


Institutional Logics, Risk and Extreme Events: Insights from and for Management Education

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To shed light on the interrelationship between risk and logics, we explore how multiple institutional logics shape management educators' experiences of risk in classroom teaching. Using a two-case research design, we analyse an empirical case study of management educators in a UK business school during the COVID-19 pandemic and a case study of emergency physicians during the Ebola epidemic. Comparing these two focal cases of different types of frontline professional work during global health crises, we develop a model of how perceptions of risks and their mitigation shape, and are shaped by, experiences of compatibility, contestation and rejection among multiple logics. Our study extends the literatures on institutional logics and risk by providing insight into the role of multiple logics in the social construction of risk. We also contribute to the management education literature by focusing attention on the risks of physical harm in classroom teaching and by theorizing when, how and why management educators apprehend these risks as ordinary or extraordinary to their normal professional role. Finally, our study has practical implications for risk mitigation at individual and organizational levels and for creatively and safely adapting teaching and learning practices with students during extreme events.

Introduction

A large body of research has explored the puzzle of multiple institutional logics and how they shape behaviour inside organizations (Greenbaum *et al.*, 2020; Greenwood *et al.*, 2011; Lounsbury *et al.*, 2021; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012). Institutional logics are defined as organizing frameworks and meaning systems associated with societal institutions that create 'distinctive categories, beliefs and motives' to guide organizational and individual action (Friedland and Alford, 1991, p. 122). One emerging stream of inquiry has focused on multiple logics in business schools and universities (Alajoutsijarvi, Juusola and Lamerg, 2014; Cai and Mountford, 2022; Juusola, 2023; Lepori, 2016). Studies tend to highlight the prominence of three institutional logics, which can be in conflict: a managerial logic prioritizing rational efficiency and bureaucratic standardization (Juusola, 2023); a professional logic valuing academic expertise and autonomous practice (Alajoutsijarvi, Juusola and Lamerg, 2014); and a state logic in which the government has authority and

responsibility for citizens' welfare and educational opportunities and regulations (Cai and Mountford, 2022). Other logics, such as a family logic of protecting the family unit and relationships (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012), tend to be secondary.

While this research has provided valuable insights, existing understandings of how multiple logics play out in business schools and universities assume that management educators deliver teaching and learning in circumstances that pose little risk of physical harm. Yet this is not always the case. The return to face-to-face teaching in British universities while the COVID-19 pandemic was still raging is a notable instance of management educators confronting personal harm when engaged in teaching and learning practices inside physical classrooms (Beech and Anseel, 2020; Brammer and Clark, 2020). Other examples of risks include exposure to common infections, such as winter flu, and attacks from violent or aggressive students, which are fortunately much rarer in occurrence. Given that risks are social constructions (Hardy *et al.*, 2020), it might be expected that multiple logics are involved in shaping an individual educa-

tor's perceptions of the nature and degree of risk they experience in classroom situations. However, we know little about this interplay between risk and logics and, in turn, about the practical consequences that arise for management education.

We take up this question of how multiple institutional logics shape management educators' experiences of risk through an interpretive qualitative study. To shed light on the interrelationship between risk and logics, we used a comparative case study design (Yin, 2009). We compared the case of management educators during the COVID-19 pandemic with the case of emergency physicians during the Ebola epidemic. The similarities and differences across these two empirical cases allowed a richer and more nuanced analysis for theory building in response to our research question (Eisenhardt, 2021). Both of our focal cases similarly involve professionals delivering frontline services during global health crises. A key difference arises from variations in a professional's qualifications to evaluate the risk of harm associated with their particular frontline work during the crisis. Physicians are medically qualified to make judgments about risk when treating patients; management educators are medically unqualified to evaluate the infection risks of teaching students inside classrooms.

By contrasting the experiences of management educators with those of emergency physicians, the relationship between risk and multiple institutional logics was thrown into sharp relief for the different types of professionals. This allowed us to build a theoretical model of how perceptions of risk and their mitigation shape experiences of the compatibility, contestation and rejection of multiple logics in frontline professional work. Our study makes three contributions. First, we extend the literatures on institutional logics and risk by providing novel insights into the role of institutional logics in the social construction of risk. Second, we contribute to the literature in management knowledge and education by focusing attention on the risks of physical harm in classroom teaching and by theorizing when, how and why management educators apprehend these risks as ordinary or extraordinary to their normal professional role. Finally, we provide practical implications for risk mitigation at individual and organizational levels, and for creatively and safely adapting teaching and learning practices with students during extreme events.

Theoretical background

The institutional logics perspective conceptualizes organizations as sites where multiple institutional logics, or 'constellations of logics derived from broader society' (Goodrick and Reay, 2011, p. 372), play out with varying degrees of contestation, dominance or alignment (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Greenwood *et al.*, 2011; Kraatz

and Block, 2008). Studies suggest that different logics can co-exist over time when organizations pragmatically manage conflicts and contradictions between them (e.g. Hodgson, Paton and Muzio, 2015; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Nicolini *et al.*, 2016; Reay and Hinings, 2009). In universities and business schools, for example, a professional logic typically co-exists with managerial, state and market logics (e.g. Alajoutsijarvi, Juusola and Lamerg, 2014; Cai and Mountford, 2022; Juusola, 2023; Lepori, 2016) and these are often taken for granted as the appropriate constellation of logics for organizing the delivery of management education.

Inside universities and other organizations, individual-level experiences of multiple logics tend to be most potent during the 'everyday realities of frontline work' (McCann *et al.*, 2013, p. 753), such as when management educators are teaching students. An organization's frontline is where people interact with each other and with elements that instantiate different institutional logics, including organizational structures and practices, controls over knowledge and work processes, education and training, and performance standards (Goodrick and Reay, 2011; Smets *et al.*, 2015). As such, management educators and other frontline professionals must 'negotiate the meaning and enactment of elements' of different institutional logics, which may be compatible or contradictory (McPherson and Sauder, 2013, p. 187). Empirical studies show that individual professionals can adapt their behaviour according to which elements of a logic, or logics, they cognitively and affectively attend to and prioritize in a particular situation (McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets *et al.*, 2015; Currie and Spyridonidis, 2015). Other scholarship theorizes that 'different people might experience the same contradiction [between multiple logics] differently' when performing the same everyday work (Voronov and Yorks, 2015, p. 566), opening up a variety of professional actions and reactions to ostensibly similar situations and events.

