the new nation with regard to Black Africans.

Following *La Reconquista*, the insatiable capitalistic impulses of the merchants, traders, and bankers of the Mediterranean, who now looked far beyond the European continent to increase their profits, led to the exploitation of millions of enslaved individuals over the course of four centuries in the vain bid to satiate their greed. As a result, Whiteness, as Homi Bhabha explains, simultaneously became “a strategy of authority” as opposed to being a fundamental or inherent *identity*.<sup>100</sup> White supremacy was necessarily defined and upheld by the denigration of the “other”: racism was the lifeblood both of enslavement and the White sense-of-self.<sup>101</sup>

As Alejandro de la Fuente and Ariela Gross have shown, the slave trade and enslavement were processes of legal race-making, wherein, in the minds of White traders and enslavers, and enshrined in their laws, each unique African culture, cosmology, language, subjectivity and history was expunged in one fell-swoop, replaced by White conceptions of Blackness: “a single legally defined, socially constituted category of degradation.”<sup>102</sup> In Spain, the slave trade, and the long-standing cultural and academic denigration and derision of Black persons, propagated in Spanish Golden Age literature and, later, also by so-called “science,” mutually enforced each other.<sup>103</sup>

This transmutation, Cedric J. Robinson theorises, saw Whites move away from the standard of the preceding centuries, which had seen them interact and trade with African merchants; sail transatlantically with Black mariners; and regard both ancient and modern dominant African civilisations (such as the military force of Muslim armies) with fear. To meet the demands of their barbarous enslaving enterprise, and in a bid to excuse its monstrousness, Robinson explains, in the minds of capitalist Whites, Black men and women ceased to qualify as worthy of human compassion. They were regarded instead as an opportune exploitable and inexhaustible labour force by virtue of their imposed subalternity: “the fiction of a dumb beast of burden fit only for slavery.”<sup>104</sup> The wealth and technological advancement of Spain and Cuba (and, indeed, the Western world) is owed to the centuries of labour undertaken by these enslaved millions.

Philosopher Tommy C. Curry’s analysis is indisputable. The lives of enslaved Black men were regarded in terms of: “sheer fungibility.” In the eyes of mercenary slave traders, the merciless demonisation of Black men not only validated their enslavement, but also endorsed their torture, rape, and murder, all of which were undertaken on the ferocious and capricious timeframe of each overseer and enslaver.<sup>105</sup> In an uncompromisingly and intensely stratified Cuban society, Sarah Franklin emphasises, institutional patriarchy as it operated in the realms of education, the Catholic Church, and marriage, developed precisely as a means of organising and maintaining a social order that placed White men in positions of power in every sphere.<sup>106</sup>

Patriarchy – defined by Gerda Lerner as the institutionalisation and manifestation of male dominance over women in both the family and in wider society – was the central governing force of Cuban society, just as it was in Spain.<sup>107</sup> The institutional power given to White men was set in place to dominate rebels of all kinds, be they unruly women, lower-class Whites, free people of colour, or enslaved people. The identity of

Black men existing within a White patriarchy, Curry states, is best classified a state of *Man-Not*, since conceptions of masculine superiority that applied to White men cannot accurately be regarded as having stretched to include Black men. Regarding the Black men they kept enslaved as *Men-Not* legitimated the White determination to view them not as persons, but as subhuman beings of brute force.<sup>108</sup>

Through the same avaricious lenses, enslaved Black women were considered solely as what Jennifer L. Morgan has framed as *reproductive* chattel: useful for their labour, but also, perhaps more crucially, for their capacity to replenish an enslaver's workforce with each child to whom they gave life.<sup>109</sup> For this reason, in a trend unique to Cuba, once the slave trade finally appeared to be in real danger of ending, the purchase price for enslaved women rose sharply relative to the price of enslaved men.<sup>110</sup>

Though slavery had largely disintegrated as an institution in Spain by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Spanish slaveholding classes, by that point, were culturally, and sadistically, familiar with unleashing diabolical violence upon an enslaved population, having done so for centuries.<sup>111</sup> The fury, contempt, and distrust expressed by Cubans was therefore wholly familiar to them historically, even if no longer in practice. These emotions were comprehensible to elite Whites on both sides of the Atlantic, and it was that reality Cuban proslavery zealots capitalised upon. After centuries of the demonisation and reduction of Black persons, Cuban expressions of violent fearfulness were completely comprehensible in Spain.

## Emancipados: Racializing an island

These Spanish conceptions of race were knowingly antagonised by enslavers who sought to make Cuba appear more vulnerable for its putative *Whiteness*. Despite the 1841 census confirming, for the first time, that the Cuban population had a White minority, official correspondence from slaveowners consciously characterised the island as White. That vulnerable and beautiful daughter of Spain was deliberately presented to the metropole as being exposed jointly to the covetous imperial designs of the USA, Britain, and possibly France, but also, more menacingly in the eyes of the Crown, to the machinations of Jamaica, Haiti, and Cuba's own free and enslaved populations of colour, each of whom, allegedly, sought to claim the island for themselves.

