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1 **Title:** A new Omicron lineage with Spike Y451H mutation that dominated a new COVID-19
2 wave in Kilifi, Coastal Kenya: March-May 2023

3

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20

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24

25 **Running Title**

26 New FY.4 Omicron lineage in Kilifi, Kenya

27

28 **Key Words**

29 FY.4, SARS-CoV-2, Omicron, Kilifi, Kenya

30

31 **Abstract**

32 We report a newly emerged SARS-CoV-2 Omicron lineage, named FY.4, with two unique
33 mutations; spike:Y451H and ORF3a:P42L. FY.4 emergence coincided with increased SARS-
34 CoV-2 cases in coastal Kenya between April and May 2023. We demonstrate the value of
35 continued SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance in post-acute pandemic era in understanding
36 new COVID-19 outbreaks.

37

38 **Main Text**

39 To date >340,000 test-confirmed COVID-19 cases and 5,688 COVID-19-related deaths
40 have been reported in Kenya[1]. Sero-surveillance indicated high seropositivity in rural and
41 urban populations despite low vaccine uptake (~28% of the adult population received at least
42 one dose)[2]. By August 2022, 69-81% of rural (Kilifi and Siaya) and 89-95% of urban (Nairobi
43 and Kisumu) Kenya adult population had anti-Spike IgG antibodies (unpublished data).

44 Genomic surveillance has been critical in informing origins of new waves, evolution,
45 and spread patterns of SARS-CoV-2. By June 2023, seven distinct waves of SARS-COV-2
46 infections had been observed in Kenya[1][3]. The last three were dominated by Omicron sub-
47 variants: BA.1-like, BA.5-like and BQ-like, respectively. These sub-variants were associated
48 with an increase in SARS-CoV-2 cases due to possession of mutations conferring escape from
49 pre-existing immunity and/or transmission advantage[4].

50 In coastal Kenya, the KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme (KWTRP) is
51 conducting SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance across five health facilities (HFs) within the
52 Kilifi Health and Demographic Surveillance System (KHDSS)[5]. Up to 75 respiratory
53 samples are collected weekly from individuals across all ages presenting with acute respiratory
54 illness to the participating HFs. SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR testing and sequencing is performed on:
55 (i) positive samples from the KHDSS HFs surveillance and (ii) positive SARS-CoV-2 samples
56 from other collaborating HFs across Kenya.

57 Beginning late March, SARS-CoV-2 positivity rate in the KHDSS HFs increased from
58 1.2% in the week commencing 27th March, and peaked at 42.9%, in the week commencing 24th
59 April (Figure, panel A). This then dropped in the first week of May to 23.5% and ranged
60 between 5.0%-7.7% over the next three weeks. Between January – May, 120/1612 (7.4%)
61 SARS-CoV-2 positives were identified from samples collected from the KHDSS surveillance.
62 Ninety-six samples (80%) with cycle threshold (Ct) values <35 were sequenced either on
63 Oxford Nanopore Technologies – GridION (n=35) or Illumina Miseq (n=61), recovering
64 76(79%) genomes with coverage \geq 70%. Additionally, we received 39 positives from HFs
65 outside the KHDSS, of which 32(82%) were sequenced yielding 25(78%) genomes,
66 Supplementary Table 1.

67 The 76 genomes from KHDSS HFs were assigned into two lineages; BQ.1.1(n=1), and
68 FY.4(n=75). The increase in the positivity rate starting late March coincided with detection of
69 a new Omicron lineage FY.4 (Figure, panel B). In Kenya, the FY.4 lineage was first observed
70 in Lamu County(n=6) on 10th March 2023, (Figure panel A). By 31st May, (GISAID accessed
71 on 21st August), this new FY.4 lineage had been detected in four other counties; Mombasa(n=2),
72 Narok(n=2), Nairobi(n=7) and Kiambu(n=31). In the KHDSS, FY.4 lineage was first
73 identified from samples collected on 27th March and by April and May it became the dominant
74 lineage, representing 98% of all the detected SARS-CoV-2 cases. Other than Kenya, the FY.4

75 lineage had been detected in 13 other countries; Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, India,
76 Sweden, Canada, France, China, Australia, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of
77 America (GISAID accessed on 21st August)[6].

78 In the KHDSS HF, participants infected with FY.4 presented with cough (98%), fever
79 (78%) and nasal discharge (74%) while 7% presented with difficulties in breathing (Table).
80 Only 13 (16%) participants reported receiving at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. A
81 sero-surveillance study (February – June 2022) found that 67% of the unvaccinated KHDSS
82 residents have anti-SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibodies indicating that a high proportion of this
83 population may have been naturally infected[7].

84 Relative to other Omicron lineages, the FY.4 has two additional amino acid(aa)
85 changes; spike(Y451H) and ORF3a(P42L). The exact impact of the Y451H change is
86 unknown. Previous studies have shown that spike aa change in the receptor binding domain
87 near the Y451H, such as L452R increases virus infectivity and fusogenicity by enhancing spike
88 stability and cleavage[8]. Changes within the ORF3a CD8⁺ T cell epitopes have been reported
89 to cause complete loss of recognition in the ancestral lineages and Alpha VOC[9].

90 We applied a Bayesian hierarchical model[10] to estimate the growth rate of the FY.4-
91 like lineage in Kenya. These estimates serve as warning system for lineages showing consistent
92 increase in frequency for at least two consecutive weeks in Kenya and/or other countries.
93 Growth rate estimates on Kenyan data was compared to data from Germany and USA, as these
94 were the only countries with reported FY.4 cases in at least two consecutive weeks as of the
95 last weeks of May (Figure, panel C). The model warned of a high concern in Kenya as from
96 week of March 26 towards May, suggesting continued increase in cases attributed to FY.4
97 lineage.