Taken together, these insights into multiple logics and frontline professional work suggest that logics play a role in management educators' individual-level experiences of risk. The recent COVID-19 pandemic highlights how educators experience risk when extreme events occur that create the potential for physical, psychological and material harm to business schools and universities and the people in and around them (Hannah *et al.*, 2009; Hällgren, Rouleau and de Rond, 2018). Risk is generally conceptualized as 'the probability of an adverse event of some magnitude – a danger of some kind that can be managed if the chances the event will occur and the magnitude of its effects, should it occur, can be accurately assessed' (Hardy and Maguire, 2016, pp. 80–81). Judgements about the presence and degree of perceived risk are therefore socially constructed (Gephart, 1993; Hardy *et al.*, 2020). Given that institutional log-

ics also structure a management educator's attention, interests and motives (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012), it is likely that risk perceptions play out alongside multiple logics when management educators deliver frontline teaching during extreme events. To better understand this question of how multiple logics shape management educators' experiences of risk, we undertook an empirical study.

Methods

We investigated our research question using Eisenhardt's (2021) multi-case theory-building method. Our case selection was informed by Bechky and Okhuysen's (2011) emergent two-case design, which encourages the comparison of independently collected datasets to explain a focal phenomenon common across two empirical cases. In our particular study, we were prompted to employ a two-case design when we realized that the experiences of management educators during the COVID-19 pandemic provided an empirical case for comparison with a dataset that we had collected during the Ebola epidemic in 2014.

Data collection

In 2014, two authors of the current paper were conducting longitudinal field research at an emergency department that was attached to a large public hospital in a metropolitan city in Australia (Wright, Irving and Selvan Thevatas, 2021; Wright *et al.*, 2021; Wright *et al.*, 2016; Wright, Zammuto and Liesch, 2017). During their data collection, an Ebola outbreak occurred in West Africa and was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in August 2014. Ebola is a highly infectious haemorrhagic disease with a high mortality rate (70%). The Australian government designated the authors' field-site hospital part of the frontline response for international travellers who might be infected with the Ebola virus (see Wright *et al.*, 2021). After Ebola infections spread to the United States and Europe in October 2014, the authors conducted 47 semi-structured interviews with emergency physicians at their field site, asking questions about their perceptions and experiences of risk. Interviews were conducted in person, lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, and were digitally recorded and transcribed (for more information, see Wright *et al.*, 2021).

Having collected this data in 2014 during the Ebola epidemic, these authors noticed that management educators in the UK seemed to be facing a comparable situation in the return to face-to-face teaching as the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded. Reflecting on this

situation with the other authors in our research team, the entire team of authors speculated that the similarities and differences between the situations facing management educators and emergency physicians could be generative for theory building. Risk and multiple logics, as our focal phenomena of theoretical interest, were apparent in both empirical cases of frontline professional work. Risk arose from the same source in both cases, specifically the risk of a professional becoming ill with an infectious disease when delivering frontline services during an international health crisis. What was different across our two cases was the ability of frontline professionals to make judgements about the risk they faced. Emergency physicians are medically trained in evaluating and mitigating risks when interacting with people who are potentially infectious; management educators are not.

Guided by the methods literature and examples of emergent two-case designs (Bechky and Okhuysen, 2011; Eisenhardt, 2021; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2009) and adopting instrumental scholarship as a mode of engagement in extreme-context research (Wright *et al.*, 2023), we sought to develop an empirical case study of management educators during the COVID-19 pandemic for comparison with our existing case of emergency physicians during the Ebola epidemic. We selected a business school within a university in the UK for data collection. At the start of the pandemic in 2020, lockdowns were introduced in the UK, in parallel with many other countries, and teaching in the business school shifted from in-person to online delivery. After improvements in the spread of infection allowed the UK lockdown to be lifted, the business school returned to face-to-face teaching in October 2020, at the start of the academic year. Face-to-face teaching was then suspended when the government declared a second national lockdown in January 2021. Teaching was delivered online until the UK's lockdown restrictions were progressively lifted following the roll-out of vaccination programs. The business school returned to socially distanced classroom teaching in October 2021, although infection risks were still present for management educators.

In assembling our dataset for this focal case, three authors (who had not been involved in data collection in the Ebola case) conducted 30 semi-structured interviews, namely with 28 academics who had delivered face-to-face teaching in these periods and two members of the business school's professional services team who had been involved in decision-making. Interviewees were equally split on gender (15 male, 15 female) and spanned the academic levels of teaching assistants and assistant professors (7), associate professors (14) and professors (7). Interviews were conducted either in-person or online, lasted between 40 and 75 minutes, and were digitally recorded and transcribed.

Table 1. Ideal type of institutional logic and associated characteristics

Characteristics	State logic	Professional logic	Managerial logic	Family logic
Sources of authority	Government powers to regulate in a crisis for public safety	Disciplinary expertise and knowledge	Bureaucratic roles within organizational hierarchy in school/hospital	Primacy of family relationships, especially parent-child
Sources of identity	Citizenship in a nation	Skillful performance and personal reputation as an educator/physician	Organizational membership of school/hospital	Loyalty and belonging to family unit
Basis for action	Protecting citizens	Supporting student learning/patient care	Maintaining school/hospital services and resources	Honouring responsibilities to family unit
Control of work processes	Tasks that educators/physicians perform are subject to state laws, rules and guidelines	Educators/physicians control their own work processes according to profession-determined standards	Tasks that educators/physicians perform are subject to bureaucratic rules and administrative procedures	Tasks that educators/physicians perform support and protect family
Economic system	Welfare capitalism	Personal capitalism	Managerial capitalism	Family capitalism

Table adapted from Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012, p. 73) and Goodrick and Reay (2011)

Data analysis

We began our analysis by focusing on the case of emergency physicians and the risk of Ebola. Guided by Reay and Jones (2016), we identified the presence of four logics: state, professional, managerial and family. Table 1 depicts the ideal-type logics and their associated characteristics: sources of authority, sources of identity, basis for action, control of work processes, and underpinning economic system. We developed these characteristics from the institutional logics literature (Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012; Goodrick and Reay, 2011) and adapted them for our physician case. The two authors who collected this data then coded the transcripts, looking for similarities and differences in the ways that physicians described their experiences with Ebola risk and in how an individual physician judged that risk.

During coding, we were struck by how connections between logics and risk unsettled the more typical ‘constellations’ (Goodrick and Reay, 2011) of state, professional and managerial logics that we had become used to observing at our field-site emergency department over the course of our research project. Our initial coding indicated that physicians could be grouped into three broad categories of logic-risk connections. The first category tried to make logics compatible by cross-cutting selected characteristics of different logics in their risk assessments. Drawing on the logics literature (Kraatz and Block, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury, 2012), we tentatively labelled this ‘compatibility among multiple logics’. The second category perceived conflicts between particular characteristics of different logics when making risk assessments, which we labelled ‘contestation among multiple logics’ (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Reay and Hinings, 2009). Finally, the third category, which we labelled ‘rejection of multiple logics’ (Cappellaro, Tracey

and Greenwood, 2020), evaluated risk through a preferred professional logic and rejected other logics.