Haiti, the Black republic whose immense revolutionary force haunted the slaveholding Atlantic, was evoked for this reason as a volcanic source of insurgency. Visible with the naked eye from the easternmost tip of Cuba, Haiti loomed over the island's enslavers with an ominous sense of *déjà vu*. When recently emancipated Jamaica was introduced into the equation, the slaveowners of Cuba saw themselves as surrounded by those they regarded as Black agitators who were poised to invade the island and overthrow White rule in scenes of unbridled bloodshed. Subsequently, race and Whiteness became key, alongside fear, to their creolised emotional protocol when calling to Spain for an urgent solution regarding Cuba's rapidly increasing number of *emancipados*. As Domingo del Monte expressed in the US periodical *The Democratic Review*:

The island of Cuba is at present in imminent danger of being irrecoverably lost not only to Spain, but to the white race and the civilized world, unless the Spanish government shall adopt immediately some energetic measures to remedy the evil. The blacks, as might have been expected, threaten the political and social existence of the colony.<sup>112</sup>

The defenceless island, del Monte made clear, was either to have been stolen away by a rapacious imperial nation or ravaged by what he unequivocally presented as “savage” Africa. (Depictions such as this one highlight monumental paradoxes in the thought process of each slaveowner. The assumed savagery and dangerousness of Black Africans was referenced frequently by enslavers, alongside the supposition that all enslaved and free Cubans of colour longed to incite “race war” against White Cubans. Meanwhile, the ferocity of Whites who enslaved Black persons stolen from their homelands as living, human plunder; who mercilessly worked Black persons to death by the hundreds of thousands; and who viciously brutalised Black persons using the most depraved and torturous forms of punishment was somehow not, in the minds of men like del Monte, any indication of White savagery or dangerousness at all. There was no reflection as to whether the Whites themselves had been committing “race war” against Africans since the dawn of racial enslavement.)<sup>113</sup>

These staggering ironies in White slaveholding logic notwithstanding, the enslavers of Cuba weaponized the power of their island’s vulnerability. The slaveowners that feminised Cuba made clear to the island’s metaphorical husband/metropole, Spain, that he was becoming an Atlantic cuckold, whose young, beautiful wife/colony was coveted by the major powers of the hemisphere. These imperial admirers desired to penetrate Cuba’s borders, overthrow torpid Spain, and seize the spoils. Seemingly, it served Cuban enslavers to emphasise this sparring match between various Atlantic masculinities vying after the same prize. This technique was deployed expertly (and provocatively) by three successful Havana merchants and members of the *Tribunal de Comercio*, Jorge P. Urtetégui, Nicolás Galcerá, and Alejandro Morales, when writing to the Spanish Minister of State who oversaw the governance of the overseas possessions:

The current question [...] [is] whether this island should maintain itself in its state of prosperity or disappear from the commercial map of the world and cease to exist for Spain [...] the moment [is] approaching in which it will come to be the cause of scandal, [the] motive of discord, and [cause] the definitive battle for maritime power between England and the United States.<sup>114</sup>

Correspondence sent by Francisco de Leyva, interim Minister of State, on 9 February 1828, exemplifies this method of portraying Cuba as being overrun by its growing number of *emancipados*, an approach that conjured images of that which was dreaded in White imaginations across the Atlantic as the likely outcome for all post-emancipation societies: Black men ravaging (supposedly) pure, virtuous, White women. “The excessive number of *emancipados* who inundate the island” he prophesized evocatively “could give rise to the total loss of that beautiful portion of the dominions.”<sup>115</sup> Alongside presenting to Spain the question of which Atlantic power might steal Cuba away, then, the risk was also made apparent that Africa could take her. A transcribed speech from “Deputy Sancho” (presumably Vicente Sancho y Cobertores, president of the Congress of Deputies in 1837), given in the Spanish Cortes and printed in South Carolina’s *Cheraw Gazette*, demonstrates that paranoia being utilised for its persuasive effect:

If, gentlemen, the island of Cuba should cease to be Spanish, it must belong to the *negro*. It cannot come under the power of any other nation, because, firstly, there is no nation powerful enough to subjugate 400,000 negroes, who, under the tropics, shall say, ‘we will not be governed by you’ [...] it may be said that the whites possess wealth and knowledge. They

possessed them also in Sto. Domingo. But of what avail are wealth and knowledge, when opposed to brutal force; when the question is one of exposure to the elements, of bearing fatigue, to which the slave is accustomed, and suffering the heat of the sun, of which the *negro* declares himself to be the child? What would be the result? The whites would be subdued, as they were exterminated in St. Domingo. (28 June 1837)

Those who had interests in the continuation of slavery conveyed the message that Spanish national integrity was wrapped up in the defence of beautiful, helpless, and above all *White* Cuba. Miguel Tacón, for example, knowingly emphasised the “sad and lamentable state of that island, which threatens at pace a *tremendous explosion*.”<sup>116</sup> Marla Stone’s study of the Italian Fascist regime, which sought methods to rouse the Italian population to war, reveals compelling similarities between the thought process behind Fascist wartime propaganda and the emotive correspondence sent from Cuban slaveowners to the Spanish Crown and colonial officials.

The dictatorship, Stone explains, realising the limitations of relying solely on pro-Fascist rhetoric, instead strategically deployed the use of fear. Depicting the Communist enemy as a dangerous and racially inferior threat to everything Italians valued most (the family, the Church, and the honour of Italian women) enabled the regime to manipulate that fear as a means of inciting the Italian people to war. For the state, fear was an invaluable catalyst for its ability to provoke and mobilise popular hostility against enemies both within and beyond the nation’s borders. Italians were therefore galvanised not by their support of Fascism, but by the vivid terror of the loss that faced them should they not fight against this dreaded enemy. The Fascist regime relied on awakening the collective fears of the Italian population in the same way that those with proslavery interests sought to stimulate in the Spanish Crown the compulsion to act defensively, lest the British succeed in causing the immediate liberation of Cuba’s *emancipados* to overwhelm and possibly destroy that most productive and prized colony.

As Stone demonstrates, the dictatorship relied on Sara Ahmed’s theorised “politics of fear” in a bid to provoke action. Proslavery Cubans did the very same thing. Fascists tailored their propaganda to inflame specific ideological and racial Italian fears, making plain to Italians that, unless they fought to defend their nation, all they held most dear would be destroyed by their Communist enemy. With the same logic, Cuban enslavers spoke directly to Spanish fears: fears of lost profit, of stolen empire, and racialised fears of internal African enemies. For the Fascists, where rousing defences of Fascism failed in their bid to inextricably bind the Italian people to their regime, emotions – namely terror and anxiety – proved immensely effective.<sup>117</sup> In a comparable sense, the consistent emotional writing style of Cuban slaveowners conveys to us their belief that *fearful* loyalty was far more convincing than loyalty alone.

