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# Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's *In Praise of Shadows* and critical transparency

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## ABSTRACT

Mainstream reception of Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's literary essay *In'ei Raisan/ In Praise of Shadows* (1933) has tended to swing between writing it off as a nostalgic nationalist exceptionalism and marketing it as a melancholic hymn to everyday beauty, although recently much more nuanced positions have emerged in terms of the text's aesthetic 'authenticity'. There is much more at stake in *In'ei Raisan*, however, including a perception of the evisceration of negativity and a surrender to a cybernetically foreclosed, capital-driven future, and this should be located relative to much older and much newer concerns. This themescape becomes more obvious when the essay's driving image of the shadow is understood as part of a long negotiation to the total control of space by a property-owning subject, whose rise had been naturalised as progress during Japan's unification and 'modernisation', primarily via a British empire which was morally sustained by a Scottish Enlightenment 'empiricism of history'. This unification of, and dominion over, space gives *In'ei Raisan* such extraordinary similarities to the field recently identified as Critical Transparency Studies, similarities which are explored here.

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## The stakes of *In'ei Raisan*

In the Anglosphere, Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's essay *In'ei Raisan/ In Praise of Shadows* (1933) has moved, over the last few decades, from being an obscure but beautiful expression of national melancholy to a popular paperback sitting a battleground between condemnation of Japanese particularism and praise for 'mindful' environmental harmony. For some it still means a disappearance into nostalgia, for an increasing number it signals a

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crucial pushback against commercial empire. The extensive 2023 comparativist study of the text's origins and travels by Nishimura Masahiro, moreover, importantly describes a millennial boom in selling this essay-book as 'in praise of Japan', with a hint of abject melancholy missing in more overtly counter-imperial texts.<sup>1</sup> In 2009 Margherita Long's highly-original orientation of Tanizaki towards gender and psychoanalysis pioneered one path by tracking the inter-war cultural history of the eminent Japanologist Harry Harootunian's subtle description of an early Showa Era (1926–) 'culturalist' turn as a renegotiation of a 'modernisation' already visited on Japan (*Overcome by Modernity*, 2000), but without following Harootunian to assume that this 'culturalism' necessitated a denial of the political.<sup>2</sup> Even the most counter-imperial or subversive '30s 'culturalism' had its dangers, of course, and many would see a particularist Buddhism as easily overwhelmed by militarist ideology, but the potential of the text outweighs this.<sup>3</sup> In describing Tanizaki's relation to a visual field, Thomas Lamarre has, with one eye on the Cornell Professor Naoki Sakai, one of the few writers on the Anglosphere-Japan cultural relationship to be taken really seriously outside Japan itself, helped redefine an apparent traditionalism as a re-location of an already-established 'modernised Japan' whose Anglo-American universalism is forced into a clash with everyday experience.<sup>4</sup> *In'ei Raisan* has even further-reaching implications, though: this *zuihitsu* – literary essay, or literally 'following the brush' essay – describes a social realm that has become entirely evaluative, and a hegemonic understanding of modernity as a unification of space, something I have described as hard-wired into Meiji Era (1868–1912) Japan by the mid-nineteenth century moral underpinnings of the British empire. Correspondingly, *In'ei Raisan*'s ontology of the shadow says something fundamental about a sense of political 'stuckness' that has seemed to characterise the first couple of decades of the twenty-first century, a depressive feeling of relationships falling to escape evaluative mediation. Tanizaki makes explicit this totalisation as the penetration of light, the progressive visual identification of objects for moulding and exchange, which should now be seen as a metaphysics in itself. This is also what is at stake in our attempt to imagine 'shadowy' futures not predetermined by a progressive operationalisation of the world working a universalist domination of space. This helps explain why Tanizaki's essay shows such extraordinary resonances with the later field of Critical Transparency Studies, a field that takes in work including Thomas Docherty's *Confessions: The Philosophy of Transparency* (2012), Byung-Chul Han's *The Transparency Society* (2015), Emmanuel Alloa and Dieter Thomä's *Transparency, Society and Subjectivity* (2018), and Clare Birchall's *Radical Secrecy* (2021), and with a prehistory of transparency scepticism passing through, amongst others, Jean Baudrillard and Gianni Vattimo, as well as millennial policy debates. This field's concerns with a totalised space and light as a public

virtue became even more pointed with the way 2020–2022 Covid lockdowns were used to justify the mediation of ‘public’ communication by screens, algorithms, capital. This crossover suggests that *In’ei Raisan* has a surprising amount to say about collective agency’s struggle with an algorithmically-enforced, progressive isolation within the subject-self.

In unpacking these stakes of *In’ei Raisan*, it is important to understand that the early ‘modernisation’ processes unifying Japan, although typically ascribed to ‘the west’, in fact closely tracked the conditions unifying the British Union, and its monopoly on the morality of progress. In his half-concealed speculation about this progressive monopoly, the ’30 Tanizaki bears comparison not only to competing literary fashions of the time, but also the philosophy of the Kyoto School – a loose grouping following Nishida Kitarō and aiming to renegotiate European philosophy from a ‘peripheral’ Japanese standpoint. Understood in this way, a Kyoto-inflected *In’ei Raisan* speaks directly to the millennial *impasse* of capitalist realism also animating Critical Transparency Studies. The voluntary-yet-forced adjustments that culminated in Japan’s 1868 ‘opening’ had closely tracked a British moral universalism honed over the long eighteenth century and more widely unfolded in the nineteenth. Beginning from the English *coup* of 1688, then the Acts of Union and the turn-of-the-eighteenth-century financial revolution, the British empire would insist on virtuous ‘worldly’ moral credentials via a natural progressive ordering of space around an empiricist individual able to evaluate and mould the world’s resources as objects. This rise of the knowing-owning subject came to anchor *history itself* during the Scottish Enlightenment, as ambitious individuals in Britain’s barbaric peripheries described natural laws justifying the inclusion of all hardworking, value-producing individuals in empire. In turn the Scottish Enlightenment’s ‘empiricist historiography’ became the foundation of the moral case for forcing open East Asia during the First Opium War (1839–42), leading, after a couple of decades of internecine struggle, to Japan’s Meiji Restoration of 1868. Like much Japanese writing struggling to renegotiate this Meiji legacy, *In’ei Raisan* obliquely but powerfully addresses this historiographical universalism, in an essay that turns from the apparently-innocent theme of building a house to a critique of the penetration of light into all space, the separating out of objects for individual instrumentalisation apparently fixed as a condition of progress.