As we iteratively compared within and across each of these categories, we were surprised by how, despite being medically trained and expected to treat sick patients, some physicians questioned whether Ebola fitted within their normal role. We also noticed variations among physicians in terms of their perception that risk of Ebola was being adequately mitigated. There appeared to be a temporal element to these risk perceptions. Over time, the risk of Ebola came to be seen as ordinary and adequately mitigated, as individuals’ experiences of logics in the emergency department reverted back to the typical ‘constellation’ of state, professional and managerial logics. Speculating that the relationships between risk and logics might be more transient rather than enduring, we hazarded that risk was perceived and evaluated in particular situations in relation to the boundaries of a physician’s expected professional role.

To probe our hunch (Locke, Golden-Biddle and Feldman, 2008), we turned to the management educator case. Here the authors who collected the interview data for this empirical case took the lead in the analysis. After considering how the ideal-type logics and associated characteristics could be applied to management educators (see Table 1), we compared within and across the interview transcripts (Corbin and Strauss, 2014). We verified and refined our three categories, which we now labelled: *transient compatibility among multiple logics*, *transient contestation among multiple logics* and *transient rejection of multiple logics*.

Reviewing the educator transcripts for patterns in how logics were being connected to risk, we noticed that many individual educators perceived COVID-19 to be a risk that they did not expect to confront in their

Evaluation of risk mitigation practices	<i>Inadequate</i>	Transient rejection of multiple logics	Transient contestation among multiple logics
	<i>Adequate</i>	Reversion to acceptance of multiple logics	Transient compatibility among multiple logics
		<i>Ordinary risk</i>	<i>Extraordinary risk</i>

Perceived relationship of risk to professional role

Figure 1. Interplay between risk and institutional logics during extreme events

classrooms. We labelled this perception as ‘*extraordinary risk*’ and, through cross-case comparison, affirmed that it was similar to how some physicians viewed Ebola. Guided by the risk literature (Hardy *et al.*, 2020), we categorized the risk associated with providing frontline services to students or patients as extraordinary when an individual considered the potential for adverse harm to be over and above that expected in the course of the normal duties of their professional role. Only a handful of educators considered COVID-19 to be an ‘*ordinary risk*’, in comparison to around half of the physicians in the Ebola case. We categorized risk as ordinary when an individual perceived that the potential for harm was related to the core activities of their everyday role in the business school or emergency department.

Trying to tease out the risk–logic connections, we noticed that, similar to in the case for the physicians in the Ebola case, there were variations among educators in their evaluations of whether risk mitigation practices were adequate or inadequate. We categorized risk as *adequately mitigated* when an educator or physician had confidence that they would be kept relatively safe from threats of harm while teaching students or delivering care to patients. We categorized risk as *inadequately mitigated* when an educator or physician considered that mitigation practices offered suboptimal protection from adverse harm.

Having clarified our understanding of risk, we then revisited our coding of the experiences of multiple logics. As we iteratively compared our empirical data within and across our two cases using our emergent theoretical categories, we developed a deeper under-

standing of the interplay between the following: (1) risk perceptions in relation to a professional’s role (ordinary/extraordinary risk), (2) evaluation of risk mitigation practices (adequate/inadequate), and (3) experiences of multiple logics (transient compatibility, transient contestation, transient rejection, reversion to typified acceptance). By cross-cutting the first two dimensions, we generated a theoretical explanation for the experiences of risk and multiple logics, which we depict in a two-by-two matrix in Figure 1. We present detailed findings related to our theoretical model for each case study in the section that follows.

Findings

In response to our research question exploring how multiple institutional logics shape management educators’ experiences of risk, we present our findings of the analysis of our two empirical cases. We first present our abbreviated findings for the case of emergency physicians during Ebola, which offers a baseline understanding of the interplay of logics and risk for those professionals who are medically qualified to evaluate infection risk when performing frontline work during an extreme event. We then present our findings for the more complex case of multiple logics and risk in frontline professional work that occurred when management educators returned to face-to-face teaching in the COVID-19 pandemic and confronted infection risks that they were medically unqualified to assess.

Case 1: Emergency physicians during the Ebola epidemic

Our first case study explores the different ways that emergency physicians' perceptions of risk and its mitigation played out in transient experiences of compatibility, contestation and rejection among multiple logics during the Ebola global health crisis in 2014 (for more information about the research that informed this case, see Wright *et al.*, 2021).

Transient compatibility among multiple logics. Our analysis shows that most emergency physicians initially perceived the Ebola virus as an extraordinary risk beyond their normal professional work. Interviewees explained that if a person infected with Ebola presents to the emergency department (hereafter ED), 'your risk to me is extraordinarily high' (Int-15). Ebola has ineffective treatment options, a greater transmission risk and much higher case-fatality rates than familiar infectious diseases, such as AIDS and malaria, that routinely confront an emergency physician. The extraordinary nature and gravity of Ebola risk brought different logics into salience. State, managerial, professional and family logics were all accessible to individual emergency physicians as a guide for how to respond.

Our data indicates that emergency physicians experienced transient compatibility among these four logics when they perceived that the extraordinary risk of Ebola was being adequately mitigated. First, the *state logic* encoded the government's regulative authority to issue directives and protocols in the interests of public safety and to deploy the resources of national border control and the public health system to prevent Ebola spreading within Australian communities. Border control officials tracked travellers arriving from Ebola-infected regions, and public health officials were positioned at international airports to ensure the testing, quarantining and monitoring of travellers arriving with fevers. Historically, the state logic had identified viral haemorrhagic fevers as a specific international risk and officially classified particular public hospitals as having responsibility for assessing and treating travellers showing symptoms.

Second, the *managerial logic* was readily accessible at the organization level of the designated public hospital. The state logic empowered a managerial logic for developing the local response in terms of preparing and communicating plans, assigning departmental and staff responsibilities, organizing protective equipment and supplies, and earmarking physical spaces for assessing and treating Ebola cases in the hospital. Reflecting on the practical implications of this alignment of state and managerial logics for the hospital's ED, an emergency physician concluded that 'our role in response to the Ebola virus is really nothing' (Int-16) because infected travellers from West Africa would be intercepted by public health officials at airports.

Third, from the viewpoint of emergency physicians who evaluated Ebola's extraordinary risk as being adequately mitigated, the combination of state and managerial logics propagated a risk management approach that was compatible with a *professional logic*. Members of the medical profession are a legitimate source of expert knowledge about evidence-based processes of patient care delivery. In developing the organization-level response strategies and protocols for suspected Ebola cases, the hospital and ED drew upon the expertise of infectious disease specialists to design 'robust processes' (Int-17).