The depiction offered by Urteátegui, Galcerá, and Morales of Cuba being “subverted and demoralized by terror and misery” should be considered an attempt to render Spain’s duty of protection an urgent question of national honour made yet more intense by their deliberate provocation of the racial anxieties of the age.<sup>118</sup> Their ominous musing: “perhaps there is no lack of those who have, to a degree of exaggeration, fears of an immediate insurrection of the blacks against the whites,” while typical in its style of foreboding warning, was mobilising their agenda. The letter, warning against the dangers of sudden mass emancipation, wasted no time in provoking metropolitan fear that the

consequence, more than bloodshed, would also be the financial collapse of the island on which imperial coffers so heavily relied:

What would be, going forward, the state of a population which was always living in continual alarm and anxiety, one part of the population against the other, and obligated to be cautious of an attack which is unforeseeable, but inevitable and terrible. The first consequence would be the discouragement of the capitalists, and the emigration [of those] who would be able to gather the necessities in order to go and live in peace [elsewhere] [...] The second would be the abandonment of sugar production companies, which are those that form almost exclusively the wealth which sustains the commerce [...] from which all classes live.<sup>119</sup>

### (Dis)loyalty, doubt, and censorship

This amplified fear of violence among the free and enslaved population should not necessarily be considered disingenuous or false. It is reasonable to assume that it was an emotional reality set to work as the central element of supplicative language used to awaken metropolitan dread. This is typified by proslavery correspondence that carefully emphasised slaveowner fear when stressing to the colonial government that lax censorship, simultaneously with emboldening enslaved people to plot violent insurrection, would also promise financially disastrous results. When Cuban slaveowners wished the open discussion of abolition in Spanish publications and newspapers to cease, they used their own professed fear to impress upon Spain the consequences widespread unease would have had upon the island's profitability, deploying emotion in the service of self-interest. Miguel Tacón bemoaned such materials, which were reportedly sailed over along with the mail and distributed surreptitiously across the island, with their origins ranging from New York and Bordeaux to Cádiz and beyond:

An anarchic and disorganising faction [...] whose objective is to tear away this possession from the mother country [...] to denigrate the principal authority by means of the press in order to tempt everyone down the road to disorder [...] to see whether, from Madrid, they may win over dissidents via the medium of the anonymous press [...] dedicated to the muddy goal of losing this island for Spain ... They [are] [...] met by the mockery of sensible people. But, at long distances, and in the farthest extremities of the island, they may leave unfavourable ideas in the minds of the simple people, and produce inconveniences most easy to conceive of.<sup>120</sup>

Adding to María Dolores Pérez Murillo's theorisation that "false sentimentalism" characterised proslavery correspondence to the colonial government in a bid to prompt tighter restrictions on Peninsular abolitionist tracts, it is evident that fear was just as crucial to that writing "etiquette" as sentimentalism was. Tacón's emphasis on the words "disorganising faction" and "losing this island for Spain," alongside references in the same letter to "disloyal Cubans, dedicated to the muddy ends of losing this island for Spain and for herself," serve to further underscore the loyalty of the proslavery voices seeking the colonial government's intervention.<sup>121</sup> Again, this demonstrates the uses of fearful loyalty as a persuasive rhetorical strategy, rather than simply a state of being. In this sense, loyalty was evidently a useful form of leverage, and not a unilateral advantage enjoyed solely by Spain. (The substantial profits Tacón notoriously enjoyed from the bribes he received from slave-traders positions him as a reliable mouthpiece



for enslaver interests on the island, giving voice to their frustrations since he, from a financial standpoint, arguably felt them too.)

Ironically, a Cuban who was neither altogether disloyal to Spain nor an abolitionist, José Antonio Saco, produced materials that exemplify the type of publications elite enslavers regarded as so deeply vexing. Exiled (by Miguel Tacón) from Cuba in 1834 for his liberal political views, Saco was a vocal spokesman against the slave trade, but not for entirely humanitarian reasons, and certainly not for anti-racist ones.<sup>122</sup> On the contrary, Saco wrote cold-bloodedly about enslavement itself, regarding it as essential to the Cuban economy. For this mouthpiece of nascent Cuban nationalism, however, the slave *trade* posed two issues he deemed intolerable. Saco, who was desperate both to ensure the island's continued prosperity and to achieve political representation in Spain, saw the slave trade as the factor that subdued Cuba under autocratic Spanish control and kept Cubans politically impotent, since the island's perceived instability justified (in the eyes of the Spanish Cortes) the political exclusion of Cubans.<sup>123</sup>

Of enslaved people, he mused uncaringly in an article published in Madrid in 1837: "I don't blame the Cuban who buys them, his plantation needs workers, and, finding no-one else to employ, should he lose his property?" Saving his indignation for another target, Saco added, with bitterness: "that which I accuse and incriminate is the government, who can and should end the infamous African contraband."<sup>124</sup> For Saco, continuing the slave trade to the island represented a staggering disregard for how dangerous the limitless introduction of new enslaved Africans was to Cuba, a process he regarded as a direct march towards devastating and inevitable violence.