In one reading, Tanizaki’s path towards *In’ei Raisan* is typical of an early Showa (1926-) ‘turn to Japan’. Kinya Tsuruta describes a now-familiar story of how until around 1921 Tanizaki ‘adored the West and abused what he characterised as a poor and dirty Japan; but something happened to his passion when he fled to the Kansai district [the Kyoto-Osaka-Kobe area] after the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923’.<sup>5</sup> Certainly, many literati either left Tokyo or resented the city’s new blindingly bright shopping arcades.<sup>6</sup>

*In'ei Raisan* has one recent returnee from Europe suggesting that Tokyo, not Paris, is now the world's city of light, with real darkness confined to the mountains.<sup>7</sup> Tokyo's streets were increasingly defined by what Han calls *exhibition*, or constant illumination for consumption.<sup>8</sup> Tanizaki begins to rehearse his moral qualms about this in his 1924–25 novel *Chijin no ai/Naomi*, in which a *sarariman* 'reimagines' a young girl as a Hollywood film icon, enthralled by her brightness.<sup>9</sup> The earlier Tanizaki had been dedicated to film; by the mid-'20s, film's visual command of everyday life had prompted, as Thomas Lamarre describes, an awareness in Tanizaki of a 'double consciousness' in Asian cinematic modernity.<sup>10</sup> Photography also arose, as Atsuko Sasaki describes, alongside both a popular learning of 'how to look and how to be present in images', and a new concern with subjectivity in literature.<sup>11</sup> Crucially in Tanizaki's fiction, photography gradually sheds fidelity: by *Chijin no ai*, Jōji's pictures of Naomi have a taken on granularity and tactility, despite the protagonist's ideal whitewashing, for Sasaki exposing the schism between the visual machine and the personal, and 'effectively destabiliz[ing] the scheme of representation'.<sup>12</sup> This signals not a simple traditionalism in the Tanizaki of this period, but a desire to destabilise and redeploy apparently fixed images within an 'objective' visual field.<sup>13</sup> In *Tade Kuu Mushu/ Some Prefer Nettles* (1929), identified by Gregory Golley as the point at which Tanizaki began to agitate against 'ideological formations that expressed themselves hegemonically through paradigms of progress', a disaffected Kansai husband turns from Hollywood's constant 'display' to the 'dark radiance' of *bunraku*/ puppet theatre.<sup>14</sup> The ontological role of shadow is already readable here – the unease about shining white bathrooms, the attraction to shadowy corners.<sup>15</sup>

As *zuihitsu* became Tanizaki's preferred mode of expression at the turn of the '30s, *In'ei Raisan* concentrated these concerns into a thought experiment about building a house able to resist this total penetration of light. The essay sets out by considering each room and utility, according to what seems like a slightly grumpy personal set of preferences, but really aimed at the machinic progressive domination of space, and protecting the 'feeling of sitting in dim light, taking in the faint reflection of the *shōji* [paper sliding door], sunk in meditation or gazing at the garden through the window'.<sup>16</sup> So this house avoids light-transmitting and reflecting materials – electric lights most obviously, but also bathroom tiles, air conditioning, and glass.<sup>17</sup> Each room's interior also encourages an awareness of seasons, and encourages pleasure *within* the surrounding ecology.<sup>18</sup> Again, this is not an *anti-modern* stance: Tanizaki understands there is no 'turning back' (*gyakumodori*) from a light-flooded modernity – however the apparent inevitability of the penetration of all space *as modernity itself* is leavened by the unknowable that belongs in the shadow.<sup>19</sup> The shadow is what prevents all space being progressively arranged around a subject-self tasked with evaluating

and moulding the world.<sup>20</sup> Shadows seep into everything in the room: *yōkan*/ ‘bean jelly’ draws darkness into the body, and *akamiso*/ red miso ‘blends with darkness’.<sup>21</sup> Shadowy things have unclear borders, as in *sumi-e*/ ink paintings, or lacquerware.<sup>22</sup> And overall what distinguishes this from the currently desirable house, as Tanizaki describes with extraordinary prescience, is that it is not *perforated by communication*.<sup>23</sup> It does not belong to datafied space; and, like the Buddhist temple, it doesn’t leave shadows in its wake in a conquest of space, but rather *starts in* the shadows.<sup>24</sup>

In this haptic world, scratches and blemishes are cherished for their ability to bear a memory, while polishing, or clarifying, creates an amnesia much like that created by an overwhelming by data.<sup>25</sup> Old temples and shadowy houses, through grime, can remain haunted by pasts otherwise destroyed by the urge to clarify, and the patina (*sabi*) of Chinese metals has a character and dignity, as do temples where ‘you could believe that the dust in the corners has sunk into the paper’.<sup>26</sup> Michael Bernstein and Gary Saul Morson describe an unearthing of ideas ‘submerged beneath unidirectional historical narratives’, a revisiting of their ‘unrealized possibilities’ to return a ‘multidirectional’ present to a capitalist progress that has seemed inevitable and indeed automated. In fact this is much like what would later in England be called *hauntology*, or a recovery of buried possibilities for other possible liveable futures.<sup>27</sup> It is not that the shadowy room of *In’ei Raisan* is *timeless*, as used to be assumed of a ‘nostalgic’ essay – on the contrary, it contains *time-specific* fragments reanimating another flow of time and the ‘lost futures’ within them.

This return more broadly marks a *renegotiated* modernity in which the unification of space is not all-determining. Light-unification no longer has a metaphysical monopoly; or as Akira Mizuta Lippit glosses *In’ei Raisan*, grime generates a ‘negative luminosity’.<sup>28</sup> Critical Transparency writers speculate something extraordinarily similar: for Han, shadows can make things *appear*, whereas they had disappeared under conditions of hypervisibility; or earlier for Baudrillard, ‘things disappear through proliferation, by becoming saturated or transparent’.<sup>29</sup> In Tanizaki’s murky world, empiricist typologies are not always metaphysical truths. Colours, for example, might be understood in terms of affect as much as of evaluable wavelength.<sup>30</sup> And this applies, crucially, to cultural experience. An ‘enshadowing’ of pure whiteness, for example, comes through the mask of *nō* theatre, whose ‘cloudiness’ anticipates transparency critics’ defences of ‘masks, mystery, enigmas’.<sup>31</sup> *In’ei Raisan*’s terminology, that is, begins to dismantle the metaphysics of the visually unified world: *fukasa*, for example, usually translated ‘depth’, here means something more like ‘out of the light’. Shadows themselves have gradations which are almost imperceptible to the unfamiliar, who see only stark, undecorated rooms.<sup>32</sup> And most tellingly, in this silent spot where space is not arranged around the seeing subject, history acts

differently, ‘we lose track of the passage of time’, so that timelines outwith a unipolar progress become possible.<sup>33</sup> What, then, is the ‘automated’ history to which this is responding, and why is the resistance to it important?