Finally, compatibility between the state, managerial, and professional logics extended to the *family logic*. In the minds of these physicians, safeguarding citizens from community spread of a high-fatality virus (*state logic*) by directing suspected Ebola cases to a designated organizational site (*managerial logic*) with risk-mitigation processes informed by knowledgeable experts in infectious diseases (*professional logic*) was not expected to disrupt the family logic. It was assumed that an individual emergency physician could interact with a patient, who might or might not be infected with Ebola, without exposing family members to undue harm. The perceived compatibility of the family logic with other logics reinforced a view of Ebola as an extraordinary risk that was adequately mitigated:

Read about [Ebola and the state's response] and if you've got major concerns, talk to the [infectious disease] experts about it... Do some reading, get your perspective, have a chat to your wife/husband [and say] the chance of me getting this is so low that you should be more worried about me getting hit by a car on the way home. (Int-15)

Transient contestation among multiple logics. Our data indicates that other emergency physicians initially perceived contestation among family, state, managerial and professional logics. Many emergency physicians who were also parents apprehended situational cues that an Ebola infection was an extraordinary risk beyond their normal professional role in an Australian city. The Ebola risk felt unlike other risks of being injured or infected that they managed routinely every shift in the ED: 'there's this threat you could actually die if you get it wrong' (Int-18). In their view, state health authorities and managers were expecting emergency physicians to 'go out to war' (Int-19) against a terrifying new risk with inadequate training, equipment and supplies for the required frontline work. They perceived that the risk could not be effectively mitigated when assessing a suspected Ebola patient in a small isolation room having received limited training in putting on personal protective equipment to avoid self-contamination: 'it's not ideal ... that's where people can get infected' (Int-20). An emergency physician who treated a confirmed case of Ebola would

need to quarantine for 21 days; at worst, they would become infected themselves with a high-mortality illness.

The visceral danger of the situation made the family logic readily accessible at the individual level for conscious reflection about an emergency physician's willingness to perform work tasks associated with suspected Ebola patients. As a physician explained, 'This [disease] kills healthcare workers. ... Running that by me internally and by my wife has informed how I feel about it' (Int-21). The physician concluded that, 'I've got responsibilities [to my family]. I can't afford to be taking those risks' (Int-21). Physicians also considered the family impact of quarantining if they looked after an Ebola-infected patient: 'that'll be really great for my family!' (Int-22). Those without children acknowledged the moral legitimacy of the family logic, noting that children 'would probably colour your perspective completely' (Int-23). These quotes highlight how perception of extraordinary and unmitigated risk temporarily disrupted the usual subordination of the family logic to the primacy of professional and managerial logics in the ED.

Our analysis shows that these risk perceptions shaped, and were shaped by, contestation over which logic should legitimately control work processes during the extreme event. An emergency physician's relative situatedness in the family logic fed a natural instinct to protect the family unit. This supported a view that control of work processes for suspected Ebola cases 'ultimately has to be an individual decision and all those other things in your life are going to impact on that decision' (Int-18) and 'are valid arguments' (Int-20) for choosing not undertake these extraordinary tasks. Yet an individual physician asserting personal agency to 'opt out' of work tasks that are core to the work of the ED as 'the door' (Int-24) of the hospital in the public health system – that is, treating every sick or injured person who physically presents to an ED – conflicts with managerial and state logics. These logics empower management systems to control, organize and prioritize work processes to ensure continued system functioning and to prevent spread of a deadly disease to the nation's citizens during a global health crisis. In a different vein, an emergency physician resisting using their clinical skills to treat a patient because of fear about their potential illness conflicts with the professional logic. Within a professional logic, physicians have autonomy over work processes to act in the best interests of patients in compliance with medical standards and values but 'don't pick and choose' who they give care to (Int-24).

Thus, for some emergency physicians, extraordinary and unmitigated risk perceptions of Ebola were attuned to their individual personal circumstances, and this activated contests among family, state, managerial and professional logics over control of work processes: 'it's us on the frontline not [managers]' (Int-25). Reflecting on

their own experience of contestation among multiple logics during the extreme event, an interviewee clarified that emergency physicians 'weren't actually being put in harm's way [by managers], but they felt they were being put in harm's way' (Int-19).

Transient rejection of multiple logics. A few emergency physicians took an alternative stance on risk and multiple logics by focusing their attention on legitimate sources of knowledge authority for risk mitigation. Interpreting Ebola as an ordinary risk with inadequate risk mitigation, they rejected that state, managerial and professional logics should share authority over controlling the risk burden of frontline work in the ED. Instead, they judged the seriousness of the situation as fitting solely within the expert knowledge domain of emergency medicine as a specialty: 'I see it being in the realm of disaster management really' (Int-26). This judgement elevated the *professional logic* of emergency medicine as the ultimate source of knowledge and authority over risk. Senior managers were viewed as being unable to understand the risk burden that they were expecting emergency physicians to assume in their frontline work:

So that's one of the problems about the public health system where you've got management levels of people who make decisions [but] who don't have the same skill base, knowledge or context as the people who they're expecting to [do the frontline response]. ... These people up there don't understand that the ones down here in the ED actually know what needs to happen. And they come and try and impose [risk mitigation strategies and equipment] ... that are completely useless. (Int-27)

This quote expresses how the professional logic challenged the managerial logic in granting managers the authority and responsibility for implementing risk mitigation strategies. Our case data suggests that emergency physicians who perceived an ordinary risk and inadequate mitigation temporarily situated themselves more deeply in the professional logic and as separate from the managerial logic. Attentive to the demands for expert authority in the ED's frontline response to Ebola, they temporarily rejected the validity of the managerial logic in making judgments about how to adequately mitigate risk.

Reversion to acceptance of multiple logics. Our data shows that the compatibility, contestation and rejection of multiple logics were transient experiences. With additional training support and improved risk management protocols, emergency physicians judged Ebola as an ordinary risk that was adequately mitigated. The ED handled only a few suspected cases of Ebola, and there were no confirmed ones. The shift in risk perceptions encouraged emergency physicians to revert back to an unreflective acceptance of state managerial and professional logics, and a subordination of the family logic, which typified their everyday experiences of frontline work.