Although in another 1837 piece also published in Madrid Saco did confront the reality that conditions aboard slave ships following the abolition of the trade had, almost inconceivably, worsened, in his forthright anti-slave trade treatise (published in Paris in 1845) Saco spoke directly to matters crucial to the interest of every capitalist considering investment in Cuba.<sup>125</sup> Bypassing attempts at evoking sympathy, Saco judiciously aimed for that which he felt was more likely to have had a measurable impact upon the slave trade. Speaking plainly about the reality that insurrections in Cuba were becoming more dangerous and numerous, Saco prophesied a dire economic reality by invoking the Samuel Sharpe Rebellion, which began in December of 1831, in Jamaica. Lasting five full weeks, during which time Whites resorted to astonishing violence in a bid to suppress the movement, the rebellion ultimately, as Tom Zoellner states, catalysed the end of British slavery shortly thereafter.<sup>126</sup> Saco used this event to paint a vivid image. While Jamaican enslavers were comfortably compensated by Britain following the abolition of slavery, Saco proffered that extensive violence in Cuba between enslavers and enslaved would bring about no such metropolitan succour, ending instead in unbridled violence:

Jamaica, amid its misfortunes, was able to console itself with the aid that its rich metropolis provided. But who would dry the tears that Cuba would shed in its hours of tribulation? Spain, withered away by the many disasters it has suffered, could give no financial help to its colony; [Cuba] would vainly implore it from foreign nations, [but,] her existence being compromised, they would all abandon her, leaving her surrendered to her fatal destiny.<sup>127</sup>

Although Saco seemed certain that White authorities would ultimately suppress any widespread insurrection mounted by the free and enslaved population of colour in Cuba, he took pains to forecast triumph, from a financial standpoint, as being acridly bittersweet:

Victory would be undoubted. But that same victory is that which we ought to avoid, because it would occasion our ruin. The victims who would fall under the grapeshot of the cannon would be our slaves, and our fields [would be] suddenly deprived of the only workers that fertilize and enrich them today. We would have to lament our destitution in the same arena of our triumph.<sup>128</sup>

By highlighting the fact that Cuba was becoming “more and more vulnerable each day” to attacks posed by Spain’s adversaries who were seeking to “rip the island away” from Spain, Saco was undermining the requisite element whose absence has ruinous effects upon capitalist investment: confidence.<sup>129</sup> In exploring the effects of human psychology on capitalism and the global economy, George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller illustrate that, when it comes to making significant investments, a sense of confidence is vital.<sup>130</sup> Saco’s writing deliberately exposed the precarity of Cuba’s situation as a strategy for disturbing investment. His desired result was for this upheaval to halt the illicit slave trade once and for all, as nothing less could reanimate doubtful capitalists to regard the island with optimism again. Prognosticating the course of events should his warnings go unheeded, he continued:

It is not necessary that the *negros* should rise up in one blow across the whole island; it is not necessary that her fields should all burn from one extremity to the other in one day alone: partial movements, repeated here and there, will be sufficient to destroy credit and confidence. At that point the emigration would begin, the capital would flee, [and] agriculture and trade would rapidly diminish [...] When we have such a horrendous prospect ahead of us, dare we still, with a greed so blind it touches on stupidity, import new Africans into our Cuba?<sup>131</sup>

It seems methods such as Saco’s were effective. On 5 March 1841, Captain General Pedro de Alcántara Téllez-Girón conveyed that, upon reading abolitionist publications originating from Spain:

Plantation owners and property holders [in Cuba] [...] threw themselves into lamentable hypotheses [...] as there are few among them in whose property is not included some black providing service [...] it was thought that the white race was in danger of a commotion placing them in the same painful situation as that of deplorable Haiti.

In a thinly-veiled hint, the Captain General continued by relating that the only way in which he was able to calm the nerves of those slaveowners (and keep them from moving their capital elsewhere) was to explain, privately, to each of them, “that the supreme government has neither occupied itself with such questions nor will it ever think of anything other than to respect the existing property and to disregard the theories of some abolitionist fanatics.”<sup>132</sup> Gerónimo Valdés, on 31 May 1843, similarly made the explicit point that “reckless” publications were generating distrust and scepticism in the minds of “timid” traders.<sup>133</sup> As was shown at the opening of this article, Cuba’s *Junta de Fomento* related the same message: materials generated in Madrid that spoke openly on the issue of abolition were causing “distrust and anxiety among the capitalists and plantation owners” who, increasingly full of doubt with regard to Cuba’s suitability as a sensible zone for their speculation, were beginning to believe that “the time has come to save the parts they still can of their fortune, moving it to countries which offer more stability and protection.”<sup>134</sup>

Fear was the ideal tool for unofficially lobbying for stricter censorship laws.<sup>135</sup> Portraying the island in a state of dismay was the intentional strategy of businessmen who linked emotion to capital when communicating their forecast of Cuban prosperity and loyalty to the Crown. The fear they evoked, and perhaps exaggerated, was done so pragmatically, with self-interest, and therefore should not be read as an impartial commentary on the unease of the island's investors, the genuine likelihood of their restive anxiety notwithstanding.

Joaquín de Cupeleta similarly stressed a frightfully familiar fate looming over Cuba, whose inhabitants were inundated by publications openly theorising on subjects that could spark revolutionary impulses. Of the diffusion of such documents, Cupeleta frankly explained:

There is no-one [these publications] do not reach, nor a point [they do] not circulate [...] they will be precursors, if not efficient causes for emancipation. Let us always remember what happened in different times when Americans have received their rights ... [we] have within our view the close island of Haiti [...] we will feel it painfully [...] [Peninsular abolitionism] will be a weapon in their hands to facilitate their emancipation.<sup>136</sup>

Both White massacre and the possibility of Cuba's independence were wed in Cupeleta's correspondence as the ultimate disasters that would confront Spain should these publications continue to be printed in Spain and covertly introduced into the island.

## Conclusion

Enslaver professions of fear and loyalty should not be regarded as having been artificially performative. Earnest pro-Spanish sentiment and profound fear of enslaved violence were undeniably strong among a vast number of elite Cuban slaveowners between 1830 and 1850, but emotions can be authentic whilst still being deployed and put to work pragmatically. The intention of this article has been to emphasise the utility of professed loyalty and fear, to explore the work fearful loyalty did, and how it was exploited by colonial actors stripped of any other form of political influence.