## Commerce and clarity

The ‘modernisation’ that *In’ei Raisan* resists might be better understood as modernity-as-spatial-universalism. Meiji modernisation had been hardwired to the spread of light: the contemporary buzzword *bunmei*, civilisation, is transliterable as *culture-light*, and *Meiji* itself as *bright-government*. After the Meiji Restoration, as Kyoto writer Kōyama Iwao describes, ‘[o]vernight everything about the Edo [pre-Meiji] period was condemned as a form of medieval darkness’.<sup>34</sup> In the British or Anglosphere understanding of the modern, progress meant a greater typologising and operationalising as the world as objects; moreover, *viewing* discrete objects became inseparable from *owning* them (something readable in the crossovers between John Locke’s ‘political empiricism’ in *Two Treatises on Government* and his ‘scientific empiricism’ in *Essay on Human Understanding*).<sup>35</sup> The great anchor for the typologising impulse that reached its zenith in the Scottish Enlightenment and provided a moral underpinning for East Asian expansion was *Opticks* (1704), by Locke’s fellow-activist for the 1688 *coup* and the financial revolution, Isaac Newton. *Opticks* redefined space as absolutely universal and containing all things and ‘discoverable’ by universal rules, and this spatial universalism would become the backbone of England-then-Britain’s arithmetic regime and its *natural laws of progress*, or historiographical universalism, for which a single path was trodden by all peoples towards ‘commercial society’.<sup>36</sup> Numerous early eighteenth-century Scoto-British literati in particular drew on *Opticks* to describe the new British state *as light*, and the ‘uncovering’ of the world as a naturally civilising force, and this would become more far-reaching within the more familiar phase of the Scottish Enlightenment.<sup>37</sup>

It was Japan’s encounter with a particularly hard-edged version of the long Scottish Enlightenment (of repurposings of Adam Smith particularly), ultimately drawing on Newtonian techno-moral laws of space applied to the world as resources, that had begun to unravel the authority of the Tokugawa regime, after ripping through the neighbouring superpower of China. For British market progressives, China had been ‘slumbering’ – missing the liberatory ethics of exchange by blocking trade in opium (neatly imaging the addictive nature of commercial empire’s self-affirming individualism, something well identified by transparency critics’ linking of total accessibility and isolated narcissism).<sup>38</sup> Indeed the Smith explicator Dugald Stewart had been the Edinburgh mentor of Opium War hawks in politics and commerce around the start of the nineteenth century (Lord Palmerston not least),

and the central figures of the Meiji Restoration had almost all been armed by, and smuggled to Britain for education by, Smith-inflected Scoto-British opium traders.<sup>39</sup> Rapidly-adapting Meiji era elites then oversaw a wholesale transmission of Scottish Enlightenment ethics that has rarely been accounted for in its proper specificity: for Scotland within the new British union, universalist rules of progress had enabled participation in a nascent commercial empire; for Meiji Japan, they did the same.<sup>40</sup> As Japan's most influential moderniser, encyclopaedist and educator Fukuzawa Yukichi, would put it, Japan was *hankai*, *half-developed* – it had a chance to open up to universalist narratives of progress that should be vigorously grasped.<sup>41</sup>

The clan battles resulting from witnessing the Opium War also speak to Nishimura Daisuke's, and later Nishimura Masahiro's, description of the way Tanizaki's essay drew from a 'Chinese orientalism': even during what used to be seen as Tanizaki's Occidentophile phase, the remnants of a British-dominated China provided a bridge to an exoticism he overtly approached 'as a foreigner', a kind of strangeness to the self he would import to his own country's Kansai region – not just a relatively 'old-fashioned' area, but also now the home of the Kyoto School of philosophical revisionists.<sup>42</sup> *In'ei Raisan*, then, is full of a kind of Sinic rediscovery, of a reconsideration of the civilizational specificity of the East Asia. As most readers of Tanizaki now acknowledge, *In'ei Raisan* was no simple 'return to Japan', but rather a more complicated renegotiation with pre-ordained universalisms and already-set orientalisms. A China in the middle of coping with British imperial enclaves then became a repository of the now-archaic to be redeployed as what Nishimura interestingly calls a 'Kansai raisan', an alter-modern return to a 'modernised' country.<sup>43</sup> Or for Long, the apparently 'culturalist' return of *In'ei Raisan* is really a counter-universalist consideration of roots of modernity in Japan's own past.<sup>44</sup>

Tanizaki's unwillingness to *polish* the stuff of the room in *In'ei Raisan*, moreover, belongs to a longer rejection of the Scoto-British insistence on an ideal of perfectly clear representation that helped fix Japan in Meiji modernity. From around the 1870s the Meiji Enlightenment transmitted, with extraordinary faithfulness, the Scottish Enlightenment's equally-peripheral demand to standardise and polish language to clearly represent objects and ideas to become ready for exchange. William Barron's *Lectures on Belles Lettres and Rhetoric* (1781), amongst many others, describes how Scotland specifically needs 'to polish her language and her pronunciation' to flourish in commercial empire – and this need for perspicuity was stressed by *most* major late-eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment figures at some point.<sup>45</sup> (And especially when magnified by the import of long-eighteenth-century Enlightenment axioms by the US, this binding of progress, commercial extraction, and clear language, is what part of what gives the term *Anglosphere* a specific valency). Meanwhile, as transparency critics



have described, clarity and openness would become character traits associated with fairness, with language stripped of connotation and ambivalence.<sup>46</sup> Birchall describes the association between despotic monarchies and the shadowy apparently overcome during the scientific revolution (and so Anglosphere liberalism) – ‘darkness and light were the textual and visual metaphors to capture the desired transition from legitimacy drawn from arbitrary sources and maintained by secrets and mystery to one drawn from reason’.<sup>47</sup>

This emergence of the discrete subject claiming dominion over the world-as-objects had been an existential demand of the British ‘empiricist empire’ even in its foundation and its *raison d’état*. ‘Dualism’ is often abbreviated as ‘Cartesianism’, but it is only in Locke’s political translation of Newtonian laws that the arrangement of space around an *owning* subject-self becomes a truly world-unifying principle. Newton had insisted on spatial universalism, arguing with Descartes’ tendency to attach space to specific things: for Newton, all space is uniform, and all things are linked to a pre-existing calculable space.<sup>48</sup> Building on the idea of a totally even space, representationalism demands perfection of the world by and for a subject which, paradoxically, also pre-exists space and ‘discovers’ universal laws.<sup>49</sup> The metaphysical goes underground as the viewing subject, in other words. The divine is morally redeployed as the *arithmetic*, and calculation becomes ‘the ground plan of history’.<sup>50</sup> This ‘discovered’ therefore monopolised progress then relies on what we might call a cybernetic evisceration of human agency. And where progress is reduced to observing-and-evaluating, morality becomes dependent on visual fidelity – shadows, ontologically as well as physically, are backward and feudalistic, and have to be wiped away.