Table 2. Table of representative data: Transient compatibility among multiple logics

Category	Representative data
Transient compatibility among multiple logics: extraordinary risk being adequately mitigated	<p>I also thought that it was a risk, even existing, I should be taking ... so that students could get the best possible experience. ... There was loads of information circulating ... with the government guidance ... there was school and university communication measures in place. ... And it was pretty much left to you to assess how you would interpret them and assess what kind of risk you were facing and how comfortable you were with that. ... Coming back to face-to-face teaching ... I was somewhat relaxed. ... That [risk] was not something that limited me much. (<i>Compatible state, managerial and professional logics; adequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) My personal consideration of what the risk or risks can be [is] if I see that there are reasonable provisions to avoid contagion or infection or things like that, okay, we can still go for [face-to-face teaching]. But why is that? Because my personal approach to teaching is that it is face-to-face. That's how you engage [students] and build rapport and all that but again, not at any cost. There has to be a reasonable level of security or provisions to actually do that in the middle of a pandemic. (<i>Compatible state, managerial and professional logics; adequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) I had some health concerns at that time. ... If I really pushed for online teaching (instead of face-to-face) it would have been granted ... but I also remember at that point I was living alone ... so I was just kind of seeking human connection. ... I was just desperate to get some semblance of normality so I was quite happy [with face-to-face teaching]. ... What I wanted and what the department or university wanted kind of aligned so it works out in that respect. ... [When I was in the classroom with students] I was quite explicit about, 'Look, this is the situation. ... These are the ground rules. Keep you masks on. I will endeavour to make it engaging and useful. I've tried everything I can do within my legal and professional toolbox to make this experience as best as I can for you.' (<i>Family logic compatible with state, managerial and professional logics; adequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) There was a business case associated with [the return to face-to-face teaching]. ... The business school couldn't do anything unilaterally because the university made up the rule and the government made the rules in terms of what we were allowed to do. But within what we were allowed to do, we could do that in as safe a way as possible. ... People had different sense of the risks associated with it. ... It felt as though [the school's management] was trying to be really really measured within the context of the expectations of the university and a sense of responsibility towards the students. (<i>Compatible state, managerial and professional logics; adequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) I think we made an informed judgment. We heard all opinions and decided to go back to class and it was as education professionals ... we knew face-to-face was better. ... So we were constantly balancing and juggling those decisions around educational outcomes, the safety to students, the safety to staff. And I think we were always really, really mindful of the vulnerabilities of staff in that and of any staff that did have a real legitimacy around their concerns and worries. (<i>Family logic compatible with managerial and professional logics; adequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>)</p>

Case 2: Management educators and the COVID-19 pandemic

Our second case study of management educators builds on and extends this first case of frontline professional work in an extreme health event. Our findings highlight the different ways that educators perceived ordinary and extraordinary risks alongside adequate and inadequate risk mitigations during the return to face-to-face teaching in the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, we reveal how these risk perceptions shaped, and were shaped by, experiences of compatibility, contestation, or rejection among state, managerial, professional and family logics before reversion to the acceptance of business-as-usual logics over time. Additional representative data for this case study are presented in Tables 2–4.

Transient compatibility among multiple logics. According to our data, most educators perceived that the COVID-19 pandemic created extraordinary risks for classroom teaching beyond those expected in the normal exercise of their professional role. Interviewees likened the global pandemic to a 'meteor strike-type event' (Int-1) and 'so unknown' (Int-2) in carrying infection risks and potentially serious health consequences from teaching that were previously inconceivable. For individual educators, the extraordinary nature of COVID-19 risks

made multiple logics readily accessible as a guide for understanding and evaluating their risk exposure and for weighing their willingness to engage in face-to-face teaching. Depending on an individual's situated circumstances and interests, logics pertaining to the state, management, profession and family could become salient. Our data indicates that an educator experienced compatibility among multiple logics when they perceived and trusted that the extraordinary COVID-19 risk was being adequately mitigated: 'I didn't think it was too risky ... I was happy with the mechanisms in place' (Int-3).

Our analysis suggests that an educator's judgment about the adequacy of risk mitigation was shaped by the sources of authority that typified different logics. A *state logic* gave the government authority to make decisions and give orders to ensure the health and safety of its citizens. This logic materialized in the declaration of national lockdowns and the introduction of laws and guidelines for social distancing, mask use, testing, quarantining/isolation and travel restrictions. The state logic authorized a *managerial logic* at the organizational levels of the university and business school to develop and continuously update plans, guidelines, risk-mitigation protocols and equipment, technology investments, and communications for a return to face-to-face

Table 3. Table of representative data: Transient contestation among multiple logics

Category	Representative data
Transient contestation among multiple logics: extraordinary risk being inadequately mitigated	<p>I was going to continue to [teach classes online] but then it was like, ‘Okay but now, just so you know, these are in person’. And I didn’t have any say over that ... in terms of having a seat at the table of who’s making those decisions. ... Which makes sense rationally because as an employer, if they’re trying to get people back into work, they’re not gonna say, ‘Also you could die if you get COVID’. And the same with students. You know there’s business incentive for the university to go back to in-person [classes]. (<i>Managerial logic conflicts with professional and family logic; inadequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) Staff weren’t consulted. ... Part of it being such a big department, the scope for responses to individual situations is much less ... I’m thinking of colleagues who were very concerned, who were vulnerable or had family who were vulnerable and took their concerns to [management]. ... Universities are ideal transmission mechanisms and I was very conscious [of that risk]. ... There was always an element of lack of confidence in official [government] policy and guidance. (<i>Managerial and state logics conflict with family logic; inadequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) I was really worried. And from the comfort and, you know, protection of my home myself going out there in a classroom with all these people breathing. It really felt dangerous and uncomfortable and something that I kept hearing a lot about people that they don’t want to do it, clearly worried, fearing really to die. (<i>Managerial and state logics conflict with family logic; inadequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) It just felt a little unsafe to me ... because for me, the perception of what the government should do to protect its citizens had been conditioned so much by what happened in [my home country]. ... I remember there was a [department] meeting and another academic [who is medically trained and also from a home country outside the UK] was quite upset about the risk and ... the quality of the masks [provided for face-to-face teaching]. ... I think my perception was kind of aligned with theirs. (<i>Contestation of state and professional logics; inadequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>) I wasn’t included in the decision [to teach face-to-face]. I was just told what I was doing. ... How did I feel about coming back face-to-face? I was stressed about it for sure at the time ... I was in that category [of government policy allowing me to travel by train to attend my workplace] which felt like kind of risky in some way ... So I wasn’t necessarily happy with the decision. I definitely would have preferred it to be online because it would have felt like that was the safer thing to do at the time. ... I was slightly conflicted. I prefer to teach in person but it definitely felt like it was the riskier thing to do. ... As far [as the decision being] up to me, it wasn’t an option, right? There was students who were here in person that we had to offer in person. (<i>Contestation of managerial and professional logics; inadequate mitigation of extraordinary risk</i>)</p>

teaching in socially distanced classrooms: ‘the government was allowing us to do that’ (Int-4). To help mitigate infection risks, classes were scheduled in large rooms to allow social distancing, and considerable resources were invested in protective equipment and supplies, for example by providing face visors and high-grade masks and installing transparent screens in classrooms. For many educators, this alignment of state and managerial logics created the perception that the extraordinary risk of returning to face-to-face teaching could be adequately mitigated: ‘I had confidence that people had thought about this and they’ve made as much, you know, preparation and I was going to be as safe as I was going to be’ (Int-1).