98 In summary, SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance in coastal Kenya has detected the
99 emergence of a new Omicron lineage with unique spike and ORF3a gene mutations. Detection

100 of FY.4 lineage coincided with increase in SARS-CoV-2 cases in Kilifi and has also been
101 detected in other parts of the country. Growth estimates suggests potential for continued spread
102 of FY.4. Further analysis on the phenotypic impacts of the observed mutations are ongoing.

103

104 **Acknowledgement**

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106 sequencing at KWTRP and the submitting laboratories where genetic sequence data were
107 generated and shared via the GISAID Initiative, on which this research is based. Submitting
108 and the Originating laboratories of the GISAID data used in this study are listed in the
109 [Supplemental_File.docx](#)

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120 Health and Social Care, or the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, the Africa-
121 CDC, WHO-Afro, ASLM.

122 **Data Availability**

123 Genome sequences generated in this study are available on GISAID. Generated
124 genomes are listed in the **Supplemental_File.docx**. **The dataset** and analysis scripts used are
125 available in **Harvard** Dataverse at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZMGR5P>.

126

127 **Conflict of Interest**

128 Authors declare no conflict of interest.

129 **Ethical Statement**

130 The whole genome sequencing study protocol was reviewed and approved by the
131 Scientific and Ethics Review Committee (SERU) residing at the Kenya Medical Research
132 Institute (KEMRI) headquarters in Nairobi (SERU # 4035).

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Table: Distribution of observed clinical symptoms among the FY.4 cases observed in Kilifi Health Demographic Surveillance System between January – May 2023

Symptoms	Omicron FY.4 (n=73)
Fever	
Yes	57 (78.1%)
No	16 (21.9%)
Cough	
Yes	72 (98.6%)
No	1 (1.4%)
Nasal discharge	
Yes	54 (74.0%)
No	19 (26.0%)
Difficulty in breathing	
Yes	5 (6.8%)
No	68 (93.2%)
Sore throat	
Yes	28 (38.4%)
No	45 (61.6%)
Body malaise	
Yes	25 (34.2%)
No	48 (65.8%)
Conscious level	
Alert	73 (100.0%)
COVID-19 Vaccination status	
Yes	12 (16.4%)
No	60 (82.2%)
No data	1 (1.4%)
COVID19 vaccine doses	
1	3 (4.1%)
2	7 (9.6%)
No data	63 (86.3%)

Figure legend

Figure: Panel A – Weekly number of collected samples (horizontal continuous line) and

positive SARS-CoV-2 cases (bars) in health facilities within the Kilifi Health Demographic Surveillance System (KHDSS) between January – May 2023. Vertical dotted lines represent time points when FY.4 lineage was first detected in Kenya (red) and in Kilifi (black). Panel B – Weekly distribution of SARS-CoV-2 lineages observed on samples processed at the KWTR from HFs within the KHDSS and HFs outside the KHDSS between January – May 2023. Lineages in red were identified on samples collected from HFs within the KHDSS while lineages in blue were identified on samples collected from HFs outside the KHDSS. Panel C – Growth rate estimates of the FY.4 variant in Kenya relative to USA and Germany.

Supplementary Table 1.

Summary showing the number of samples collected, positives, and sequenced at KEMRI Wellcome Trust Research Program (KWTRP) between January – May 2023. The KHDSS column represents samples collected from health facilities within the mapped Kilifi Health Demographic Surveillance System (KHDSS) area. The Non-KHDSS column represents already tested positive samples collected outside the KHDSS area and sequenced at KWTRP.

	KHDSS	Non-KHDSS
Samples Collected	1612	x
SARS-CoV-2 Positives	120	39
Cycle Threshold Value (<35) & PCR Concentration (>18)	96	32
Sequences >70% Coverage	76	25
Variants by County	Kilifi (FY.4 – 75, BQ.1 – 1)	Kilifi (BA.1.1 – 2), Kwale (FY.4 - 2), Kiambu (FY.4 – 5), Mombasa (XBB.1.5-like – 1), Nairobi (BQ.1.1 – 1, CH.1.1-1, XBB.1.5-like – 4, XBB.1.9-like – 3, XBB.1.16-1, XBB.1.22.2-1, FY.4 - 4)

X – No samples were shared for testing. We only received already tested samples

Data Availability

GISAID Identifier: EPI_SET_230627zw
doi: [10.55876/gis8.230627zw](https://doi.org/10.55876/gis8.230627zw)

All genome sequences and associated metadata in this dataset are published in GISAID's EpiCoV database. To view the contributors of each individual sequence with details such as accession number, Virus name, Collection date, Originating Lab and Submitting Lab and the list of Authors, visit [10.55876/gis8.230627zw](https://doi.org/10.55876/gis8.230627zw)

Data Snapshot

EPI_SET_230627zw is composed of 101 individual genome sequences.
The collection dates range from 2023-03-27 to 2023-05-31;
Data were collected in 1 countries and territories;
All sequences in this dataset are compared relative to hCoV-19/Wuhan/WIV04/2019 (WIV04), the official reference sequence employed by GISAID (EPI_ISL_402124). Learn more at <https://gisaid.org/WIV04>.

Supplementary Table 1.

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Data Availability


GISAID Identifier: EPI_SET_230627zw
doi: [10.55876/gis8.230627zw](https://doi.org/10.55876/gis8.230627zw)

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
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A



B



C