*In’ei Raison* was one strong part of a long reaction against this demand for transparent representation – a demand particularly obvious amidst Tokyo’s Benjamin-like bright arcades of the 1920s–30s, but going right back through the Meiji Era. Since the 1860s, public intellectuals, including the key importer and translator of Anglo-empiricist philosophy Nishi Amane and his *Meiroku Zasshi* circle, had called to simplify Japanese language to *kana* (‘phonetic characters’), or even to replace it with English, in order to free it of mystery and connotation and make it more transparent.<sup>51</sup> ‘Language reform’ societies were common mid-Meiji, and de-kanjification (removal of ‘Chinese characters’) underscored Tsubouchi Shōyō’s *Shōsetsu shinzui/ The Essence of the Novel* (1885), hugely influential on a generation of writers, then *genbun itchi* – a unification of speech and writing to become mainstream from the 1900s in the *shishōsetsu/* ‘I-novel’, for which, as Arthur Mitchell says, ‘linguistic transparency was closely tied to notions of sincerity and authenticity’.<sup>52</sup> As Karatani Kōjin has described (famously, since this book was translated into English then prefaced by Frederic Jameson), the development of this ideal of representative script was closely

tied to the development of a subject-self to be discovered in discovering an object-world.<sup>53</sup> Brian Hurley adds that *genbun itchi* acted as a leveller for upcoming provincial bureaucrats, which is to say that it had much the same social function as it had had for peripheral Scottish demands for rhetorical perspicuity.<sup>54</sup> Tanizaki was one of the most vocal critics of *genbun itchi*, which he came to associate with an imperially-imposed ‘luminescence, efficiency, and rationality’, *reducing* referential possibilities; *Chijin no ai* is easily readable as a pointed distortion of the *shishōsetsu* form, and he remained wedded to *kanji*’s power of *connotation*.<sup>55</sup> So within a cultural turn-of-the-1930s ‘Showa restoration’ – historically far too often associated with the kind of ultranationalist takeover the Kyoto School plotted *against* – a critique of the ideal of linguistic clarity becomes necessary for what Hurley calls ‘multidirectional possibilities for cultural renewal’.<sup>56</sup> In non-representationalist, or ‘grainy’ language, as Han might put it, there is an archive of experience not yet reduced to evaluation. Thus *In’ei Raisan*’s insistence that polishing does not *enable* access to history, as Scottish and Meiji Enlightenment rhetoricians had claimed, but *destroys* history as a meaningful participatory process.<sup>57</sup> One nice example here is gold: in old Buddhist temples, gold provides a flickering illumination that fixes attention on the present, rather than abstracting attention to ‘semi-permanent’ value – contrasting with Locke’s state-forming conviction that stabilising the property-owning citizen through standardising precious metals in currency would allow commercial empire to expand limitlessly.<sup>58</sup>

This concern with representationalist universalism certainly belongs alongside the 1930s Kyoto School. Another obvious, and now well-worn, touchstone is Martin Heidegger, whose first serious academic treatments came from Japan in 1921, the first monograph of whose work was by the Kyoto School writer Tanabe Hajime, and whose *Sein und Zeit/ Being and Time* (1927) was translated into Japanese before the end of the ’30s.<sup>59</sup> Heidegger’s later ‘Dialogue With a Japanese Philosopher’ described a 1927 meeting, at the house of Edmund Husserl, with his Kyoto School advocate Kuki Shūzō – himself a vocal advocate of ‘the blessing of a shadow’.<sup>60</sup> However, ‘Nishida philosophy’ *anticipated* many of Heidegger’s concerns with representationalism. Much of *In’ei Raisan*’s insistence on place looks like Nishida’s use of the term *basho*, better understood, as Hasumi Osaki puts it, not just as place but also as ‘located (me)ontology’.<sup>61</sup> For two decades, but particularly from *Mu no jikakuteki gentei/ Self-delimitation of experience* (1932), Nishida had wrestled with the transcendental subject typologising and measuring objects out-there.<sup>62</sup> For Nishida, perception involves a person *becoming* the thing, making it location-specific and non-dualist.<sup>63</sup> In 1938, Heidegger’s ‘The Age of the World Picture’ similarly traced the conquest of mystery and darkness back to a Platonic insistence that knowledge *present itself* for a discrete evaluating self: for English

neoplatonists, God had been the overarching subject revealing his mind to the world, then the scientific revolution repurposed this to make the divine subject that which uncovers universal physical laws.<sup>64</sup> Parts of the world become ontologically legitimised 'in the realm of man's knowing and his having disposal', as does the subject that 'knows and disposes'.<sup>65</sup> And crucially, this reduction of the world to evaluation *makes all places equal*, as individuals internalise universal space.<sup>66</sup> At heart the 'arithmetic empire' that had stood for modernisation in Japan, then, *was* this evisceration of location.<sup>67</sup> This is also the homogenisation of space described by Han, echoing Tanizaki, as a constant *dehousing*.<sup>68</sup>

Kyoto-related figures, however, were further pressing Heidegger on the question of location, asking whether his entanglement with environment really outstripped the metaphysics of subjectivity. *Rinrigaku II Ethics I* (1937), by Watsuji Tetsurō, former Heidegger student and Tanizaki literary collaborator, famously questions *Sein und Zeit's* concentration on time over place.<sup>69</sup> Equally famously, it breaks down the term *nin*gen, meaning human, into *nin* – person – and *aida* – between – to locate the personal in *aidagara*, betweenness, countering the empiricist subject, who had become enslaved to a narrow subjectivism.<sup>70</sup> In *Fūdo! Climate and Culture* (1935) Watsuji had even overlain this *aidagara* onto domestic architecture: in Tanizaki's *In'ei Raisan*, *shōji* (paper screens) and *fusama* (sliding doors) suggest environments *not* unified around the subject; in Watsuji's *Fūdo*, they show a cohabitation 'partitioned within a unity of mutual trust'.<sup>71</sup> Still, the mythopoesis of *Fūdo* is closer to the Japanese particularism typically ascribed to *In'ei Raisan*, and as Long suggests, was likely spoofed by the 1930s Tanizaki (and tellingly, for Watsuji 'meadow people', roughly people of the Anglo-sphere, are unusual in understanding nature as something docile to be moulded, and invent the light bulb because they can't stand the gloom).<sup>72</sup> The overarching point here is that if Heidegger's critique of a 'metaphysics of presence' – objects' having to present themselves for use – strongly fed into the late twentieth century cultural theory later influencing Critical Transparency Studies, in Jacques Derrida particularly, Japanese thinkers of the '30s had negotiated this Heidegger decades before.<sup>73</sup>