Educators experienced compatibility when the alignment of state and managerial logics intersected with the *professional logic* to further boost perceptions that risk mitigation was adequate. Within the professional logic, educators draw their professional identity from their disciplinary expertise and competence in teaching and derive professional reputation, satisfaction and meaning from engaging with students and guiding their learning. Our analysis suggests that when an educator evaluated the risk-mitigation solutions provided within the authority of state and managerial logics as being supportive of a desire to safely deliver face-to-face teaching

within the professional logic, their motives and actions in the classroom tended to become more deeply situated in the professional logic. As an interviewee explained, ‘the worry was less around the risk of getting COVID and more just how is this going to actually work’ in order ‘to provide a normal kind of teaching experience with all the new restrictions that were in place’ (Int-6).

As their basis for action shifted more towards the professional logic, these educators worked to find creative ways to balance risk mitigation with student learning engagement. For example, they moved around the classroom space to interact with students while wearing a mask; facilitated student participation in socially distanced conversations as a safe proxy for group-work; encouraged rather than policed students’ mask-wearing; and provided a social space for students to come and ask questions at the end of class. For some educators, this meant ‘I probably didn’t distance myself as much as I should have done because I did not want to come across like I was intentionally always trying to move away from students’ (Int-6). For other educators, a *family logic* was also highly salient alongside the professional logic, which focused attention on ensuring that their actions during teaching were not in conflict with family responsibilities. Reflecting on how they constructed compatibility between professional and family

Table 4. Table of representative data: Transient rejection of multiple logics and reversion to acceptance

Category	Representative data
Transient rejection of multiple logics: ordinary risk, inadequate mitigation	I remember I went to class ... and no one had a mask [even though] at the time masks were mandatory. ... I remember writing to [management] saying these guys didn't have a mask ... that this is mandatory – we need that to be in place. ... Personally I never felt that I'm particularly at risk because I was like young and healthy or I felt young and healthy anyway. So, for me, from very early stages I realized the risk is very minimal, not more than, you know, developing a cancer at this stage. For me, always it was the case of protecting the National Health System and of not overloading the [system] so [it] didn't really worry me going back to class as such. Even in that situation I was mostly kind of concerned with the general population health and how we are contributing to circulating the virus as a university rather than a personal thing. <i>(State logic has primacy; ordinary risk inadequately mitigated by university)</i> The most important thing for me was the preservation of things like the rule of law and your ability to take your own judgements and decisions [within those laws]. There were calls [by some academics] for making the mask compulsory ... [but] the government is clear. You can't force, for instance, students with autism [to wear a mask]. <i>(State logic has primacy; inadequately mitigated)</i>
Reversion to acceptance of multiple logics: ordinary risk, adequate mitigation	I would say that, yeah, once you kind of got into a rhythm, it did [revert to business as usual]. And you just stopped thinking about it ... You were kind of acutely aware of that [risk] the first couple of sessions. After you got through the first couple of weeks, it just kind of sunk into the background of your regular teaching duties. ... By university fiat, it was normal. <i>(Return to university's normal constellation of logics; risk becomes ordinary and seen as adequately mitigated)</i> The return to work did not happen instantly ... and it's still happening because it's taken over from fear, anxiety [about risk to self and family] or legal prevention. ... I think the university is still trying to work out the fallout from this break that happened [in face-to-face teaching], the before and after. ... It's set up very very hierarchically, which you need for responsibility and clarity of processes. <i>(Return to university's normal constellation of logics; risk becomes ordinary and seen as adequately mitigated)</i> It became very quickly, very natural to me and I think that's one reason that I, like many other people, forgot about what happened before because it felt so natural so quickly for me. ... The first time [returning to face-to-face teaching] was shocking and I think that, you know, after that I was pretty much at ease with going back. I never felt that I'm becoming less comfortable. What I felt was becoming more and more comfortable. <i>(Risk becomes ordinary and seen as adequately mitigated)</i> Generally, it was just more accepted, wasn't it? That COVID is now here and it's not as horrendous as it was. We can manage it. ... You got into it, you know, it just became normal again. ... I mean it's probably more complicated, but we've got used to it. <i>(Return to university's normal constellation of logics; risk becomes ordinary and seen as adequately mitigated)</i>

logics, an interviewee said, 'That [risk] was never going to get in the way of me doing my job ... [but] I was always mindful of I can do without getting the virus because [my father was ill and] had no support network' (Int-1).

In other instances of compatibility among multiple logics, our analysis suggests that an educator's risk perceptions could also be shaped by assumptions about the economic system that characterizes different institutional logics salient to teaching. To illustrate this 'balancing act in terms of risk assessments' (Int-2), we offer the following account of Executive MBA teaching:

Once there was a bit of leeway there to get back to in-person teaching, [Executive MBA students] weren't taking it in any other way. ... They are actually paying a lot. And it's a bit of our duty, too, actually if the government is allowing it. ... This is what we should be doing [as a business school]. ... I was actually very keen to try to keep the interactions [with my students and] ... still seem approachable, interested in their views. ... I was very comfortable with the risk I was running. ... I didn't have any underlying health conditions, I didn't have care responsibilities so I didn't feel particularly vulnerable in any way either for me or for my family. ... I tried to comply with the university guidance

... but I would perhaps look for options that were less disruptive of the usual way of [face-to-face teaching] ... such as wearing a face visor even though a mask offered more protection. (Int-2)

This account highlights how involvement in Executive MBA teaching focused the educator's attention on assumptions about the economic systems that characterize particular logics and on how these economic systems could be made compatible. More specifically, the interviewee constructs compatibilities between: (1) the state logic's assumptions of welfare capitalism (i.e. the government has responsibility to ensure citizens' safety); (2) the managerial logic's assumptions of managerial capitalism (i.e. academics are business school employees whose labour contributes to the achievement of organizational goals and revenues); and (3) the professional logic's assumptions of personal capitalism (i.e. faculty-student interactions are learning experiences anchored in the academic's expertise and personal reputation as a good teacher). The interviewee also does not perceive conflict between the risk of teaching and the family logic's assumptions of responsibilities to protect the family unit. Overall, the account highlights how attention to these compatibilities between logics informed

the interviewee's understanding of COVID-19 as an extraordinary but adequately mitigated risk in frontline teaching, activating classroom behaviours involving social distancing and masking that allowed them to engage more interactively with students: 'I understood the risk, but I was not constrained by it' (Int-2).