Politically disenfranchised elite Cuban enslavers attempted to wield their fearful loyalty as a persuasive and manipulative force at a time when they had to rely on informal, unofficial measures to have their voices heard by the metropolitan government. This rhetoric, although stylistically scripted, was more than effusively deferential: it was also gendered, emotional, and strategic. It has been argued that this writing style is evidence of creolisation at play, as the interests of enslavers on the island, while not necessarily anti-Spanish or anti-colonial, were motivated and flavoured by interests that were strictly colonial. This style was also mobilised by Peninsular Spaniards, both in the metropole and in Cuba, whose interests in the continuation of slavery and the illicit slave trade to the island led them to utilise the language of a creolised emotional protocol for their own gains.

This style was used to appeal for varying and, at times, competing ends. These men, in different moments, were fighting to end the slave trade; to continue the illicit slave trade; to dictate their own slave codes; to lambast existing slave codes; and to expel the British.<sup>137</sup> Although their objectives often contrasted, a rhetoric that deliberately played upon the island's vulnerability, and which emphasised imperial impotence by appealing to Spanish *vergüenza*, was common to all causes. The business of this article has not been

to measure how effective these appeals were in terms of the results and outcomes they brought about, but rather, to emphasise that fear was clearly thought of as being significantly persuasive to warrant its frequent, trans-Atlantic reference by Peninsular Spaniards and Creoles alike who wished to shape the future of slavery in Cuba.

This article has reframed the conception of Cuban enslavers as acquiescent settler colonists. Instead, it has stated that the self-awareness among Creoles of their childlike/feminised status within the Spanish imperial family allowed for the manipulation and coercion of the parental/husband figure: Spain. Self-interested and avaricious proslavery voices in Cuba found a way to appeal to Spain, turning the fearful loyalty of that island into an asset for persuasion. Its efficacy lay in the reality that, when Cuban enslavers purported to live in terror of their free and enslaved populations of colour, those messages made conceptual sense in Spain, a nation whose culture, literature, “science,” and Church had been legitimating racialised loathing, disparagement, expulsion, and enslavement for centuries by the 1830s. Fatal fictions of White supremacy and Black dangerousness were manipulated by mercenary, merciless enslavers seeking to coerce their metropole into protecting their ability to continue profiting from the enslavement and trade in human beings. It is hoped that this framework will invite new studies into the *uses* of loyalty and emotions by colonial actors, exploring their performance and deployment by approaching them not only as states of being or feeling, but also as rhetorical tools in the colonial armament.

## Notes

1. For a definition of slaveowner capitalism, this article subscribes to the explanation given in Clegg, “Capitalism and Slavery,” 281–304; for discussions concerning the capitalist intentions of Cuban intellectual and elite enslaver Francisco de Arango y Parreño, see Knight, “Origins of Wealth,” 231–253; and Tomich, “The Wealth of Empire,” 4–28.
2. “Exposición de la Junta de Fomento de Agricultura y Comercio de la Isla a la Regencia Provisional Del Reino Relacionada con la Abolición de la Esclavitud,” principally signed by El Conde de Villanueva, President of the Junta, [signed by 9 others, among them counts, marquises, and prominent landowners], Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba José Martí (henceforth BNCJM), classification: C.M. Exposición No. 2., 27 February 1841.
3. The communications under analysis were penned by enslaving male elites in Cuba that were sent to the Spanish Crown either as unprompted solicitations, akin to petitions (but never explicitly presented as such), or reports sent back in response to direct metropolitan enquiry. Fitting Heerma van Voss’s, definition, they were sent to the higher levels of the metropolitan power structure and conveyed “demands for a favour, or for the redressing of an injustice.” Heerma van Voss, “Introduction,” 1.
4. Pérez Murillo, “El Pensamiento Esclavista,” 407–414.
5. Cruz-Taura, “Annexation and National Identity,” 105.
6. Piqueras, “La siempre fiel isla de Cuba,” 427–486.
7. Sartorius, *Ever-Faithful Isle*, 84–91, 14; see also Hirschman’s classic political and economic study on loyalty *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*.
8. Ahmed, “The Affective Politics of Fear,” 64.
9. Bourke, “Fear and Anxiety,” 123.
10. *Ibid.*, 124.
11. Green, “Fear and Atlantic History,” 26–27.
12. Discussions pertaining to the supposedly benevolent nature of Iberian slavery when compared against anglophone slavery – be they contemporary proslavery claims, or more recent historiographical debates proffering that Spanish slavery was less barbarous in view

of the juridical and religious protections offered to enslaved people by law – belie the monstrous, hateful emotions of enslavers. The argument that slavery was more benign in Spanish America due to the religious conscience of Catholic slaveowners, most famously argued by Frank Tannenbaum, and the famed “Spanish Catholic Kindness” which supposedly characterised slavery in Spanish America as merciful and benevolent, has been proven as fantasy. Cuban enslavers were as brutal and punitive as non-Catholic enslavers, and if religion acted as a balm to calm and bridle the master’s ire, it was a question of personal religiousness, varying from enslaver to enslaver. Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen*; for a critique of Tannenbaum’s theory, see Degler, *Neither Black Nor White*, 19–20; and Rout *The African Experience in Spanish America*, 93; Alejandro de la Fuente offers an interesting revision to these dismissals, commenting on the continued value of Tannenbaum’s work as it concerned the path to manumission in Catholic Latin America, owing to the legal statutes of Castile, stating that: “the colonial state was not necessarily out of the reach of enterprising slaves,” while the *Siete Partidas* did protect the rights of enslaved people to marriage and baptism, which tied them into a “moral community” of social links with fellow worshippers who were occasionally above their own social status, as demonstrated by the choice of White Godparents. de la Fuente, “Slave Law and Claims-Making in Cuba,” 350–357.