Like Kyoto thinkers then, the apparently impressionistic comments on light in *In'ei Raisan* raise serious questions about commercial empire's received wisdom that progress consists in the unification of space around the seeing-owning subject. Thus *In'ei Raisan's* admittedly vague, though crucial, speculation about localised sciences, or technologies that don't fill in all shadowy or silent spots in the name of a transcendental subjective wholeness (or data-saturation). Nor need technologies be universally reproducible across all space, as in the phonograph or radio that eviscerate silence, or, as Tanizaki tellingly puts it, 'bend the arts to pander to the machines'.<sup>74</sup> Without the representationalist drive to clarity, writing itself would be more

haptic, the pen would be more brush-like, better suited to rough paper (*washi*), which would itself be an ‘imperfect white’ less dedicated to clarity – and practically better for writing *kanji* (which depends on the ‘tapering’ or ‘flicking’ of strokes).<sup>75</sup> In Tanizaki’s Nishida-like speculation, in an Asian science even the ‘nature and function of light, electricity, and atoms’ might be conceived in different forms; or as Thomas Kasulis suggests, it might be scientific without scientism.<sup>76</sup> As the Watsuji student Yuasa Yasuo would describe, Japan already had a different tradition of science, less dualistic and not claiming a metaphysical high ground.<sup>77</sup> But this is not simply a return to the mid-nineteenth century hedge of ‘Japanese spirit, western technology’; it is a recognition of the dangers of reducing technology itself to fundamentalist aims within a *de facto* Anglicised modernity. Pointedly, one of the critics cited complaining about Japanese light pollution in *In’ei Raisan* is Albert Einstein, not only a Jewish émigré but also now the face of the indeterminacy of Newtonian physics. (Or, in Long’s pithy formulation, ‘Einstein did what Tanizaki wishes Japan could have done’).<sup>78</sup>

This is not to say that Tanizaki thinks Newtonian physics doesn’t ‘work’; rather, he questions the progressive instrumentalisation involved in turning Newtonian laws into a world-encompassing *metaphysics*.<sup>79</sup> Early transparency critics like Baudrillard and Vattimo indeed explicitly suggested that empiricist metaphysics’ claim to ‘open up’ the world can really be understood as an aggressive narrowing, one in which ‘a fragment of the world, human consciousness, arrogates to itself the privilege of being its mirror’.<sup>80</sup> And similarly a Kyoto-inflected *In’ei Raisan* implies not only that a fundamentalist empiricism does not simply equal modernity, but also that empiricism’s monopoly on consciousness may be a political means of *delimiting* modernity.<sup>81</sup> Kyoto School figures like Nishitani Keiji repeatedly reimagined modernity in terms of plural (*tagen*) knowledge forms, and saw space-unifying commercial empire as giving way to a radically multi-located world described better by overlapping seas than bounded territories made of subject-citizens.<sup>82</sup> Such a decoupling of progress from extractive subject-centred progress, Kyoto thinkers rightly speculated, might do a lot to avoid the current global crisis. Critical Transparency Studies belongs to a later but tightly-connected response to this threat to eclipse human agency; and this helps explain why it so uncannily tracks Kyoto’s and *In’ei Raisan*’s attachment to the radically unknowable, or the unoperationalisable of the shadow.

### ***In’ei Raisan*, critical transparency studies, and great blinding**

Both *In’ei Raisan* and Critical Transparency Studies, then, stress a commitment to what lies beyond evaluation. Critical Transparency Studies, of course, springs from an era seemingly defined by the disappearance of

alternative futures, and the normalisation of cybernetic evaluation as a social mediator. In *Confessions* Thomas Docherty rightly describes this ideal of transparency a reduction of relationships ‘to “values”, values that are always already known in advance’; for Han, echoing Heidegger, this is a reduction to *naked number*.<sup>83</sup> Also for Han, the transparency society’s demand for exhibition, or uncovering (Heidegger’s ‘presenting’), makes the social *pornographic*, where beauty demands a degree of hiddenness; in a working eerily echoing the turn-of-the-’30s Tanizaki, exhibition removes any ‘erotic luster’ in the play of visibility and concealment.<sup>84</sup> The loss of the unknowable, critically, leaves a frictionless ‘society of opinion’ that inevitably slides into a non-agential narcissism.<sup>85</sup> Baudrillard had described how a language of transparency had replaced moral language, and later transparency critics would agree about this fate of moral action, something I have suggested was hardwired into the ‘arithmetic empire’ of Anglosphere commercial ethics.<sup>86</sup> Han similarly sees exhibition as absorbing ethics, the good as tending towards whatever can be displayed for reward in a naturalised self-entrepreneurship and ‘credited to the ego-account, appreciating the value of self.’<sup>87</sup> In this sense ‘individuals *become* the calculation of their performances’.<sup>88</sup> Or as Birchall puts it, transparency affirms a privatisation of public morality.<sup>89</sup> In the neat phrasing of Docherty, the resulting plenitude of empty, datafied subjectivity leaves ‘the *form* of democracy without any *content*’, and the person as nothing but a ‘formal abstraction’, a person, he says drawing from Benjamin, ‘stripped of their historical being, substance and location’.<sup>90</sup> Transparency then becomes ‘the medium through which we eviscerate politics of content and substance, and replace it with the means of social conformity’.<sup>91</sup> In this, of course, are crucial echoes of Tanizaki’s blinding light and banal consumerism.

This incarnation of Critical Transparency as we usually understand it rose somewhere in the millennial rollout of neoliberal institutionality, with the term coming to straddle, then often relatively unremarked, individual rights and corporate efficiency. Numerous early 2000s commentators did note the transparency ideal’s claim to have reached a ‘post-ideological’ condition after the fall of socialist state ‘propaganda’. But where these millennial critiques rightly rang alarm bells, 2010s accounts became more dystopian, describing a loss of human agency to data accumulation covertly taking the form of a ‘divine subjectivity’. For Docherty echoing Vattimo, ‘a pious cult’ of transparency had taken the place of truth.<sup>92</sup> Or more brutally for Han, crystallising the concerns of many sceptical voices, ‘the mass of information produces no truth’.<sup>93</sup> Han in particular concentrates growing concerns into a pop-philosophy tone that would be easy to criticise, but does acutely diagnose the authoritarian tendencies of total evaluation (notably with one eye on Japan as a counterweight). For Han in 2011, transparency was a neoliberal *dispositif*; for a sympathetic Birchall in 2021, transparency

had been ‘closely linked to a neoliberal ethos of governance that promotes individualism, entrepreneurship, voluntary forms of regulation and formalized types of accountability ... [becoming a] normative order’.<sup>94</sup> Comparably, in a 2008 book section tellingly titled ‘In retrospect; the play of shadows’, Garsten and de Montaya describe how ‘notions of transparency are involved in efforts to fashion, govern and control human activity ... [around] a cluster of concepts and practices that constitute the globalized market rationality’.<sup>95</sup> Moreover for Docherty in a Kyoto-like tone, if unabsorbed, unoperationalised otherness, or social trust, was a condition of democracy, transparency tended to absorb all otherness for evaluation – and so to collapse democracy’s futurity. This left not only a catastrophically totally extractable world, but also what Han calls ‘glassy individuals’, which is to say, exactly the form of the self Tanizaki’s shadowy interior was trying to resist.<sup>96</sup>