Transient contestation among multiple logics. Other educators who were situated at the intersection of multiple logics initially experienced contestation among them rather than compatibility. Apprehending COVID-19 infection as an extraordinary risk beyond their normal professional role, these educators felt 'scared' (Int-8), 'panicked' (Int-9) and 'very anxious' (Int-10) that available mitigation measures would not be adequate when interacting with lots of students in poorly ventilated classrooms. For these educators, 'it did feel like the risk of getting COVID was quite high because of the network effects of student populations ... and spreading that sickness' (Int-8). One interviewee said, 'it was something out of a [horror] film' (Int-9).

Our analysis shows that these risk perceptions shaped, and were shaped by, contestation over which logic should legitimately control work processes associated with frontline teaching. The nature and scope of this contestation varied according to an individual's relative situatedness in different logics. The most compelling examples involved greater attention to, and heightened emotions aroused by, the *family logic* among educators with caring responsibilities for young children and elderly parents and/or living in households with vulnerable people. One interviewee described feeling 'very resentful that because of my job, I was potentially putting family members at risk' (Int-10). Perceptions of extraordinary and unmitigated risk of COVID infection during face-to-face classroom teaching made the family logic readily accessible because the individual's perceived risk burden was inevitably – and, in their minds, illegitimately – being transferred to other members of the family and/or household unit. An interviewee reflected:

What if I bring something back? ... I'm not making the decisions [about when and how the university returned to face-to-face teaching] so that worries me slightly because I'm the person who has to carry out the decisions that do or don't get made. (Int-9)

The above quote illustrates how these individual-level risk perceptions opened up contests between the family logic and the state, managerial and professional logics over the 'proper' delivery modes for teaching that would offer the 'right' balance between protecting the health and safety of employees and their families and supporting the learning of students. When the *state logic* permitted the lawful return to face-to-face teaching despite what these educators perceived to be extraordinary and poorly mitigated risks, this interviewee focused

their attention on the contradictions between managerial and professional logics regarding who had the legitimacy to control the choice between face-to-face teaching and other delivery modes that exposed the frontline academic to less risk. Within the *managerial logic*, administrative processes prioritize and standardize when and how different face-to-face, online and hybrid modes are used to deliver teaching and by whom: 'in that kind of situation, it can't become a free-for-all where everybody just kind of decides what they think is the best way forward' (Int-11). Within the *professional logic*, academics are trusted to use their expert knowledge and autonomy as management educators to make judgments about what and how to teach, including how to creatively leverage the affordances of online technologies to motivate and engage student learning. Attention to the professional logic informed a view that professional autonomy should have primacy over managerial control in making decisions about how to balance risk with the affordances of online technologies vis-à-vis face-to-face teaching:

I did a lot of risk assessments and negotiations in my head about just how do I place myself in the world and not become a risk factor for others. ... I have a young family. I don't have other caring help. ... The school [management] seemed unwilling to either go against the university or to go against the government and to make accommodations [for online teaching]. ... They didn't want to talk about risk. ... They didn't seem to trust either in my ability to deliver [high-quality learning experiences] in different ways or in my professionalism. ... I can't tell you honestly if that's some sort of administrative logic of ease trumping everything else. (Int-12)

Our data also highlighted other sources of conflict among logics in the work of frontline teaching. Some educators interpreted tensions between a managerial logic of managerial capitalism as an organizational employee and more personal forms of capitalism rooted in logics of the family and the profession, embodied in intimate family ties and educator–student exchange relationships, respectively. For example, an educator noted that getting paid to teach meant that 'there's definitely a financial incentive to continue doing that work even if you're uncomfortable' about the risk of face-to-face teaching (Int-8). By arousing feelings of anxiety over risk mitigation to protect 'your friends and family potentially' (Int-8), this conflict between managerial and family logics could motivate classroom behaviours that contradicted the student learning goals of professional logics: 'I remember always wearing two masks, being extra cautious, being up in the front [of the classroom] and not walking around, very much keeping distance ... [which] hindered the learning experience' (Int-8). Other educators similarly described how they enacted safety concerns through: sage-on-stage style teaching from the

front of the room; distant and cautious interactions with students; an absence of small-group activities; and some attempt to police masking and social distancing: 'I remember quite a lot of times having to say to them, 'Whoa! ... Stay away' (Int-10).

Overall, our analysis shows that for individual educators who experienced contestation among multiple logics, the contradictions between different logics over the legitimate control of frontline work processes were typically informed by assumptions about the relationship between perceived risk and student learning. By being situated at the intersection of various logics according to their personal circumstances, an educator could see a 'paradox' (Int-11) between (1) organizational constructions of risk exposure in frontline professional work and (2) the possibilities for student learning that might, or might not, be afforded by different delivery modes for teaching (the more risky face-to-face mode versus safe online mode). The following account illustrates how extraordinary unmitigated risk and student classroom learning play out in contestation among multiple logics:

There shouldn't really be a trade-off. [Management] should never say, 'Oh, because of health and safety, we're going to wind down how seriously we take education.' ... [Yet] at some point you have to make a decision in terms of, 'Am I going to endanger this person's health by putting them in the classroom?' (Int-11)

Transient rejection of multiple logics. A few educators, who self-identified as 'outliers' (Int-12), took a very different stance on risk and multiple logics. They perceived that being exposed to viruses when interacting with students during face-to-face teaching was an ordinary risk within the normal bounds of their professional role. In their view, 'there's never much worry about the risk' (Int-13) and 'the risk is minimal' (Int-14). Another noted, 'Any time you take public transportation or teach in a classroom, you could get sick, and it has always been like that. And so, I did not feel personally more at risk' (Int-12).

Recognizing that this ordinary risk was occurring in the context of a global pandemic, these educators rejected instantiating the typical *managerial logics* of universities and business schools in overzealous and 'absurd' (Int-14) attempts to control risk in frontline work processes. Instead, they prioritized a *state logic* as the legitimate source of authority for the pandemic response and deemed government laws to be the appropriate mechanisms for regulating human behaviour and controlling the spread of infection among people, while still allowing individual agency within the law to accommodate for personal circumstances. Our data suggests that academics who perceived that attempts had been made to over-reach managerial authority and inappropriately mitigate an ordinary teaching risk had temporarily sit-

uated themselves more deeply in the state logic and rejected managerial logic:

I saw too many measures and too many things being done [by university management to try to control risk]. ... Many people think what should universities have done in terms of more masks or less masks? ... I think they should have done what they are supposed to do, which is to strictly follow the rule of law. ... Otherwise the world becomes an anarchy. (Int-13)

Reversion to acceptance of multiple logics. Our data shows that educators who experienced compatibility, contestation or rejection among logics tended to do so on a transient basis. Over time, as understanding and availability of COVID preventions, treatments and vaccinations improved, perceptions tended to shift to COVID as an ordinary risk with adequate mitigation: 'We can manage it, you know, it's just one of those illnesses now that's around' (Int-9). With this shift in risk perceptions, academics largely reverted back to experiencing multiple logics as 'business as usual' and to tacitly accepting the logics usually more salient in their work as business school educators; that is, to a general blend of elements of *state*, *managerial* and *professional* logics regarding legitimate sources of knowledge, authority and control of work processes and some focused attention to the *family* logic as a basis for action according to individual situated circumstances.