13. Sartorius, “Of Expectations and Afterlives,” 154–157. I am very grateful to Camillia Cowling for encouraging me to develop these ideas.
14. Berbel, Marquese, and Parron, *Slavery and Politics: Brazil and Cuba*, 95–100.
15. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, termed by Ada Ferrer “the century of anti-slavery,” Cuba became a crucial imperial treasure chest. Ferrer, “Cuban Slavery and Atlantic Anti-slavery,” 135. See also Ferrer, *Freedom’s Mirror*, 17–43 (Chapter 1). Cuba came to mechanise and capitalise the system of enslavement significantly during what Dale Tomich has classed as the “Second Slavery” of the early nineteenth century, at which point the enslavement systems in Brazil, Cuba, and the southern US, underwent immense growth in terms of output, size of enslaved populations, and areas covered by plantation estate. Tomich, “Introduction,” ix. See also Blackburn, “Why The Second Slavery?,” 1–36 (Chapter 1).
16. Surwillo, *Monsters by Trade*, 9.
17. Sanjurjo, *In The Blood of Our Brothers*, 46. (My emphasis.)
18. Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery*, 65.
19. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 100–101.
20. Lawrence, *Spain’s First Carlist War*, 48–80.
21. Sharman, *Britain’s Informal Empire in Spain*, 35–37.
22. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 100.
23. *Ibid.*, 106–107.
24. Corwin, *Spain and the Abolition of Slavery*, 64–65.
25. Sanjurjo, *In The Blood of Our Brothers*, 73–76.
26. Reid-Vazquez, *The Year of the Lash*, 47.
27. The often violently insurgent enslaved population, and free people of colour who frequently masterminded insurrectionary movements, were believed both in the colony and metropole to threaten the island’s economic ruin. Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion*, 94; see also Barcia, *Seeds of Insurrection*; Barcia, *The Great African Revolt of 1825*; and Finch, *Rethinking Slave Rebellion in Cuba*.
28. Lazo, *Writing to Cuba*, 63–98.
29. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 28.
30. *Ibid.*, 17.
31. Opatrný, “José Antonio’s Path Toward Cubanidad,” 47–48.
32. Cruz-Taura, “Annexation and National Identity,” 90.
33. Opatrný, “José Antonio’s Path Toward Cubanidad,” 41–51.
34. *Ibid.*, 94.
35. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 14–36. Saco’s imagined Cuban identity was strictly a “Hispano-Cuban nationality” and was formed predominantly during the annexation efforts of

- the USA, when his conception of an (exclusively White) Cuban nationality began to calcify. Opatrný, "José Antonio's Path toward Cubanidad," 51.
36. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 30.
  37. Moreno Fragnals, "Nación o Plantación," 245. This nuanced examination depicts Saco's frustrated efforts to find ideological communion with a slaveocracy for whom, Fragnals explains, sugar was more important than nation, and who deemed it "more convenient to sacrifice the nation to sugar," rather than vice versa.
  38. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, therefore, whilst enforcing a European pledge against intervention in the American continents, was also a (successful) attempt by the Monroe Administration to preserve Spanish rule in Cuba, thereby strategically keeping the island from the British, while also protecting continued US access to sugar and coffee produced in Cuba, the main provider of those goods to the USA at the time. On the Monroe Doctrine and trade between Cuba and the USA see Chambers, *No God But Gain*; Ely, "The Old Cuba Trade," 456–478; and Rood, *The Reinvention of Atlantic Slavery*, 29–40.
  39. The 1823 attempt, *La Cadena Triangular*, was led by a group of Colombians. The slight ease in terms of printing regulations during *Trienio Liberal* allowed the agitators to produce and distribute broadsheets among Whites and free people of colour alike, claiming that they would remain "humble serfs and vile slaves" while they remained puppets with European strings and puppet-masters. Despite the plot to rid Latin America of Spanish rule being revealed to the authorities by enslaved people, the involvement of free people of colour in the movement was enough to provoke the ire and distrust of those in power. The next endeavour, the Mexican-influenced "*Aguila Negra*," led by Creoles, was also ultimately smothered. Following the failed attempts made by the United States to purchase Cuba in 1848, Venezuelan general in the Spanish army, Narciso López, made three failed filibustering attempts in Cuba, supported, in spirit only, by the USA and Cuban exiles therein. Sartorius, *Ever-Faithful Isle*, 84–91, 48–51, 70; Berbel, Marquese, Parron and Berbel, *Slavery and Politics: Brazil and Cuba*, 256–257.
  40. Naish, *Slavery and Silence*, 23; Havard, *Hispanicism and Early U.S. Literature*, 122–164.
  41. Wexler, "Sex, Race and Character," 121. I am very grateful to Richard E. Morris for encouraging me to engage with Wexler's work.
  42. Pérez Jr., *Cuba in the American Imagination*.
  43. Levine, "Introduction: Why Empire?," 2, 6.
  44. McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 26.
  45. Dionisio Vives to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación de Ultramar, Archivo General de Indias (henceforth AGI), Ultramar, legajo (leg.) 88, 31 May 1823; Dionisio Vives to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho, Ultramar leg. 88, 12 June 1823; *Ibid.*, leg. 88, 6 June 1823.
  46. "El Ayuntamiento de Vuestra Siempre Fidelísima Ciudad de la Habana" to the Monarch María Christina of the Two Sicilies, principally signed by El Marques de la Cañada Juan Tirry Lacy [accompanied by 8 signatures], Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Estado, leg. 8033, exp. 18, 19 October 1830.
  47. Franklin, *Women and Slavery*, 63; Cowling, *Conceiving Freedom*.
  48. Cowling, *Conceiving Freedom*, 140–141.
  49. Lauderdale Graham, "Writing From the Margins," 623. Lauderdale also uses the term "formulas" to describe these writing techniques, which applies equally well to the language under consideration here. 624.
  50. Pitt-Rivers, "Honour and Social Status," 43.
  51. *Ibid.*
  52. Pérez has pressed for historians of the 1960s onwards to "overturn the historiographical premises upon which the neo-colonial order rested," to disturb and counter-argue the prevailing "central assumptions of American hegemony in Cuba." Pérez Jr., "In the Service of the Revolution," 81–86.
  53. Sharman, *Britain's Informal Empire in Spain*, 3–5.
  54. Sanjurjo, *In the Blood of Our Brothers*, 81–85.
  55. *Ibid.*, 106–113.

56. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 147.
57. Reid-Vazquez, *The Year of the Lash*, 52.
58. Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 123–127.
59. Claudio Martínez de Pinillos to Leopoldo O'Donnell, AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2828, 20 April 1844.
60. Barcia, "El Conde de Villanueva," 292–298.
61. Garcia and Zanetti, *Sugar & Railroads*, 24.
62. Barcia, "El Conde de Villanueva," 299, 298.
63. Berbel, Marquese, and Parron, *Slavery and Politics: Brazil and Cuba*, 224. See also Guerra y Sánchez, *Manual de Historia de Cuba*, 311.
64. *Diario de la Habana*, no. 253. 10 September 1842 [clipping inserted in letter from Diputación Provincial de Santander to the Crown, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 4617, exp.13, no. 50, 29 June 1842.]
65. Claudio Martínez de Pinillos to Ministro de Hacienda, AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2828, no. 657, 29 April 1844.
66. Lambert, *White Creole Culture*, 37. Creolisation is best defined by Brathwaite, as the manner in which "a colonial polity reacts, as a whole, to external metropolitan pressures and at the same time to internal adjustments made necessary by the juxtaposition of master and labor, white and non-white, Europe and colony." Brathwaite, *Contradictory Omens*, 11; it should be noted that, in the context of White elites, as Yelvington illuminates, creolisation should be regarded "less as a kind of ontology and more as a kind of cultural identity," "The Anthropology of Afro-Latin America and the Caribbean," 250.
67. Lambert, *White Creole Culture*, 39, 13, 28.
68. Elliot, "Introduction: Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World," 9.
69. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge*, 24.
70. Lambert, "The Counter-Revolutionary Atlantic," 415.
71. Miguel Tacón to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 4627, exp. 1, no. 15, 31 August 1836.
72. Gerónimo Valdés to the Junta de Comercio de Cataluña, BNCJM, classification: C.M. Morales T.78, No. 135, 28 April 1842.
73. Hochschild, *The Managed Heart*, 57–59.
74. Diputación Provincial de Santander to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación de Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar leg. 4617, exp.13, no. 50, 29 June 1842.
75. Rodrigo y Alharilla's study explores the enormous profits Spaniards based in major port cities such as Barcelona, La Coruña, Cádiz, and Santander, made from their investments in the slave trade. These men, when considered alongside the Spanish colonial employees in Cuba who profited from the bribes they received for turning a blind eye to the trade, typify mercenary European pro-slavery sympathies in the age of abolition. Rodrigo y Alharilla, "Spanish Merchants and the Slave Trade," 176–200.
76. Petition of the Diputación Provincial de Santander, sent to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación de Ultramar, 29 June 1842, (see note 54 above.)
77. *Ibid.*
78. These letters can be found in AHN, Ultramar leg. 4617, exp. 12 & 13.
79. Petition of the Junta de Comercio de Barcelona to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar leg. 4617, exp. 12, 17 February 1843; Junta de Comercio de Cádiz to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación de Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar leg. 4617, exp. 12, 13 February 1843.
80. *Ibid.*
81. Petition of the Junta de Comercio de Cataluña to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación de Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar leg. 4617, exp. 12, 31 March 1843.
82. Junta de Comercio de Cádiz to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Marina, Comercio y Gobernación de Ultramar, 13 February 1843, (see note 77 above.)
83. Casanovas, *Bread or Bullets!*, 44–46; Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 4.
84. "Exposición de la Junta de Fomento de Agricultura y Comercio ...", Principally signed by El Conde de Villanueva, 27 February 1841. (See note 2 above.)

85. Francisco de Arango y Parreño to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Gracia y Justicia, AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2828, 30 August 1830.
86. Claudio Martínez de Pinillos to Ministro de Hacienda, AGI, Indiferente, leg. 2828, no. 657, 29 April 1844.
87. "Informe de la Comisión, Nombrada al Efecto, Sobre el Proyecto de Convenio de SM Británica Relativo a la Libertad de los Esclavos," Ignacio Francisco de Borja de Peñalver y Peñalver (Marquis de Arcos), Evaristo Carillo, Narciso García y Mora, and Tomás de Juara, BNCJM, C.M. Morales, T.78, No.123, 28 September 1841.
88. Claudio Martínez de Pinillos to Ministro de Hacienda, 29 April 1844. (See note 60 above.) (Emphasis in original.)
89. Hennenon, "Introduction: Adjusting to Fear," 10.
90. Barcia, *West African Warfare*.
91. Hennenon, "Introduction: Adjusting to Fear," 10. Freud separated fear and anxiety based on whether the subject is reacting to a threatening event that has already taken place, or anticipating something dreaded, but not yet materialised: "fear and anxiety are states of fearful preparedness for danger: anxiety is a generalized preparedness; fear is directed towards a specific worldly object." As such, while it can be said that Spain *feared* losing another portion of its empire, as it had done many times before, the prospect of its island being stolen away by Haiti or the USA was more a source of *anxiety*. Lear, *Freud*, 154. For further discussion on the definition and characteristics of fear, and how it differs from anxiety, see Bourke, *Fear: A Cultural History*, 189–192; Weiss, "Introduction: Fear and Its Opposites," 1–9.
92. McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 23, 24, 27.
93. Johnson, *The Social Transformation of Eighteenth Century Cuba*, 1.
94. This is the title of Robert Paquette's monograph investigating the *Escalera* conspiracy. Paquette, *Sugar is Made with Blood*.
95. Karenga, *Introduction to Black Studies*, 115–124; on the use of the term "Holocaust" see also Sundquist, *Strangers in the Land*, 435–502. On "Maafa" – the Kiswahili term meaning "human tragedy" or "terrible disaster," and generally used in reference to the slave trade – see Ani, *Let the Circle be Unbroken*.
96. Branch, *Colonialism and Race*, 42–44; see for instance Reilly, *The Medieval Spains*, 191–192.
97. Ikeotuonye, "The Leviathan Black Hole and the Hydra It Beholds," 92.
98. Branch, *Colonialism and Race*, 49.
99. Those who were born to two married Catholic parents were considered to have had "*limpieza de sangre*," entitling them to benefit from public esteem and to occupy positions of power within society. The *Siete Partidas* of the thirteenth century made clear the fact that Catholicism and birth by married parents entitled a man to "*honra*" (honour) and would further enable him to benefit from social respect and "*fama*": defined in the Thirteenth Century *Siete Partidas* as "the good state of [a] man who lives rightly, and according to law and proper customs." Twinam, *Public Lives, Private Secrets*, 44–45.
100. Bhabha, "The White Stuff," 21.
101. Ferber, "Constructing Whiteness," 60. See also Guess, "The Social Construction of Whiteness," 649–673.
102. de la Fuente and Gross, *Becoming Free, Becoming Black*, 15. See also Nagel, *Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality*, 96.
103. Sweet, "The Iberian Roots of American Racist Thought," 144.
104. Robinson, *Black Marxism*, 81–82.
105. Curry, *The Man-Not*, 29.
106. Franklin, *Women and Slavery*, 1.
107. Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy*, 239. On nineteenth century conceptions of Spanish masculinity see Forsting, *Raising Heirs to the Throne*, 18, 103, 102.
108. *Ibid.*, 7. See also 6, 8.
109. Morgan, *Laboring Women*, see especially 69–106. (My emphasis.)
110. Bergad, Iglesias Garcia, and Del Carmen Barcia, *The Cuban Slave Market*, 154.