For critical transparency writers then, the promise of immediate access to all knowledge inevitably skirts authoritarianism since it collapses all difference into itself. This refocuses the old philosophical question of whether we can live with genuinely unabsorbable – shadowy – difference. Provocatively, Han cites Nietzsche’s desire to linger with the unknown – a *will to ignorance*.<sup>97</sup> Or, as Docherty argues particularly strongly, if a condition of social trust is an acceptance of a degree of unknowability, since the unknown is progressively uncovered in a transparency society, trust inevitably increasingly recedes.<sup>98</sup> Some of the millennial transparency sceptics, like Onora O’Neill, had already gestured towards this institutional dynamics by which trust is reduced to ‘formal systems of accountability’.<sup>99</sup> Nor, she stresses, does ‘compulsory disclosure’ necessarily improve communication; on the contrary, it can bureaucratise communication and drive inequality by favouring those trained in manoeuvring institutional codes.<sup>100</sup> Freedom of Information requests can act as a ‘regulation by revelation’.<sup>101</sup> Birchall would later expand this to describe how a rhetoric of transparency tends to be encouraged ‘by companies whose business models rely on *opaque* algorithms to deliver content and advertisements and data extraction hidden within long and complex terms of use agreements’.<sup>102</sup> So just as Tanizaki’s room of homely things disappears when exposed to universalist light, the interpersonal tends to be *blocked* by bureaucratic layering. Transparency, as David Heald says, can then paradoxically operate ‘in a non-transparent manner’.<sup>103</sup> Thus the growth, since this early neoliberal naturalisation, of a political activism demanding opacity. The semi-anonymous radical group Tiquun, for example, who called for a ‘fog’, an indiscernibility, or a ‘zone of opacity’.<sup>104</sup> Or Jodi Dean, who warned those working for inclusion not to become ‘enthralled to transparency’, caught in a ‘deluge of screens and spectacles’.<sup>105</sup> There could hardly be a better description of *In’ei Raisan* than this concealment of consumerist progressivism *in light*.

Moreover for Han and others the absolutely unknown is a crucial anchor of ethics in the form of the presence of death; conversely, capital accumulation claims to act as a charm against death – something of a critical staple now but also precisely the promise made by the Lockean state, in which embodied time was perpetually converted into labour time to mould the world into objects of exchange, and the subject-citizen's experience was measured by *financial* expectation.<sup>106</sup> Death, as the limit-marker and animator of embodied action, is effectively buried by the evaluative regime. The Kyoto School explicator David Williams has persuasively described the effects of this giving up of embodied animating force, what Kyoto neo-Confucians knew as *toku*, or what exceeded 'mere survival' – transparency critics' 'life without liveliness'.<sup>107</sup> Tanizaki then suffused his interior with the dead as reminders of historically meaningful action. For Han, it is the transparent citizen who is 'truly dead', lacking all negativity and so incapable of action.<sup>108</sup> This is part of the importance of Tanizaki's sense of physical in-touchness as fundamental to a meaningful life.<sup>109</sup> Or for Han, capitalism's promise of non-death makes real suffering unbearable, and also makes real newness impossible, so that 'life that avoids death as if it were a pollution will suffocate in its own excrement'.<sup>110</sup> And 'mere survival', we might add to these observations, became an official rationale for the relatively-unremarked incursion of screen- and capital-mediated platforms into 'public' discourse in 2020–22, as people were confined to houses expected to be 'perforated by communication'.<sup>111</sup>

Moreover the breaking of the spell of undeath had ended the Meiji Era as a hardwired principle of progress, or Japan's own 'end of history': after Emperor Meiji's death, the ritual suicide of General Nogi Maresuke, and numerous other ritual suicides to follow, caused a minor moral panic about the stability of the apparently previously hardwired progress, something immediately taken up by the two most influential literati of the day, Mori Ōgai and Natsume Sōseki (1912, 1914). The shocking recursion of death also meant the recursion of action, indeed of the possibility of an imaginable future. So as easy as is to read *In'ei Raisan* as nostalgic, its archaism more suggests a *break* with the continuity that for Han, like Beaudrillard, would constitute a 'hell of the same'. In the hauntology of *In'ei Raisan*, the dead linger on in the room – opaquely, unlike the European ghosts that are 'clear as glass'.<sup>112</sup> Shadow, as architectural theory describes, is generally a *death threshold*, a realm of unknowability, a limit of operation.<sup>113</sup> So although the endgame of an empty formal equality has been powerfully articulated by Critical Transparency Studies, something like this struggle had already been embodied by Tanizaki's shadowy self, a *kenotic* (self-emptying) self, as Kyoto writers would say.<sup>114</sup> Noting the dangers of a subjectivity-driven historicism, Nishitani suggested that 'the East [*tōyō*] is projecting itself as a vast shadow on the horizon of Europe'.<sup>115</sup> This shadow is not some

kind of threat – although the military regime of Tōjō Hideki would attempt to redeploy it as such – it is the repository of difference needed to avoid the loop of positivity into which human volition ultimately disappears.

Both these iterations of transparency-scepticism, as Baudrillard suggests echoing Tanizaki, aim to reclaim the citizen who is otherwise ‘lit from all angles, overexposed and defenseless against all sources of light ... exposed on all sides to the glare of technology, images and information’.<sup>116</sup> Birchall perfectly echoes *In’ei Raisan* in describing how the flooding by light exists *just to dispel shadows* – this light doesn’t help us to do other things, it *serves objectification*, feeding an automated progress.<sup>117</sup> Nor is this a ‘merely aesthetic’ question: light pollution may be ugly in itself, but it also, in destroying a sense of wonderment in space, forecloses any sense of cosmic smallness that might trouble the ego of the owning subject – a theme readable in much ‘30s Japanese fiction, including Kawabata Yasunari’s Nobel Prize-cited novel of light distortions, double exposures, and ‘dark illumination’, *Yukiguni/ Snow Country* (1935–37). This early-Showa struggle to reinsert ethics into perception anticipates the Critical Transparency assertion that, to paraphrase Henri Lefebvre, space is not innocent: a drive to absolute clarity is not merely alienating – since it inexorably and ‘virtuously’ converts the world to the operational, it is also omniscient.<sup>118</sup> As it happens, a reminder of this cosmic smallness has been described in the key Kyoto School commentator Graham Parkes’s recent rumination on climate change, in the dark night unexpectedly re-emerging after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake.<sup>119</sup>