Discussion

We set out to explore how multiple logics shape management educators' experiences of risk in classroom teaching through comparing two empirical cases of frontline professional work during global health crises. More specifically, we compared the experiences of management educators in a UK business school returning to face-to-face teaching in the COVID-19 pandemic with the experiences of emergency physicians during the Ebola epidemic.

Our findings generated a theoretical model of the interrelationships between multiple logics and risk when professionals perform frontline work during extreme events. According to our model, individual professionals may perceive the risk as either ordinary or extraordinary to their normal professional role, and may evaluate the organization's risk mitigation practices as adequate or inadequate. Our model shows how risk perceptions shape, and are shaped by, individual experiences of compatibility, contestation or rejection among multiple logics. These experiences of logics are transient. As the extreme event unfolds over time, perceptions of risk shift to becoming more ordinary and adequately mitigated, and the experiences of logics tend to revert to

acceptance of the normal constellation of logics that typifies the organization.

Our study makes three contributions. First, we bridge the literatures on institutional logics and risk by bringing attention to the role of multiple logics in the social construction of risk. Prior research on risk translation and the discursive construction of risk has generally been concerned with the translation of individual risk to organizational risk or vice versa (Bednarek, Chalkias and Jarzabkowski, 2021; Hardy and Maguire, 2016, 2020; Maguire and Hardy, 2013). In contrast, the institutionally determined nature of risk assessments is not as well understood (Hardy *et al.*, 2020). Our study offers new insight by explicating how multiple logics influence individuals in forming their risk assessments. We show how a novel risk in the organizational environment, for which little meaningful information exists (especially among management educators), becomes translated into individual risk assessments by being filtered through the lens of the different logics a person finds themselves at the intersection of. Thus, our study complements prior research that theorizes that organizations translate novel risks into more familiar risks that have well-known processes for mitigation (Hardy and Maguire, 2016, 2020) by specifying the role of logics at the individual level for professionals, especially those who may be very poorly positioned to assess the risk, as was the case with management educators.

In doing so, we also build on and extend previous research into multiple institutional logics inside organizations (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Greenwood *et al.*, 2010; Gümüşay, Smets and Morris, 2020; Smets *et al.*, 2015; Wright and Zammuto, 2013) and in professional work (Currie and Spyridonidis, 2015; Goodrick and Reay, 2011; McPherson and Sauder, 2013) by shining light on how multiple logics and risk are mutually implicated when individuals perform frontline professional work in organizations during extreme events. Our findings suggest that logics influence individual judgments about the nature of risks and the adequacy of their mitigation. At the same time, risk assessment changes engagement with logics. Our findings suggest that this occurs through a cognitive process in which judgments of extraordinary and unmitigated risks can cause higher-order shifts in the institutional logics that become salient. An individual's awareness of their own situatedness at the intersection of multiple logics becomes heightened through extraordinary and/or inadequately mitigated risk, making new logics from other institutional domains of their personhood available as a basis for action. Thus, our findings extend recent insights on the institutional consequences of individuals' attempts to understand, categorize and frame novel events (Voronov and Yorks, 2015). Our study found that the interplay between logics and risk explained the ac-

tions of both medically qualified and medically unqualified professionals during global health crises. Future research could examine the applicability of our model in other extreme events, such as natural disasters and cyber-attacks, and to the experiences of other types of occupational actors with varied abilities, confidence and experience in assessing and accepting ordinary and extraordinary risks.

Second, we extend the literature in management knowledge and education by theorizing the actions of management educators in identifying and navigating the risk burden of classroom teaching. Extending scholarship on how COVID-19 impacted management education in British universities (Beech and Anseel, 2020; Brammer and Clark, 2020) and internationally (Greenberg and Hibbert, 2020), our empirical case opens up the 'black box' of frontline risk in classroom teaching. This has been remarkably under-theorized and under-examined empirically, with the exception of research into psychological harm to students and/or educators arising from, for example, shadow-sides of groupwork and experiential learning in class (Bacon and Stewart, 2019; Morgan and Stewart, 2019; Wright *et al.*, 2018), and teaching after extreme events such as 9/11 (Greenberg, Clair and Maclean, 2007), along with mostly descriptive accounts of dealing with violent or aggressive students (Bergman, Westerman and Daly, 2010; Edwards, Martin and Ashkanasy, 2021).

Our findings and model advance new insights by focusing attention on risks of physical harm in classrooms and on how, when and why management educators apprehend these risks as ordinary or extraordinary to their normal teaching role. Extending research that shows that universities and business schools are characterized by state, managerial and professional logics (Alajoutsijarvi, Juusola and Lamerg, 2014; Cai and Mountford, 2022; Juusola, 2023), our findings reveal how these typified 'constellations' (Goodrick and Reay, 2011) of logics become disrupted during extreme events as individual management educators perceive themselves being 'at risk' of harm during frontline teaching. Our study reveals how individual-level variations in risk assessments as ordinary or extraordinary are rooted in logics and how management educators draw on logics to judge the adequacy or inadequacy of a university's risk mitigation practices in keeping them safe from harm in classrooms. Risks associated with an extreme event, such as pandemic, can induce management educators to construct compatibility, contestation and rejection among logics they previously accepted as legitimate for organizing their teaching and learning practices. Our study suggests that this can enable or constrain how management educators engage with students to support learning, and we invite future research to examine these processes and outcomes in more depth.

Finally, we make a third contribution through our study's practical implications. Our study suggests that at the individual level, management educators should reflect on how risk and logics are influencing what and how they teach, including their preferences for delivery modes (face-to-face versus online) and the spatial tactics they adopt when interacting with students in physical spaces (Huang, Wright and Middleton, 2022). They should also buttress their knowledge and competencies in pedagogical theory and practice with adaptive competencies needed to (1) identify and evaluate ordinary and extraordinary risks for the self and students in classroom situations, and (2) develop responses that support students' access to learning while maintaining safety through adequate risk mitigation. In doing so, management educators may be better able to deploy multiple logics in compatible ways to creatively and safely adapt teaching and learning practices with students during extreme events (Wright *et al.*, 2013). At the organizational level, business schools can support frontline educators in these endeavours through targeted investments in training, resourcing and communication to help identify ordinary and extraordinary risks, inform adequate risk mitigation, and deploy logics in more compatible ways during extreme events. We encourage more research to investigate these important practical issues for management education.

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