111. Branch, *Colonialism and Race*, 57.
112. Cited in Murray, *Odious Commerce*, 180.
113. I am sincerely grateful to the second anonymous reviewer of this article for their comments on this section in particular.
114. "Exposición presentado por el tribunal de comercio de la isla de Cuba en solicitud de apoyo contra cualquier medida inoportuna que se proponga en las cortes sobre la abolición de la esclavitud en esta isla," Tribunal de Comercio de la Siempre Fidelísima Ciudad de la Habana, signed Jorge P, Urtetégui, Nicolás Galcerá, Alejandro Morales, to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación de Ultramar, BNCJM, classification: C.M. Exposición No.1, 30 March 1841.
115. "Acuerdo Del Consejo de Estado," Francisco de Leyva to Secretario Interino de Estado, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 3548/9, exp. 4, 9 February 1828.
116. "Comunicación dirigida al ministro del interior en donde relata extensamente las actividades antiesclavistas en Jamaica, SD y EU, destacando la influencia que ello pudiera tener para Cuba" (no. 121), Miguel Tacón to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho del Interior, BNCJM, C.M. Tacón No.19, 31 August 1835.
117. Stone, "Italian Fascism's Wartime Enemy," 115–128.
118. "Exposición presentado por el tribunal de comercio de la isla de Cuba ..." Urtetégui, Galcerá, and Morales, 30 March 1841, (see note 68 above.)
119. *Ibid.*
120. Tacón makes reference to several publications: *Paginas Cubanas*, *Cuadro Político de la Isla*, *Carta de un Patriota (osea) Clamores de los Cubanos*, and *La Isla de Cuba Tal Cual Está*, explaining that one was printed in New York, another in Bordeaux, and the other in Cádiz. Miguel Tacón to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación (de Ultramar), AHN, Ultramar, leg. 4627, exp. 1, no. 15, 31 August 1836. for Tacón's increasing frustration, see Opatrný, "El Estado-Nación o la 'Cubanidad'," 375–376.
121. *Ibid.*
122. Tacón's sending anti-slave trade mouthpiece José Antonio Saco into exile is unsurprising considering Tacón's financial interests in the continuation of the trade. Casanovas, *Bread or Bullets!*, 44–46.
123. Schmidt-Nowara, *Empire and Antislavery*, 18–21.
124. José Antonio Saco, *Paralelo entre la isla de Cuba y algunas colonias inglesas*, 17.
125. Saco exposed the reality that, while previously those Africans were subject to vaccinations; quarantine in case of contagion; cured, when possible, of any diseases they may have developed on the journey; and kept in at least an attempted state of sanitation, since the abolition of the slave trade, the slave trader's only goal was to fill his boat with as many enslaved people as physically possible, losing as many as was necessary to death and disease along the way. Saco, *Mi primera pregunta*, 14.
126. Zoellner, *Island on Fire*, 4–5.
127. Saco, *La supresión del tráfico de esclavos africanos*, 49–50.
128. *Ibid.*, 50.
129. *Ibid.*, 58.
130. Akerlof and Shiller, *Animal Spirits*, 13. See also: 11–18.
131. Saco, *La supresión del tráfico de esclavos africanos*, 51, 57.
132. El príncipe de Anglona Marques de Javal Quinto, Pedro de Alcántara Téllez-Girón to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación de Ultramar, ANC, Gobierno Superior Civil (GSC), leg. 940, no. 33145 (no. 174), 5 March 1841.
133. Gerónimo Valdés to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobierno de Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 4617, exp. 13, no. 677, 31 May 1843.
134. "Exposición de la Junta de Fomento de Agricultura y Comercio ..." Principally signed by El Conde de Villanueva, 27 February 1841 (see note 2 above).
135. *Ibid.*
136. Joaquín de Cupeleta to Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de la Gobernación de Ultramar, AHN, Ultramar, leg. 4627, exp. 1, no. 5, 14 January 1839.

137. For examples of enslavers sending beseeching correspondence concerning codification of enslavement that was considered (or presented as being) unsafe, see Tardieu, *Morir o Dominar*, 201–263.

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