This Japanese resistance to perspicuity, of course, would encounter a very concrete response, a response that helps explain the lack of concrete steps between Tanizaki’s light scepticism and Critical Transparency Studies. The August 1945 attack by light weapons didn’t bring the Anglosphere any real ‘gain’ in civilian deathcount, compared to the March firebombing of Tokyo – but it did reassert unified space, a remote evisceration of shadowy belonging as well as, as Lippit puts it, of ‘a certain order of language, a flow of meaning’.<sup>120</sup> This blast helped clear the space for reordering by Anglosphere commercial empire – and Japanese historical study after the war did duly largely revert to a ‘catch up’ model.<sup>121</sup> The Kyoto School’s aims were radically curtailed, though from 1941 they had already been suppressed by the Tōjō military government; their last great moment before this, the *Chūō Kōron* roundtable discussion, translated and extensively introduced by Williams in 2014, worried over the crisis of a Euro-American historicism demanding ever more subject-centredness; if they were thinking of Nazism, nevertheless nuclear weapons, light weapons, the apotheosis of Anglosphere liberal democracy, had also just gone into their production-research phase.<sup>122</sup> Their 1945 demonstration on an intransigent Japan is even strangely prefigured by *In’ei raisan* – hot winds, white dots scarring the sky, and after-images overwhelming the senses.<sup>123</sup> This is less an act of prophesy on



Tanizaki's part than it is an understanding of an inexorable binding of Anglosphere progress and penetration by light. Lippit has powerfully contrasted Tanizaki's shadows with the irradiation of the Japanese citizen's 'dark body'; what is still missing, though, is an understanding of the light weapon as the *telos* of Anglosphere globalisation, the 'worlding' linking Tanizaki's gloomy house to twenty-first century data-immediacy.<sup>124</sup> (Tellingly, extinction-range nuclear weapons were largely forgotten during the Anglosphere's neoliberal high summer, even as they helped fix depoliticised individuals to the transcendent violence of total light – the 'victory' over ideology that Critical Transparency writers were then beginning to question).

Both eras of critique, then, grasped that totalised light corresponds to totalised positivity – it destroys all negativity, and so all debate, all difference, and all action.<sup>125</sup> For both, totalised positivity traps populations in a cybernetic loop of stimulation that eviscerates kenotic moments that might hold the possibility of genuine difference, eclipsing human relationships and agential futures – a 'transparentocene'.<sup>126</sup> Where all difference is automatically operationalised, the imagination of another future becomes impossible.<sup>127</sup> The transparent present, then, cannot be occupied in any agential sense, leaving a 'pernicious cultural dominant that promotes a tyranny of homogenous positivity and maintains the status quo'.<sup>128</sup> What it leaves is 'distanceless intimacy with oneself', and a 'reduction of time to instantaneity'.<sup>129</sup> Thus for many of these writers, the need for 'the release of the self from the imprisonment of the culture of transparency'.<sup>130</sup> But since this voluntary imprisonment is subject-affirming, it becomes the opium of the aspiring middle classes, the policymakers and gatekeepers. That this insight of the Tanizaki-early-Showa critique speaks so directly to today's sense of 'stuckness' makes it telling that for so long Kyoto-related thinking tended to be written off as particularist-therefore-nationalist. These condemnations are not entirely without substance, but as many now realise, the kenotic counter-imperialism was casually thrown out with the military-hijacked bathwater. Or as Williams more strongly puts this, missing the radically multipolar and postcolonial tendencies of the Japanese critique is 'a measure of the exhaustion of liberal history itself'.<sup>131</sup> This is remarkably close to what transparency critics have been arguing. Han describes the current demonisation of anyone who does not reduce otherness to 'consumable, usable differences'.<sup>132</sup> Or for Baudrillard, amplifying Williams and eerily recalling the light weapon, '[t]hose who do not conceptualise difference, who do not play the game of difference, must be exterminated'.<sup>133</sup> For the transparency bureaucracy, all belonging must be operationalised and typologised – agency as identity, difference as diversity, and so on. This, precisely, leads to a world without difference, without shadows.

This demand for 'smooth', identity-bound typologies is what is answered by *In'ei Raisan* in a way that has much to say to our own time. Spectral

typology – whiteness, obviously – is an ideal as well as a measurable colour; thus Tanizaki's portrayal of Japanese skin as faintly shadowed or murky, and causing unease within the 'modern' – or the interpenetration of the shadowy and the whiteness ideal in the bleaching of *Chijin no ai*'s Naomi, whose name written in English makes her seem 'western' and therefore mesmerising, but also conceals a pun on the narcissism of 'now me'. For Akira Lippit and for others for follow, this is a provocative 'phenomenology of race' that undoes race itself and makes '[t]he Japanese body ... an anti-body, a shadow'.<sup>134</sup> Lippit's Tanizaki's shadow-body, moreover, contains a non-representational inscription, and 'darkness flows and overflows from Japanese being like a paradoxical light, engendering not only an aesthetic of shadows, but also a form of writing'.<sup>135</sup> Or for Golley, in Tanizaki literary language – non-transparent language – is a crucial means of breaking with 'Western ideological formations that expressed themselves hegemonically through paradigms of progress'.<sup>136</sup> Tanizaki himself, the end of *In'ei Raisan*, explains that literary writing is an indispensable source of opacity.<sup>137</sup> So as tempting as it is to reduce *In'ei Raisan* to either traditionalism or national melancholy, a wider historical embedding suggests a shared warning about the reduction of progress to a universalistic control of space, leading to the possible foreclosure of all determinable futures. As global existential threats increase in our thoughts, a new thinking of the shadow seems crucial.

## Notes

1. Nishimura Masahiro, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi: In'ei Raisan to 20seiki bunka kōryū/ Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's World-History: In Praise of Shadows and Twentieth Century Cultural Exchange* (Tokyo: Benseisha, 2023), pp. 1–9, 453–54.
2. Margherita Long, *This Perversion Called Love: Reading Tanizaki, Feminist Theory, and Freud* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 13–14; Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity – History, Culture and Community in Inter-War Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 111.
3. Brian Hurley, 'Toward a New Modern Vernacular: Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, Yamada Yoshio, and Showa Restoration Thought', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, 39.2 (Summer 2013), pp. 359–396: 393–94; Gregory L. Golley, 'Tanizaki Junichiro: The Art of Subversion and the Subversion of Art', *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 21.2 (Summer 1985), pp. 365–404: 378; Nishimura, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi*, pp. 178–180.
4. Thomas Lamarre, *Shadows on the Screen: Tanizaki Jun'ichirō on Cinema and 'Oriental' Aesthetics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005), e.g. pp. 266–270; Arthur M. Mitchell, *Disruptions of Everyday Life: Japanese Literary Modernism in the World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), p. 96, 239.

5. Kinya Tsuruta, 'Tanizaki Jun'ichirō's Pilgrimage and Return', *Comparative Literature Studies*, 37.2 (2000), pp. 239–255, 240, 247; Nishimura, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi*, p. 16.
6. Cf. Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Inter-war Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 13–30.
7. Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, *In'ei Raisan/ In Praise of Shadows* (Tokyo: Chūkō, 2009 (1933)), pp. 7–65: 56. All translations from this are my own.
8. Byung-Chul Han, *The Transparency Society*, trans. Erik Butler (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015 (2012)), p. 26.
9. Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, *Chijin no ail Naomi* (Tokyo: Kadokawa, 1960 (1924–25)); Steven C. Ridgley, 'Tanizaki and the Literary Uses of Cinema', *Journal of Japanese and Korean Cinema*, 3.2 (2012), pp. 77–93.
10. Golley, 'Tanizaki Junichiro', p. 373; Lamarre, *Shadows on the Screen*, pp. 11–15.
11. Atsuko Sasaki, *The Rhetoric of Photography in Modern Japanese Literature* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 18–31; Long, *This Perversion Called Love*, p. 121.
12. Sasaki, *The Rhetoric of Photography in Modern Japanese Literature*, p. 56.
13. Lamarre, *Shadows on the Screen*, pp. 17–19; Naoki Sakai, *Translation and Modernity: On 'Japan' and Cultural Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
14. Tanizaki Jun'ichirō, *Tade kuu mushi/ Some Prefer Nettles* (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2020), p. 22, 44–45; Golley, 'Tanizaki Junichiro', pp. 391–92, 403–04.
15. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, pp. 13–14; Tanizaki, *Tade kuu mushi*, pp. 232–33.
16. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, p. 11.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–12, 49.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 18; Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 39; cf. Akira Mizuta Lippit, *Atomic Light (Shadow Optics)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), p. 187.
20. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, p. 57.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 25, 28–30.
22. *Ibid.*, 34–35.
23. Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 44; Christina Gasten and Monica Lindh de Montaya, 'Introduction: Examining the Politics of Transparency', in Gasten and de Montaya (eds.), *Transparency in a New Global Order: Unveiling Organizational Visions* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 1–21.
24. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, pp. 30–31; Nishimura, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi*, pp. 192–93.
25. Byung-Chul Han, *The Disappearance of Rituals*, trans. Daniel Steuer (Cambridge: Polity, 2020 (2019)), p. 35; Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 10.
26. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, p. 20, 36; Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 1.
27. Hurley, 'Toward a New Modern Vernacular', p. 365.
28. Lippit, *Atomic Light*, p. 23.
29. Jean Baudrillard, *The Intelligence of Evil, or The Lucidity Pact*, trans. Chris Turner (London: Bloomsbury, 2013 (2005 (2004))), p. 4, 73; Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 13; Byung-Chul Han, *Topology of Violence*, trans. Amanda Demarco (2018 (2011)), pp. 102–03; Tanizaki, *In'ei Raisan*, pp. 54–55.
30. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, p. 33, 48–52.
31. Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 35, 45; Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil*, p. 58, 190.
32. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, pp. 31–32.

33. Ibid., p. 37.
34. Quoted in David Williams, *The Philosophy of Japanese Wartime Resistance* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp. 297–98, 125.
35. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: Penguin, 1997 (1689/1690)), pp. 144–45.
36. E.g. Adam Smith, *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978 (1763)), pp. 14–37.
37. Marjorie Hope Nicolson, *Newton Demands the Muse: Newton's Opticks and the Eighteenth Century Poets* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1979 (1946)), p. 7, 82.
38. Han, *The Transparency Society*, p. 50; cf. Mark Fenster, *The Transparency Fix: Secrets, Leaks, and Uncontrollable Information* (Redwood City: Stanford Law Books, 2017), p. 125.
39. Cf. Michael Gardiner, *The British Stake in Japanese Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2019).
40. Albert M. Craig describes the national specificity, but not its significance – *Civilization and Enlightenment: The Early Thought of Fukuzawa Yukichi* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
41. Cf. Goto-Jones, *Political Philosophy in Japan*, p. 51.
42. Nishimura Daisuke, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō to orientaruizumu: taishō nippon no chūgoku genso/ Tanizaki Jun'ichirō and Orientalism: Taisho Japan and the vision of China* (Tokyo: Chūōkōron, 2003), pp. 48–56; Masahiro, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi*, pp. 46–49, 56–63, 74–75, 92–99; Lamarre, *Shadows on the Screen*, 356–58.
43. Nishimura, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō to orientaruizumu*, pp. 75–75, 257–259.
44. Long, *This Perversion Called Love*, p. 18.
45. William Barron, *Lectures on Belles Lettres and Rhetoric*, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1806 (1781)), p. 36.
46. Emmanuel Alloa, 'Transparency: A Magic Concept of Modernity', in Alloa and Dieter Thomä (eds.), *Transparency, Society, and Subjectivity: Critical Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2018), pp. 21–55: 32–34; Han, *Topology of Violence*, p. 100; Baudrillard, *The Intelligence of Evil*, p. 52.
47. Birchall, *Radical Secrecy*, p. 20.
48. Andrew Janiak, Introduction to Isaac Newton ed. Janiak, *Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. vii–xxxv: xxxii, xxvii, xxxi; Newton, 'De Gravitatione', *Philosophical Writings* [n.d.], pp. 26–58: 37, 41.
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50. Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977 (1938)), pp. 115–154: 123.
51. Nishi Amane, 'Yōgaku o motte kokugo o sho suruno ron' / 'Japanese writing with Western study', in Yamamura Shin'ichi and Nakanome Tōru (eds.), *Meiroku Zasshi* vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1999 (1874)), pp. 27–51.
52. Mitchell, *Disruptions of Everyday Life*, p. 14; Seiji M. Lippit, *Topographies of Japanese Modernism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 31; Christopher Bush, *Ideographic Modernism: China, Writing, Media* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 15, 18–19, 31–33; Tomi Suzuki,

- Narrating the Self: Fictions of Japanese Modernity* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 96; Nishimura, *Tanizaki Jun'ichirō no Sekaishi*, pp. 165–67.
53. Karatani, *Nihon kindai bungaku no kigen*, p. 44, 57–69, 205.
  54. Hurley, 'Toward a New Modern Vernacular', p. 378.
  55. *Ibid.*, 359, 364, 374, 387; Mitchell, *Disruptions of Everyday Life*, p. 12; Lamarre, *Shadows on the Screen*, pp. 29–33.
  56. Hurley, 'Toward a New Modern Vernacular', p. 359, 364.
  57. Tanizaki, *In'ei raisan*, pp. 19–22.
  58. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
  59. Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 10–26.
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### Disclosure statement

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